



The Ukraine List #496

The Ukraine List (UKL) #496
compiled by Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca)
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.chairukr.com
www.danyliwseminar.com
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#1

15th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 7-9 November 2019

<http://www.danyliwseminar.com>

CALL FOR PAPER PROPOSALS

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies, with the support of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation, will be holding its 15th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Ottawa on 7-9 November 2019. Since 2005, the Danyliw Seminar has provided an annual platform for the presentation of some of the most influential academic research on Ukraine.

The Seminar invites proposals from scholars and doctoral students—in political science, anthropology, sociology, history, law, economics and related disciplines in the social sciences and humanities—on a broad variety of topics falling under thematic clusters, such as those suggested below:

Conflict

- war/violence (combatants, civilians in wartime, DNR/LNR, Maidan)
- security (conflict resolution, Minsk Accords, OSCE, NATO, Crimea)
- nationalism (Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet, historical, far right)

Reform

- economic change (energy, corruption, oligarchies, EU free trade, foreign aid)
- governance (rule of law, elections, regionalism, decentralization)
- media (TV/digital, social media, information warfare, fake news)

Identity

- history/memory (World War II, Holodomor, Soviet period, interwar, imperial)
- language, ethnicity, religion, nation (policies and practices)
- culture and politics (cinema, literature, music, performing arts, popular culture)

Society

- migration (IDPs, refugees, migrant workers, diasporas)
- social problems (reintegration of combatants, protests, welfare, gender, education)
- state/society (citizenship, civil society, collective action/protests, human rights)

The Seminar will also be featuring panels devoted to recent/new books touching on Ukraine, as well as the screening of new documentaries followed by a discussion with filmmakers. Information on past book panels and films can easily be accessed from the top menu of the web site. The 2019 Seminar is welcoming book panel proposals, as well as documentary proposals.

Presentations at the Seminar will be based on research papers (6,000-8,000 words) and will be made available in written and video format on the Seminar website and on social media. The Seminar favors intensive discussion, with relatively short presentations (12 minutes), comments by the moderator and an extensive Q&A with Seminar participants and the larger public.

People interested in presenting at the 2019 Danyliw Seminar are invited to submit a 500 word paper proposal and a 150 word biographical statement, by email attachment, to Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, at darel@uottawa.ca AND chairukr@gmail.com. Please also include your full coordinates (institutional affiliation, preferred postal address, email, phone, and Twitter account [if you have one]). If applicable, indicate your latest publication or, in the case of doctoral or post-doctoral applicants, the year when you entered a doctoral program, the title of your dissertation and year of (expected) completion. Note that a biographical statement is not a CV, but a written paragraph.

Books published between 2018 and 2020 (as long as near-final proofs are available prior to the Seminar) are eligible for consideration as a book panel proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the book, as well as the 150 word bio and full coordinates.

Films produced between 2017 and 2019 are eligible for consideration as a documentary proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the film, as well as the 150 word bio, full coordinates, and a secure web link to the film.

In addition to scholars and doctoral students, policy analysts, practitioners from non-governmental and international organizations, journalists, and artists are also welcome to send a proposal.

The proposal deadline is 27 June 2019. The Chair will cover the travel and accommodation expenses of applicants whose proposal is accepted by the Seminar. The proposals will be reviewed by an international selection committee and applicants will be notified in the course of the summer.

The Danyliw Seminar website (<http://danyliwseminar.com>) contains the programs, papers, videos of presentations and photographs of the last five years (2014-2018). To access the abstracts, papers and videos of the 2018 presenters, click on “Participants” in the menu and then click on the individual names of participants. The 2018 Program can be accessed at <https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2018>. Presentations from previous years can be accessed under menu “Archives.”

Check the “Danyliw Seminar” Facebook page at <http://bit.ly/2rssSHk>. For information on the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, go to <https://www.chairukr.com>. (The site is being re-developed).

The Seminar is made possible by the generous commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine.

#2

Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

Application Deadline: 1 February 2020 (International & Canadian Students)

<https://www.chairukr.com/kule-doctoral-scholarships>

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing a new competition of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of \$25,000, with all tuition waived, for four years (with the possibility of adding a fifth year).

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of \$500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book *Champions of Philanthropy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments*.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields related with the research interests of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship. The competition is open to international and Canadian students.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to Dominique Arel, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room, 7067, University of Ottawa, 120 University St., Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.

Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on **1 February 2020** and will continue until the award is announced.

The University of Ottawa is a bilingual university and applicants must have a certain oral and reading command of French. Specific requirements vary across departments.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships beginning in the academic year 2020-2021 are invited to contact Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca), Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, and visit our web site www.chairukr.com.

#3

Emily Channell-Justice to Lead Contemporary Ukraine Program

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, April 19

<https://bit.ly/2YFoVvu>

The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University is pleased to announce that Dr. Emily Channell-Justice will develop and lead its new program on contemporary Ukraine.

The program, named the Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program (T-CUP), has been established with the generous financial support of Mr. James Temerty, a Ukrainian-Canadian entrepreneur and philanthropist. The T-CUP initiative will extend the scope of HURI's work beyond its traditional focus on literature, history, and language. With an emphasis on the social sciences, the program is a response to the growing need for experts who can analyze the unfolding changes in Ukrainian society and politics. It is HURI's hope that the program will serve as an influential platform for the academic and policy communities to exchange ideas.

As Director of T-CUP, Channell-Justice will first be charged with developing the priorities and strategy of the program. She will be responsible for day-to-day management and implementation of projects that support research on Ukraine's contemporary foreign policy, domestic government and politics, and significant sociological and cultural trends. While organizing events that bring together numerous experts, Channell-Justice's expertise will enrich the program as she carries out her own research and analysis.

As she prepares to join HURI this summer, Channell-Justice is finishing her term as a postdoctoral fellow and visiting assistant professor at Miami University, Ohio. Previously, she completed a doctorate degree in cultural anthropology at the City University of New York, conducting ethnographic fieldwork on contemporary activist initiatives in Ukraine. Her current project seeks to understand some of the ways the growing IT sector has influenced self-perception in Ukraine. In general, her research interests include contemporary Ukrainian politics, economy, and society, with a focus on social movements, gender issues, and economic development.

We hope you will join us in extending a warm welcome to Emily Channell-Justice. We're looking forward to working with her on this exciting initiative and will share more news as plans for the project develop. The program will officially launch later this year.

At this time, HURI would also like to sincerely thank James Temerty for making T-CUP possible. In addition to his philanthropic activities, Temerty has made his mark as a successful business entrepreneur, an inspiring leader, and an advocate for sustainable energy. Born in Ukraine, Temerty moved with his family to Canada in 1950. Ukraine has joined Canada in recognizing Temerty's skill and leadership, honoring him with the Order of Yaroslav the Wise in 2015. Temerty's business ventures have spanned the technology,

retail, and energy sectors, while his generosity has benefited causes such as mental health and addiction treatment, music, and education in Ukraine.

#4

New Book:

Lawrence Freedman
Ukraine and the Art of Strategy
Oxford University Press, 2019
<https://bit.ly/2X2jO86>

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed by the West, transformed European politics. These events marked a dramatic shift away from the optimism of the post-Cold War era. The conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared but nor was either side able to bring it to a definitive conclusion. Ukraine suffered a loss of territory but was not forced into changing its policies away from the Westward course adopted as a result of the EuroMaidan uprising of February 2014. President Putin was left supporting a separatist enclave as Russia's economy suffered significant damage.

In *Ukraine and the Art of Strategy*, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark *Strategy: A History*-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin's anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting 'EuroMaidan Revolution' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin's strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of 'information warfare' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail.

Freedman's application of his strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict challenges our understanding of some of its key features and the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

#5

New Book:

Mychailo Wynnycky
Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War
Frankfurt: ibidem, 2019
<https://bit.ly/2CAFGQ5>

In early 2014, sparked by an assault by their government on peaceful students, Ukrainians rose up against a deeply corrupt, Moscow-backed regime. Initially demonstrating under the banner of EU integration, the Maidan protesters proclaimed their right to a dignified existence; they learned to organize, to act collectively, to become a civil society. Most prominently, they established a new Ukrainian identity: territorial, inclusive, and present-focused with powerful mobilizing symbols. Driven by an urban “bourgeoisie” that rejected the hierarchies of industrial society in favor of a post-modern heterarchy, a previously passive post-Soviet country experienced a profound social revolution that generated new senses: “Dignity” and “fairness” became rallying cries for millions. Europe as the symbolic target of political aspiration gradually faded, but the impact (including on Europe) of Ukraine’s revolution remained. When Russia invaded—illegally annexing Crimea and then feeding continuous military conflict in the Donbas—, Ukrainians responded with a massive volunteer effort and touching patriotism. In the process, they transformed their country, the region, and indeed the world. This book provides a chronicle of Ukraine’s Maidan and Russia’s ongoing war, and puts forth an analysis of the Revolution of Dignity from the perspective of a participant observer.

#6

New Book:

Tetyana Malyarenko, and Stefan Wolff
*The Dynamics of Emerging De-Facto States:
Eastern Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Space*
London: Routledge, 2019
<https://bit.ly/2HAcSKf>

What are the causes and consequences of the crisis in Ukraine, and what has been the nature of local, national, and external actors’ involvement in it? These are the questions that the authors examine in this comprehensive analysis of the situation in Ukraine.

The crisis evolved from peaceful protests to full-scale military conflict and to an unstable ceasefire frequently interrupted by, at times, intense clashes between government forces and separatist rebels. Tracing the emergence of two new de-facto state entities in the post-Soviet space—the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics—from the chaos

of the early days after Russia's annexation of Crimea in Spring 2014 to the second Minsk Agreement in February 2015, and focusing on the actions of the immediate conflict parties and their external backers, the authors investigate the feasibility and viability of several prominent 'scenarios' for a possible future settlement of the conflict.

As an in-depth case study of the complex dynamics of the conflict at local, national, regional, and global levels of analysis, the book complements and advances existing scholarship on civil war and international crisis management and also provides insights for the policy community and the wider interested public.

#7

New Book:

Bohdan Kordan

Strategic Friends: Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan

Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019

<https://bit.ly/2Hwv2fM>

Since the end of the Soviet Union, Canada has played a leading role in the international response to Ukraine and to the challenges associated with its transition to independence. As Conservative and Liberal governments alike have sought to adapt foreign policy to contend with uncertainty and upheaval, the relationship between Canada and Ukraine has remained resilient.

In *Strategic Friends* Bohdan Kordan examines the intersections between global developments and Canada's evolving foreign policy in light of national interests, domestic factors, and political agency. His historical-comparative narrative follows the post-Cold War aspirations and ambitions of the Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin, and Harper governments as they worked to minimize conflict, increase security, contextualize the independence movement, manage bilateral relations, and promote election monitoring, as well as defend liberal democracy and the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Consulting media reports, official speeches, statements, published government documents, and archives of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Kordan highlights both continuities and shifts in policy during the leadership of four prime ministers, and reveals the undercurrents of contemporary Canadian foreign affairs.

Investigating the progression of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, *Strategic Friends* queries the dynamics that have shaped Canada's foreign policy response in an age of change.

