The Case for Moral Consumption: Examining and Expanding the Domain of Moral Behavior to Promote Individual and Collective Well-Being

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Acknowledgment: The authors would like to thank Maureen (Mimi) Morrin and Karen Winterich of the Moral Regulation Track at the Transformative Consumer Research 2015 Conference at Villanova University for the inspiration and valuable discussion.
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Abstract

This research delineates and critically examines extant empirical research on marketplace morality within the context of transformative consumer research (TCR). The authors identify how public policy can be leveraged to promote moral consumption in the marketplace in line with TCR objectives of personal and collective well-being and conduct a systematic review of the last decade of marketing literature and find that the definition of what is considered “marketplace morality” has been rather narrow. Subsequently, a broader definition is proposed and a typology of moral consumption behaviors based on the valence of moral judgment/behavior (moral or immoral) and moral content (harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) is developed. The authors find that most research has focused on understanding one-time (im)moral behaviors in narrow domains, which have local implications and short-term impact. This research proposes that there is untapped potential in investigating repeated (im)moral behaviors associated with lifestyle choices and habits of individuals and have wider, long-term moral implications (e.g., wastefulness, overindulgence, pollution, authenticity, discrimination). Finally, the authors consider the underlying motivations for (im)moral behaviors and offer recommendations for policy development and research.

Keywords: marketplace morality, moral consumption, moral behavior, moral malleability, moral diversity, moral consumption norms
Moral reasoning is not like that of an idealized scientist or judge seeking the truth, which is often useful; rather, moral reasoning is like that of a lawyer or politician seeking whatever is useful, whether or not it is true. 

Haidt (2007)

In an ideal marketplace setting, consumers engage in relationships and transactions that are equitable, just, and fair to all parties. Yet, in reality, moral scandals seem to consistently dominate public attention (e.g., Martha Stewart’s insider trading or Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). At the same time, consumer fraud regularly leads to multi-billion dollar losses for organizations (Mazar and Ariely 2006; Tian and Keep 2002). For example, holiday return fraud costs retailers an estimated 3.8 billion dollars in one year, according to the National Retail Foundation (Allen 2014). Such violations of fairness, justice, and trust may be categorized as immoral behavior. In contrast, Aquino and colleagues (2009, p. 124) define moral behavior as “actions that demonstrate social responsiveness to the needs and interests of others.” Put more simply, moral behavior is “how people ought to treat each other” (Turiel 1983, p.3). In the current review, we focus on examining both moral and immoral individual consumption behaviors. We define (im)moral behavior broadly to include both prosocial and altruistic behaviors, such as donating, volunteering, or environmental conservation, and harmful, self-interested behaviors (which may or may not be explicitly criminal or felonious) such as unfair treatment of others, stealing, cheating, or discrimination (cf. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp 2009). Although moral behavior is relevant to individuals in their various roles (e.g., consumer, company employee, government official), the current research focuses specifically on individual consumers’ moral behavior in consumption domains.

Despite an increased research focus on morality in recent years, there has been little discussion on what types of behaviors fall in the domain of morality. What is defined as “moral behavior” can vary greatly from paper to paper, from field to field (Graham et al. 2013), or from
person to person (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993); some have gone so far as to state that “all aspects of consumer behavior…have an integral moral component” (Vitell 2003, p. 33).

Although there are easily identifiable morally relevant behaviors, such as donating to charity or theft, the moral relevance of other behaviors, such as recycling or illicit substance abuse, is often ambiguous. To date, little to no research has focused on clarifying what types of decisions and behaviors fall in the moral domain in the marketplace, and how broadening the scope of what researchers define as “moral behavior” could impact public policy, and therefore better promote individual and collective well-being. The current research addresses this gap.

We begin by defining moral consumption in line with recent developments in the social psychology literature and propose a typology of moral consumption behaviors based on the valence of moral judgment (moral or immoral) and moral content (harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity). Next, based on our own review of premier marketing journal publications from the last decade (2005-2015), we map the (im)moral consumption behaviors that have been investigated to date onto this proposed typology. In doing so, we propose additional behaviors that may need to be incorporated into the moral domain if research and public policy are to effectively support and guard the well-being of consumers, organizations, and society at large (Mick et al. 2012). Finally, we consider the underlying motivations for (im)moral behavior, outline some of the existing regulations intended to curb immoral and encourage moral behaviors, and offer recommendations for policy development and research.

**Examining, Defining, and Conceptually Organizing Moral Consumption**

The marketplace, like society at large, requires that social ties between individuals and groups (e.g., consumers, company employees, organizations) are mutual and supportive. In line with evolutionary and moral psychology (e.g., Alexander 2007), for such ties to form and sustain, it is imperative not only to mitigate and regulate immoral behavior, such as fraudulent
insurance claims or customer rage, but also to encourage, reward, or in some instances even mandate, moral marketplace behavior. Such moral behavior could range from sustainable product choice and use, to organ donation, or pro-bono peer-to-peer services, where individuals volunteer time to share their expertise with another (perhaps vulnerable) consumer or group of consumers (e.g., tax filing, financial planning).

Morality is viewed as inherently social, as it has evolved over time out of the human necessity to co-exist with others (Moore and Gino 2013). These interlocking sets of values and practices, as well as the related institutions and evolved psychological mechanisms, work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible (Haidt 2008). Consumption, therefore, is fundamentally rooted in morality (Devas 1899), as consumers regularly make decisions regarding how to acquire, spend, or otherwise distribute monetary and non-monetary resources, while upholding societal norms and the rule of law. Moral consumption, based on this prosocial view, incorporates decisions and behaviors that are motivated by care for someone other than the self (Alexander 2007; Gilligan 1982; Moore and Gino 2013) and by the desire to fight for justice (Kohlberg 1969). Immoral behaviors, on the other hand, disturb social co-existence, consequently threatening societal well-being (Schimmack et al. 2002).

