Introduction: Justified Mourning

The ecological crisis provides no shortage of evidence for justified mourning. For a non-exhaustive list, consider the following: overpopulation (more than 200,000 people added every day); global warming (global ice cap melting, sea level rise, increasing catastrophic natural disasters); deforestation (32 million acres annually); unsustainable agriculture\(^1\) (the abominable treatment of non-human animals aside, current farming practices are responsible for 70 per cent of the pollution of United States rivers and streams); unsustainable transportation (a single car emits 12,000 pounds of carbon dioxide every year in the form of exhaust; in the United States cars emit roughly the same amount of carbon dioxide as coal-burning power plants); human-caused environmental accidents (e.g. Exxon Valdez and the BP Oil disaster); coal mining (mountain top removal and strip mining); invasive species (400 of the endangered 958 species listed in the United States are at risk because of competition with alien species); overfishing (90 per cent of the ocean's large fish have been fished out of their natural habitats); and damming waterways (reservoir-induced seismicity refers to dams causing earthquakes; the Three Gorges reservoir is built over two major fault lines - hundreds of small tremors have occurred since it opened) (Schwarzfeld 2013).

The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change attests to widespread scientific agreement that humans
are, indeed, responsible for dangerous levels of global climate change (IPCC 2013). Given that ecological harms of unprecedented proportions continue daily, one can argue that an adequate response to the global climate change crisis has not yet happened. In terms of escalating oil consumption alone, consider that over the course of a single lifetime humans have burned 97 per cent of all the oil that has ever been burned (Thompson 2010). The ecological ramifications of overpopulation coupled with energy addiction are manifesting themselves in increasing extreme weather events, which in turn are evident in the increasing numbers of environmental refugees. The American Association for the Advancement of Science warns that the United Nations predicts that by 2020 we will have 50 million environmental refugees (Zelman 2011).

Humans are driving extinction faster than species can evolve; for the first time since the disappearance of the dinosaurs the rate of species extinction is faster than the rate of new species evolving (Jowit 2010). This rate of extinction of species is driven by destruction of natural habitats, hunting, the spread of alien predators and disease, and climate change (ibid.). Insufficient progress has been made toward sustainable solutions in spite of the fact that anthropogenically caused ecological harms are destroying the very ecological systems that underwrite the possibility for life as we recognize and value it (Fiala 2010). Val Plumwood (2006) argues that the social change necessary for reducing harmful human impacts, at minimum to a level that facilitates the future survival of human society, has not occurred. The emotional impact of such losses, coupled with the alarming lack of action to remedy the situation, can lead directly to despair and avoidance if there is an absence of community support and action. Relatedly, environmental educator Elizabeth Andre (2011) asks in her work on ecological mourning: “Could it be that people won’t deal with the climate issue until they have a way to deal with the emotions that come along with it?” (2).

Part of my motivation in what follows is to assess the emotional capacities that might limit action if they fail to be cultivated and activated in fruitful ways. The types of emotional community support I envision are diverse, interact in multifarious ways, and occur at multiple levels simultaneously. My account is influenced by Susan Sherwin’s (2008) conceptualization of public ethics. Sherwin argues that the ethics required to deal with the many global threats to human well-being,
including environmental threats, require looking “beyond the moral responsibilities of individuals and consider[ing] the ways in which social organizations of all sorts (including community groups, corporations, governments, and international bodies) also must alter their behaviors” (9). There are communities at local, national, international, and global levels that are politically, socially, ecologically, spiritually, and emotionally organized in manifold and overlapping ways. Emotional dimensions of life simultaneously shape and are shaped by, reflect and are reflected by all of these levels. Although I make a case for seriously considering the role of emotion as it relates to ecological harm and political empowerment – or lack thereof – my account is both exploratory and truncated. It is by no means meant to be definitive – rather, I envision a contributory perspective open to perpetual revision.

Environmental mourning and the constellations of emotion attendant to such experiences of loss are understudied in Western, analytic, philosophical writing. This volume creates the opportunity for academic engagement with the emotional fallout that comes from witnessing the violent death of the inhabitants and living systems of planet Earth. I wish to make the case that giving voice to this loss, and the sadness that accompanies it, is essential for emotional honesty (wherein emotions are not repressed, denied, or ignored) and morally adequate responses. Community mourning can serve to provide support for, and galvanize the strength of, those grappling with ecological loss. Importantly, emotional solidarity through community support can validate “outlaw” emotions. Community support can likewise counter the threat of ecological despair and terror management, where management techniques often involve denial and refusal to deal with the source of the terror. The form of ecological mourning I address in what follows is symptomatic of harmful human-ecological relationships; movement toward long-term healing involves community empowerment for positive, protective, and proactive ecological action. Communities can be as small as two and as large as the global community.

People who mourn beloved animals, environments, rivers, mountains, trees, insects, as well as entire species, involve circumstances wherein rebirth of this particular individual or this particular species is not possible (barring appeals to various religious traditions). But one cannot stop here, for in the case of the living planet and those inhabitants and systems that people value, there are many complex and exquisite forms
of life that are not yet dead. Renewal remains possible for those not yet destroyed, for those who could help weave together future planetary health. Backward-looking mourning at what once was simply cannot be the place where we stop. Possibilities for renewal demand forward-looking orientations where emotions serve to empower people. I will explore the justified emotion of anger in response to the ecological injustices that ecological mourning is predicated upon. Additionally, I identify an emotional orientation toward hope as a method for fighting ecological despair and terror. Anger and hope are not postulated as being sufficient for positive change. Rather, their potential as justified responses that can help fuel positive change is explored.

I begin with a political analysis of emotion. A more nuanced account of emotion offers an explanation of the importance of emotional solidarity as a political tool for effecting positive change. Attending to the historical development of how to conceptualize emotion in the Western tradition – the wrongful relegation of emotion to the domain of the irrational and the powerful, pervasive, subtle but explicit politics of emotion – helps provide a rationale as to why there has not been a groundswell of public articulations of ecological mourning. At the heart of my analysis is a move toward political recognition of the epistemic import of emotional responses, nurturing appropriate emotional responses to the suffering of human and non-human others, and orienting ourselves emotionally for facilitating positive, ethically grounded change.

