



Politics and Economy

Transformation of Identities and Historical Memories in Ukraine after the Euromaidan: National, Regional, Local Dimensions

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Since the Euromaidan debates around shifts in nationality and belonging continue to dominate the media agenda in Ukraine. The post-Euromaidan search for new commemoration practices with a simultaneous attempt to sweep away the Soviet past — which resulted, first, in the massive dismantlement of Lenin statues (Leninapad) and later in the passing by parliament (Rada) of controversial decommunization laws — launched another powerful wave of discussions in the media. At the same time relatively little work has been undertaken to analyze the transformations of identities in connection with historical memories adopting a comparative cross-regional perspective in Ukrainian social studies.

METHODOLOGY

Current sociological and political science studies on Ukraine (both in Ukraine and abroad) are limited by available resources (the size of a survey's sample) and, as a rule, have no choice but to group the largest Ukrainian administrative units (oblasts) into four macro-regions (East, West, South and Center). Due to the specifics of sampling procedures, the majority of sociological surveys recently conducted in Ukraine can only grasp regional differences at the level of macro-regions and thus provide very little information about local communities in each oblast. The average nationwide sample is N=1800-2000. As Ukraine consists of 27 administrative units (24 oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, plus two cities with special status, Kyiv and Sevastopol), researchers have to combine several oblasts into a larger unit – a macro region — to be able to compare data at a statistically significant level. Such studies unavoidably level differences among oblasts included in one or another of the macro-region and stress differences among macro-regions. As a result, they contribute to the formation of stereotypic images of Ukrainian regional divisions rather than help to reconsider Ukrainian regionalism and map more precisely Ukrainian cultural identities and political loyalties.

Studies that make use of representative samples of residents of Ukraine on a level of analysis other than the typical four macro-regions (which often are reduced to two: East and West) must involve a much larger number of respondents. The project “Region, Nation, and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconsideration of Ukraine” was aimed to overcome this stereotypical four-region scheme and to test the veracity of the East-West dichotomy in a much more nuanced way. Its team managed to collect an absolutely unique quantitative and qualitative data set.

Its quantitative part consisted of surveys conducted in March 2013 and funded by the Swiss National Foundation. The 2013 survey appeared to be a snapshot of Ukrainian society just before the tectonic upheavals that happened after November 2013. The project team was fortunate to capture the situation just half a year before the beginning of mass

protests. The feeling, however, was that the very detailed picture of yesterday's Ukraine might either be very different from the current state of Ukrainian society, as claimed in public and media discourse, or might preserve the same basic characteristics, which could be an unexpected and thus very interesting result. In March 2015 the project team had a unique possibility to conduct a follow-up survey, thanks to a generous support of the **Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation**). This second survey allowed for a complex comparative analysis of Ukrainian society before and after the revolutionary events, with a specific focus on identities, attitudes towards the future development of Ukraine, historical memory, reading preferences, attitudes to language policies, level of religious practices, civil activism, democratic values and anti-corruption attitudes. This paper focuses on two of these issues: national identity and historical memory.

Most important for the project was to assure a much larger than average sample. Both surveys had the country-wide sample, with representative profiles with respect to age, education and the size of population concentration (from villages to cities over one million).¹ Moreover, as the number of respondents was so high (N=6000), it became possible to draw conclusions on lower levels of analysis, especially at the level of oblasts (provinces). *The target audience of the research was the entire population of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The survey method used in this research was face-to-face personal formalized interview based on standard questionnaire.*

Quantitative studies exploring identities in Ukraine tend to employ two different methodological approaches. The most widely used is the one in which a researcher creates a list of pre-selected identity markers and measures the level of respondents' attitudes to them (Makeev and Patrakova 2004; Hrytsak, Portnov, and Susak 2007). Sometimes additional opinion statements supplement these questions. The main advantage of using this approach is that variables can be used in a more sophisticated statistical modeling. But its main disadvantage is that researchers unavoidably are confronted with the bias of a pre-defined list (when a scholar decides arbitrarily which markers are included and which are left out on the basis of his/her own experience and scientific background). The other problem is that the closed-answer measures give respondents the possibility to answer a question even if they know nothing about the subject on which they have been tested or do not have any particular opinion. The reason behind such a behavior might be that they do not want to reveal their lack of knowledge/attitude about the issue in the question. As a result, the collected data provide little evidence whether those pre-selected markers are really viewed by respondents as essential to their identity or not.

One might also question the choice of markers. Most academic work on national identities carried out in Ukraine during the last two decades often used a very short list

¹ In March 2015, for safety reasons (both for interviewers and respondents), the survey was not conducted in occupied Crimea and in the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts not controlled by the Ukrainian army.

of markers representing a combination of “objective” (language, ethnic origin, physical appearance) and “subjective” (“feel X”, “respect Ukrainian law”) markers (Ruchka 2002; Stehniĭ 2007). In our opinion, a missing element is a pro-active citizenship position, when acting for the good of a nation makes someone a proud member of the community without relating to his/her ethnic origin or language. All those experiences were actualized during the Euromaidan, after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of armed conflict in Donbas. Consequently, I proposed to add to our survey several markers unfolding the importance of citizenship practices to Ukrainian identity.

Finally, as Michael Skey rightly pointed out, recent studies on national belonging and identity tend to focus either on marginal groups (like national minorities) or on a general macro-level analysis. They give us little understanding of how and why “national forms of identification, imagination and organization might matter to different people and, in particular, those who form part of the dominant group within a given nation” (Skey 2011, 4).

The combination of quantitative data with in-depth interviews, used in our project as a main strategy, give researchers a chance not only to discover additional explanations with the help of the general trends of quantitative data, but also to go beyond the measures of common support (or non-support) of certain attitudes, and analyze how respondents understand and articulate their national belonging, and what meanings they attribute to it.

