



# THE YEMEN TREND

**End of  
2017**  
November & December



RESEARCH . ANALYSIS . ADVISORY

The Yemen Trend is a monthly digest that highlights Yemen's key economic and humanitarian trends and political and military developments, providing context and analysis where necessary in order to facilitate informed discussion deeply rooted in the facts.

# Executive Overview

The year ended in Yemen with sustained fighting across several fronts and an ever-increasing risk that famine will hit the most food insecure districts of the country. The recent escalation, which began in November and peaked with the killing of Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, has left the stalled peace process without a clear way forward. Political maneuvering, most notably including a meeting of Saudi, UAE, and Islah Party officials on December 13, appears more geared toward creating a unified military front against the Houthis than finding a political solution. Meanwhile, the Southern Transitional Council held the first session of its 303-member Southern National Assembly on December 23. The unrecognized parliamentary body called on the UN Security Council to restore the seat of the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) at the UN, arguing the 1990 unity agreement is void.

The escalation began when a ballistic missile was fired at Riyadh from Houthi/Saleh-held territory on November 4. Within 24 hours, the coalition released a wanted list of 40 senior Houthis, deeming them "supporters of Iranian terrorist militias" and offering a financial reward of \$5-30 million dollars for information leading to their arrest. On November 6, the coalition imposed a full nationwide blockade on all sea, air, and land ports, including those under the control of the internationally-recognized government that they back. Ports were gradually reopened, but it was not until December 20 that the coalition announced the reopening of Hodeidah port to commercial vessels, likely due to mounting pressure from the US and humanitarian agencies, who warned that without the full removal of the blockade famine was likely to reach many areas serviced by the northwestern ports of Hodeidah and Saleef. The 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview was released, showing that 8.4 million Yemenis are now "severely food insecure and at risk of famine," a 25 percent increase from in 2017.

An attempt by the Houthis to take control of the Al-Saleh Mosque in Sana'a on November 29 quickly spiraled into conflict in several strategic neighborhoods in the capital. The power-sharing agreement between the two de-facto authorities in Sana'a completely broke down by December 2, when Saleh called for a "new page" with the coalition countries, and called his followers to rise against the Houthis. Following his death, throughout December fighting raged in the majority of Yemen's governorates. UAE-led forces entered Hodeidah governorate for the first time in the war, capturing territory in the southern districts of Khawkhah and Hays. Houthis were defeated in Shabwa and anti-Houthi forces pushed across the governorate border into Na'man district of Al-Bayda, while near the Saudi border Hadi-aligned forces recaptured most of Khabb wa Al-Sha'af district in Al-Jawf.

# Timeline

## November

- Nov 01** Two airstrikes on a market in Sa'ada governorate kill 31 civilians, injure 26 others
- Nov 04** Ballistic missile launched from Houthi/Saleh territory targets Riyadh
- Nov 05** Coalition places bounties on 40 most senior Houthis, labelling them "terrorists"
- Nov 05** Islamic State claims twin attacks in Aden that leave 35 security personnel, civilians dead
- Nov 06** Coalition imposes full nationwide blockade in response to Nov 4 missile attack
- Nov 12** Coalition announces reopening of all ports under control of Hadi and coalition
- Nov 22** Coalition announces reopening of Houthi/Saleh-held ports to aid, not commercial imports
- Nov 28** Ministerial Quintet (KSA, UAE, US, UK, and Oman) meet in London with UN Envoy
- Nov 29** Fighting erupts between Houthi and Saleh factions, battle for control of Sana'a ensues

## December

- Dec 02** Saleh announces split with Houthis, calls for 'new page' with coalition
- Dec 04** Saleh and GPC Secretary General Aref Al-Zouka killed by the Houthis
- Dec 10** Ministerial Quintet (minus Oman) meet in Abu Dhabi
- Dec 13** Islah Party head Mohammed Al-Yadoumi meets UAE and Saudi leaders in Riyadh
- Dec 18** Number of suspected cholera cases surpasses 1 million
- Dec 19** Ballistic missile fired by Houthis at Yamamah palace in Riyadh intercepted
- Dec 20** Coalition announces reopening of Hodeidah port to commercial shipments
- Dec 23** STC inaugurates 303-member Southern National Assembly, appoints leadership
- Dec 23** Southern National Assembly calls on UNSC to reinstate South Yemen at the UN

