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European Transfigurations—Eurafrica and Eurasia: Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy Revisited

THORSTEN BOTZ-BORNSTEIN

ABSTRACT The Eurasianist movement launched a theory according to which Russia does not belong to Europe but forms, together with its Asian colonies, a separate continent named “Eurasia” whose Eastern border is the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, in the early 1920s, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-European movement, developed, the idea of “Eurafrica.” I compare the writings of Coudenhove and those of Nicolas S. Trubetzkoy and show how the idea of Europe was used as an anti-essentialist model of a cultural community. Though both “Eurasia” and “Eurafrica” may be understood to express cultural and economic imperialism, the sophistication with which both concepts are brought forward makes their interpretation as simple derivatives of chauvinism impossible. Both Trubetzkoy and Coudenhove refuse national “egocentricity” which “destroys every form of cultural communication between human beings.” Above that, Trubetzkoy and Coudenhove agree that cultural apogees have often come about through fusion. I discuss the idea of “convergence” in the context of Bergson’s and Deleuze’s biophilosophies.

INTRODUCTION

In the present article, I intend to show how in the 1920s the idea of Europe was used to form an anti-essentialist model of a cultural community. In 1921, the so-called Eurasianist movement launched a theory according to which Russia does not belong to Europe but forms, together with its Asian colonies, a separate continent named “Eurasia” whose Eastern border is the Pacific Ocean. In the early 1920s, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) founded the so-called Pan-European movement, which, though it had been widely neglected among the European Union’s fathers and sank into oblivion since the 1950s, must be considered as a kind of grass roots movement for the EU. In 1929, Coudenhove coined the term “Eurafrica” as an extended version of Europe supposed to include also the European colonies. According to Coudenhove, Europe stretches from Angola to Spitzbergen and the Mediterranean should be seen as Europe’s axis and not as its border.

Though both “Eurasianism” and “Eurafricanism” have to face charges of cultural and economic imperialism, the strikingly high degree of sophistication with which both concepts are brought forward makes their interpretation as simple derivatives of...
chauvinism impossible. In principle, Eurasianist and Pan-European ideas are “idealistic” and far removed from cynical geopolitical constructions. Many points that both the Eurasianist and Coudenhove make about cultural self-determination or about the relative character of borders, for example, are still interesting today.

I compare the writings of Coudenhove and those of one of the main representatives of Eurasianism: Nicolas S. Trubetzkoy (1890–1938), who is best known as a linguist, one of the founding fathers of phonology, and an important representative of the Prague Circle, but whose culturological writings have began to attract scholarly interest. Finally, I want to show that Trubetzkoy’s and Coudenhove’s ideas manifest parallels with regard to a “conversionist” conception of culture. Both develop a paradoxical conceptual linking of openness and closedness, of self-awareness and awareness of the other, through which they manage to establish an alternative that transcends both particularism and universalism. Both avoid defining “civilizations” in an essentialist way as self-sufficient and egocentric entities but point, in a more constructivist vein, to the dependence of human communities on the contact with the “outer” world.

Some biographical parallels between Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy are also striking. Both were born in the early 1890s, both were aristocrats, both had to emigrate, both lived in Vienna, and both led their lives within the tension between Eastern and Western Europe as well as between totalitarianism and humanism. Both thinkers remained conservative throughout their lives but cultivated a sort of humanism sensitive to social questions. Further, one can note a similarity in their style of writing: though engaging in questions of what we would today call cultural anthropology, neither of them had been formally educated as an anthropologist. Their writings are inspired by a few fundamental ideas and are “populist” in the broadest sense of the term.

Certainly, the Eurasianist position is anti-European. The Eurasianists interpret the Revolution of 1917 as the point when Russia left the European world. This is a highly provocative position since throughout the nineteenth century Russians considered their country as European, which view few Europeans would have contested. Russians considered themselves to be Europeans especially after 1700, as Nicolas Riasanovsky affirms: “they immediately and consistently, and without exception proceeded to consider themselves and their country as a part of the single body of Europe and European culture.” Still, by calling their movement “Eurasian,” the Eurasianists make an indirect statement about the identity of Europe.

