

UNIVERSALISM VALUES AND THE INCLUSIVENESS OF OUR MORAL UNIVERSE

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Inclusiveness of the moral universe refers to the breadth of the community to which people apply moral values and rules of fairness. A preliminary study establishes the values typically viewed as moral. The author indexes moral inclusiveness at the societal level by the number of value items focused on the welfare of non-in-group members that form a distinct region in a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS), rather than intermixing with moral values that usually relate to the in-group. Three societal characteristics predict inclusiveness of the moral universe across 66 societies: cultural egalitarianism, cultural embeddedness, and level of democratization. Using representative national samples from 21 countries, the author assesses how the societal level of moral inclusiveness influences relations between individuals' universalism values and their perceptions of immigration, opposition to immigrants from different racial or ethnic groups, and participation in activities that benefit the wider society. Findings suggest that, where moral inclusiveness is high, people understand universalism (but not benevolence) values as applying to all members of society.

Keywords: moral inclusion; national cultures; prosocial behavior; universalism values

Do not oppress the stranger, for you know the stranger's heart.

Exodus 23: 9

Being helpful and forgiving are highly valued across most groups and societies. People also attribute high importance to justice, equality, and peace (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). However, this consensus breaks down when we ask—helpful toward whom? forgiving of whom? justice for whom? Do people feel equally obligated to express these values to strangers as well as to friends? Do these values apply equally in relations with people of another religion or ethnicity, with the poor and weak, the rich and strong, and in relations with our extended family, friends, and others with whom we feel close? Phrased differently, how inclusive is our moral universe, the community to which we apply moral values?

Moral inclusiveness is the opposite of what others have called “moral exclusion” (Deutsch, 1990; Opatow, 1990). They refer to people's perception that others are outside, rather than included in, the boundary of rules, moral values, and fairness. This article estimates the extent of moral inclusiveness characteristic of 66 societies. It then examines some sources of societal differences in moral inclusiveness and some consequences of such differences.

I assess the inclusiveness of people's moral universe through an examination of basic values. Drawing on the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992), I consider different

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possible meanings of value items such as justice and equality that presumably have as their goal enhancing the welfare of all others. The value theory labels these and related value items “universalism” values. However, the meaning of these values may vary across societies. In some societies, such values may refer to a broad moral community that includes members of all groups for most people. Then they would be truly universalistic. In other societies, these values may apply only to the narrow moral community that encompasses those with whom we are close and expected to identify (the in-group). They may exclude members of other groups (out-groups).

Study 1 identifies societies in which universalism values take on these different meanings, societies in which the scope of the moral universe to which these values apply is broad or narrow. Study 2 tests hypotheses concerning three characteristics of societies that may influence the inclusiveness of their members’ moral universe: (a) a cultural orientation that emphasizes egalitarianism, (b) a cultural orientation that emphasizes the embeddedness of individuals in societal groups, and (c) the level of democratization in the political system. Studies 3 and 4 turn to some implications of the prevailing degree of moral inclusiveness in society. Study 3 relates the societal level of moral inclusiveness to average national perceptions of the consequences of immigration. Study 4 assesses how the societal level of moral inclusiveness moderates relations of individuals’ values to their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. It considers perceptions of how immigration affects the receiving country, attitudes of opposition to immigration by those who come from different racial or ethnic groups, and participation in activities that benefit the wider society.

PRELIMINARY STUDY: WHICH VALUES ARE “MORAL”

Theorists commonly define *human values* as trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group (Feather, 1975; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1992) identified 10 motivationally distinct basic values that are recognized across societies. The 10 basic values, each followed by two exemplary items that express it, are power (authority, wealth), achievement (success, ambition), hedonism (pleasure, enjoying life), stimulation (exciting life, varied life), self-direction (creativity, independence), universalism (social justice, equality), benevolence: (helpfulness, loyalty), tradition (devoutness, humility), conformity (obedience, honoring parents), and security (national security, social order).

Which of these 10 values do people consider “moral values”? Philosophers, social scientists, and laypeople alike see morality as concerned with actions that affect the welfare of others directly or indirectly (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984). Thus, they would define *helpfulness*, *protecting the environment*, *insuring justice for the weak*, and *preventing harming* as moral values.

We conducted a simple empirical study to assess the value items laypeople judge to be moral values (Schwartz, 1995). We asked 100 Israeli adults whether they considered each of the 56 items in the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992) to be a moral value. Consensus among respondents was very high. More than 80% of respondents labeled every one of the items used to measure benevolence values as moral, and at least 70% labeled all or most of the items used to measure universalism, conformity, tradition, and security values as moral. In contrast, fewer than 20% rated any of the items that measure power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation values as moral, and fewer than 30% rated more than one of the self-direction items as moral.

The five basic values considered “moral” by respondents all concern promoting or protecting positive relations of self to others. The five values respondents did not consider “moral” all concern promoting or expressing self-interest either without regard to others (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism) or in competition with them (power, achievement).

STUDY 1: USING VALUES TO DEFINE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE MORAL UNIVERSE

Do some moral values apply primarily to the in-group whereas others apply to out-groups as well? According to the values theory (Schwartz, 1992), universalism and benevolence values express the motivation to promote the welfare of others. By definition, what distinguishes them is the target for which they express concern. Benevolence values apply primarily to those who are close to us, those with whom we frequently interact and/or identify. Universalism values presumably apply to all of humankind and to the natural environment.