In line with the above broad bipolar definition of (im)moral consumption, the literature has recently distinguished between two faces of morality - *prescriptive* morality and *proscriptive* morality. Prescriptive morality is sensitive to positive outcomes, activation-based, and focuses on what we should do: engage in moral actions. *Proscriptive* morality, in contrast, is sensitive to negative outcomes, inhibition-based, and focuses on what we should not do: engage in immoral actions (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2009). Whereas proscriptive morality is condemnatory, mandatory, and duty-based, prescriptive morality is commendatory, discretionary, and based on duty or desire. A similar distinction—between morality of duty and morality of aspiration—has long
been made in law and public policy (Fuller 1964). The morality of duty consists of the basic proscriptions against crimes such as murder or theft, imposed by any government, whereas the morality of aspiration deals with promoting virtue. Although researchers have postulated that differences might be expected in how to effectively regulate prescriptive versus proscriptive moral behaviors (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2009), little research in the moral domain has examined these differences, particularly as they pertain to (im)moral consumption behavior (e.g., Noval and Stahl 2015; Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman 2010).

Thus, an important question arises about the role and responsibility of marketers and public policy makers in influencing prescriptive and proscriptive morality. Crafting effective policy to regulate (im)moral behavior may be especially challenging, given the fluid nature of consumer morality. Research studying individuals’ moral judgments and behaviors has pointed to the possibility that people have a moral equilibrium (i.e., a desired level of morality they wish to achieve and maintain), deviation from which can promote compensatory behavior in the interest of restoring balance (e.g., Conway and Peetz 2012; Effron, Cameron, and Monin 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin 2009). This can be beneficial in the short term, as immoral (i.e., proscriptive) acts that can cause harm and disturb a person’s moral equilibrium are often counteracted with moral (i.e., prescriptive) behaviors that restore or maintain the moral equilibrium. However, moral behaviors are conversely balanced with immoral behaviors. Furthermore, although consumers have been shown to exhibit a great deal of diversity in their own perceptions of morality (e.g., Graham et al. 2013), very little, if any, public policy deals with addressing this diversity.

We address these gaps by proposing an opportunity to go beyond the common practice of discouraging immoral behaviors (e.g., by imposing external punishments; Mazar and Ariely 2006), and promoting a limited number of moral, virtuous behaviors (e.g., by offering external incentives or emphasizing internal rewards; Mazar and Ariely 2006). Specifically, we provide a
framework to guide future research examining how marketers can effectively reshape consumers’ long-term preferences and consumption-related moral values, beginning with a descriptive typology of moral consumption behaviors.

**A Typology of Moral Consumption Behaviors**

Moral psychology distinguishes between *moral judgments*, which are evaluations of certain acts or individuals as being moral or immoral (Chapman and Anderson 2013), and *moral content*, which is related to why a certain act feels intuitively “right” or “wrong” (Graham et al. 2013). Moral foundations theory (Graham et al. 2013) divides morality into five types of moral content – ‘harm/care’ (e.g., intentionally causing/preventing physical or emotional suffering), ‘fairness/cheating’ (e.g., (un)fair division of resources that violates distributive and procedural justice), ‘loyalty/betrayal’ (e.g., protecting/betraying one’s in-group), ‘authority/subversion’ (e.g., exhibiting (dis)respect toward authority figures), and ‘purity/degradation’ (e.g., violating/upholding spiritual and physical cleanliness). For instance, a consumer’s actions may be judged as similarly immoral after either physically harming a store employee or after providing a fraudulent product review, but the moral content of these two behaviors is arguably different; the former represents harm, while the latter may more closely represent betrayal. Importantly, these distinctions are not simply made on the basis of legality, but rather on a behavior’s moral impact. Based on the above, we propose a typology of moral consumption behaviors that organizes the relevant marketing literature along the two dimensions: (1) Valence of Moral Judgment/Behavior: prescriptive (moral) versus proscriptive (immoral), and (2) Moral Content: harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation.

This typology can accommodate a wide array of diverse (im)moral behaviors, yet little is known regarding the behaviors marketers have chosen to label as (im)moral behavior to date. To
assess the depth and breadth of recent operationalizations of moral behavior among marketing researchers within the framework of this typology, we conducted a systematic, comprehensive review of the top marketing journals across the last decade. The benefits of conducting such a review are threefold. First, it allows us to summarize how marketplace morality has been examined to date within the marketing literature. Second, it allows us to identify gaps in the literature by highlighting moral content domains with relatively few empirical research articles. Third, this review allows us to argue for a broadening of the range of behaviors marketers currently frame as “moral,” based on the gaps identified.

To conduct this literature review, one author utilized Google Scholar to scan all records—published in the field’s top journals from 2005 to 2015—that contained the word “moral” and the word “behavior,” in any order, anywhere in the text (such search procedures also return records featuring the word “immoral”). We constrained our search to the following six top marketing journals: *Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Consumer Psychology,* and *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing.* These search procedures resulted in the scanning of 2,685 records. Figure 1 displays the total number of eligible records identified from each of these publication outlets.

--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---

Articles were selected for inclusion if they: (1) were an empirical research article published in one of the six aforementioned publication outlets, (2) explicitly measured consumer behavior or behavioral intentions as a dependent variable, either in the laboratory or in the field, and (3) explicitly labeled or conceptualized such behavior as “(im)moral,” either in the methods section or in the introduction. It is important to note here that within the context of this review we are not interested in identifying behaviors that could, “should,” or might be conceived of as (im)moral, but rather in how marketing researchers to date have chosen to operationalize
“(im)moral behavior.” For example, a publication may examine donation behavior, but may do so from a strictly non-moral standpoint (i.e., not utilizing morality theory), or may describe the behavior as “charitable,” but not “moral.” Such articles are informative but are not included in our review, as we are interested in characterizing and organizing how researchers have examined moral behavior to date, with the goal of proposing avenues for expanding the reaches of moral research. Accordingly, any article that assessed behavior that some researchers have conceptualized as “(im)moral,” but did not explicitly identify or define it as such, was not eligible for inclusion. Additionally, articles examining firm morality—such as corporate social responsibility initiatives—were excluded, as the current review limits its scope to individual consumer morality. Finally, moral judgment studies (i.e., studies examining perceptions of morality, or utilizing classic “trolley” dilemmas) were excluded, as these assess perceptions as opposed to explicit (im)moral behaviors.