Some words need to be said about Pan-Slavism. The straightforward heading “Pan-Europeanism and Pan-Slavism” would have offered a more manageable parallelism because both terms have certain things in common. Both aimed to bring together through a “Pan-” (Greek: “all”) movement, people of one civilizational group that were until then divided. In the 1820s, the Slovak students Jan Kollar and Pavel Josef Safarik transformed German Romantic nationalism into Slav nationalism. Pan-Slavism represented a mixture of nationalist and supra-nationalist elements developed by non-Russian Slavs who felt the need for cooperation. In the Western-Slav countries, it remained the work of poets and intellectuals to give ideological shape to the nations though around 1860, Pan-Slavism also became a subject of interest in Russia. However, in many ways Pan-Slavism exemplifies the kind of closed cultural essentialism that Coudenhove’s Pan-Europeanism intended to avoid, as did Eurasianism.
EURASIANISM

The representatives of Eurasianism are Nicolas S. Trubetzkoy, the geographer Pétr Nikolaevitch Savitzky, the renowned orthodox theologian Georgy V. Florovsky, the musicologist Pétr P. Suvchinsky, and the legal scholar Nicolai N. Alekseev. Eurasianism can be considered as a truly intellectual development of Pan-Slavism and Slavophilism, purging the latter two of imperialist connotations. Its intellectual variety is impressive. Being critical of Marx’s reduction of history to class struggle, Eurasianists focus on questions concerning society or the formation of the state. Their work embraces three main fields: geography-economics, jurisprudence and state theory, and spiritual-cultural matters. Their general tendency is to emphasize religious and metaphysical questions, which enables them to establish Russia (like Byzantium) as an amalgam of European and Asian elements, and to see the existence of “Slavic culture” as a myth. Their theories adopt “organic” tones well-known since the Slavophiles and Pan-Slavism, as well as a critique of Western philosophy. Curiously, their rather conservative thoughts are combined with distinctly progressive ideas about the organization of a multicultural state as laid out by the economist Petr Struve, as well as with impressive degrees of cultural relativism and anti-colonialism.

In spite of this conservative and paternalist background, it is possible to see in the Eurasianist writings an “early post-modernist strain,” because the identification of Eurasia as a localized culture pushes the very opposition East-West towards cultural conversion or transculturalism. This is all the more apparent in Trubetzkoy’s eminently culturological writings. In no case can Eurasianism be reduced to either ideocracy or dictatorship. The Eurasianist motive for Russia’s separation from Europe was not nationalism but the insistence on cultural affinities between Russians and Asians.

THE PAN-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND “EURAFRICA”

The Eurasianist suggestions represent an unexpected step in Russian civilization: the fact that persons, who do not seem to have any reason to consider themselves Asians, identify themselves in an outspoken way with Scythians and Mongols makes the Eurasianist case unique. Coudenhove, the father of Pan-Europeanism, however, does not embrace cultural relativism in the same way as Trubetzkoy does. For the Pan-European movement, the “Europeanization” of Africa, and of other regions should they enter the Pan-European community (like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan), is an absolute condition for the coherence of Europe as a geopolitical and cultural body. At the same time, “Europeanization” is not as absolute as it appears to be.

The theoretical writings about Pan-Europeanism are found in Coudenhove’s book Europa erwacht (1934), and in his later books in which many of the initial claims were developed. He chose the name “Paneurope” for his movement not to imitate nationalist movements like Pan-Asianism, which degenerated into more or less cynical forms of state-imperialism, but, as he explains,

I chose the name “Paneurope” because I wanted to avoid giving the impression of intending to create a centralist European federal state following the American model, but first [I wanted to create] only a European counterpart of the “Pan-American
Union,” which unites the American double-continent into a loose community of sovereign states (PE, 58).