#8

New Book:

Nicholas E. Denysenko
The Orthodox Church in Ukraine
A Century of Separation
Northern Illinois University Press, 2018
<https://bit.ly/30GjhuK>

“Based on in-depth archival research, this study brings to light various neglected aspects of Ukrainian church history, casting into a sharp relief the connections between the issues of language, state independence, and church governance. The story that emerges is narrated with considerable nuance, elegance, and lucidity.” —Paul Gavriyuk, University of St. Thomas

The bitter separation of Ukraine’s Orthodox churches is a microcosm of its societal strife. From 1917 onward, church leaders failed to agree on the church’s mission in the twentieth century. The core issues of dispute were establishing independence from the Russian church and adopting Ukrainian as the language of worship. Decades of polemical exchanges and public statements by leaders of the separated churches contributed to the formation of their distinct identities and sharpened the friction amongst their respective supporters.

In *The Orthodox Church in Ukraine*, Nicholas Denysenko provides a balanced and comprehensive analysis of this history from the early twentieth century to the present. Based on extensive archival research, Denysenko’s study examines the dynamics of church and state that complicate attempts to restore an authentic Ukrainian religious identity in the contemporary Orthodox churches. An enhanced understanding of these separate identities and how they were forged could prove to be an important tool for resolving contemporary religious differences and revising ecclesial policies. This important study will be of interest to historians of the church, specialists of former Soviet countries, and general readers interested in the history of the Orthodox Church.

#9

Chernobyl

TV Review, Tribeca 2019

Hollywood Reporter, 26 April 2019

<https://bit.ly/2HM2uxM>

HBO and Sky TV's miniseries, starring Jared Harris, Emily Watson and Stellan Skarsgård, tells the disturbing true story of a human-caused catastrophe.

There is no getting around this fact about HBO and Sky TV's five-part miniseries, Chernobyl: It's very difficult to watch.

Initially, the factually accurate retelling of the worst nuclear reactor disaster in history is shift-in-your-seat uncomfortable because we know what (most of) the people at the nuclear power plant don't and what (all of) the people in the surrounding area don't — that they are the walking dead.

One after another plant worker is exposed to insanely toxic amounts of radiation without knowing it, or certainly without knowing the full impact. Firefighters sent in to fight "the fire" have no idea what they are touching and breathing as they get as close as they can with their hoses. Local residents standing outside in a sea of radioactive ash from "the fire" and their children and babies inhaling it and playing in it don't know what it is, either. But you, as the viewer, know exactly what's coming, and series creator, writer and executive producer Craig Mazin (*Identity Thief*, *The Hangover Part II & Part III*) and director Johan Renck (*Breaking Bad*, *The Last Panthers*) forcefully — and arguably too heavily, at least in the first hour — lean into the dramatics of what it means to watch a relentless stream of black smoke billow into the atmosphere, so there's no let-up.

The second bit that's difficult is how the Soviets immediately went into cover-up mode and how all manner of abuses and bad leadership by ignorant people in power not only worsened events but killed infinitely more people. It can be maddening to witness, precisely because there's the benefit of distance. Lastly, there are the visuals that start as early as the second episode but hit peak horror-movie level in the third episode — bubbling skin peeling off still-alive bodies in the hospital. There ultimately isn't much let-up and Chernobyl is both successful for never wincing at the fallout as it gets to the truth of the issue and hampered by the relentless bleakness of the topic and its depiction.

This is a cautionary tale, of course, but the most effective message the miniseries sends isn't that the world has somehow been lucky to avoid another meltdown, but instead how frightened we all should be that a rogue country (or our own) or an accident could repeat this horrifying event all over again, except with a larger degree of damage. What Mazin nails is the dramatization of a horrible event that happened pre-cellphone, pre-internet, pre-cable-news-hysteria and thus exhumes a scary ghost we've all forgotten about.

It's a powerful story. The cover-up provides a kind of thriller element to the drama. But there's not much that needs gilding here for dramatic purposes, and Mazin has said he didn't make anything worse than what it was really like; the facts and the science and the human toll have an exactitude.

If there's a drawback beyond how difficult the story is to watch, it's the decision that was made to skip Russian accents entirely. Now, granted, that may be a blessing — Eastern Bloc voice work shifts almost too easily into parody. And for argument's sake, the Brits have been churning out historical dramas for decades that merely insert their people into the main roles — any fan of HBO's *Rome* will understand (and in that case probably accept) the decision. Short of an all-Italian cast, that might have also been an accident of accents.

But in *Chernobyl*, the decision is simply more stark. Everyone's name is Russian/Eastern European; city names, landmarks, official titles, the written word (and in a few scenes, full-on Russian being spoken over loud speakers to evacuate residents) clash noticeably with a heavily British cast told to speak effortlessly in their native tongue, making it all seem a bit like *Downton Abbey* or *The Crown* dropped into a Russian disaster movie. In addition, Stellan Skarsgard — not British — is excellent as the real-life Russian official Borys Shcherbina, who goes from annoyed party apparatchik to stunned believer, but plays his character with a Russian accent (note: that's how it sounded to me but Mazin reached out to confirm that's Skarsgard's real accent), clashing oddly with Jared Harris (the lead), who plays nuclear scientist Valery Legasov in full English accent.

Again, that might not be a problem for some people (particularly if you don't hear Skarsgard as Russian rather than Swedish!), but for others it will most certainly be a minor barrier or irritation.

Harris helps carry the early going of *Chernobyl* and fuels the rest of it with his ease at conveying, not only as a scientist but as a human, the unimaginable toll yet to come. "You are dealing with something that has *never* occurred on this planet before," he says at one point.

But Mazin indulges in some mildly troubling exposition as well as a certain repetitiveness in the clash between apparatchik apologists and scientists — as when Emily Watson appears as Ulyana Khomyuk (also in an English accent), a nuclear physicist alarmed that Minsk is getting radioactive readings so far from the Chernobyl plant (something she susses out and then works to help fix). As she confronts a local party official, Mazin's portrayal turns heavy-handed. The disbelieving bureaucrat is drinking vodka during the day and previously worked at a shoe factory.

"I've been assured there is no problem," he tells her.
"I'm telling you that there is," she responds.
"I prefer my opinion to yours," he says, taking a sip.
"I'm a nuclear physicist," she says, dismissively.

The problem facing Mazin and Renck as they tell the Chernobyl story is that staggering incompetence mixed with political cover-ups results in depictions of many characters as dumb or evil while the scientists are left to explain the reckoning and there's not a lot of subtlety in between. In their defense, this is not a subtle story. The actual Chernobyl explosion and meltdown could have been exponentially worse if not for any number of Russians, either compelled by the state or willing to save their country (and many millions in Europe), who walked into certain death to help stave off further, unfathomable disaster. *Chernobyl* works particularly well when those stories are documented. Any time you're dealing with a narrative where people aren't just put into traditional coffins but their nearly liquid bodies are eased into metal caskets, welded shut and then *buried under concrete* — well, there's not a whole lot of ways to make that point subtly.

A subplot about a firefighter and his wife — neither initially understanding the grave circumstances and then later flaunting them to be closer together, with dire consequences — is no doubt based on countless real-life instances but nevertheless comes off as just another collection of very rough scenes to endure. Was there a better way to show this? Would that other way be softening the blow of reality for no reason? You should at least know what you're getting into with *Chernobyl* and if you can face that awful, true story, then by all means take it in. But it won't be for everyone.

Cast: Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgard, Emily Watson, Jessie Buckley, Paul Ritter, Adrian Rawlins, Con O'Neill

Created, written and executive produced by: Craig Mazin

Directed by: Johan Renck

Premieres: Monday, May 6, 9 p.m. ET/PT (HBO)

#10

Berlin Film Review: 'Mr. Jones'

by Guy Lodge

Variety, 10 February 2019

<https://bit.ly/2Qgb8IR>

The story of truth-seeking anti-Soviet journalist Gareth Jones remains compelling through the highs and lows of Agnieszka Holland's overlong biopic.

Director: Agnieszka Holland

With: James Norton, Vanessa Kirby, Peter Sarsgaard

2 hours 20 minutes

The story of Gareth Jones is such a fascinating one, built on such intrepid, one-man-against-the-system ideals, that it's a wonder it hasn't been filmed into oblivion over the past 80 years. A young Welsh journalist who blew the first public whistle on the

Holodomor — the man-made famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine — only to be broadly discredited by his professional peers and murdered before his 30th birthday, he was the quintessential man who knew too much. “Mr. Jones,” Agnieszka Holland’s suitably absorbing but somewhat stuffy biopic, knows too much in a different sense: neophyte screenwriter Andrea Chalupa’s plainly well-researched script is at such pains to put all its fact-finding on the screen that what should be an urgent political thriller proceeds at a bit of a trudge, its human dimensions not always clear in the ultra-low lighting.

A far stricter edit of this baggy 140-minute film would solve a number of its problems, but the good news is that “Mr. Jones” gets better and more soul-stirring as it goes along. After a particularly murky opening act detailing Jones’s embattled time in Britain’s Foreign Office, things slowly gather pace once he heads for Russia, peaking with a staggering, visceral stretch of survivalist drama in the frozen farmlands of Ukraine — where Holland’s aptitude for skin-prickling visual storytelling finally comes to the fore. James Norton’s plucky, deeply invested performance as Jones is good company even when the film around him is at its most opaque; that asset, plus fine supporting work from Peter Sarsgaard and “The Crown” breakout Vanessa Kirby as more questionably embedded Moscow journos, lends luster to a film that rather hides its commercial light under a bushel.

For the film’s first few minutes, some casual viewers may wonder if they’ve inadvertently wandered into a George Orwell biopic instead: The film opens on Joseph Mawle’s ripe impersonation of the socialist author, clattering away at a typewriter as he develops the idea for “Animal Farm.” A separate arc of the film follows how the novel grew from Orwell’s disillusionment with Stalinism, fed in turn by Jones’s findings — an intriguing aspect of the journalist’s legacy, certainly, but presented here in clunkily literal fashion, right down to corny cutaways of a vexed Orwell whittling wooden models of farmyard animals.

It’s a relief when Jones takes center stage, his valiant lone-wolf credentials established in a scene that finds the 27-year-old — then a foreign advisor to Prime Minister David Lloyd George (Kenneth Cranham) — laughed out of the room by smoke-belching cabinet ministers when he suggests that war with Nazi Germany is imminent. (As with the Orwell subplot, Chalupa’s script revels in thick applications of dramatic irony.) He loses his Whitehall job, but secures a journalist’s visa to Russia, certain there’s a bigger story to be found there than the mollifying, pro-Stalin reports being churned out by Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times writer Walter Duranty (Sarsgaard, cast to slithery perfection). Circumspect British journo Ada Brooks — played by Kirby with vulnerably cracked femme fatale hauteur — offers him sympathetic but ambiguous counsel.

Even Ada doesn’t share Jones’s conviction that Stalin’s brand of socialism is masking mass human suffering beyond the bright lights of Moscow, where Duranty effectively controls global understanding of the region — in between attending to a louche circuit of heroin-fueled society parties. (Chalk up another point the film is loath to make without an extended illustrative set piece.)

Jones's only recourse is to defy foreign commissar Maxim Litvinov (Krzysztof Pieczynski) and journey to Ukraine himself, where even he is unprepared for the genocidal scale of death and starvation that greets him. His navigation of this ruined winter landscape could be a full film in itself. With Chalupa's dialogue at last pared to the bone, Holland likewise sheds her fussiest stylistic mannerisms to isolate haunting sensory specifics: the crunch of unpopulated snow, captured in blinding widescreen ribbons by d.p. Tomasz Naumiuk; the piercing wail of an abandoned infant; the palpable cold of every visible surface, raising gooseflesh even in a heated movie theater.