The quantitative part of the project was supplemented by over five hundred semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in each oblast of Ukraine (sampling the provincial capital, small towns and villages, as well as gender, age and main nationality groups). Their main focus was on identities, as well as on how the historical past is experienced by Ukrainians at a personal level in local (urban/rural) spaces and reproduced in their everyday practices. The interview guide included also a projective drawing of city/village, which gave us yet another dimension of analysis. In addition to above-mentioned interviews, I participated in two other qualitative research projects focusing on Ukrainian refugees where identity issues were also prominent.² Over 140 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Ukrainian refugees choosing different directions of their resettlement were collected in two waves of research in 2014 and 2016. Due to the constraints of the paper I will have a limited chance to comment on the qualitative part of the research, but this data will be used in my future publications to create a more complex picture of the transformation of identities in Ukraine after the Euromaidan.

2 The first project, comprised of “Present Ukrainian Refugees: Main Reasons, Strategies of 2015 Resettlement, Difficulties of Adaptation” (Lviv-Kyiv-Kharkiv-Odesa-Dnipropetrovsk) and “Homo Militants,” was funded by the British Embassy and the Ukrainian Peacekeeping School. The second project, called “Displaced Cultural Spaces: Current Ukrainian Refugees,” is part of the international project “Cultural Contact Zones,” carried out by the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe at the University of St. Gallen.

In my paper I intend to discuss the regional dimensions of identity and historical memory shifts in Ukraine. For this purpose I will employ another important exploratory analytical tool of our inquiry - the GIS map, which allows us to generate a profile of a particular geographical unit (*oblast* of Ukraine in our case). The maps and profiles of different oblasts of Ukraine will be used in the comparative cross-regional analysis of respondents' identities and attitudes to the past. I will be able to answer the question as to whether nationality identity and historical memory follow clear-cut macro-regional divisions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.

I will first analyze the strength and hierarchical position of national identity among other social identities and shifts that occurred between 2013 and 2015 in Ukraine in general and among different national groups or regions in particular. I will then examine the structure of national identity, as well as different modes of understanding of national belonging. I will also discuss whether there are any regional differences in support of each mode.

In the second part of my paper, I will discuss changes that happened to the attitudes of Ukrainians regarding the past after the Euromaidan, focusing on issues that were the most controversial in public debates and served as important political mobilization instruments – among them, the 1932-1933 Holodomor, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the “war of monuments.

National Identification

In the following section, based on the collected data, I will reconstruct the structure and possible shift of identities that happened in Ukraine after the Euromaidan. Taking into account the unusual circumstances - revolution, annexation of territories and military conflict, propaganda war — one would expect visible shifts toward radicalization of attitudes.

I will begin my analysis with a comparative examination of cross-regional divisions in respondents' self-description according to nationality (*natsional'nist'*) and native language (*ridna mova*). **Table 1** presents the percentage of respondents in each oblast who were asked described themselves as Ukrainians or Russians in 2013 and 2015.

TABLE 1 RESPONDENT'S SELF-IDENTIFICATION BY NATIONALITY (IN %)

OBLAST UKRAINIAN	2013		2015	
	RUSSIAN	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN	
Cherkasy	96.0	4.0	95.0	3.0
Chernihiv	99.3	0.7	97.1	1.8
Chernivtsi	70.5	3.6	81.9	3.6
Crimea	28.4	57.6	-	-
Dnipropetrovsk	87.8	10.9	85.5	10.5
Donetsk	75.4	20.6	69.2	17.6
Ivano-Frankivs'k	98.9	0.6	97.2	0.0%
Kharkiv	79.8	18.8	85.5	10.6
Kherson	83.5	13.7	85.1	13.1
Khmel'nyts'kyi	98.2	0.0	93.6	2.5
Kyïv (City)	91.5	6.8	91.3	6.7
Kyïv (Oblast)	95.4	3.3	91.5	7.4
Kirovohrad	96.2	3.1	91.0	7.1
L'viv	97.6	2.1	95.4	2.0
Luhans'k	63.0	35.3	77.8	15.6
Mykolaïv	80.4	15.0	85.3	10.9
Odesa	67.4	20.9	74.2	13.2
Poltava	93.4	4.6	92.7	3.9
Rivne	99.3	0.7	89.9	3.0
Sumy	94.9	4.5	95.1	3.8
Ternopil'	99.3	0.7	92.2	2.4
Vinnitsa	98.6	0.5	90.3	2.7
Volyn'	93.1	3.8	94.5	1.6
Zakarpattia	96.9	1.9	92.2	3.2
Zaporizhzhia	74.9	23.0	84.9	12.3
Zhytomyr	95.5	2.6	92.9	3.6
Total	83.9	12.9	88.6	6.9

What we see is that in contrast with prevailing views, in 2013 in all oblasts of Ukraine (including Donbas) the percentage of respondents who self-identified as Ukrainians was close to 70% and higher. The only exception was Crimea. Second, we do not see any radical shifts in respondents' self-attribution as Ukrainians or Russians in 2015. However,

some changes took place in the West, South, East and in Donbas (namely in Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk oblasts).³

Table 2 provides the percentage of respondents describing their native language as Russian or Ukrainian. A question menu also included other choices, such as “both languages,” “surzhyk,” “other nationality,” “Ukrainian and other nationality,” and “Russian and other nationality.” With the exception of the bilingual option, which both was supported by a quarter of respondents (24,3% in 2013 and 25,4% in 2015), other options had very small number of supporters.