Among the universalism value items, four most clearly refer to the welfare of others beyond the in-group. These items, with the explanatory phrase that follows them in the SVS, are equality (equal opportunity for all), social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak), broadmindedness (tolerance of different ideas and beliefs), and a world at peace (free of wars and conflict). Sagiv (1994) and Schwartz (1997) identified these items as conceptually more associated with concern for and action to promote the welfare of people outside one’s in-group than the other universalism items. Moreover, confirmatory factor analyses of data from 46 samples suggest that three of these items (equality, social justice, and world at peace) form a subset within the set of universalism (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004).

People with a narrow, exclusive moral universe may understand even these four value items as applying only to their in-group. When considering the importance of social justice or equality, for example, they may think only about justice or equality for their own family or ethnic group. They may rate these value items as especially important because they are concerned about their application to promote the welfare of the people with whom they identify. The idea that these values might also apply to groups beyond this narrow moral universe may never cross their mind. When individuals whose moral universe includes only members of their in-groups attribute high importance to justice or equality, the meaning of these values is no longer distinct from the meaning of benevolence values. For these people, these sets of moral values are concerned with the welfare of the same target—people to whom we feel close. In the extreme, universalism values, in the distinct sense defined by the theory of basic values, do not exist for these people.

Individuals within and across societies differ in the breadth and inclusiveness of their moral universe. Much of this variation among individuals probably reflects the prevailing beliefs and perceptions in the society or social groups that socialized them. In societies that socialize to a broadly inclusive moral universe, people should more often understand values such as justice and equality as applying beyond the in-group to all members of society. Thus, justice and equality should express the motivational goal of universalism as defined in the theory of basic values. In contrast, in societies that socialize to a concept of the moral universe as a narrower, more exclusive group of similar others, people are likely to understand the same value items of justice and equality as applying largely to the in-group. These values will have little relevance to the wider society of different others with whom one does not identify. The meaning of these values should resemble that of benevolence values that also concern the welfare of the in-group.

ASSESSING THE MEANING OF VALUE ITEMS

The meaning of any construct finds expression in the pattern of its semantic or functional associations with other constructs. Hence, to assess the meaning of value items, I examine their patterns of association or correlation with a wide range of other values. If the set of universalism items share a distinct meaning, they should correlate more highly with one another than with other moral value items. In addition, these highly intercorrelated universalism items should all exhibit low or negative correlations with the same set of nonuniversalism items. Moreover, these low or negative correlations with the nonuniversalism items should differ from the correlations of the other moral values with these items. In other words, the set of universalism items should show convergent and discriminant validity.

Where this occurs, one can infer that the universalism items have a meaning that differs from that of the other moral values that apply primarily to the welfare of close others (benevolence) or focus primarily on the interests of the in-group (conformity, tradition, security; Schwartz, 1992). This distinctive pattern of correlations would support an interpretation of the universalism values as applying to an inclusive moral universe. However, if the universalism items show patterns of correlation similar to those of the other moral values, one can infer that they also share the latter's domain of application—relations with the in-group. This would imply that they apply to a narrow moral universe.

To reveal the total pattern of associations among the value items, I correlated respondents' ratings of the importance of the value items in the SVS. They rated each item on a 9-point importance scale, as a guiding principle in their life. The correlation matrix was the input for a similarity structure analysis (SSA; Borg & Groenen, 1997; Guttman, 1968) that represents the total pattern of correlations among items. This scaling technique locates each item as a point in space such that the distances between the points reflect the associations among the items. The greater the conceptual similarity between any two items, the more related they should be empirically and, hence, the closer their locations in the multidimensional space.

Figure 1 presents a two-dimensional projection of the value items from the SVS derived from the average correlation matrix across 195 samples of teachers, students, and the general public in my database. In this projection, all items that represent each of the 10 values form separate labeled regions in the space, indicated by partition lines.¹ This projection updates earlier presentations of the structure of value items (e.g., Schwartz, 1992). It is based on additional samples, includes the item "self-indulgent" added to the SVS in 1994, and excludes the item "detachment" dropped in that version.

The four key universalism value items—equality, social justice, broadmindedness, and world at peace—are all located in a distinct universalism region. They are not intermixed in the space with the benevolence value items that express concern primarily for the in-group. This is the pattern of relations expected in groups that understand universalism values as referring to an inclusive moral universe, as applying to all others and not only to those with whom we identify or are close. In contrast, in groups that understand universalism values as referring largely to the in-group, the universalism value items should not form a distinct region in the value space. Rather, they should be located together with the items from the other values that concern the welfare of the in-group—benevolence in particular but perhaps even conformity, security, or tradition values.²

MEASURING MORAL INCLUSIVENESS AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL

Samples. All the representative or near-representative adult samples in our database from various countries and all the samples of schoolteachers were included in the analyses. There




Figure 1: Two-Dimensional Smallest Space Analysis: Individual-Level Value Structure Averaged Across 195 Samples

were 107 samples from 66 countries. In countries with two or more samples, I averaged the number of the four universalism values that formed a distinct region across samples to obtain the country score. Table 1 lists the countries studied, the number of samples in each, the years the data were gathered, and the moral inclusiveness score for each country.