This does not mean that Coudenhove was unaware of Pan-Asianism. As a matter of fact, he first interpreted Pan-Asianism as the formation of an economic power-block: “In Asia, the Mongolian race is today united under Japan’s leadership. This state block will comprise and organize one quarter of humanity” (Ee, 39). To some extent, the Pan-European movement is shaped through such geopolitical considerations. However, while geopolitical concerns are present in Coudenhove’s writings, we do not find any geopolitical theory. Given that such theories were very fashionable in the 1920s and 1930s, this is astonishing. Many of those who approved the idea of Paneurope in Germany were hastening towards a revision of the Versailles-Treaty. As Charles-Robert Ageron has noted:

Ceux qui s’exprimaient dans la revue Zeitschrift für Geopolitik s’attachaient surtout au côté démonstratif du projet eurafricain, parfait exemple de Grossraum Idee, selon le général Karl Haushofer, théoricien connu de la géopolitique. D’autres comme le Dr Schacht, lié à la fois au milieu des industriels travaillant pour l’exportation et aux commerçants coloniaux, pensaient surtout à l’Eurafrique en termes de marchés économiques et de sources de matières premières.9

Also in Japan, the Pan-Asian house-ideologist of the government, Masamichi Romaya, formulated the concept of “Greater East Asian Regionalism” in an outspoken way with the help of Karl Haushofer’s thoughts (1869–1946);10 but for Coudenhove such references are not central at all. His Eurafrika, as Ageron writes, “était d’inspiration libérale et ne récelait aucune arrière-pensée nationaliste” (451). Central for Coudenhove is the common-sensical insight that Europe must unite in order to play a leading role on the international scene.

Coudenhove’s idea of “Eurafrica” as a geopolitical body appears for the first time in Europa erwacht! and in the 1929 issues of Paneuropa. The multilateral relationship between six European states and their dependencies overseas was officially called “Eurafrica” until 1973.11 Like the Eurasianists, Coudenhove excels in the division of “world culture” into different groups fighting for hegemony. Even in 1971 (one year before his death) he divides the world into Europe, Arabia, India, China, and Japan (WE, 68). Interestingly, the miscarriage of Pan-Asianism allows Japan and China to again appear as two separate groups; “Africa,” on the other hand, does not appear at all. Coudenhove’s 1929 replacement of Europe with Eurafrica was thus meant to strengthen Europe’s position within the geopolitical game and signified the “key to world politics” (Ee, 23). Still it would be wrong, as Anssi Kristian Kulberg affirms, to reduce Coudenhove’s Paneurope to a simple geopolitical device:

Considering Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropean vision as a mere geopolitical construction manifesting “petty-bourgeois”, “white”, or even “racist” European hegemony over other geopolitical regions (Kövics), or seeing it as a primarily anti-socialist project (Tuomainen) seems rather a purposeful misinterpretation of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s moralist view, as does the criticism directed against the Paneuropeans in the interwar period by Italian and German nationalists who, like Count von Lerchenfeld (archenemy of Paneuropeanism), saw the Paneuropean
movement as a conspiracy of Vienna-based Jews and Freemasons... The Paneuropean vision is not based on just a vision of a united Europe, but on a strong vision of how the united Europe should be constructed upon the basic values of liberty and non-violence.12

The Eurasianists, on the other hand, were fascinated by geopolitics. This, however, was such an old fashioned geopolitics that it could hardly be taken seriously at the time (though Hitler and Stalin later believed in it).13 The Eurasians took much interest in the analyses of Sir Halford John Mackinder, a British geographer who wrote in his 1904 essay “The Geographical Pivot of History” that the control of Eastern Europe is vital to anyone who wants to control the world.

The Eurasianists used Mackinder’s ideas to establish the existence of Eurasia, but not because they had any ambitions “to control the world.” It comes as a bad coincidence that the refounder of the Eurasian Movement, Alexander Dugin, appears as a nationalist geopolititian and also calls his movement “radical traditionalism.”14 Opposed to this, Trubetzkoy’s interests were purely culturological and far removed from geopolitical ambitions of any kind.