# Humanitarian and Economic Trends

**The coalition announced a full and immediate nationwide blockade on November 6**, which by the end of the month had been loosened to include only commercial shipments to Hodeidah and Saleef seaports and Sana'a airport. The coalition [stated](#) the decision to implement the blockade came in response to the ballistic missile fired at Riyadh on November 4. On November 12, the coalition [announced](#) that within 24 hours it would begin the "reopening of all ports in areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, including Aden, Mukalla, and Mocha, as well as the airports of Aden, Seiyun and Socotra," but not those controlled by the Houthi/Saleh alliance. On November 22, the coalition [announced](#) it had "completed a comprehensive review of the inspection and verification procedures used to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216," and that the following day it would reopen Hodeidah port and Sana'a airport to aid but not commercial shipments.

**The blockade increased the risk of famine and the spread of disease.** Within days of the November 6 blockade, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock [warned](#) that without the reopening of Yemen's ports the country would face "the largest famine the world has seen for many decades, with millions of victims." By mid-November, Jens Laerke, spokesperson of UN OCHA, [said](#) "there may be as we speak right now, famine happening, and we hear children are dying... there's excess mortality as a cause and consequence of undernourishment." While complete data to determine IPC Phase 5 Famine remains lacking, the acknowledgment that excess mortality is occurring is noteworthy. In April 2017 the WFP [found](#) indicative acute malnutrition rates above 40 percent (past the 30% famine threshold) and poor food consumption scores exceeding 50 percent in the most affected districts of IPC Phase 4 governorates, "suggesting that pockets of famine may already exist," but noted data on crude death rates was unreliable.

**On December 20 the coalition announced Hodeidah would be open for commercial vessels** for a period of 30 days "to implement the proposals of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen concerning the port of Hodeidah." The [statement](#) does not expand on what these

"If the situation with respect to commercial shipping doesn't change, and [perhaps] even if it does, based on the damage that's already been done to the food and fuel pipeline, there will be a famine, the largest we've seen in many decades. The evidence will be impossible to ignore."

- Scott Paul, Oxfam senior humanitarian policy advisor

proposals entail, but says the move came as a result of improved inspection procedures. The next day, the State Department [said](#) the Saudi decision also includes moving the US-funded cranes that have been in storage in Dubai to Hodeidah. In the lead up to the move pressure on the Saudis had been mounting in Washington, including via a Whitehouse [statement](#) on December 8 saying "We call on the Saudi-led coalition to facilitate the free flow of humanitarian aid and critical commercial goods, including fuel, through all Yemeni ports and to restore commercial flights through Sana'a Airport." The day after that statement, Reuters [quoted](#) a senior US official as saying "we wanted to be very clear with Saudi officials that the political environment here [in Congress] could constrain us if steps aren't taken to ease humanitarian conditions in Yemen."

Pressure was also maintained by humanitarian organizations like UN OCHA, which [warned](#) after the coalition's November 22 announcement [that](#) "even with a partial lifting of the blockade on Yemen, an additional 3.2 million people will be pushed into hunger, as jointly warned by WFP, WHO and UNICEF. If left untreated, 150,000 malnourished children could die of malnutrition in the coming months." Commercial food imports had resumed before the coalition statement on December 20, although in low numbers. Jan Egeland, head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, [said](#) on December 6 that "today for the first time... the first commercial goods have arrived in port, and the first ships that were let through this iron grip," although this is contradicted by a Logistics Cluster [snapshot](#) saying "a commercial vessel carrying 5,500 mt of flour was the first to


berth at Hodeidah on 26 November after the end of blockade.” No fuel tankers docked in Hodeidah from November 6 to December 24, [according](#) to Mark Lowcock, under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator. [According](#) to the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), despite the body having given approval for tankers to reach Hodeidah the coalition refused them and “has repeatedly said their priority is food only.”

