



THE YEMEN TREND

November
2016



“The Yemen Trend is a monthly digest that highlights Yemen’s key economic and humanitarian trends and political and military developments, providing context and analysis where necessary in order to facilitate informed discussion deeply rooted in the facts.”

Executive Overview

Events in November centered around efforts to continue formal negotiations based on the UN roadmap which was rejected in late October but has since garnered support from the Houthi-Saleh camp and reluctant consideration from the Hadi administration. The Houthis and Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) demonstrated increased engagement with the peace process throughout November, meeting the UN envoy at the beginning and toward the end of the month and supporting Secretary of State Kerry's push in mid-November for a ceasefire. The Hadi government, in contrast, refused to meet the UN envoy in Riyadh during the lead-up to the ceasefire and initially rejected the truce. Nevertheless, on November 19 a 48-hour truce began but like the cessation of hostilities in October it was repeatedly violated by both sides and was not extended. Then, on November 28 the Supreme Political Council – the joint presidential office of the Houthi/Saleh alliance – announced the formation of a 42-member cabinet, referred to as the Government of National Salvation. This was seen as an escalatory step and a blow to the peace process.

The humanitarian crisis continued to worsen due to sustained fighting on many fronts, continued difficulties in importing at the port of Hodeidah, and the country's 1.25 million government employees – along with their estimated 6.9 dependents – went mostly unpaid as both central banks remain without sufficient funds or operating capacity. In reports looking ahead to the new year, the WHO and UN OCHA predict worsening food insecurity and a further breakdown of the public sector and the country's health facilities, less than half of which are fully operational. Meanwhile, fighting on the ground raged on many fronts throughout November. In Taiz city resistance fighters backed by Hadi and coalition air support were able to take over some territory from the Houthi/Saleh alliance in eastern and northern parts of the city as they attempt to unblock the siege and cut off supply lines from Sana'a. Houthi/Saleh forces launched dozens of attacks across the border and claimed to have taken two towns in Jizan region, while the major fronts in Marib, Hajjah, Sa'ada, and Sana'a changed little.

Timeline

- Nov. 03** | UN envoy begins 4-day visit to Sana'a, meets Houthi-Saleh alliance
- Nov. 06** | Detained US citizen and head Houthi delegate travel from Sana'a to Oman
- Nov. 15** | Kerry says Houthis agree to ceasefire Nov. 17, rejected by Yemeni gov
- Nov. 19** | 48-hour renewable ceasefire begins at 12pm, breached within one hour
- Nov. 21** | Ceasefire is not renewed
- Nov. 26** | Hadi makes surprise visit to Aden
- Nov. 28** | Houthi/Saleh alliance forms new cabinet in Sana'a

Humanitarian and Economic Trends

The World Food Program (WFP) outlined possible economic scenarios moving forward, forecasting a “likely breakdown of the public sector caused by the deteriorating economy and ongoing conflict.” Compared to 2014, the WFP predicts hunger will increase by 110 percent and food insecurity will hit 16.6 million people, which is a 47 percent increase from before the crisis, and 2.5 million more since a major assessment in June 2016. Accordingly, food assistance must be increased by 53 percent to meet the rising needs, the WFP brief says. However, the UNCHR announced that as of November 8 only 43 percent of [funding requirements](#) for Yemen had been received. Beyond funding and resources, the conflict continues to hinder the movement of goods. For example, during the ceasefire, on November 20 it was reported that 18 WFP humanitarian aid trucks were being [blocked](#) from reaching Taiz by the Houthi/Saleh alliance.

A nationwide survey of Yemen’s health infrastructure by the WHO found that less than half of all health facilities are fully accessible and functioning, 274 health facilities have been damaged (69 of which “totally damaged”), and at least 49 districts have no medical doctors, among [other](#) worrying statistics.

UNOCHA released the [Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017](#), saying that of Yemen’s 27.4 million people, 18.8 million are in need of assistance (10.3 acute and 8.5 moderate). This number is lower than the 21.2 million figure cited for 2016, but OCHA states the decrease is due to better data collection and “a further tightening around priorities,” and in no way should the humanitarian situation be seen as having improved. The report says Yemen’s economy is “being willfully destroyed, with preliminary results of the Disaster Needs Assessment estimating \$19 billion in infrastructure damage and other losses – equivalent to about half of GDP in 2013.”

The UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) [reported](#) a significant decrease in the number of new vessels applying for

clearance to enter Yemen in October. The UNVIM lists potential reasons for this decrease as being seasonal, a result of the Central Bank relocation to Aden, and/or due to new procedures for issuing letters of credit to commercial traders. The longest delay at anchorage continued to be at Al-Saleef port in Hodeidah, with an average 53-day wait for berth attributed to very limited infrastructure.

On November 1 the US Treasury [designated](#) the two brothers who run the Al-Omgly and Brothers Money Exchange as “financial supporters” of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). One of the brothers, Mohammad Al-Omgly, has openly [admitted](#) to doing financial transactions with AQAP, arguing that it was unavoidable to do business with the militants while they controlled the town of Al-Shihr, as well as many other places in Hadhramout, and that he kept his business open because many government companies and employees relied on his bank to receive their salaries. **Meanwhile, Yemeni paper Al-Mashad Al-Yemeni [suggested](#)** that Hadi’s trip to Djibouti in early November was part of an effort to get the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit (CAC) Bank to freeze assets allegedly held by former president Saleh. CAC Bank was also used by the Houthis, only days before the Saudi-led offensive began in March 2015, in their efforts to get citizens to [donate](#) money to their war effort.

On November 14 the British parliament was presented a [joint report](#) by the Secretaries of State for International Trade, Defense, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and International Development. “The government is confident in its robust case-by-case assessment and is satisfied that extant licenses for Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s export licensing criteria,” the report says. The British government claims the coalition’s Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) “will be able to conduct the most thorough and conclusive investigations,” and welcomed the release by the JIAT of its eight investigations thus far, which goes against evidence collected by the UN and various human rights organizations. **Less than two weeks prior**, the UK’s former secretary of state for business, innovation and skills, Vince Cable, [said](#) he was lied to about oversight of Saudi weapons’ use in Yemen. Cable had suspended the sale of Paveway bombs and refused to approve the licenses until the Ministry of Defense placed more safeguards

on minimizing civilian casualties. Contrary to assurances Cable claims he was given, the Ministry of Defense told the Guardian no British military personnel are involved in the decision process for which targets are bombed.

The Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies released a report titled Yemen Without a Functioning Central Bank: The loss of basic economic stabilization and accelerating famine. The report notes the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) arrangements – whereby local councils collected taxes and revenues on behalf of the government and gave them to their local CBY branch to be redistributed – favored the Houthis, who had more public sector employees in areas under their control, which has spurred spending and allows the Houthi to impose a “war tax” on individual salaries, in addition to siphoning off funds. Looking ahead, the report notes:

As of mid-November the CBY in Aden “had announced no plans to relocate any of some 800 well-trained and seasoned staff from the former CBY headquarters in Sana’a, nor offered details as to how it planned to recruit properly qualified new staff to work in Aden.” Additionally, “the chances are extremely small that the CBY in Aden will be able to unilaterally develop the capacity to function as a central bank in the near to medium term,” regardless of how much financial support it receives.

Yemeni wheat importers said that by the new year domestic supplies of grains will be depleted without renewed financial support.

Another form in which external intervention could take place, at least until cooperation between Yemen’s two central banks is resolved, “is for financial aid provided by donors to be held in an offshore account administered by an independent economic committee. This committee would work in coordination with the CBY administration to ensure that basic economic stabilization in Yemen is maintained.”

Somalia became the first country to move its embassy to Aden, following the Hadi administration’s call for foreign governments and humanitarian organizations to move their headquarters there. In a related development, following the opening of a UN Human and Relief Operations bureau in Aden, Prime Minister Bin Dagher [renewed](#) his call for diplomatic missions and NGOs to relocate to the interim capital of Aden

Political Developments

November was characterized by ongoing attempts by international players to push forward with the peace roadmap rejected by Hadi and the Houthi-Saleh alliance at the end of October. On November 1 a draft UN Security Council resolution by the UK was [posted](#) online. Of note is the call for both sides to “immediately respect the terms of the April 10, 2016 ceasefire,” the resumption of consultations toward a political solution “on the basis of the road map,” and for the UN envoy to report back within 15 days. British UN Ambassador Matthew Rycroft at the time said he expected to submit the draft “in the coming days,” but this never happened. Saudi paper Asharq Al-Awsat later [quoted](#) Saudi Ambassador to the UN Abdullah Al-Mouallimi as saying the delay is due to a joint Gulf-British agreement “concerning the draft resolution, and whether there is a need for it or not.”