Index of moral inclusiveness. Eight SVS items serve as markers for universalism values (Schwartz, 1994).³ To limit ourselves to those items whose meaning can most clearly express either concern for the welfare of all humankind (i.e., an inclusive moral universe) or concern primarily for the in-group (i.e., a narrow moral universe), I focused on four value items: social justice, broadmindedness, equality, and a world at peace. I examined the spatial projection of the associations among all 56 or 57 SVS value items in each sample studied. I counted how many of these four key value items formed a distinct region separated from the regions of the benevolence, conformity, security, and tradition regions (cf. Figure 1). For each sample, the number of these universalism items that formed a distinct region could range from 0 (*all items intermixed with other moral value items, most often benevolence*) to 4 (*all items clearly separated from the other moral value items*). I call this the “moral inclusiveness score.”

STUDY 2: INFLUENCES ON MORAL INCLUSIVENESS IN SOCIETIES

CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS

Egalitarianism. The above reasoning suggests that two cultural orientations that characterize societies are likely to influence whether universalism values form a distinct region in the value space or intermingle with the other moral values. First is *egalitarianism*, defined as a normative emphasis in the culture on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (Schwartz, 1999, 2004, 2006). Where high cultural egalitarianism characterizes a society, people are socialized to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. They are expected to internalize a commitment to voluntary cooperation with others to manage their unavoidable interdependencies and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare. I hypothesize that the stronger the cultural orientation of egalitarianism in a society, the more inclusive the moral universe is likely to be. The operational hypothesis is that the universalism value items form a more distinct region in the value space, separated from the other moral values, in societies higher in cultural egalitarianism.

Embeddedness. The second relevant cultural orientation is *embeddedness*, defined as a normative emphasis in the culture on maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. People are viewed as role players embedded in the collectivity who find meaning largely through identifying with the in-group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. Sharp boundaries separate the in-group from outsiders. I hypothesize that the stronger the cultural orientation of embeddedness in a society, the less inclusive the moral universe is likely to be. Operationally, the universalism value items should mix with items from benevolence and/or other moral values in societies high in cultural embeddedness, rather than forming a distinct region in the value space.

To test the two hypotheses involving cultural orientations, I used the cultural orientation scores for egalitarianism and embeddedness from our database of schoolteachers and college

TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics, Moral Inclusiveness, and Democratization Scores

| Country | # of Samples | N | Year | Moral | |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | | | | Inclusiveness | Democratization |
| Argentina | 1 | 224 | 1995 | 0 | 12 |
| Australia | 2 | 199, 201 | 1988, 96 | 4 | 14 |
| Austria | 1 | 195 | 1997 | 4 | 14 |
| Belgium | 1 | 338 | 2001 | 4 | 14 |
| Bolivia | 1 | 110 | 1993 | 3 | 11 |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | 1 | 240 | 2002 | 0 | 5 |
| Brazil | 2 | 121, 187 | 1989, 95 | 1.5 | 11 |
| Bulgaria | 2 | 196, 331 | 1992, 95 | 0.5 | 2 |
| Canada | 1 | 115 | 1993 | 4 | 14 |
| Chile | 2 | 500, 304 | 1997, 98 | 1.5 | 5 |
| China | 3 | 194, 199, 211 | 1988, 88, 89 | 1 | 4 |
| Costa Rica | 1 | 139 | 2004 | 4 | 14 |
| Croatia | 2 | 227, 444 | 2002, 05 | 1 | 5 |
| Cyprus | 1 | 140 | 1992 | 4 | 13 |
| Czech Rep | 1 | 200 | 1993 | 0 | 3 |
| Denmark | 1 | 442 | 1995 | 4 | 14 |
| Egypt | 2 | 186, 133 | 2004 | 2 | 8 |
| Estonia | 2 | 230, 189 | 1989, 90 | 0 | 2 |
| Ethiopia | 1 | 175 | 1995 | 0 | 2 |
| Finland | 4 | 205, 211, 1808, 1402 | 1989, 91, 97, 2001 | 3.25 | 12 |
| France | 4 | 159, 349, 2339, 2190 | 1991, 94, 98 | 3.25 | 13 |
| Georgia | 1 | 200 | 1992 | 3 | 2 |
| Germany East | 1 | 202 | 1991 | 0 | 2 |
| Germany West | 2 | 187, 148 | 1990, 96 | 4 | 13 |
| Ghana | 1 | 219 | 1995 | 0 | 3 |
| Greece | 1 | 234 | 1989 | 3 | 12 |
| Hong Kong | 2 | 201, 126 | 1988, 96 | 2 | 10 |
| Hungary | 2 | 141, 130 | 1990, 95 | 0 | 6 |
| India | 1 | 187 | 1991 | 3 | 11 |
| Indonesia | 1 | 95 | 1994 | 3 | 5 |
| Iran | 2 | 821, 213 | 2000, 05 | 3 | 5 |
| Ireland | 1 | 118 | 1995 | 4 | 14 |
| Israel(Jew) | 4 | 213, 192, 164, 226, | 1989, 90, 96, 97 | 3.5 | 12 |
| Italy | 1 | 200 | 1989 | 4 | 14 |
| Japan | 3 | 229, 207, 173 | 1989, 89, 95 | 3.3 | 14 |
| Jordan | 2 | 215, 168 | 2002 | 3 | 6 |
| Korea, South | 1 | 257 | 2002 | 4 | 7 |
| Macedonia | 1 | 201 | 1996 | 3 | 5 |
| Malaysia | 1 | 151 | 1989 | 3 | 8 |
| Mexico | 2 | 266, 342 | 1990, 96 | 0 | 8 |
| Namibia | 1 | 301 | 1997 | 0 | 5 |
| Nepal | 1 | 202 | 1993 | 0 | 9 |
| Netherlands | 4 | 187, 240, 119, 159 | 1988, 88, 96, 98 | 4 | 14 |
| New Zealand | 2 | 199, 141 | 1988, 98 | 3 | 14 |
| Norway | 1 | 178 | 1994 | 4 | 14 |
| Peru | 2 | 175, 182 | 2002, 03 | 3 | 11 |
| Philippines | 3 | 157 | 1996, 97, 2000 | 2 | 9 |
| Poland | 2 | 195, 141 | 1989, 96 | 0 | 5 |
| Portugal | 1 | 192 | 1989 | 4 | 13 |
| Russia | 3 | 194, 189, 174 | 1995, 95, 97 | 1.3 | 2 |
| Singapore | 1 | 183 | 1991 | 3 | 7 |