Nothing else in "Mr. Jones" quite matches this haunting, symphonic sequence for sheer emotional impact and narrative intensity, though the perilous aftermath of Jones' investigation cues a shift into rousing, clenched-fist conspiracy drama. Even when the filmmaking sinks back into relative dourness, Holland and Chalupa deserve credit for not soft-pedaling the politics in a slab of history that could have been blandly packaged as "Imitation Game"-style awards bait, while the film's expressionist visual style — all vertiginous low angles and vast blankets of shadow, with occasional frantic flurries of handheld lensing — offers challenges of its own. The powerful contemporary resonance of a story that veritably hinges on the dangers of "fake news" and its devastating consequences, meanwhile, hardly needs to be explained. As drama, "Mr. Jones" sometimes struggles to get out of its own way, but its message still lands with concrete force.

Berlin Film Review: 'Mr. Jones'

Reviewed at Berlin Film Festival (competing), Jan. 9, 2019. Running time: **140 min.**

Production: (Poland-Ukraine-U.K.) A Film Produkcja, Parkhurst presentation in association with NEM Corp. (International sales: West End Films, London.) Producers: Klaudia Śmieja-Rostworowska, Stanisław Dziedzic, Andrea Chalupa. Executive producer: Leah Temerty-Lord. Co-producers: Angus Lamont, Egor Olesov.

Crew: Director: Agnieszka Holland. Screenplay: Andrea Chalupa. Camera (color, widescreen): Tomasz Naumiuk. Editor: Michał Czarnecki. Music: Antoni Komasa-Łazarkiewicz.

With: James Norton, Vanessa Kirby, Peter Sarsgaard, Joseph Mawle, Kenneth Cranham, Krzysztof Pieczynski, Celyn Jones, Patricia Volny. (English, Russian, Ukrainian, Welsh dialogue)

#11

COMPLETED: Restoration of 1983 Symposium/Conference Famine Archives

REPORT: Saving Archives in Montreal from 1983 on the 1932-33 Holodomor AVAILABLE ONLINE.

Yurij Luhovy, project director

2330 ave Beaconsfield, Montreal, Quebec H4A 2G8 E-mail: mmlinc@hotmail.com

The project entailed restoring and safeguarding the unique, historical archival material of the *first international Symposium on the 1933 Famine in Soviet Ukraine*, held on March 25-26, 1983 at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), undertaken by Yurij Luhovy and Zorianna Hrycenko-Luhova and their team.

Refer to complete list of presenters, their topic, length of each section.

Online are a total of 22 sections, speaker & topic identified, with codes.

Their paper was delivered in English, French or Ukrainian.

Section with the Symposium's question and answer period included.

The aim of this project was to make accessible materials on the early work on the Holodomor. This restoration project provides a unique record of the early work conducted in the diaspora on the 1932-1933 Famine-Genocide, during a time when the Soviet Union was still denying the famine, when archives in the Soviet Union were not accessible, and survivors were afraid to talk.

The two-day 1983 Symposium on the Ukraine Famine, organized by Prof. Roman Serbyn and Dr. Bohdan Krawchenko, was co-sponsored by Interuniversity Centre of European Studies (ICES), comprised of four Montreal universities, including the University of Montreal, McGill University, Concordia University and UQAM, together with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.

The 1983 Symposium held in Montreal was filmed by a crew from University of Concordia comprised of Peter Blyszczak and his team, directed by Yurij Luhovy.

THE RESTORATION PROCESS

The Symposium speakers were filmed on U-MATIC ¾" videotape. This format, now discontinued, put the community at risk of losing these historic archives, since they were in a very fragile state, in danger of disintegrating and disappearing.

The Symposium restoration work entailed transferring the 14 one-hour U-MATIC tapes to DVD. Because the tapes became extremely brittle with the passing of time, each tape required constant attention to avoid breaking. The accumulation of magnetic oxide particles required cleaning the video heads every few minutes.

Once successfully transferred to DVD, each shot which had faded with time, had to be color corrected, thereby enhancing the original as much as possible, to keep the quality of the original taping. Editing was required.

The restoration project included the Symposium's official opening remarks. In the introduction to the 1983 Symposium, Prof. Russell Breen, Vice-Rector Academics of Montreal Concordia University, stated: "The theme, indeed a challenging one, the 1933 little known though, man-made event, stands as a further example of man's inhumanity throughout history. ...Your task, to attempt an understanding of this important event in the highest spirit of scholarly inquiry and with sensitivity and intellectual rigor it requires, I am confident you will perform the task well."

Prof. Michel Grenon, Director of ICES stated in 1983, "... scholars must eventually come to terms with the obscurity which still shrouds this event. In other words, how can a historical fact of such magnitude be obfuscated?"

Yurij Luhovy: "Had it not been for the far-sighted decision to film this Symposium in the 1980's, there would not be a lasting record of the proceedings over three decades later."

Prof. Roman Serbyn: "The uniqueness of the conference lay in the fact that it examined not only Stalin's starvation of the Ukrainian farmers but also the destruction of the Ukrainian national elites, the Ukrainian church, language, culture – all the qualities that made Ukrainians a nation and a culture."

The restoration project, has links to other sites on the Holodomor. Materials can be incorporated in the current Holodomor educational and awareness efforts.

PHASE 2 OF PROJECT

Having completed restoring the proceedings of the 1983 Symposium, *work continues on* 1/ conserving the Montreal public panel presentations held the day following, as well as 2/ work on restoring early interviews conducted with famine survivors in Montreal and additional survivors in Toronto. The eye-witness testimonies were filmed by Yurij Luhovy with the assistance of Volodymyr Hayduk, coordinated by Zorianna Hrycenko.

Oral history helps to reconstruct the past, enriches historical knowledge, and brings to life the voices and experiences of the genocide survivors, thus preserving historical memory for future generations.

LIST OF PRESENTERS AT THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE 1932-1933 FAMINE IN SOVIET UKRAINE, UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTREAL, MARCH 25 - 26, 1983

1. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine in Montreal, Canada, March 25 & 26, 1983. Intro by Dr. Russel Breen, Vice-Rector Concordia Univ, Prof. Michel Grenon, Univ. du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) Videotaped on U-Matic 3/4» (4 min 59 sec)

<https://youtu.be/v6S5l2eoz24>

2. “The Man-Made Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine”. Dr. James E. Mace, Harvard University, USA. March 25, 1983. Symposium organized by Prof. Roman Serbyn, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and Prof. Bohdan Krawchenko, University of Alberta. In English - en anglais (24 min 59 sec)

<https://youtu.be/l3pgcWGvtEw>

3. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Prof. Jaques Mascotto, UQÀM: “L’ogre a faim: position de la Famine-Génocide en Ukraine soviétique dans le ventre de la dictature”. In French - en français. (19 min 35 sec)

<https://youtu.be/Q3MSfKe59Lw>

4. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Prof. Bohdan Krawchenko,” Le Parti Communiste d’Ukraine et la Famine de 1932-1933”. In French - en français. (20 min 24 sec)

https://youtu.be/VQG_wOaOB8c

5. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. First question period. Prof. Bohdan Krawchenko, Univ. of Alberta, Prof. Jaques Mascotto, UQAM, Dr. James Mace, Harvard Univ., Prof Roman Serbyn, UQAM, Prof. Jacques Lévesque, UQAM. In English and French. (40 min 14 sec)

<https://youtu.be/QrZHENrNZYo>

6. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada , March 25, 1983. Orest Pytlar, independent researcher, New York, USA. “Reaction to the Famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukrainian Press in the West”. In English - en anglais (25 min 54 sec)

<https://youtu.be/4zi64was43A>

7. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Marco Carynnyk, researcher, writer, Toronto, Canada. "Reaction to the Famine of 1932-1933". In English - en anglais (28 min 50 sec)

<https://youtu.be/a-QJDdTXW6E>

8. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Prof. André Liebich, UQAM: "Les Menchéviques luttent en exil et la Famine de 1932-1933". In French - en français.

<https://youtu.be/yMhxeKbE7lo>

9. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. 2nd question period. Marco Carynnyk, Toronto Canada; Orest Pytlar, New York, USA; André Liebich, UQAM, Canada. In English - en anglais (12 min 38 sec)

<https://youtu.be/eLjeUF0usPE>

10. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Dr. James E. Mace, Harvard University: "How Do We Analyze the Famine of 1932-1933." In English - en anglais (23 min 40 sec)

<https://youtu.be/GoO2sdLzaU0>

11. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. Alexander Babyonyshev, University of Alberta, Canada: "Population loss in Soviet Ukraine 1926-1938". In English - en anglais (19 min 04 sec)

https://youtu.be/Ak_SBZ9DU2I

12. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983 Marco Carynnyk, Toronto, Canada: "Diplomatic archives and oral history on the Famine of 1932-1933". In English - en anglais (8 min 42 sec)

<https://youtu.be/Hrt6b7HN2mI>

13. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQAM, Qc, Canada, March 25, 1983. 3rd question period, Alexander Babyonyshev, University of Alberta, Dr. James Mace, Harvard University, Marco Carynnyk, Toronto, Prof. Wsevolod Isajiw, Univ. of Toronto, Prof. Bohdan Bociurkiw, Carleton Univ., Orest Putlar, Prof. Ivan Myhul, moderator, Bishop's University, Disrupter. In English - en anglais (37 min 33 sec)

<https://youtu.be/q-kvbnw5l4>

14. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Wsevolod Isajiw, Univ, of Toronto, Canada: “The Consequences of the Famine of 1932-1933 on the structure of the Ukrainian society”. In English - En Anglais (26 min 45 sec)

https://youtu.be/_l8dHfuX0qA

15. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Bohdan Bociurkiw, Carleton University, Canada: “Destruction of the Ukrainian Church”.
In English - En Anglais (29 min 14 sec)

<https://youtu.be/3pqe8oCmYHw>

16. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Titus Hewryk, University of Pennsylvania, USA: “The Lost Architecture of Kyiv”. Mostly voice-over as it was filmed in darkness, due to his slide presentation. In English - En Anglais (34 min 21 sec)

<https://youtu.be/-vcpoQhAWrc>

17. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Marco Carynnyk, researcher, writer, Toronto, Canada: “Ukrainian Writers and the Famine of 1932-1933”. In English - En Anglais (15 min 09 sec)

<https://youtu.be/0layixkE-Iw>

18. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Frank Chalk, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada: “Conceptualizing Genocide and Ethnocide”. In English - En Anglais. (32 min 40 sec)

<https://youtu.be/BGEuZaxlxUU>

19. 1983 Symposium Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQàM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Dr. Nina Strokata-Karavanska, New York, USA: “Malnutrition: une politique sociale de plus de 60 ans”. (“Malnutrition: A social policy for over 60 years”.) Lada Topchan translates from Ukrainian.
In French - En Français. (22 min 34 sec)

<https://youtu.be/0Q54WP8JBmQ>

20. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQÀM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Yuriy Shevelov, Columbia University, USA: “La Montée et la chute de la politique d’ukrainisation”. (“The rise and fall of the ukrainization policy”). In French - En Français (35 min 10 sec)

https://youtu.be/z_FWiPl6ZmM

21. 1983 Symposium on Famine 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine held at UQÀM, Qc, Canada, March 26, 1983. Prof. Roman Serbyn, Dept of History, UQÀM. Co-organizer of the first international Sympos

#12

Full Text of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s First Speech as President of Ukraine

Hromadske, 20 May 2019

<https://bit.ly/2HAOUPe>

Hromadske publishes unadulterated speech of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy given after the inauguration in the parliament in Kyiv, Ukraine on May 20.