The following information was recorded for all eligible studies: (1) authors, (2) publication year, (3) publication title, and (4) operationalization of (im)moral behavior. These search procedures produced 36 eligible records. Figure 2 provides an overview of all moral behaviors assessed in these records, subdivided by moral behavior valence and moral content to highlight the relative frequency of each. As Figure 2 shows, despite a rich tradition of theoretical work on morality, most empirical marketing research to-date has adopted a rather narrow definition of moral behavior. Specifically, most has focused on prescriptive behaviors falling under the care/harm domain, or prescriptive and proscriptive behaviors falling under the fairness/cheating domain. In contrast, authority/subversion and purity/degradation content areas have been virtually neglected.

Table 1 provides a more detailed summary of the results of this literature review, indexing the exact behavior examined in each of these 36 records. Such a presentation further
highlights the narrow definition of marketplace morality to date. By far the most common (im)moral consumption behavior assessed in published empirical marketing research to date has been charitable giving, with 12 total records, followed by community participation, with a total of five records. Overall, just fourteen unique behaviors were examined. We posit that it is important to examine a broader range of both moral and immoral behaviors under the umbrella of morality. In the next section we suggest ways in which we as marketers can achieve this goal.

--------Insert Table 1 about here--------

**Broadening the Scope of What is Moral**

The above systematic review highlights the surprising level of homogeneity in the behaviors that have been explicitly labeled as (im)moral in empirical marketing research. Theoretical and qualitative review papers often touch on a wide range of (im)moral marketplace behaviors, yet our empirically-derived insights regarding the antecedents and consequences of moral behavior are founded on a narrow collection of behaviors. Though problematic for our field as a whole, this insight provides ripe opportunities for research on a variety of behaviors relevant to the moral domain, which have not been examined as such. In Table 2 we identify some marketplace behaviors that are absent from our review, yet we feel could benefit from being examined through a moral lens. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it is our hope that it will help provoke future research and prompt researchers to identify and examine other moral behaviors not listed here.

Of course, it is important to note that such behaviors likely have been examined to date, perhaps with marketers choosing to frame them as “ethical” or “prosocial” over “moral,” or perhaps in other publication outlets, thus explaining their absence from our review. Still, this absence is a notable finding, since explicitly identifying and labeling behaviors like organ donation, pro-bono services, consumer cheating and fraud, or unsafe driving, among others, as
“moral” would allow researchers and policy makers to examine these behaviors in light of existing moral theories and frameworks, and perhaps in turn more effectively promote or discourage such actions as a result.

---Insert Table 2 about here---

Another important insight from our literature review is that most research to date has focused on understanding one-time (im)moral behaviors - instances where individuals break existing moral standards or (fail to) follow prescriptions for engaging in moral acts, often in a laboratory setting. Such one-time moral behaviors have local implications and usually isolated, short-term impact (e.g., buying a counterfeit product, donating to charity). We suggest that, beyond examining one-time moral behaviors, there is a great and largely untapped potential in investigating the effects of repeated moral behaviors that are often reflections of lifestyle choices and habits, and offering ways to break some of the habits that lead consumers to engage in immoral behaviors (Wood and Neal 2009). Influencing these repeated (im)moral behaviors may require shaping or reshaping of consumers' moral standards, values, and norms to have wider, long-term implications for the well-being of individuals and society at large (e.g., wastefulness, overindulgence, pollution, authenticity, discrimination and injustice, materialistic behaviors, sustainable consumption). As such, they constitute a fertile ground for public policy influence. Although we provide a few examples of factors with long-term implications for moral consumption to encourage future research in Table 2, there are certainly many others worthy of research attention.

In sum, we propose that marketing research, as part of the broader societal and transformative consumer research objectives (Mick et al. 2012), needs to broaden the conceptualization of the moral domain to make a sizeable positive impact on policy and consumer welfare. Additionally, it is equally important to ensure that public policy makers are equipped with conceptual frameworks and relevant empirical research to effectively encourage moral
consumption. Next, we examine the antecedents and mechanisms of (im)moral consumption processes, and propose frameworks to aid future research and public policy efforts with a purpose of encouraging prescriptive and curbing proscriptive consumption behavior.

**Encouraging Consistent Moral Consumption Behavior**

Plenty of evidence suggests that even individuals who generally consider themselves to be moral—as opposed to hardened criminals—sometimes make intentional immoral choices or engage in immoral behavior when the perceived potential benefits outweigh the costs of doing so (e.g., Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Mazar and Ariely 2006; Tsang 2002). At the same time, and despite the societal need and pressure for moral marketplace behaviors, consumers’ moral acts are rarely systematic, as there seems to be no clear norm regarding the “adequate” number or frequency of good deeds. Many individuals associate ‘being moral’ with avoiding immoral acts only, and thus lack any template to determine when and how much of their resources, such as time and money, to contribute to which (moral) cause. Moreover, there is considerable diversity in individuals’ morals, and the extent to which notions of being moral (e.g., being fair, just, or kind) are central and essential to their self-identity (Aquino and Reed 2002; Blasi 1984). Insights into the mechanisms and antecedents that explain these outcomes may have important implications for public policy and for identifying new avenues for future research. We examine these issues in the following two sections.

**Why Do “Good” Consumers Engage in Immoral Behaviors?**

In the marketplace, the possible gains from behaving immorally are particularly abundant, and thus the lure of forgoing one’s moral standards can be very potent. For example, according to the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention (NASP 2015), the “vast majority of shoplifters are non-professionals who steal not out of criminal intent, financial need, or greed, but as a response to social and personal pressures in their life.” Similarly, return fraud
is an $8.8 billion-a-year problem for retailers (Timberlake 2013), with one in six women
admitting they have contributed (Fairley 2013). Even when not engaging in explicit fraud or
theft, consumers can behave aggressively or demand unwarranted privileges and compensation,
leading to high employee turnover, financial losses for the company, and negatively impact other
consumers’ experiences (Berry and Seiders 2008; Grandey, Dickter, and Sin 2004).