**Accounting for Emotion: Background Context**

What emotion amounts to has a rich and complex history. Methods for sense-making regarding what precisely emotions are vary significantly, ranging from definition by scientific reduction to isolated events, to identifying constituent parts in synergistic interaction, to identifying wholes that are not reducible to their parts, to identifying experiences so complex they are potentially better gestured at by art than pinned down piecemeal by science (Brennan 2004). The range of experience meant to be captured likewise shifts when experiences of emotion are explored within the restraining contexts of individual human domains, group human levels, varied individual and group ecological levels, or any combination therein. Understandings of emotion also can vary.
depending on the intended applications of said understanding; for a non-exhaustive list consider: psychology, philosophy, politics, geography, education, psychiatry, sociology, and literature. Differing characterizations among theorists demand an overarching conceptualization of emotion that is dynamic, pluralistic, context sensitive, and occasionally frustratingly elusive. Moreover there are considerations of relationships (if distinctions are accepted at all) between affects, passions, feelings, and emotions. I use emotion as a broad umbrella term with the intent of capturing much of this pluralism.

I think of the varying understandings of emotion as each being a contribution to a nuanced story of emotion. Each, exempt from the others, is insufficient to the task of highlighting the varied meanings and understandings that identify facets of a fluid and evolving concept. I suggest that defining emotion with a precision that captures a consistent meaning over expanses of times and domains would invite a static understanding of emotion. Such an understanding fails to reflect the diversity of reference this concept generates. Rather than offering such a definition, the elements of emotion I take to be relevant for development of my position will be articulated as my argument unfolds and will include cognitive, psychological, social, and political dimensions. Appealing to varied understandings of emotion can be problematic when those concepts contain contradictory elements. However, the multiple understandings of emotion that I appeal to in my position do not adopt understandings of emotion that necessarily conflict. Or, stated differently, on a generous reading of the conceptualization of emotion I offer, internal conflict need not, of necessity, be present. Implicit in my account is a conceptualization of emotion wherein there are moral dimensions to emotional experience. I am focusing on emotions that a) are responses to morally charged events, and b) can be reflected on and assessed with regard to their justifiability.

In the history of Western analytic philosophy, we see a recurring value dualism between reason and emotion. Emotion is often taken to belong to the domain of the irrational and is contrasted with the exercise of reason. Insofar as this dualism is gendered, women are taken, predominantly, to be identified with the emotional dimensions of human experience. Men, in contrast, are predominantly identified with the rational dimensions of human experience. Given the historical pervasiveness
of gender oppression and attendant devaluing of that which is associated with expressions of feminine gender, there continues to be a pronounced denigration of the epistemic worth of emotions. Systematic emotional oppression happens when a group's justified emotional response is denied uptake due to group membership. Historically, people have faced this due to gender and ethnicity. For example, historically women were grouped by their gender and oppressed as a group. I wish to add to the analysis of varied forms of oppression a concern with emotional oppression in the context of ecological harms. People who wish to give voice to the harms to the Earth through mourning are often emotionally oppressed. The systematic denial of this attempt at emotional expression is disempowering. Part of what is at work, I contend, is a devaluing of emotion generally.

Alison Jaggar (1997) points out that within Western philosophy emotions are more often than not considered subversive to knowledge. Elizabeth Spelman (1989) also notes that there is considerable anxiety about emotions in Western philosophy due to a tendency to see them as interfering with the successful function of reason. James Jasper (1998) contends that "there is still a taint or suspicion of irrationality surrounding most emotions" (408).

I use this analysis as a lens to see what it may contribute to understanding why there has been so little attention to the emotional experience of mourning at witnessing the death of existing life forms and systems on this planet. Ashlee Cunsolo queries, in this collection and elsewhere, why the grief and mourning experienced in response to the anthropogenic destruction of Earth's inhabitants and living systems appear strangely silenced in public discourse. I suggest the undermining, devaluing, and political dismissal of emotion plays a role in the rarity of successful articulations of group emotion as a platform for social change in the Western tradition. Such analysis also helps identify the sometimes subtle, but no less deeply disempowering, lack of uptake that occurs when such attempts at articulating emotion do manage to arise.

Reasonable Emotions and Emotional Reasons

I contend that most "emotion versus reason" disputes are unnecessary, as they hang on a misunderstanding that can be clarified by a more
nuanced awareness of the relationships between reason and emotion. In *Anger and Insubordination*, Spelman (1989) quotes Aristotle: anyone “who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people, is a dolt” (263). If I stubbed my toe painfully on a rock while walking, and started yelling angrily at the next person who crossed my path — thereby holding them blameworthy for the event and the rightful recipient of my angry diatribe — then I would be acting foolishly (and unkindly). The reason why such action is recognized as foolish is because emotions have a relation to circumstances wherein they can be either appropriate or inappropriate. On the “dumb” view of emotions, emotions are simply “dumb” occurrences. Emotions are taken to be “like feelings of dizziness or spasms of pain since they do not involve any kind of cognitive state. According to this view emotions are, quite literally, ‘dumb’ events” (ibid., 265). On the “dumb” view, Aristotle’s reflection fails to make sense. In contrast, cognitivist views of the emotions — which have seen an intense revival — insist judgments, beliefs, or some kind of cognitive state, are constituent of emotions. When people are happy, sad, jealous, or angry it is typically at or about something or someone. Additionally these emotions are regarded as “appropriate or inappropriate, reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified, by others or by oneself” (ibid.). Given that the “dumb” view of emotions is incapable of accounting for the aboutness of emotions, and the ways in which emotions are evaluated and judged, it is incorrect and should be abandoned. Insofar as a) our emotional lives require narratives that explain why our feelings are justified and when they should be acted on, b) reasoning provides such explanations and justifications and c) without the desire that accompanies emotion there would be no will to act, we must recognize the cognitive dimensions of emotions, and the emotional dimensions of cognitions.

Recognition of the relevance of emotion to our moral lives is not without philosophical precedence in the Western tradition. For example, seventeenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume highlighted the necessary role of emotion in our ethical lives, arguing that no action is possible without an emotional impetus — without a desire for one thing over another we would be perpetually indifferent to states of affairs (Hume 2002). Likewise, Jaggar notes, “values presuppose emotions to
the extent that emotions provide the experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional responses to the world, it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more highly than another” (391). Moreover, given cognitive, communicative dimensions of emotional expression, no emotion can successfully be communicated in a manner understood as justified without it being a reasonable response to a state of the world. Jaggar highlights a mutually constituting relation between reason and emotion through her demand that we attend to the social construction of emotion. Attributions of emotions only happen in the context of shared linguistic resources with associated concepts; children are taught what counts as appropriate expressions of emotion with the intent of generating the habituation of appropriate identification and expression of a culturally identified set of emotional resources. Emotions are constituted, in part, by shared social meanings, norms, and expectations regarding appropriate behaviour and response (Averill 1980 in Jasper 1998). Such a stance is required to account for the considerable variability historically and cross-culturally in the situational causes, experience, meaning, display, and regulation of emotion (Thoits 1989). Any viable view of human experience, I contend, must minimally recognize the necessity of an intimately interwoven symbiotic relation between emotion and reason wherein both provide epistemic insight.