TABLE 2 RESPONDENT’S NATIVE LANGUAGE (IN %)

OBLAST UKRAINIAN	2013		2015	
	RUSSIAN	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN	
Cherkasy	84.7	5.3	82.4	4.0
Chernihiv	50.7	4.9	62.0	0.6
Chernivtsi	89.9	7.6	90.1	1.7
Crimea	8.9	74.7	-	
Dnipropetrovsk	40.4	26.5	42.1	14.3
Donetsk	11.3	49.4	6.3	39.7
Ivano-Frankivsk	99.4	0.6	99.1	
Kharkiv	17.5	39.0	12.6	38.1
Kherson	47.9	16.4	53.8	7.0
Khmel’nyts’kyi	87.9	1.2	92.0	1.5
Kyiv (City)	66.9	9.3	66.0	7.9
Kyiv (Oblast)	84.5	4.6	68.7	7.9
Kirovohrad	40.0	6.4	69.6	5.4
L’viv	96.4	2.1	97.1	0.8
Luhans’k	4.3	57.9	17.5	30.0
Mykolaiv	19.0	40.1	22.8	24.4
Odesa	25.1	35.5	15.3	34.3
Poltava	71.6	11.9	78.0	4.9
Rivne	97.1	0.7	91.9	2.5
Sumy	56.6	5.5	71.0	3.7
Ternopil’	98.6	0.7	98.8	0
Vinnytsia	92.8	1.3	94.9	1.7

3 Although the changes in the later one should rather be attributed to changes in sampling itself, since survey was conducted only on territories controlled by the Ukrainian army, which are mostly rural areas.

Volyn'	89.3	5.6	92.6	1.2
Zakarpattia	95.3	0.8	99.3	0.7
Zaporizhzhia	19.8	33.3	39.4	18.6
Zhytomyr	84.8	2.4	89.7	2.1
Total	53.4	22.3	63.1	11.5

Comparing these two years one can notice that the attribution of Ukrainian language as a native language slightly increased, although in the majority of oblasts the situation has remained fairly stable. One could rather speak about a few outliers (which actually go in both directions – increase and decrease in calling Ukrainian as a native language). We observe more dynamics in the attribution of Russian as a native language. At the same time, one should take into consideration that the most important changes occurred in the oblasts bordering the Donbas conflict zone. This might be a sign that respondents' willingness to name Russian as their native language was influenced by the war. One possible explanation might be that because in Russian propaganda the presence of Russian-speaking population was used as a pretext for military intervention in Donbas, respondents were afraid that by expressing their Russian-language preference the war might be extended to their territory.

The simple measurement of respondents' self-identification, however, tells us nothing about the strength or importance of this identification at the personal level. An individual might self-categorize as X by nationality, but in everyday life feel very little attachment to that identity or, by contrast, it might be the most important dimension for him/her. To understand the place national identity possesses among other possible social and territorial identities for Ukrainian citizens who live in different regions, respondents were asked to measure the importance of 14 prelisted identities on a 5-point scale, where 1 is definitely not important and 5 very important. To avoid overloading with data in my paper I will focus only on 6 territorial identities – local, regional, Ukrainian, Russian, East Slav and European. **Table 3** presents a comparison of mean values for each listed identity in 2013 and 2015. In addition, I computed for 2013 survey mean values of listed identities excluding Crimea, to make our comparison more accurate.⁴

TABLE 3 MEAN VALUE OF MEASURED TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES: 2013-2015

	2013	2013 (EXCLUDING CRIMEA)	2015
Local	4,4	(4,4)	4,5
Regional	4,4	(4,4)	4,5

⁴ One should bear in mind that in 2015 also not all parts of Donbas were covered by our survey, but it is much more difficult to exclude them from the 2013 sample to make our comparison even more accurate.

Ukrainian	4,3	(4,4)	4,5
Russian	2,1	(2,0)	1,6
East Slav	2,7	(2,7)	2,7
European	2,7	(2,8)	2,9

As previously mentioned, media and political discourses have claimed that following the 2013-14 protests, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, the identity of Ukrainian citizens has significantly changed - mainly giving greater importance to European and Ukrainian identity (both supposedly became stronger). The comparison of the 2013 and 2015 data, however, demonstrates, that Ukrainian and European identities increased only slightly. Even though the Euromaidan's main objective was for Ukraine to join the EU, the pro-European sentiment did not strengthen dramatically on a mass scale, though there has been a shift in respondents' political orientations from supporting a union with Russia towards backing one with the EU (Piaskovs'ka 2016; Reityng 2016). The greatest change concerned attitudes to Russian identity, but it might partially be attributed to the exclusion from our sampling of a part of Donbass as well as to respondents unwillingness to reveal openly their Russian identity. When we compare the regional distribution of respondent support for East Slav and European identities, we do not see dramatic regional differences.

Another interesting aspect in the analysis of national belonging would be to compare whether and to what extent respondents who self-identified as Russians feel that Ukrainian identity is also important to them and vice versa. **Tables 4 and 5** illustrate the regional distribution of respondents attitudes to Ukrainian and Russian identity in 2013 and 2015 according to their self-identification as Russian or Ukrainian.