(continued)

TABLE 1 (continued)

| Country | # of Samples | N | Year | Moral | |
|----------------|--------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | | | | Inclusiveness | Democratization |
| Slovakia | 2 | 189, 186 | 1991, 96 | 1 | 3 |
| Slovenia | 1 | 199 | 1992 | 0 | 4 |
| South Africa | 1 | 309, 232 | 1992, 2003 | 2 | 5 |
| Spain | 1 | 186 | 1988 | 4 | 13 |
| Sweden | 2 | 211, 1711 | 1993, 98 | 4 | 14 |
| Switzerland | 1 | 89 | 1990 | 4 | 14 |
| Taiwan | 2 | 202, 141 | 1988, 93 | 0 | 6 |
| Turkey | 1 | 180 | 1990 | 4 | 8 |
| Uganda | 1 | 428 | 1995 | 0 | 7 |
| Ukraine | 2 | 247, 174 | 2003, 04 | 2 | 2 |
| United Kingdom | 1 | 194 | 1995 | 4 | 14 |
| United States | 2 | 261, 159 | 1988, 95 | 4 | 14 |
| Venezuela | 1 | 175 | 1989 | 2 | 13 |
| Yemen | 1 | 200 | 2003 | 0 | 4 |
| Zimbabwe | 1 | 185 | 1989 | 3 | 7 |

NOTE: Moral inclusiveness score = number of following values—equality, broadmindedness, social justice, world at peace—found in a distinct universalism region and not in benevolence, tradition, conformity or tradition regions in multidimensional space analysis.

Democratization score = sum of 7-point ratings of civil liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, press, assembly) and of political rights (e.g., to vote, be elected) in 1985 (Freedom House, 1987).

students in 66 countries (Schwartz, 2004). These scores are based on sample means for the importance of a set of values chosen a priori to represent each orientation. Scandinavian countries score especially high in cultural egalitarianism, for example, whereas Sub-Saharan African countries score especially high in cultural embeddedness (Schwartz, 2004, 2006).

DEMOCRATIZATION

A third potential influence on the inclusiveness of people's moral universe is the nature of the political system in a society, particularly its degree of democracy. Democracies emphasize individual rights, freedom, and equality among people. They impose the responsibilities of political participation on all. The law serves to protect rights and freedoms and to insure at least formal equality. An ideal democratic political system socializes those it governs to view all citizens as deserving of equal care and concern and to reject special advantages or disadvantages for particular ethnic, religious, political, or other groups. The greater the degree of democratization, the more the rights, freedoms, and responsibilities provided to all citizens, regardless of their personal or group identities (Dahl, 1998; Putnam, 1993). The structure and ideology of democratic systems promote extending the boundaries of one's moral universe to include the weak as well as the strong, those different from self as well as those like the self.

In contrast, the less democratic the political system, the fewer the individual rights and freedoms and the less equality of opportunity and responsibility. Particular groups are privileged and others disadvantaged. The less democratic the state, the more likely people are to perceive threats from the larger environment to their personal well-being and to the welfare of those close to them. The structure and ideology of nondemocratic systems promote a narrowing of the moral universe to encompass like others who share one's fate and can be trusted, but to exclude members of other groups. In sum, people in more democratic countries are likely see

values such as justice and equality as relevant to all societal members, whereas those in less democratic societies are likely to consider such values primarily as goals for their own group. I therefore hypothesize that the higher the level of democratization in a country, the more inclusive the moral universe. Hence, universalism value items are more likely to form a distinct spatial region separate from the regions of the other moral values.

We measured level of democratization with the Freedom House country index for 1985 (Gastil, 1987).⁴ This index combines a 7-point rating of civil liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, press, assembly) and a 7-point rating of political rights (e.g., to vote, be elected) in each country. The last column of Table 1 lists the country scores on level of democratization.

EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE SOURCES OF MORAL INCLUSIVENESS

To test the three hypotheses, I correlated countries' moral inclusiveness scores with their scores on cultural egalitarianism, cultural embeddedness, and democratization. The zero-order correlations across 66 countries strongly supported all three hypotheses: for cultural egalitarianism, $r = .44$ ($p < .001$); for cultural embeddedness, $r = -.44$ ($p < .001$); for level of democratization, $r = .73$ ($p < .001$).

One might also think of moral inclusiveness as referring to the sharpness of the boundaries between the in-group and out-groups in a society. Triandis (1995) argued that the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups are sharper in so-called collectivist versus individualist societies. If so, the moral universe should be more inclusive in individualist societies. Is this the case? Individualism scores from Hofstede (2001) and moral inclusiveness scores are available for 57 countries. They correlate $.34$ ($p < .01$). Thus, moral inclusiveness is somewhat greater in individualist societies, though the correlation is a little weaker than for the egalitarianism and embeddedness cultural orientations. In sum, moral inclusiveness relates to three cultural orientations: egalitarianism and individualism positively, and embeddedness negatively.