Like Eurasianism, Coudenhove’s Pan–Europeanism refrains from forced political unification, which is what distinguishes these movements from fascism and bolshevism. Although the ideal of Pan–Europe was inspired by geopolitical interest in terms of foreign policy, on an internal level, European unification was not supposed to be enforced in a pragmatic, authoritarian fashion. Until the end, the unification of Europe remained a matter of idealism. Europe as a cultural unity was for Coudenhove not so much a matter of political, historical, or racial identification, but a matter of morals and of style. Together with Roman law and the Christian religion, he puts forward “the lifestyle of the true gentleman” as the most important typically “European” characteristics. From there he concludes that education (Bildung) is not only a matter of the mind but of the personality.

The “personalist” tones that are so striking in all of Coudenhove’s works were very common in Russia at the time. Trubetzkoy, like the naturalist Danilevsky, the Pan–Slavist Kireevsky, the religious philosopher Pavel Florovsky (not to be confused with the Eurasianist George Florovsky), Berdiaev and Karsavin, was a personalist philosopher who tried to discover a hidden, immediately functioning principle in culture capable of unifying the individual and his/her environment in their personality. For Trubetzkoy, personalism was the basis for the emergence of human individuality in every society.

The question is: to what extent was this also true for Eurafrica? In other words, was Eurafrica a model of domination or of cooperation? For Liliana Ellena, Eurafrica symbolizes the Europeanization and exploitation of Africa. In the new European Empire “the knowledge of individual empires should become European knowledge shared among colonising and non-colonising nations.”15 Through Eurafrica, Africa would become the homeland for millions of Europeans for whom the fatherland had become too narrow and the colonies would become the main providers of raw materials for the empire. All this, of course, is purely “imperialist,” but in 1934 how else could Coudenhove have convinced European politicians of the virtues of his brainchild, Eurafrica?

In reality, Coudenhove does not say anything about African culture or about Africans in general (except in one passage in Europa erwacht! where he vaguely suggests
that the Arab population of Africa will probably soon adopt the European way of life [“sich der europäischen Lebensform erschließen,” 220], exactly as the population of Turkey did shortly before). However, if we consider Eurafrica against the background of Coudenhove’s general culturological ideas, it is likely that he would not have opted for radical Europeanization but for an “Eastern spirit–Western technology” method that was also the option of the Eurasianists. Further, given the remarkable emphasis that Coudenhove lays on the notion of “fusion” when it comes to culture, I wonder if a geographical model of convergence does not emerge here as a possibility for cultural formation of Eurafrica.

**Autarky and Nationalism**

Both Trubetzkoy and Coudenhove excel in “conservative” thinking that also foregrounds the idea of “autarky.” In the case of the Eurasianists, this autarky [pravitel ’nitsa] is, as Alexander Antoshchenko says, in the service of “the well-being of the group of peoples inhabiting this particular autarkic world, and provide[s] peoples with the same level of life while preserving the variety of their national cultures.”

Likewise, Coudenhove’s Eurafrica clearly has autarkic traits. He insists that “European colonies can thrive economically only when the European industry prefers their products to British, American, Russian and Japanese products (Ee, 223). All of Eurafrica should be surrounded by a custom wall in order to repulse extra-European economic powers. For the same reason the European nations should engage in a monetary union (Ee, 238).

Both Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy take the autarkic model of the state as a starting point for particular considerations of nationalism as well as of the state management of the cultural identity of national minorities. “Autarky” leads them to a radical questioning of the idea of nationality. Trubetzkoy denies the superiority of European culture and reveals the hypocritical nature of universalism, humanism, and progress as well as the depersonalized character of democracy. However, instead of lazily resorting to general principles like “capitalism” or “socialism,” Trubetzkoy attempts to fundamentally rethink the meaning of national self-determination. Avoiding cultural essentialism in the form of a celebration of the “natural culture,” Trubetzkoy suggests a spatio-temporal approach that transgresses the limits of “national character studies” in the sense of a *Kulturtypenlehre*.