TABLE 4 MEAN VALUE OF UKRAINIAN/RUSSIAN IDENTITY IMPORTANCE FOR RESPONDENTS, WHO SELF-DESCRIBED AS RUSSIAN OR UKRAINIAN (2013)

OBLAST 2013	UKRAINIAN IDENTITY		RUSSIAN IDENTITY	
	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN
Cherkasy	4.4311	2.7143	1.5210	3.8571
Chernihiv	4.6014	5.0000	2.2568	2.0000
Chernivtsi	4.4557	3.2500	1.5570	3.7500
Crimea	4.3944	3.4167	3.1127	4.3472
Dnipropetrovsk	4.4832	2.9167	2.0982	4.4792
Donetsk	4.3610	2.8783	2.5558	4.2261
Ivano-Frankivsk	4.7684	1.0000	1.1356	5.0000

Kharkiv	4.5000	3.0735	2.1875	4.2647
Kherson	4.6379	2.5789	1.7069	4.4737
Khmel'nyts'kyi	4.7073	-	1.4756	-
Kyiv (City)	4.5975	3.5833	1.5851	4.1667
Kyiv (Oblast)	4.5739	3.3750	1.5565	3.1250
Kirovohrad	4.7460	1.7500	1.1746	4.7500
L'viv	4.7895	3.2857	1.1455	3.1429
Luhans'k	4.0054	3.0485	2.9457	4.0000
Mykolaiv	4.6016	3.3913	1.8537	3.8261
Odesa	4.4138	2.6508	2.3153	4.4444
Poltava	4.4208	2.8889	1.6667	4.1111
Rivne	4.5352	5.0000	1.4859	4.0000
Sumy	4.3784	3.2857	2.0743	3.2857
Ternopil'	4.7972	2.0000	1.0979	4.0000
Zakarpattia	4.5649	3.6667	1.3896	2.0000
Vinnytsia	4.8246	2.0000	1.2938	5.0000
Volyn'	4.8512	4.0000	1.2645	4.2000
Zaporizhzhia	4.5330	3.0536	2.0769	3.9643
Zhytomyr	4.5101	3.5000	1.5705	2.2500
Total	4.5491	3.0928	1.8055	4.2026

TABLE 5 MEAN VALUE OF UKRAINIAN/RUSSIAN IDENTITY IMPORTANCE FOR RESPONDENTS, WHO SELF-DESCRIBED AS RUSSIAN OR UKRAINIAN (2015)

OBLAST 2015	UKRAINIAN		RUSSIAN	
	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN	UKRAINIAN	RUSSIAN
Cherkasy	4.6335	3.8333	1.1623	3.1667
Chernihiv	4.4940	3.3333	1.3855	3.0000
Chernivtsi	4.6372	4.2000	1.1681	4.0000
Crimea	4.6130	3.6364	1.7204	4.1273
Dnipropetrovsk	4.1561	2.7955	2.2486	4.0227
Donetsk	4.8195	-	1.0439	-
Ivano-Frankivsk	4.4312	3.1489	1.9497	3.9362
Kharkiv	4.4545	3.0455	1.4406	3.6818
Kherson	4.8377	4.4000	1.1309	2.2000
Khmel'nyts'kyi	4.7251	3.7667	1.4039	3.3333
Kyiv (City)	4.7368	2.7000	1.2955	4.3500

Kyiv (Oblast)	4.2887	3.2727	1.3380	3.2727
Kirovohrad	4.7748	3.1250	1.1099	3.6250
L'viv	4.4286	2.4286	1.5714	4.8571
Luhans'k	4.7134	4.0000	1.8599	4.3500
Mykolaïv	4.3297	3.2245	1.9783	3.8367
Odesa	4.4120	3.4444	1.7454	3.3333
Poltava	4.6908	4.4000	1.2697	2.0000
Rivne	4.5632	3.5714	1.4770	4.1429
Sumy	4.8039	3.2500	1.0588	3.2500
Ternopil'	4.8084	3.6000	1.1078	4.6000
Zakarpattia	4.8159	4.0000	1.1967	3.5000
Vinnytsia	4.6831	4.8000	1.1831	1.6000
Volyn'	4.7025	2.6857	1.3223	4.0286
Zaporizhzhia	4.6758	4.0000	1.2143	3.2857
Total	4.6199	3.3123	1.4446	3.8281

The important outcome of the comparison is that the significance of Ukrainian identity to those who self-identified as Russians in 2013 in practically all oblasts of Ukraine was above the mean value and it became even stronger in 2015. Similarly, although not on the same scale, Russian identity was and still remains somewhat important to those respondents who self-categorized as Ukrainians. Therefore, Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine are not two separate national groups, but mutually strongly intertwined and mutually inclusive groups with blurred lines of group boundary. This result has one important implication – it gives us very different perspective to that presented by the Russian media and political discourse on processes of identity building that were taking place in Donbass region before the outbreak of the armed conflict. In terms of national self-identification and support for Ukrainian identity, the absolute majority of the inhabitants of Donbas saw themselves as a part of Ukrainian political project.

Most academic work on national identities carried out in Ukraine during the last two decades focused primary on the opposition between “ethnic/cultural” and “political” type of nationalism, often stereotypically attributing the East-West cleavage in Ukraine to the fact that first type dominates one region and the second the other region.

Table 6 ranks the importance attributed by Ukrainian citizens to each of the listed markers of national identity (representing “ethnic/cultural” or “political” types of nationalism) and compare outcomes of 2013 and 2015. All markers were measured on a 5-point scale (from 1 – completely not important, to 5 – very important).