Of course, the cultural orientations within a country are not independent of its political system. Rather, they mutually influence one another (Schwartz, 2004, 2006). Moreover, they are related to the level of socioeconomic development in the country. To assess the joint influences of these factors on the inclusiveness of the moral universe in a country, we entered egalitarianism, embeddedness, democratization, and socioeconomic development (GDP per capita, 1985) as predictors in a multiple regression. Together, these predictors accounted for 50.2% of the variance in moral inclusiveness.⁵

Next, to assess the unique contribution of each predictor, we allowed them all to enter in a stepwise regression. Only the level of democratization entered this regression as a significant contributor, explaining 51.9% of the variance by itself.⁶ None of the other predictors added significant variance. Apparently, the civil liberties and political freedom people experience in their environment largely mediates the impact of socioeconomic level and of culture on the inclusiveness of people's moral universe.

STUDY 3: MORAL INCLUSIVENESS AND NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRATION

This study examines implications of societal differences in moral inclusiveness for average societal-level perceptions of immigration. Do people in societies with greater inclusiveness of the moral universe perceive the consequences of immigration for life in

their country as more positive? What are the effects that people believe immigration to have on the economy, cultural life, crime, and so on?

I hypothesize that the more inclusive the moral universe of people in a country the more positive their perceptions of the consequences of immigration. For most citizens, immigrants are members of out-groups. However, where the moral universe is inclusive, immigrants are more likely to be seen as part of this universe. Hence, they are more likely to be perceived as contributing positively or at least as not seriously harming society.

METHOD

Data from interviews with strict probability samples of the population age 15 years and older in 21 countries that participated in 2002-2003 the European Social Survey (ESS; 2003) served to test this hypotheses. Table 2 lists the countries included and the numbers of respondents.

Perceptions of the consequences of immigration were measured by a summary index of responses to six items. They asked whether immigration (a) takes away jobs or creates new jobs, (b) brings in more in taxes than it costs in services or less, (c) is good or bad for the economy, (d) undermines or enriches cultural life, (e) makes the country a worse or a better place to live, and (f) makes crime problems worse or better. The alpha reliability of this index was $> .85$ in all 21 countries.

To assess the breadth of the moral universe in the 21 ESS countries, I used the moral inclusiveness scores derived for these countries from the SVS data for teachers and other adult samples, listed in Table 1. I assigned a score of 3.0 to Germany for the ESS, based on a population-weighted average of the scores for former East and West Germany.

RESULTS

I tested the hypothesis by correlating the mean perceptions of the consequences of immigration in the ESS countries with the moral inclusiveness scores for these countries. The correlation between countries' average perception of immigration as having negative consequences and their moral inclusiveness scores was negative ($r = -.49, p < .05$), as hypothesized. People in countries with a less inclusive universe of moral concern believe that immigration affects the economy, cultural life, crime, and so on more negatively.

Might this relationship derive from the fact that one or more of the three sources of moral inclusiveness identified above directly influences perceptions of the consequences of immigration? To assess this possibility, I regressed these perceptions on national scores for cultural egalitarianism, cultural embeddedness, and level of democratization as well as on moral inclusiveness. Only moral inclusiveness entered the regression, accounting for 19.1% of the cross-national variance in perceptions of the consequences of immigration. When controlled for moral inclusiveness, the partial correlations of the other variables with the perceptions drop below .11 ($p > .5$). These results suggest that moral inclusiveness mediates possible effects of its sources on perceptions of the consequences of immigration.

STUDY 4: DOES MORAL INCLUSIVENESS MODERATE RELATIONS OF UNIVERSALISM VALUES TO PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOR?

The analyses thus far have been at the societal level. Study 4 examines how the prevailing breadth of the moral universe in the surrounding society influences individual differences in

TABLE 2
European Social Survey: Standardized Regression Coefficients
for Universalism Values in Predicting Perceived Consequences
of Immigration and Acceptance of Immigrants

| Country | N | β for Predicting | | | |
|----------------|------|--|---|--|--|
| | | Perceived Consequences of Immigration ^a | Accepting Immigrants of Different Race/Ethnicity ^b | Accepting Different Controlled for Similar Immigrants ^b | Prosocial Activity Benefiting Wider Society ^b |
| Austria | 2150 | .183** | .277** | .180** | .222** |
| Belgium | 1345 | .200** | .205** | .168** | .163** |
| Czech Republic | 1173 | .030 | .070 | .057 | — |
| Denmark | 1434 | .324** | .308** | .239** | .144** |
| Finland | 1737 | .196** | .228** | .175** | — |
| France | 1090 | .303** | .267** | .193** | .148** |
| Germany | 2715 | .215** | .257** | .143** | .119** |
| Greece | 2266 | .068* | .092** | .040 | .071* |
| Hungary | 1475 | .070 | -.001 | -.046 | -.005 |
| Ireland | 1745 | .212** | .218** | .111** | .195** |
| Israel | 2079 | .154** | .114** | .022 | .078* |
| Italy | 513 | .213** | .200* | .144* | — |
| Netherlands | 2255 | .233** | .255** | .183** | .180** |
| Norway | 1785 | .239** | .272** | .225** | .117** |
| Poland | 1799 | .053 | .035 | .012 | .022 |
| Portugal | 1316 | .058 | .008 | .083* | .139** |
| Slovenia | 1273 | .082* | .154** | .107* | .101* |
| Spain | 1559 | .179** | .220** | .164** | .118** |
| Sweden | 1660 | .308** | .305** | .262** | .145** |
| Switzerland | 1956 | .220** | .275** | .183** | — |
| United Kingdom | 1711 | .332** | .334** | .265** | .235** |

a. Controlled for respondents' age, education, gender, income, urban/rural residence, immigrant status, unemployment experience.

b. Controlled for respondents' age, education, gender, income, immigrant status, unemployment experience, religiosity.