**8.4 million Yemenis are “severely food insecure and at risk of famine,”** according to the [2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), up nearly 25 percent from 6.8 million in 2017. Out of Yemen’s estimated population of 29.3 million people, 22.2 million are in need of some form of assistance, marking an increase of 1.5 million people in the last six months alone and amounting to around 76 percent of the entire population. While emphasis is often placed on Hodeidah and the northwest of Yemen with regards to the risk of famine, data from the WFP and FAO-led Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) shows that 107 of Yemen’s 333 districts around the country face “heightened risk of sliding into famine.” The districts in blue in the map below include 10.4 million people, the majority of whom do not know where their next meal will come from, and “large segments of the population in these districts face extreme and severe deficits of food, have

surpassed emergency malnutrition rates, and are at potential risk of death by starvation or due to the interaction of malnutrition and disease.”

**The cumulative total of suspected cholera cases surpassed 1 million** on December 18, according to a WHO [database](#), although the number of new reported cases has steadily declined. The coalition [called](#) this figure exaggerated because it is “nearly impossible to accurately determine whether the suspected cases are cholera or simple diarrhea,” and this sentiment was also expressed by Mark Poncin, Yemen emergency coordinator for MSF, who [said](#) it is almost certainly exaggerated but no less concerning. At the same time, there are fears that a new wave of cholera will arrive with the rainy season in March or April – something Poncin called “probably unavoidable” – and this will be compounded by several factors.

The Red Cross [said](#) the lack of fuel had caused water and sewage systems in Hodeidah, Sa’ada, and Taiz to stop functioning, and “as a result, close to one million people are now deprived of clean water and sanitation in crowded urban environments.” Furthermore, [discussions](#) about carrying out a nationwide cholera vaccination campaign in early 2018 are likely to have been complicated by the infighting between the Houthi and Saleh camps in Sana’a and intensified military operations by anti-



Houthi forces. Many of these factors are also likely to hamper efforts to tackle [diphtheria](#), which has now spread to the majority of Yemeni governorates following a 25-year absence from the country. From August 13 to December 21 a total of 333 suspected diphtheria cases and 35 associated deaths were reported across 20 governorates, [according](#) to the WHO, which warned the risk of further transmission is “very high.”

**Authorities in Sana’a ordered commercial banks to freeze the assets of 1,223 Yemenis.** The order was issued by the Financial Information Unit of the Sana’a-based Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) based on a December 23 [request](#) from the so-called “Committee to Inventory and Collect the Traitors’ Property,” headed by Deputy Interior Minister Abdulhakim Al-Khaiwani. The targeted individuals include senior government and military figures as well as activists and lawyers, and the Aden-based CBY [rejected](#) the order.

## Political Developments

**Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis on December 4.** Clashes erupted between the Houthis and Saleh supporters on November 29, when four Saleh supporters were [reportedly](#) killed after Houthis stormed the Al-Saleh Mosque in Sana’a. Presumably the timing of the Houthi raid was related to the large rally the group carried out near the mosque the following morning to mark Prophet Mohammed’s birthday. Within 24 hours [dozens](#) had been killed as control over vital political and military buildings in the capital was challenged by either side. On December 1 [talks](#) between the GPC and Houthis fell flat and the fighting escalated to engulf much of the capital. The following day, in a televised address Saleh [called](#) for his followers to rise up and defend the Republic against the Houthis, and said his party would “turn the page” with regional countries if they lifted the blockade, a move the Houthis deemed a “coup”. On December 4 the Houthis killed Saleh as well as Aref Al-Zawka, general secretary of the GPC.

**Saudi Arabia and the UAE held a meeting with senior Islah Party officials.** The UAE’s Mohammed Bin Zayed and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman met Mohammed Al-Yadoumi, chairman of the Islah Party, in Riyadh on December 13. The [meeting](#) was also attended by the party’s secretary

general, Abdulwahab Al-Anisi, and senior security officials, including Saudi intelligence head Khaled Al-Humaidan. The move was viewed by many as an attempt by the coalition to improve relations with Islah, which is represented in the Hadi government and anti-Houthi forces, but which the coalition – and the UAE in particular – have sidelined or targeted during the war due to its proximity to the Muslim Brotherhood. Secretary General Al-Anisi [said](#) afterward that Islah was asked to reach out to Saleh’s GPC loyalists to unify efforts against the Houthis, and he described the meeting as a “turning point” although admitted his party was “having an extremely difficult time reaching them.”

