



# The Ukraine List #483

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[www.danyliwseminar.com](http://www.danyliwseminar.com)  
<http://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/ukraine/>

13 June 2017

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For regular postings on Ukraine and Ukrainian Studies, follow me on Twitter at @darelasn

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## #1

### New Website for the Chair of Ukrainian Studies

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The Chair of Ukrainian Studies is inaugurating a new web site with a simple URL: [www.chairukr.com](http://www.chairukr.com). The site currently contains basic current information and will be gradually developed in the coming months. Have a look!

## #2

### 13th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

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Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 16-18 November 2017  
<http://www.danyliwseminar.com>

#### CALL FOR PAPER PROPOSALS

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies, with the support of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation, will be holding its 13th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Ottawa on 16-18 November 2017. Since 2005, the Danyliw Seminar has provided an annual platform for the presentation of some of the most influential academic research on Ukraine.

The Seminar invites proposals from scholars and doctoral students—in political science, anthropology, sociology, history, law, economics and related disciplines in the social sciences and humanities—on a broad variety of topics falling under thematic clusters, such as those suggested below:

#### *Conflict*

- war/violence (combatants, civilians in wartime, DNR/LNR, Maidan)
- security (conflict resolution, Minsk Accords, OSCE, NATO, Crimea)
- nationalism (Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet, historical, far right)

#### *Reform*

- economic change (energy, corruption, oligarchies, EU free trade, foreign aid)
- governance (rule of law, elections, regionalism)
- media (TV/digital, social media, information warfare, fake news)

#### *Identity*

- history/memory (World War II, Holodomor, Soviet period, interwar, imperial)
- language, ethnicity, nation (policies and practices)
- culture and politics (cinema, literature, music, performing arts, popular culture)

#### *Society*

- migration (IDPs, refugees, migrant workers, diasporas)
- social problems (reintegration of combatants, protests, welfare, gender, education)
- state/society (citizenship, civil society, collective action/protests, human rights)

The Seminar will also be featuring panels devoted to recent/new books touching on Ukraine, as well as the screening of new documentaries followed by a discussion with filmmakers. In 2016, four book panels (Lawrence Douglas/*The Right Wrong Man*, Catherine Gousseff/*Échanger les peuples*, Serhii Plokhyy/*The Gates of Europe*, and Ioulia Shukan/*Génération Maidan*) were on the program and two films were screened (Elena Volochine/*Oleg's Choice*, Antony Butts/*DIY Country*). Information on the 2016 book panels and films can easily be accessed from the top menu of the web site. The 2017 Seminar is welcoming book panel proposals, as well as documentary proposals.

Presentations at the Seminar will be based on research papers (6,000-8,000 words) and will be made available, within hours after the panel discussions, in written and video format on the Seminar website and on social media. The Seminar will privilege intensive discussion, with relatively short presentations (12 minutes), comments by the moderator and an extensive Q&A with Seminar participants and assembled public.

People interested in presenting at the 2017 Danyliw Seminar are invited to submit a 500 word paper proposal and a 150 word biographical statement, by email attachment, to Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, at [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca) AND [chairukr@gmail.com](mailto:chairukr@gmail.com).

Please also include your full coordinates (institutional affiliation, preferred postal address, email, phone, and Twitter account [if you have one]). If applicable, indicate your latest publication or, in the case of doctoral or post-doctoral applicants, the year when you entered a doctoral program, the title of your dissertation and year of (expected) completion.

Books published between 2016 and 2018 (as long as near-final proofs are available prior to the Seminar) are eligible for consideration as a book panel proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the book, as well as the 150 word bio and full coordinates.

Films produced between 2015 and 2017 are eligible for consideration as a documentary proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the film, as well as the 150 word bio, full coordinates, and a secure web link to the film.

In addition to scholars and doctoral students, policy analysts, practitioners from non-governmental and international organizations, journalists, and artists are also welcome to send a proposal.

The proposal deadline is 28 June 2017. The Chair will cover the travel and accommodation expenses of applicants whose proposal is accepted by the Seminar. The proposals will be

reviewed by an international selection committee and applicants will be notified in the course of the summer.

To celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Danyliw Seminar in 2014, a special website was created at [www.danyliwseminar.com](http://www.danyliwseminar.com). The site contains the programs, papers, videos of presentations and photographs of the last three seminars (2014-2016). To access the abstracts, papers and videos of the 2016 presenters, click on “Participants” in the menu and then click on the individual names of participants. The 2016 Program can be accessed at <https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2016>.

Check the “Danyliw Seminar” Facebook page at <http://bit.ly/2rssSHk>.

For information on the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, go to <http://bit.ly/2r7Hl8L>.

The Seminar is made possible by the generous commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine.

### #3

## Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine

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Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

Application Deadline: 1 February 2018 (International & Canadian Students)

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing a new competition of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of \$22,000, with all tuition waived, for four years (with the possibility of adding a fifth year).

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of \$500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book *Champions of Philanthropy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments*.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields related with the research interests of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship. The competition is open to international and Canadian students.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to Dominique Arel, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room, 7067, University of Ottawa, 120 University St., Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.

Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on 1 February 2018 and will continue until the award is announced.

The University of Ottawa is a bilingual university and applicants must have a certain oral and reading command of French. Specific requirements vary across departments.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships beginning in the academic year 2017-2018 are invited to contact Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca), Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, and visit our web site (<http://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/ukraine>)

## #4

### Failure to Officially Define the East as Russian-Occupied Gives Moscow a PR Advantage, Some Ukrainian MPs Say

Isobel Koshiw

Codastory, 13 June 2017

<http://bit.ly/2reBayP>

*Isobel Koshiw is a Kyiv-based freelance journalist writing about politics, business and the war*

After three years of conflict with Russia-backed separatists and the deaths of some 10,000 people, Ukraine still refers to its war-torn eastern territories as an “Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone.” But now, some Ukrainian lawmakers say it’s time to use the “o” word — “occupied.”

Ukraine’s failure to do so, the MPs say, has aided the Kremlin’s claims that it is not funding and directing the rebels in eastern Ukraine. It is also “the greatest weakness in the information war” with Russia according to reformist MP Mustafa Nayyem, who has proposed a bill to declare the East occupied.

But before they even address the issue, the Ukrainians first must to agree among themselves whether or not to define the eastern regions of Donetsk and Lugansk as occupied.

Parliament appears at a standstill on the question. So far, three bills have been tabled to define Kiev’s relationship with the East but no votes have been scheduled.

