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# A Review of Taiwanese Trust in the Police with Alternative Interpretations

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## Abstract

This study aims to review and reinterpret Taiwanese citizens' trust in the police, with a focus on taking its social changes, political transitions, and historical background into consideration. Modern Taiwan inherits both Chinese and Japanese cultures, and the urbanization on the island has generated substantial differences between rural areas and metropolitans. The political system has also successfully transformed from authoritarianism to democracy since late 1980s and subsequently leads to paradigm shift in policing. All of the contemporary empirical studies regarding public assessments of the police are based on survey data, however, they either poorly measure the multi-dimensional nature of trust as a social construct or understudy social-historical context when interpreting survey findings. This review attempts to fill the gap and points out the demand of qualitative insights in future research.

**Keywords:** Procedural Justice, Urbanization, Perception of Police, Transitional Justice

## Introduction

After nearly three decades of democratization, Taiwan is considered as a democratic country that successfully transformed from authoritarian regime. Along with the major political change, social institutions, including the police that is in charge of maintaining social order, have to make substantial efforts in adjustment in order to remain functional in a different social context. In democracy, citizens' attitudes toward the police and assessments of their performance has become important reflections of their belief of the authority's legitimacy. In democratic societies, citizens' attitudes toward the police can influence their perceptions of public safety, political support of the authority, and then compliance with the law (Tyler, 1990). A lack of public support and trust in the police signals inadequate policing or insufficient crime control efforts, which can lead to more serious political consequences, including threats to the legitimacy of domestic governance (Wang & Sun, 2018).

The primary purpose of this study is to articulate recent empirical studies of Taiwanese' assessment of the police, offer alternative interpretations of the survey findings based on

Taiwan's social-historical background, and then sum up a direction of future research. Two reasons justify this study. First, Taiwan is an island society that has experimented political transformation and successfully switched from authoritarianism to democracy (Cao et al., 2014), and such a case offers implications to other Chinese societies that either face enormous societal and economic changes (e.g., China) or political transitions (e.g., Hong Kong and Macau). Second, while recent studies have assessed public trust in the police in Taiwan (Sun et al., 2014; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012) or other Chinese societies (Wu & Sun, 2009; Wu et al., 2012), they often measured the level of police trustworthiness using a singular dummy or ordinal variable. In addition, only one recent empirical study on the Taiwan police addresses rural and urban difference (Wang & Sun, 2018), but, like many prior studies, the interpretation is lacking sufficient social-historical context, which is elaborated in this review.

### **Social and Political Background of Taiwan**

Taiwan is a densely populated island off China's southern coast, with a current population around 23 million. Before the World War II, this 13,855 square miles island, formerly known as Formosa, was a colony of Japan after the Qing Empire lost the Jia-wu Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Republic of China (ROC), which was led by Chiang Kai-shek and his political party (Kuomintang or KMT), acquired control of Taiwan in line with the Cairo declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Conference of 1945 after the World War II. The forces of Chiang and KMT swiftly took over Taiwan following Japan's 1945 surrender. Shortly after the regime were glorified by the victory of defeating Japan in the war, they surprisingly lost mainland China to Mao's Communist Party.

Ultimately, ROC took refuge to Taiwan and accompanied with massive mainland immigrants, documented and undocumented. It was estimated that mainland immigrants were accounted for about 15% of the residential population at the time. After the Martial Law was declared in 1947, Formosa was under an exhaustive control by the regime of Chiang and KMT, until late 1980s. Accompanied with the implementation of Martial Law, the 228 Incident/Massacre<sup>1</sup> in 1947 quickly generated a chilling effect (the so-called *White Terror*) that was unspeakable among citizens across generations for several decades. During the period of Martial Law, the KMT exhaustively controlled over the government, including the police, the military, the media, content of education, and business associations. The police force was used to maintain coercive social order, monitor activists, and facilitate other forms of control, in addition to its core functions like crime fighting (Cao et al., 2014).

Even though this island society was coercively controlled, with the financial aid from the U.S., Taiwan enjoyed remarkable economic growth after 1950 and was glorified by a title of "economic miracle" given by the international community. The successful economic development transformed Taiwan from an agricultural society to an industrial and commercial one. Urbanization has been an ongoing process since Japanese colony but at a faster pace.