Dear Ukrainians! After [my] election win, my 6-year-old son said: “Dad, I saw on TV that Zelenskyy is now the president! Does that mean I’m the president too?” Back then, it sounded like a childish joke. But then, I came to realize that it was actually the truth. Because each and every one of us is the president. Not just the 73% who voted for me, but the entire 100% of Ukrainians. This is not my victory, it’s our shared victory. And it’s our shared chance that we all bear responsibility for. And just now, it wasn’t just me who took the oath. Each one of us placed their hands on top of the Constitution, each one of us took the oath to be loyal to Ukraine. Imagine screaming headlines like: “The President does not pay his taxes,” “The President drove on the red light after drinking,” “The President steals money in secret –because that’s what everybody does.” You agree that that would be a shame. And that’s what I mean by saying that “each one of us is President.”

From today onward, each one of us has responsibility for the Ukraine that we leave behind for our children. Each one of us – being in their jobs – can do everything in their power for the development of Ukraine. A European country starts with each of us. Yes, we chose a path to Europe. But Europe is not somewhere over there. Europe is right here (points at his head, -ed.). And when Europe is right here, it will be here, too (points at his surrounding, -ed.). It will be in Ukraine. That’s our shared dream. But we also have a shared pain. Each one of us has died in the Donbas. And each day, we’re losing each one of us. Every one of us is an internally displaced person. All those who lost their homes and all those who opened up their homes to share the pain. And every one of us is a worker abroad. Yes, those who did not find themselves in their home country and went to work abroad. Those who, while fighting poverty, are forced to lose their dignity.

But we will overcome all of this. Because each one of us is a Ukrainian. We're all Ukrainians. There are no bigger or smaller [Ukrainians], proper or wrong [Ukrainians], we're all Ukrainians. From Uzhhorod to Luhansk. From Chernihiv to Simferopol. In Lviv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. In Dnipro and Odesa. We're all Ukrainians. And we need to stay united because that's the only way to stay strong.

Today, I address all the Ukrainians in the world. There's 65 million of us. Don't be so surprised – yes, there are 65 million of us. All those who were brought to life by the Ukrainian land. The Ukrainians in Europe and Asia, in North and South America, in Australia and Africa. I address all the Ukrainians on this planet: we really need you. All those who are prepared to build a new, strong and successful Ukraine – I will happily provide you with a Ukrainian citizenship. You shouldn't be coming “to visit” Ukraine, you should be coming home. We're waiting for you. Don't bring souvenirs from abroad, please bring your knowledge, experience, and mental values [instead.] All of this will help us start a new epoch. The skeptics will say that it's a fantasy and it's impossible. But maybe that is our national idea: to do the impossible by uniting together. In spite of everything.

Think about the Icelandic national team during the European football championship. When a dentist, a film director, a pilot, a student, and a cleaner fought together and defended their country's dignity. And they managed to do it successfully despite nobody believing in them.

That is our path. We need to become the Icelandic in football, the Israelis in defending their rightful land, the Japanese in terms of technology, the Swiss in terms of knowing how to co-exist happily with each other despite any differences. Our first task is to end fire in the Donbas (the whole audience in the parliament stands up and applauds after these words, -ed.).

I've often been asked what I'm prepared to do in order to stop fire. It's a strange question. What are you, the Ukrainians, prepared to lose for the lives of the people close to you, what? I can assure that in order for our heroes to stop dying I am ready to do everything. And I am definitely not afraid to make difficult decisions, not afraid to lose my own popularity, my ratings. And if there's a need I'm prepared to give up my own position – as long as peace arrives. But without giving up our territories – ever (people stand up and applaud again, -ed.).

History is not fair, that's true. It wasn't us who started this war, it wasn't us. But it's our job to end it. And we're ready for a dialogue. But (switches to Russian at this point, probably for the Russians to understand, -ed.) I'm confident that the first step for this dialogue to take place would be the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war.

(Switches back to Ukrainian, -ed.:) Our next challenge is to return the lost territories. But, to be honest, I don't think such wording is correct since it's impossible to lose something that rightfully belongs to us. Both Crimea and Donbas are Ukrainian lands. We didn't just lose the territories, we lost the most important thing: the people. (Switches to Russian

again, -ed.)) Today, we just must – I’m sure they’re listening to us – to get their conscience back. We lost this conscience. All these years, the government has not done anything to make them feel Ukrainian.

(Switches back to Ukrainian, -ed.)) They’re not foreign, they’re our people, they’re Ukrainians. Excuse me? (Zelenskyy addresses MP Oleh Lyashko in the parliament who shouted that the people in the Donbas and Crimea can understand Ukrainian, -ed.) They understand Ukrainian? Really? Thank you very much. Thanks for carrying on dividing the nation, Mr. Lyashko. Because a Ukrainian... I want to say: yes, we’re all Ukrainians. Regardless of where we live because Ukrainian is not what’s written in your passport. Ukrainian is what’s right here (points at his heart, -ed.). And that’s it.

I know this for sure. I know this from the soldiers who defend Ukraine, from our heroes. Both the Ukrainian- and the Russian-speaking ones. There’s no such thing as a strong army – I want to address them – there’s no such thing as a strong army in places where a government does not respect the people who give up their lives for their own country every day.

I will do everything so that you feel this respect. That means a worthy and, most importantly, stable financial support. It’s your living conditions. It’s your legal vacations after carrying out military tasks. Vacations for you and your families. We need not to talk about the NATO standards, but to create them – to create these standards.

Of course, apart from the war, there are many other problems here that make Ukrainians unhappy. I’m talking about the shocking tariffs, humiliating salaries and pensions, painful prices, the absence of job opportunities. It’s the healthcare the improvement of which is only talked about by those who never had to stay in a regular hospital with a child. It’s the infamous Ukrainian roads that are only being repaired inside someone’s imagination.

Please let me quote one American actor who turned into a great American president. The government is not here to solve all our problems, the government is our problem. It’s just a quote.

And to be honest, I don’t understand our government when all it does is shrugs and says “there’s nothing we can do.” That’s not true, you can. You can take a piece of paper and a pen and free your seats in favor of all those who will think about the next generations and not about the next elections. I think that the people will appreciate [this step.] Somehow, only some of you are applauding, I’m speaking from the nation, please...

My election [as president] only proves that the citizens are tired of the experienced politicians who over the past 28 years created a country of opportunities – opportunities to steal, bribe and loot. Let’s build a country of other opportunities. Where everybody is equal before the law and where the rules of the game are honest and transparent, that are the same for everyone. And for this to happen, people who want to serve the nation, need to take office. And please, I really don’t want you to hang my portraits on your office walls.

Because a president is not an icon and not an idol. A president is not a portrait. Hang pictures of your children. And before you make any decision, look into their eyes.

You know, I could talk a lot more but I know that Ukrainians want actions, not words. Therefore, dear lawmakers... You yourselves have chosen Monday to be the inauguration day, a weekday. I see a pro in this. This means we won't party but we will work instead. So I'm asking you to please adopt the law on canceling the parliamentary immunity, the law on criminal responsibility for illegal enrichment, the much-anticipated electoral code. And please make the lists open to the public.

And please, I'm asking you to dismiss the following people: the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine. And that's far from all you can do. But that would be a good enough start. I give you two months to do that, you have two months for that. Please do that and then get yourselves medals. And this is a good chance to announce snap parliamentary elections. I'm dissolving the Ukrainian Parliament of the 8th convocation.

Glory to Ukraine!

Thank you all! As far as I understand, you've all just consulted already. And the last thing, in short. Dear nation, throughout my life, I've been trying to do everything for Ukrainians to smile. I felt with my heart that it wasn't just my job, it was my mission. In the next five years, I will do everything so that you, Ukrainians, don't cry. Thank you.

#13

Cultural Recovery: Zelensky, the Post-Soviet Man

by Peter Pomerantsev

The American Interest, 6 May 2019

<https://bit.ly/30HtBD8>

Part of Zelensky's appeal is that he offers a way for people who still feel close to Soviet and Russian pop culture to become politically European.

Peter Pomerantsev is a director of the Arena Program at the London School of Economics. He is the author of *Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia*, which won the Royal Society of Literature Ondaatje Prize.

In the early 2000s I arrived at graduate film school in Moscow thinking I would be surrounded by brooding lovers of avant garde Soviet cinema, devotees of the evasive spiritual allegories of Tarkovsky or the high-art agitprop of Sergey Eisenstein. To my surprise, most of my mature co-students-many of whom were from outside Moscow, as well as from the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Ukraine-were more interested in imitating the

bittersweet psychological dramas of the late Soviet era. The films they loved were quietly anti-Soviet in that they shunned great power narratives in preference for private stories about love and friendship. The heroes of these films were often humble, tired men looking for the sparks of values—friendship, loyalty, love—in a somewhat cynical, cold world.

I was reminded strongly of these 1970s Soviet movies when I began watching the new Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky's, television series *Servant of the People*, where, as I'm sure you've heard, he plays a humble school teacher who accidentally becomes President. The utterly lovely opening song, with its easy melody and friendly irony, is right out of a late Soviet film:

I love my country, my, wife, my dog

I already have everything I need, decency and honor...

Zelensky's character, the school teacher Goloborodko, is an archetypal 1970s crumpled male: His wife has left him; he lives with his parents in the most Soviet-looking apartment one could possibly imagine; the characters in the communal courtyard seem to have wandered out of Mosfilm central casting.

Thrust into the cynicism of government-level politics, Goloborodko is the late Soviet “decent” everyman trying to preserve his values in a mean world. His guides are great historical figures who advise him how to behave in dreams, such as Plutarch and Abraham Lincoln. They are largely from the Western canon of democratic heroes (Ukrainian historical characters only appear late in season 2). Thus the positive part of the Soviet cultural legacy is fused with aspiration for a Western-style government and global history.

As the very sharp Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko first noted to me, part of Zelensky's appeal is that he offers a way for people who still feel close to Soviet and Russian pop culture to become politically European. This is attractive to many. Since 1991 the main way to head towards “Europe” in Ukraine was a post-colonial Ukrainian identity, centered, like many 19th- and 20th-century national-liberation projects, around language and memories of martyrs sacrificed in the name of independence over many centuries of imperial oppression—an approach that the previous President Poroshenko tried to encapsulate with his election slogan “Army, Language, Religion.” With Zelensky's approach, one can be “European” while retaining the attributes of late Soviet culture.

This process can upset those who have risked, sacrificed, and staked much on the project of Ukrainian national liberation over the centuries. But it is also potentially subversive for Putin's cultural model of the Russian world too: It opens a space where you can take the positive associations of Soviet culture and fuse them with a desire for democracy. The great, late 1970s Soviet films are still shown in prime time TV slots in Russia and beamed to Russian speakers in the post-Soviet “near abroad.” The emotions they capture—that desire for values in a cynical world—still resonate. By screening them next to Putin TV's ultra-propaganda with its sneering, sarcastic tone, the Kremlin has managed to co-opt the

wistful yearning for decency of the older Soviet films with geopolitical ambitions: Come for the lovely, gentle movies that prove you have a soul, stay for the spittle-laden current affairs show brimming with hate that satisfies other needs.