Furthermore, an approach seeking to facilitate action must of necessity attend to emotion. A dominant, but nonetheless erroneous, assumption is that once individuals become sufficiently knowledgeable about their contribution to an environmental problem they will shift their attitude and then shift their behaviour to reflect that new attitude toward the problem. In other words, knowledge will lead to a change in attitude, and a change in attitude will lead to a change in behaviour. The “knowledge-attitude-behaviour” method has been widely critiqued given that increased knowledge about nature does not, of necessity, lead to either a) a favourable attitude toward nature or b) action on behalf of nature (Goralnik and Nelson 2011). Cognitive agreement, on its own, does not result in action – emotional engagement is required (Jasper 1998; Kals et al. 1999). Lissy Goralnik and Michael Nelson highlight the crucial role of care and a sense of community in environmental theories meant to generate action, and recommend focusing on relationships that inspire care and empathy. An approach to morality where reason
and emotion play a necessary role is indicated by contemporary brain research (Goralnik and Nelson 2011). Chrisoula Andreou (2007) notes that the “prevailing view among empirically oriented moral philosophers is that morality is grounded in sentiment ... at least for human beings, the capacity to make genuine moral judgments depends on related emotional capacities” (47). Emotional intelligence is thus crucial for motivating, generating, and responding to and with emotions that empower. I borrow the term emotional intelligence from Karen Warren (2005) who argues “Moral emotions are part of what psychologists have called ‘emotional intelligence’ ... [and are] essential to moral reasoning” (271). Emotional intelligence is important for ethics, ethical reasoning, and ethical decision-making; ethical motivation, reasoning, and practice require that rational and emotional intelligence operate in concert (Warren 2005). Warren is here utilizing the work of Daniel Goleman (2005) who identifies limitations to IQ tests – which focus solely on rationality – and envisions emotional intelligence as a complementary capacity. To facilitate fecund imaginaries it is far better, I suggest, to explore emotional intelligences – in order to capture the pluralistic and diverse capacities of emotional understandings, experiences, and knowings. The existing emotional shaping of our lives and the potential for intentional emotional self-configuration are, as of yet, underutilized and extremely powerful sources for motivating positive environmental action.

The Politics of Emotion

The successful expression of some types of emotion is a more fragile political achievement than many recognize (Campbell 1994, 47). Sue Campbell’s (1994, 1997) account of emotional expression makes explicit the political dimensions inherent in public attempts to articulate our emotional lives. She does this by calling attention to the role of the would-be expresser(s) of an emotion, the role of the would-be interpreter(s) of an emotion, relevant context, and the attendant implicit power dynamics. The success of emotional expression hangs not just in a personal attempt at articulation but also in whether it is recognized as a successful expression of that emotion, whether it is recognized as a reasonable assessment, whether it is given “uptake.”
Which emotions are socially recognized and validated, which emotions are given "uptake," is importantly politically grounded. In *A Note on Anger*, Frye (1983) introduces the notion of "uptake" with respect to the attempted expression of anger. She highlights that two parties are involved when it comes to successful expression, both the person attempting to express anger, for example, and the person who either recognizes it as anger or does not. In the example Frye gives, a woman attempts to express her anger and the response she receives is a character assault – she is called crazy. Frye notes that the anger and its claims are not met; rather, the topic was changed from what the woman takes to be an expression of her anger to the interpreter's reading of it as evidence of questionable sanity. Deprived of uptake her anger "is left as just a burst of expression of individual feeling. As a social act, an act of communication, it just doesn't happen" (89). As such, we require a theory that addresses "how resources for securing uptake can be unequally distributed so as to reinforce existing patterns of oppression, and how particular emotive criticisms can also serve this political goal" (Campbell 1994, 54). This is particularly important given that emotional work is often taken to be primarily women's work (Jasper 1998). It is a form of work both expected and undervalued; that is, if it is valued at all – for a tendency to perform the work of navigating emotional life is often written off as a tendency to focus on irrational responses. In contrast to this view, emotional work can be recognized as involving an inherently difficult skill to hone, a skill that requires attending to the complex emotional language of interaction central to healthy relationships and identities. To adequately defend emotions it is essential to understand that the "means by which we express our psychological states" – the expressive resources themselves – can be denied or used for dismissal (Campbell 1997, 48).

As a case in point, dominant culture in North America encourages a subset of women (those who fit the criteria for the Kantian feminine) to blush, cry, and smile – and these are promoted as feminine attributes (Campbell 1994, 57). Campbell identifies this set of expressive resources as being reflective of "the Kantian feminine; an ideal of a woman formed by race and upper class privilege and applicable mainly to such women" (ibid., 56). How emotional resources, both expressive and interpretive, are complicated through considerations of intersectional...
oppression needs further analysis. Moreover, although the expressive and interpretive constraints that tend to be attached to masculine and transgender emotive repertoires are beyond the scope of this chapter, they are certainly important areas for additional investigation. Camp­bell’s example is illustrative of one way in which dismissal can work, and helpfully identifies some of the power dynamics at work in attempts at emotional expression.

Insofar as women are encouraged to blush, cry, and smile, alternative expressive resources may not be encouraged or recognized as meaningful when attempts are made to exercise them. When women employ these “feminine” expressive resources they can be taken as symptomatic of sentimentalism and over-emotionality, and thus grounds for dismissal (Campbell 1994). The duplicitousness here is marked. Women are expected to be emotional to satisfy gender requirements for ideal expression and intelligibility, but those very same expressive capacities are used as a ground for dismissal, hence the significance of a focus on the potential authority of our anger, of others to interpret us, and of our own judgments and experience (ibid.). Another example of a group whose expressive resources are taken to be “justification” for dismissal is the caricature of bleeding-heart environmentalists. Think here of an environmentalist attempting to express ecological mourning to an unreceptive individual, group, or even government. They might seek to express this emotion through attempting to articulate their suffocating frustration and the press of despair. Uptake denial might take the form of the claim that “You are being overly dramatic. The world is continuing on just fine. You should stop being so negative.” Here deep concerns are dismissed through the accusation of over-emoting. Moreover, an environmentalist group’s attempt at expression is further delegitimized by the charge of insincerity that the claim of being “overly dramatic” carries. For the successful expression of emotion one needs uptake, and uptake requires a collaboration of interpreters (ibid.).

