



The Ukraine List #494

The Ukraine List (UKL) #494
compiled by Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca)
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.chairukr.com
www.danyliwseminar.com
25 October 2018

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#1

A Unique Look at Contemporary Ukraine at Three-Day Danyliw 2018 Seminar in Ottawa

The 14th Annual Danyliw Seminar (8-10 November 2018), organized by the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, is unveiling an ambitious program devoted to current research and documentaries on Ukraine.

The Seminar, featuring 23 presentations and 2 film screenings, will bring together 33 scholars or doctoral students, and 2 film creators -- 29 from outside Canada (8 from Ukraine), and 18 attending for the first time, a testimony of the vibrancy of the field of Ukrainian Studies.

The program is online at <https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2018>.
A PDF version is also attached.

Among the highlights:

- A special section commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Holodomor, featuring five presentations, as well as the presentation of a new book presenting for the first time to an English-language audience the contribution of Ukrainian historian Stanislav Kulchytsky (*The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: An Anatomy of the Holodomor*).
- Two sections on Ukraine in World War II and its aftermath, touching on state and church in Galicia, the UPA and gender, the OUN and concentration camps, and anti-Jewish violence, featuring new books by Omer Bartov (*Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz*) and Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg (*Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust*).
- Two new Ukrainian films featured in international documentary festivals this Fall – *No Obvious Signs* (2018), on a female soldier suffering from PTSD following her tour of duty in Donbas, and *Home Games* (2018), a hard look at the reality of broken homes and strong women, with a backdrop of professional sports. Each screening will be followed by a Q&A with film creators.
- A simulation game of the war in Donbas, based on ethnographic evidence collected or aggregated by British documentary filmmaker and programmer Antony Butts.
- Several presentations on the societal impact of the Donbas war — on medical care infrastructure destruction, daily life near the contact line, decommunization in a Ukraine-controlled Donbas town, and the songs of the war.
- An introductory section on the political economy of post-Maidan Ukraine — on water management in Donbas, corruption in the military, and the economics of journalism.

- A panel on changing political behavior and attitudes since Maidan, including a new book co-edited by Oleksiy Haran on *Constructing a Political Nation*.

All the Seminar sessions will be held in Room 12102 of the Desmarais Building (DMS), 55 Laurier Ave., on University of Ottawa campus. A map of University of Ottawa campus – with the DMS location – can be accessed at <http://maps.uottawa.ca>.

The Seminar is open to the public and registration is free. Since space is limited, people interested in attending the seminar must register by sending an email to the Chair of Ukrainian Studies (chairukr@gmail.com).

An opening reception will be held on Thursday, November 8, at 7.00 PM in Desmarais 12102, after the screening and Q&A of *Home Games*. All are cordially invited.

The Seminar will have an extensive presence on the web. All presentations will be filmed and uploaded on the Seminar web site (<http://www.danyliwseminar.com>). The Seminar papers will also be available on the website shortly after they are presented.

For real time updates, go and like the Seminar's Facebook page (<https://www.facebook.com/Danyliw-Seminar-874438662581143/>) or follow me on Twitter at @darelasn.

The international selection committee is comprised of Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa), Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris Nanterre, France), Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US), Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK), Anna Muller (U of Michigan Dearborn, US), Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US) and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris Nanterre, France).

The Seminar is made possible by the commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine. We are grateful to the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for their support in the Holodomor commemoration section.

14th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Desmarais Hall 12102
8-10 November 2018
<https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2018>

THURSDAY 8 NOVEMBER

Political Economy: Oligarchs and Corruption

9.15-10.00 AM

Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

Sophie Lambroschini (Centre Marc Bloch, Germany, sophie_lambro@yahoo.com)
“Rivers Don’t Abide by the Laws of War”: The Water Utilities Company Voda Donbasu as a Case Study of Collaborative Practices Across the Contact Line in Eastern Ukraine

10.00-10.45 AM

Moderator: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)

Dmytro Khutkyy (Independent Defense Anti-Corruption Committee, Ukraine, khutkyy@gmail.com)
Corruption Risks in Defence Procurement in Ukraine

Political Economy: Since Maidan

11.15 AM-12.00 PM

Moderator: Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Taras Fedirko (U of Cambridge, UK, taras.fedirko@gmail.com)
Money and Free Speech in Ukrainian Journalism: The Case of Hromadske

The Holodomor: 85 Years Later
(with the support of the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium)

1.00-2.30 PM

Perpetrators and Bystanders

Moderators: Anna Muller (U of Michigan Dearborn, US, anmuller@umich.edu) and
Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK, dm628@cam.ac.uk)
The Ordinary and Extraordinary Perpetrators of the Holodomor

Olga Ryabchenko (Beketov National U of Urban Economy, Ukraine, lerche555@ukr.net)
Resistance and Humility: Mobilizing Young People for Work in Urban Areas during the Years of Collectivization and Holodomor

Nick Kupensky (Bowdoin College, US, nkupensk@bowdoin.edu)
Blindness, Hypnosis, Addiction, Fetish:
The Language of Holodomor Denial in Soviet Industrial Travel Narratives

3.00-4.30 PM

Asking the Big Questions

Moderators: Bohdan Klid (CIUS, U of Alberta, Canada, bohdan.klid@ualberta.ca)
and Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK, dm628@cam.ac.uk)

Stanislav Kulchytsky (Institute of Ukrainian History, Ukraine)
New Book: The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: An Anatomy of the Holodomor (CIUS Press, 2018)

Oleh Wolowyna (U of North Carolina Chapel Hill, US, olehw@aol.com)
A General Framework for Holodomor Research

4.30-7.00 PM

Film Screening

Home Games (Ukraine 2018), directed by Alisa Kovalenko

A season in the life of Alina, a poor 20-year-old girl from Kyiv who has a chance to be saved by football, but must also rescue her young siblings. A hard look at the reality of broken homes and strong women.

Followed by a Q&A with the film producer, Stéphane Siohan (East Roads, Ukraine, stephane@east-roads.com).

Moderated by Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com) and Natalia Stepaniuk (U of Ottawa, Canada, natalia.stepaniuk@gmail.com).

FRIDAY 9 NOVEMBER

9.00-9.45 AM

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Natalia Levchuk (Institute of Demography, Ukraine, levchuk.nata@gmail.com)
The Role of Grain Procurement in Understanding Regional Variations of 1933 Holodomor Losses

The OUN and World War II Violence

9.45-10.30 AM

Moderator: Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK, dm628@cam.ac.uk)

Orysia Kulick (U of Toronto, Canada, omkulick@gmail.com)
OUN Prisoners in the Buchenwald Subcamp Mittelbau-Dora: A Microhistory

11.00 AM-1.00 PM

Moderators: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca) and Anna Muller (U of Michigan Dearborn, US, anmuller@umich.edu)

Jeffrey Kopstein (U of California Irvine, kopstein@uci.edu)
Jason Wittenberg (U of California Berkeley, witty@berkeley.edu)
New Book—Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust (Cornell, 2018)

Omer Bartov (Brown U, US, omer.bartov@gmail.com)
New Book—Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz (Simon and Schuster, 2018)

John Paul Himka (U of Alberta, Canada, john-paul.himka@ualberta.ca)
OUN-UPA and the Holocaust: A Survey of the Historiography

The Humanitarian Costs of the Donbas War

2.00-3.00 PM

Moderators: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)

Cynthia J. Buckley (U of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, US, buckleyc@illinois.edu)
Ralph S. Clem (Florida International U, US, clemr@fiu.edu)
Erik S. Herron (West Virginia U, US, esherron@mail.wvu.edu)
No Safe Place: Geopolitical and Humanitarian Implications of Medical Care Infrastructure Destruction in the Donbas Conflict

3.00-3.45 PM

Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

Tania Bulakh (U of Indiana Bloomington, US, tbulakh@uemail.iu.edu)
Daily Life Near the “Contact Line”: How People Experience the State in Conflict-Affected Ukraine

4.15-6.15 PM

Film Screening

No Obvious Signs (Ukraine 2018), directed by Alina Gorlova

The story of a female soldier who returns from the Donbas war. Talking to psychologists, battling her PTSD and panic attacks, she tries hard to get back to normal life. The film shows her difficult path of recovery.

Followed by a Q&A with the filmmaker Alina Gorlova (Tabor Productions, Ukraine, alinagorlova.e@gmail.com)

Moderators: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com) and Natalia Stepaniuk (U of Ottawa, Canada, natalia.stepaniuk@gmail.com)

SATURDAY 10 NOVEMBER

War and Gender

9.00-10.30 AM

Moderator: Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK, dm628@cam.ac.uk) and Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

Anna Muller (U of Michigan Dearborn, US, anmuller@umich.edu)

Underground, Imprisonments, and the Polish-Ukrainian Relationships: The Life of Polish and Ukrainian Female Underground Members

Oksana Kis (Institute of Ethnology, Lviv, Ukraine, oksanakis55@gmail.com)

Faith as a Shield: Ukrainian Women's Religious Practices as Resistance to Total Dehumanization in the Gulag

Religion after the War

11.00-11.45 AM

Moderator: Anna Muller (U of Michigan Dearborn, US, anmuller@umich.edu)

Kathryn David (NYU, US, ked376@nyu.edu)

Soviet Governance in postwar Western Ukraine: Church and State

Recasting Memories

11.45 AM-12.30 PM

Moderator: Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Anna Balázs (U of Manchester, UK, anna.balazs@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk)
The Decommunization of Everyday Life: The Case of Mariupol

Political Behavior and Attitudes Since Maidan

1.30-3.00 PM

Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu) and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Discussant: Oleh Havrylyshyn (Carleton U, Canada, olehhavrylyshyn@cunet.carleton.ca)

Olga Onuch (U of Manchester, UK, olga.onuch@manchester.ac.uk)
The Impact of War on Voting Behavior: The Case of Ukraine

Oleksiy Haran (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, haranov@gmail.com)
New Book—Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas (Stylos, 2017)

The Donbas War in Visuals and Sounds

3.00-3.45 PM

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Antony Butts (Filmmaker/Programmer, UK, antonybutts@me.com)
The Many Lives of “Lenin”: A Simulation Game of the War in Donbas

A video game, based on ethnographic evidence, exploring how information warfare impacted the minds of individuals on the ground in what became the Donbas war.