Coudenhove also insists, in several works, on the impossibility of defining an individual “nationality.” The notion of nationality (Nationalbegriff) varies constantly (Ee, 251), and one person can be subject to several nationalisms at a time. Nationalism, on the other hand, is the product of a bourgeois semi-culture as Coudenhove writes: “Just as aristocrats nourished their self-esteem through the disdain of the bourgeois, so the bourgeois began using the newly discovered nationalism in order to thoroughly despise all other nations. In some way, every nation sees itself as the chosen people, as Grande Nation, as the salt of the earth” (Ee, 251).

Trubetzkoy calls this kind of nationalism the “nationalism of petty conceit.” It has nothing to do with the awareness of one’s own belonging to a certain culture but functions in the service of chauvinism:

The term “national self-determination,” which proponents of this type of nationalism like to use, especially when they belong to one of the “small nation,” can lead only
to confusion. Actually there is nothing “national” and no “self-determination” whatever in this set of attitudes, and this is why national liberation movements often incorporate socialism, which always contains elements of cosmopolitanism and internationalism.19

Both Trubetzkoy and Coudenhove reject national “egocentricity” which “destroys every form of cultural communication between human beings.” Egocentricity can hide behind “cosmopolitanism” that is no more than a kind of chauvinist universalism attempting to dominate the others. “The culture that ought to dominate the world…turns out to be the culture of the very same ethnographic-anthropological group whose supremacy is the lodestar of the chauvinist’s dreams,” writes Trubetzkoy in “Europe and Mankind” (5). “With regard to Eurasia this means that the nationalism of every individual people of Eurasia (the contemporary USSR) should be combined with Pan-Eurasian nationalism, or Eurasianism,” he continues in “Pan-Eurasian Nationalism” (241). This is why Trubetzkoy suggests that “the first duty of every non-Romano-Germanic nation is to overcome every trace of ego-centricity in itself” (“On True and False Nationalism,” 66). For the Eurasianists there is a large quantity of “local patriotisms” sustained by the weak, all-Russian patriotism of the elite. “Eurasian culture” is not simply the sum of different single cultures but all cultures “converge” into a symphonic reunion.

Coudenhove’s “common European nationalism” (Ee, 251) has an identical function. Both Trubetzkoy and Coudenhove preach a kind of “supra-national” nationalism that is “Eurasian” for Trubetzkoy and “European” for Coudenhove, as the latter writes:

The concept of the nation as a cultural community, as a big school, must lead to the conclusion that all of Europe is one big nation that is divided in branches; racist nationalists see only the branches and think they are trees because, semi-cultured as they are, they are unable to see the trunk (WE, 75).

THEORIES OF CONVERGENCE

Eurasianism is based on the assumption that cultural affinities between Russians and Asians exist. “Eurafricanism” does not embrace this kind of cultural agenda: nowhere does Coudenhove suggest cultural affinities between Europe and Africa, nor does he suggest that African and European cultures will or should fuse. Neither does he suggest the contrary. With regard to cultures other than African, on the other hand, Coudenhove is very outspoken when it comes to fluent definitions of borders, the impossibility of defining “nations” in terms of closed entities, in terms of language, state, history, culture, geography or race (Ee, 173). About Europe he writes, for example: “Nobody knows how far eastward Europe extends: up to the iron curtain, to the Ural, or to the Pacific Ocean?” (PE, 10). And at the end of Europa ewacht! he joins Eurasian positions when he declares:

Geographically, there is no European continent, just like there is no Asian continent but only a Eurasian continent… The notion “Asia” is a European invention. It is a generic term for all extra-European parts of Eurasia. This notion is as arbitrary as if the
Chinese designated all non-Chinese parts of their continent as Europe. ... Asian solidarity comes about neither through culture nor through history, geography or race, but only through the artificial antithesis Europe-Asia. ... In order to prevent the natural movement striving for the unification of East-Asia from artificially turning into a Pan-Asian and anti-European one, Europe should break with the old opposition of Europe vs. Asia and replace it with the image of a Eurasian continent divided into five great nations: India, East-Asia, Soviet Union, Middle-East, Europe (Ec, 292).