MP Natalia Veselova, a native of the Donetsk region, believes that Kiev should wait for the international community to recognize the East as occupied before doing so itself. Her bill, the latest of the three, would term the area “non-controlled.”

Vesselova says she has been asking the European Parliament and Ukraine's international partners for advice. "They say it makes no difference if we recognize the territories as occupied on a national level," Veselova said. "They are not interested. They are interested in evidence [of occupation] that we provide them with."

The first steps of gathering this evidence, Veselova says, have been taken at the The Hague's International Court of Justice, where Kiev charges that Moscow's support of separatists in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea violated Ukrainians' human rights and facilitated terrorism.

Deputy Parliamentary Speaker Oksana Syroyid, author of a second bill to define the East as occupied, does not want to wait on the world, however.

"The international community will not admit the truth until we start," Syroyid stressed. The United Nations endorsed the Minsk ceasefire agreement, and, in December, condemned the Russian Federation for the "temporary occupation" of Crimea, but it has not criticized Moscow's role in backing the separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.

Russian media routinely describes the conflict as internal or a "civil war" and this language has slipped into the international coverage as well. In the world where words matter, it is crucial, Nayyem insists, to have a law that declares the East's separatist-controlled areas as occupied and "destroys all those discussions that it is an internal conflict or a civil war."

But many outsiders believe Ukraine's real problem is that the world, and especially the United States, doesn't care.

"I think there is pretty clear international understanding [about the situation in eastern Ukraine]. I think people really don't care and what's worse is that the United States has ignored Ukraine since [the Trump administration has] come into office," said Stephen Blank, a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council "If the US is interested in the issue, it gets traction."

Arguably, lessons in this debate could be drawn from Georgia, Ukraine's newly declared PR partner against Russian aggression. Georgia does have an occupation law to define Russia's presence in its own breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has used it to advance its message abroad.

Nadia Volkova, a lawyer at Ukraine's Helsinki Group, believes that a Ukrainian law declaring an occupation would at least send the message that Ukraine is prepared to accept and apply international legal standards.

Those who support a Ukrainian occupation law charge that such legislation scares the authorities because they benefit from the current state of uncertainty about the East.

Among the most powerful opponents of calling the territories “occupied” is Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko himself. He says doing so would destroy the Minsk peace process and, with it, western sanctions against Russia. It would also, he predicted, push the territories to integrate further with Russia. Instead, Poroshenko has promised to introduce his own bill on the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity.

But Oleksandr Paraschiy, director of investment bank Concorde Capital, believes Poroshenko wanted Ukrainian enterprises in the separatist territories to continue to function because their production numbers were included in Ukraine’s GDP.

A Central Bank warning that activists’ trade blockade of the East could cause the economy to shrink by 1.3 percentage points was intended to convince the public of the necessity of wartime trade with the separatist territories, he said. After the blockade became official in March, that estimate was reduced.

Ukrainian officials have still not explained how or why separatist leaders allowed the companies to operate.

Many believe that corruption or betrayal explain the government’s reversal on the trade blockade, Nayyem says.

“If we are . . . playing a hybrid game, then let’s admit to it,” he said. “They need to say it clearly: ‘We don’t want to define a clear status because of this or that.’” Until then, he says, the lack of unity among Ukrainians themselves over what to call the territories they had lost will continue to enable Moscow to dictate the global the narrative about Ukraine.

## #5

### Russian Diplomats Expelled from Moldova Recruited Fighters: Sources

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by Matthias Williams  
Reuters, 13 May 2017  
<http://reut.rs/2sjBH5M>

Moldovan intelligence believes five Russian diplomats expelled from Moldova last month were spies who were recruiting fighters for the Moscow-backed insurgency in neighboring Ukraine, a government source and two diplomatic sources told Reuters. Moldova, a former Soviet state that has long been the focus of a struggle for influence between Russia and the West, expelled the diplomats on May 29. It did not explain the decision, with Prime Minister Pavel Filip saying only that his government had “good reasons”.

According to the sources, who are familiar with the case, the five were ejected because of their alleged activities as undercover officers with the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU.

They said Moldovan officials believed the Russians were recruiting fighters from Gagauzia, an autonomous southern region home to an ethnic Turkish population that is pro-Russian and opposes closer integration with the European Union.

The Moldovan government source and Chisinau-based diplomatic sources all spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. They did not say how the Russians allegedly recruited the fighters, how many were recruited or the reason for their recruitment.

Reuters could not independently verify the allegations about the activities of the five Russians.

The Russian foreign ministry declined to comment. The Russian defense ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

Asked by Reuters if the five Russians were GRU officers, a spokeswoman for the Moldovan foreign ministry said they were diplomats and declined to comment further.

More than 10,000 people have died in fighting in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian troops and pro-Russian rebels since the conflict began in 2014 following Moscow's annexation of the Crimean peninsula. While Moscow politically backs the insurgents, it has repeatedly denied Western accusations that it is arming them and sending fighters to aid them.

## **Training Camp**

Moldovan intelligence believes fighters recruited from Gagauzia were first sent to a paramilitary training camp in the Rostov region of southern Russia, according to the sources.

The sources did not identify the camp. Russia has used at least two military camps in Rostov to train volunteers for fighting in eastern Ukraine, according to evidence collected by Reuters and the Russian media.

A former member of a Russian army artillery unit told Reuters that he saw about 200 people in camouflage fatigues - not Russian military uniforms - based in a camp near a Russian army position at the Kuzminsky firing range in Rostov in 2014, at the time of fierce battles in eastern Ukraine.

This was corroborated by a member of a unit of the Cossacks - a Russian paramilitary group - who told Reuters in early 2015 that volunteers to fight in Ukraine were training alongside the Russian army in that area.

According to Russian media outlet Gazeta.ru, fighters bound for eastern Ukraine were also training at the Kadamovsky firing range in Rostov.

The three sources said some information about Gagauzians fighting in eastern Ukraine was brought to the attention of Moldovan authorities by Ukraine's state security service, the SBU, which gathers intelligence on people fighting with the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine.

With information from the SBU, the Moldovan authorities were able to track, arrest and interrogate Gagauzian fighters returning from the conflict, according to the sources. Some became informers, they added.

The SBU did not respond to a request for comment.

Relations between Moldova and Russia have been bumpy under a succession of pro-Western governments. Russia halted imports of Moldovan produce in retaliation for Chisinau signing a trade and political deal with the European Union in 2014. Moldova and Russia have also feuded over the treatment of Moldovan officials traveling to Russia.