It is important to note that even marketplace moral failures that seem fairly small at an
individual consumer level can have staggering social and economic consequences as an
aggregate. In 2007, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service estimated that tax evasion cost the
American economy $345 billion dollars, totaling 14% of federal revenues for the fiscal year
(Kaufman 2007). According to an ongoing study from the Insurance Research Council, up to
$7.7 billion in auto insurance injury claims filed in 2012 were fraudulent or contained inflated
figures, the costs of which were subsequently transferred onto customers via higher auto
insurance quotes (NerdWallet 2015). Apart from the financial costs on both sides of the
marketplace, many seemingly small immoral behaviors, such as customer entitlement, rage, and
aggressive behavior, can have negative compounded effects on employee well-being (e.g., Rose
and Neidermeyer 1999; Warner 2015).

Traditionally, engaging in moral judgment (i.e., deciding whether or not to behave
morally) was conceived of as a process involving careful, rational thinking and the consistent
application of general moral principles (Kohlberg 1969; Piaget 1932; Rest 1986). Accordingly,
rational theories of morality have argued that moral judgment starts with the conscious
recognition of a moral event, which leads to the development of moral intentions, followed by
actual moral behavior (Rest 1986). Consistent with this rational processing view of morality is
the Fraud Triangle, a popular model for explaining the factors that cause individuals to commit
fraud. The Fraud Triangle dates back several decades (Albrecht, Wernz, and Williams 1995;
Cressey 1951) and has been employed in various fields including fraud examination, accounting,
The Fraud Triangle proposes that three factors must be simultaneously present in order for an ordinary person to commit an immoral act. The first element is the presence of situational pressure (e.g., financial hardship, peer pressure) or an incentive (e.g., desire to receive benefits) to commit an immoral act. The second element is the presence of an opportunity to commit and conceal fraud (e.g., weak controls, presence of factors that contribute to the capability to perpetuate or conceal fraud). The third element is rationalization that the fraud is acceptable and is not inconsistent with one’s values (e.g., temporary flexing of one’s moral standards, moral justification).

Yet more recent studies have shown that moral judgments are made not solely on the basis of rational, conscious cognitive processing, but are often the result of automatic, intuitive, and affective processes (Greene and Haidt 2002; Haidt 2001). Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model of moral judgment has proposed that moral judgments are often the result of automatic evaluations and intuitions, even when these intuitions are incidental or irrelevant to the object or situation being judged. In addition, an accumulating body of evidence has implicated the embodied processing system in moral judgment and behavior (Dinh and Lord 2013). Research has begun to explore how sensorimotor activity impacts the moral judgment process. For example, the feelings of anger or disgust provoked by tasting, smelling, or hearing something disgusting, irritating, or highly annoying have been shown to subconsciously lead individuals to make harsher moral judgments (Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz 2011; Schnall, Benton, and Harvey 2008; Seidel and Prinz 2013).

We propose that policy makers take into account both the rational and automatic contributors to marketplace immorality in trying to curb these behaviors. Accordingly, we adapt the traditional Fraud Triangle model and propose that moral judgments and behaviors do not always involve all three sides of the Fraud Triangle. Rather, recent research contributes to a more nuanced conceptualization of the moral judgment process and counters the long dominance of
rational moral reasoning and deliberation (see Figure 3). We suggest that the automatic and embodied moral processing systems could skip the rationalization element of the Fraud Triangle (as depicted by a solid line in Figure 3), essentially turning the triangle into a straight line. As such, in the case of automatic (quick, intuition-based) moral behaviors, policy makers and marketers can make an effort to interrupt automatic responses, where appropriate, by engaging the more deliberate moral processing system prior to behavior, potentially discouraging immoral acts. Specifically, public service announcements, paid communication, and/or signage at a point of purchase may remind consumers that the decision they are about to make has moral content and depending on the choice they make, there will likely be positive or negative moral consequences (e.g., pride or guilt, reward or punishment, respectively).

Our adapted Fraud Triangle framework can explain various types of immoral behaviors in addition to fraud, where it is commonly applied, such as cheating on a test, receiving too much change, breaking the speed limit or cheating on one’s partner (Albrecht 2014). Removing one of its other elements (i.e., incentive or opportunity) is another key to reducing immoral behavior. Removal of opportunity generally provides the most actionable route to immoral behavior deterrence (Cendrowski et al. 2007). Development and consistent enforcement of appropriate systems of control (such as increasing the probability of being caught and the magnitude of punishment) is another common tactic for mitigating fraud or immoral behavior (Mazar and Ariely 2006).

We also suggest that better understanding the role of the rationalization component (e.g., specific evaluations and thoughts preceding immoral behavior, per the adapted Fraud Triangle), which often entails temporary flexing of moral standards and moral justification, could offer other useful avenues for deterring immoral behavior. Notably, such temporary shifts in moral standards, which often lead to immoral consumption behavior, may also occur automatically,
given certain criteria, like a consumer feeling wronged by a firm (Komarova Loureiro et al. 2016). Incorporating both automatic and rational routes of moral judgment, we refer to the temporary flexing of moral standards with a purpose of justifying (unconsciously or consciously) immoral choices and behavior as *moral malleability* - an important mechanism that explains how otherwise moral individuals are able to justify engaging in immoral consumption behaviors. Importantly, however, effective policy and marketing practices with a purpose of curbing immoral consumption may need to simultaneously limit consumers’ ability to flex their moral standards (i.e., moral malleability) and facilitate cognitions that would result in counter-arguing of the immoral act. Next, we discuss opportunities to mitigate moral malleability and streamline cognitions in a way to discourage immoral consumption.

*Moral Justification*

The notion of a flexible moral compass, which often helps explain behaviors inconsistent with one’s moral standards, is not a new phenomenon (Banaji, Bazerman, and Chugh 2003; Bartels et al. 2015). Psychology literature often refers to a lack of consistent correspondence between one’s moral standards and behavior as moral hypocrisy (Monin and Merritt 2011; Tenbrunsel et al. 2010). Such moral justification and self-deception with respect to one’s perceived morality has been observed in the context of dishonest marketplace behavior, including instances of insurance fraud, wardrobing, and theft of intellectual property (cf. Ayal and Gino 2012; Mazar and Ariely 2006).

