

The World Cup, Nationalism, and International Trade

Supplementary Materials

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1 Estimation Methods

To compute the estimated effects in the paper, we followed the standard approach for calculating estimates with randomization inference. Specifically, we found the value that must be subtracted off the treated units' outcomes such that the two-sided p-value approaches 1.00. The treated units here are the pairs of countries that played at the World Cup. The value that brought the p-value to approximately 1.00 was 4.3 percentage points. To get the percent change from baseline, we divided this value by the average outcome from the re-randomizations (percent of pairs of countries that experienced a drop in trade). This produced the 12.0% figure from the paper. we used the same procedures to get the estimate for pairs where soccer was the most popular sport for both countries, except using that subsample of the data only.

This approach accounts for the fact that about 5.1% of the countries that were not assigned to play in the group stage of the World Cup met in the knockout stage. This is essentially a one-way non-compliance problem that can be handled by treating group-stage assignment as a very strong instrument for whether countries played at the World Cup. A detailed explanation of how this type of problem is addressed can be found in the 2005 article by Imbens and Rosenbaum on randomization inference in the instrumental variable context (32). We will summarize the logic behind their procedure as follows. If the World Cup only consisted of a group stage (so no non-compliance), then deriving estimates would only involve finding the value to subtract off the outcomes of the pairs that played each other in the group stage such that the two-sided p-value was approximately 1.00. However, because the knockout stage created a 5.1% non-compliance problem, we must find the value to subtract off the outcomes of the pairs of countries that played *in either the group stage or knockout stage* that makes the two-sided p-value approximately 1.00. This value is the one reported in the paper—4.3 percentage points (or 12.0% from baseline) or 6.1 percentage points (or 17.1% from baseline) for pairs where soccer is the most popular sport for both countries.

2 World Cup Groups

The following pages show the World Cup pots and groups. The 1930, 1950, 2002, and 2006 World Cups had slightly more complicated randomization procedures. We took these more complex formats into account when we conducted the 10,000 re-randomizations. Also, the 1934 and 1938 World Cups did not feature a group stage, but the first round of the knockout stage pitted countries against each other that were randomly drawn from two pots. We counted this first knockout stage round as a miniature group stage where each group had two countries.

Fig. S1. Pots and Groups for the 1930 World Cup

Pots for the 1930 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2
Brazil	Bolivia
Argentina	Chile
Uruguay	Yugoslavia
United States	France
	Romania
	Belgium
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Mexico

Groups for the 1930 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Argentina	Yugoslavia	Uruguay	United States
Chile	Brazil	Romania	Paraguay
France	Bolivia	Peru	Belgium
Mexico			

Note: For the first World Cup, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States were put in one pot, and the remaining participants were randomly selected to make groups with these four countries.

Fig. S2. Pots and Groups for the 1934 World Cup

Pots for the 1934 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2
Argentina	United States
Brazil	Spain
Germany	France
Italy	Egypt
Netherlands	Romania
Austria	Switzerland
Czechoslovakia	Belgium
Hungary	Sweden

Groups for the 1934 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Italy	Spain	Austria	Hungary
United States	Brazil	France	Egypt
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Czechoslovakia	Switzerland	Germany	Sweden
Romania	Netherlands	Belgium	Argentina

Note: For the second World Cup, there was no official group stage. The participants from Pot 1 were randomly assigned competitors from Pot 2, and the resulting pairs played in the first round of the knockout stage. However, given this random assignment, the first round of the knockout stage can essentially be thought of as a miniature group stage and analyzed in the same way as before.

Fig. S3. Pots and Groups for the 1938 World Cup

Pots for the 1938 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2
Germany	Belgium
France	Switzerland
Italy	Dutch East Indies
Czechoslovakia	Netherlands
Hungary	Norway
Cuba	Poland
Brazil	Romania
Austria (withdrew)	Sweden

Groups for the 1938 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Italy	France	Brazil	Czechoslovakia
Norway	Belgium	Poland	Netherlands
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Hungary	Switzerland	Sweden	Cuba
Dutch East Indies	Germany	Austria (withdrew)	Romania

Note: The format of the 1938 World Cup was the same as for the 1934 World Cup.