This has been the skill of the Kremlin: to own both the snarling cynicism of Great Power Bullying and its emotional critique—simultaneously to own arrogance and humbleness, so the whole rainbow of experiences can be subsumed into one great Russian World of feeling where all emotional roads and cultural associations lead to the Kremlin. Breaking the Kremlin’s emotional geography on all ways to think and feel in Russian, to feel a connection to the past, is an important and subversive project.

And it could resonate in other countries once colonized by Moscow, where large parts of the Russian-speaking population, descendants of peoples moved there by Soviet population shift, find themselves caught up in local national liberation projects which by definition they struggle to belong to. I have met “Russian minority” Latvians and Estonians who are completely loyal to their Baltic homelands politically, but feel adrift in terms of culture, not wanting to be part of Putin’s “Russian World” but also unable to find a steady sense of self in the national liberation projects around them. It’s a challenge that is producing a generation of very interesting writers and poets who deal with the question of how to be simultaneously Latvian, Estonian, Russian, and European in ways more subtle, if less popular, than Zelensky.

Just to be clear: I’m making no comment here about Zelensky’s politics, which are perturbingly opaque. Though he speaks of “fighting corruption,” it is as yet unclear if part of his appeal is not more reforms but actually undoing the few that have taken place already, which, like securing independence from Russian energy flows, have been hard and expensive for people. The more experienced Ukrainian experts I have spoken to roll their eyes at all the identity dramas I have discussed in this piece. Zelensky, they fear, is just another layer of cover for another set of clans to exploit the country.

#14

Brotherly Ukraine Answers Back

by Thomas de Waal
Carnegie Europe, 7 May 2019
<https://bit.ly/2M47bIP>

The delight in Moscow at seeing the back of Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko has not lasted long.

In Volodymyr Zelenskyy the Russian leadership got the kind of Ukrainian leader it said it wanted—a Russian speaker from outside the old political elite, who talked more emollient

language about the Donbass conflict. Some corresponding Western comments portrayed a Zelenskiy win as a victory for the Kremlin.

This notion vanished on first contact with reality. In his first victory speech, Zelenskiy encouraged Russian voters to wake from their slumbers, saying, “as a citizen of Ukraine, I can say to all countries in the post-Soviet Union look at us. Anything is possible!” The warmest response in Russia to Zelenskiy’s victory came not from the Kremlin but from opposition leader Alexei Navalny (the two men are almost exact contemporaries) who praised Ukrainians for their exercise in democracy.

Putin followed up with an extreme provocation, offering Russian passports to residents of the two Moscow-backed breakaway territories in eastern Ukraine. In answer to this, outgoing Petro Poroshenko would probably have doubled down on patriotic rhetoric. In the first shot of what has been called a game of state-level ping-pong, Zelenskiy’s response was masterful. He announced that he was offering Ukrainian passports to dissident Russians, then, in a measured Facebook post, told Russians why his was a much better offer than Putin’s.

“Ukraine is different in particular because we Ukrainians have freedom of speech, a free media, and internet in our country. Which is why we clearly understand what a Russian passport really offers someone: the right to be arrested for a peaceful protest; the right to not have free and competitive elections; the right to forget about your natural rights and human freedoms.”

The medium was as important as the message itself, being conveyed in both Ukrainian and Russian.

Ukraine’s language politics since independence has been, to put it mildly, a mess. Under Poroshenko there has been a new push to cement Ukrainian as the language of the state, while offering far too little to the millions who still speak Russian by choice. A new language law, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, on April 26, made use of the Ukrainian language in public places, businesses, the media, and education mandatory. Zelenskiy was critical, saying that “the government should enable development of the Ukrainian language by establishing stimuli and positive examples, and not bans and punishments.”

A native of eastern Ukraine, Zelenskiy belongs to the social group that mixes the two languages freely, who do not like Russia but still speak it as their first language of choice. In “Servant of the People,” the sitcom that propelled him to the presidency, most of the characters speak Russian, while switching back and forth to Ukrainian. Essentially this is a rejection of the flawed notion, shared by both Ukrainian nationalists and Russian politicians, that using the Russian language in Ukraine constitutes a political affiliation to Russia.

If he gets the chance, we can expect Zelenskiy to promote a more nuanced language policy, promoting Ukrainian as the state language but without seeking to penalize use of Russian.

How much does this matter? Raw power matters more, people will say, and Russian military hardware is still in the Donbass. The Russian establishment will find ways of undermining Zelenskiy. No doubt we will hear a Russian media message that the new president is “hostage” of establishment hardlines.

It does matter, however, because Ukraine policy in Russia is about more than the elite. The public has a view too, and consistently a more pacific one than its leaders. Since 2014, Putin has spun the idea that Russia is an embattled fortress, with Ukraine its most hostile frontline state. The message is that “brotherly Ukraine” was captured in a coup d’état by pro-Western stooges who are trying to drag their country into NATO and oppress its Russian speakers.

Putin told American correspondent Charlie Rose in 2015, “[Ukraine] is our closest neighbor. We’ve always said that this is our sister country...What I believe is absolutely unacceptable is the resolution of internal political issues in the former USSR Republics, through “color revolutions,” through coup d’état, through unconstitutional removal of power.”

A smiling Ukrainian leader, with a big democratic mandate, rejecting Russian state aggression but reaching out to the Russian public in its own language, makes a mockery of this narrative.

The evolution of Georgia since 2012, the year it voted out the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, is an interesting precedent.

The Georgian Dream government has fashioned a fairly successful dual-track policy of distinguishing between the Russian political elite and Russian society as a whole. On a high state level, since the 2008 war, Tbilisi has kept diplomatic relations with Moscow suspended and defended its red lines on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Georgia’s recent leaders have refrained from Saakashvili’s inflammatory rhetoric and have cultivated trade and tourism. Up to one million Russian tourists visited Georgia last year.

Russian attitudes to Georgia have changed, surely in large part due to this deployment of Georgian charm. Levada Center polls show a precipitate drop in the number of Russians who consider Georgia to be an “enemy country”—from 62 percent in 2009 to 8 percent in 2018.

The Kremlin can still try and pick a fight with Georgia, and intervene in Ukraine, but it is not going to win any votes by doing so.

To put it another way, on a modest level in Georgia and perhaps now in Ukraine, Putin's regime is dealing with a new phenomenon—soft power from its neighbors. Beware brotherly Ukraine!

#15

What to Expect from Ukraine's Next President

by Matthew Rojansky and Mykhailo Minakov
Focus Ukraine, Wilson Center, 25 April 2019
<https://bit.ly/2WYAygM>

On April 21, Ukrainians elected a new president. He is Volodymyr Zelenskiy, an actor, comedian and political satirist, who won by a compelling margin of nearly three to one (73 percent of all votes cast and majorities in every region of the country but one). When his five year term begins next month, Zelenskiy will lead Europe's largest state by territory, a country divided by war with neighboring Russia and weary of corruption, but also wary of both external and internal "change" that could make an already difficult situation even worse.

Who is Zelenskiy and why did Ukrainians choose him?

Zelenskiy is an entertainer, a political satirist rather than a politician in any traditional sense. At 41, he is certainly young. He came of age well after the dissolution of Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence in 1991, and has therefore experienced firsthand the high hopes of the early independence years, but also the political chaos, economic collapse, and the rise of the oligarchs—people like incumbent president Petro Poroshenko and Zelenskiy's own business partner, Igor Kolomoisky.

In his television appearances, Zelenskiy has been merciless in shredding the country's corrupt, oligarch-controlled political class. The younger generation of Ukrainians is especially familiar with his comic show "Block 95," which blended slapstick comedy and variety show acts with cutting political satire. Underscoring Ukraine's traditions of free speech and pluralism, Zelenskiy's show lampooned the absurdity of Ukrainian political events and figures from the pro-Western, reformist Orange Revolution (2004-5) to the grossly corrupt Yanukovich years (2010-14). Indeed it was on television, live on New Year's Eve last year, that he announced his presidential bid.

Zelenskiy's other signature television project 'Servant of the People,' in which he plays an upright and honest schoolteacher turned president, is now also the name and the manifesto of his political party. His landslide victory, defeating the incumbent by a 3-1 margin and winning majorities in all but one region of the country, was more than anything a resounding rejection of the status quo by voters who are justifiably outraged. These voters may well see Zelenskiy's television character as far preferable to the present

political reality. As Zelenskiy himself said to Poroshenko in the pre-election debate, 'I am not your opponent, I am your sentence.'

Zelenskiy's own honesty was tested in the recent campaign: he has acknowledged his business partnership with Kolomoisky (who owns the TV channel on which Zelenskiy appears), as well his own commercial interests in Russia. When asked pointedly about Kolomoisky, Zelenskiy said that if the oligarch breaks the law in Ukraine under his presidency, he will go to jail. He also claims to have wound down his business in Russia, and rightly pointed out that president Poroshenko has had extensive business dealings in Russia during his tenure. Despite intense attacks by opponents, Zelenskiy has not suffered any loss of popularity nor shed the image of a candidate of hope shaped to a large degree by his TV personality, 'President' Holoborodko.

How will Zelenskiy's election impact the conflict in eastern Ukraine?

First, he has offered an inclusive political alternative to the nationalist policies and rhetoric of the current president. A native Russian speaker himself, Zelenskiy was seen by his electorate as preferable to president Poroshenko and his nationalist campaign slogan, "army, language, faith." In his last years in office especially, Poroshenko has pushed hard to promote the dominance of the Ukrainian language over Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism (which is widespread in the center, east and south of the country), and touted his successful bid for the Orthodox Church's independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. Meanwhile he has prosecuted a grinding and bloody war of attrition against Russian backed forces in Donbas, which has cost thousands of civilian and military lives but delivered no measurable progress on the ground.

Second, Zelenskiy has promised to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the conflict. While Poroshenko and other critics warn that the comedian would be no match for his wily Russian adversary, Ukrainians appear weary of endless conflict and hopeful that a new president can at least bring peace and a chance to rebuild, if not restoration of territories seized by Russian forces in 2014. With his overwhelming victory over Poroshenko, Zelenskiy at least comes to any negotiation – whether with Russia or with local Donbas separatists – with a powerful mandate that can strengthen his hand.

Can Zelenskiy fulfill his promises to the Ukrainian people?

Any president can deliver on promises only to the extent he is able to cooperate with the parliament (Verkhovna Rada), which enjoys considerable power under Ukraine's constitution. Zelenskiy's compelling victory sets the stage for the next phase of political competition in Ukraine's parliamentary elections (to be held in October 2019). According to a recent poll, his party has the highest level of support among all Ukrainians (26 percent). However, the party lacks any real infrastructure: it has neither members nor regional organizations, which are critical for mobilizing voters. Even if Zelenskiy's party wins a quarter of seats in the Rada in October, he will still need allies from other

factions to build a stable coalition and confirm his appointment of allies to the Cabinet of Ministers – especially to the powerful post of Prime Minister.

Without the political party infrastructure enjoyed by his vanquished presidential rivals, Zelenskiy faces the risk of not being able to deliver what is expected from him. Voters' disappointment with the slow pace of fulfilling the promises could already count against the new president by the fall, lowering his parliamentary result from the current 26% to far less and making the formation of a favorable coalition even more important. What Zelenskiy may then be ready to sacrifice to the political and oligarchic old guard to secure such a coalition and actually implement the remainder of his agenda has yet to be seen.