For the Eurasians, such definitions of Asia lead to theories of cultural convergence. Trubetzkoy tried to find an alternative to both “zoological nationalism” and European cultural universalism. Once he had identified a hypocritical European form of “Cosmopolitanism” as the last derivative of linear conceptions of history, he was able to present Eurasian culture as a prototype of a new non-linear cosmopolitanism. In the domain of linguistics he proved that similarities between languages cannot always be traced back to a common (“natural”) origin, but that lasting mutual influence leads neighbouring languages towards convergence. Eurasianism bases the development of culture on an anti-Darwinian theory of convergence, and Trubetzkoy presents an open form of culturalism that refrains from substantialization of national culture because cultural development is based on a non-linear model.

The nineteenth-century predecessor of the Eurasians, the naturalist and historical philosopher Nicolai Jakovlevich Danilevsky (1822–85), had already criticized the Hegelian system of history as a unilinear development. A professional botanist, Danilevsky derived his theories of history from the most recent trends in the science of classification. At his time, unilinear classifications of plants and animals were abandoned and replaced by “natural classification” that divides them into a number of different types of organisms. Danilevsky applied this system to the study of culture. The natural system does not classify according to arbitrarily selected criteria, but considers the entire sphere of a phenomenon by trying to understand how it is divided up into parts.

Eurasianists used some of Danilevsky’s insights to interpret Eurasian culture as a converging and unified flow of different cultures. Though parallels between Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe and Trubetzkoy’s “Europe and Mankind” are limited to some points on a Kulturtypenlehre, Trubetzkoy’s claims on convergence are indirectly linked to some of Danilevsky’s.

The Eurasianist geographer Savitzky, on the other hand, applied Danilevsky’s natural system directly to geography. Like Danilevsky, Savitzky refused to divide the world into clearly defined continents because that would be a “natural classification” following the natural lines of oceans, mountains, and so forth. Instead, he proposed “geographical worlds” in which characteristics can overlap. The unity of Eurasia, for example, is not “natural” but based on a model of convergence. Savitzky introduced the term mestorazvitie (space-development) as a theoretical notion through which socio-historical components can be seen as integral parts of geographical conditions. The individual, not unlike the personality, is supposed to appear as a “geographical individual.”

Like Trubetzkoy, Coudenhove agrees that cultural apogees have often come about through fusion: “China’s two biggest apogees during the last millennium fall into the time of the Mongolian rule under Kublai-Khan and the Manchurian rule under
Kang-Xi” (Ee, 41). In particular, he depicts the geographical space of Europe as a fluid entity that is dependent on imagination rather than on geographical and political facts (PE, 52). First of all, as mentioned, Europe is no continent; Europe is “Asia’s Northern bridge towards Africa” (WE, 79). The Roman Empire was not European but Mediterranean; and the West-Roman Empire managed to unite almost all of Europe but it included also the Maghreb (PE, 53). Finally, the land beyond the Mediterranean is the geographical continuation of Europe (Ee, 220).

Further, Coudenhove declares that the existence of Germanic or Roman culture is a myth (Ee, 273ff). The Eurasianists said the same thing about “Slavic culture.” Eurasianism and Coudenhove’s Pan-Europeanism can be seen as a culturological means of overcoming cultural egocentricity by defining formative life not as a dialectically temporal development, but as a culturological system of convergence. Within this converging system of races and cultures, “egocentric nationalism” is overcome and a “true nationalism of self-awareness,” according to Trubetzkoy, is supposed to “show a person his place in the world.” “In pursuing self-awareness, every individual comes to know himself as a member of a nation” (“On True and False Nationalism,” 67). In this sense, “nationalism” reflects a concept of global formationalism.