Given the importance of uptake for successful emotion formation and articulation it becomes crucial to establish communities of support. In particular, I am thinking of supportive communities that will recognize mourning as a fitting response to the current ecological massacre, and will provide uptake for legitimate attempts at emotional expression.12 This is not to say all people must of necessity mourn but, rather, that
those who do mourn have justification for doing so and deserve uptake. Emotional expression involves attempting to identify and communicate what is salient, what is taken to be significant; as such, dismissal can serve as a powerful political tool meant to persuade already oppressed groups and individuals that their viewpoint is dismissible (ibid.). Campbell highlights the experience of dismissal – being dismissed is when “what we do or say, as assessed by what we would have described as our intentions in that situation, is either not taken seriously or not regarded at all in the context in which it is meant to have its effect ... Put more simply, if no one takes my anger seriously by making any attempt to account for his or her behavior or to change it, but, instead, characterizes me as upset and oversensitive, I may be unsure, in retrospect, of how to best describe my behavior” (ibid., 49). When power differentials work against the emotional uptake of members of certain groups we are faced with systematic epistemic denial. The epistemic denial is denial of what is taken to be important to one’s own experience. It is to deny the legitimacy of what has been marked as salient in one’s own life. Moreover, those who inhabit positions of social and economic dominance may seek to defuse the motivational power of justified emotional responses that demand recognition of the experience of non-dominant groups. That oppressed groups are disproportionately subject to the systematic denial of uptake of emotions that empower – such as anger – is well documented (Campbell 1994, 1997; Spelman 1989; Lorde 1984). Thus we can see how it comes to be that reasonable emotional responses to the current large-scale, human destruction of the environment (such as mourning) are politically dismissed. There is no global consensus on necessary revisions to current fundamentally unsustainable climate change policies (or the lack thereof), which are premised upon likewise unsustainable social, political, and economic systems. Lack of leadership and foresight, and the blatant failure to show a basic concern for future generations, can reasonably lead to a sense of mourning for all that has already been lost, at least for those who are honestly engaging emotionally with the breadth and depth of ecological destruction at human hands.

Jaggar (1997) argues that people who are marginalized are often better placed to think critically about dominant paradigms than those in dominant positions. (Also see Lorde, 1984.) Those who experience
conventionally unacceptable or what she calls “outlaw emotions” are often “subordinated individuals who pay a disproportionately high price for maintaining the status quo. The social situation of such people makes them unable to experience the conventionally prescribed emotions” (Jagger 1997, 396). Although the examples I am about to articulate are importantly different from racism and sexism, they are nevertheless circumstances that potentially merit the critique of emotional outlaws. Consider the following: an inability to take pleasure in the consumeristic exchange of unnecessary goods destined for the dump at holiday time, or responding to a colleague’s “winter getaway” plans by questioning the morality of vacations that involve flights generating obscene greenhouse gas emissions, or sadness at the woefully unreflective proliferation of procreation given an already unsustainable population, or articulations of mourning for those creatures, spaces, and processes devastated by the anthropogenic destruction of nature. Granted, the reasons for any of these activities are more nuanced than a general analysis can give, and the particulars of the cases will need attending to. Nonetheless, the examples can still serve as potential points of departure for exploring ecologically rooted outlaw emotions. Outlaw emotions can be epistemically fruitful in that they help develop a perspective that is critical of dominant paradigms; ways of seeing that have been lifted to the status of “facts” are shown to be constructions – constructions that are to the benefit of some and the detriment of others (Jaggar 1997). Such considerations are especially important given that emotions are managed to fit social expectations, which can keep in place particular social, political, and economic conditions and agendas (Norgaard 2006, 384). Emotions are both a primary site of social control and political action that can be utilized to mobilize resistance and liberation (Boler 1999, xv). The transformative power of emotions is largely untapped in Western cultures that encourage fear and control of emotions.

Kari Marie Norgaard (2006) explores the social organization of climate change denial, and sees it as being kept in place through emotional norms shaping what is perceived as socially acceptable to feel. Denial of climate change is socially required in many environments, given the gravity of the harms climate change brings and the cloud it casts on what would otherwise be light and un-troubling, and therefore socially permissible, conversation. Outlaw emotions, when articulated and
validated, can serve to call into question and alter current problematic anti-ecological emotion norms. Mourning and a desire to protect ecological others are morally appropriate responses to the ecological crisis. Thus, they should function as the new socially condoned and validated emotional norms as opposed to anomalies. Creating such norms can take place, at present, through the efforts of ecological emotional outlaws. The concept of the emotional outlaw is further elucidated through the work of Sara Ahmed. Ahmed helpfully flags the political operations of social communities and attendant emotion mores. She highlights the ways in which a failure to share a dominant emotional response is a failure to align with a community; as such it generates alienation (2008, 10-11). For example, chastizing the sexist "joketeller" in a roomful of sexists renders one a feminist killjoy (Jaggar 1997, 396; Ahmed 2008, 13). Feminist killjoys provide subversive observations that undermine dominant conceptions of the status quo; they illuminate ways in which social norms are constructed so as to obscure the experience of subordinated people (Jaggar 1997, 397). People seeking to mourn what has been lost are currently emotional outlaws to the extent that they are systematically denied uptake and resultantly disempowered. The possibilities for outlaw emotions extend beyond mourning, but given the focus of the volume I will focus on mourning and directly related emotions.

Andre (2011) is an environmental educator. In her presentations on a) why despair is so common in environmental circles and b) how to combat that despair, she senses that "people are eager to shine some light into the dark corners of their hearts and minds where they've been hiding sorrow, guilt, and feelings of hopelessness. In most social situations, talking about these dark topics would be outside of social norms ... Creating a forum where the stated purpose was to examine these feelings freed participants from these restrictive norms" (83). Andre previously had to steel herself against the negative responses to her worries and sadness about human-generated ecological decimation, but found that "sharing this mutual experience with others helps me to not feel so alone there" (84). Through the act of emotional solidarity a counter to isolated mourning was discovered, and a new source of strength and acceptance was revealed.

At a time when there has yet to be a global ethical evolution of compassionate consciousness, those who mourn the massive destruction of
the ecosystems and species that populated planet Earth are emotional outlaws. Their insights are epistemically crucial in that they are honestly engaging with emotions around the increasing death and destruction of the planet and its inhabitants. This involves emotional integrity, bravery, and openness to responding to even the hard truths – the ones that justify mourning, threaten with despair, and make demands that we share our environmental grief and mourning with others (Cunsolo chapter 7). I am concerned about the silencing that results from lack of uptake. Patricia Monture-Okanee (1992), a Mohawk woman, writes of her experience of narratives reflecting only the views of colonizers as a form of silencing: “The continual denial of our experience at every corner, at every turn, from education at residential schools through to universities, is violence. The denial of my experience batters me from all directions. Because others have the power to define my existence, experience, and even my feelings, I am left with no place to stand and validly construct my reality. That is the violence of silence” (197–8). The social construction of emotions makes clear the importance of validating the experience of those who are unjustly silenced. To counter inaction we must strategize against the deflationary silencing of epistemically grounded, and ecologically sensitive emotions, especially given that environmental emotional outlaws are privy to crucial insights. The public articulation of outlaw emotions is a political act; it is a demand for recognition.