TABLE 6 RANKING OF MEAN VALUES FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY MARKERS

	2013	2015
To feel Ukrainian	4,3	4,5
To respect Ukrainian political institutions and law	4,1	4,3
To respect Ukrainian traditions	-	4,3
To be ready to defend Ukraine in case of threat to its sovereignty or unity	-	4,3
To help compatriots	-	4,3
To take active part in civic life	-	4,0
To consider Ukrainian all citizens independent of their ethnic origin	-	4,0
To have Ukrainian citizenship	3,9	3,9
To live in Ukraine all your life	3,9	3,7
To speak Ukrainian	3,8	3,7
To have Ukrainian origin	3,8	3,6
To be born in Ukraine	3,7	3,5

In comparing the 2013 and 2015 rankings, we observe that the markers representing the “political/civic” type of national affiliation are more important to Ukrainians than those representing the “ethnic/cultural” type. Moreover, in 2015 the first group of markers (“political/civil” type of national identification) appeared to be increasingly gaining its importance and the last one was further losing its position. Consequently, we can conclude that contrary to the picture described by the Russian propaganda, Euromaidan and the further tragic events have had a positive impact on strengthening the political nation in Ukraine, and downplayed ethnocentric attitudes. One can also notice that markers emphasizing the importance of citizenship practices to Ukrainian identity (the component of national belonging, which was added in 2015) appeared to be highly important and relevant to the respondents.

To reveal possible latent patterns in respondent understanding of national identities we computed a factor analysis of 12 previously mentioned identity markers.⁵ Two factors were extracted, which can be attributed to the two different understandings of national belonging - “political/civic nationalism” and “ethnic/cultural nationalism” (*see Table 7*).⁶

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⁵ The 2015 survey data was used for the analysis.

⁶ Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. The rotation converged in 3 iterations. KMO=0.892, r=50%, Sign.= .000.

TABLE 7 FACTOR MATRIX

IDENTITY MARKERS	FACTOR	
	POLITICAL/CIVIC NATIONALISM	ETHNIC/CULTURAL NATIONALISM
To be born in Ukraine		.826
To live in Ukraine all your life		.782
To have Ukrainian citizenship		.748
To have Ukrainian origin		.632
To speak Ukrainian		.620
To take active part in civic life of the country	.647	
To respect Ukrainian political institutions and law	.599	
To respect Ukrainian traditions	.684	
To be ready to defend Ukraine in case of threat to its sovereignty or unity	.710	
To feel Ukrainian	.636	
To help you compatriots	.763	
To consider Ukrainian all citizens independent of their ethnic origin	.508	

By saving both factors as separate variables and comparing factor means for each oblast of Ukraine we can test the presumption that “ethnic/cultural” and “political” types of national identification are prevailing in different parts of Ukraine and can be attributed to the West-East split in Ukraine, where Western Ukraine demonstrates predominantly ethnic type of national identification and Eastern – political. The **Table 8** illustrates the mean value of each factor for each oblast of Ukraine.

TABLE 8 REGIONAL DIVISION OF FACTORS' MEAN VALUES

OBLAST	ETHNIC_NAT	POLITICAL_NAT
Cherkasy	.4075404	.1169454
Chernihiv	.2199276	.3152972
Chernivtsi	-.0399615	.1662079
Crimea	-.0255503	.0199056
Dnipropetrovsk	-.4514559	-.6096573
Donetsk	.3194253	.1202880
Ivano-Frankivsk	-.1805819	-.4967993
Kharkiv	.2962687	-.1147263

Kherson	.2248981	.3324490
Khmel'nyts'kyi	-.0059567	.0989794
Kyiv (City)	.0896083	.1559308
Kyiv (Oblast)	-.0193922	-.3323543
Kirovohrad	.4541094	.3628711
L'viv	-.2391561	-.6323452
Luhans'k	-.3305877	.1954264
Mykolaiv	-.5212555	-.2087149
Odesa	.4575049	-.2021127
Poltava	-.0644966	.1803031
Rivne	.0700131	.0511250
Sumy	.2940117	.1828030
Ternopil'	.2081729	-.0448924
Zakarpattia	-.1525802	.2451932
Vinnitsia	.2433545	-.2024868
Volyn'	-.7751293	.2139529
Zaporizhzhia	.1284544	-.1915783

Ukraine's East-West dichotomy is often presented as a stereotypical split between ethnic and political nationalism. Yet our cross-regional comparison demonstrated that divisions between political and ethnic nationalism often run within regions than between them. Even more importantly, what we see that the borders between two major ethnic groups in Ukraine - Ukrainians and Russians, are often blurred and their national identifications are multi-layered and partially intertwined, although some regional variations persist.

Analyzing quantitative data one should bear in mind that answers to the questions present a simplified reality, which does not take into account all possible inconsistencies and ambivalences of how people are thinking and describing themselves in national terms. To give an example from one of our in-depth interviews, conducted in 2013 in Transcarpathia:

"I. From your point of view, according to which lines or groups would you split dwellers of your city?"

R: Groups? There is group of *rusyns*... if you take by national, not national but historical traditions. There representatives of Hungarian nation, there is Russian speaking group, there are Ukrainians. Hm... there are not many pureblood Ukrainians here, but... More *rusyns* here. My father was *rusyn* and I also belong to *rusyn* group. Before war my grandparents were here. Grandfather was local county doctor and grandmother did not work.

[...]

I: Are there any groups that are socially superior?

R: Hm... I do not know, I think that Russian speaking inhabitants are a little bit... more esteemed. May be because I belong to Russian speaking group...

[...]

I: What is your nationality?

R: Ukrainian.

I: What does it mean to you to be Ukrainian?

R: To live in Ukraine, to speak Ukrainian. Nationality is passed on by the father. Father Ukrainian – and it goes... Where are you born - that is your nationality.”

This in-depth interview demonstrates how many more multi-layer and nuanced might be individual's understanding of her/his national belonging. It is important to complement quantitative data with qualitative research.

Our analysis demonstrated that Euromaidan and following events had their impact on Ukrainians' national identities and in the following part I will examine whether it had a similar effect on Ukrainians' attitudes towards history.