Reducing opportunities for moral justification and hypocrisy could be achieved by employing strategies to discourage consumers from using self-deception that helps them appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally. For example, such strategies could entail helping consumers avoid misperceiving their behaviors as moral by establishing clear standards and rules, encouraging consumers to compare their own behavior to moral standards (Batson et al. 1999), or shifting the consumer’s focus from his or her potentially or self-perceived “good
intentions” to the actual immoral behavior (Monin and Merritt 2011). Further strategies for reducing moral justification should deal with addressing contextual variables that may facilitate flexible interpretation of unethical behavior (Mazar et al. 2008) – eliminating flexibility in how a behavior can be categorized (e.g., the belief that bringing printer paper home from one’s office is different from taking printer paper from a store without paying) and increasing the salience of ethicality at the moment a behavior is evaluated.

**Moral Costs and Standards**

Individuals are likely to exercise moral malleability and engage in immoral behavior when the perceived benefits of acting immorally seemingly outweigh the perceived costs (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008; Mazar and Ariely 2006). The lure of immoral deeds, therefore, could be mitigated by further or more ardently emphasizing the financial (e.g., Fullerton and Punj 1997), legal (e.g., Collins 1989), social (e.g., Ohtsubo et al. 2010) or psychological (Gino, Norton, and Ariely 2010) costs of acting immorally. Another tactic might involve bringing attention to the benefits of resisting immoral behavior, as the benefits of abstaining are perhaps not as apparent as the costs of acting immorally. One way to present these is by assigning an affective reward value, such as a sense of achievement and pride (i.e., a positive moral emotion; Haidt 2001) for having resisted the temptation.

**Past and Future Behaviors**

Individuals’ past moral decisions and behaviors are a particularly strong indicator of their future moral decisions. Research in psychology and marketing provides ample evidence that emphasizing past moral actions can license people to engage in significantly less moral actions in the future (i.e., *moral licensing*; Blanken, van de Ven, and Zeelenberg 2015; Conway and Peetz 2012; Effron, Cameron, and Monin 2009; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Merritt, Effron, and Monin 2010; Sachdeva et al. 2009). Even simply planning to behave morally in the future, such as pledging a donation, can encourage licensing in the short-term (Cascio and Plant 2015).
It is important to note here that moral malleability is not always negative; the very notion that consumers’ moral compasses can be steered to immoral territory implies that they can be steered to moral territory as well, given the right conditions. Indeed, engaging in a questionable or immoral behavior (or even recalling such behavior) can lead people to engage in a more positive, moral behavior subsequently (i.e., *moral balancing or moral cleansing*; Conway and Peetz 2012; Jordan et al. 2011; Sachdeva et al. 2009; Zhong and Liljenquist 2006).

So, given this knowledge, how can understanding the impact of past (im)moral behavior or planned future behaviors help encourage more moral behaviors in the present? This research would suggest that reinforcing past moral actions might not be ideal, as it might encourage moral licensing. For instance, reminding consumers of green products they have purchased or the money and/or time they have donated to a charity can actually backfire and lead people to choose a less moral subsequent action when the next opportunity arises. Perhaps a better option would be to remind consumers of the self-benefits they reaped as a result of their past or planned moral behavior, hopefully producing a greater likelihood of consistently moral downstream behaviors.

**Behaviors of Other Consumers**

Recent work suggests that the moral or immoral behavior of others can have a significant impact on moral decisions (e.g., Gino and Galinsky 2012; Kouchaki 2011; Noam and Wren 1993). An individual’s moral behavior may be influenced by the behavior and choices of other consumers. The impact of others differs depending on whether the others in question are more similar (in-group) or different (out-group; e.g., Cassidy, Quinn, and Humphreys 2011; Hildebrand, DeMotta, Sen, and Kongsompong 2013). When in-group members act morally, individuals feel licensed to act immorally as they view their in-group as an extension of the self (Goldstein and Cialdini 2007; Smith and Henry 1996). Similarly, Gino and Galinsky (2012) found that feeling connected to another individual who engages in selfish or dishonest behavior can lead people to behave more selfishly and less morally themselves. Here, as people feel
psychologically close to someone who behaves selfishly, they evaluate their behavior to be less shame-worthy and less unethical (Gino and Galinsky 2012), thus flexing their moral standards and justifying immoral behavior.

**Reducing Moral Diversity**

As discussed earlier, there is considerable diversity in individuals’ morals and consumers vary in their moral identity— the extent to which notions of being a moral person are central to one’s self-concept (Aquino and Reed 2002; Blasi 1984). Moral identity influences behavior via individuals’ innate desire to maintain consistency between their self-concepts and their actions, and thus avoid self-condemnation (Blasi 1980; Conway and Peetz 2012). The centrality of moral identity to an individual’s overall self-concept is an important predictor of consistent moral behavior (Blasi 1984). Since the centrality of one’s own moral identity is somewhat fluid, there is an opportunity to prime individuals’ moral identities within the experimental or marketplace context. One way to make individuals’ moral identity more salient to encourage consistently moral behavior is priming “moral exemplars.” Moral exemplars are individuals who have consistently lived their lives in a moral way, or those who have engaged in particularly notable moral behavior (Aquino et al. 2009). Such primes are especially effective, as they activate the moral self-schema without specifically enumerating the moral deeds of the individual him or herself, which could backfire and result in licensing.

**Why Do “Good” Consumers Fail to Engage in Moral Behaviors?**

In addition to studying individuals’ propensity to engage in immoral acts, research has also examined their propensity to engage in a variety of moral behaviors including bystander intervention (Latane and Darley 1970), volunteering (Batson 1991), donating (Cialdini and Kenrick 1976; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009), and sustainable consumption (Griskevicius, Cantú, and Vugt 2012; Haws, Winterich, and Naylor 2014; Prothero et al. 2011). Notably, prescriptive morality, unlike proscriptive morality, is naturally perceived as more desire-based
than mandatory (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2009). As such, prescriptive moral consumption behaviors are likely to be more sensitive to moral credit and self-benefit (such as personal gain, sense of pride, and societal praise), rather than punishment and blame. However, if prescriptive behaviors become widely accepted norms, not engaging in these behaviors can be deemed immoral as well.