3.45-4.30 PM

Moderator: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)

Iryna Shuvalova (U of Cambridge, UK, is411@cam.ac.uk)
Songs of the Donbas War: Dismantling, Construction and Reconstruction of Identities through Text, Sound and Image

#2

Call for Papers

24th Annual World Convention of the
Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN)

International Affairs Building,
Columbia University, NY
Sponsored by the Harriman Institute
2-4 May 2019
<https://www.asnconvention.com/proposal-information>

Proposal deadline: 7 November 2018

Proposals must be submitted to:
darel@uottawa.ca and darelasn2019@gmail.com

Over 150 Panels/Events in 11 Sections

****The Ukraine section had 22 panels/events at the ASN 2018 Convention****

Nationalism Studies
Migration/Diasporas
Balkans
Central Europe
Ukraine
Russia
Caucasus
Eurasia (Central Asia and China)
Turkey and Greece
Book Panels
World Documentary Films

Thematic Sections

The Rise of the Far Right
The Politics of Refugees
Political Memory
Political Violence
The Russia/Ukraine Conflict

ASN Awards

Best Doctoral Papers
Best World Documentary Film
Best Book on Nationalism
Best Article in Nationalities Papers

The ASN World Convention, which annually brings 750+ scholars from 50+ countries to Columbia University, welcomes proposals on a wide range of topics related to nationalism, national identity, ethnicity, conflict and migration in regional sections of Central, Southern and Eastern Europe or cross-regional sections on nationalism and migration/diasporas.

In addition to the thematic sections on the far right, refugees, memory, violence and the Russia/Ukraine conflict, popular themes over the years have included gender, youth, language politics, religion, arts and culture, EU integration/exit, foreign policy, nation-building, energy politics, parties and elections, and civil society.

Disciplines represented include political science, history, anthropology, sociology, international studies, security studies, area studies, economics, geography, literature, and other fields of humanities and social sciences.

Prospective applicants can get a sense of the large thematic scope of ASN Convention papers and presentations by looking at the 2018 Final Program.

The ASN scholarly journal Nationalities Papers will be published as of January 2019 by Cambridge University Press. The ASN 2019 Convention Opening Reception will celebrate this new partnership between ASN and Cambridge University Press.

Proposal Forms

Paper Proposal
Panel Proposal
Roundtable Proposal
Documentary Film Proposal
Book Panel Proposal
Discussant Proposal

To send a proposal, download the relevant form above, send it to darel@uottawa.ca and darelasn2019@gmail.com, and fill out a Fact Sheet online.

Applicants can be considered for only one paper (included either in a paper proposal or a panel proposal) and appear in a maximum of two proposals (paper, panel or roundtable).

An exception is made for book panels or films, although applicants can only be on one book panel proposal.

Applicants whose proposals is accepted are responsible for covering all travel and accommodation costs. *ASN has no funding available for panelists.*

The receipt of all proposals will be acknowledged electronically, with some delay during deadline week, due to the high volume of proposals.

An international Program Committee is entrusted with the selection of proposals. Most applicants will be notified between January and February 2019.

Practical information on the Convention, including registration costs, will be communicated in January 2019.

Publishers and companies wishing to exhibit at the Convention or advertise in the Convention printed program can contact ASN Executive Director Ryan Kreider atrk2780@columbia.edu.

For practical questions on the Convention, please contact ASN Executive Director Ryan Kreider at rk2780@columbia.edu.

The ASN website is at <http://nationalities.org>

The ASN Convention website is at <http://asnconvention.com>

To follow us on Facebook, go to <https://www.facebook.com/Nationalities>

To follow us on Twitter, go to @asn_org

We very much look forward to receiving your proposal!

Dominique Arel, ASN Convention Director

Agathe Dudzinski, ASN Convention Assistant Director

Lisa Koriouchkina, ASN Communications Director

Ceren Belge, Evgeny Finkel, Tamara Pavasović Trošt, Program Committee Associate Directors

On behalf of the ASN Convention Program Committee

Deadline for proposals: 7 November 2018 (to be sent to both darel@uottawa.ca AND darelasn2019@gmail.com in a single attachment).

#3

Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

Application Deadline: 1 February 2019 (International & Canadian Students)

<https://www.chairukr.com/kule-doctoral-scholarships>

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing a new competition of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of \$22,000, with all tuition waived, for four years (with the possibility of adding a fifth year).

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of \$500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book *Champions of Philanthropy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments*.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields related with the research interests of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship. The competition is open to international and Canadian students.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to Dominique Arel, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room, 7067, University of Ottawa, 120 University St., Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.

Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on 1 February 2019 and will continue until the award is announced.

The University of Ottawa is a bilingual university and applicants must have a certain oral and reading command of French. Specific requirements vary across departments.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships beginning in the academic year 2017-2018 are invited to contact Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca), Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, and visit our web site www.chairukr.com.

#4

Russia Stops Calling the Kerch Mass Killing Terrorism When It Can't Blame Ukraine or Crimean Tatars

By Halya Coynash

Human Rights in Ukraine, 18 October 2018

<https://bit.ly/2OSZ5DN>

As of late on 17 October, 19 people are known to have died from a mass shooting in Kerch, Russian-occupied Crimea, including the 18-year-old believed killer, Vladislav Roslyakov, a fourth-year student at the Kerch Technical College where the tragedy took place. His motives have yet to be ascertained, however Russia's Investigative Committee has now changed its qualification of the crime from an act of terrorism to multiple homicide. This was after Russian media reported a top occupation regime official as claiming that Ukraine was behind the terrorism, and that the culprit allegedly "looked like a Tatar". The requalification is also in marked contrast to the ever-mounting number of Ukrainians arrested since Russia's invasion of Crimea on 'terrorism' charges despite the lack of any act of terror, or even evidence that one was planned.

It is understandable that in the confusion after the explosion and shooting that there should have been such conflicting reports about what was happening, and the number of victims. It is unfortunately no less predictable that very many people both within Crimea and outside should have responded with identical concern that this was to be an excuse for new repression in the occupied peninsula.

Photos are now available of Roslyakov holding a hunting rifle which he apparently turned on himself, after killing 18 teachers and students, and injuring up to 50 others. Krym.Realii has probed the rather conflicting ideas about Roslyakov's likely motivation, based mainly on his posts on social media. His VKontakte page contains anti-fascist slogans and indicates an interest in hard rock, possibly also support for left-wing ideas. The same page has a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a repost from a page entitled 'This country can't be beaten', with symbols of the so-called 'Novorossiya', linked now with the Kremlin-controlled pseudo 'Donetsk and Luhansk republics'. The term Novorossiya was first used by Putin in April 2014 at a time when there was every indication that Russia was hoping to seize control of at least the Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts as well, both of which Putin placed in this alleged 'Novorossiya'. Viktoria Veselova, writing for Krym.Realii notes that Roslyakov also posted a sarcastic photo of Putin together with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill. It may be that the young man had personal grounds for a grudge against the college, or particular students.

Nothing like this has ever happened in Crimea before, and after over four years of Russian attempts to push the idea that Ukraine and Ukrainians pose a threat and are planning

acts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘sabotage’, it was understandable that the initial horror was combined with apprehension, as well as suspicion that a terrorist act could have been staged to justify further acts of aggression. The concerns were only exacerbated by the comments made to the Russian state-controlled Rossiya 24 by Vladimir Konstantinov, speaker of the de facto Crimean Parliament. While saying that they were awaiting official information, he clearly blamed the Ukrainian authorities, asserting that “all evil falling upon Crimean land comes from the Kyiv authorities. I’m convinced that the wind blows from there”.

The Russian website Lenta.ru reported after it was already clear that one person had carried out the shooting that the suspect “looked like a [Crimean] Tatar”. This was allegedly from “a source within the law enforcement agencies” and was later corrected, presumably after the absurdity of this allegation became evident from the photos of Roslyakov.

This immediate attempt to claim a ‘Crimean Tatar’ culprit is nothing new, especially under Russian occupation, and rightly elicited a strong statement from the Moscow Community of Crimean Tatars. They condemned those irresponsible media who had, in the face of human grief and the death of children, seen fit to use inadmissible methods which incite enmity.

Since the arrests of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, civic activist Oleksandr Kolchenko and two other opponents of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia has been trying to justify its aggression and the fact that the promised prosperity has not eventuated by blaming Ukraine and individual Ukrainians of ‘sabotage’ and ‘terrorism’. The Russian state media also regularly uses fake video footage and downright lies to present the occupying state’s persecution of particular Crimean Tatars or of Muslims for their faith as about ‘fighting terrorism’.

#5

Nationalists Attack pro-Russian Politician Medvedchuk’s Office in Kyiv

by Veronika Melkozerova
Kyiv Post, 15 October 2018
<https://bit.ly/2RfkK5R>

Several dozen members of the Sich C-14 and Tradition and Order far-right nationalist groups on Oct. 14 attacked one of the offices of an organization headed by pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk.

The attack on the offices of Ukrainian Choice-Right of the People, a non-governmental organization based in Kyiv, came after nationalists rallied in the center of the capital

to mark the 76th anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary and partisan force.

The nationalists demanded that Medvedchuk, who oversees the prisoner exchange process with Russia and who has close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, secure the release of all 70 political prisoners jailed by the Kremlin since the start of its military intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

“Return the prisoners, you, Putin’s bitch!” the activists chanted, while throwing stones, drawing graffiti and vandalizing the building on Ivana Franka Street in central Kyiv, where Ukrainian Choice shares an office with businessman and politician Vadym Rabinovich’s For Life political party.

Yevhen Karas, leader of C14, filmed the attack and posted the video on Facebook in the evening on Oct. 14.

Medvedchuk, who earlier joined For Life party and announced his plans to run in next year’s parliamentary elections, said the attack was prompted by his political positions.

“Medvedchuk, Ukrainian Choice and the For Life party share the position that for peace in the Donbas and for the restoration of its territorial integrity, Ukraine needs to normalize relations with Russia,” reads an official statement Medvedchuk’s press service published on the Ukrainian Choice website on Oct. 14.

“The party of war has been using anti-Russian hysteria and violent methods of political struggle in order not to let the idea of peace triumph,” the statement went on.

Medvedchuk’s press service claimed this was not the first time nationalists had attacked his office. They had previously set fire to the offices of Ukrainian Choice and sent physical threats to Medvedchuk, the press service said.

Nationalists on Aug. 16 hung a portrait of Ukrainian poet Vasyl Stus, a Soviet dissident and political prisoner, who died in a Soviet labor camp in 1985, near the Ukrainian Choice office.

Medvedchuk was Stus’s defense lawyer at the poet’s sham trial in 1980 for anti-Soviet activities. In his final statement, Medvedchuk took the side of the state, agreeing with the charges made against Stus. After being found guilty, the poet received a ten-year prison term and five years in exile.

Earlier, on July 31, activists burned a giant ball of cotton wool near one of Medvedchuk’s offices, demanding he speed up the release of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, sentenced for 20 years in prison on false charges in 2016.

Cotton wool, or “vata” in Ukrainian has come to symbolize pro-Russian activists and politicians in Ukraine. The name is connected with the coats made with a cotton wool lining, called vatniks, which were used by the Soviet military and are still a popular item of clothing in Russian villages. A “vatnik” is a Russian who supports Putin’s regime and Russian nationalism.

“None of the attackers was arrested by police afterward. Not this time, not ever,” Medvedchuk’s press service said.

The National Police of Kyiv claimed in a statement published on the police website on Oct. 14 that by the time its officers arrived at the scene, all the attackers had left.