HISTORICAL MEMORY

I will not be able to analyze all structural elements of the historical memory included into our survey (namely – holidays, historical figures and event as well as commemorative practices) and all questions designed to describe them. Instead, I will focus on several issues, which caused most controversies in public debates and served as important political mobilization instruments – among them the 1932-1933 Holodomor, attitude to UPA and “war of monuments”.


First, I will test the impact of impact of Viktor Yushchenko's public campaign focusing on Famine on the memory shaping processes. If one looks at level of importance attributed by the respondents to the Famine one can see that it is taken as an important but definitely not as the central historical event (with its 6th position in the rating in 2013 and 9th in 2015 out of 16 listed historical events). At the same time Yushchenko's campaign did succeed in making some inroads in public opinion. Data show that, when respondents were asked directly about their attitudes towards the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, an overwhelming majority (in 2013 - 70,5% and in 2015 – 78%) gave a positive response.

If one looks at regional distribution of respondents' attitudes, one can see a quite clear regional pattern (*see Map⁷ 1*): Galicia, Volhynia and the some parts of Central Ukraine demonstrate the strongest support for the statement that the Holodomor was a genocide; at the same time, Donbas together with Kharkiv, Odessa, Kirovograd and Mykolaiv oblasts show the weakest support. The **Map 2** presents the total direct Famine losses in Ukraine by region in 1932-33.⁸

MAP 1 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS' SUPPORT OF THE FAMINE AS GENOCIDE (2015)



MAP 2 THE TOTAL DIRECT FAMINE LOSSES IN UKRAINE BY REGION IN 1932-33.



- 7 All credentials to the maps based on the 2013 survey to Maria Lewicka (WarsawUniversity), all 2015 survey maps were produced by Viktoriya Sereda as a part of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute's MAPA project
- 8 For more details see: HURI's "Harvard Holodomor project" <http://harvard-cga.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=348774c75d8043fc8e68b2682dbcfe25>.

What is striking about the comparison of those maps is that we observe here two were distinct phenomena. For one side the recognition of Famine is very strong in those oblasts, which did not experience it at all, because they belonged at that time to a different state such as Galicia, Transcarpathia and Volhynia. This demonstrates that for the inhabitants of those oblasts the event is strongly connected to the national myth rather than to living memory. At the same time, the other group of oblasts, where respondents strongly agree that 1932-33 Famine should be recognized as a genocide, which had highest death rates in 1932-33, so here it possible might be attributed to a living post-memory.


At the same time, one should take into consideration the limits of historical memory malleability affected by institutional and individual factors. Such division also corresponds to the regional media discourses, which were instrumentalized by local political elites to oppose the attempts of Yushchenko government to impose certain representations of the past (Sereda, Mazuryk 2013). The central government proposes certain initiatives. However, local elites in cooperation with local communities have many instruments to undermine or completely reject them. In Kharkiv and Odessa oblasts these strategies of resistance went as far as to vandalize the Holodomor commemorative monuments.

If we look at the socio-demographic profile of respondents who supported the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide the strongest predictors are language⁹ (Ukrainian speaking 86,3% / 89,2%, bilingual - 59,7% / 67,2% and Russian speaking 46,3% / 49,8% only), nationality (Ukrainians 75% / 80,2%, Russians 45% / 56,4%), level of religiosity (visit church every week 84,3% 91,7%, never go to church 59,1% / 62,2%) and belonging to a certain church (Greek Catholic believers 96,5% / 98,4%, Roman Catholic and Autocephalous 86% / 90,6%, Orthodox Kyivan Patriarchate 85% 88,3%, Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate 58% / 68,4%). Less critical influence was exerted by such factors as higher education, age (middle age), respondents' place of residence (village or smaller city).

During the last two decades in Ukraine the question of the recognition of OUN-UPA as independence fighters was another hotly debated issue. Therefore this issues was also included in our survey. Respondents were asked to assess their support for the recognition of the OUN-UPA as fighters for Ukraine's independence on the 5-point scale (where 1 – means support and 5 – absence of support). Unlike the attitude towards the Famine, in this question we see a great shift from non-supporting majority in 2013 to a minority in 2015. In 2013 only 1/3 of respondents (32,5%) supported recognition, and 47,5% were against, another 20% were indecisive. In 2015 situation reversed – 45,1% of respondents supported recognition, 29,6% were against and 25,3% were indecisive.

.....
9 Here and further numbers represent first 2013 and after a slash - 2015 survey.

If one compares this result with the regional distribution of respondents' attitudes (see *Maps 3a and 3b*), one may notice that if OUN-UPA support in 2013 (the lighter color is - the stronger support and vice versa) was limited mainly to Galicia and Volhynia', in 2015 the strongest support zone is still there, but it is gradually gaining its way in the Central and Southern Ukraine.



Support for the OUN-UPA is stronger among the young (young 34,6%, old 28,6% - almost same in 2015), well-educated (higher education 36%, primary 26% almost same in 2015), and richer people (good material condition 48%, bad 25% almost same in 2015). It is also stronger in a big city, but smaller 1 000 000 and in the countryside.


At the same time the main distinctions are found along national and religious lines although in 2015 they started to soften (Ukrainians 37% (34% in 2015) vs Russians 7,3% (9,9% in 2015), Ukrainian speaking 51% (45,6% in 2015) vs Russian speaking 7,3% (6,1%), Greek Catholic 90,5% (84,2% in 2015), Ukrainian Autocephalous 62,5% (47,6% in 2015), Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate 45% (40,4% in 2015) and Roman Catholic 43% (45,3% in 2015) vs Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate 22% (same in 2015), those who go to church once a week 66% (60% in 2015) vs those who never attend church 22% (16,5% in 2015)).