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<sup>1</sup> According to U.S. Military personnel's report (Cole, 2006), between twenty and thirty thousand civilians lose their lives during the incident, and the overall population is around 6.3 million when the incident occurred. However, the exact number of victimization may remain unknown.

More rural residents moved to cities because of job and business opportunities, and consequently led to a continuous decline of population in rural counties, especially after mid-1970s. Accompanied with the above structural changes in the society, particularly in cities, some traditional values and family functions (e.g., family-centered, education, child welfare) were gradually replaced by non-familial institutions, and the lifestyles become similar to Western cities' residents in the modern world (see Cao et al., (2014) for a general description of social and legislative changes). Jobs were further divided and occupations were specialized to increase the efficiency, which is important to Taiwan's economy that is highly influenced by international trades and exportation. Although official version of educational content in schools remained uniform and foreign news were largely blocked, Taiwanese residents were increasingly adaptive to the Western values of diversity, legality, and equality. Collectively, the social changes, economic achievements, and geographical environment probably provided the fertile soil for the democracy.

After martial law was lifted in 1987, the president Lee from KMT of the time partially led a series of Constitutional changes in 1990s and 2000s to satisfy the realistic demands of democracy from the grass root. Citizens were allowed to organize political parties and practice political right via a representative system of government in Taiwan. The largest one that gathered activists and non-KMT politicians was Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was considered as the opponent party. These two major parties are substantially different in many ways, such as interpretations of national independence, practices of democracy, and emphasis on political agendas like environmental protection and economic development. It is worth noting that some early DPP members dislike KMT regime because of their conflict ideology or deprived status. During this transition period, criminal incidents, including juvenile delinquency and drug abuse, escalated steadily. More confrontations between the police and the citizens occurred, especially during protests, in the process of democratization.

The process of transforming from an authoritarian to a democratic society was also characterized by several observable changes, such as the media was exempt from the government's forceful control, collective bargaining were allowed, and the educational system began to accept different voices and discussions of alternatives. To the general public, one noticeable change in their daily lives probably is about the open market of mass media. Radio stations, newspapers, cable companies, and TV stations were allowed to form in the market and compete with those funded by the state or KMT. Some stations even use local dialects (e.g., Taiwanese, Hakka), which were suppressed in the educational system during Martial Law period, to report news or play in TV shows for the purpose of attracting certain groups of audience, largely Taiwanese citizens who had lived on the island for several generations. Information come from foreign news are allowed to be broadcasted. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the media was completely controlled by the KMT regime's absolute force through Martial Law in Taiwan before late 1980s. In the era of democracy, the free market model has brought serious competitions to private-owned news groups, and one of the less desirable consequences is the tendency of reporting negative and/or sensational news to attract audience. Political figures and governmental agencies, including the police, are not waived from being the subjects of these reports. Today, Taiwanese enjoy a high level of press

freedom, and publicly making comments or critics against the public entities, including the president, is not uncommon. At the same time, citizens somewhat suffer from the quality of some contents covered by the mass media.

While democracy was taking root, the process was not immune from a few drastic confrontations and incidents. For example, Cheng, a pro-democracy activist and publisher who set himself on fire in 1989 in support of “real” freedom of speech. Cheng’s wife later became an important political figure in DPP. For another example, the first student protest in modern history of Taiwan – Wild Lily Movement – was initiated by students from National Taiwan University, the iconic higher education institution of Taiwan, in 1990 to seek for essential changes regarding how democracy should be practiced (e.g., citizens directly elect the president) in “real” democracy. This large scale student-led protest brought real challenges of the time to the authorities because a similar protest – Tiananmen Square protest – led by students of Beijing University, the iconic higher education institution of China, was out of control one year before.

To individual citizens, being truly free to affiliate with political parties or not to affiliate with KMT without concerning consequences was a relatively new experience that takes time to form a set of social norms at different levels. Since KMT’s massive migration from China to Taiwan in mid-1900s to today’s fully, but not necessarily mature, democratic society, Taiwanese has had experienced dramatic political and socio-economic changes. Several waves of immigrants, in conjunction with major events like Civil War and World War II, left interesting phenomenon in the society’s basic unit of social institution. For example, in a family, the great grandparents may be born and educated as Japanese, the grandparents grow up in KMT’s authoritarianism with limited rights, the parents witness substantial political and social changes in democratization process, and the grandkids take freedom and democracy for granted. In another family, the great grandparents may be born in mainland China, the grandparents grow up during wars, and loss everything and migrate (with KMT) to Taiwan. Occasionally, a sense of group identity derived from political affiliation or political ideology can cause serious conflicts or even separations, especially during elections, in other pro-social institutions like family in this new democratic society.