Fig. S4. Pots and Groups for the 1950 World Cup

Pots for the 1950 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Brazil	England	Sweden	Uruguay
Mexico	Spain	Italy	France (withdrew)
Yugoslavia	Chile	Paraguay	Bolivia
Switzerland	United States	India (withdrew)	

Groups for the 1950 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Brazil	Spain	Sweden	Uruguay
Yugoslavia	England	Italy	Bolivia
Switzerland	Chile	Paraguay	France (withdrew)
Mexico	United States	India (withdrew)	

Fig. S5. Pots and Groups for the 1954 World Cup

Pots for the 1954 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Switzerland	Austria	France	Belgium
Uruguay	England	Italy	Mexico
Brazil	West Germany	Czechoslovakia	South Korea
Hungary	Yugoslavia	Turkey	Scotland

Groups for the 1954 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Brazil	Hungary	Uruguay	England
Yugoslavia	West Germany	Austria	Switzerland
France	Turkey	Czechoslovakia	Italy
Mexico	South Korea	Scotland	Belgium

Fig. S6. Pots and Groups for the 1958 World Cup

Pots for the 1958 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Sweden	Czechoslovakia	England	Argentina
West Germany	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Brazil
Austria	Soviet Union	Scotland	Mexico
France	Yugoslavia	Wales	Paraguay

Groups for the 1958 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
West Germany	France	Sweden	Brazil
Northern Ireland	Yugoslavia	Wales	Soviet Union
Czechoslovakia	Paraguay	Hungary	England
Argentina	Scotland	Mexico	Austria

Fig. S7. Pots and Groups for the 1962 World Cup

Pots for the 1962 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Chile	Czechoslovakia	Italy	Bulgaria
Brazil	England	Hungary	Colombia
Argentina	Soviet Union	Spain	Mexico
Uruguay	West Germany	Yugoslavia	Switzerland

Groups for the 1962 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Soviet Union	West Germany	Brazil	Hungary
Yugoslavia	Chile	Czechoslovakia	England
Uruguay	Italy	Mexico	Argentina
Colombia	Switzerland	Spain	Bulgaria

Fig. S8. Pots and Groups for the 1966 World Cup

Pots for the 1966 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Brazil	England	France	Bulgaria
Argentina	Hungary	Portugal	North Korea
Chile	Soviet Union	Spain	Mexico
Uruguay	West Germany	Italy	Switzerland

Groups for the 1966 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
England	West Germany	Portugal	Soviet Union
Uruguay	Argentina	Hungary	North Korea
Mexico	Spain	Brazil	Italy
France	Switzerland	Bulgaria	Chile

Fig. S9. Pots and Groups for the 1970 World Cup

Pots for the 1970 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
England	Brazil	Belgium	El Salvador
Italy	Mexico	Bulgaria	Israel
Soviet Union	Peru	Czechoslovakia	Morocco
West Germany	Uruguay	Sweden	Romania

Groups for the 1970 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Soviet Union	Italy	Brazil	West Germany
Mexico	Uruguay	England	Peru
Belgium	Sweden	Romania	Bulgaria
El Salvador	Israel	Czechoslovakia	Morocco

Fig. S10. Pots and Groups for the 1974 World Cup

Pots for the 1974 World Cup			
Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
West Germany	Bulgaria	Brazil	Australia
Italy	East Germany	Argentina	Haiti
Netherlands	Poland	Chile	Sweden
Scotland	Yugoslavia	Uruguay	Zaire

Groups for the 1974 World Cup			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
East Germany	Yugoslavia	Netherlands	Poland
West Germany	Brazil	Sweden	Argentina
Chile	Scotland	Bulgaria	Italy
Australia	Zaire	Uruguay	Haiti

Fig. S11. Pots and Groups for the 1978 World Cup

Pots for the 1978 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Argentina	Italy	Hungary	Austria
West Germany	Sweden	Poland	France
Netherlands	Mexico	Scotland	Iran
Brazil	Peru	Spain	Tunisia

Groups for the 1978 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Italy	Poland	Austria	Peru
Argentina	West Germany	Brazil	Netherlands
France	Tunisia	Spain	Scotland
Hungary	Mexico	Sweden	Iran