Moral behaviors are not just good for society; they are beneficial to those who engage in them. For example, volunteering has been associated with a host of health benefits for volunteers, especially older adults (Piliavin 2010). Yet, little research has studied ways to encourage the prevalence of moral behavior engagement (Peltier, Schibrowky, and Schultz 2002), raising the question of how to further encourage it among consumers. To fully understand why some consumers are more likely to engage in moral actions than others, and thus effectively inform public policy, policy makers must understand the forces that influence consumers’ motivations to engage in moral behavior, including the role of moral norms and standards for what a moral individual “ought to do,” as opposed to “not do.”

Motivation can range from intrinsic or self-determined motivation (i.e., “I do this because I want to,” or “It feels good to do this”) to extrinsic or not self-determined motivation (i.e., “I do this for monetary gain,” or “I don’t want to do this, but I know that I should or ought to”; Ryan and Deci 2001). Intrinsically, individuals’ moral identities influence behavior via their innate desire to maintain consistency between their self-concepts and their actions (Blasi 1980; Conway and Peetz 2012). Alternatively, consumers may behave morally due to “warm glow” effects, or the positive affect they feel when engaging in such behaviors (Andreoni 1990; Winterich and Barone 2011). Extrinsicly, public recognition and rewards such as donor dinners, benefactor plates, tax-deductions, and gifts to people who contribute to charities or buy environmentally friendly products may further motivate such behavior, as may societal pressures or social norms.

We propose two general routes for encouraging prescriptive moral consumption behavior - (1) emphasizing benefits and rewards, which often promise immediate, but short-term impact
potential (e.g., Griskevicius, Cantu, and van Vugt 2012; Peter and Honea 2012), and (2) initiatives to shape and reshape appropriate norms, values, and habits that promise a delayed, but likely long-lasting effect (e.g., Granzin and Olsen 1991; Wiener and Doescher 1994). Figure 4 summarizes our framework, which depicts these two paths to encouraging prescriptive moral consumption behavior, informing policy development and guiding future research. Next, we briefly discuss how emphasizing extrinsic benefits, as well as efforts to shape and reshape one’s intrinsic values, norms, and habits, may motivate moral behavior, and provide recommendations for researchers and policy makers.

-------Insert Figure 4 about here-------

**Intrinsic Motives**

As discussed above, a moral identity that is central to one’s self-concept compels an individual to act morally, as individuals are highly motivated to behave in ways that are consistent with their self-concepts (e.g., Colby and Damon 1992; Damon and Hart 1992). Thus, priming moral identity can not only effectively disincentivize immoral behavior, it can motivate moral behavior. Even simply increasing self-awareness can motivate moral behavior by highlighting consumers’ discrepancies between their ideal and actual selves (Carver and Scheier 1978; Duval and Wicklund 1972; Fenigstein and Levine 1984). In fact, such primes might have the greatest impact on people for whom the moral identity is relatively low in centrality, as their moral identities are unlikely to be a key part of their self-concept prior to priming (Aquino et al. 2009).

To increase engagement in moral behavior based on intrinsic motives, policy makers could take steps to increase moral identity salience, as was suggested above for discouraging immoral behavior. Such efforts could take the form of targeted advertising or point-of-purchase signage (e.g., statement of mutual commitment to uphold moral/ethical values between customers and an organization) reminding consumers of moral norms and principles. Research
on mere measurement of intention has shown that simply asking people whether they intend to engage in a particular behavior increases their likelihood to engage in that behavior (e.g., Morwitz and Fitzsimons 2004). Thus, asking people about their likelihood to engage in moral behaviors (and avoiding asking them about their likelihood to engage in immoral behaviors) could be beneficial. Furthermore, subsequent to engaging in a moral behavior, people are more likely to continue behaving morally if they feel a sense of commitment, and more likely to feel licensed to behave immorally if they feel they have made progress (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Accordingly, encouraging a sense of commitment to the goal could be useful. While these are just a few of the ways to encourage moral behavior, it is important that policy makers are aware of the general possibility of moral licensing (e.g., Conway and Peetz 2012) and are encouraged to consider the downstream consequences of short-term policies or interventions.

Policy makers, particularly in more individualistic societies, are advised to stress and promote moral credits and egoistic development (i.e., self-benefits) over altruism (i.e., societal benefits) in their efforts to increase moral behavior, as prior research (Omoto and Snyder 1995) has found that egoistic motives (e.g., personal development) are better predictors of prosocial behavior than altruistic motives (e.g., community concerns). Although community development and sustainment are the ultimate goals in promoting moral consumer behavior, consumers may be most likely to heed the call when they perceive personal (yet still intrinsic) benefits. Still, little research has been done to better understand the longevity of spillovers (i.e. how long one moral or immoral behavior has an impact) beyond the time frame typically considered in lab experiments (Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996; Tiefenbeck et al. 2013; Zwane et al. 2011), leaving room for further exploration.

Researchers have also acknowledged the important role of both negative and positive emotions in motivating prescriptive moral behavior. In particular, experiences of guilt—a so-called “moral emotion”—can motivate cooperative behavior (de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans,
and Zeelenberg 2011; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans 2007; Frank 2004), sharing (Cryder, Springer, and Morewedge 2012), and eco-friendly behavior (Mallett 2012). Pride, another moral emotion, can also promote moral behavior, despite intuitions to the contrary. More specifically, instead of promoting dominance, pride can promote cooperative, prosocial behavior via the social cohesion it engenders in interpersonal contexts (Cheng, Tracy, and Henrich 2010; Williams and DeSteno 2009). Similarly, gratitude can also foster moral behavior by drawing consumers’ focus to long-term relationships (Bartlett and DeSteno 2006; McCullough, Shelley, Kilpatrick, and Larson 2001). Finally, empathy is associated with altruistic helping behavior (Batson 1991; Eisenberg and Miller 1987), while simultaneously inhibiting immoral behavior (Feshbach and Feshbach 1969; Miller and Eisenberg 1988). Although empathy constitutes a trait-like moral character dimension, and thus is less susceptible to outside influence, moral affect represents a more feasible public policy solution, as affect can be easily primed. Furthermore, over time and as a result of consistent efforts to strengthen the association between relevant emotions and desirable prescriptive moral behaviors, consumers’ norms, values, and habits may also shift accordingly.