But Russia has forged direct ties to Gagauzia.

Irina Vlah, elected the head of Gagauzia in March 2015 on pledges of closer ties with Russia, visited the Kremlin in January this year and attended a reception hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"The people of Gagauzia view Russia with affection," Vlah said at the reception.

## #6

### A Former Berkut Commander Now Wanted in Ukraine for Crimes Against Protesters is Spotted Working for Moscow's Riot Police

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Meduza, 13 June 2017  
<http://bit.ly/2sxwlEV>

Footage recorded by the television station Dozhd at a protest on Monday in Moscow reveals a riot control officer who appears to be Sergey Kusyuk, a former commander of the "Berkut" special police force in Kiev, notorious for its brutality and dissolved in 2014, after the Maidan Revolution. Kusyuk is wanted in Ukraine for his role in the violent police crackdown on protesters in Kiev in November 2013. Meduza reviews Kusyuk's checkered past and how he ended up in Russia.

Ukrainian journalists recognized Kusyuk in footage from Monday's protest at Tverskaya Street in Moscow. In footage from the demonstration, the man in question — a colonel in Russia's National Guard — is identical to Kusyuk, though there's no surname visible on his uniform. While serving in the Ukrainian police force in 2013, Kusyuk also held the rank of colonel. In the video recorded at Tverskaya, Kusyuk appears to be coordinating the actions of Moscow riot police, as they managed and dispersed protesters.

Russia's National Guard has refused to comment officially on Sergey Kusyuk's possible role in the police response to Monday's protest in Moscow.

Back in Ukraine, Kusyuk is charged with exceeding his authority as a police officer and illegally obstructing a political demonstration. In June 2015, he was placed on a wanted list, and the Ukrainian Attorney General announced that Kusyuk had relocated to Russia, adding that he might have found work with the Russian police (and later the Russian National Guard, following reforms that transferred the riot police out of the Interior Ministry). Riot police in Moscow, moreover, have openly welcomed former Berkut officers, hiring them at the same ranks they enjoyed in Ukraine, before the Berkut were liquidated.

**Colonel Kusyuk is a key figure in Ukraine's investigation into the crackdown on the Euromaidan movement.** In 2013, Kusyuk served as a Berkut regiment commander and allegedly ordered the first violent crackdown on Euromaidan activists in Kiev on the night of November 30, transforming the protests into a clash with police that eventually escalated to a full-blown revolution.

The next day, on December 1, 2013, skirmishes broke out near the presidential administration building. There are unconfirmed reports that Kusyuk may have actually led a group of provocateurs against police as a pretense for a new offensive against the demonstrators. Kusyuk denies these accusations.

#7

## Ukraine Restores NATO Membership as Key Foreign Policy Goal

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by Darya Krasnolutska and Anthony Halpin  
Bloomberg, 8 June 2017  
<https://bloom.bg/2r6sGhl>

Ukraine's parliament set NATO membership as a key foreign-policy goal, replacing the non-aligned status adopted by ousted Kremlin-backed President Viktor Yanukovych in a move that's likely to further sour relations with Russia.

A bill submitted by the ruling coalition was backed by 276 lawmakers in the 450-seat legislature Thursday in Kiev, the capital. President Petro Poroshenko wants to meet NATO entry requirements by 2020 and has promised to hold a referendum on joining.

The former Soviet republic sees NATO as a security guarantee after a second pro-European revolution in a decade poisoned ties with Russia, which later annexed Crimea and backed an insurgency across its neighbor's border. Ukraine has also signed an Association Agreement with the European Union, though has no formal path to joining the world's biggest trading bloc. Russia has opposed the two organizations' eastward expansion.

“Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Ukrainian territory have set an urgent task for Ukraine to ensure real national security,” the authors of the legislation said. “The most effective tool for the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty is collective security, the most effective of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

In response to NATO expansion toward its borders, Russia is taking steps to “re-balance the situation and defend its security,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on a conference call. Ukraine is a country in “civil war” and decisions on its membership are taken in Brussels and other capitals, he said.

### **Latest Member**

Thursday's move formalizes Ukraine's efforts to join NATO after having a fast-track application rejected in 2008. The alliance has already absorbed 13 ex-communist nations, most recently Montenegro, which became its 29th member on June 5. Historic affinity to Russia soured its accession, with the Kremlin denying allegations it backed a failed coup attempt in October to overthrow the former Yugoslav republic's pro-Western leadership.

NATO itself has faced questions about its future after the election of Donald Trump. The U.S. president has criticized some members for investing too little in their armies and failed during a recent trip to Europe to clearly state his commitment to the alliance's collective-defense pledge, known as Article 5.

## **#8**

### **Unpunished Bank Fraud: Big Fraud, No Prosecution – Why?**

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by Josh Kovensky and Oleg Sukhov  
Kyiv Post, 9 June 2017  
<http://bit.ly/2t3QP10>

It's been six months since the Ukrainian government nationalized PrivatBank, leaving Ukrainian taxpayers on the hook for \$5.6 billion in losses — much of it because of insider loans and bank fraud, central bank officials acknowledge.

Ex-National Bank of Ukraine Governor Valeria Gontareva has repeatedly accused the bank's ex-owner Ihor Kolomoisky of embezzling the deposits through fraudulent transactions, including insider loans to associates.

“On the last night (before nationalization), they conducted fraudulent transactions amounting to more than Hr 16 billion (\$612 million),” Gontareva said in an April interview. She called on the General Prosecutors' Office to investigate fraud at the bank, which remains Ukraine's largest lender with 36 percent of deposits.

But there doesn't appear to be an active criminal investigation into the former owners, Kolomoisky and his business partner Gennadiy Bogolyubov.

Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine — which is now run by acting governor Yakiv Smolii — and the Presidential Administration, did not reply to requests for comment on June 8. Mustafa Nayyem, a lawmaker with the dominant Bloc of Petro Poroshenko in parliament, called for prosecutors to open fraud and organized crime investigations against PrivatBank executives who signed the loan documents. Nayyem said the executives should also be called to testify on who ordered them to lend the money. “The National Bank was apparently observing this process,” Nayyem said. “And if it was observing it, why didn't they start investigations or inspections? Apparently Gontareva or other National Bank officials got orders not to open cases.”

The central bank had a curator in place at PrivatBank from the time it received recapitalization loans in 2014. The curator would have been able to see all the operations going in and out of the bank.