**The STC held the first session of its Southern National Assembly** on December 23 in Aden, attended by STC President Aidarous Al-Zubaidi and Vice President Hani Bin Buraik. Aidarous [appointed](#) Ahmed Bin Buraik, former governor of Hadhramout, president of the 303-member parliamentary body, and Dr. Anis Yusuf Ali Luqman vice president. In a lengthy [statement](#) released the same day, the National Assembly laid out an argument for why it considers the 1990 unity agreement to be void, calling on the UN Security Council to authorize “the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) to restore its lawful seat in the United Nations and in all the other regional and international organizations.” The National Assembly furthermore called on the UN envoy and Security Council to consider deploying international peacekeeping forces to the North-South border, and for remaining northern forces to withdraw from southern lands, adding that the STC will continue building southern state institutions.

**The Quint convened twice and addressed the humanitarian situation** but gave no indication as to the direction of the peace process. The UK foreign secretary hosted the first meeting in London on November 28, joined by the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, in addition to the American undersecretary of state for political affairs. A brief [communique](#) released by the Quint emphasized the need for all Yemeni ports to be opened for both humanitarian and commercial goods, and criticized the November 4 missile attack on Riyadh. The group [convened](#) a second time on December 10 in Abu Dhabi, again without the presence of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. The latter meeting did not include Oman (and Emirati state media referred to the group as the Quad).

## Background on the peace process

The UN-mediated peace process came to a complete pause in early December as a result of the fighting between the Houthi and Saleh factions, but it had been stagnating for months. This was readily apparent in early November, when the coalition placed the Houthi leadership on a wanted list, labelling them members of “Iranian Terrorist militias” (see below). Weeks before, in October UN Envoy Ould Cheikh sought to build momentum for the peace process by prioritizing humanitarian efforts, [telling](#) the Security Council that he was “currently in the process of discussing a proposal that includes humanitarian initiatives to rebuild trust and steps to bring the parties back to the negotiations table.” However, both Foreign Minister Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi and Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam said the envoy had not presented them anything new or a clear plan for moving forward.

In late December, Saudi media [reported](#) that Ould Cheikh is planning to visit Aden in an effort to renew efforts toward peace talks, and that he will then travel to Sana’a, but not before the Houthis commit to cease their campaign against members of the GPC. [According](#) to the Houthi-run Saba News, the deputy special envoy was supposed to visit Sana’a in December but rescheduled for January. It is not clear how the dynamics of the peace process will change after Saleh’s death, but it is likely to remain focused on the same core proposals the envoy introduced in May 2017. These are to create a mutually agreed upon military committee to manage Hodeidah port, and in parallel a financial committee to develop a mechanism to have state funds collected from all parts of Yemen and disbursed to public servants on both sides.

For more background, see the [October 2017](#) version of the *Yemen Trend*.

**The coalition placed 40 senior Houthis on a “terrorist” wanted list on November 5.** The list is said to include “40 names of leaders and elements responsible for planning, executing and supporting various terrorist activities in the Houthi terrorist group,” and it includes rewards ranging from 5 to 30 million dollars for information leading to the capture of the wanted individuals. The names were [published](#) by the state-run Saudi Press Agency, presented on a poster labelled “Wanted List: Supporters of the Iranian Terrorist Militias in Yemen.”

It includes a mix of primarily military and political officials, and the first three names are as follows: Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, the self-proclaimed “leader of the revolution;” Saleh Al-Sammad, the de-facto Sana’a-based president; and Mohammed Al-Houthi, the head of the Houthi Revolutionary Committees and the previous de-facto president.



**Saudi Arabia is preventing President Hadi from returning to Aden,** the Associated Press reported in early November. Quoting a Yemeni security commander and two other anonymous Yemeni officials, the news organization [wrote](#) that Hadi and his sons, in addition to several cabinet ministers based in Riyadh, are unable to return. The commander characterized Hadi as being under a form of house arrest and said the apparent travel ban arose as a result of the feud between the president and the UAE.