“Police are investigating at the crime scene, and examining the video of the attack published online,” the police press service said.

#6

#MinskMonitor: New Details on Zakharchenko Assassination

Digital Forensic Research Lab, 10 September 2018
<https://bit.ly/2ygohJZ>

A week after the shocking assassination of the leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Aleksandr Zakharchenko, new information has surfaced regarding the circumstances of his death and possible motivations for carrying out the attack.

Aleksandr “Tashkent” Timofeyev, Zakharchenko’s right-hand man, was also wounded in the assassination, fled to Moscow after attending Zakharchenko’s funeral. Two days after this exit, “separatist” news outlets reported multiple allegations of Timofeyev’s rampant corruption while serving as a “minister” in the so-called DNR, providing a strong motive for the assassination. However, there have also been false leads to explain the method and reasoning behind the assassination, as we will detail in this report.

How did the assassination take place?

In the week following the assassination, contradicting claims arose regarding where and when the explosive device that killed Zakharchenko was placed. We will summarize each of the most high-profile claims below, and assess which is most likely to correspond with reality.

Cheburashka or Chandelier Charge?

Currently, the most probable claim regarding the placement of the bomb is either an overhead light (chandelier) or a floor lamp at the entrance of the cafe. This claim was first

published by Kommersant on September 1, who also reported that the bomb was triggered from a cell phone. According to Kommersant, the actor(s) who carried out the attack triggered the bomb after observing Zakharchenko enter the cafe. Aleksandr Kazakov, a former advisor to Zakharchenko, said that the explosion took place “at the exact moment when they entered inside of the cafe”, reinforcing the theory that the explosive was placed at the cafe’s entrance.

However, this is not the only theory regarding the bomb’s placement.

On September 5, the popular publication Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) published information that the bomb was placed not in a chandelier, but instead behind a Cheburashka (a popular animated Soviet children’s character) logo on the overhanging sign near the cafe’s entrance. This claim does not stand up to much scrutiny, judging just by a quick glance at the entrance of the cafe before and after the explosion. The Cheburashka is visible on the right part of the sign, next to the on the overhang.

After the explosion, there is clear damage to the overhang, but it was obviously not the source of the explosion.

Additionally, footage taken by Russia’s state-run Vesti news program shows extensive damage inside of the cafe, right at the entrance.

Lastly, “separatist” politician Oleg Tsarev claimed that the bomb was placed in an overhead light, but rather than at the direct entrance, it was near the table where Zakharchenko normally sat. It is unclear where this table was located, therefore this information does not necessarily contradict the other claims regarding the explosive being placed in a light fixture near the entrance.

When was it placed?

Most serious theories agree that the bomb was placed at the entrance in some light fixture—but when? This question has not been answered, but the competing theories reveal competing claims regarding the motivation and planning of Zakharchenko’s assassination.

Zakharchenko adviser Kazakov claimed that the bomb may have been placed the night before the explosion—the night of August 30 or early morning of August 31—and the planners “got lucky” when Zakharchenko made an unplanned visit to the cafe.

Ukrainian analyst and former SBU officer Oleg Starikov differed in his analysis, claiming that the bomb would have been placed “about a half-year, year” ahead of time. However, this estimate was made in a very generalized way based off of how a more professional operation from a state security service would likely operate, considering Starikov’s experience.

Who did it?

Perhaps the most important question to resolve is who placed and triggered the bomb that killed Zakharchenko; however, there have been few realistic, credible claims that can resolve this question.

Immediately after the assassination, so-called DNR security forces arrested “a few” suspects along Bohdan Khmelnytsky Prospect in central Donetsk who “confirmed the involvement of Ukrainian authorities in the crime.” However, much like other Ukrainian “saboteurs” who are arrested soon after crimes in the so-called republics of eastern Ukraine, there has been little to no information about them afterwards, indicating that the “arrests” either did not take place or were hastily made to inflate the competence of DNR security forces.

A week later, the so-called DNR’s Interior Affairs Ministry, responsible for the police, shared the photographs of two men who were patrons at the Separatist Cafe shortly before the explosion.

However, these two men were cleared of any involvement soon after their photographs were published. The so-called DNR Interior Affairs Ministry deleted the video showing the two men from their YouTube channel.

On September 9, Russia’s FSB claimed to have interrogated a member of ISIS in Russia’s Smolensk Oblast. This Dagestani ISIS member, according to the FSB, was ordered by the SBU and the Ukrainian far-right “Right Sector” group to carry out an assassination of an unnamed leader of the DNR. The FSB did not explicitly tie this man to the Zakharchenko assassination, but it was clearly insinuated from the timing and method of the announcement. There is no reason to take this “discovery” seriously, as there have been numerous propaganda attempts from Russian and separatist-run media outlets to tie ISIS together with the Ukrainian government and far-right groups, including Azov.

Motivations Emerge: Corruption and Hubris

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has already sent in a team of investigators to Donetsk to determine a culprit for the assassination, despite the fact that Russia has no international jurisdiction on Ukrainian territory. The FSB’s spokesperson did not take long to name their eventual suspect—the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), accusing them just days after the attack.

While it is possible (though, unlikely) that the SBU pulled off this attack, it is far more probable that the assassination was carried out by either an “insider” from Donetsk or a Moscow-ordered assassin. On September 2, Novaya Gazeta’s Pavel Kanygin provided one of the more credible reports for a potential motive: the rampant corruption of Zakharchenko and his right-hand man, Aleksandr “Tashkent” Timofeyev, who was also wounded in the August 31 explosion.

Along with the sort of corruption you would expect from the leaders of a pseudo-state—taking control of or skimming the profits from profitable local businesses, playing fast and loose with the tax code, and so on—Zakharchenko and Timofeyev personally profited in a coal export scheme. As Kanygin described in an interview with Meduza, this scheme involved mining coal in the Donbas, then it was “exported to Russia and then shipped back to Ukraine as a Russian import,” as there is a trade blockade between the unrecognized separatist republics and Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war and dismal relations between Ukraine and Russia, they are still trade partners.

There have been numerous investigations published by both national and international media on Russia’s re-export scheme with Donbas coal, including from Bloomberg.

Zakharchenko and Timofeyev, according to Kanygin and other journalists, were too greedy with this re-export scheme and other business deals, a potential reason for their exit from the stage. As a source told Kanygin, “The pie had gotten much bigger, and everyone wanted a big slice of it themselves, and not to dole it out civilly. Batya [Zakharchenko] and Tashkent [Timofeyev] were in over their heads when dealing with those more powerful than them.”

Timofeyev has not stuck around Donetsk following the assassination, fleeing to Moscow after Zakharchenko’s funeral. Both he and Kazakov appeared in Moscow a week after the assassination.

Attributing the reason for this exit to Moscow, along with a motivation for the assassination, to Timofeyev and Zakharchenko’s rampant corruption was strengthened on September 7, when the Donetsk News Agency (DAN) published an explosive report that accused Timofeyev of over 850 million rubles (~12.2 million USD) of graft. This report opened up the floodgates, with another article published shortly later in DAN detailing how Timofeyev stole from a transport company as well by abusing his ministerial position.

Whither Donetsk?

With the high-profile assassination, the future course of the “republics” of eastern Ukraine remain in question. The relatively unknown Dmitry Trapeznikov served as the head of the DNR for only about a week after Zakharchenko’s assassination, followed by the ascension of Denis Pushilin, a longtime politician and notorious pyramid scam artist.

Pushilin has publicly feuded with Zakharchenko, but not to the same level as the assassinated leader’s other rival, Aleksandr Khodakovsky, who, like Zakharchenko, presented himself as a “strongman.” Pushilin, in contrast, never fought in the war in the Donbas and has continuously served as a politician in a suit, in contrast to Zakharchenko’s public image as a former military commander walking around in fatigues.

Elections are scheduled to take place in the illegally-occupied Donbas on November 11, as confirmed on September 7 following questions if they would be rescheduled or cancelled. It is unclear if Pushilin will run for the position of so-called head of DNR during these elections, but it should be expected.

#7

Forensic Search Volunteer: “Our Duty is to Bring Our Soldiers Back Home!”

by Bohdana Kostiuk
EuroMaidan Press, 27 September 2018
<https://bit.ly/2OUP1cS>

“The other side” – this is what the volunteers of the forensic search group Evacuation-200 call the Donbas territories that are controlled by hybrid Russian forces.

Vadym Mashtabey, a war veteran who served in the special-purpose regiment “Myrotvorets” (Peacemaker) travels to “the other side” to search for missing Ukrainian soldiers and return them to their families. On October 13, 2015, Mashtabey and his colleagues worked non-stop amidst the ruins of Donetsk Airport. They were able to find the remains of several Cyborgs. Vadym Mashtabey tells us about his work.

Vadym Mashtabey: - Members of two forensic search groups – Evacuation 20 and Black Tulip – arrived at Donetsk Airport. There were also two vehicles from the OSCE Monitoring Mission and about twenty television crews from Russia. We were accompanied by a group of enemy insurgents led by Motorola. I saw him talking regularly to the Russian journalists. The airport was completely destroyed; there was nothing left. The grounds were covered with shell fragments and metal. There wasn’t a centimeter of floor or ground area visible.

– Why did your forensic search crew decide to go to the airport?

– We were allowed inside the airport because they suspected that the body of a soldier had remained in a destroyed tank on the runway. Either the mechanic was still inside the tank or somewhere nearby. In the last days of battle for Donetsk Airport, two crew members of that tank managed to crawl all the way back to our side... four kilometers along the runway. They said that the tank hatch was open, but they hadn’t seen anyone anywhere.

We immediately went up to the tank, looked inside, but found no one. We also searched the surrounding area, but with no success. The runway was overgrown with grass and weeds, some places the grass was up to one metre high. We couldn’t go there as many places were mined. But, we saw a burnt-out armoured personnel carrier where we found the remains of our boy. We took him out carefully and delivered him to his family.

As we were leaving, one of Motorola's men approached and handed me a cellophane bag: "Take your Cyborg with you! We don't need him here... although we did think of using him in our next football game."

I opened the bag... and there lay a charred skull. The Motorola guy stared at me silently for about two minutes, and then handed over another bag that contained part of a human foot wearing a combat boot...

- Did you manage to identify the Cyborgs?

- We identified the soldier whose leg I delivered to our headquarters. First, his sister recognized the boot she'd bought for her brother. Later, he was officially identified through DNA testing.

- When did you start working with the Evacuation-200 team?

- I joined the team in March 2015, after I was discharged from the "Myrotvoret's" Battalion.

It so happened that we had to leave immediately and travel to "the other side" to pick up the remains of our soldiers. There was an agreement between both sides. They would allow us on "their territory", but we had to follow a certain route and procedure.