* $p < .01$. ** $p < .001$.

psychological functioning. It asks whether the level of moral inclusiveness in the society to which individuals are exposed moderates the relationship between their own values and their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.

HYPOTHESES

Where universalism values represent the goals of tolerance and concern for the welfare of all humankind, individuals who attribute higher priority to universalism values should perceive immigration as less damaging to life in their own country, even though it increases the heterogeneity of the population. Similarly, the more importance individuals attribute to universalism values the less they should oppose immigration to their country by persons of different races and ethnic groups or from poorer and less similar countries (i.e., immigrants typically seen as out-group members who are difficult to assimilate). Third, the more importance individuals attribute to universalism values the more they should engage in prosocial activity that benefits the wider society.

These three hypotheses are likely to hold only to the extent that universalism values have the meaning of concern for the welfare of all. That is, the expected positive relations

of universalism values with perceptions and attitudes toward immigration and with out-group prosocial activity depend on whether universalism values reflect an inclusive conception of the moral universe. In societies where most people share an understanding of universalism values as applying to all, those who attribute high importance to universalism values should exhibit more positive perceptions, attitudes, and behavior than those who attribute less importance to universalism values.

What should happen, however, in societies where most people understand the universalism value items as referring to the in-group? In such societies, I expect the importance attributed to universalism values to show little relationship with perceptions and attitudes toward immigration or with prosocial activity that benefits the wider society. The moral inclusiveness scores for each country serve as indicators of whether universalism values apply to a broad or narrow moral universe for most societal members. This leads to the following operational hypotheses: The higher the moral inclusiveness score for a country, the more strongly individuals' universalism values predict (a) positive perceptions of immigration, (b) acceptance of immigration, and (c) prosocial activity that benefits the wider society.

METHOD

Samples. I tested the three hypotheses with data from the ESS countries. The ESS measured the 10 basic values with 21 items (Schwartz, 2003). These items, based on the Portrait Values Questionnaire method (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001), each describe a person in terms of what is important to him or her. Respondents reveal their own values indirectly by indicating how much the person in each item is similar to them, from 1 (*not at all like me*) to 6 (*very much like me*). Individuals' scores for the importance of each value are their mean responses to the relevant items.

Universalism values. Individuals' scores for universalism values are the mean of three items that measure this value: (a) He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. (b) It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them. (c) He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him. Mean alpha across 21 countries is .57 (range .47 to .68), quite reasonable for a 3-item index designed to measure a broad construct with diverse components.

Perceptions of the consequences of immigration. Measured with the 6-item index described in Study 3.

Attitudes toward "other" immigrants. I developed two indexes to measure acceptance of out-group immigrants. The first averaged responses to three items that asked whether to allow people to come and live in the country who are (a) of a different race or ethnic group from most people in the country, (b) from poorer countries in Europe, and (c) from poorer countries outside Europe. The mean alpha reliability of this index across 21 countries was .93, with a range from .90 to .97. The second index controlled for general opposition to immigrants, even to similar others who do not constitute an out-group. This index is the residual obtained when regressing the first index on responses to an item asking whether to allow into the country immigrants of the same race and ethnic group as most citizens. This index expresses acceptance of immigrants who are different from one's in-group, over and above general acceptance of immigrants.

Prosocial activity that benefits the wider society. I measured prosocial activity as the mean of eight relevant items in the ESS. Four items asked about activity related to humanitarian organizations devoted to civil rights or helping minorities or immigrants during the past 12 months. Were you a member, a participant in activities, a contributor of money, or a volunteer worker in such an organization? Four other items asked the same questions about activity related to organizations devoted to protecting the environment, to peace, or to animal rights. The alpha reliability of this index was $>.50$ ($M = .61$), with all items increasing the alpha in all but Finland and Italy (alpha = $.26$ in both), which I therefore excluded. Data on prosocial activity were not gathered in Switzerland and the Czech Republic. This left 17 countries for the analyses. The reliability index, though relatively low in some countries, did not correlate with country moral inclusiveness, values, or prosocial activity scores. Thus, the hypothesis could be tested, although the strength of findings might be attenuated.

RESULTS

Perceptions of immigration. I regressed the six-item index of perceived consequences of immigration on universalism values, entering seven potentially relevant background characteristics first as controls. Controls were respondents' age, education, gender, household income, urban/rural residence, whether they themselves were immigrants, and whether they had been unemployed and seeking work for a period of 3 months or more. Separate hierarchical regressions in each country yielded standardized regression coefficients (β s) for relations of individuals' universalism values to the consequences of immigration they perceive. Averaged across the 21 countries, universalism values were the strongest predictor of perceiving positive consequences of immigration. The 21 β s for universalism were all positive, as expected, and in 17 countries, they were significant ($p < .01$; see Table 2, column 2). Other consistent, though weaker predictors were number of years of education and being foreign born.