In the following part I will look at the respondents' reaction on the ongoing processes of symbolic (re)articulation of urban/rural landscapes in Ukraine. Many experts agree that Ukrainian society does not have an integrated commemorative space. These conflicting places of memory often remain at the level of peaceful coexistence, but in some instances, especially during electoral campaigns or revolutions, they might give rise to open conflict, frequently referred to as the "war of monuments." In spite of a stereotypical perception, these symbolic memory battles take place not only on an inter-regional


level but, more often, within the same urban or rural spaces (Portnov 2008). After the Euromaidan, which among other commemorative practices also launched a “Leninofall” and after the decommunisation laws, the whole context for the symbolic demarcation of public spaces changed. However, our second wave of survey was conducted just one month prior to the acceptance of decommunisation laws, so respondents’ opinion was not yet affected by debates this new law provoked.

As everywhere, in Ukraine the naming of streets and squares has played one of the crucial roles in symbolic codification of an urban space (Hrytsak, Susak 2003; Sereda 2012, Sereda, Mazuryk 2013, Sereda 2014). (Re)naming requires much less labor and fewer resources than erection of a monument; at the same time, street names are well embedded in everyday practices of urban dwellers who find themselves recurrently referring to street names, when filling out bureaucratic forms, asking a bus driver to stop at some place, explaining a location, etc. At the same time, as some studies and media maps (www.texty.org.ua) illustrate, the process of street renaming in Ukraine has had a rather limited scope affecting a restricted number of settlements.

In our 2013 survey we examined Ukrainians’ attitudes to street renaming processes. Respondents were asked to assess their opinion about street renaming both in their settlement and in other cities of Ukraine on a 5-point scale (1 – strongly support, 5- completely disagree). One may note a generally negative attitude to the process of street renaming (both at the level of local community and at the all-Ukrainian level) that unites inhabitants of Ukraine irrespectively of their regional location (*see maps 4a and 4b*). Practically everywhere, their answers cluster around the positions – “neither yes, nor no” or “partially disagree”, with a slight tendency of the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Chernihiv oblasts to lean closer to the first option and inhabitants of the Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad oblasts and Donbass - to the second, but difference between respondents’ opinions is ranging between 3.0 and 4.2 (two extremes). Analysis of social-demographic characteristics of both groups reveals that out of 10 social-demographic factors the main predictor of such leaning is the Ukrainian language.



In our 2015 we decided not to repeat the question about the streets' renaming but to examine Ukrainians' attitudes the process of dismantling Lenin and other communist leaders' monuments, launched by the Euromaidan. Respondents had to assess their attitude towards these processes both in their settlement and in other cities of Ukraine on a 5-point scale (1 – strongly support, 5- completely disagree). To our surprise, this issue appeared to be among the most dividing Ukrainian society among many question covered by our survey (*see maps 5a and 5b*). A generally negative attitude to the “Leninofall” (both at the level of local community and at the all-Ukrainian level) unites inhabitants of South and Eastern Ukraine. Practically everywhere, their answers clustered around the positions – “completely disagree” or “partially disagree”, and inhabitants of Galicia and Volhynia demonstrated a full support to the Leninofall, and Central Ukraine was in-between those two positions. The regression analysis reveals that out of 10 social-demographic factors the main predictor of such leaning is the Ukrainian language.



For deeper analysis of the respondents' attitudes towards symbolic recodification of urban/rural landscapes there were selected six most controversial historical figures who represent Ukrainian nationalist (Bandera, Mazepa) and national-democratic (Hrushevskyi), Soviet (Lenin, Stalin) and Russian Imperial (Catherine II) meta-narratives and tested the level of respondents' support for the idea of erection (or preservation, if already standing) of a monument to the listed historical personalities. The survey results make clear that in 2013 no historical figure manages to attract support over 40% (*see Table 9*). Therefore, one may conclude that none of the listed historical meta-narratives had a dominant position in Ukrainian society. Greater support of such historical figures as T. Shevchenko or B. Khmelnytskyi can rather be attributed to their simultaneous inclusion within several different models of the past (Imperial Russian, Soviet Ukrainian and nationalist Ukrainian), what was evidenced by the analysis of our in-depth interviews.

TABLE 9 PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS, WHO SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF ERECTION (OR PRESERVATION, IF ALREADY STANDING) OF A MONUMENT TO THE LISTED HISTORICAL PERSONALITIES.

	2013	2015
1. Stalin	8,1%	5,4%
2. Bandera	17,2%	26,1%
3. Hrushevsky	40,1%	48,7%
4. Mazepa	24,2%	31,5%
5. Catherine II	15,9%	14%
6. Lenin	24,8%	19%
7. Nebesna Sotnia	-	62,7%
8. ATO participants	-	70%

In 2013 among the historical figures for whom general support for the idea of erection (or preservation, if already standing) of a monument was limited was Stalin (8,1%), Catherine II (15,9%) and Bandera (17,2%). They embody three different models of the past. At the same time, this does not mean that all three figures were equally supported in all regions of Ukraine. Higher support for Stalin, Lenin and Catherine II coincides in five oblasts (Kherson (Stalin – 11%, Lenin – 41%, and Catherine II – 28%), Kharkiv (Stalin – 22%, Lenin – 34%, and Catherine II – 21%), Odesa (Stalin Lenin 41% and Catherine II), Luhansk (Stalin – 16%, Lenin – 37%, and Catherine II – 28%) and Dnipropetrovsk (Stalin – 13%, Lenin – 31% and Catherine II – 25%)). It also coincides with lower support for Bandera, Mazepa and Hrushevskyi and vice versa – strong support for Bandera, Mazepa and Hrushevskyi in Galicia (Bandera - 69-82%, Mazepa – 56-64% and Hrushevskyi – 65-80%) and Volhynia (Bandera – 34-46%, Mazepa – 40-46%, and Hrushevskyi – 62-36%)

coincides with the lowest support for Stalin, Lenin, Catherine II and their monuments. The most localized was the Bandera cult, the least localized that of Hrushevskiy (here the main exception was the Crimea with 3,9% of support for Hrushevskiy). Taking into consideration that Hrushevsky's historical image as of the first president of Ukraine was highly important for legitimization of the new Ukrainian Institute of Presidency, and his cult was actively promoted by all Presidents of Ukraine, he became a recognizable historical symbol of Ukrainian political nation.