Our guys accompanied us to the demarcation line, and on "the other side" we were met by a local group of insurgents. They stayed with us all the time. That's how it works every time that search groups are allowed to travel to the occupied territories of the Donbas. We had to drive along a specific route... and God knows what would've happened or what their special services would've done to us if we had suddenly decided to change our itinerary or stop along the way!

- What is the procedure for returning our fallen soldiers?

- Here's what a typical procedure looks like:

First, our search group, accompanied by their special services, arrives at the "DPR" military base, or at another place authorized to deliver the remains of our men. Then, we draw up the required documents, retrieve the bodies, and return to the demarcation line accompanied by their special services or military officers. We cross over to our side and deliver the bodies to competent persons, who transfer them to Zaporizhzhya or Dnipro where DNA tests can be conducted.

At times, we were allowed to return on our own, but we were ordered not to delay, stop or take another road.

- Have you counted how many soldiers your organization has brought home?

– It’s hard to say. My search crew has taken part in several operations and I’d say we’ve transported about fifteen bodies. I’m talking about our soldiers, of course, plus the bodies of men that we handed over to “the other side”.

We don’t distinguish between ours and theirs... someone somewhere is waiting for each soldier. Moreover, we don’t work according to the “one-for-one” scheme. We hand over the bodies that we have, and “the other side” gives us what they find.

– Our mission, our duty is to return the soldier to his home so that his family can say goodbye, mourn him, and accompany him to his final resting place.

#8

Ukraine’s Top Court to Review Constitutional Amendments on EU, NATO Membership Goal

RFE/RL, 20 September 2018
<https://bit.ly/2yC00Te>

Ukrainian lawmakers have **voted to submit draft bills** to the country’s top court that would enshrine Ukraine’s course toward Euro-Atlantic integration in the constitution.

A total of 321 lawmakers voted on September 20 to appeal to the Constitutional Court to review the proposed amendments.

After the court issues its judgment, the draft bills will return to the Verkhovna Rada where they will need at least 300 votes to pass.

Earlier in the day, President Petro Poroshenko told lawmakers that Ukraine needs the constitutional amendments to make EU and NATO membership its long-term goal.

In his annual address to parliament on Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy, Poroshenko said the Ukrainian armed forces will meet the criteria for NATO membership by 2020.

The move comes amid continued fighting between Ukrainian government forces and Russia-backed separatists in a conflict that has killed more than 10,300 in eastern Ukraine since April 2014.

Peace accords signed in Belarus’s capital, Minsk, in September 2014 and February 2015, have failed to put an end to the fighting.

Moscow’s support for the separatists and its seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 prompted the United States, the European Union, and others to impose sanctions on Russia.

In his speech, Poroshenko warned that there was a risk of the international sanctions imposed on Russia for its actions in Ukraine being eased.

“We will consistently oppose attempts to ease the sanctions pressure on Russia,” he said. “But know that there is a risk of softening [sanctions].”

Making concessions to Russia before it had handed the Crimean Peninsula back to Ukraine would be a defeat for international law, the president added.

As Poroshenko delivered his address, four people were reported injured in clashes between police officers and demonstrators outside the parliament building. At least one police officer was taken to hospital.

The demonstrators were calling for a relaxation of the rules on gaining Ukrainian citizenship for foreigners who have fought for Ukraine against the separatists in the country’s east.

#9

Ways to End the Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas: an Interview with Serhiy Kudelia

by Maria Lipman and Serhiy Kudelia
Open Democracy, 3 October 2018
<https://bit.ly/2pSaZPm>

Political scientist Serhiy Kudelia has studied the conflict in Donbas since its very early stages. In a recently published academic article, “Institutional Paths to Ending the Donbas Conflict”, he discussed the possible approaches to ending the war. Maria Lipman talks to Kudelia about the current state of the conflict, as well as the prospects for, and impediments to, its resolution.

This interview originally appeared on Point & Counterpoint, PONARS Eurasia.

Maria Lipman: In your article, you describe various elements of conflict resolution that can be applied to Donbas. You point out, however, that what you describe is not a policy nor policy recommendations, but rather guidelines for a possible policy drawn from empirical studies of other conflicts. So my first question is: on which empirical studies did you base these guidelines – on which countries and conflicts – and how applicable might those experiences be to the Donbas case?

Serhiy Kudelia: Most of the studies that I examined were quantitative studies based on the large sample of armed conflicts since World War II. They look at a broad range

of variables that may affect post-conflict stability, from the terms of the negotiated agreements to the strategies for ex-combatant reintegration and civilian reconciliation.

When we think about conflict resolution, we have to conceptualize it as a multi-stage process. The first stage is about finding a suitable compromise to which both parties would agree and taking steps to increase the probability of reaching such a compromise. A number of studies looked at the role of the balance of powers between the different parties that are involved in the conflict and how that balance of power affects the type of compromise that can be reached.

The second phase is about ensuring post-conflict stability and improving the parties' capacity to prevent conflict from recurring. The relevant variables for thinking about this phase are the type of autonomy guarantees a region receives or the types of power-sharing mechanisms designed for a particular group, the roles of ex-rebel parties and their position in the post-conflict setting, and the extent to which individual insurgents are reintegrated into civilian life and receive guarantees that they will not be prosecuted after the settlement.

Finally, the third phase is about reaching a longer-term reconciliation on the societal and individual levels. It requires finding a way to allow remembrance and ensure some accountability for the crimes committed by both sides during the conflict without triggering renewed hostility and confrontation within the society.

Lipman: One of your premises is that the conflict in Donbas has reached a stalemate. What do you mean by that?

Kudelia: There exists in the conflict resolution literature the concept of a “mutually hurting stalemate,” which means that the costs of continued conflict – either in terms of lost lives or material losses – continue to rise for all parties involved, while the prospects of winning, and hence the gains associated with victory, are increasingly dim in the perceptions of all sides.

This is one of the conditions for jumpstarting talks to end the conflict. We are clearly seeing a stalemate in Donbas, since the contact line has not moved significantly since February 2015. For some time now, there has also been a realization on all sides – in Kyiv, Donetsk, and Moscow – that the conflict is not going to go their preferred way.

Ukrainian troops will not be able to retake separatist-controlled areas with a military push; Western sanctions will not be sufficient to crush Russia or change its policy; the rebels will not take back Sloviansk and Severodonetsk; and the rest of southeastern Ukraine will not rise up in solidarity with the Donbas separatists. None of these outcomes, which many envisioned as likely at the start of the conflict, now seem remotely realistic.

It is less clear whether this stalemate is equally and sufficiently costly for all sides. It certainly imposes tremendous costs on the civilians in the region. However, Ukrainian

ruling elites seem to have found ways to benefit personally from increased military spending and restrictions on trade with separatists, so the costs for them are primarily political. Poroshenko's failure to achieve progress in finding a resolution to the conflict is a major liability in the presidential campaign set to begin later this year (the election is scheduled for March 2019). Similarly, the costs of conflict for the leaderships of the two separatist republics, which are completely isolated from public opinion, are minimal. Finally, continued economic sanctions against Russia are certainly taking their toll, but they are no longer linked only to Donbas. Thus, Moscow's concessions on Donbas would not guarantee the immediate lifting of sanctions.

In my view, this lack of a sense of urgency on all sides is one of the main obstacles to starting serious talks right now. This may change if, let's say, the new Ukrainian leadership realizes that without ending the Donbas conflict they may lose power very quickly. Similarly, if separatist leaders realize that an ongoing conflict increases the risk to their lives, it may change their calculations. (At least a dozen leaders have been killed or died unexpectedly since the beginning of the conflict.) Finally, in the case of Russia, if Putin realizes that, without credible progress in Donbas, the sanctions will only increase and there will be no possibility of a breakthrough in Russia's relationship with the West, he may be more open to intermediate solutions. But we are not there yet, as I certainly realized when writing this paper.

However, the availability of an alternative to stalemate is also critically important for policy-makers in starting serious negotiations – and academics should be the ones generating new ideas about such alternatives.

Lipman: As you are looking at possible approaches to conflict resolution in Donbas from a political science standpoint, you offer four key insights that apply to the Donbas crisis. Would you talk about those four insights and the challenges to each of them in the Donbas case specifically?

Kudelia: In the case of a secessionist conflict, conflict resolution requires answering a number of central questions. One question is what the distribution of power and areas of responsibility between the central and regional governments will be once the conflict is over: how will government structures be organized locally?

The second question is what the future of those who participated in the conflict on the rebel side will be – not only the insurgents who were fighting the Ukrainian army, but also the people who participated in separatist governance, people who handled local administration or provided public services (doctors, schoolteachers, etc.) How can they be reassured that their livelihoods will remain intact?

And the third question has to do with a long-term guarantee that the negotiated agreement will remain in place and that the Ukrainian authorities will not unilaterally revise the terms of this agreement by reneging on the promises that they made to the people of the region. So these are three very important questions that I think need to be

addressed when we discuss the specific terms of the compromise.

As far as the first question is concerned, there are two types of power-sharing agreements. The first, on the national level, provides a region with certain guarantees of representation in the executive and legislative branches. The second offers expanded powers on the local level, giving regional government additional areas of responsibility. In my view, the first type of power-sharing would be very destructive for the future of the Ukrainian state. There is no question that if Donbas receives certain representation quotas on the national level, then this will be used to subvert state policies, sow discord, and paralyze decision-making. An alternative compromise arrangement offering the region *de facto* or *de jure* autonomy would not be as destabilizing. It would not mean turning Ukraine into a federal state – remember that Crimea has autonomous status according to the Ukrainian constitution, yet Ukraine has always been a unitary state. And broader regional powers would certainly address some of the key concerns of people in Donbas regarding their cultural rights: the right to receive education in Russian, the right to maintain their own historical memory policies, or even the right to maintain regional cross-border ties with Russia.

One of the key problems with the creation of this kind of autonomy, again drawing on the political science literature, is that these autonomous entities tend to create what some scholars call “segment states.” Reliance on their own exclusive institutions solidifies a sense of regional identity, and these institutions may later be used by local elites as instruments for separatist mobilization.

Another problem with this autonomy arrangement is that it may perpetuate the master cleavages that produced the conflict in the first place. I therefore suggest that we need to create a larger autonomy for each of the two Donbas provinces, rather than only for the separatist-controlled territories, as the Ukrainian authorities currently advocate. In so doing, we would dilute separatist sentiment in Donbas as a whole, since such an arrangement would include a significant share of people who, according to many recent polls, already identify themselves primarily with Ukraine.

The second thing that I propose is to encourage the emergence in the region of what political scientists call “cross-cutting majorities.” That is, instead of creating a centralized regional structure with vast powers given to the executive leaders of the two provinces, we should envisage empowering local mayors or the heads of local village councils, for example, and allowing them to elevate the issues of people in each of these smaller regional units. These problems would certainly differ between different parts of Donbas, such that the master cleavage of Kyiv vs. Donetsk or Luhansk would no longer be relevant. This would produce fragmentation of Donbas along multiple issue dimensions and might help prevent regional collective mobilization in the future.