But, as one NBU official who wished to remain anonymous due to a lack of authorization to speak publicly said, the central bank only has “ex-post facto authority.” It can only act after it observes misconduct and, at that, only as a civil regulator, and not as a criminal prosecutor.

According to Nayyem and Anti-Corruption Action Center executive director Daria Kaleniuk, Kolomoisky hasn't been prosecuted because of a political agreement with President Petro Poroshenko. Kolomoisky may have been granted de facto immunity because he controls at least 20 votes in the 423-member parliament and has vast media holdings in which he can block criticism of the president.

“If Privatbank's former shareholders got guarantees from those who could have given them — and this could have only been the head of state — then it's obvious why neither

the Interior Ministry, nor the Prosecutor General's Office, nor the National Bank investigated this," Nayyem said. "Kolomoisky received a certain political indulgence."

Kaleniuk said that PrivatBank took capitalization loans from the NBU from 2014 to 2015, and then lent \$1.8 billion to offshores, without totally repaying the NBU loans. The Anti-Corruption Action Center asked the Prosecutor General's Office to investigate the loans, but prosecutors have been unwilling to open criminal cases, she said.

Kaleniuk suspects that the transactions could have involved fraud, money laundering and embezzlement of public funds.

### **Bank fraud in plain sight**

From the moment that the NBU learned of the extent of PrivatBank's issues, Kolomoisky was in negotiations for a settlement.

Oleksandr Zavadetsky, the NBU's first-ever related party loans monitoring unit chief, who took part in the verification of PrivatBank's loan portfolio, said that the central bank knew about the depths of the problem as early as December 2015.

From there, the NBU and government engaged Kolomoisky in negotiations surrounding the bank's recapitalization and subsequent nationalization. The oligarch visited the NBU more than 30 times in the year before the nationalization, giving him months to strip assets from the bank.

Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko spoke of "rumors" in December that Kolomoisky had already "withdrawn the tastiest parts from the bank."

Kolomoisky dismissed an investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a Kyiv Post partner, that PrivatBank made more than a \$1 billion in loans to business associates in the run-up to nationalization.

Kolomoisky called the OCCRP investigation "nonsense" in a written reply.

He has denied that the government forced the nationalization and instead said that he and his fellow shareholder, Gennadiy Bogolyubov, requested the government takeover after a coordinated attack in the press which caused a run on the lender.

When the bank was nationalized, the government hired EY to audit the past two years of PrivatBank's activity in an effort to account for the massive losses at the bank.

The NBU promised that the audit would be released publicly by March, providing final details of everything that happened at the bank until it fell under state ownership. PrivatBank is now under the control of Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, which has yet to make the audit public.

#9

## South Ossetia: A “Little Switzerland” for Donbas?

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Nikolaus von Twickel  
Eurasianet, 31 May 2017  
<http://bit.ly/2s7y9Sp>

South Ossetia has emerged as an unlikely banking center, providing financial services that connect Russia and the self-declared, Kremlin-backed breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine, according to officials in all three regions.

While the eastern Ukrainian “people’s republics” are intent on reorienting their economies toward Russia, in the short term, Moscow must prop up large industrial enterprises in Donbas. The de facto capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, plays an important role in facilitating Russian subsidies.

In April, the de facto authorities in the Donetsk People’s Republic announced that they were putting the bulk of the territory’s massive industrial enterprises under a little-known holding company reportedly based in South Ossetia. And for the last two years Tskhinvali has hosted a bank that manages payments between Moscow and the two eastern Ukrainian breakaway republics, Luhansk and Donetsk.

The holding company, Vneshtorgservis, **now controls** the nine biggest plants in Donetsk and the three biggest in Luhansk. The firm is reportedly run by Vladimir Pashkov, a Russian citizen and former deputy governor of the Irkutsk region in Siberia, according to comments by the de facto Donetsk Minister for Trade and Industry, Alexei Granovsky, **published in Russia’s Kommersant-Vlast** weekly in early May.

De facto officials in Donetsk did not return a request for comment from EurasiaNet.org about the company’s place of registration. The press office of Luhansk separatist leader Igor Plotnitsky also refused to comment.

But a former senior official in the Donetsk de facto republic, Alexander Khodakovsky, **wrote on his blog** that the company was registered in South Ossetia, and complained that the arrangement was not in the interests of the people of Donbas: “As long as we don’t have a legal basis for these holding companies, we will always have grounds to suspect the [de facto Donbas] government of double-dealing and hypocrisy, of a willingness to return everything to the old oligarchs, or to sell them to people ... for whom the interests of our Republic are not even a passing concern.”

Officials in South Ossetia also did not respond to written questions submitted via email from [EurasiaNet.org](http://EurasiaNet.org). However, local leaders have officially confirmed the banking link. In early April, outgoing de facto President Leonid Tibilov told a visiting delegation from Donetsk that the newly formed “young republics” should support each other: “What we

managed to do for you is to open an international bank,” Tibilov [said](#), according to the official news agency RES.

Tibilov did not name the bank, but it has been identified on multiple occasions by separatist officials from Ukraine as the “International Clearance Bank” (Mezhdunarodny Rashchyotny Bank / MRB). The website of South Ossetia’s Central Bank [lists its](#) address as Stalin Street 20. In turn, the central banks of both the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” have identified South Ossetia’s MRB as their official international correspondence bank.

This bank is believed to have operated for two years now, and observers believe it exists primarily to funnel cash from Russia to the separatist republics, which are largely dependent on outside financial support. And its role is likely to have grown considerably since March 1, when the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk brought all Ukrainian-held industrial plants under their control.

The move, partly an answer to a trade blockade imposed by Ukrainian activists, was meant to improve the revenues of the breakaway republics by forcing the plants to pay their taxes locally. However, an unintended consequence was a cut off in the supply of raw materials from Ukraine. That, in turn, led to the departure of much of the industries’ management, either fired by the new separatist authorities or withdrawn by the Ukrainian owners. As a result, production at the plants has ground to a halt.

South Ossetia is the world’s only territory that has formally recognized the two “people’s republics.” South Ossetia itself was recognized by Russia in 2008, after Moscow crushed an attempt by Georgia to recapture the territory. All but Russia, along with a handful of states, consider South Ossetia to still be a part of Georgia.

In a [video interview](#) published in April, Donetsk’s parliamentary speaker and chief international envoy Denis Pushilin explained that “all processes” regarding payments, raw materials and their documentation for the relevant plants “go through the country that has recognized us – that is South Ossetia.”