Background: During his visit to Sana’a between October 23 and 25 the UN envoy presented a roadmap to Houthi and Saleh representatives. Although the plan was not officially released to the public, a [draft copy](#) was leaked. It entails Houthi/Saleh forces withdrawing from Sana’a, Taiz, and Hodeida, and handing over their heavy and medium weapons. Meanwhile, Vice President Ali Mohsen is to step down. Hadi would then transfer his powers to a new vice president agreeable to all sides, while remaining a figurehead.

The foreign ministers of the so-called quad countries – the US, UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – met on October 16 and September 21, and earlier at their August 25 meeting John Kerry brought forth a renewed peace plan involving a simultaneous political and military track. This sequencing remains the key point of contention – namely, at what stage in the process should the Houthi/Saleh alliance be relieved of their military capabilities? President Hadi and his officials have continually [rejected](#) or called for modifications to the roadmap on the basis of conformity to three things: The GCC Initiative, the National Dialogue Conference

(NDC) outcomes, and UNSC Resolution 2216, which demands the Houthis immediately withdraw and hand over weapons.

The UN envoy did not make the roadmap public, but [told](#) the UN Security Council on October 31 that the roadmap “foresees the creation of military and security committees, which would supervise withdrawals and the handover of weapons in Sana’a, Hodeida and Taiz.” A new vice president would be appointed and a Government of National Unity would be formed, which would resume political dialogue and oversee “the completion of the constitutional process and ultimately elections.” The envoy noted that both parties had rejected the roadmap, but it continues to be positioned as the basis for further negotiations. As such, the plan is structured so that by agreeing or lending support to it, the parties are not committing to any concrete actions.

UN Envoy Ould Cheikh visited Sana’a from November 3 to 7, meeting delegates from the Houthi and GPC parties. The day he arrived, [protests](#) formed in many governorates under Hadi’s sphere of influence, with residents voicing support for the president’s rejection of the roadmap, which many worry would leave the south vulnerable to further attacks and expansion by Houthi/Saleh forces. Hadi [praised](#) those who protested against the UN envoy’s roadmap and again stated his rejection of the peace plan. Ould Cheikh flew to Riyadh on November 7, but Hadi apparently [refused](#) to meet with him. Instead, the president convened members of his government, as well as Riyadh-based Shura Council and parliament members, and reiterated his rejection of the roadmap. He released a lengthy [statement](#), again repeating his claim that it “rewards the coup plotters.” The UN envoy left Riyadh without meeting Hadi or his officials.

In the week surrounding the envoy’s visit, several parties changed their tone toward the UN-backed roadmap. Saudi Arabia was [said](#) to have privately accepted the plan and encouraged Hadi to work with it, and Saleh [lent his support](#) for the roadmap via his Facebook page, calling it a “good

basis for negotiations,” albeit in need of further negotiating. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi, following a meeting in Riyadh on November 10 with the Ambassador of Russia to Yemen, called on the UN envoy to put forward a [new](#) roadmap “that takes into consideration the references of the Gulf sponsored initiative, UN Security Council resolutions and the outputs of the National Dialogue Conference, in addition to accords reached, in consultations conducive to peace, previously, taken place, in Switzerland as Kuwait,” the Saudi Press Agency reported. The foreign minister also said governmental committees had been formed to consider the roadmap further.

ANOTHER FAILED CEASEFIRE

At a [press roundtable](#) in Abu Dhabi on November 15, Kerry said he had met with the Houthi negotiating team and “laid down a document, a short program for trying to move the negotiations forward.” The Houthis agreed to a ceasefire starting November 17, provided the other side comply, and the Emiratis and the Saudis “both agreed to try to move forward with this,” the Secretary of State said. In the media, Kerry’s remarks were taken to mean the coalition had agreed to the ceasefire and bypassed the Hadi government. In response, Foreign Minister Al-Mekhlafi wrote on Twitter that Kerry’s announcement had not been coordinated with his government, “nor is it interested in what Secretary Kerry announced, which represents a desire to scuttle peace efforts by trying to reach an agreement with the Houthis apart from the government.”