Lipman: If I remember correctly, other key factors include converting rebels into legitimate actors, transitional justice, and also the issue of elections – you suggest in your article that elections should not be held straight away.

Kudelia: The issue of guarantees to former rebels is the second most important question that we have to answer. Why? Because if separatist leaders and their subordinates feel that their livelihoods will be threatened by reaching an agreement, they will certainly act as spoilers – they will try to subvert the agreement by any means possible.

One of the most common reassurance mechanisms is to allow these rebel groups to convert themselves into political parties, which would then be integrated in the political process on the local level. This means that they will be allowed to participate in local elections. Of course, they need to denounce violence, they need to give up arms, they need to completely demilitarize themselves, but if they feel that they have a future through the political process and will be guaranteed representation if they manage to win local elections, they will develop a stake in the agreement. It will give them a reason to both accept the agreement and participate in its enforcement.

This is certainly a very difficult proposition for many Ukrainians today, because it means that separatist organizations that have long been characterized as terrorist groups in the national media and by Ukrainian officials would basically be recognized as legitimate actors. But since the start of the conflict, these organizations have developed genuine relationships with local residents through the provision of various social services, humanitarian assistance, and protection. As such, if they are banned or excluded, it will be very hard for Ukraine to create a stable and legitimate local government.

Another proposal that I make in this paper is delayed elections. Only after a transitional authority has been in place for two or three years, has provided access to information for the residents of the region, and has ensured a reasonably level playing field for various political parties on the ground can we actually hold elections that will be meaningful and produce results that will genuinely reflect local preferences.

The fourth and final issue is that of transitional justice. Over the course of the conflict, many members of the separatist government and of rebel groups may have committed various crimes, from embezzlement and extortion to war crimes. But in the majority of similar conflicts in the past, rebels received both comprehensive and unconditional amnesty. Again, this is a very difficult bargain for the rest of the society to accept. But the primary reason that most conflicts have ended with this type of bargain is because any attempts to investigate and prosecute individuals have inevitably led to selective justice (especially if only the rebel side is targeted), thereby undermining the peace process.

Thus, the solution that many countries, including Guatemala and El Salvador, chose was to investigate and publicize the human rights violations committed by both sides during the conflict, but to hold their perpetrators responsible in the court of public opinion rather than in the court of law.

Lipman: Such as truth commissions?

Kudelia: Yes, truth commissions collect evidence and expose individual participation in

crimes, but are not empowered to put these individuals in jail. It is a sub-optimal solution for many victims of these crimes or their families. But as far as achieving sustainable peace is concerned, this has been shown to be the most effective method.

The recent peace agreement in Colombia created a novel accountability instrument – a special tribunal charged with investigating the gravest crimes, such as the kidnapping, killing, or torturing of civilians or prisoners of war. However, depending on the willingness of the accused to admit guilt and show contrition, this tribunal can issue sentences other than jail time, such as community service. This allows restorative justice to be achieved without threatening the stability of the peace. The effectiveness of this instrument has yet to be tested, since it has only recently begun to operate. Importantly, the Colombian tribunal can indict and investigate members of both pro-government and anti-government forces. Ukrainian society should be ready to accept the principle of blind justice in the event that a similar tribunal is created as part of the Donbas peace process.

Lipman: My final question has to do with today: what do you think about the recent assassination of the head of the so-called Donetsk republic, Alexander Zakharchenko? How important a factor is it and, especially since you are looking at an indefinite future, do you think this assassination will affect the course of the conflict?

Kudelia: This assassination matters for a number of reasons. First of all, we have seen that in the four years since the beginning of this conflict, most of the insurgent leaders in Luhansk and Donetsk have been either assassinated or exiled to Russia, where they later died under suspicious circumstances. Valeriy Bolotov was exiled to Russia in August 2014 and died there under suspicious circumstances in January 2017. His successor, Igor Plotnitsky, was similarly exiled to Russia last year and we have not heard from him since. Many of the local commanders – Alexei Mozgovoy, Pavel Dremov, Batman, Givi, Motorola, and others – have been assassinated over the past three years. Their killings were never investigated. In Donetsk we have seen greater continuity in the case of Zakharchenko, and the fact that a figure of Zakharchenko's standing has been assassinated shows that his successor will also become a potential target for assassination.

This strategy, which may be characterized as a decapitation strategy, serves a number of purposes. First, it is used to send a signal to the leaders of these separatist organizations that they will never be safe as long as the conflict continues. The second goal of this strategy is to produce chaos in the rebel ranks, because the killing of a longstanding leader such as Zakharchenko triggers in-fighting over his replacement. Since there are no formal, open mechanisms through which for that succession to take place, it leads to fractionalization of the rebels themselves. And the more fractionalized they are, the weaker they are. So of course it is in the interests of the other party – in this case the Ukrainian government – to stick to decapitation; it actually works in the interests of Ukraine.

But there is also a more strategic consideration. In the paper, I mentioned that one of

the key difficulties with converting the rebels into political parties is the fact that some separatist leaders (like Zakharchenko) participated in the armed struggle, and this makes it very difficult for the Ukrainian side to accept them as negotiating partners or as future regional leaders. If you think about the Irish peace process, for example, it was Sinn Féin – the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, which was never involved in direct armed struggle – that represented the interests of Irish separatists in the talks with the British government. The fact that Zakharchenko was a soldier and military commander who fought the Ukrainian military on the battlefield of course made him completely illegitimate from the Ukrainian standpoint. His elimination therefore re-opens the path for civilian leaders to emerge, leaders who can be drivers of rebel conversion and therefore more acceptable to the Ukrainian side as counterparts in talks.

#10

U.S. Senate Says Stalin ‘Committed Genocide’ in Famine-Hit Ukraine

by Mark Najarian

RFE/RL, 5 October 2018

<https://bit.ly/2yDsLtJ>

The U.S. Senate has adopted a resolution recognizing that Soviet dictator Josef Stalin committed genocide against the Ukrainian people in the early 1930s, when millions died in a horrific famine known as the Holodomor.

The “simple resolution” passed on October 3 commemorates the 85th anniversary of the famine of 1932-33, saying the event “should serve as a reminder of repressive Soviet policies against the people of Ukraine.”

The Senate “recognizes the findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine as submitted to Congress on April 22, 1988, including that...’Stalin and those around him committed genocide against the Ukrainians in 1932–1933,’” it said.

Millions of people died in the famine, which many Ukrainians consider to have been caused by Soviet central planners as an act of genocide, aimed at wiping out Ukrainian farmers.

In the U.S. Congress, simple resolutions are nonbinding, passed by only one chamber of Congress, and don’t become law. Typically, they are used by lawmakers to usually back a pet project or endeavor, or a potentially political controversial issue without forcing a more public vote.

The Ukrainian Embassy in Washington described the resolution as the “first-ever legal act” of Congress recognizing the tragedy as a genocide, a highly charged term that is likely to anger Moscow.

Russian historians, and others, have stopped short of saying the famine was engineered to kill Ukrainians, noting that many other ethnic groups also suffered.

#11

At War with Russia in East, Ukraine Has Worries in the West, Too

by Andrew Higgins

New York Times, 5 October 2018

<https://nyti.ms/2RyehnB>

When the Hungarian State Opera visited a town just over the border in western Ukraine last month to perform a patriotic opera, 3,000 people in the audience rose to their feet for the playing of the Ukrainian and then Hungarian national anthems.

What followed, however, was a striking display of discordant allegiances. The audience, gathered in the Ukrainian town of Berehove in an outdoor amphitheater, stood mute during the Ukrainian hymn and then burst into boisterous song for the anthem of Hungary, a foreign country.

The spectacle explains why, whether along Ukraine's border with Russia in the east or on its western frontier with the European Union, border-straddling bonds of language and culture make it so difficult for Ukraine to hang together as a single, unified state. It is a clue as well of the skillful exploitation of nationalist impulses by Hungary's leader, Viktor Orban, to cement his increasingly autocratic rule.

Mr. Orban has avoided threats of force to right what he calls historic wrongs that put millions of Hungarians outside their country's border. But the fear is that having positioned himself as the leader of a populist surge across much of Europe with his strident attacks on immigration and the European Union, Mr. Orban now risks reopening Europe's most dangerous Pandora's box: the grievances of ethnic groups caught outside their homelands.

The town of Berehove, like the audience at the opera, is made up largely of ethnic Hungarians who mostly speak Hungarian, not Ukrainian, which many do not speak at all, and set their watches according to the time in Hungary, not Ukraine, which is an hour ahead.

"In their heads these people are living in Hungary," said Vasyl Vovkunovich, a former teacher and furniture seller who in November led a group of fellow Ukrainian nationalists in tearing down a Hungarian flag flying outside the town's city hall. The group left intact three other flags also on display, those of Ukraine, the European Union and the municipality.

Few nations in the world have had their borders chopped up and lands redistributed as frequently as those in Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly former components of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which disintegrated after World War I. Berehove, for one, has found itself in five different countries over the past century.

Under the Trianon Treaty in 1920, Hungary — which was allied with the losing side in both world wars — suffered what it still considers the great historical injustice of losing two-thirds of its land.

Fury at the dismemberment of the country has been a constant theme in Hungarian politics ever since, but it has taken on new force in recent years under Mr. Orbán's leadership.

His immediate political calculus is simple: His government has given 1 million Hungarians living outside Hungary passports and the right to vote, creating a large bloc of voters who mostly cheer the robust nationalism championed by Mr. Orbán and his party, Fidesz. Hungary itself has only 9.7 million people.

Berehove's ethnic Hungarian mayor, Zoltan Babek, who said he had not received a passport from Budapest but whose wife has, said nobody is agitating for his town to rejoin Hungary. He insisted he joined in the singing of the Hungarian anthem simply out of courtesy for the visiting opera troupe and the Hungarian consul general, who was in the audience.

But asked whether he considered himself a Ukrainian patriot, he hesitated and then said: "I am a patriot of this town."

Worried that Hungary is gnawing away at the stability of Ukraine's western border zone, prosecutors in Transcarpathia, the region bordering Hungary, recently announced the start of a criminal investigation for high treason over the issuing of Hungarian passports to Ukrainian citizens. On Thursday, the Foreign Ministry in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, ordered the expulsion of Hungary's consul in Berehove.

The expulsion followed the posting online of a video that showed a group of Berehove residents singing the Hungarian anthem and pledging loyalty to Hungary at a passport-issuing ceremony at the Ukrainian town's Hungarian consulate. A Hungarian diplomat can be heard warning them not to tell the Ukrainian authorities about their new citizenship. Ukrainian law bars dual nationality.

Mr. Orbán's government insists that it recognizes Hungary's current borders and has no intention of trying to seize lost lands and rebuild "Greater Hungary," which includes territory now in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

But it has lavished money as well as passports on Hungarians living outside Hungary. His government, while fiercely opposed to multiculturalism at home, has complained loudly

about any attempt by countries like Ukraine to force their Hungarian minorities to learn the language and follow the customs of their host nation.