One method for identifying such concerns is through forming ecological mourning groups to give space for voicing and validating experience that is not yet widely validated. The function of these groups could be somewhat analogous to women’s critical consciousness-raising groups that provide space for voicing and validating women’s experience. Oppressed groups generally benefit from safe spaces for voicing and validating non-dominant experiences. The assimilationist expectations of dominant experience serve to silence, perpetuate epistemic error about experience (because experience is not monolithic), and repress diversity (Young 2009). Consciousness-raising groups not only validated the experiences of women, they helped provide a ground for political action addressing issues brought to the fore by second-wave feminism. Prior to the activity of consciousness-raising groups there was not a language to establish particular harms (e.g. intersectional
oppression, women's double day, emotional labour) and there wasn't an understanding of the complex ways that individual harms were actually points in an interwoven systematic structure designed to repress women. Supportive community helped give shape, in language, to what could not be articulated previously. To stop a harm, you first have to be able to identify it. In this way emotional outlaws can band together to give name to what is impossible to identify without the systematic analysis provided through group insight; both personal validation of grief and public articulations of mourning can be fruitfully articulated. The means by which they are articulated are only as limited as our imaginations: protest marches, performances, sit-ins, petitions, books/articles, letters to the editor, documentaries, visual and auditory art, not-for-profit organizations, coalitions, capacity building, exploration and validation of different experiences and expressions of grief given different communities, ethnicities, geographies and so on.

An effective example of mourning motivating action is the Mothers of the Disappeared movement. It is telling of the political silencing of emotion in that the legitimate claims and demands of the Argentinian women were initially met with a character assault that called into question their sanity (much like in Frye's example). Government officials tried to marginalize and trivialize the efforts of the mothers searching for their children by calling them "las locas" which is translated as "the madwomen" (Kurtz 2010). Fortunately those efforts at silencing were not successful.

My analysis of emotion helps explain why large-scale, socially validated expressions of mourning for environmental loss have not been forthcoming despite clear indications that such mourning is in fact appropriate. It may be tied, at least in dominant Western paradigms to a) a de-valuing of the validity of emotions and b) a political denial of the attempt to express outlaw emotions. Public articulations of outlaw ecological emotions such as mourning simultaneously reflect the worth of nature and demand accountability.

**Emotional Solidarity: What to Do with Mourning**

Mick Smith (2001) contends mourning is a painful exercise in memory, where the pain occurs because the other is no longer immediately
present to us (Paul Ricoeur 1999 in Smith 2001). Mourning is taken to be an ethical relation, a reconciliation with the past and its loss, a coming to terms with death and extinction (Smith 2001). Mourning is contrasted with melancholy, which, following Sigmund Freud, is taken to be a pathological condition which occurs when we interiorize that which has been lost. “The melancholic ego wants to hold onto the past by consuming and fixing it in themselves, by becoming one with it. But the inevitable result of this impossible desire is that the subject becomes caught up in a depressive and repetitive spiral.” Smith highlights that environmentalism “exemplifies a loss of faith in the ideology of ‘progress,’ which everywhere runs up against the reality of contemporary life, of road congestion and radiation, genetic modification and cancer producing chemicals, poisonous emissions and extinctions” (375). The danger is that, broken-hearted about ecological decimation, “we withdraw into ourselves, reciting the litany of those lost in our abject environmental melancholia” (ibid.). Rather than adopting a melancholic reflection on what is perceived as inevitable destruction, Smith recommends we take the fullness of memory to inspire political action against environmental harm. Building communities of support around shared experiences of mourning facilitates validation and capacity building for direct action against forces of environmental abuse. One such force of abuse is anthropocentric contributions to climate change.

As noted at the outset, Andre (2011) asks the tantalizing question “could it be that people won’t deal with the climate issue until they have a way to deal with the emotions that come along with it?” (2). Climate denial may be a coping mechanism for those who don’t want to be depressed and frightened by what we have done – and what we continue to do – to the planet and its members. It may serve as a temporary evasion for those wishing to push the margins of denial to the breaking point with the goal of avoiding despair, sorrow, anger, frustration, and accountability. Andre (2011) dares to ask “how do we deal with the grief of witnessing the destruction of places we love?” (30). Using autoethnography as her lens for exploration she articulates the following position: if the fate of numerous species is extinction, if they are in fact the walking dead, “their fate is already sealed, they just haven’t quite disappeared yet. So mourn them and then move on. If there’s truly nothing you can do to save them ... mourn their loss and then change your
horizon. You can't be stuck in this state of continual grief ... all you're going to see is loss after loss after loss and there will be nothing you can do to help" (ibid., 73). Mourn then, what cannot be saved, but defend what remains and can be.

Mourning is a legitimate emotional response to large-scale, escalating, ecological devastation. Individuals sharing appropriate responses must identify communities of others who share in this understanding. Communities can help individuals support and validate each other; we must cradle the falling, and empower the rising, of each other. Aldo Leopold (1993) contends that “one of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds” (165). Emotional solidarity affords the opportunity to recognize we are not alone in our mourning, nor are we alone in our anger over the loss and the palpable pressing need for immediate action against such destructive forces. Not only do symptomatic wounds have to be tended to, simultaneously the source of those wounds must be stopped. Given that anger can be overwhelmed by grief, an analysis of anger is in order (Jasper 1998, 412). When justified anger at the source of loss is merited it can serve to mobilize and motivate.

**Justified Anger**

Effective protest is grounded in anger ... Anger nourishes hope and fuels rebellion, it presumes a judgment, presumes how things ought to be and aren't, presumes a caring. Emotion remains the best evidence of belief and value.

Mary Midgley (1996) contends that for efforts in the direction of sustainability to be effective, they need to be supplemented by a direct, spontaneous moral feeling – a sense of outrage. Profound indignation is taken to be effective in environmental campaigning. Anger involves making a negative evaluative judgment where another is held responsible; their actions are taken to be blameworthy (Spelman 1989, 266). In imbalanced power relations, this judgment can be taken to be an act of insubordination. Historically, uptake of anger was secured by privilege. Such considerations make clear that there is a politics of emotion. “If we recognize that judgments about wrong-doing are in some sense constitutive of anger, then we can begin to see that the censorship of anger is
a way of short-circuiting, of censoring, judgments about wrong-doing” (272). Peter Lyman (1981) points out that anger is the “essential political emotion,” thus silencing anger may repress political speech (Lyman in Spelman, ibid.). One of the most prevalent norms in social movements is the conviction that existing social conditions are unjust (Turner and Killian 1987, 242, in Jasper 1998). Anger is an appropriate response to experiencing or bearing witness to injustice. When others are oppressed, exploited, or otherwise treated unfairly they are justified in an angry response (Spelman 1989). So, too, are we justified in being angry about the oppression of non-human others.