**Extrinsic Incentives**

Providing extrinsic incentives is another strategy that could help encourage moral actions. This strategy, however, is not always effective (e.g., Fabes et al. 1989). People consider themselves to be less altruistic when they receive external rewards (monetary or otherwise) for engaging in a moral behavior (e.g., helping an experimenter code data, Batson, Coke, Jasnoski, and Hanson 1978; helping a blind person, Kunda and Schwarz 1983; blood donation, Upton 1974). High school students often face programs that require them to attain a number of volunteer hours to graduate, with the goal to mandate altruistic and moral behaviors. However, the lack of choice about participating has actually been shown to decrease enjoyment as well as intentions to volunteer in the future (Inagaki and Hatano 1984), compared to students who were
given a choice (Stukas, Snyder, and Clary 1999). This somewhat counter-intuitive finding is likely due to the fact that extrinsic incentives for behaving morally (or punishments for failing to do so) can undermine individuals’ own internal reward mechanisms, thereby decreasing self-determined motivation (Moller et al. 2006; Ryan and Deci 2001). Still, not all external incentives have been shown to backfire. Below we outline some of the more effective strategies that policymakers could implement.

A particularly helpful extrinsic influence to encourage moral behavior may be social consensus. Social consensus, or the degree of social agreement regarding the morality of an action, can promote moral behavior by relieving pressure from the individual to determine what is right or wrong (Jones 1991). In other words, if a consumer perceives a strong social consensus regarding the necessity of performing a given action, choosing to engage in such an action will be a less effortful process. Recent research suggests that viewing oneself as a part of a community committed to a socially conscious principle or action (e.g., environmental protection) can provide meaning and value for consumers and positively influence their likelihood to engage in prosocial (i.e., moral) behaviors (DeVincenzo and Scammon 2015). If sufficient social consensus regarding a behavior is present, such behavior may become a community or societal norm (e.g., pro-environmental behavior; Stern 2000; Stern and Dietz 1994; Thorgersen 1999).

Descriptive social norms, which provide information on how most people behave in a situation, can be an effective tool in the promotion of behaviors that are beneficial for consumers and society as a whole (Winterich and Nenkov 2015). For instance, providing information about linen usage by fellow hotel guests can increase guests’ participation in a hotel linen conservation program (Goldstein et al. 2008). In practice, energy companies (e.g., NSTAR, a U.S. energy provider) are currently attempting to promote energy conservation by providing information on consumer bills about how much electricity their neighbors are using, a method shown to be effective in field experiments (Schulz et al. 2007). Additionally, good deeds could establish
moral credits that boost one’s self-worth (cf. Merritt, Effron, and Monin 2010), so increasing moral credits from moral actions through public recognition is another potential external incentive that can effectively promote moral actions.

Public policy could play an important role in the efforts to shape and reshape moral norms, and to increase the salience of social norms related to consistent moral (prescriptive) behavior. Public service announcements can communicate and remind consumers of self- and societal benefits of sharing time, wealth, and expertise by telling stories of in-group others that highlight their moral behavior, in an effort to establish social consensus or norms. For example, featuring photos of neighbors engaging in recycling behavior may establish this as a social norm, encouraging others to engage. Perhaps some of these desired norms could be incorporated into screenplays and content for entertainment programming such as talk shows, documentaries, or reality television. In the section that follows, we discuss the current state of public policy as it relates to moral consumption. Although we do not intend to provide a comprehensive overview, and these policies change frequently, we review a number of current policies and regulations with their successes and challenges, thus further informing the road map for future policy development and research.

**Overview of Policy Efforts to Date**

Both consumer researchers and public policy makers are consistently trying to better understand what leads consumers to engage in moral behaviors and avoid immoral behaviors. While a number of policies, regulations, and advertising campaigns (e.g., Stern 2000) are currently in place, questions remain regarding (1) how rooted these policies are in empirical research, and their demonstrated impact on individuals’ behavior, and (2) how enforced, or enforceable, these policies are. Furthermore, some policies have been mandated (e.g., fines for not choosing to recycle) whereas others use an incentive system (e.g., a tax break for choosing to
recycle). Using the taxonomy of moral consumption behaviors proposed in the current work (Table 1), we highlight a few current policies and regulations that are more or less effective, as well as identify several important gaps for future research and policy makers to address.

As one example, public policy makers have taken great steps to increase sustainable or conservationist behavior, one type of prescriptive moral behavior in the purity domain. In the United States, consumers are now eligible for significant tax credits if they purchase a qualified solar electric system, heat pump, water heater, or a variety of other items (IRS 2016). Similarly, and at the time of writing, purchase price benefits also exist in Australia under the Government’s Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) for the purchase of renewable energy (solar, wind or hydro) and hot water systems (DIIS 2016).

Furthermore, in an attempt to help the environment, California became the first state in mid-2015 to ban single-use plastic bags at large retail stores. In recent months, other cities and towns outside of California have followed suit. Though the effects of such policy have yet to be extensively studied, as California’s statewide ban has yet to go into effect, it is expected to help reduce the estimated 660,000 tons of plastic bags discarded annually into landfills (EPA) to some extent. On the other hand in Rotterdam, Netherlands, consumers can earn green points when they separate waste for recycling, use public transport, or purchase locally-produced, fair-trade or green products. These points can in turn be redeemed for public transport tickets or discounts on sustainable goods. Based on our earlier discussion, we would argue that such benefit-based system is likely more effective than a punishment-based system for encouraging prescriptive moral behaviors.