There was considerable confusion over the ceasefire. On the day it was supposed to begin, State Department spokesman John Kirby [noted](#) that fighting was ongoing and urged “all parties, including the Republic of Yemen Government, to quickly and publicly announce their support for the cessation.” On November 18 Doctors Without Borders (MSF) [wrote](#) about fierce clashes in Taiz under the assumption the ceasefire was already underway, while the UN Envoy did not issue a [statement](#) on the ceasefire until the morning of November 19. The ceasefire officially began at 12pm on November 19 with Houthi representatives said to be taking part in the Coordination Committee in Dhahran Al-Janoub, Saudi Arabia. Less than two hours later the coalition had already claimed

Houthi/Saleh forces [violated](#) the truce in Al-Jawf and Taiz governorates. The truce ended at noon on November 21 without extension.

During the ceasefire Kerry released a [statement](#) voicing his support for Ould Cheikh “to restart by the end of this month negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement, using the UN Roadmap as a basis for talks between the parties.” The UN envoy was continuing to push forward at the end of November with efforts to promptly renew peace talks, and concluded meetings with Houthi and GPC delegates on November 26 in Muscat, before travelling to Riyadh. Meanwhile, after more than a year outside Yemen, on November 26 Hadi travelled to Aden. The UN envoy [met](#) Hadi in Aden on December 1 in an effort to convince Hadi to support the UN-sponsored roadmap, while Hadi’s chief of staff said the government has submitted its criticisms of the roadmap to the envoy.

Houthi delegation head Mohammad Abdulsalam quietly travelled from Sana’a to Muscat on November 6. That same day a former US soldier who had been imprisoned in Sana’a for over a year-and-a-half was also flown to Muscat. In a press [statement](#) John Kerry named him as Wallead Yusuf Pitts Luqman and said he recognized “this positive gesture by the Houthis.” Whether a deal to allow the Houthis to travel or a gesture of goodwill, both times the Houthi delegation has taken a flight in the last two months Americans have been released on the same day. Previously, after being denied access to Yemeni airspace for over a month, Houthi and GPC delegates flew from Muscat to Sana’a on October 15, with two American detainees and many injured Yemenis taking the same plane on the return journey. On November 6 the American citizen and the [Houthi delegation](#) both travelled from Sana’a to Muscat before mid-day on Omani aircraft, although it remains unclear if they travelled together.

The Houthi delegation’s departure without the GPC delegation was one of a number of events in November some commentators said indicate a growing rift between the Houthis and Saleh’s GPC party. One point of contention is the appointment of a new commander of the Republican Guard, following Commander Ali Al-Jaifi’s death in the October 8 funeral hall bombing. The Houthis

[apparently](#) want to fill the position with Abdulkhalig Al-Houthi, a military commander and younger brother of Houthi leader Abdulmalik, while Saleh reportedly wants his nephew Tariq to take the spot. The major indication of a rift, however, was said to be the delay in the formation of a new cabinet. On November 9 Supreme Political Council head Al-Sammad met acting Prime Minister Abdul-Aziz Bin Habtoor to discuss the formation of a so-called Government of National Salvation, whose formation had been anticipated for many weeks. Habtoor [said](#) the cabinet would be formed in the “next few days,” but weeks passed without action.

Finally, on November 28 it was announced that Prime Minister Abdul-Aziz Bin Habtoor is to lead a National Salvation government made up of [42 ministers](#). The move was denounced by the Hadi administration and the GCC, and the UN envoy said it “represents a new and concerning obstacle to the peace process and does not serve the interests of the people of Yemen in these difficult times.”

Analysis: While the Houthi/Saleh alliance’s delay in forming a cabinet may have pointed to a growing division between the two partners of convenience – which is the narrative pro-Hadi media have been peddling – an alternative interpretation is the alliance held off on its formation in order to negotiate a better position for the roadmap. This political maneuver, combined with continued attacks into Saudi Arabia and fairly stagnant frontlines within Yemen, might have pressured the Saudis and other international players to push Hadi to move forward with the roadmap while the opportunity exists. This strategy at the very least positioned the Hadi government to be perceived as the main obstacle to renewing negotiations.