Taiwan’s successful and largely peaceful transition was labeled as a “political miracle” by some Western scholars, as the process challenged existing political theories (Clark, 2001). As of now, Taiwan has practiced democracy to a great extent for about three decades, and citizens are truly free from White Terror to organize political parties and to elect their legislative representatives and executives without concerning coercion and persecution. Also, citizens have the right to directly vote the president in the last six presidential elections and have used ballots to rotate the ruling party of the central government (KMT: year 1996-2000, year 2008-2016 and DPP: year 2000-2008, year 2016- ). In 2016, citizens of Taiwan even elected the first female leader in modern Asia.

During the post-martial law period of Taiwan, general public are free to affiliate with any political parties, including communists. The freedom to exercise this part of civil rights is relatively new to Taiwanese. In the process of democratization, citizens identified themselves

with political ideologies held by KMT and other smaller parties (e.g., People First Party and New Party) and those identified themselves with ideologies held by DPP and other smaller parties (e.g., Taiwan Solidarity Union and Taiwan Independence Party) have different views and perceptions of governmental entities, including the police (Sun, et al., 2016). Today, three political orientations are naturally emerged among residents of Taiwan: Pan-Blue, Pan-Green, and neutral. Pan-Blue group tends to align with a Chinese nationalist identity and holds the political ideology that favors a greater linkage with the mainland China. Pan-Green, on the other hand, tends to support the political ideology that favors a viewpoint of focusing on Taiwan's interests and be independent from China (Sun et al., 2016). Still others are neutral in their political orientation, and they tend to ignore political affiliation and elect political candidates based on individual credentials and characteristics.

Like other countries new to democracy, Taiwan is still developing its legal foundation and not immune from corruptions of public entity. Governmental corruptions often lead to ineffective operations, compromised human rights, wasteful public spending, weaker economic performance, larger inequality, and erosion of citizens' trust in the government. According to Transparency International, Taiwan ranks 29th out of 180 countries/regions on corruption perceptions index 2017, and the ranking fluctuated downward in 2000s<sup>2</sup>. When DPP first time won the presidential election and controlled the central government between 2000 and 2008, serious scandals and corruptions occurred to high-end officials, which ultimately sentenced the president Chen to the prison. It is worth mentioning that the police has been perceived as the least trustworthy governmental branch in Transparency International reports, and citizens' concerns of police integrity would generally predispose a lower evaluation of the police performance (Rosenbaum et al., 2005).

While the democracy is rooting in Taiwan, more representatives are elected from small political parties recently. The general public are gradually shield by liberty to contest voting results that are used to be dominated by two major political ideologies. The capital city – Taipei – even elects a medical doctor as the mayor who has no political party affiliation and no prior election experience.

## **Policing in Taiwan**

The police is described as the “gatekeeper” of the justice system in the community, and the political transitions often bring challenges to the police force in many aspects. In the era of Japanese colony in Taiwan, the police were exclusively Japanese until the later period. The system of neighborhood-based police stations (the so-called *pai-chu-suo*) was established to main social order. The Japanese police were granted great authority in Taiwan and sometimes empowered to exercise authority that usually reserved for judges. The Japanese police could

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<sup>2</sup> Please view the report from Transparency International Corruption Index at [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2017](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017). Previous rankings of Taiwan were 27 (2001), 29 (2002), 30 (2003), 35 (2004), 32 (2005), 34 (2006), 34 (2007), 39 (2008), 37 (2009), 33 (2010), and 32 (2011). Some methodology changes occurred in 2012, and the index scores of corruption are comparable across years. Between 2012 and 2016, Taiwan has been scored about 61 and ranked 31.

even administer corporal punishment against Taiwanese for minor offenses on the street. The police not only enforced laws but also provided guidance to residents' daily living, farming, public health, and education. Generally speaking, the Japanese police penetrated into residents' daily lives in nearly all aspects, and they cast an ever-present shadow over the Taiwanese. Parents, for example, would threaten their ungovernable kids by mentioning the Japanese police. Incidents of resistance or retaliation occurred from time to time though.