Donation behavior is also governmentally encouraged throughout the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Australia; Australian Taxation Office 2016), a behavior falling under the care dimension of moral behavior. Donating to qualified charitable organizations can lower one’s taxable income, which by implication can reduce a taxpayer’s personal tax payment (IRS 2016).
Individuals can also make significantly greater moral gestures, such as donate their organs, though in the literature, this behavior has not been examined as frequently from the moral perspective. In 1999, the U.S. Congress enacted the Organ Donor Leave Act, which allows federal employees to take 7 days of paid leave to be a bone marrow donor and 30 days of paid leave to be a solid-organ donor. Individual states also have their own policies to encourage such behavior. Wisconsin, for instance, allowed living donors to deduct up to $10,000 in travel, lodging and lost wage accruing from the donation act, and yet such policies didn’t increase donation rates (Napolitano 2004). In order to ensure effectiveness, it might be necessary to assess the benefits a particular policy offers against the material and non-material costs (including risk) to the individual, and perhaps further increase benefits to the donors where appropriate. While a tax deduction or some type of financial compensation may further encourage organ donation, compensating living donors for their organs might lead to the exploitation of those who are poor and underprivileged, and potential donors may withhold relevant medical information out of fear that they won’t be eligible and compensated. Nudges have been used to encourage such moral behaviors, including requiring individuals to opt-out (rather than opt-in) with organ donation. Not surprisingly, opt-out systems had greater overall number of organ transplants (McIntosh 2014). While ethically questionable, some have argued that the failure to register an objection can be taken as a sign of consent (see: Saunders 2012 for counterpoints). Regardless, evidence suggests that the U.S. policies to encourage organ donation thus far have been largely ineffective, and even donor registries, public education, paid leave, and tax incentives had no significant effect on donation rates or number of transplants (Seaman 2015). Such incentives may be effective for bone marrow donation, but less so for riskier and more difficult procedures like organ donation (Lacetera, Macis, and Stith 2014).

At times, larger-scale ethical behaviors can be mandated, such as volunteerism. States like New York require lawyers to perform unpaid work before being licensed to practice – a way
to help the many people who can’t afford legal services (Barnard 2012). Yet opponents of such mandates argue, and we concur, that transitioning a moral behavior like volunteering from voluntary to mandatory spoils the moral significance of the action (Cramton 1991). Instead, in line with our framework and earlier discussion, encouraging pro-bono services might be most effective by providing short-term incentives while simultaneously shaping professional norms (e.g., lawyers compete to earn maximum number of pro-bono service points to earn a monetary award, accolades, and professional respect).

More readily identifiable are those policies, laws, and regulations put forth to discourage immoral (proscriptive) behaviors. For example, the U.S. federal law protects trademarked goods and makes it illegal to knowingly traffic such goods (a proscriptive cheating behavior). Harsh punishments can follow including 10 years in prison and a $2 million fine. Interestingly, while these regulations exist, they are clearly not enforced, as guides to buying counterfeit handbags exist for many locations, including New York City (New York Show Tickets 2016). Interestingly, often such immoral behavior is not legally discouraged at the individual level. For example, federal law does not prohibit an individual from buying a counterfeit product for personal use, even if he or she does so knowingly (FindLaw 2016). While perhaps additional public policy would benefit from highlighting the unseen costs of counterfeit goods, such as ties to the drug trade and human trafficking, the key to effective discouraging of counterfeit consumption could be in developing enforceable regulations that are consistent across the many jurisdictions and based on solid field research. One promising insight based on the recent work by Irwin (2015), is that effective marketing is the reason why people tend to consume ethically, which should endow marketers with a sense of optimistic responsibility for making a substantive difference in encouraging moral consumption.

Conclusions
The current review has characterized and expanded the domain of moral consumption to better reflect the current moral psychology thought and align with the societal and transformative consumer research objectives of personal and collective well-being (Mick et al. 2012). A review of the last decade of premier marketing journal publications revealed that the definition of what falls in the domain of marketplace morality has been rather narrow. We particularly point out the skewed focus of researchers on single instance (im)moral acts, which have local implications and usually isolated, short-term impact (e.g., buying a counterfeit product, donating to charity), as opposed to repeated (im)moral behaviors that are closely associated with life-style choices and habits and have wider, long-term moral implications for individuals and society at large (e.g., wastefulness, overindulgence, pollution, authenticity, discrimination and injustice, materialistic behaviors, sustainable consumption). This trend provides ripe opportunities for research on a variety of behaviors relevant to the moral domain, which have not been examined as such (see Table 2 for examples). Labeling such behaviors as moral would allow researchers and policy makers to examine these behaviors in light of existing moral theories and frameworks and better understand their antecedents and consequences.

To aid in this effort, we proposed a typology that organizes moral consumption behaviors along two dimensions: moral judgments/behaviors: proscriptive (immoral) versus prescriptive (moral), and moral content: harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity, and discuss the role of marketers and public policy makers in discouraging/promoting these various types of (im)moral behaviors. Finally, we considered the underlying mechanisms and motivations for both proscriptive and prescriptive moral behaviors and offered recommendations to help guide future policy development and research. Gaining a more complete understanding of when, how, and why consumers behave (im)morally will allow researchers, policy makers, and marketers to make meaningful progress in improving the well-being of consumers, firms, employees, communities, and beyond.
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The 6 leading marketing journals published 2005-2015 were reviewed. The search returned 2,685 records, which were subsequently scanned for relevant content. The summary results are reported here and Table 1 provides the resulting typology of moral marketplace behaviors in line with our conceptualization.

Figure 2: Summary of Records Identified in Systematic Literature Review, Organized by Moral Content Area
Figure 3: The Two Routes of Moral Judgment Leading to Proscriptive Consumption Behavior

![Diagram of the Two Routes of Moral Judgment]

- Rationalization
- Pressure/Incentive
- Proscriptive (Immoral) Behavior
- Opportunity

Elements of Automatic and Embodied Moral Processing

Elements of Rational Moral Processing

Figure 4: The Two Routes for Encouraging Prescriptive Consumption Behavior

![Diagram for Encouraging Prescriptive Consumption]

Immediate and Short-Term Impact
- Benefits

Delayed and Long-Term Impact
- Values, Norms & Habits

Prescriptive (Moral) Behavior
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<th>Moral Content</th>
<th>Care/ Harm</th>
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<th>Loyalty/ Betrayal</th>
<th>Authority/ Subversion</th>
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<td>• Organ donation</td>
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<td>• Pro-bono services</td>
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<td>• Peer-to-peer sharing</td>
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<td>• Caretaking responsibilities and choices; end of life care</td>
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<td>Proscriptive (immoral)</td>
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<td>Theft of tangible goods or services</td>
<td>Perusing services that promote and facilitate immoral and/or illegal behaviors (e.g., online dating for married individuals)</td>
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<td>• Internet behavior that is disrespectful or offensive (e.g., cyber bullying)</td>
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