# Military and Security Developments

**A missile fired from Houthi/Saleh-controlled territory was intercepted over Riyadh** on November 4. The ballistic missile had a range of more than 900km, [according](#) to the Saudi Press Agency, making it one of the deepest attacks into the Kingdom to date (the missile fired at the Yanbu refinery on July 22 [reportedly](#) travelled 930km). An [investigation](#) by the New York Times found indications the missile flew unimpeded by the US-supplied Patriot missile defense system, and only missed the airport by a kilometer. On November 6, the coalition said thorough examination of the missile debris from both the November 4 and July 22 attacks “has confirmed the role of Iran’s regime in manufacturing these missiles and smuggling them to the Houthi militias.” Moreover, on November 24 coalition spokesman Turki Al-Maliki [stated](#) the specific missile used in the November 4 attack on Riyadh was smuggled into Yemen via Hodeidah port.

## **Closer look: Iranian involvement in the missile program**

There is mounting evidence that Iran is providing ballistic missile components to the Houthis. After inspecting four ballistic missiles fired into the Kingdom, including those used for the aforementioned July and November attacks, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen [reported](#) that the “design characteristics and dimensions of the components inspected by the panel are consistent with those reported for the Iranian designed and manufactured Qiam-1 missile.” [According](#) to AFP, the experts found a missile component “marked with a logo similar to that of the Sahid Begheri Industrial Group... a subsidiary of the Iranian Aerospace Industries Organization.” The panel said it did not, however, have evidence of the broker or supplier. Furthermore, the UN monitors said they found evidence the missiles had been transferred to Yemen in pieces and assembled in-country, and that the most likely smuggling route is overland through Oman or from the coast of Al-Mahrah governorate.

Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the UN, held a public [display](#) of the remnants of some of the weapons used by the Houthi/Saleh alliance, including ballistic missiles and drones, saying “these weapons

were supplied by the Iranian regime, the evidence is undeniable.” The evidence lies in logos on some of the fragments that match Iranian defense firms, part designs that the US says are only used by Iran and the Houthis, and the crude welding on the missiles, said to indicate Iran shipped the missiles to the Houthis in disassembled parts.

However, it is unlikely weapons smuggling is occurring at the tightly-monitored port of Hodeidah, and there are allegations the coalition used the issue to justify its November 4 blockade. “[The blockade] is not about preventing weapons shipments, because the ships that are being stopped have never even been alleged to contain weapons and are being screened by the United Nations,” [said](#) Scott Paul, a senior humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam. “It has been clear for a long time that Saleef port and, in particular, Hodeidah port have been of huge strategic value to both sides.” Furthermore, following the November 4 attack, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen [wrote](#) that the “imposition of access restrictions is another attempt by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition to use paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) as justification for obstructing the delivery of commodities that are essentially civilian in nature,” referring to the resolution prohibiting military support for the Houthi/Saleh alliance.

**The Houthis fired another ballistic missile at Riyadh on December 19.** The group [claimed](#) it successfully targeted the royal Yamamah palace in Riyadh “during a meeting of Saudi senior officials.” King Salman and the cabinet were announcing the state budget for 2018 from the palace at the time, but the missile was [intercepted](#) and no damage occurred. Relatedly, on December 3 the Houthi-run Saba News [reported](#) the group had hit the Al-Barakah nuclear reactor in Abu Dhabi, which would be the first targeted location in the UAE, but the UAE [denied](#) the claim and no evidence surfaced.

**Anti-Houthi forces made gains in several governorates in December,** capturing significant territory in Shabwa, Hodeidah, and Al-Jawf governorates, and making additional progress in Al-Bayda governorate and Nehm district of Sana’a. On December 28 the Hadi military [launched](#) an operation to liberate Khabb Wa Al-Sha’af, the largest district in Al-Jawf governorate, which within days had succeeded in retaking a strategic road connecting northern Al-Jawf with Sa’ada governorate. The development has [reportedly](#) allowed anti-Houthi fighters to, for the first time in the war, send reinforcements and equipment into

Sa'ada through Al-Jawf rather than across the Saudi border. Additionally, after fully retaking Shabwa governorate in December, Hadi-aligned forces entered Na'man district of Al-Bayda.