While KMT took over Taiwan and implemented the Martial Law, the police force was used to maintain coercive social order and monitor activists in the name of fighting against communists. Although the economy took flight after World War II, the political atmosphere remained coercive during Martial Law period. All the heads of the national police agency and the presidents of Central Police University, where police officers are educated and trained in Taiwan, had military but police background. The police was genuinely used as an extended arm of military to suppress political dissents before the Martial Law was lifted in 1987. The Taiwanese police used to coercively maintain social order and reserve status quo of KMT during Martial Law period. Also, the police used to enjoy a great deal of discretion regarding search, seizure, and detention.

Warrantless arrests were not unusual, but all these practices were gradually restricted by the legislations during post-Martial Law period. Importantly, the policing paradigm shifted from systematically reaching out for the regime's potential threats to cautiously limiting activities within the reinforcement of criminal law and to protect individuals' rights in a society that inherent Chinese and Japanese cultures, which morally encourages its members to sacrifice some of their individual interests for the sake of group harmony. During the political transition, the practice of law enforcement changed principles from "high policing" (exhaustive control) to "low policing" (protect citizens' rights) (Cao et al., 2014). The purpose of policing changed from preserving the distribution of existing power to serve general population, take public opinions into account, and proactively prevent crimes (Lai, 2016; Sun and Chu, 2006).

Currently, there are two law enforcement agencies in Taiwan – the National Police Agency (NPA) within the Ministry of Interior and the Investigation Bureau within the Ministry of Justice (MJIB). Both are centralized forces of the executive branch in the central government, and the later one is equivalent to U.S. Federal agencies like FBI, Secret Service, and DEA. To the citizens, the police wearing identical uniforms and stationing in neighborhood-based branches (*pai-chu-suo*) across cities and counties is under the chain of command of the NPA (Sun and Chu, 2006). NPA exercises administrative jurisdiction over all police departments throughout the country and evaluates police chiefs' performance, although local elected political leaders have the authority to appoint their police chiefs from a list of candidates recommended by the NPA. In addition, NPA recruits and selects candidates of both genders through an identical set of process, and there are two educational institutions underneath: Central Police University and Taiwan Police College. The Central Police University grants 4-year bachelor degree, in addition to graduate studies, and the Taiwan Police College offers 2-year degree.

Currently, the NPA has approximately thirteen hundred local police stations across the country, which enable the police to function at the neighborhood level. The current Taipei mayor tosses out some ideas of policing, such as replacing static police stations (e.g., in buildings) with mobile stations (e.g., on vehicles) to increase the mobility and visibility of the police, and the experiments have been conducted in Taipei. Nevertheless, the traditional police stations remain the mainstream. Furthermore, officers are encouraged by the management to keep good relations with local residents by frequent contacts and participation of local events (Sun & Chu, 2009). Rural police agencies also have had devoted efforts to increase their quality control measures by introducing international standard like ISO quality management certificate. Taidong County Police, for example, had implemented quality control circle initiative integrating operational research and development into the quality control management. For another example, the police of Yuli Township, Hualien County was also ISO certified for its extensive services, such as assistance to elders and delivery of public library books to remote tribal (Wang, 2015). Cao et al. (2014) argued that these noticeable changes in Taiwan policing are driven by external factors like globalization and new media (e.g., Internet, social media), and to what extent these introduced Western standards have positively changed the internal culture and management of the police remains unclear.

Although the Taiwanese police is a relatively enclosed system – it has its own radio station, education (e.g., textbooks), and training (e.g. Taiwan Police College and Central Police University), Taiwan police has faced greater challenges in performing their duties after the political transition. While the market of mass media has been opened for competition, the police retain its radio station and professional magazines. However, the police are not waived from being the subjects to media coverage of misconducts or scandals (Cao et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2012). Today's Taiwanese perceptions of the police are significantly influenced by the media – citizens who know negative media coverage about the police and believe in negative news of the police tend to have a lower level of trust in police (Sun, et al., 2014; Wang & Sun, 2018).