Moscow so far has shied away from recognizing the Donbas republics, ostensibly because they are under Western sanctions already, but also because such a move would threaten to scuttle the Minsk agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin signed along with his counterparts in Ukraine, France, and Germany. (Georgia’s other breakaway republic, Abkhazia, also has not formally recognized Donetsk or Luhansk, although it does maintain friendly relations with the Ukrainian separatists.)

As long as Russia does not recognize the “people’s republics,” companies wishing to do business there face multiple logistical hurdles, including a significant risk of being hit by sanctions from Ukraine. Thus, South Ossetia’s role as a little Switzerland for Donbas plays a useful part for Russia and Russian firms wishing to disassociate themselves from the destination of their transactions.

“If in doubt, Moscow will always say that this is a problem between South Ossetia and Ukraine,” said Alexei Malashenko, a Caucasus expert and director of studies of the Berlin-based Dialogue of Civilizations think tank.

#10

## The Power of the Russian State vs. a Librarian

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by Serge Schmemmann  
New York Times, 10 June 2017  
<http://nyti.ms/2rcXmNS>

There is something particularly Orwellian about accusing a librarian of hate crimes because books under her care don't jibe with government propaganda. That, in essence, is what a Russian court did in giving to Natalia Sharina a four-year suspended sentence because the Moscow Library of Ukrainian Literature, which she formerly headed, purportedly carried literature that didn't match Russia's official version of what's happening in Ukraine.

No matter that most of the books seized in the raid on the library in 2015 and cited by the prosecution were in special storage and not available to the public, or that, according to the library staff, the book deemed most offensive by the state was planted there by the police. The case was not about inciting interethnic enmity and hatred, nor was it about the spurious charges of embezzlement that were leveled against Mrs. Sharina.

It was about denying Ukraine's claim to a cultural uniqueness, and even more about making clear that the state would brook no challenge to its official lies about Ukraine being in the grips of fascists manipulated by the West to denigrate Russian culture. That version of Russian-Ukrainian affairs was, in fact, how the prosecutor, Lyudmila Balandina, opened her oral arguments, leaving no doubt about the political nature of the trial. It was the librarian's duty, she argued, to filter new books and to destroy anti-Russian ones.

Mrs. Sharina's eminently reasonable response was an emphatic no: I am absolutely not guilty of anything. Nobody gave a library director the right, moreover the responsibility, to censor legally published books.

Furthermore, she said, she never disseminated any hostile ideas, as the state claimed she did, but maintained a library founded in 1989. Of the books listed by the prosecution as degrading to the Russian people, she said, only one was actually accessible to readers, a children's magazine called Barvinok. There, a court-appointed expert found the extremist contention — one shared by much of the rest of the world — that Russia, and not only separatists, was involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.

But in Vladimir Putin's Russia, rights, responsibilities and the law have fallen prey to the old Soviet notion that any deviation from the position or the lies of the state is liable to be prosecuted under vague anti-extremism legislation.

The obvious motive behind the trial is to intimidate critics of Russia's annexation of Crimea and of its continued meddling in eastern Ukraine. That in itself is reprehensible. But to do so by accusing an innocent librarian of extremism is beneath contempt.

#11

## Ukraine's Government Seeks to Legalize Illegal Security Service Detention Prisons

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by Halya Coynash

Human Rights in Ukraine, 12 June 2017

<http://bit.ly/2rfcVR9>

The Cabinet of Ministers has tabled a draft bill which acknowledges the long-denied existence of SBU [Security Service] detention facilities and proposes amendments to legislation in order to formally allow them. Legal may be preferable to illegal, however removing the possibility of abuse by the Security Service would be better still. Ukraine's SBU gained excessive power under the regime of Viktor Yanukovich which has never been removed, with this especially dangerous since the agency has not undergone any reform.

Hennady Tokarev, a lawyer for the Kharkiv Human Rights Group, is appalled at the Cabinet of Ministers' effective acknowledgement of a crime. How else can one view their acceptance that detention facilities which are not envisaged by Ukrainian law exist and euphemistic decision to now 'regulate' the situation? Nor have they just noticed this 'irregularity'. The current move is based on an action plan drawn up on 23.11.2015. The Law on Pre-Trial Detention gives a comprehensive list of places of pre-trial detention in Ukraine. It does not mention any under the control of the SBU. The de facto existence of such centres, openly acknowledged as far back as November 2015, suggests that criminal offences have been committed under several articles of Ukraine's criminal code, including abuse of power and unlawful detention. Tokarev has filed a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor General's Office and demanded that it carry out an investigation.

The PGO will almost certainly do nothing of the kind, but Tokarev's concern is warranted and widely shared. The draft law, tabled on May 26, 2017 \*, proposes amendments to the Laws on Pre-Trial Detention and On the Security Service of Ukraine, with these being essentially to legalize the unlawful status quo.

Tokarev and another KHPG lawyer Olena Ashchenko [have set out](#) the reasons why they believe that adoption of the draft bill would not be in the public interest, but would instead violate human rights.

The bill does not ensure the rights of remand prisoners, and clashes with the aim of the National Strategy, namely to create an effective system for safeguarding the right to liberty and personal security. This aim is supposed to be achieved by bringing all detention procedure into line with international standards.

In fact, the lawyers write, there has been a trend over the past three years towards a worsening of the situation for people detained and held in custody.

One of two laws passed in August 2014 gave the prosecutor much broader powers under martial law, a state of emergency or in areas where an anti-terrorist operation [ATO] is underway. It introduced a new Article 615 to the criminal code, which stated that in a situation where a judge was not available, a prosecutor could order detention where a person was suspected of one of a number of crimes (Articles 109-114-1, 258-258-5, 260-263-1, 294, 348, 349, 377-379, 437-444).

This, the lawyers note, is a direct violation of Article 5 of the European Convention and of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights which insist that a person must be brought before a judge.

The law on fighting terrorism, passed on 12.08.2014, allowed for preventive detention of up to 30 days, with this being at the decision of the head of the SBU or of a territorial body of the National Police. Once again this could be without a court ruling, although a judge must be informed “without delay” if the detention is for over 72 hours. The lawyers see scope for abuse in the lack of any clarity as to when the requirement to notify kicks off and what “without delay” actually means in time. Nor does the law oblige the judge, on being notified, to actually check whether the detention was lawful.