In the first week of December anti-Houthi ground forces entered Hodeidah governorate for the first time during the war, [capturing](#) the town of Khawkhah in the southernmost district of the same name by December 7, and also pushing into neighboring Hays district. Khawkhah is around 110 km from Hodeidah city on a relatively straight road along the coast. [Video](#) released by the Emirates News Agency (WAM) shows tanks bearing UAE flags involved in the operation, which also includes southern resistance factions, the Sudanese military, and the Tihama Resistance, led by Abdulrahman Hajri. Although Brigadier General Abdulsalam Al-Shehi, commander of the coalition forces on the western coast, [said](#) shortly after capturing Khawkhah that "there is cooperation with the Republican Guard," it is unclear what role if any former Saleh-loyalists played in the offensive in the governorate.

**A very high casualty count was witnessed throughout December.** On December 5 the Red Cross [said](#) the fighting in the capital between the Houthi and Saleh factions in less than a week had resulted in 234 deaths and 400 wounded. Airstrikes were especially deadly in December, and [according](#) to the New York Times increased from around 80 per day to 120 after Saleh's death. Nearly 1,000 documented casualties in December resulted from the fighting in the capital and the incidents listed below, which do not include any of the casualties from ground fighting between Hadi-aligned and Houthi forces that took place in the majority of all governorates, including: Taiz, Hodeidah, Shabwa, Al-Dhale'a, Al-Bayda, Lahj, Marib, Al-Jawf, Sana'a (Nehm district), Sa'ada, and Hajjah.

- On December 13 an airstrike on a military police camp in the capital [reportedly](#) left at least 39 dead and 90 wounded
- On December 17 eight women and two children from the same family were killed when an [airstrike](#) targeted their van.
- UN OCHA [reported](#) that on December 26 "airstrikes on a crowded popular market" in Taiz killed at least 54 civilians and wounded 32 others (in response, the coalition spokesman strongly [condemned](#) the UN humanitarian coordinator for alleged bias in favor of the Houthis).

- Also on December 26, 14 family members were killed when an airstrike hit their farm in Hodeidah. "These new victims are in addition to 84 civilian casualties reported in the last 10 days, including 41 people killed, and 43 people injured by airstrikes in several governorates throughout Yemen," OCHA [said](#).

**The Islamic State claimed responsibility for twin attacks in Aden that left 35 dead.** On November 5, suicide bombers hit the security headquarters in Khormaksar district and the nearby criminal investigations unit, before militants engaged security forces at both sites. They were [reportedly](#) able to enter the investigations unit and release around 50 detainees from their holding cells. A standoff ensued, in which the suspected Islamic State members took hostages and conducted subsequent suicide bombings to hold the building. The criminal investigations unit was [retaken](#) the following day, and in total 29 security personnel were killed in addition to six civilians.

**US forces "conducted multiple ground operations and more than 120 strikes in 2017"** against AQAP and the Islamic State (ISIS-Yemen), the US Central Command announced on December 20. A CENTCOM [press release](#) states that AQAP remains one of the terrorist groups "most committed to and capable of conducting attacks in America," and that in the past year ISIS-Y, which the US claims to have begun counter-terrorism operations against in October, has doubled in size.

## Recommended reading:

- A comprehensive report by DeepRoot details the staple food import process from beginning to end, [Navigating Yemen's Wartime Food Pipeline](#) and providing a set of recommendations for Yemeni and international stakeholders to ultimately increase import quantities and reduce retail costs.
- [Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order](#), a Chatham House report by Peter Salisbury, argues for a fundamental shift in the way policymakers and politicians think about Yemen, from a top-down approach to restoring a central government to one that considers the internal logic and dynamics at the sub-national level.
- Detailing a little-discussed aspect of what one fighter calls [The 'absurd' war](#), the Middle East Eye speaks to Taiz natives who have returned from fighting on the Saudi border. Travelling to Saudi Arabia to fight the Houthis is controversial, as many locals regard it as high-paying mercenary work that serves to protect the Kingdom but not the people of Taiz.
- Drawing from a conference held in April 2017, the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung released a series of short papers authored by various experts on Yemen and focused on [Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen: Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention During and Post-Conflict](#).
- Reporting from Hodeidah and Sana'a, Iona Craig details the lost livelihoods of Yemeni fishermen and farmers, arguing that the country is being [Bombed into famine](#).
- Given that alleged AQAP members are in many cases accessible to local security forces for arrest and trial, America's November 2 [Yemen Strike Raises Questions About Whether the US Follows Its Own Drone Rules](#), reporters write after an interview with the governor of Marib.



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