How does Russia see Zelenskiy?

For the Kremlin, which has not yet formally congratulated Zelenskiy on his victory, the “anyone but Poroshenko” enthusiasm appears to be shared with Ukrainian voters. On the one hand, this might reflect a cynical calculation that Ukraine under a new, inexperienced president who is determined to trash the political status quo will be a weaker adversary and thus more easily pressured and manipulated. On the other hand, Russia has shown little appetite for ‘owning’ the costly conflict it unleashed in eastern Ukraine and may be ready to settle the dispute on terms that permit outsiders, especially wealthy western countries, to step in and help reconstruct the Ukrainian economy.

Zelenskiy's focus on pursuing peace and fighting corruption would potentially facilitate these goals in the short term. In the longer term, though, Zelenskiy says he is fully committed to Ukraine's western orientation, including pursuing EU and NATO membership. These can hardly be to the Kremlin's liking, but Moscow may be willing to keep its powder dry and offer Zelenskiy some concessions just to help consolidate his defeat of Poroshenko and the national conservative constituency he represents. After all, Russia can always attack Zelenskiy with real or fake “kompromat” in the future, and can at any time escalate violence by its proxy forces in Donbas to discredit the new president as a peacemaker and demoralize his core constituents.

What does Zelenskiy's victory mean for the West?

In terms of implications for the United States and the European Union, Ukraine's election may become a critical turning point. With the Mueller investigation concluded, Ukraine remains the biggest sticking point for President Trump's long-standing goal of repairing US-Russia ties. Trump was among the first to congratulate Zelenskiy on his victory and may seek to highlight in the comedian's victory a version of his own message that only a political outsider can contain the “deep state” and deliver real change for the benefit of the majority of ordinary people.

In any case, if Zelenskiy is successful in tamping down the Donbas conflict and restoring some degree of normalcy to Ukraine's economic and political ties with Russia, then the impetus for further escalation of US sanctions on Russia will be reduced, and there will

be less tension between Washington and European capitals like Berlin and Rome, which now strongly oppose piling on new sanctions. Such steps could likewise clear the air for a Trump-Putin summit in the near future and permit progress on a long-frozen list of US-Russia priorities, from getting nuclear arms control back on track to deescalating risks around regional conflicts in Latin America, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Baltic, which would be broadly welcomed by Europeans as well.

In sum, President-elect Volodymyr Zelenskiy is for the moment more a symbol and a beneficiary of Ukrainians' rejection of the past than a figurehead for any concrete political movement or policy program. He won the election first and foremost because he is not a politician, and not a creature of the old system. But to be an effective president, he will have to master national politics and wrestle the old system into submission. Whether he can do that will depend on which domestic forces rally to his banner in the months leading up to the fall parliamentary elections, as well as on the attitudes of Washington, Moscow and European capitals. Amid Ukraine's ongoing severe economic difficulties and the costly war in the east, Zelenskiy can certainly use all the help he can get.

#16

Why We Can't Get Enough of Ukraine

By Francis Fukuyama
Atlantic Council, 6 May 2019
<https://bit.ly/2M7q39P>

The impact one can have on building institutions like the modern state, the rule of law, and democracy is limited. The area where it's easiest is the third category, building democracy. The first two, building the modern state and building a real rule of law, are much harder, and those are the areas that have been the real obstacles to the modernization of the political systems of many countries, including Ukraine. The reason that those are particularly difficult is that they're essentially about power. If you hold an election, the old guard can think we will win the election. We know how to run candidates, we can contest things, we can protect our interests. If you want to build a modern state, it's a different task. If you want to have a rule of law that applies to powerful people in a society, that is much harder because one is basically forcing them to give up power.

A lot of the well-meaning efforts of outside donors and governments to influence that process has been quite disappointing, especially in the area of corruption, which is the area I have looked at most closely. Corruption exists because it's not in the self-interest of existing elites to have things change. Elites like the status quo. Therefore, changing that system is a matter of power. It's a matter of gaining power on the part of people that are not corrupt and want a modern system. One can help that along by creating the proper kinds of incentives; one can do things like create special prosecutors, anti-corruption courts, and the like, which Ukraine has been involved in. One can try to pay people better

in the bureaucracy so that they're not as tempted to take bribes. So there some short-term things in terms of people's incentives.

But fundamentally good government is not simply this incentive structure. It's also a matter of human capital. And this is why modernizing the state in so many countries has taken a long time, because it is basically an educational project. It's a matter of the skills and knowledge and the level of education that's carried around in the heads of the people that run the government or that come in to the government and that is a long-term project.

Every effective modern bureaucracy, in Britain, in France, in Germany, in the United States, in Japan, was also connected to a big educational project in which the educational system was renovated in order to provide a whole class of people that could enter the bureaucracy, that could go into politics, and would be able to govern the country. For example, the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in Prussia after their defeat by Napoleon was connected with Wilhelm von Humboldt's reform of the German university system. The Trevelyan Northcote reforms in Britain were connected to reform of Oxford and Cambridge. The American progressive movement was built on the back of the Morrill Act creating a network of land-grant universities that trained agronomists and other people that could go into a much more professionalized American bureaucracy. This observation about the connection between education and state modernization has guided my understanding of what possible role I as a researcher could play in this process.

I have watched external donor organizations try to affect the short-term incentive structure in different countries. Empirically if one steps back from two decades of trying to fight corruption, one will see certain local victories, but in the aggregate the results have been less than transformational. On the other hand, one thing we can do is help build a new generation of professional, modern people.

So, I have been going to Ukraine a lot. In addition to this Emerging Leaders Program, I have a program called The Leadership Academy for Development, which has been supported by the Center for International Private Enterprise, where we are training people to be policy reformers. We hope to build a network and a a new generation of reform-minded younger Ukrainians. And the single thing that makes me very optimistic every time I go there is that I meet a lot of young people that really do want a different kind of country. It is going to take a lot of time but when these people come into their own and run the country, it's going to be a completely different place.

Last thing I will say is why this is important, why Ukraine. At Stanford, we receive lots of requests from different countries. As soon as Brazilians found there's a Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program, they said how about a Brazilian Emerging Leaders Program, and you know Brazil is an important country. Of course it is, but Ukraine plays an outsized role in Europe as a whole. It's both a symbol and also a geopolitical role that is much more important than other countries, other post-Soviet or post-communist countries. It has twice now made an effort to break with its Soviet past, with its authoritarian, kleptocratic

neighbor. That neighbor does not want this to happen. The Russians understand fully well how important it is that Ukraine not succeed. Ukraine's success, that it can be a democracy with real competition in politics, that it can clean up its act in terms of the way its governed, is really the critical battleground in a global situation that in the last years has not looked good for democracy.

We have seen a huge amount of backsliding in Eastern Europe. The most disappointing things have been the fate of Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic and Romania and a lot of other countries that still seem very much mired in corruption but also tempted by their own domestic forms of Putinism. And in that respect Ukraine is doing better because it still believes that Europe and the European Union and the idea that liberal democracy coupled to an open capitalist economy is still the wave of the future and the way to go.

In many ways, the way to counter Russia and Russia's long-standing imperial ambitions is to make Ukraine succeed. That's the single thing Western powers can do that's going to make a big difference in Ukraine's struggle.

Francis Fukuyama is Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Mosbacher Director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. Editor's note: This essay was a speech that Fukuyama gave at the Atlantic Council on April 18. It has been edited with the author's permission. Atlantic Council intern Katherine Hewitt transcribed Fukuyama's remarks.

#17

Ukraine's State Language Law Enshrines the Lingua Franca

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16 May 2019
<https://bit.ly/2X3GTay>

On May 15, Ukraine's outgoing president, Petro Poroshenko, promulgated the "Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language." The accompanying communique characterizes this law as "one of the fundamental acts in the formation of Ukrainian statehood" (Ukrayinska Pravda, May 15).

The long-debated language law is a centerpiece of Ukraine's post-Maidan transformation, alongside such nation-building gains as the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the establishment of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (see EDM, September 13, 2018; March 11, 2019). These processes consummate Ukraine's break with the Russian metropolis. In this perspective, the language law strengthens the efforts to reverse the centuries-long russification of Ukraine. After 1991, Ukrainian state weakness and the persisting ascendancy of the Russian language on the psycho-social

level prevented the Ukrainian language from assuming the normal functions of a *lingua franca* in Ukraine's public sphere. Moreover, Ukraine remained fully exposed to the impact of Russia's far more powerful mass media and mass-culture products until 2014. The regime change and Russia's war at last inspired measures to protect and promote the Ukrainian language as a state-building foundation.

The Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) adopted the language law on April 25, 2019, with 278 votes in favor, 38 opposed, and the remainder seemingly uncommitted in the 450-seat chamber. Motions by the pro-Russia opposition to block the law's promulgation were defeated by similar margins on May 14 (Ukrinform, April 25, May 14). The less-than-overwhelming majority is illustrative of the inertia that the de-russification process still encounters in some sections of Ukraine's society. At the same time, the constituency actively defending the legacy of russification has dwindled, as the balance of political forces has shifted. For comparison, the 2012 language law, which favored the Russian language, was adopted with the votes of 248 deputies in the Verkhovna Rada at that time (Ukrayinska Pravda, June 6, 2012).

The just-promulgated law (Ukrinform, April 25; Golos Ukrayiny, May 16) obligates state officialdom to be capable of speaking the state language, and to use it in the performance of their official duties. The officials covered by this legislation range from the head of state, prime minister, ministers and heads of government departments, members of parliament, heads of state institutions and enterprises, and on down to civil servants, judges and notaries, police officers, professors and teachers in the public education system, postal workers, as well as medical personnel in state and municipal health care institutions.

Law enforcement, medical, and other personnel providing public services are, however, free to use languages other than Ukrainian when dealing with persons who cannot speak Ukrainian. State officials and civil servants in those categories are given a three-year transition period to learn the Ukrainian language with state assistance (see below). These provisions are meant, in part, to remedy a uniquely Ukrainian linguistic imbalance. Russian remained the primary language of political elites (in interconnection with the business elites) in Ukraine long after 1991. Of all the presidents and prime ministers of this era (21 persons in toto), only one president (Viktor Yushchenko) and one prime minister (Arseniy Yatseniuk) are Ukrainophone in terms of native language and language of first choice. Several of Ukraine's leaders (e.g., Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Groysman) chose to switch from Russophone to Ukrainophone as their preferred language. Ukraine's industrial-financial "oligarchs" are all Russophone, as is the business sphere generally (this language law does not affect the private sphere).

This law introduces a state program to assist in learning the Ukrainian language, to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The state program shall sponsor courses to help achieve Ukrainian language fluency for adults who did not have such an opportunity until now.

Under this law, foreign citizens who apply for Ukrainian citizenship will have to pass a Ukrainian language test. Foreigners serving in Ukraine's armed forces and applying for citizenship shall have that test deferred by one year.

The law regulates the use of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian language content in television and radio broadcasting, printed publications, IT systems, as well as advertising in these types of media. Ukrainian-produced print media in "other" languages (meaning, primarily, Russian) must offer a parallel, Ukrainian-language print run. (Many Ukrainian-language media outlets of all types offer parallel Russian-language versions). At least 50 percent of printed publications offered in each retail distribution site should be in Ukrainian. Breaches, such as exceeding the proportion of non-Ukrainian language content in audio-visual media, are punishable by fines. Insulting the Ukrainian language in public is deemed a criminal liability and may result in prison terms.