All of this effectively means that pre-trial investigators are free to decide at their own discretion what constitutes well-founded suspicions. This clashes with Article 194 of the Criminal Procedure Code [CPC] which places the responsibility for determining whether the detention is warranted with the judge. The article was adopted as part of Ukraine’s fulfilment of international obligations.

There is nothing in either the CPC or the Law on Pre-trial Detention to safeguard the rights of people held under this provision though the period can be equivalent to that of persons remained in custody.

The procedure for this preventive detention is only regulated by an Instruction No. 872/88/537 from 26.08.2014, approved by the Interior Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office and SBU. This is not legislation, and is adopted by the very people who will exercise such powers.

The lawyers also criticize an addition to Article 176 of the CPC from 7.10.2014 which made detention mandatory where a person is suspected of crimes against national security, terrorism and similar. They believe that this conflicts with judgements by the European

Court of Human Rights which found it a violation of a person's rights under Article 5 to exclude other preventive measures.

The above-mentioned changes are in breach of Ukraine's Constitution, article 29 of which states that a person can only be remanded in custody on the basis of a justified court ruling, and must be released if no such ruling has been provided within 72 hours.

### *The next step backwards*

The lawyers warn that this new draft law, if passed, could be a further move in the wrong direction with respect to safeguarding the right to liberty.

The SBU were, at least according to the law, stripped of the right to hold remand prisoners back in February 2003. At the moment, all places of pre-trial detention are under the State Penitentiary Service which is itself within the Justice Ministry's structure. This move towards civilian structures is in keeping with international principles for safeguarding the rights of people in custody. Detainees should not be held in places that are under the control of investigators.

One of the roles of the SBU is specifically to carry out pre-trial investigation with respect to certain crimes, such as those against national security, treason and terrorism. Most of the crimes are classified as serious or very serious, and are therefore those for which detention can be applied.

Another problem is that although pre-trial detention, according to Articles 197 and 219 of the CPC cannot exceed 12 months, a trial on the kind of charges under SBU jurisdiction can go on for a long time. This could mean that people end up in custody, without any conviction, for years, with the people then held in SBU remand prisons. According to international standards, since the SBU is carrying out the pre-trial investigation, they should only be able to hold a person in custody for 72 hours before obtaining a court order.

The KHPG lawyers warn that this new law, if passed, would drag Ukraine back to the inquisition-like treatment of prisoners seen in the Soviet Union.

This is when the SBU regularly comes under criticism from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Monitoring Mission in its reports on the human rights situation over torture and ill-treatment, and violation of the right to liberty and personal security. This shows, the lawyers stress, that the SBU at present is one of the main human rights violators both on territory of military conflict, and in other parts of the country. Legalizing SBU-controlled places of detention can only worsen this situation, and will certainly increase the likelihood that the use of unlawful physical and psychological means of influence are not properly recorded and reported to the relevant bodies. The UN Monitoring Mission has, in fact, noted in its reports that most cases where SBU officers have used unlawful force are not properly documented due to SBU obstruction.

*No economic grounds*

The number of remand prisoners has decreased significantly over the past four years meaning that remand prisons are not full to capacity, and could take those detainees whose cases are being investigated by the SBU.

Instead of legalizing the SBU's illegal places of detention, and only exacerbating rights abuses, it would make more sense and be in keeping with international standards to put a stop to these SBU places of detention altogether.

#12

## Ukraine Bans the St. George's Ribbon as a "Symbol of Russian Aggression"

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Euromaidan Press, 18 May 2017

<http://bit.ly/2s7xr7z>

On 16 May 2017, Ukrainian lawmakers banned the St. George's ribbon, a controversial emblem of the Second World War used in Russia which many Ukrainians see as a symbol of Russian aggression.

The black-and-orange striped ribbon is a state-embraced symbol of military valor in Russia, where it is widely used in commemorations of the 1945 victory over Nazi Germany. For many in Ukraine, however, the ribbon has come to symbolize Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine in a war that has killed a bit under 10,000 and displaced over 1.6 million people.

Now fines from 850 (\$32 USD) to 2550 hryvnia (\$97 USD) are envisaged for public use, demonstration or wearing of Georgian ribbons or pictures thereof, UaWire [reported](#). For repeated infringement during a year, a more severe punishment is envisaged – a fine of up to 5100 hryvnia (\$193 USD) or administrative arrest for up to 15 days.

The new rules do not affect World War II veterans, their awards or documents, TV channel 112 Ukraine reported. Furthermore, depictions of Georgian ribbons are permitted, for example, in works of art, educational material, on tombstones, and on documents issued before 1991. Use of ribbons in museum expositions, historical reconstructions, and objects of antique trade will not be punished.

The bill was initiated by MP Anton Herashchenko, the adviser to the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs. An explanatory note on the document states that for Ukraine, the Georgian ribbon has become a "symbol of Russian occupation and aggression."

In a 16 May [Facebook post](#), Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova slammed the parliament's backing of the bill as "antidemocratic and antihistorical."

### History of the emblem

As James Hudzik wrote in his article, "the St. George ribbon originated in the reign of tsarist Russia's Catherine II. It was an addition to the Order of St George, which was founded in 1769 during a Russo-Turkish war that solidified Russian control over southernmost Ukraine and five years before Catherine's razing of the Zaporizhzhya Sich. The Order was discarded in 1917 following the Soviet revolution.

However, as the Soviet need for a richer military symbolic grew during World War II, the Tsarist trappings returned, first in 1941 with newly reconstituted Guard units utilizing the Order's distinctive orange and black ribbon, and then in 1943 with the Order of Glory. Most famously, the ribbon was used in decorations such as the Medal for the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945, which was awarded to all who served in the war. It was as a reward for bravery in combat and for liberating epy fatherland from foreign invaders.

The ribbon has its modern use as well. In August 2000, the Russian Federation brought back the Order of St. George as its top decoration. Moreover, the St. George ribbon has been used since 2005 as a symbol of commemorating the victory over Germany and is seen frequently around May 9 Victory day celebrations. However, it is not used in any formal Ukrainian military decorations."

The ribbon was used by the Anti-Maidan camp opposing the Euromaidan protesters in 2014 and has ever since become a symbol of the "Russian world" and the Russian-led conflict in Donbas. St.George's ribbons have been handed out at pro-Russian rallies worldwide.

In 2014, Ukraine adopted the red poppy as the symbol of victory over nazism and is moving away from the Soviet conception of the "Great Patriotic War," introducing the Day of Commemoration and Reconciliation aside with Victory Day. Ukrainian historians note that Russia's usage of the "Great Patriotic War" is being used as an instrument of Russian imperialism.