The largest Hungarian diaspora population, more than half of a total of around 2.4 million people, lives in Romania. But the relatively small population of about 150,000 Hungarian-speakers in western Ukraine has become a much bigger source of friction, not least because Mr. Orbán keeps picking fights with his weak eastern neighbor.

His government caused outrage in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, in July when it announced the appointment of a ministerial commissioner for the development of Transcarpathia. At first glance, the announcement suggested just another reshuffling of Hungary's bureaucratic chairs but for one detail: Transcarpathia is not in Hungary but in Ukraine, so not a place for which Budapest should be appointing officials.

“This is a small, but important detail,” said Dmytro Tuzhanskyi, a political scientist and expert on Hungary's relations with Ukraine in Uzhgorod, the capital of Ukraine's Transcarpathia region. “It was a mistake, a Freudian mistake. It showed what they are really thinking.”

Hungary, Mr. Tuzhanskyi added, is not about to send “little green men” into Transcarpathia to foment secession, as Russia did in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. But Hungary's assertive and often prickly nationalism under Mr. Orbán has left Ukraine feeling besieged not only in the east by Russia but in the west by Hungary, a member of what is supposed to be its biggest backer, the European Union.

After a heated diplomatic flap, Mr. Orbán's government agreed to change the title of its new ministerial commissioner to avoid any suggestion that it was claiming Ukrainian territory.

The gulf has been widened by hard-line nationalists on both sides, including the Hungarian far-right group Jobbik, which has called for the annexation of Transcarpathia, and it has created a fog of uncertainty in which hotheads — and also Russia — can easily spread unease.

In February, the office in Uzhgorod of the region's main Hungarian political party, known as KMKS, was hit twice by arson attacks. The second firebombing, far more serious than the first, incinerated the building's interior and was quickly denounced by Budapest and also Moscow as a provocation by Ukrainian extremists. The Ukrainian authorities, however, insist the attack was the work of a Polish far-right group working for Russia. Poland has arrested two people accused of involvement in the attacks.

At around the same time, Ukraine announced that it would reopen a long-abandoned army base in Berehove. Budapest swiftly denounced the move as “disgusting,” because, Hungary said, it suggested Ukraine viewed Hungarian residents in the town as a threat.

Some believe that in addition to his domestic political calculations, Mr. Orban wants to prove himself a reliable partner to the Kremlin by unsettling Ukraine. This is the view of liberals in Budapest, who see Mr. Orban as a menace not only to his own country's democracy but to Europe's wider security because of his eagerness for close ties with Russia.

"Bashing Ukraine is the best thing you can do if you want to win points with Vladimir Putin," said Peter Kreko, the director of the Political Capital Institute, a research group in Budapest that is often critical of Mr. Orban.

Despite being a member of the European bloc, which has put moving Ukraine toward the West at the heart of its joint foreign policy, Mr. Orban has repeatedly pushed in the other direction, tilting toward Russia whose authoritarian leader, Mr. Putin, he seems to view as a kindred spirit.

When Kiev announced a new language law late last year, designed to promote the use of Ukrainian and reduce Russia's influence, Hungary retaliated by vowing to block Ukraine's aspirations to forge closer ties with the European Union and NATO, undermining the goals of two organizations to which Hungary itself belongs.

As part of its outreach to the Hungarian diaspora, Budapest has set up a host of charities and foundations to provide financial and other support. The most visible of these, the Egan Ede Foundation, has provided thousands of ethnic Hungarians living in western Ukraine with cash grants to support their businesses.

In response, Ukraine's internal security agency, known as the S.B.U., recently opened a criminal case against the foundation for promoting separatism.

Mr. Babek, Berehove's mayor, said the real problem is not that Hungary offers so much financial and other help, but that Ukraine offers so little. When the town wanted to erect a statue to a revered Ukrainian writer, Taras Shevchenko, it spent years trying to raise money in Ukraine; it eventually got the bronze tribute finished after Hungary agreed to cover half the cost.

The biggest beneficiary of Hungarian money in Berehove is the Ferenc Rakoczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, which occupies the town's largest building, a grand former courthouse built during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The institute's rector, Idiko Orosz, had nothing but praise for Mr. Orban, who visited the institute in 2013 and pledged financial support, and for his Fidesz party. "It supports us so we support it," she said.

She is particularly grateful to Fidesz for its help in protesting restrictions on the use of languages other than Ukrainian. Hungarian-speakers living in Ukraine, she said, are not like the foreign immigrants whom Mr. Orban rails against constantly in Hungary, but are more like Native Americans who suddenly found their homeland taken over by strangers.

“We stayed at home; they came to us, not us to them,” she said, noting that her grandmother was born in Czechoslovakia, and her mother in Hungary and she in the Soviet Union. “None of us moved anywhere.”

#12

Paul Manafort in an Email to Pro-Russia Client: Non-Partisan Think Tank Wonk

Did My Bidding

by Betsy Woodruff

Daily Beast, 15 September 2018

<https://thebea.st/2Ei5cMX>

An influential American think tank chief helped Paul Manafort advocate for his Russia-friendly Ukrainian client, according to an email Manafort sent that surfaced in federal court filings Friday.

The scholar, Matthew Rojansky, heads the non-partisan Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, which focuses on American relations with Russia and Ukraine. The Wilson Center, which Congress established 50 years ago, is considered one of Washington’s most influential think tanks.

In an email, Manafort claimed one of its scholars coordinated with him on an op-ed about his client Viktor Yanukovich, the pro-Russia Ukrainian strongman who had imprisoned his top political opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko.

A Wilson Center spokesperson provided the following statement to The Daily Beast: “The Wilson Center’s Matthew Rojansky is one of the country’s top experts on Russia, Ukraine and the region and heads the Center’s Kennan Institute, which is dedicated to improving American understanding of the former Soviet Union through research and exchange. The article in question, and all of the Center’s work, is the product of independent thought and analysis.”

The email in question was sent by Manafort on April 21, 2013, and was part of the new charging document released by Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s team on Friday. Manafort, whose middle name is John, is identified as “PJM.” The recipient is only identified as “SL.” In the email, Manafort detailed work he and his team had been doing for Yanukovich, focused on the European Union’s preparation to sign an association agreement with Ukraine. Manafort noted that the American consultants working with him had been highlighting the release of Yuriy Lutsenko, a Tymoshenko ally who had been imprisoned along with her.

“This week we directed the efforts of a number of positive news articles that appeared in several prominent publications and in the digital media space,” he wrote. “These articles

were done in tandem with key efforts we have been focusing on to emphasize the positive progress Ukraine has made on several key issues.”

Manafort then listed four articles: two press releases, a piece published by the now-defunct organization Center for the Study of Former Soviet Socialist Republics, and an op-ed by Rojansky titled “Will Ukraine Seize Its EU Chance?” The op-ed was published on CNN’s Global Public Square blog.

The article discussed Yanukovich’s pardon of Lutsenko, and noted that the continued incarceration of Tymoshenko would hinder Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with Europe. It also called on Yanukovich to release her, while praising his government for “a wide range of reforms.”

“Freeing Tymoshenko would not only underscore Kiev’s political commitment to fulfilling the conditions set by Brussels, but would also endow with much greater credibility a wide range of reforms already undertaken by the Yanukovich government, including a new criminal procedure code, prison reforms, and new protections for NGOs,” Rojansky wrote.

Under Rojansky’s leadership, the Kennan Institute has faced turmoil. A host of former Ukrainian alumni of the Center’s programs wrote an open letter in February of this year lambasting Rojansky and calling his organization “an unwitting tool of Russia’s political interference.”

“We are deeply concerned by the Kennan Institute’s growing pro-Kremlin policies, lack of democratic procedures and unprofessional communication with Kennan Institute alumni in Ukraine,” they wrote.

It noted that the Institute hosted a concert featuring musicians who praised Russia’s annexation of Crimea and gave an award to billionaire Alfa Bank head Petr Aven. The Institute later shuttered its Kyiv office.

In a statement released in March of this year on the closure of the Institute’s Ukraine office, Wilson Center CEO Jane Harman praised Rojansky’s work.

“Our programming on Ukraine has been balanced, professional, and of lasting value,” she wrote. “Moreover, our activities in Washington have promoted a broader understanding of Ukraine in the United States. We are proud to be voted #1 in the world in regional expertise by our peers. The Kennan Institute, under the able leadership of Matt Rojansky, is a huge reason for this accolade.”

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko hailed the resolution, **writing on Facebook** on October 4 that it was «another significant result of strengthening Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership.”

“We hope that the rest of the world, including the EU, and international organizations, including the United Nations, will do the same,” he added.

The office of Republican Senator Rob Portman, who sponsored the bill, did not immediately get back to RFE/RL for comment. Asked for comment, the State Department referred to a 2017 statement that described the Holodomor as “**one of the most atrocious acts of the 20th century.**”

Congress and individual states often pass resolutions that do not necessarily reflect overall U.S. policy.

The U.S. government has not recognized the Ukrainian famine as a “genocide,” instead labeling it as a “criminal act of the Stalinist regime” against the people of Ukraine. The EU terms it an “appalling crime.”

The Holodomor famine took place in 1932 and 1933 as Soviet authorities forced peasants in Ukraine to join collective farms by requisitioning their grain and other agricultural production.

Historians say the seizure of the 1932 crop by Soviet authorities was the main cause of the famine.

Along with Ukraine, at least 15 other countries have officially recognized Holodomor as “genocide.”

Ukraine commemorates the event every November 28.

U.S. lawmakers have **introduced similar resolutions** in the past on politically charged historical events, like the **massacre of Armenians** in Turkey during World War I. Most historians and a growing number of countries consider the killings to constitute genocide.

But the measures have never passed a full vote in either the Senate or the House.

The White House, under pressure from Turkey, has stopped short of using the word “genocide” to describe the Ottoman-era massacre.

#13

Ukraine's Painful Reforms Start To Bear Fruit

by Neil Buckley

Financial Times, 11 September 2018

<https://on.ft.com/2MkwaT7>

The government in Kiev can justifiably claim to have made more progress with structural reform in just four years than any administration since the country gained its independence in 1991.

In spite of the conflict with Russian-backed separatists that still smoulders in the south-eastern Donbas region, growth is slowly picking up, and investment — though still below the level Ukraine needs — is just starting to flow. “[We faced] the challenge of transforming a country which is really crucial to the stability and prosperity of Europe,” says Daniel Bilak, chairman of UkraineInvest, the government’s investment promotion agency. “The biggest challenge is trying to get our message out [about how the country has changed].”

One problem is that ordinary Ukrainians do not yet feel many of the changes in their daily lives. They have been hit hard by the slump in the economy and the national currency after the pro-democracy revolution and subsequent conflict in 2014.