Audre Lorde (1984) gives a politically motivating account of anger, arguing anger is an appropriate response to racism. Anger, I contend, is also an appropriate response to naturism. She highlights positive uses for anger as a spotlight for injustice that can be used in the service of change, as a site of learning, as loaded with information and energy, and as an existing forceful resource that can be used “against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being” (124–7). She goes on to discuss the power of anger. “Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions ... I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlining our lives” (127). Lorde speaks of a paradigm shift.

Anger successfully conveyed is a political accomplishment. Hatred is to be distinguished from anger. “Hatred is the fury of those who do not share our goals, and its object is death and destruction. Anger is a grief of distortions between peers, and its object is change” (129). We hold others accountable when we are angry and we do so because, when the injustice is acknowledged, the need for change can then be defended. Using anger to fuel action is not to act out of blind rage. Successfully expressed anger is communication about an unjust present, and insofar as uptake is secured, it can prompt change for a just future. Anger need not be acted on immediately. Like a gas stove, all you need is for the pilot light to remain lit, at the ready for cranking up the heat when a boil is needed ... at the right time, in the right place, and directed at the right source. That source — in our case — is ecological injustice.
Fear about attempting to express anger is a legitimate worry. It can be rational, for those who are politically disempowered and attempting to articulate anger, to fear the response of those in positions of power (Spelman 1989). That being said, in activist communities it is important to realize that the harder the pushback from those in positions of power the more indicative it is of the recognition that the activism being engaged in is a real threat to the status quo. Politically tabling appropriate expressions of anger at injustice, and energizing related action with the motivational power of emotion, are strengths. These strengths can be developed and drawn upon so as to force those in positions of power to recognize the magnitude of our anger over an ever-quickening destruction of our planet. Anger can help provide a ground for mobilization (Jasper 1998, 409). Fear about the continuation of the status quo with regard to human-generated ecological harms is much more justified than fear of change. Allen Thompson (2010) makes the case that given the ecological threats we face there is a need for a new set of ecological virtues, which include courage and radical hope against despair and hopelessness. Emotional solidarity regarding anger toward ecological injustice awards moral authority to those concerned about the environment and carries the force of a socially-recognized and justified response. As the eminently brave Lorde articulated: “My fear of anger taught me nothing. Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also” (124).

Justified Hope

The backward-looking experience of justified mourning requires support to ground the forward-looking and empowering emotion of hope so as to help prevent slippage into despair. Despair, Paulo Freire (2011) notes, is inaction. Hope can function as a bridge from mourning to action. This bridge is particularly important given that mourning carries great sadness, which may lead to the inaction of despair. Emotional reserves, community support, and intentional emotional strategies for generating strength can help to resist the weight of this inaction. Rachel Carson serves as an exemplar of environmental virtue generally, and serves as an example of someone who successfully bridged mourning to action (Cafaro 2005). As Mitchell Thomashow (1996) highlights, Carlson...
was immersed in the “ecology of love and loss” in her study of the debilitating effects of DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) but utilized her positioning to become a role model of ecological citizenship and demonstrated the power of grassroots organizations to have a significant impact on public policy (41). The danger of despair is a legitimate concern though, particularly given that the enormity of global problems can lead to the belief that the ability of any one person to achieve change is hopeless (Courville and Piper 2004).

The threat of ecological terror and despair are pressing worries. Elin Kelsey (2012) notes that “despair about the planet has many labels, among them ‘ecofatigue’ and ‘ecophobia’” (25). Some conservationists worry their messaging is counterproductive in that a continuing culture of hopelessness among conservation biologists will work against successfully mobilizing conservation action (Kelsey 2012). When pessimism prevails ecological successes fail to be highlighted and therefore fail to attract wide attention (ibid.). If this leads to despair the spiral of inaction is set in motion. Educators and conservation psychologists are finding that despair leads to terror management, where problems are downplayed, as in climate change denial, and hyper-materialism serves as an ineffective panacea (Kelsey 2013). A groundswell of positive stories of resilience that inspire ecological hope is needed to instigate positive action (ibid.). Strategic framing is essential, given that the way a situation is framed serves to constrain its set of perceived solutions (Kelsey 2003). Kelsey (2012) highlights that the continuing debates between those who contend “doom needs to be leavened by hope” and those “who maintain that an optimistic message plays down the crisis and justifies business as usual” are failing to acknowledge a crucial point (25). “What’s at stake is more than what makes the best message; it’s what makes the best conservation strategy. Chronicling demise offers little guidance. But if we tell stories about positive outcomes and share details of how they are achieved, the likelihood that they will be replicated will increase. Hope engenders conservation success, and success breeds more successes” (ibid.). The way a situation is framed, for example as a challenge as opposed to an impossibility, can mean the difference between inaction and positive action. In situations where one is facing slow uptake by a reluctant community of potential and necessary
collaborators, the crucial role of generating communities of support to validate justified emotions is all the more evident.\textsuperscript{17}

Andre (2011) discusses her own experience with ecological despair. In seeking out healthy methods for grappling with ecological destruction Andre recommends humility.\textsuperscript{18} Humility enables a vision wherein we recognize our limits, and with those limits comes proposals for what is in fact possible and achievable – goals that can support and generate hope. She explains that, through the sharing of mutual experience, she is enabled to manage both the emotional and mental challenges of environmental education in an age of mass ecological devastation. Andre notes that through the process of becoming educated about the dimensions of anthropogenic ecological destruction, through delving deeply into the literature, she gained the vocabulary, theories, and models required to understand and articulate her own experience (83). “These tools allow me to enrich the discussions I have with friends, colleagues, and strangers at parties. I can sense that the people with whom I talk are excited to gain this vocabulary and framework; it seems to validate their experience, make them feel less alone, and give them the tools to reflect and share with others” (ibid.). Prior to addressing a problem, one needs tools to recognize the nature of the problem; sharing frameworks and vocabularies can contribute to this goal.

\textbf{Amplifying Action}

The space between current facts and future possibilities must be broached with epistemic, emotional, and psychological care. Although justified, hope requires a factually grounded account of the current state of affairs – otherwise it is based on falsity; the associated emotional response can either engender despair or hope depending on how one is imagining future possibilities (Kretz 2013a). Thus, a clear sense of how the psychology of hope functions is essential for proactively generating emotional responses that enable rather than hinder positive environmental action.