This law establishes a National Commission on State Language Standards and, in parallel, a Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, both under the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Commission is mandated to define requirements for language proficiency and conduct the testing. The Commissioner's office shall consider complaints and impose fines for breaches of this law, mainly in the sphere of consumer services.

While regulating the public use of the Ukrainian language, this law (or any other) does not apply to private communications, the business sphere, or the use of national minority languages. These and other languages shall be freely used in the cultural life of national minorities, religious rites, academic publications, as well as publications in English and the other languages of the European Union, regardless of whether those publications include texts in Ukrainian or not.

Ukrainian society and members of parliament had debated the terms of such legislation literally from the next day after the EuroMaidan-precipitated regime change. The Verkhovna Rada adopted the first draft in October 2018. In total, no fewer than 2,000 amendments were considered until the law was finally adopted on April 25 (see above). In his message on this occasion, Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman commented that Ukraine honors its ethnic and linguistic pluralism, "but our state language can only be one—Ukrainian—which we must protect and develop. Esteem of the state language is self-esteem" (Liga.ua, April 25).

President-Elect Volodymyr Zelensky's message (via his campaign team) has straddled the issue, apparently seeking to hold together his heterogenous electorate. Inaccurately claiming that this law was adopted "hastily" and that it had been prompted by electoral considerations, Zelensky's message nevertheless fully endorsed the status of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language deserving of state support. But he objected to the penalties contained in this law, and promised to undertake a "thorough analysis" as soon as he takes office as president (Ukrinform, April 25). In his entertainer's career, Zelensky has a track record for satirizing (among many other things) Ukrainian national values, even in front of Russian audiences. As a presidential hopeful, in October 2018 he criticized the Ukrainian authorities' language policy for "dictating" to Ukrainians what to

watch and “how to speak” (BBC Monitoring, November 13, 2018). As president, however, Zelensky will undoubtedly become respectful of Ukrainian national values.

#18

Half of Ukrainians Identify with Orthodox Church of Ukraine; Only One in Seven with Moscow Jurisdiction, Poll Shows

by Paul Goble

Windows on Eurasia, 22 May 2019

<https://bit.ly/2Wj8qb8>

Staunton – A new poll shows that 48.8 percent of Ukrainians identify with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine while only 14.2 percent say they are followers of the Moscow Patriarchate Church in Ukraine. 16.3 percent say they’re Orthodox without identifying a jurisdiction, 4.3 percent identify as atheists, and 4.9 percent are followers of other confessions.

This poll reflects the fact that while the number of parishes still part of the Moscow Patriarchate’s organization is still very much larger than that of those affiliated with the OCU, the number of participants in the former is much smaller than in the latter.

The survey also found that 64.5 percent consider the tomos or grant of autocephaly is sufficient for the development of an independent Ukrainian church and that the grant should not be rejected, while 8.8 percent disagree and call for restoring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Perhaps significantly one in four did not answer this question.

As to the impact of autocephaly, 50.6 percent of those queried said it unified society, while 30.5 percent said on the contrary that it is divisive. Again, a large share did not answer – 18.9 percent or nearly one in five.

Yesterday, in another Ukrainian church development likely to have an impact on the shift of parishes and bishoprics from the Moscow church to the OCU, Metropolitan Ioann of Cherkass announced that from now on each parish will keep a list of members on the basis of declarations by them.

That list will not be used to exclude anyone who wants to take part in religious services, but it will, the metropolitan said, determine who will be able to vote on the affiliation of the parish. As a result, the compilation of these lists is likely to become a new flashpoint in the fight between the OCU and the Moscow church.

#19

“A Good Career, if I Satisfied Him.” Ukraine Fights Sexual Abuse, and a War

by Iuliia Mendel

New York Times, 19 May 2019

<https://nyti.ms/2Etslv5>

VINNYTSIA, Ukraine — On her first day of service as a commissioned officer of the Ukrainian military, Lt. Valeria Sikal reported for duty at her base and received an unusual order.

She said the commander, Col. Viktor Ivaniv, ordered her to accompany him in his personal car for a trip to a summerhouse to meet a friend, who turned out to be a local police chief.

The colonel then “ordered me to sit beside him,” and though he was her commanding officer, he “tried to touch me and patted my leg,” said Lieutenant Sikal, who is 24 and has become the first woman to speak out about sexual harassment in the Ukrainian Army.

“He promised me a good career if I satisfied him,” she said of the episode in January 2018. “I felt like a whore. He was bragging that he could do anything he wanted with us.”

Colonel Ivaniv, who declined to be interviewed for this article and has denied engaging in any abuse, has retained his command. A Defense Ministry spokesman, Col. Bohdan Senyk, said that the base commander faced accusations but they had not been proved in court.

“Anyone can be accused,” he said. “Men also accuse women.”

The country’s military, poor and under tremendous pressure from a smoldering war with Russian-backed rebels, is admired for recent changes that have greatly improved its professionalism and battlefield resilience. The United States has provided more than \$1 billion to the Ukrainian Army since 2014. But sexual harassment remains an unacknowledged problem.

Formally, the military has promoted attempts to improve gender equality. In 2018, it expanded a list of positions that women can hold to gunners on armored vehicles, snipers and infantry commanders. Sexual harassment is illegal in Ukraine, in private companies and the military. Under the law, superior officers who coerce subordinates into sexual relationships can be jailed for up to six months.

Yet, while 57,000 women currently work in the Ukrainian military, with 26,000 on active duty, the authorities last year registered only five sexual harassment cases, including Lieutenant Sikal’s. In the course of the five-year war, no top army commander has ever been disciplined for sexual abuse.

Though sexual abuse in the army is widespread, Ukrainian rights groups say, it is typically overlooked in a society reluctant to criticize soldiers during a war.

That has led to an agreed conspiracy of silence, said an activist, Vitaly Pavlovsky, director of the nongovernmental group Auditing Authority. If victims speak out, he said, they risk dismissal and the loss of their military housing.

“To prove harassment, a victim must find like-minded people or other victims who will be ready to risk their careers,” he said. They must “be ready for conflicts in the family and to be attacked in public,” as was the case with Lieutenant Sikal.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is reluctant to prosecute sexual abuse in the ranks, Mr. Pavlovsky said, for fear of damaging the image of the army. But protecting abusive officers, he said, only “creates an impotent and weak army, physically and in spirit.”

Bolstering Lieutenant Sikal’s case, seven other women have told investigators about alleged sexual harassment by Colonel Ivaniv, according to transcripts provided to a military office that looks into morale problems in the army, but does have authority to press charges. One woman said he had forced her to sleep with a general, according to the transcripts. Another said she resorted to asking her male relatives to help protect her from him.

Colonel Ivaniv’s former deputy, Lt. Col. Viktor Mishchuk, said he had been compelled to carry out demeaning and abusive orders on behalf of the colonel.

“Ivaniv noticed that a girl had three earrings in one ear,” he said in a phone interview. “He asked me to check if she had piercings on her breasts,” as well. “With his actions, he humiliates the honor and dignity of a Ukrainian military officer.”

Women harassed at work say they do not trust the authorities to take their side, so few report the episodes. “Unfortunately, this is a problem not only of the Ukrainian Army, but of our society,” said Alona Kryvuliak of La Strada Ukraine, a group opposing gender discrimination. “These cases kill the inner motivation for women to seek help.”

Ukraine, of course, is hardly the only country with sexual abuse in the military. This year, Senator Martha McSally, an Arizona Republican who was the first American female fighter pilot to fly in combat, told a committee hearing that a superior officer in the Air Force had raped her, and that when she tried to report it to military officials she “felt like the system was raping me all over again.”

For Lieutenant Sikal, the trip to the summerhouse on Jan. 3, 2018, was just the start. There, sitting with the police chief, Lieutenant Sikal said the colonel boasted of the attractive junior officers under his command. He then asked her to kiss the policeman, she said.

“He bragged that he had two young, new female lieutenants and suggested we all take a sauna together,” she said, her voice trembling.

For months, she said, daily harassment ensued and she tried a variety of ways to escape him. She tried hiding and directly confronting him with a plea to stop. Nothing worked.

“His apartment was one floor above mine” in the barracks, she said. “He was coming drunk, checking my underwear in the drawers of my nightstand. Once, he said my sofa was good and suggested we check it.”

Every new rejection caused further humiliation, punitive reprimands and senseless orders, she said.

“I was not a human for him,” Lieutenant Sikal said.

Finally last December, she filed a sexual harassment complaint with military prosecutors and the national police authorities that is still under investigation.

She said the local police did not take Lieutenant Sikal’s complaint seriously until activists pressured the leadership. An officer on a military hotline for complaints said he could do nothing. Prosecutors initially rejected her written report. She said she felt invisible to the police.

It is far from clear whether Lieutenant Sikal will prevail in her case. After she gave interviews to the Ukrainian news media, a taxi driver tried to punch her when she got into his cab, she said. Fellow soldiers heaped abuse on her online.

“Valeria, if you cannot resist ordinary harassment in training, what will happen to you in a combat unit or if you are captured,” one man, who identified himself as Yuriy Opr, wrote in comments under an article in Strana.ru, an online news portal.

“Her approach has no place in the armed forces,” he added. “I am writing for myself and my sworn brothers.”

A man who identified himself as Viktor Margelov wrote, “Why did you wait a year” before filing a complaint? Another, Pavel Vasiliev, answered, “Perhaps she liked it.” Lieutenant Sikal’s husband, Oleksi Vdovychenko, himself a veteran of the war in eastern Ukraine, now regularly receives anonymous phone threats.

“I don’t feel that the state can defend me,” Lieutenant Sikal said. “The state is passive in this case.”

#20

Getting Aid to Separatist-held Ukraine

by Anna Arutunyan

International Crisis Group, 13 May 2019

<https://bit.ly/2M5qn9e>

The front lines in eastern Ukraine are slowly freezing in place, as is civilian deprivation in the conflict zone. An embargo, bureaucracy and distrust conspire to keep humanitarian aid out. Russia and Ukraine should find politically neutral ways to unblock the flow of assistance.

After five years of war, a humanitarian crisis drags on in the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics (L/DPR), the parts of eastern Ukraine nominally governed by Russian-backed separatists. More than 3.5 million people in eastern Ukraine are in need of aid, according to UN figures. The need is particularly dire in the rebel-held territories, which confront a Ukrainian economic blockade as well as isolation imposed by the rebels themselves. The aging segment of the L/DPR's population is hardest-hit of all, struggling to get by on pensions as low as \$30 per month. But humanitarian groups face several obstacles in getting these people the aid they need.

All sides are erecting hurdles. Citing obstruction by the L/DPR authorities, the UN has scaled back its humanitarian response in rebel-controlled areas, focusing on the less hard-hit but still in need people on the government-controlled side of the line. Ukraine's trade blockade of the L/DPR limits aid access. Russian humanitarian groups say indiscriminate shelling from the Ukrainian side of the contact line makes aid distribution dangerous, and that they also face obstacles from L/DPR authorities whom they decry as corrupt. They perceive the Russian government as doing too little to coordinate assistance efforts and say they cannot trust anyone in power.