#13

## Ukraine Blocks Russian Social Networks: Anti-Democratic Move or Antidote to Disinformation?

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by Sergey Sukhankin  
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 June 2017  
<http://bit.ly/2rfA068>

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree, on May 15, introducing a new package of sanctions against Russian companies and individuals (President.gov.ua, May 15). However, it was the decision to block two extremely popular Russian online social networks—Vkontakte (VK) and Odnoklassniki, embraced by more than 15 million Ukrainians—that produced the most heated debates. To justify their decision, Ukrainian officials argued that these resources are regularly employed by Russia for intelligence-gathering and propaganda purposes (Epravda.com.ua, May 16).

In the immediate aftermath, the Russian Internet space (Runet) lost approximately half of its normal Ukrainian traffic and the number of Ukrainian-based Facebook users increased by 35 percent, whereas the popularity of the Opera browser went through the roof (Tns-ua.com, accessed June 5). Notably, Opera features free, built-in virtual private network (VPN) support, allowing the user to mask his or her physical location and thus circumvent geolocation-based restrictions.

The announced ban of Russian social networks does not automatically mean that the Ukrainian government will be actually succeed in blocking this venue for espionage and propaganda operations coming from Moscow. Two main factors must be considered:

First, a full eradication of Russian social networks will require both time and money and will not ensue immediately. According to Oleksandr Fedienko, the head of the Ukrainian Internet Association, this process might take up to two years and \$1 billion. The first deputy director of the presidential administration, Dmytro Shymkhiv, as well as the head of the association Telecommunication Chamber of Ukraine, Tetiana Popova, both provided a similar assessment (Pravda.com.ua, May 16). Another limitation is based on the fact that, currently, Ukraine lacks proper mechanisms for this purpose. This was one of the most immediate challenges emphasized by Ukrainian Lieutenant General Vasyl Grytsak (112.ua, May 22).

Russia's harshly negative reaction to the Ukrainian government's move was rather predictable (Kommersant, May 16). Incidentally, the Russian side has clearly shown it is unwilling to watch its influence in Ukraine be uprooted. The Russian Internet search giant Yandex has already declared it was working on ways for Ukrainian users to evade

the ban. Reportedly, the Android version of Yandex can now elude the blocking, and the necessary instructions for how to do this have been dispatched to users (Vc.ru, May 22).

A sizable part of the domestic audience in Ukraine also sharply rebuked the ban. For instance, Oleksandr Olshanky, the president of the Internet Invest Group holding, contended that Ukraine is moving toward joining the club of North Korea, China and Russia —countries which do not allow the free flow of information and which control their domestic Internet space (Pravda.com.ua, May 16). Similar opinions abound, and in many cases were immediately picked up and highlighted by the Russian mass media.

The reaction of the international community was mixed—particularly when considering the differing postures taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a number of European international organizations. NATO pointed out that blocking the Kremlin-backed social networks should not be seen as an infringement on democracy. Whereas, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Johansen, stated that this decision contradicts European norms of freedom of mass media and speech (Odnako.su, May 17). Christian Mihr, from Reporters Without Borders (RWB), classified the decision of the Ukrainian government as “an attack against freedom of speech and free flow of information” (Dw.com, May 16, 2017). Such characterizations arguably betray a lack of understanding of the role of mass media and Internet resources in Russian strategies related to information and cyber warfare (see EDM, July 8, 2014; May 11, 2017).

Indeed, while Kyiv’s Russian social network ban has come into conflict with European perceptions of freedom of mass media and the Internet, Ukraine is not unique in its decision to block VK, which was also done earlier by Italy and Georgia (Torrentfreak.com, November 19, 2013). And indeed, the Ukrainian government’s decision must be evaluated within the context of the country being a target of Russian armed aggression, surreptitious destabilization operations, and information warfare.

Moscow has weaponized information against its enemies and adversaries: as has been well documented, the Kremlin has turned major information outlets and social networks into platforms for spreading lies, disinformation and hatred (see Hot Issue, August 13, 2014). It is worth remembering that the first stage of the so-called “Russian Spring,” which led to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of military conflict in Donbas, is directly linked to the banned Russian social networks, in which anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiments were being cultivated online. In this regard, one should not forget that the original creator of VK, Pavel Durov, has had to flee Russia after being pressed by the Federal Security Service (FSB) to give it access to the database of users who had participated in the EuroMaidan in Kyiv (Facebook.com/butusov.yuriy, May 17).

The ability of citizens to receive information is a vital bedrock of a democratic society. But the Ukrainian government has chosen to weigh this against the need to uproot malignant lies and anti-Ukrainian sentiment delivered digitally to its population. The threat is not

illusory: the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has indicated it has identified 800 active anti-Ukrainian groups operating on VK and Odnoklassniki (Espresso.tv, May 25).

This being said, a number of corollaries should be outlined:

- Ukraine is in a state of information and cyber warfare with Russia (see EDM, May 24), which requires the government in Kyiv to act accordingly. The example of secessionist groups and organizations in southeastern Ukraine and semi-autonomous Crimea, which Kyiv had ignored since 1991 until the outbreak of the Russian Spring in early 2014, should not be forgotten;
- Russian social networks are an essential element of the Kremlin's Russian World (Russkiy Mir) project (see EDM, July 2, 2014) and are deeply controlled by the Russian security services, which use them as platforms for spreading lies and disinformation;
- Russian IT software companies and search engines (such as Yandex) facilitate Moscow's cyber operations;

In the final analysis, Ukraine's security situation differs significantly from much of the rest of the European continent. Not only is Ukraine one of the main targets of Russian cyber and information operations, its population is dangerously prone to Russian propaganda. Until this existential threat coming from Moscow can be eliminated, Kyiv's approach to information and Internet freedoms is likely to continue to diverge somewhat from Western liberal norms.

## #14

### Research Associate - Multilingualism: Empowering Individuals, Transforming Societies

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Cambridge Ukrainian Studies Programme

2 July 2017 Application Deadline

<http://bit.ly/2s4iVNJ>

A Post-Doctoral Research Associate position is available at the University of Cambridge in conjunction with the landmark AHRC-funded research project 'Multilingualism: Empowering Individuals, Transforming Societies' (MEITS, [www.meits.org](http://www.meits.org)).