The new cabinet, touted by the Supreme Political Council as diverse and representative of a wide range of actors, displays a further infusion of Houthi ideology into the state structure, a continuing role of the old GPC elite and a push away from the technocratic government envisioned in the post-2011 political dialogue. Many of the appointments

Military and Security developments

appear to be a reward of sorts for the patronage network of tribal sheikhs who joined or have been fighting alongside the Houthi/Saleh alliance. Meanwhile, other appointments are geared toward shaping the future generation of Yemen, for example with Yahya Badr Al-Deen Al-Houthi being put in charge of the Ministry of Education. Yahya is the brother of Houthi leader Abdulmalik, and is himself a prominent Houthi figure. The move is reminiscent of the Islah party's control of the education ministry post-2011 and their control over some parts of the education system during Saleh's years of power. Islah drew criticism for overreach and attempting to further its ideology via various ministries with social sway, especially over the youth.

Of the 42 ministers only three are women, which is far short of the 13 women who would be required to fulfill the 30 percent quota activists have long been campaigning for. Ahmed Abdullah Aqabat, a pro-Houthi judge and former NDC member, was named minister of justice. Key ministers Jalal Rowaishan and Hussein Khairan were replaced as ministers of interior and defense, respectively, and infamous arms smuggler Fares Mana'a was appointed to the largely symbolic position of minister of state. Fares previously served as governor of the Houthi heartland of Sa'ada between 2011 and 2014, and for over a decade has been implicated in arms deals with groups within Yemen and the horn of Africa, including Al-Shabab and other Islamist extremist groups.

Writing in his capacity as a Member of the National Security Subcommittee of the House Oversight & Government Reform Committee, Congressman Ted Lieu wrote a [letter](#) to Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. In it, he voices his concerns as the US conducts its review of support to the Saudi-led coalition. He writes that the US appears to be violating the laws of armed conflict by taking such a direct role in supporting coalition fighter jets without knowing whether the targets are civilian or military.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines released a global report, [Landmine Monitor 2016](#), noting the devastating impact landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are having in Yemen. "In Yemen, there were 988 mines/ERW casualties identified in 2015," the report states. There were several landmine-related incidents in Taiz in November. At the beginning of the month in the rural areas of Haifan, Al-Silw, and Hithran, the Houthis allegedly forced 150 families out of their homes [to place landmines](#) in an effort to slow advances by resistance forces. On November 18, photographer Awab Al-Zubairi was [killed](#) by a landmine in Taiz thought to be left behind by Houthi/Saleh forces.

The chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, General Mohammad Baqeri, [told](#) a forum of naval commanders in Tehran, "We need bases in distanced areas and perhaps we might one day come to have bases on the coasts of Yemen or Syria or establish bases on islands or offshore floating bases." The general also noted that having naval bases abroad is "ten times more important" than nuclear power and "creates deterrence." Curiously, the Associated Press version of the story, which was republished by hundreds of international papers including the New York Times, [says](#) "Iran is currently helping the Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen and the Syrian government in their fights against the extremist Islamic State group," without providing any evidence. Relatedly, The Times of London said Britain [deployed](#) a warship off the coast of Yemen "to protect a crucial shipping lane from the threat of Iranian-backed missile attacks." The ship was previously scheduled to travel to the Gulf for operations against the Islamic State in Syria and to patrol shipping lanes. Meanwhile, the warships Iran had sent to the coast of Yemen in October – prompting countless opinion pieces about a looming Iran-US escalation – [continued](#) their voyage in November along a pre-planned route to South Africa and were headed to the Atlantic Ocean.

Fighting in Taiz raged for the entirety of November. Battles between local resistance fighters and the Houthi/Saleh alliance were focused around the eastern part of the city, as well as mountainous areas on its outskirts and a road that links the city to Aden. Resistance fighters are attempting to cut off the alliance's supply line from Sana'a, and a mixed group of Hadi troops and allied tribesmen retook Saleh district, which overlooks the Presidential Palace. Heavy coalition strikes on the port of Al-Mocha appear, to some local [observers](#), to be paving the way for a ground offensive on Yemen's western coast. On November 22 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [said](#) that during the previous 72 hours – meaning over the course of the ceasefire – an average of 200 wounded were received at Taiz's main hospitals. "Sniper fire and indiscriminate shelling has trapped civilians," the ICRC Yemen head said. "Dead bodies are in the streets and people are unable to attend to their most basic needs."