I tested the hypothesis by correlating the moral inclusiveness score for each country (from Table 1, column 4) with the β for universalism from the regression that predicted perception of positive consequences of immigration in that country (Table 2, column 2), across the 21 countries. The correlation was positive, as hypothesized, and substantial ($r = .69$, $p < .001$). Thus, the positive association between peoples' universalism values and their perceptions of immigration as having positive consequences was stronger to the extent that most people in the country understand universalism values as applying to an inclusive rather than to a narrow moral universe.

Attitudes toward "other" immigrants. Next, I regressed the two indexes of acceptance of out-group immigrants on universalism values, again entering potentially relevant background characteristics first as controls. Separate hierarchical regressions in each country yielded standardized regression coefficients (β s) that measure the effect of individuals' universalism values on their acceptance of immigration. The three-item index of acceptance was the dependent variable in one set of regressions and the residual index was the dependent variable in a second set. Averaged across the 21 countries, universalism values predicted accepting such immigrants most strongly, followed by education. For both indexes of opposition, 20 of the 21 β s for universalism were positive and 17 were significant ($p < .01$; Table 2, columns 3 and 4).

I tested the hypothesis by correlating the moral inclusiveness score for each country with the β for universalism from the regression that predicted acceptance of out-group immigrants in that country (Table 2, column 3 and 4), across the 21 countries. Correlations

were positive for the three item index ($r = .65, p < .001$) and for the residual index that controlled general acceptance of immigration ($r = .50, p < .05$). Thus, both tests confirm that the importance of peoples' universalism values predicts acceptance of out-group immigrants more strongly to the extent that most people in a country understand universalism values as applying to an inclusive rather than to a narrow moral universe.

Prosocial activity that benefits the wider society. Finally, I regressed the index of prosocial activity on universalism values, again entering potentially relevant background characteristics first as controls. Separate hierarchical regressions in each country yielded standardized regression coefficients (β s) that measure the effect of individuals' universalism values on their prosocial activity. Sixteen of the 17 β s for universalism were positive, as expected, and in 15 countries, they were significant ($p < .01$; see Table 2, column 5). Universalism values were the strongest predictor of prosocial activity in four countries and second to education or income in 12 countries.

I tested the hypothesis by correlating the β s for universalism from the regression that predicted prosocial activity in each country (Table 2, column 5) with the moral inclusiveness score for that country (Table 1, column 4), across the 17 countries. The correlation was positive and significant ($r = .74, p < .001$) as hypothesized. Thus, the importance of peoples' universalism values predicts prosocial activity that benefits the wider society more strongly to the extent that most people in a country understand universalism values as applying to an inclusive rather than to a narrow moral universe.

UNIVERSALISM AND BENEVOLENCE

Throughout this article, I have argued that people may understand universalism values such as *social justice* as applying primarily either to members of their in-group or more broadly to those beyond the in-group. I have used the location of four universalism value items (equality, social justice, broadmindedness, world at peace) in the value structure of a society to assess which of these understandings prevails in that society. I assumed that most people apply universalism values to a broad, inclusive moral universe in societies where these four value items form a distinct set in the value structure, separated from other moral values. In contrast, in societies where these items intermix with the other moral values, I assumed that most people understand universalism values as applying primarily to their in-group. The three hypotheses in Study 4 were based on these assumptions, so their confirmation supports the assumptions as well.

The theory of human values holds that benevolence values (e.g., helpful, honest, forgiving), like universalism values, concern the welfare of others. However, benevolence values focus primarily on the welfare of close others, members of the in-group (Schwartz, 1992). If this distinction between universalism and benevolence values is correct, then benevolence values should predict positive perceptions of immigration, acceptance of "other" immigrants, and prosocial activity that benefits the wider society considerably less strongly than universalism values do. If, on the other hand, many people understand benevolence values as applying to members of out-groups, benevolence values should predict the three variables investigated in Study 4 (almost) as well as universalism values do.

I examined this issue by repeating the regression analyses in each country using benevolence values as a predictor instead of universalism values. In each case, I included the same control variables.

Predicting perceived positive consequences of immigration, the β s for benevolence were smaller than those for universalism in 20/21 countries, only six were significant ($p < .01$)

versus 17, and the mean β was .058 vs. .184 for universalism. Predicting acceptance of different immigrants, the β s for benevolence were smaller than those for universalism in 18/21 countries, only four were significant versus 17, and the mean β was .059 versus .195. Findings were similar with the control for accepting similar immigrants. For prosocial activity, the β s for benevolence were smaller than those for universalism in 14/17 countries, nine were significant versus 15, and the mean β was .076 versus .129.

When both types of values were jointly entered into the regressions, benevolence values predicted significantly in only 8 of the 80 regressions examined, compared with 65 significant β s for universalism values. These findings clearly support the distinction between universalism and benevolence values. Universalism values express concern for the welfare of the out-group much more than benevolence values do.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

There is high consensus regarding the values people consider moral. However, do they think of these values as applying only to members of the groups with which they identify, or do they also see them as relevant to all others? I labeled variation in the breadth of applying moral values the "inclusiveness of the moral universe." The current research measured moral inclusiveness at the level of societies. The moral universe is more inclusive to the extent that a population understands moral values that can refer to the welfare of all others as distinct from moral values that primarily entail relating to close others.