Anti-corruption campaigners say the government has not yet broken the grip of billionaire oligarchs on governance and economy. “What are the challenges? First of all, vested interests,” says Oleksandr Danyliuk, who served as finance minister until June this year. “The more you squeeze them out, the more they push back.”

The Kiev government has been accused of dragging its feet on some key reforms — including creating an independent, anti-corruption court — demanded by the IMF as a condition of its \$17.5bn bailout programme. While an IMF-approved law to create the court was finally passed in July, the next \$2bn disbursement of IMF funding is running more than a year behind.

“This [anti-corruption] court is needed to bring to justice senior officials who are still embezzling millions and billions from state funds,” says Daria Kaleniuk, head of the Kiev-based Anti-Corruption Action Centre. The country can list many reform successes. It has managed to regain macroeconomic stabilisation after the post-revolution financial crisis. The economy shrank almost 17 per cent over 2014-15, before returning to growth in 2016. It is forecast by the World Bank to grow about 3.5 per cent this year.

The hryvnia has stabilised, while inflation — which hit 43 per cent in 2015, in part because of IMF-mandated increases in domestic fuel prices — was down to 13.7 per cent last year.

Before stepping down in March, central bank governor Valeria Gontareva led a clean-up of the banking sector that cut provider numbers almost by half. In the energy sector, increasing what were previously state-subsidised gas prices towards market levels was unpopular with domestic consumers — though targeted welfare payments partially offset its effects. But it removed the basis for huge corruption schemes.

The price increases, along with a strategy revamp, also transformed the fortunes of Naftogaz, Ukraine's natural gas utility. Its losses used to form part of a budget deficit that peaked at 10.1 per cent of gross domestic product in 2014 but has shrunk to 2.3 per cent.

“We were the biggest black hole in Ukraine. Now we're the biggest taxpayer,” says chief commercial officer Yuriy Vitrenko. In a sign of the changed relationship with Moscow, Naftogaz has not bought gas directly from Russia since November 2015. Consumption was reduced, while Naftogaz reached agreements to buy gas from neighbouring European countries.

The government has also reformed its tax and pension systems, reducing “under-the-table” wage payments. The introduction of transparent online bidding for public procurement contracts closed off another source of corruption.

Ukraine's Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, a think-tank, calculated that the gas sector, procurement, banking and tax reforms together restored up to \$6bn in annual revenues formerly stolen from the state.

The government is now moving to reforms that will be felt by ordinary Ukrainians. One is a reorganisation of healthcare into a National Health Service of Ukraine. Some Kiev insiders suggest the international community has not given Ukraine's authorities deserved credit for such difficult reforms, but focused disproportionately on IMF stipulations such as the anti-corruption court. Campaigners say the court was vital to ensure that a newly created National Anti-Corruption Bureau could bring cases before genuinely independent judges. Ukraine's government has yet to implement IMF demands for a final increase in gas prices.

“People will finally get the free healthcare they already paid for in their taxes,” says Ulana Suprun, health minister.

Officials say privately that agreement is close, despite the political sensitivity ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Ms Gontareva says uncertainty over the elections and the longer-term outlook for reforms should not obscure Kiev's achievements: “I don't believe that we can even compare the new Ukraine with the old Ukraine. Things are many times better than they were a few years ago.”

#14

Good News: Ukraine Finally Gets New IMF Agreement

by Anders Aslund

Atlantic Council, 22 October 2018

<https://bit.ly/2CZW7XO>

On October 19, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had finally reached a staff-level agreement with Ukraine on renewed lending. Ukraine hasn't received any IMF funds since April 2017. Experts had warned that without an IMF tranche, Ukraine's economy might face a serious financial crisis this fall.

Now the two parties have agreed on economic policies for a new 14-month stand-by agreement of \$3.9 billion that will replace the previous agreement, a four-year Extended Fund Facility of \$17.5 billion, which would have lapsed in March 2019.

This agreement is of vital importance and very much needed now. First, it will grant Ukraine sufficient international financing until the end of 2019. Second, it will help the Ukrainian government to pursue sound economic policies. Third, it will keep the Ukrainian economy stable during the 2019 election year with the presidential election slated for March 31 and parliamentary elections in October.

Ukraine has substantial debt service coming due in 2019-20 and it would need some \$7 billion in external financing during this period. The IMF agreement should solve it all. The IMF itself will probably disburse \$2 billion at the end of this year. With IMF approval, the European Union and the World Bank are likely to provide \$2 billion, and the government can sell Eurobonds for an additional \$2 billion at an admittedly high yield of some 9 percent. In addition, several state corporations are likely to sell Eurobonds or borrow by other means. Thus, \$8 billion or so of additional government borrowing is probable. Given that Ukraine's public debt has shrunk to 62 percent of GDP, the additional public debt raises no concerns, while the central bank reserves of only \$16.6 billion at the end of September corresponded to only 2.9 months of imports and were worrisome. Now the reserves should arouse no concern until the end of 2019.

Under the old IMF agreement, the country was supposed to receive an IMF tranche each quarter, but the funds have been held up for two issues. First, Ukraine was supposed to raise gas prices for households in July 2017, but it did not. Therefore, it has to hike prices by 23.5 percent as of November 1. Second, as the international community has identified corruption as the main problem in the Ukrainian economy, the IMF has untypically conditioned its assistance on the law establishing an independent anticorruption court that Ukraine adopted last June. Finally, the IMF always asks for a sound budget. On October 18, the Ukrainian parliament adopted it in a first reading with a deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP, which is even less than what the IMF demands.

Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman, who has led the negotiations, has been caught between two fronts. On the one hand, President Petro Poroshenko opposed an independent anticorruption court and proposed a lower corporate profit tax that would have undermined the budget. On the other side, opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko has objected strongly to higher gas prices and threatened a no-confidence vote in Groisman, even if Poroshenko, her main competitor in the presidential election in March, is her main target. Given these uncertainties, the IMF wisely insists on final adoption of the new budget before it disburses any new funds.

In spite of the political turmoil, the IMF appears to have confidence in Ukraine's economic decision makers, Groisman, acting Finance Minister Oksana Markarova, and Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine Yakiv Smoliy. The NBU has pursued a very conservative monetary policy with an interest rate of 18 percent, while annual inflation is just below 9 percent. The high interest rate has kept the exchange rate surprisingly strong at 28 hryvnia to \$1, in spite of rising emerging market instability.

Ukraine's prior IMF agreement would have lapsed in March 2019, concurrently with the presidential election, which would have been unnecessarily destabilizing. With this new agreement, the IMF offers Ukraine the option of financial stability through both elections.

This is an important step forward for Ukraine that will hopefully reassure investors that Ukraine can maintain macroeconomic stability and thus promote economic growth.

#15

War and Water in the Donbas

by Sophie Lambroschini
ZOiS Spotlight, 17 October 2018
<https://bit.ly/2EtZ98h>

Sophie Lambroschini is a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin. Her full paper on Voda Donbasu will be presented at the 2018 Danyliw Seminar.

Last spring, a large water pipe that crosses the front line in eastern Ukraine was once again cracked by shelling, shutting down the local water supply. Valery Konovalov, a water engineer and director of the water utility company in Kyiv-controlled Avdiivka, as “responsible boss”, took the lead to oversee repairs. As soon as the demining team had cleared the road, he put on a flak jacket and headed out to assess the damage to the pipe. Monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had organised so-called mirror patrols to secure the area, with Ukrainian officers and representatives of the separatist territories standing watch during a brief truce.

Konovalov knew he had little time to carry out the dangerous repairs before shooting started again. Each window of silence between the warring parties can take weeks to negotiate and can hold for just a few hours, as shelling can resume while repairs are still under way. In April, a bus taking technicians home from the Donetsk Filtration Station was hit by small-arms fire. Five employees were injured and the facility was shut down for several days. Some 350,000 people were left dependent on reservoirs and water trucks until the OSCE's monitoring mission could set up secure transport.

From January to September 2018, supply infrastructure was shelled on average almost twice a week, according to the United Nation's UNICEF that monitors the situation. Ad hoc crisis management at the political and technical levels has so far averted a major humanitarian crisis, but water management on the front line shows the workings and limitations of cooperation across enemy lines

A legacy of Soviet industrialisation

Operating at the centre of this hydro-political nexus, Voda Donbasu (VD), or Water of the Donbas, is a municipal public company that is based in separatist-held Donetsk but abides by Ukrainian legislation. It manages and controls the water-distribution facilities straddling the front line. Local water stems from the river Siverskyi Donets, in the north of Kyiv-controlled Donetsk, and flows through a system of channels, filtration stations, and pumps to homes, fields, and factories through Donetsk down to Mariupol on the Azov Sea.

This aging system was last developed in the late 1950s to serve the Soviet metallurgical and energy plants and their company towns. It was passed up for capital investment and modernisation in the post-Soviet decades, when profit-oriented business groups controlled the region. Four years of war have also taken their toll on infrastructure, quality maintenance, and financing.

Maintaining normality as an adaptive strategy

The 12,000 employees of VD's 30 local subdivisions, who live and work in both Kyiv-controlled and non-government controlled areas, are trying to adapt to the volatile day-to-day conditions in the region. VD captures the complexity of this arrangement: one company operating on both sides of the war as a guarantor of drinking water for 3.8 million people.

Local subdivisions like Konovalov's run the local water distribution for municipal water and heating systems. They maintain quality, carry out maintenance, check household water meters, and collect payment. In Avdiivka, there is a pumping station with a reservoir and, since 2015, a bomb shelter. In the office building, staff have covered the glass panes with foil to protect them against splinters from shelling.

Operating on both sides of the front line demands mobility. In interviews, VD managers described how they negotiate long lines at checkpoints to visit the Pokrovsk office, which serves as a second headquarters on the government-controlled side. It can take up to eleven hours to travel from Yasynuvata, on the separatist-held side, to Avdiivka, just 22 kilometres away. Sometimes the managers carry small spare parts across the line—nuts and bolts tailor made in a Donetsk workshop to fit the aging machinery. Monthly board meetings are held between Pokrovsk and Donetsk via an unstable video link.

VD employees explain their reluctance to leave the company—despite the security situation and problems with salary payments—by the obligations they have to their community. This attachment appears particularly strong for those born and bred in the Donbas, who are sometimes sons or daughters in water-management ‘dynasties’. Continuing one’s daily life as it used to be is a documented behaviour by people in war—an attempt to create a sense of normality out of chaos.

VD’s managers claimed in interviews that the interaction between staff on different sides had been little affected by official propaganda or the socio-political alienation caused by the war: ‘Being professionals means that we don’t let politics [the war] disrupt our work.’ The line of contact between government-controlled and non-government controlled areas is perceived more as a complication to be managed than as an actual obstruction for company communication.