MEITS consists of six research strands exploring multilingualism from a range of disciplinary perspectives. This position is attached to Strand 1, 'Arts of Identity: Literature, Cinema, Culture and Citizenship in a Globalising Europe', which undertakes a study of cultural texts and events that relate to questions of linguistic unity, diversity, and power in Ukraine's public sphere.

The ideal candidate will have a demonstrable background in Ukrainian Studies and a native or near-native proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian as well as English. Additional knowledge of one of Ukraine's minority languages is desirable but not required. Candidates will have completed a PhD in a relevant field.

The successful candidate will lead the organization of two conferences exploring the strand's central research questions and produce at least two articles in peer-reviewed scholarly journals.

This position is 100% FTE with a fixed term of 24 months, starting 1 October 2017. The successful candidate will be mentored by Dr Rory Finnin and associated with the Cambridge Ukrainian Studies programme in the Department of Slavonic Studies. Salary will normally rise annually by one point on the anniversary of appointment. The appointment is subject to satisfactory completion of a probationary period of 6 months.

To apply online for this vacancy, please click on the 'Apply' button below. This will route you to the University's Web Recruitment System, where you will need to register an account (if you have not already) and log in before completing the online application form.

In order for your application to be considered, please upload a covering letter, a detailed curriculum vitae, a list of publications and one sample of a recent publication. You must also provide the names and contact details of two referees who are familiar with your work in the relevant field and whom we can contact for a reference once the vacancy has closed.

The closing date for applications is midnight (BST), 2 July 2017. If you have any questions about this vacancy, please contact Dr Rory Finnin at [ref35@cam.ac.uk](mailto:ref35@cam.ac.uk). For questions on the application process or procedure, please contact MML Personnel at [MMLPersonnel@admin.cam.ac.uk](mailto:MMLPersonnel@admin.cam.ac.uk).

Please quote reference GR12346 on your application and in any correspondence about this vacancy.

The University values diversity and is committed to equality of opportunity.

The University has a responsibility to ensure that all employees are eligible to live and work in the UK.

#15

## New Book

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The Near Abroad

Socialist Eastern Europe and Soviet Patriotism in Ukraine, 1956-1985

Zbigniew Wojnowski

University of Toronto Press

Published May 2017

ISBN 9781442631076

<http://bit.ly/2rnAWK0>

From the Soviet perspective, Eastern Europe was the near abroad – more accessible than the capitalist West, yet also unambiguously foreign. Observing their western neighbours, citizens of the USSR developed new ideas about the role of states, borders, and national identities in the Soviet empire.

In *The Near Abroad*, Zbigniew Wojnowski traces how Soviet Ukrainian identities developed in dialogue and confrontation with the USSR's neighbours in Eastern Europe. The author aptly challenges the dominant chronologies of late Soviet history by arguing that patriotism framed heated debates about the future of the Soviet state even amongst the rising tide of cynicism and disengagement from public life. Wojnowski's insightful analysis illuminates the mental geographies that continue to shape relations and conflicts between Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe to this very day. Unlike most other histories of Ukraine, *The Near Abroad* does not reduce Ukrainian nationalism to anti-Soviet views and behaviours.

*Zbigniew Wojnowski is an associate professor in the Department of History, Philosophy, and Religion at Nazarbayev University.*

#16

## New Book

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New Generation Political Activism in Ukraine

Christine Emeran

Routledge

<http://bit.ly/2syeJZp>

Individuals in the post-Communist Ukraine dealt with a political climate of stalled reforms and corruption, leading to a mass distrust of many political institutions. This had a demobilizing effect on a citizen's sense of capacity to effect social change. Therefore, the

emergence of any individual to become an activist and involved in protest movements was a remarkable feat. So how does an individual become an activist in such a climate?

This book explains how socio-cultural experiences shape an individual's choices to become an activist in the authoritarian space of post-Soviet Ukraine by applying a cultural, actor-centred approach using qualitative methods of interviews and ethnography. The goal is to better understand the dynamics of individual decision-making between participants in collective protest actions under repressive conditions from the State using biographical narratives. The book covers multiple discussions with five young activists involved in the three largest protest events since Ukrainian independence in 1991: the Ukraine without Kuchma Movement of 2000–2001, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Euromaidan protests of 2014.

This is valuable reading for students and researchers interested in political sociology, social movements and Ukrainian politics, and how these Ukrainian protests can be related to wider European political movements.

*Christine Emeran* holds a PhD in Sociology from The New School for Social Research (New York), conducted post-doctoral research at the Université Paris Descartes (Sorbonne Paris Cité) and now works as an education policy consultant for an international organization. Her research interests include political sociology, social movements, Ukraine and higher education. She has been the recipient of the Fulbright U.S. Student Program and IREX Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program fellowships in Ukraine.

#17

## New Book

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On the Shoulders of Grandmothers  
Gender, Migration, and Post-Soviet Nation-State Building  
Cinzia D. Solari  
Routledge 2016  
<http://bit.ly/2s7RLWt>

*On the Shoulders of Grandmothers*, is a global ethnography of Ukrainian transnational migration. Gendered migrant subjectivities are a key site for understanding the production of neoliberal capitalism and Ukrainian nation-state building, a fraught process that places Ukraine precariously between Europe and Russia with dramatic implications for the political economy of the region. However, processes of gender and migration that undergird transnational nation-state building require further attention. Solari compares two patterns of Ukrainian migration: the “forced” exile of middle-aged women, most grandmothers, to Italy and the “voluntary” exodus of families, led by the same cohort

of middle-aged women, to the United States. In both receiving sites these migrants are caregivers to the elderly.

Using in-depth interviews and ethnographic data collected in three countries, Solari shows that Ukrainian nation-state building occurs transnationally. She examines the collective practices of migrants who are building the “new” Ukraine from the outside in and shaping both Italy and the United States as well. The Ukrainian state, in order to fulfil its First World aspirations of joining Europe and distancing itself from all things Soviet, is pursuing a gendered reorganization of family and work structures to achieve a transition from socialism to capitalism. This has created a labor force of migrant grandmothers who carry the new Ukraine on their shoulders. Solari shows that this post-Soviet economic transformation requires a change in the moral order as migrant women struggle to understand how to be “good” mothers and grandmothers and men join women in attempts to teach their children to be successful and honorable people, now that the social rules have drastically changed.

Looking at individual migrant women and men and their families in Ukraine allows us to see the production of neoliberal capitalism and new nationalism from the ground up and the outside in for a region that promises to be a flashpoint in our century.

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UKL 483, 13 June 2017

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