Fig. S12. Pots and Groups for the 1982 World Cup

Pots for the 1982 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Spain	Austria	Belgium	Algeria
Argentina	Czechoslovakia	France	Cameroon
Brazil	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Kuwait
England	Poland	Scotland	El Salvador
Italy	Soviet Union	Chile	Honduras
West Germany	Yugoslavia	Peru	New Zealand

Groups for the 1982 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
Poland	West Germany	Belgium	England	Northern Ireland	Brazil
Italy	Austria	Argentina	France	Spain	Soviet Union
Cameroon	Algeria	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	Yugoslavia	Scotland
Peru	Chile	El Salvador	Kuwait	Honduras	New Zealand

Fig. S13. Pots and Groups for the 1986 World Cup

Pots for the 1986 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Mexico	England	Algeria	Belgium
Italy	Soviet Union	Canada	Bulgaria
West Germany	Argentina	Denmark	Hungary
Poland	Spain	Iraq	Northern Ireland
France	Paraguay	Morocco	Portugal
Brazil	Uruguay	South Korea	Scotland

Groups for the 1986 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
Argentina	Mexico	Soviet Union	Brazil	Denmark	Morocco
Italy	Paraguay	France	Spain	West Germany	England
Bulgaria	Belgium	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Uruguay	Poland
South Korea	Iraq	Canada	Algeria	Scotland	Portugal

Fig. S14. Pots and Groups for the 1990 World Cup

Pots for the 1990 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Italy	Cameroon	Colombia	Austria
Argentina	Costa Rica	Czechoslovakia	Netherlands
Brazil	Egypt	Ireland	Scotland
West Germany	South Korea	Romania	Spain
Belgium	United Arab Emirates	Sweden	Soviet Union
England	United States	Uruguay	Yugoslavia

Groups for the 1990 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
Italy	Cameroon	Brazil	West Germany	Spain	England
Czechoslovakia	Romania	Costa Rica	Yugoslavia	Belgium	Ireland
Austria	Argentina	Scotland	Colombia	Uruguay	Netherlands
United States	Soviet Union	Sweden	United Arab Emirates	South Korea	Egypt

Fig. S15. Pots and Groups for the 1994 World Cup

Pots for the 1994 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Italy	Bulgaria	Greece	Cameroon
Germany	Ireland	Norway	Morocco
Argentina	Netherlands	Sweden	Nigeria
Belgium	Romania	Switzerland	Bolivia
Brazil	Spain	South Korea	Colombia
Italy	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Mexico

Groups for the 1994 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
United States	Brazil	Germany	Argentina	Italy	Belgium
Romania	Russia	Spain	Bulgaria	Ireland	Netherlands
Switzerland	Sweden	South Korea	Greece	Norway	Saudi Arabia
Colombia	Cameroon	Bolivia	Nigeria	Mexico	Morocco

Fig. S16. Pots and Groups for the 1998 World Cup

Pots for the 1998 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
France	Austria	Chile	Cameroon
Brazil	Belgium	Colombia	Jamaica
Argentina	Bulgaria	Iran	Mexico
Germany	Croatia	Japan	Morocco
Italy	Denmark	Paraguay	Nigeria
Netherlands	England	Saudi Arabia	South Africa
Romania	Scotland	South Korea	Tunisia
Spain	Yugoslavia		United States
	Norway		

Groups for the 1998 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Brazil	Italy	France	Nigeria
Norway	Chile	Denmark	Paraguay
Morocco	Austria	South Africa	Spain
Scotland	Cameroon	Saudi Arabia	Bulgaria
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Netherlands	Germany	Romania	Argentina
Mexico	Yugoslavia	England	Croatia
Belgium	Iran	Colombia	Jamaica
South Korea	United States	Tunisia	Japan

Note: The final team from Pot 2 was drawn into one of the two groups that did not already have two European teams (either Brazil or Argentina's group).