A changing social, economic, and political context in Taiwan, where a greater emphasis placed on human rights, has brought a different set of problems (e.g., influences of political representatives and media) to the police. For example, when DPP first took control of the central government between year 2000 and 2008, both sides spent some time learning the boundary. Because of DPP's long-term political opposition position, there was a profound distrust between DPP and NPA leaders. Some founders of DPP and its coalitions were either family members of victims of 228 Massacre/White Terror or human right lawyers during Martial Law period. Their injustice were greatly suppressed by the state through both formal and informal controlling mechanisms, so it is intuitive that DPP generally had a weak relation with the police. The NPA top leader was uncommonly replaced four times when DPP first took over the central government in 2000s. Ironically, eight high-ranking police officials joined DPP in a public ceremony, which contradicted to this party's long-term position of criticizing the police leaders used to pledge loyalty to the KMT and advocating the separation of political party and the police. These frequent police personnel changes somewhat led many police officers to believe that personal connections with politicians are more important than professional qualifications when deciding promotions. Some deep connections between police

commanders and politicians might have led to selective, if not biased, policing in cases like voter bribing and corruption investigation. Through legislative efforts, the passing of the *Civil Service Administrative Neutrality Law* in 2009 formally institutionalized the ideal separation between political influence and the police (Cao et al., 2014).

### **Legitimacy of Authority and Citizens' Trust in Police**

Citizens and the police are mutually depended stakeholders of community safety, and the public perceptions of the police signal their evaluations of the police that have political implications about the legitimacy of the authority (Reisig and Parks, 2000). Contemporary research regarding citizens' assessments of the police, largely derived from Western context, has recognized several key dimensions. Tyler (2006) proposed two of them in assessing the legitimacy of the police: procedural-based and outcome-based. Procedural-based dimension concerns people's judgements about the fairness of the police decision-making process, and the police are usually inspected by whether they are respectful, polite, patient, and fair when encountering the citizens. Outcome-based dimension generally focuses on the competency of the police, and whether the police can effectively play its role in the community and fulfill the promised functions (e.g., solve crime problems, respond to requests of help, control traffic) is essential. Similarly, based on qualitative data collected from Boston area, Stoutland (2001) constructed four aspects of trust in the police: dependability ("Are the police dependable?"), competency ("Do the police have the knowledge and skills to do their job?"), priorities ("Do the police share residents' priorities and concerns?"), and respectfulness ("Are the police respectful and fair in their interactions with residents?"). Conceptually, the former two aspects are consistent with Tyler's outcome-based dimension, and the latter two are aligned with procedural-based dimension (Hawdon et al., 2003).

The police cannot effectively maintain social order and ensure public safety without citizens' cooperation, which is directly related to residents' trust in them. In his theoretical framework, Tyler (1990) emphasizes the acceptance of the authority, and among citizens' perceptions of the police, trust is the most important domain in democratic societies for its links to legitimacy of the authorities (Tyler, 2006). When citizens accept the legitimacy of the police, they are more likely to comply with the law and follow officers' commands (Tyler, 1990). The police enforce laws and carry out strategies of crime control, which have direct impacts on citizens' chance of victimization, quality of life, and perceptions of personal safety in the immediate environments (Sun et al., 2012). Thus, criminal victimization experience tends to make citizens believe that the police is incompetent to protect them. A lack of citizens' trust in the police also indicate their questions about the legitimacy of the authorities, especially the local governments that they are more likely to interact with on a regular basis.

To some, trust may reflect personal and emotional reliance that a person holds toward another, but citizens' trust in the police should be tight to the social construct in the public domain. Either way, trust involves risks of danger and consequences, if the trust is broken. Psychologically, people are motivated to replace untrustworthy others who play a role in their lives, but citizens usually are unable to peacefully replace their objects of vertical trust in

institutions in dictatorship. Public trust in the police implies instinctive unquestioning belief in and reliance upon a public institution established to protect citizens (Cao, 2015). In the empirical studies, the measurement of trust reflects different emphases on the construct of trust that can have both social and psychological aspects. Studies conducted in the American and European societies focus on social construct of trust in police with multiple dimensions (Hawdon, 2008; Jackson et al., 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Some prior studies measuring trust in the police in Taiwan suffer from single question item regarding trust that somewhat leans toward psychological aspect (Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012) and deviate from the very nature of the police as a social institution and trust in the police is a social construct. Simply asking “do you trust the police?” may present a straightforward sense of face validity, but what it really measures can vary from respondent to respondent in surveys. The other camp preserves the multi-dimensional measurement of public trust in the police, although some studies argue that Taiwanese cannot differentiate procedural-based from outcome-based trusts (Sun et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016) while others point out urban/rural differences on these two types of trust (Wang & Sun, 2018).