Taiz received significant coverage in November by NGOs. Amnesty International [reported](#) that over the course of several months anti-Houthi forces in Taiz had repeatedly threatened hospital staff and interfered in hospital operations by stealing equipment, preventing Houthis from being treated, and placing tanks and other military equipment in close proximity to hospitals. Yemen-based Mwatana Organization for Human Rights released a [report](#) titled Chapters from Hell: Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Armed Ground Conflict in Taiz. The report contains 177 incidents investigated by Mwatana between May 2015 and October 2016 which it concludes are violations of humanitarian law [Note: the [full report](#) is only available in Arabic, and is accompanied by a subtitled [video](#)]. Among the key findings:

- The Houthi/Saleh alliance is "responsible for the majority of indiscriminate and bloody attacks launched on residential areas that are under the control of the popular resistance and forces loyal to president Hadi."
- Nine documented extrajudicial killings were carried out during the reporting period by resistance members against opponents alleged to be affiliated with the Houthi/Saleh alliance, usually after resistance forces retook territory.
- Both sides are each currently occupying at least seven schools each, in and around Taiz city, and damage to 24 schools has been documented,

as have dozens of cases of child recruitment by both parties, including for direct combat.

Elsewhere in Yemen fighting continued largely along frontlines from October. In Midi, Hajjah governorate, Serwah in Marib, and Al-Nehm in Sana'a governorate, there were high casualties but little reported movement. The front that opened up last month in Al-Buqa, in the Houthi heartland of Sa'ada, received government-backed reinforcements from Saudi Arabia. In Al-Jawf, bordering Sa'ada to the east, a Houthi field commander in the governorate, Jaber Mohammad Al-Hadadah, was said to have [switched sides](#) along with many of his followers.

Houthi/Saleh forces launched dozens of attacks into bordering Saudi regions throughout November, but did not fire any missiles off the coast or deep into Saudi territory like the previous month. Some of the major incidents include November 10, when [shelling](#) injured 14 people in Dhahran Al-Janoub, Aseer region, and on November 25 Saudi mouthpiece Al-Arabiya said [11 missiles](#) were launched at the border town of Al-Tuwal, in Jizan region. A day after, it was reported that a ballistic missile targeting the city of Khamis Mushait, Aseer region, was [intercepted](#), according to the Saudi Press Agency. Several other missiles were reported to have targeted the region of Najran. Additionally, Houthi/Saleh mouthpieces reported their forces [took over two towns](#) in Saudi Arabia's Jizan region, and [video](#) purporting to show their advance was spread online, but the information had not been independently verified.

Only one US drone strike was reported in November, although heightened counter-terrorism operations were conducted by Hadi forces and coalition partners. On November 21 [AFP](#) reported "a US drone strike on a vehicle killed a suspected Al-Qaeda Islamic judge in the central province of Al-Baydha," named by local security sources as Abu Hammam Al-Ibbi. In early November the governor of Hadhramout, Ahmad Bin Bourek, [said](#) a large number of soldiers from the UAE-trained Hadramout Elite Forces conducted operations with coalition air support on Al-Qaeda holdouts in Al Mouhamden valley, west of the capital Mukalla. On October 9 the Second Military Region, which operates in Hadhramout, announced via its [Facebook page](#) that it had killed around 30 Al-Qaeda fighters.

RECOMMENDED READING & VIEWING:

- A report by Ginny Hill and Baraa Shiban titled [Yemen: A Battle for the Future](#), according to the authors, “sets Yemen’s multiple conflicts in the context of the ‘remote control’ approach to warfare – focusing on the use of special forces, mercenaries and armed drones.”
- A report by Human Rights Watch titled [Yemen: Abusive detention rife under Houthis](#) provides descriptions of many of the forced disappearances documented by the organization.
- In a piece for the Atlantic Council titled [The Sequencing of Peace in Yemen](#), Nabeel Khoury lays out a possible way for the conflict to wind down and a transitional government to take shape.
- The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington hosted a discussion, [Governance and the War Economy in Yemen](#), which involves several economic experts discussing the situation in Yemen and possible ways to relieve the suffering.
- An [audio recording](#) of a Chatham House talk by former Prime Minister and Vice President Khaled Bahah titled Yemen: Mapping the Way Forward. Mr. Bahah said he does not have aspirations to be prime minister or vice president again.

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