The limits of water politics

From the broader perspective of conflict studies, technocratic cooperation, with its emphasis on standardised solutions and professionalism, is considered to have some peace-building capabilities. However, at another level, VD’s operations have become more, rather than less, political. The conflict has overturned VD’s economic and management model in particular by broadening its scope of interaction to new actors as a condition for its survival. Whereas the company originally functioned strictly on a local level, its managers now communicate with the Minsk contact group, international donors (Western governments and international organisations that provide chemicals and spare parts), authorities in Kyiv and Donetsk, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, and armed forces.

Water management in the Donbas shows how the on-the-ground experience of war is more complex than its political narrative. This nuanced picture coincides with the social environment in the Donbas, where communication across the separation line remains intense, counterbalancing the general trend towards political polarisation. However, the efficiency of this micro-level cooperation is often subordinated to military, political, and geopolitical interests.

#16

Constantinople Recognizes Kyiv Patriarch Filaret as Church Bishop

by Oleg Sukhov

Kyiv Post, 11 October 2018

<https://bit.ly/2IXXuGQ>

The Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople on Oct. 11 recognized the legitimacy of bishops of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church as part of the Constantinople church.

Until this decision, the pro-Ukrainian Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had not been recognized by the 14 official Orthodox churches, while the bishops of the pro-Russian Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine had. The recognition is an important step towards the creation of an officially recognized independent (autocephalous) Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople said on Oct. 11 it had lifted the anathema, or excommunication, imposed on Filaret, the patriarch of the Kyiv Patriarchate, and on Makariy, metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

The Synod also approved recognizing the authority of the Constantinople Patriarchate in Ukraine, and canceled its 1686 decision to allow the patriarch of Moscow to appoint metropolitans of Kyiv. The Metropolis of Kyiv had been part of the Constantinople Patriarchate from the Christianization of Kyivan Rus in 988 until 1686.

The Constantinople Patriarchate also created a stavropegeion in Kyiv – an entity that comprises churches or monasteries and is subordinated directly to the patriarch, as opposed to local bishops.

Moreover, the Synod approved plans to create an autocephalous (independent) Ukrainian church.

The Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church are planning to merge with pro-independence bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate into an independent (autocephalous) Ukrainian church, which is expected to get a tomos — a Synod decree recognizing the independence of the Ukrainian church from the Constantinople church.

“This decision gives us the opportunity to unite with bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate who are willing (to join),” Filaret said on Oct. 11.

He said that the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and some of the Ukrainian bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate would soon hold a congress to create a united church, and elect their head.

In May Sofroniy, the Moscow Patriarchate's metropolitan of Cherkasy and Kaniv, said that up to 10 out of 53 bishops from the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine supported the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church.

Responding to speculation that he would be demoted to a "metropolitan" due to the official recognition, Filaret said he would remain patriarch.

The Constantinople Patriarchate also appealed "to all sides involved to avoid the appropriation of churches, monasteries and other properties, as well as every other act of violence and retaliation, so that the peace and love of Christ may prevail."

One of the issues under discussion is whether the new Ukrainian church will acquire Moscow Patriarchate property in the country, and whether it will cause confrontation and violent protests. Filaret said that after the creation of an independent Ukrainian church Moscow Patriarchate bishops would still have a right to serve in Ukraine but would have no right to call themselves a "Ukrainian church."

"Moscow wants a conflict, and we — Ukrainians — don't want it," he added.

"God has seen the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence," Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said, commenting on the Constantinople church's decision on Oct. 11. "He has heard our prayers and appreciated our work. He made sure that his Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and the Synod of the Constantinople Patriarchate told us 'yes'."

In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate called the Constantinople church's decision "catastrophic" and warned that something "terrible" would begin.

Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church said it would have to terminate relations with the Constantinople Patriarchate, and also called for the excommunication of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

On Sept. 7, the Constantinople Patriarchate appointed two exarchs, or ambassadors, in Kyiv as efforts to create an independent Ukrainian church began to gain pace.

Filaret was defrocked by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1992 and excommunicated by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1997. He later appealed to the patriarch of Constantinople to cancel the excommunication.

He co-founded the Kyiv Patriarchate in 1992 and became the patriarch of Kyiv in 1995.

Filaret was the metropolitan of Kyiv as part of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1968 to 1992. He was also the locum tenens, or acting head, of the Russian Orthodox Church and a competitor for the job of the patriarch of Moscow in 1990.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded in 1919 during the brief period of Ukraine's independence after the collapse of the Russian Empire. In 1991 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate declared its independence from Moscow for the first time, but later most Ukrainian bishops revoked their signatures from the declaration.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has more than 12,000 parishes in Ukraine, while the Kyiv Patriarchate has about 5,000 parishes, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has about 2,000 parishes.

The popularity of the Kyiv Patriarchate has increased since Russia launched its war against Ukraine in 2014, and some parishes have switched from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv Patriarchate.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which is part of the Roman Catholic Church, has more than 3,000 parishes, mostly in Western Ukraine.

#17

Patriarch Kirill's 'Fatal Inability to Compromise' Costing Russia Influence Abroad, 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' Says

by Paul Goble

Windows on Eurasia, 22 October 2018

<https://bit.ly/2z3IiTR>

The Moscow Patriarchate's "categorical" unwillingness to reach any compromise with its opponents may make some Russians happy, the editors of Nezavisimaya gazeta say; but its approach under Patriarch Kirill not only violates Christian principles but undermines the possibility of maintaining Russian influence in churches abroad.

Kirill and his church have often been criticized by commentators who follow church affairs for rigidity even as others denounce him and it for contacts with the Vatican and the ecumenical movement, but this lead article shows that such criticism is spreading to more mainstream outlets and that in turn may mean that Kirill's position is at increasing risk.

According to the editors, the Russian church in the current crisis over Ukrainian autocephaly has shown "a fatal inability to compromise," even as its opponents have

outmaneuvered it at every turn. As a result, they say, Moscow can no longer count on its usual allies and is losing influence everywhere.

The most recent example of this, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* says, is Moscow's decision to break with Constantinople, an action that Constantinople didn't reciprocate and that few of Moscow's allies followed, thus making Kirill's move not only an empty gesture but one that highlights Moscow's isolation and limits its ability to move forward.

But this is hardly the only such case, the paper continues. Last December, Moscow didn't know how to respond in a useful way to feelers from Kyiv seeking a compromise and the consequence was that the Ukrainian political authorities and the Orthodox there have moved toward independence from Moscow.

And in an example of "the big being reflected in the small," the Moscow Patriarchate banned from further service a Minsk priest who photographed Patriarch Kirill's limousine, saying that he was working for Constantinople. By so doing, the paper says, the Moscow Patriarchate got unanimity but only at the price of losing an interlocutor and the media war.

"The Russian Orthodox Church keeps stressing its unity with Russian society" to justify its approach, the paper says; but "the mission of the church" which is to find compromise and to turn the other cheek is otherwise. Unfortunately, Kirill only wants to talk about the defense of his "canonical territory" and "expel from its ranks 'the fifth column.'"

Such an approach only guarantees that Moscow's church and thus Moscow itself will lose "even more" in the future.

#18

The Crisis in the Orthodox Church and the Battle for Slavic History

by Christopher Stoop
Moscow Times, October 17.
<https://bit.ly/2PoRfRR>

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On Oct. 11, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, "first among equals" in the Orthodox Christian world, decreed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to be canonical, or legitimate.

The move is a step on the road to the granting of autocephaly, or independence, to Ukrainian Orthodox Christians, allowing them to manage their own affairs without the oversight of the Moscow Patriarchate, which presides over the only Ukrainian Orthodox Church previously recognized as canonical.

Predictably, Russian reactions to the decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Synod came swiftly. The Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, which quickly called a synodal meeting of its own, cut ecclesiastical ties with Constantinople, blaming it for the "schism."

President Vladimir Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, invoked rhetoric associated with Russia's intervention in Ukraine's Donbas region and the 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

In a clear implicit threat of violence — though he himself insisted Russia would rely only on political and diplomatic means to resolve the situation — Peskov said:

"In the event that the events which are developing take the course of illegal activities, then of course, just as Russia defends the interests of Russians and Russian speakers — and Putin has spoken about this many times—Russia will defend the interests of the Orthodox."

Why such a heated response from Moscow? To be sure, Putin is afraid of losing power in an area he regards as Russia's sphere of influence, and of seeing Russia's power diluted in the Orthodox world. There, aggression in pursuit of influence vis-à-vis Constantinople has led to the isolation of the ROC, some of whose priests and hierarchs have been denied Greek visas they sought in order to make pilgrimages to Mount Athos.

The Moscow Patriarchate would certainly prefer to claim jurisdiction over the almost 30 million Ukrainians whose religious affiliations are distributed among the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, the Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, or who identify simply as Orthodox. And they have reason to be concerned the 12.8 percent of the population that professes loyalty to the Moscow Patriarchate may decline.

Both the Kremlin and the ROC leadership would prefer to be able to effectively exercise discipline over Orthodox clergy in Ukraine. This issue, embodied in the refusal of UOC-MP Metropolitan Onufryi to stand when the Ukrainian parliament honored Ukraine's soldiers fighting in the conflict in Donbas, may have contributed to the erosion of the ROC's position in Ukraine.

Trust in Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill has fallen precipitously from 44.4 percent to 15.3 percent over the last eight years, according to the Razumkov Center. It should be noted, however, that Metropolitan Onufryi's trust has held steady at around 31-32 percent of the Ukrainian population.

There are also more subtle forms of power at stake. In the authoritarian dystopia George Orwell famously conjured in his novel “1984,” one of the Party’s slogans is, “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.”

That there is more than a grain of truth in this axiom is one reason Russia has reacted so sharply to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s decree, which revoked the synodal letter of 1686 that granted the Patriarch of Moscow the right to ordain church hierarchs in what is now Ukraine, and what was then territory that had only recently been transferred from the Polish-Lithuanian state into the Russian Empire.

In emphasizing that the letter had been issued only for reasons of “oikonomia” — meaning it was undertaken outside of the ideals prescribed by canon law for pragmatic purposes — Constantinople effectively declared that, from a canonical point of view, there has been a Ukrainian nation deserving of its own self-governed church for centuries. This view of history, which bolsters Ukrainian sovereignty and self-determination, is one that a Russian state still devoted to the idea of Ukraine as a “little brother” cannot abide.

Many questions remain about what happens from here. Constantinople will likely issue a Tomos of Autocephaly — the document officially recognizing an Orthodox Church’s full independence — for Ukraine in November. In the meantime, Patriarch Filaret of the Kiev Patriarchate is maneuvering to take the lead while the processes for implementing Constantinople’s decision are worked out.

There will surely be some chaos ahead, including property disputes, lawsuits, and likely some violence, as well as a possible escalation of pro-Russian hostilities in eastern Ukraine. But inasmuch as the containment of Russian soft power, and of Russian attempts globally to undermine democratic institutions and support for human rights, is tied to the struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty, we must recognize that Constantinople’s bold move was the right one.

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