In 2015 situation changed historical figures representing the Soviet (Lenin, Stalin) and Russian Imperial (Catherine II) meta-narratives continued to lose their positions, although this shift was not a dramatic one and historical figures representing Ukrainian nationalist (Bandera, Mazepa) to a smaller extent and national-democratic (Hrushevskiy) to much greater extent meta-narratives were gaining their positions. Although none of them yet reached at least a 50% of support.

At the same time, our research demonstrated that the Euromaidan and following military operations in the Donbas effect on Ukrainians' attitudes towards history is that for the first time, Ukraine has started to form a cult of heroes commonly accepted practically in all regions. In 8 oblasts support for Heavenly Hundred was under 50% and only in 3 under 35% (Donetska, Luhanska and Kharkivska). At the same time support for monuments to ATO soldier was below 50% only in 4 oblasts and below 35% only in two (Donetsk and Luhansk). The Heavenly Hundreds and ATO soldiers created key markers for historical identity that is shared by the majority of inhabitants - 63% of Ukraine's population supported erection of a monument to the Heavenly Hundred in their city and 70% to ATO soldiers.

Support for the Heavenly Hundreds and ATO soldier monuments is stronger among the young (young 67%, old 59% - Heavenly Hundred, young 72%, old 67% - ATO), well-educated (higher education 67%, primary 49%; higher education 72%, primary 62% - ATO), and richer people (good material condition 70%, bad 33%; good material condition 70%, bad 54% - ATO). It is also stronger in a city, smaller 1 000 000 and in the countryside. At the same time, if we look at the divisions along national and religious lines we notice some important alterations in attitudes towards monuments to Heavenly Hundred and ATO soldiers. Among those, who support Heavenly Hundred monuments those differences still are more visible (Ukrainians 66% vs Russians 33%, Ukrainian speaking 78% vs Russian speaking 28%, Greek Catholic 92%, Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate 76%, Ukrainian Autocephalous 70%, Roman Catholic 74% , Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate 52%, go to church once a week 79% vs those who never attend church 48%). And among those, who support monuments to ATO soldiers gap narrows (Ukrainians 73% vs Russians 44%, Ukrainian speaking 82% vs Russian speaking 42%, Greek Catholic 91%, Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate 81%, Ukrainian Autocephalous and Roman Catholic 70%, Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate 59%, those who go to church once a week 80% vs those who never

attend church 61%). Our data break some stereotypes. For example, Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate Church is often portrayed by media as hostile to Ukrainian soldiers and supporting separatists, but in our survey we see that majority of Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate believers support erection of the monuments to ATO soldiers.

Finally, there was found a positive correlation between the respondents' claim that they supported Euromaidan, and their support of the erection of monuments to Heavenly Hundred and ATO soldiers. Respondents, who supported Euromaidan also are more inclined to support erection (or preservation) of Bandera monument and to reject erection of Lenin statues (*see maps 6a and 6b*) although a correlation is not very strong (0.24 for Bandera and -0.13 for Lenin).



As it appears from data analysis despite all attempts at (re)codification of historical personalities within the official discourses of Ukrainian presidents, many of these figures still signify a contested terrain at the regional level, although new uniting historical figures are appearing.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the ongoing war and anti-Russian propaganda, we observed no tendency toward radicalization of ethnic nationalism or other exclusion practices at the grassroots level in Ukraine. Nor did we see any dramatic shifts in importance attributed by Ukrainian citizens to their local, regional, professional, class, age, gender or national or pro-European identities.

One of the important outcomes is that there are no clear-cut borders between two biggest ethnic groups in Ukraine. Their national identifications are multi-layered and often strongly intertwined, although there are observable regional differences (e.g. different importance of Russian identity for ethnic Ukrainians). It gives us a very different perspective to the one, currently presented by Russian media on processes of national identity building that were taking place in Donbass region prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

Our research suggests that Euromaidan and the following events (annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Donbas) launched processes of (re)articulation of national identifications, as a result we see strengthening of Ukrainian political identity and citizens' pro-active position.

The East-West dichotomy constantly reiterated in Ukrainian sociological publications as a stereotypical split between ethnic and political nationalism proved to be wrong. The cross-regional cartographic comparison demonstrated that dividing lines between political and ethnic nationalism run often within the same regions than between them.

Finally, among some visible changes, one can name consolidation of Ukrainian political identity and emergence of heroes and historical events commonly accepted in practically in all regions, which create the key markers for both national identity and historical memory.

At the same time, if along the lines of national identification citizens of Ukraine are increasingly imagining themselves as a political nation, their historical memory is still divides them.

Prior to Euromaidan Ukrainian citizens often were living in a social space filled by mutually exclusive or controversial historical symbols. Unfortunately, this plurality of symbolic markers did not stimulated much of an internal discussion about controversial issues regarding Ukraine's past, but rather fragmented local dwellers into segregated groups celebrating their own versions of the past. After the Euromaidan and the following tragic events situation started to change radically. It is important to use all possibilities for an open public discussion and to involve local civil society to moderate processes of symbolic (re)articulation of urban/rural spaces in Ukraine.

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