Fig. S17. Pots and Groups for the 2002 World Cup

Pots for the 2002 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Argentina	Belgium	China	Cameroon
Brazil	Croatia	Ecuador	Costa Rica
France	Denmark	Paraguay	Mexico
Germany	England	Saudi Arabia	Nigeria
Italy	Poland	Uruguay	Senegal
Japan	Portugal		South Africa
South Korea	Ireland		Tunisia
Spain	Russia		United States
	Slovenia		
	Sweden		
	Turkey		

Groups for the 2002 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Denmark	Spain	Brazil	South Korea
Senegal	Paraguay	Turkey	United States
Uruguay	South Africa	Costa Rica	Portugal
France	Slovenia	China	Poland
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Germany	Sweden	Mexico	Japan
Ireland	England	Italy	Belgium
Cameroon	Argentina	Croatia	Russia
Saudi Arabia	Nigeria	Ecuador	Tunisia

Note: The last three teams in Pot 2 were drawn into three of the four groups which did not already have two European teams. Also, no unseeded South American team could be in the same group as Brazil or Argentina and no unseeded Asian team could be in the same group as South Korea or Japan.

Fig. S18. Pots and Groups for the 2006 World Cup

Pots for the 2006 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4	Pot 5
Argentina	Angola	Croatia	Costa Rica	Serbia and Montenegro
Brazil	Australia	Czech Republic	Iran	
England	Ecuador	Netherlands	Japan	
France	Ghana	Poland	Saudi Arabia	
Germany	Ivory Coast	Portugal	South Korea	
Italy	Paraguay	Sweden	Trinidad	
Mexico	Togo	Switzerland	United States	
Spain	Tunisia	Ukraine		

Groups for the 2006 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Germany	England	Argentina	Portugal
Ecuador	Sweden	Netherlands	Mexico
Poland	Paraguay	Ivory Coast	Angola
Costa Rica	Trinidad and Tobago	Serbia and Montenegro	Iran
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Italy	Brazil	Switzerland	Spain
Ghana	Australia	France	Ukraine
Czech Republic	Croatia	South Korea	Tunisia
United States	Japan	Togo	Saudi Arabia

Note: To ensure that no pot had three European teams, Serbia and Montenegro was put in a special pot and drawn first with one country from Pot 2, one country from Pot 3, and one of the three non-European teams from Pot 1 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico).

Fig. S19. Pots and Groups for the 2010 World Cup

Pots for the 2010 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
South Africa	Australia	Algeria	Denmark
Brazil	Japan	Cameroon	France
Spain	North Korea	Ghana	Greece
Netherlands	South Korea	Ivory Coast	Portugal
Italy	Spain	Nigeria	Serbia
Germany	Mexico	Chile	Slovakia
Argentina	United States	Paraguay	Slovenia
England	New Zealand	Uruguay	Switzerland

Groups for the 2010 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Uruguay	Argentina	United States	Germany
Mexico	South Korea	England	Ghana
South Africa	Greece	Slovenia	Australia
France	Nigeria	Algeria	Serbia
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
Netherlands	Paraguay	Brazil	Spain
Japan	Slovakia	Portugal	Chile
Denmark	New Zealand	Ivory Coast	Switzerland
Cameroon	Italy	North Korea	Honduras

Fig. S20. Pots and Groups for the 2014 World Cup

Pots for the 2014 World Cup

Pot 1	Pot 2	Pot 3	Pot 4
Brazil	Algeria	Australia	Portugal
Argentina	Cameroon	Iran	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Colombia	Ghana	Japan	Croatia
Uruguay	Ivory Coast	South Korea	England
Belgium	Nigeria	Costa Rica	France
Germany	Chile	Honduras	Greece
Spain	Ecuador	Mexico	Netherlands
Switzerland	Italy	United States	Russia

Groups for the 2014 World Cup

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Brazil	Netherlands	Colombia	Costa Rica
Mexico	Chile	Greece	Uruguay
Croatia	Spain	Ivory Coast	Italy
Cameroon	Australia	Japan	England
Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8
France	Argentina	Germany	Belgium
Switzerland	Nigeria	United States	Algeria
Ecuador	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Portugal	Russia
Honduras	Iran	Ghana	South Korea