When we are hopeful we act in hopeful ways, which makes it possible to achieve the hoped-for goal. Hope is recognized as being psychologically necessary for survival\textsuperscript{19} as well as contagious; it is the sort of thing
that we can pass on to each other.\textsuperscript{20} Being a hopeful person characteristically results in: having many goals, being more successful at achieving your goals, experiencing less distress and more happiness, and having superior coping skills (Snyder 1995). Importantly, hope generates active coping, prevents disengagement from stressful situations and reduces denial, which is particularly important given the worry about climate change denial articulated above (Alloy, Abramson, and Chiara 2000 in Braithwaite 2004, 83). Insofar as we are interested in habituating hopeful attitudes and practices it is useful to note that studies show that hope can be taught (Cheavens et al. 2005, 126).

There is an essential connection between agency and hope (McGeer 2004, 103). In the absence of individual agency, a mourner cannot rationally imagine being able to work against the environmental harms that give cause for mourning. In the absence of agency at the group level, those who are mourning cannot hope to use that sadness as a platform for building capacity to work against environmental harm. Peter Drahos (2004) notes that hope leads to “a cycle of expectation, planning, and action that sees the agent explore the power of her agency” (22). It is a process that facilitates building upon, and enhancing, agency. For such agency to be successfully exercised, adequate peer scaffolding must be in place. Victoria McGeer (2004) explains peer scaffolding as the psychological reinforcement of other’s effective agency through recognizing and respecting their hopes. She contends that support for others and for one’s own hope is best accomplished through communities of mutually responsive, high-hope persons. There is particular moral need for empowering historically disenfranchised communities. Those in positions of unearned privilege can utilize their position of power to amplify the voices of the disenfranchised; through that very action work is done against the immoral hierarchy based on the myth of meritocracy (McIntosh 2000). Those who are historically disenfranchised have perspectival knowledge that is essential for working against harmful power imbalances. Conversations across difference are essential given that hope develops in relationship with others. Fulfillment of hope is directly dependent on wider circles of action by others (Drahos 2004, 20). I’ve argued elsewhere, drawing from Snyder, that: “Communities of good hope can be formed through supportive relations. Growing hope requires environments where people interact in a supportive atmosphere
such that individual and collective goals can be met (Snyder 2005, 359). Through creating such environments people can increasingly perceive that they have both the agency and the pathways to succeed” (ibid.; Kretz 2013a). Conditions that ground hope’s ability to grow include having a sense of coherence about your own life which is found in a supportive and understanding network of persons who provide care and a base for thinking positively, for finding new hope, and for identifying paths to its realization (Braithwaite 2004b, 133). In light of the ecological challenges currently being faced, and in light of the crucial role community plays for generating justified hope, I suggest that coming together to mourn ecological loss could simultaneously generate community capacity for responding to, and working against, ecological harm. Hopefulness is a psychological orientation that encourages success when it is used for energizing action in the direction of that which is hoped for.

Hopefulness and hopelessness function as self-fulfilling prophecies. In the absence of hope, no effort is made to achieve the hoped-for goal, which ensures the goal will not be achieved. If instead hopeful action is exercised, the possibility of the hoped-for goal can be realized, which gives further cause for hoping for further goals, and so on. Hope is a precondition for the tools for change to emerge and take hold. 21

If the idea of trying to move society to a sustainable condition seems too enormous an undertaking, many may conclude it is pointless to try and the resulting sense of hopeless malaise “turns the belief that society will not change into a self-fulfilling prophecy.” In contrast, collective hope allows for more individuals to visualize goals, anticipate potential obstacles, and generate flexible plans for goal attainment. Therefore, social movements and groups create possibilities for change which could not have occurred without hope for the specific outcome (Milbrath 1995, 108 quoted in Lueck 2007, 253). By providing tools for plan creation, hope is a crucial part of the feedback loop that occurs between planning, action, and outcomes that generate or alter expectations and hope (Lueck 2007, 252). (Kretz 2013a)

With the growth of hopeful, active communities of support, positive action grows – action, which can then serve as fertile soil for ever more
regeneration. To quote Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper, there is mounting evidence that “while neoliberal economic globalization gathers pace, so do dissenting social and political movements, which resist the current trend of marketization, privatization, liberalization, and deterioration of labor standards” (Gills and Galbraith 2000, in Courville and Piper 2004, 43).

An apathetic and passive response to ecological harms is encouraged by neoliberalism’s rhetoric of market forces being the purveyors of meaning and value (Harvey 2007). Consumers are encouraged to adopt the ruse that happiness lies in consumption, while psychological evidence shows the relationship between consumption and personal happiness is a weak one (Durning 2009, 506–8). The two primary sources of human fulfillment are relationships and leisure, and opportunities for nurturing relationships and engaging in leisure time pursuits have dwindled under the pressure of market forces (ibid., 507–8). The attempt to satisfy social, psychological, and spiritual needs with material things is a fruitless endeavor (ibid.). The consume or decline argument – where human life is taken to require an economy like the current one, and a viable economy is taken to require the sorts of jobs currently available, and those jobs are taken to require consumption of ecological resources – is used as a forceful rhetorical tool to ensure business as usual (ibid., 509–13). The argument is flawed in so far as: a) Economic systems are human inventions and the current one is a theoretical model being tested. What that test has shown is that it is a model that undermines the welfare of the majority of Earth’s living systems and members; b) Although we need exchange systems we do not need to use the current model; c) Jobs are necessary but the sorts of jobs currently available reflect an unsustainable relationship with the majority of Earth members (including a large number of oppressed humans). Alternative jobs that reflect care and respect can be created; and d) Jobs need not rest on the consumption of physical resources. It is necessary services that we should be most interested in having fulfilled and those services can be fulfilled in multiple ways that do not require the perpetual exploitative consumption of non-renewables (ibid.). Neoliberal ideology prompts a vapid form of pseudo-hope rooted largely in denial of the ecological ramifications of current practices. 22 Authentic hope, as juxtaposed with pseudo-hope premised on delusion and falsity, is necessarily rooted in
world-reflective and world-mapping analysis of actual states of affairs. The actual state of affairs is that business as usual is resulting in the destruction of the living members and systems that underwrite life on this planet. If authentic hope – justified hope – is sought, then an alternative approach is needed.