Lack of public trust, as well as subsequent residents’ cooperation and compliance, can have serious political consequences, especially in Taiwan that social control mechanism deeply penetrates into civilians’ lives as police officers perform their duty in neighborhood-based stations (Cao et al., 2014). Also, recent empirical studies concerning trust in the police in Taiwan often limited by measuring the level of police trustworthiness using a singular dummy or ordinal variable (Sun et al., 2012; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012); however, the theoretical construct of multi-faced trust of the police is strongly supported by empirical studies in the Western literature (Jackson et al., 2011; Stoutland, 2001; Tyler 1990). Furthermore, urbanization has structured urban Taiwanese’ life styles and daily operating values close to modern Western societies, while the rural areas of Taiwan largely rely on agriculture and function in a more traditional fashion. These urban/rural differences lead to differential assessments of the police (Wang & Sun, 2018).

### Factors Influencing Taiwanese’ Trust in Police

Public attitudes toward the police are influenced by an array of factors at both individual and aggregate levels. Prior research concerning the influence of individual characteristics on their attitudes toward the police suggests a group of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Socio-demographic variables, such as income level, education attainment, age, and gender, are often examined in prior studies. The socioeconomic status pin points an individual’s relative position in the social spectrum, and people from the lower socioeconomic class and marginalized groups (e.g., homeless, unemployed) tend to have negative opinions on police for they more often receive unpleasant requests or orders from the police (Sun et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009, Wu et al., 2012). The correlation between income level and perceptions of the police, however, is not significant in prior studies conducted in Taiwan (Lai, 2016; Sun et al., 2016; Wang & Sun, 2018). Additionally, the correlation between education attainment and perceptions of the police is largely insignificant in Taiwan (Sun et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; Wu, 2014). Age is a consistent predictor that positively correlated with favorable attitudes toward the police in the Western societies (Brown & Benedict, 2002; Decker, 1981;

Reisig & Parks, 2000), and youth usually have less trust in police than seniors, as younger individuals more often perceive police officers as law enforcers who place restrictions. Seniors are more likely to have service-related contacts with the police, as they are more vulnerable to frauds, while youths tend to view officers as law enforcers. On the other hand, seniors in Taiwan usually have gone through White Terror or suffered directly/indirectly from 228 Incident, and they may distrust authorities in general. Among published survey analyses, age in general is not associated with citizens' favorable attitude toward the police in Taiwan (Sun et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; Wu, 2014; Wang & Sun, 2018), however, respondents' life time experience with the police is not addressed. It is likely that the positive correlation between age and favorable attitudes toward the police cancels out the negative perceptions derived from injustice experience.

Citizens' perceptions of the police are influenced by their immediate environments where they directly interact with the police or indirectly observe the outcomes – crime prevention and order maintenance – of policing. Being victimized naturally leads to residents' concerns of personal safety and, subsequently, questioning of the police's competency to maintain social order in the community. A higher level of safety concern has been found to inversely associate with a lower level of satisfaction of the police (Weitzer & Tuch, 2006, Wu & Sun, 2010). An unsafe or disordered neighborhood implies that laws are inadequately enforced and/or the formal social control is loosened (Skogan, 2009). Also, personal satisfaction of general life quality of the community has been found to positively associate with their favorable perceptions of the police in Taiwan (Lai, 2016; Sun et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; Wang & Sun, 2018).

#### Political Orientation and Rural/Urban Difference

Based on the most recent large probability sample of adult citizens from cities (Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung) and rural counties (Yunlin and Taidong) in Taiwan in 2010s, it is found that Taiwanese had a higher level of trust in the police in compliance with procedural rights than in outcome performance (Sun et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; Wang & Sun, 2018). When the survey was conducted, the KMT was the ruling party in the central government, as well as local governments in Taipei city, Taichung city, and Taidong County. About 23% of the survey participants identified themselves as Pan-Green and 36% identified as political neutral, and political orientation exerts some significant effects on Taiwanese trust in police. The empirical evidence shows that survey participants who identified themselves as non-Pan-Blue (Pan-Green or neutral) were more likely than their Pan-Blue counterparts to display lower levels of trust in police (Sun et al., 2016; Wang & Sun, 2018).