“The Russians, they have forgotten about them [people in eastern Ukraine]”, said Marina (not her real name), a Muscovite who regularly travels to Donetsk to deliver goods and help families buy groceries. After trying to work through established charities operating in Russia, she decided to go solo, citing a lack of transparency and corruption. “The government of L/DPR, when it comes to big convoys there, they just steal the goods”, she added. Another aid worker in Rostov-on-Don, a Russian city not far from the separatist-controlled areas, told a similar story. Exasperated, she founded her own charity, which distributes food, money, toys and animated films to children in affected areas.

Many of the independent Russian aid workers who raise these concerns sympathise with the separatist cause. But the depth and frankness of their frustration reflects their belief that both Kyiv and Moscow have abandoned the people whom the workers are trying to serve. As the conflict stagnates, and contact across the front lines becomes ever more difficult, humanitarian aid could yet be a rare, vital avenue of cooperation among the

Russian, Ukrainian and European governments. That, however, will require all sides to focus on the residents' plight rather than tactical gains vis-à-vis their adversaries.

Many Obstacles

Over five years of conflict, humanitarian access to the east has shrunk. Early in the war, militias supporting the Ukrainian government, such as Dnipro-1 and Aidar, were known to intercept humanitarian convoys headed to L/DPR territories because they did not want supplies getting through to people they regarded as the enemy. In 2017, Kyiv imposed an economic blockade on the separatist-controlled areas, not only paralysing what remained of the war-shattered L/DPR economy, but also in effect slashing the volume of assistance distributed there. As Crisis Group has reported, the embargo made an explicit exception for humanitarian convoys crossing the contact line. Yet in practice it kept aid out, because charities legally registered in Ukraine could no longer function in the L/DPR due to a combination of Ukrainian and L/DPR regulations, and to the ways in which L/DPR authorities adapted to the embargo. Before the blockade, for instance, one of the chief aid distributors in these territories was a foundation run by steel magnate and Kyiv loyalist Rinat Akhmetov. After the embargo, self-declared DPR authorities seized Akhmetov's assets, causing aid distribution to fall precipitously. Meanwhile, these authorities have also interdicted aid shipments from politically neutral parties: as late as this year, forces loyal to the self-proclaimed republics reportedly blocked Red Cross convoys, giving no explanation.

Today, many humanitarian organisations cannot reach people in need, according to aid workers from Russian and international groups interviewed by Crisis Group. Ukrainian authorities will often refuse accreditation to organisations trying to deliver aid to the L/DPR from the western, Ukrainian side if in the past they have crossed into the L/DPR from the eastern, Russian side. Kyiv distrusts such groups, viewing them as collaborators with L/DPR de facto authorities. For their part, self-proclaimed L/DPR authorities obstruct efforts by groups entering from Ukrainian-controlled territories on the grounds that they are not humanitarian agencies, but enemies.

Russian groups, which enter through Russia and therefore should be both free of Ukrainian red tape and trusted by the L/DPR, also face problems. Alexei Smirnov runs the crowdfunded Angel Humanitarian Group, based in Moscow. Angel volunteers travel to residential areas along the contact line on the L/DPR side as often as twice a week to deliver goods and medicine. Smirnov does not deny that some of his foundation's personnel may have fought alongside pro-Russian rebels in the past. He says they no longer do so, however, and adds that his organisation seeks to be politically neutral. Smirnov complains that Ukraine nonetheless treats his staff like combatants. "We get shot at [by the Ukrainian forces] because they think we are enemies and because we show what it is like in those residential areas", he said, referring to Ukrainian forces' shelling of civilian areas.

Smirnov insists that his group does not seek support from Russian authorities. “We don’t accept help from Russia because that would only increase suspicion. Or they could take advantage of us”.

Meanwhile, Russian aid groups find that coordination with Russia’s Emergencies Ministry, which gathers medical and food aid supplied by federal and regional bodies and ships it to L/DPR, is difficult or non-existent. “There is no documentational framework for us to coordinate together with [the Ministry]”, said one independent Russian aid worker. “We can’t really track the aid they send there or verify that it has actually reached civilians”. Amid the lack of both coordination and common guidelines, grassroots groups distrust each other as well as Moscow, trading accusations that some workers are merely enriching themselves instead of delivering aid to needy people. This mistrust, the aid worker said, dominates the sector and keeps grassroots groups from getting along. “There is no friendship. No coordination”. The inability to get along hampers the formation of more effective networks that could work with government agencies to maximise access.

Life Support

As a result, the overwhelming bulk of aid to rebel-held areas comes from the Russian government, via regular convoys sent by the Emergencies Ministry, but independent aid workers say it’s unclear how many of those goods actually reach the people in need. Since the conflict began, the Ministry reports, it has dispatched more than 80 convoys, each carrying up to 500 tonnes of goods. Though these numbers seem impressive, other figures point to huge unmet needs: as of late 2018, also according to Ministry figures, 160,000 of the DPR’s 2.3 million people were able to receive aid packages at distribution points. The UN estimates that over 20 per cent of the L/DPR’s population is food-insecure. Indeed, independent Russian aid workers who travel regularly to the affected areas say that Emergencies Ministry aid is, in their words, barely keeping civilians on life support. Moreover, its convoys are part of the reason why Smirnov and his volunteers have such a hard time: Ukrainian and international groups accuse Russia of secreting undeclared weapons and ammunition amid the supplies. Ukrainian authorities assume that independent Russian aid workers are doing the same – and thus treat them like combatants.

Aside from the humanitarian implications, the economic strangulation of these isolated territories dims prospects for their peaceful reintegration into Ukraine. Reliance on Russian aid, insufficient though it is, makes both the civilians and authorities of L/DPR more dependent on Moscow and more alienated from Kyiv. But it is also bad for Russia. The trickle of assistance from Russia and the lack of coordination with grassroots groups undermines the morale of once dedicated aid workers, leading to even fewer aid deliveries and greater dissatisfaction with Russia’s efforts both at home and in L/DPR. Russia is already seeking ways to pay less for assistance, local media reports suggest, and the Emergencies Ministry recently postponed a planned column of its aid trucks amid plans to “restructure” aid. The more difficult it is for grassroots groups and international

agencies to deliver aid, the larger the burden for Moscow in feeding a hungry region outside its borders.

Bringing Order to Chaos

Both Russia and Ukraine should explore politically neutral options for getting more humanitarian aid into the affected regions. Facilitating aid to civilians in the unrecognised statelets could open up avenues of bilateral cooperation that, with time, could make political dialogue easier.

One way to ease access for aid groups might be to set up an independent observer body staffed by Russians, Ukrainians and nationals of a third European country perceived as relatively neutral, such as Austria, Germany or Italy. This body could establish transparent guidelines to verify the neutrality of aid groups regardless of their country of origin, while ensuring aid, not weapons, are delivered. The body could work together with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – which is monitoring the ceasefire at the contact line and overseeing negotiations that are part of the Minsk peace plan – in accrediting aid providers.

Even such a body, however, will not be enough absent a broader shift toward reconciliation. Kyiv in particular should explore ways to facilitate aid as part of a wider policy of treating civilians of the east, regardless of their political affinities, as Ukrainian citizens in dire need of aid, rather than as combatants or instruments in political battles. There are many ways to signal this, and a new president means new opportunities to do so. Ukrainian President-elect Volodymyr Zelensky has argued in favor of re-engaging with Ukrainians in the east. One concrete way to start could be for Kyiv to make a concerted effort to ensure that pensions reach civilians in rebel-held territories, in accordance with Ukrainian laws. Kyiv should also explore ways to ease the embargo – something that may also indicate Kyiv's newfound interest in reintegrating the rebel-held territories rather than isolating them or pushing them toward Russia.

As matters stand, as Alexei Smirnov put it, aid provision “is in a state of chaos. It doesn't work”.

#21

Russian Proxy Republics “Officially” Seize Ukrainians’ Homes in Donbas

by Halya Coynash

Human Rights in Ukraine, 14 May 2019

<https://bit.ly/2Hz76si>

The so-called ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ [‘DPR’] are stealing apartments in Donbas and claiming this to be legal because the property owners did not respond to their ‘summons’. In many of the cases, the apartments are owned by Ukrainians who left occupied territory and who would be in danger of imprisonment (or worse) if they returned.

Over one and a half million Ukrainians are known to have left their homes because of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Russian armed and controlled war in Donbas. For most of these ‘internally displaced persons’ [IDP], life is very difficult and many would sell their homes in occupied territory if they could. The prices, however, are pitifully low, the chances of getting cheated and losing everything – high. For some there is also concern as to how this would be viewed by the Ukrainian authorities when the occupation is over.

Online Debaltsevo has posted a screenshot of a ‘court summons’ effectively used to deprive members of a family of their flat. The summons, signed by Olena Kirichenko, orders them to appear at a ‘court hearing’ on 25 April, providing grounds as to why they should not be stripped of the right to the property, because they have not lived in it ‘without good grounds’ for the past six months. This document ends with the words that through its posting, the family members are deemed to have been informed.

If they don’t turn up, their property is ‘confiscated’. While it is not known why the particular people named left Snizhne in the Donetsk oblast, we do know of several Ukrainians who have been seized, tortured and imprisoned on their return. Volodymyr Fomichov, for example, was just 23 when he tried to visit his family in Makiyivka for the New Year – Christmas holidays in January 2016. He was tortured, and then ‘sentenced’ to two years’ imprisonment, with it claimed that he had been bringing two grenades into ‘DPR’. These may have been the same two grenades that the ‘DPR ministry of state security’ are supposed to have ‘found’ on a bookshelf when they carried out a raid of internationally renowned religious specialist, Ihor Kozlovskyy. He was also seized and imprisoned. Both Kozlovskyy and Fomichov were released as part of the last exchange in December 2017. Others either remain incarcerated, or have been seized and taken prisoner since, including Andriy Yarovoi, who was awarded an international prize in April 2019, one that needed to be collected for him by colleagues.

The so-called Luhansk and Donets ‘republics’ are known to be holding over 100 hostages, however the real figure could be much higher since many relatives are afraid of reporting a person’s seizure for fear of making things worse. There also needs to be a high level

of secrecy as to how information was obtained in order to protect sources who would certainly be in danger if exposed.

Dzerkalo Tyzhnya clearly believes that there have already been a number of such ‘court rulings’ which take people’s property from them. The newspaper notes that, as a rule, flats are taken from those people who cannot enter occupied territory because of their ideological position or activities in government-controlled Ukraine. These are not isolated incidents, they say. In the case of the four people cited in the Snizhne ‘ruling’, this proved to be the family of a law enforcement officer who remains in service on government-controlled territory, this meaning that he or family members would be in danger if they returned. The family reacted calmly to the news that their home had been seized, saying that on their return after Snizhne is liberated, they will throw out those who moved into it illegally.

Radio Svoboda’s Donbas.Realii reported the appropriation of two flats in the centre of Donetsk back in August 2018, with 10 others in that same apartment block having been ‘confiscated’ earlier, in March. The block in question, Kirylo Sazonov, a political analyst from Donetsk explained, had been built recently for the top management of the police. It was therefore safe to assume that the new ‘official’ method of appropriation would work since the flat owners would not react to ‘summonses’.

In fact, however, militants from the so-called DPR and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ [LPR] began seizing the thousands of flats and homes which their owners were forced to abandon from 2014.

‘LPR’ reported that they were taking ‘control’ of empty flats back in 2017, with the militants beginning to carry out ‘inventories’. If the flat was declared empty, they would dispose of it as they saw fit, with analysts assuming that many of the flats would be used to house people from Russia.

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Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa, 559 King Edward Ave.
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5 CANADA
darel@uottawa.ca