I do not think that hope for the liberation of nature from an oppressive tyranny of economic growth premised on exploitation is misplaced (Kretz 2013a). Looking back at human history, we've seen movement after movement evolving in the direction of recognizing a greater diversity of those deserving of ethical consideration and respect; or as Leopold (1949) would say we evolve morally through expanding who we think of as fellow members of our ethical community. What seemed unimaginable one hundred years ago is commonplace in various locations today as efforts against racism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, classism, naturism and the like gain not only de jure but de facto hold as compassionate responses to others increase. “Institutions of hope move us collectively away from a social script that makes engagement in shaping our futures seem futile toward one in which we are expected to be active and responsible participants contributing to a vibrant civil society” (Braithwaite 2004a, 7). Hopeful vision roots radical change.

**Conclusion**

Mourning is a strong emotional response to significant loss. Denial of the epistemic import of emotional insight is both rampant and ungrounded. I argue that emotion and rationality must necessarily act in tandem. Insofar as one accepts a cognitive account of the emotions, an argument can be developed that mourning is a justified, and appropriate, response to the destruction of the diverse ecosystems that support life as we currently know it. The fall into despair that mourning can prompt must be resisted. That resistance comes through emotional solidarity – building communities of support with those who honestly and emotionally engage with the violent assault of Mother Earth, and validate the legitimate sadness to which this loss should give rise. Acting as emotional outlaws, people can identify inappropriate emotional responses to the ecological crisis. Using community support, people can move toward embracing the energizing emotions of anger and hope.
We can demand political recognition and resolution of the injustice implicit in the destruction of life on Earth, and can strengthen the capacity for change through communities of support. Emotional solidarity must eventually, in building capacity, reach beyond those who are currently concerned about the environment. Critical mass requires, I contend, a shift in emotional consciousness. An emotional paradigm shift can happen in a heartbeat and good ideas can spread at the speed of sound. An environmental ethic energized by an intentional and robust engagement of emotional intelligence grounds future possibilities heretofore unimagined. Let's dare to feel with our whole selves so as to witness what engagement with the world in emotional and political fullness reveals.

Acknowledgments

First, I offer my thanks to Ashlee Cunsolo and Karen Landman for their generous editorial support and encouragement. I also wish to thank Raymond Anthony for his close reading of, and insightful recommendations on, an early draft. I extend my gratitude to Joe Couture, James Kretz, David Kretz, Michelle Willms, Laura Mattiussi, Monique Dumont, Richard Ranger, and Jean-Francois Ranger for their constructive advice and emotional support while researching and writing. I am also indebted to the faculty and students at Michigan State University, with special thanks to Kyle Powys White and Michael O'Rourke; an invitation by the Philosophy Department to speak on this topic resulted in improved conceptual clarity and a more rigorous demand for making explicit practical applications. Finally I wish to thank Grand Valley State University and the University of Evansville for their institutional support while working on this project. In particular, my thanks are offered to Gail Vignola for her editorial assistance.

Notes

2 Here I am also alluding to forward-looking elements derived from that mourning – namely taking action in ways that work against the source of environmental harm. The temporal possibilities for mourning are varied. We can mourn that which is in the process of being destroyed as well as experience a sort of mourning in the making or anticipatory mourning wherein we mourn the likely losses on the horizon. I thank Ashlee Cunsolo for encouraging me to highlight these senses of mourning.

3 Or, perhaps more properly, why there has been failure to give adequate political uptake to attempts at communicating this loss thus far.

4 It is important to highlight, here at the outset, the limits of my analysis. My context is that of white middle-class female academic working in the global North. Both my experience and recommendations are informed and limited by this positioning. What I offer is one small contribution to a much larger, robustly inclusive dialogue that I hope occurs.


6 For an extensive discussion of how the gendered reason/emotion dualism historically functioned in philosophy see Genevieve Lloyd's *Man of Reason* (1984). Lloyd’s analysis includes the work of Plato, St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir.

7 I am here relying on Marilyn Frye’s (1983) conceptualization of oppression where oppression involves a group that is harmed systematically due to their group membership while another group benefits; the harm is related to disempowerment and the advantage is related to having power over another (Frye 1983). For a nuanced analysis that problematizes privilege conceptualized solely as an advantage see Peggy McIntosh. She worries about the ways in which power over another often includes an implicit arrogance and ignorance, noting that the role of oppressor is not one anyone should see as desirable (McIntosh 2000).

8 This is not to say there are no basic universal emotions across the human species – there are; rather, it is to say that social construction and socialization play a key role in explaining the diverse meanings of myriad emotions (Thoits 1989).

10 For a more in-depth discussion of above and related material see “Climate Change: Bridging the Theory-Action Gap” (Kretz 2012).

11 My thanks to Ashlee Cunsolo for suggesting improved conceptualization may be facilitated through articulating multiple emotional intelligences (plural) as opposed to emotional intelligence (singular).

12 Psychological care will need to be exercised with regard to appropriately navigating mourning, including the temporal dimensions of healing. Mourning is often a slow process; time plays a crucial role in healing.

13 Such considerations must, of course, reflect the differential distribution of consumption and the impacts of systemic oppression (Shiva 2005).

14 To clarify, I’m not saying we should mourn so as to get angry and hopeful – I’m not saying we always have to get sad before we get mad. One might be angry regarding massive, human-caused, ecological destruction without a strong experience of mourning prior to becoming angry. Rather, I make the case that mourning is a reasonable response to massive, human-caused, ecological destruction. Following this recognition, we ought to be proactive about how we want to reflect, tend to, implement and utilize this emotional knowledge. We must decide what to do with this knowledge and I’m recommending that we choose ways of engaging with this knowledge that empower. In the next section I am not advocating anger as a long-term goal or a stopping place. It is an intense emotion, and we need to funnel that energy to remedying the injustice that is the source of that anger. Anger is an emotion that, ideally, one renders no longer necessary by remedying the source of the anger.

15 A striking exception to the relegation of emotional expression to oppressed groups, says Spelman (1989), is anger; “their anger will not be tolerated: the possibility of their being angry will be excluded by the dominant group’s profile of them” (264).

16 In the following two sections I cover some of the same theoretical territory I address in “Hope in Environmental Philosophy” but it is reframed in light of my argument in the present context (Kretz 2013a).

17 My thanks to Raymond Anthony for posing the question that this point answers.

18 Although humility, much like anger and hope, can be parsed as an environmental virtue, I am refraining from adopting a moral environmental virtue lens throughout my analysis because not all environmental virtues are emotions, and a full analysis of environmental virtues – including the role of emotion within such accounts – is beyond the scope of this chapter.


20 See for example: Cunningham 2004; Eliott 2005; V. Braithwaite 2004a; Snyder 1995.
I offer my thanks to Raymond Anthony for making this point explicit.
My thanks to a blind reviewer for recommending exploration of this line of thought.

REFERENCES