Respondents of Pan-Green political orientation demonstrated a significantly lower level of outcome-based trust in police, regardless where they lived (Wang & Sun, 2018). One may think that political party congruence between the survey participants and their local executive officer would ease participants' concern and reveal their political support, however, the variable failed to serve as a significant predictor of trust in police, no matter the trust is viewed as unidimensional (Sun et al., 2016) or broken down into procedural-based and outcome-based dimensions (Wang & Sun, 2018). This finding implies that citizens with Pan-

Green ideology may distrust the governmental authorities in general, but qualitative component is necessary for participants to elaborate their responses in future survey studies.

Urbanization has accompanied with an array of differences between rural and urban citizens. While the urban environment offers more specialized services, convenience, advanced education and public health, and anonymity, it generally correlates with a much more stressful physical and social environment - high living costs, social disorganization and crime, traffic and long commute times, pollution and noise, and greater socioeconomic inequality. Furthermore, the police-population ratio are higher in cities (Sun et al., 2016). Urban officers often work as a team while rural officers tend to be generalists and work geographically isolated. Officers usually have more knowledge about the history and local culture of rural communities where they police (Sun & Chu, 2009).

Although rural law enforcement agencies often lag behind the applied technology in policing, rural officers are expected to stretch their coverage to other social services (Wang, 2015). Based on the above survey, it was found that rural citizens have less knowledge of negative news about the police, a lower level of safety concern, a higher level of trust in neighbors, better life quality in general, less concern about police misconduct, and lower residential mobility than their urban counterparts. Importantly, Wang and Sun (2018) found that urban citizens showed a lower level of trust regarding the police's ability to solve problems of crime, control traffic, and effectively respond to calls for help, while there is no statistical difference regarding whether citizens perceive the police is polite, patient, respectful, and fair. Although residents were significantly influenced by media coverage, residents of rural Taiwan were influenced at a greater magnitude by media coverage of police misconducts.

## Summary

After about three decades of democratization in Taiwan, the majority of citizens trust the police in terms of their decision process is motivated to be fair - friendly, patient, respectful, and responsive. Some scholars argue that Taiwan citizens may not conceptually distinguish procedural rights from outcome performance like Westerners do (Sun et al., 2014), while others found that urban residents revealed a lower evaluation of outcome-based trust in the police (Wang & Sun, 2018). Taiwanese seem to gradually recognize indicators of procedural-based trust, which is conceptually tight to the spirit of due process in Western societies, although citizens of Taiwan may not have the same conceptions of those indicators. More interestingly, urbanization makes a significant difference of citizens' assessments only on outcome-based dimension of trust in police, and a greater impact of mass media on outcome-based trust was found in rural counties (Wang & Sun, 2018). Experience from Taiwan also showed that rural police earn residents' support by extending scope of service to non-essential tasks in rural areas (Wang, 2015), while city police have to focus on the core functions. It is somewhat puzzling, especially when the fact of street crime rate in Taiwan is relatively low compared to the rest of the world (Huang & Sun, 2014).

Furthermore, citizens who identified themselves as Pan-Green or political neutral consistently revealed a lower level of trust in the police (Sun et al., 2016), including procedural-based and

outcome-based dimensions (Wang & Sun, 2018), than their Pan-Blue counterpart. Once again, some founders of DPP and Pan-Green coalitions were either family members of victims of 228 Massacre/White Terror or human right lawyers during Martial Law period. Perhaps in such a social-historical context, today's residents with Pan-Green ideology may reveal a lower level of trust in authorities, including the police, to an extent that the tendency of distrust exists even when citizens have the same political orientation as their elected local governors do. This empirical finding may reflect an accumulated effect of historical incidents which ultimately would present a challenge for the governing body to (re)establish the public trust from the grassroots.

In the framework of transitional justice, Teitel (2000) points out the importance of dealing with the violations of human rights and incidents against humanity done by the prior authoritarian, when a country is facing democratic transition. Particularly to some Taiwanese citizens, including indigenous people, who may have a deep distrust of authorities because of the embedded social-historical context constructed by their personal experience, cross-generational suppression, and subsequent socio-economic marginalization, restoring their trust in government in general probably is essential. While race/ethnicity has been a consistent predictor of attitudes toward the police in the Western societies with racial/ethnic minorities hold less favorable attitudes toward the police (Brown and Benedict, 2002; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005), this variable is often not discussed in Chinese societies, including Taiwan. Future research should devote some qualitative efforts to provide insights about citizens' trust in the police that are not revealed in published survey studies.

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