Table S1. Comparing the Alternative Randomizations to the Real Randomization

Covariate	Average from Alternative Randomizations	Actual Value	p-value
Iron and Steel Difference	21,201	21,086	0.822
Military Expenditure Difference	30,888,201	31,844,141	0.255
Military Personal Difference	387	385	0.876
Total Population Difference	61,835	62,298	0.758
Urban Population Difference	25,986	25,785	0.708
Independence Year Difference	0.14	0.13	0.119
Both Democracies	0.43	0.44	0.432
Both Non-democracies	0.13	0.13	0.595
Contiguous	0.059	0.053	0.519
Alliance Year Before	81	78	0.427
Total Military Disputes Year Before	0.92	4	0.125
Minimum Distance	354	378	0.455
Distance Between Capital Cities	6,744	7,116	0.004
Trade Drop Year Before	0.45	0.46	0.434
Trade Drop 2 Years Before	0.36	0.35	0.415
Trade Drop 3 Years Before	0.33	0.31	0.351
Trade Drop 4 Years Before	0.32	0.29	0.113
Trade Drop 5 Years Before	0.43	0.44	0.594
Trade Drop 6 Years Before	0.33	0.35	0.421
Trade Drop 7 Years Before	0.31	0.33	0.569
Trade Drop 8 Years Before	0.34	0.35	0.761
Trade Drop 9 Years Before	0.39	0.40	0.570

3 Balance on Baseline Covariates

The above table shows how similar the alternative randomizations were to the actual randomization. Basically, we just want to make sure that the actual randomization looked similar to most of the potential randomizations. If not, then it would suggest that the real randomization was not actually random (because FIFA rigged the draws in some way) or that it was random but turned out very atypical because of some fluke. However, the comparison above indicates that the real randomization looked pretty normal. There is only one significant difference, which is about what would be expected by chance. Moreover, the real randomization looked pretty similar to the alternative randomizations when it comes to the previous outcome—drops in trade in the previous years. Therefore, the real randomization looks to have been pretty random.

Fig. S21. Results after Controlling for Baseline Factors



4 Robustness Checks

4.1 Controlling for Baseline Covariates

The two histograms above show the results after controlling for the baseline factors from the balance plot. This was done by first using the 10,000 alternative randomizations to create a model that predicts what percentage of countries would experience a drop in trade based on the baseline covariates. After this model was created, the residuals from the alternative randomizations were compared to the residual for the real randomization. If the effect found in the paper was being driven by a baseline difference between the real randomization and the alternative randomizations (say distance between capital cities), then the effect should disappear after controlling for the baseline factors in this way. However, the graphs above show that the results easily pass this test.

Table S2. Changing the Time Frame for Baseline Trade Levels (All Pairs)

Years	Estimated Effect (Percentage Points)	Estimated Effect (Percent from Baseline)	p-value
1	4.1%*	11.1%*	0.030
2	4.1%*	19.1%*	0.018
3	4.5%*	17.2%*	0.010
4	4.4%*	15.3%*	0.017
5	3.4%*	11.7%*	0.048

Table S3. Changing the Time Frame for Baseline Trade Levels (Soccer Pairs)

Years	Estimated Effect (Percentage Points)	Estimated Effect (Percent from Baseline)	p-value
1	5.7%*	15.4%*	0.010
2	4.0%*	18.2%*	0.033
3	5.3%**	20.1%**	0.007
4	5.3%*	18.5%*	0.010
5	4.8%*	16.4%*	0.018

4.2 Changing Time Frame for Baseline Trade Levels

In the paper, we coded countries as experiencing a drop in trade if their level of trade in the World Cup year was less than their level of trade in the previous year. However, the above graphs show that the results are very robust to using other specifications for baseline trade.

5 Data Sources

The data for trade was taken from the Trade dataset (v4.0) from the Correlates of War database (19, 20). It can be downloaded [here](#). The data on iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, total population, and urban population are also available in the Correlates of War database, in the National Material Capabilities dataset (v5.0), available [here](#) (33). The data on military disputes was taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (v4.1), available [here](#) (34). The data on democracy comes from the Polity IV dataset, available [here](#) (35). The data on state independence year was obtained from the State Membership (v2016) dataset in the Correlates of War database, available [here](#) (36). The data on which countries are contiguous is provided in the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity dataset (v3.2), available [here](#) (37). The data on the minimum distance between countries and the distance between capital cities was taken from the Gleditsch and Ward datasets, available [here](#) and [here](#) (38).

As a robustness check, we also tested whether the results held for an alternative trade dataset. The one we found that had the most country-years covered was the CEPII TradeHist dataset (39). The results held for pairs where soccer was the most popular sport for both countries ($n=429$, $p=0.033$), but they were not quite significant for all pairs ($n=486$, $p=0.184$)

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