I identified three correlates that possibly influence the inclusiveness of the moral universe in societies. Inclusiveness is greater in societies whose culture emphasizes egalitarianism (socializing people to recognize one another as moral equals) and whose culture does not emphasize embeddedness (socializing restraint of actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity). Moral inclusiveness is also greater in societies whose political system is more democratic. This probably reflects reciprocal causality.

Future research might examine the historical sources of moral inclusiveness. In addition to the sources noted here, preliminary analyses suggest that moral inclusiveness is higher in western Europe and in countries that have ruled their own territory over the past 150 years, countries that are more religiously heterogeneous, and in ex-communist countries. The latter finding is also evident in Table 1. Analyses of value meanings in eight former communist countries in the first half of the 1990s are relevant. Bardi and Schwartz (1996) observed that equality, social justice, and world at peace, three sociopolitical value items that ordinarily express universalism values, had a meaning close to conformity values in these countries. They suggest that this meaning shift reflected the experience of life under regimes that regularly invoked these terms to justify their authority, thereby emptying them of their usual meanings.

One probable consequence of moral inclusiveness is that people in societies with a more inclusive universe perceive immigration to their country as having more positive and less negative impacts on the economy, jobs, cultural life, crime, and so on. Moral inclusiveness at the national level may also have implications for various policy issues. For example, inclusiveness of the moral universe is likely to affect asylum policy, foreign aid policy, support for humanitarian and civil rights organizations, and readiness to relieve the debts of Third-World countries.

It seems self-evident that individuals who attribute much importance to universalism values such as justice, equality, broadmindedness, and world peace will show more understanding and compassion toward others who are different or weak. Our research reveals,

however, that this is often not the case. A crucial moderator of the associations of universalism values is the way the prevailing culture defines the boundaries of the moral universe.

Where the culture defines the moral universe as including those of different racial, ethnic, religious, and other groups, universalism values apply to strangers. In such cultures, the current research has shown, attributing importance to universalism values predicts accepting immigrants and perceiving their impact on society as positive, as well as humanitarian and ecological behavior. Where the culture defines the moral universe as narrow, universalism values apply primarily to the in-group; so people who espouse such values may well ignore or be callous to the well-being of members of out-groups. Excluding others from one's moral universe justifies ignoring their needs. Perceiving them as threatening justifies dehumanizing and rejecting them.

This study supports the distinction between universalism and benevolence values in the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992). Both these types of values refer to transcending self-interest and promoting the welfare of others. The relatively weak relations of benevolence values to the three variables predicted in Study 3 confirm that many people in a large number of societies do not understand benevolence values as applying to those beyond their in-groups. When they say it is important to be helpful, honest, and forgiving, they often do not mean helpful, honest, and forgiving to outsiders and members of other ethnic or religious groups. In contrast, the stronger, consistent relations of universalism values to the three variables studied here suggest that when many people in societies high in moral inclusiveness say that equality and justice are important to them, they are thinking of equality and justice for the poor, the weak, and those who are different from themselves. Of course, for some people in all societies, equality and justice apply only to their in-groups. These people constitute a larger proportion of the population in societies low in moral inclusiveness.

Expanding one's moral universe to be more inclusive is not always looked upon as good. We are likely to label as saints, fools, or even traitors those who include people from beyond the boundaries normatively sanctioned in our society. The label depends on whether prevailing opinion views those who are included as good or harmless, dangerous or evil. For example, many Israelis and Palestinians label as foolish or worse those who meet unofficially to work together as partners in promoting peace. And some Europeans condemn as misguided or worse political leaders who call for tolerance toward Moslems and acceptance of the *nijab* (facial veil) for women.

This article introduced the concept of *inclusiveness of our moral universe* as a characteristic of societies. I employed an indirect technique for measuring the degree of inclusiveness, inferring it from the pattern of associations between universalism value items and other moral values, across the members of a group. A challenge for future research is to develop more direct methods to measure inclusiveness of the moral universe. This is desirable to measure not only the prevailing boundaries of moral inclusiveness in societies but also moral inclusiveness as a characteristic of individuals. Moreover, future research can apply the concept of *moral inclusiveness* to additional, socially important attitudes and behaviors.

NOTES

1. To assess how well a similarity structure analysis (SSA) projection supports a theory, one first encloses regions that contain the a priori, theory-based markers of each construct. One then draws partition lines between these regions. Straight partition lines do not differ mathematically from curved partition lines.

2. It is less plausible to interpret the intermixing of universalism items with those of the other moral value items as extending the meaning of the latter to include a broad moral universe. Evidence cited below indicates

that where universalism items intermix with other moral values, benevolence values correlate weakly if at all with variables that express concern for the welfare of out-groups.

3. "Inner harmony" which appears in the universalism region in Figure 1 is excluded because it is located with the other universalism items in fewer than 75% of 243 samples I have analyzed.

4. Effects of the level of democratization on the breadth of people's moral universe are unlikely to be immediate. An atmosphere of greater or lesser tolerance for difference and policies to protect diverse groups is likely to require a number of years to influence people's conceptions of who is worthy of inclusion in the moral universe. Democracy levels in 1985 were chosen because they preceded measurement of values in most samples by about a decade.

5. The Hofstede index of cultural individualism/collectivism was not included in these analyses because data were available for only 50 countries. A regression including individualism/collectivism accounted for less variance in moral inclusiveness (46.6%), and individualism/collectivism did not add significantly.

6. The greater variance explained by democratization alone than for the four predictors is due to the adjusted R^2 .

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