I urge critics to associate Eurasian and Pan-European ideas with neo-Darwinian versions of evolution as developed by Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari, not only because these versions offer appropriate theoretical tools for the study of these phenomena but because this association reveals the contemporary relevance of Eurasian and Pan-European notions. One of the main arguments of Deleuze’s biophilosophy is that “germination” never takes place at a fixed moment and at a fixed place of origin. What counts more than the thing itself (e.g. the egg, the germ) and its fixed position in time and space, is the tendency that pushes it towards invention, innovation, evolution and, finally, convergence. Bergson called this tendency “vital energy.” More important than entities like cells, are the ways in which molecules interact in time and in space. Everything that exists acts within a field in which the Self and the Other unfold their identity and at the same time their difference. The self-determinating present of creative evolution is flawed neither by a subjective ‘I’ nor by a determinating environment. Deleuze depicts creative evolution as a “thinking of difference and repetition” that he opposes, as an absolutely open system called “plane of immanence,” to Darwinian closed systems.

Eurasia and Eurafrica as a combination of spatial-temporal “undifferential entities” can be seen as structureless plateaus or rhizomes, in which acts of territorialization and deterritorialization, of organization and rupture, form a “demonic” or chôraic place that is stratified but without precise limits. For Savitzky, Russia is a combination of sedentariness and nomadic steppe elements. Eurasia is an ideal model for a Deleuzian geographical rhizome made of lines without being shaped by profound, metaphysical structures. Spaces like the Eurasianist Eurasia or Coudenhove’s Europe are not determined by evolutionary linearity, hierarchy or geometrical orientations, but are made of processes of variation and expansion. Like rhizomes, they have no beginning and no end but begin in the middle and rely neither on transcendental laws (roots) nor on abstract models of unity.
NOTES

1. In his Second Book, Hitler mentions Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan Europe project and comments: “Es ist der wurzellose Geist der alten Reichshauptstadt Wien, jener Mischlingsstadt von Orient und Okzident, der dabei zu uns spricht.” Quoted in Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Wien (Munich: Pieper, 1996), 550. I thank a reviewer of my article for having pointed this out to me.


3. The older Russian Slavophiles conceived Russia still as separated from Europe. Now, as the tendency developed towards Russian integration, reflections on the “spiritual” or “historical” destiny supposed to link together all Slav nations become more central. Non-Russian Pan-Slavism insists on the European character of the Slav nations that require recognition as European nations. In principle, Russian Pan-Slavism was sympathetic to these intentions. Official government policy, however, adopted imperialist traits, vaguely insisting that the union of Germans should be encountered with a “Union of Slavs.” This was contrary to the intentions of the Pan-Slav thinkers. See Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).

4. Georgy Florovsky (1892–1979) is one of the most eminent Russian theologians of this century. Born in Odessa, he was professor at the Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris and moved to the United States in 1948 where he taught at different universities. He distanced himself early from the Eurasian movement. Other contributors to the Eurasian discussion are the linguist Roman Jakobson and the philosophers L. P. Karsavin and P. M. Bitsilli, who later on also distanced themselves from the movement. Some American and European historians were inspired by the ideas of the interwar émigré Eurasianists, especially George Vernadsky (see below), who authored an influential multi-volume history of Russia.


7. I am using culturological not necessarily in the Russian sense as an identity-oriented humanistic research, but in the German or American sense of Kultuwissenschaften or cultural turn coined in the 1960s. (In Russia, culturology is an often compulsory part of university courses that largely replaces the teaching of dialectical materialism).

8. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa erwacht! (Vienna: Pan-Europa Verlag, 1934); hereafter abbreviated as Ee and cited in the text; Paneuropa (Vienna: Herold, 1966), hereafter abbreviated as PE and cited in the text; and Weltmacht Europa (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971), hereafter abbreviated as WE and cited in the text; all translations from Coudenhove’s books are mine. For Eurafrika, see also “L’Afrique,” in Paneuropa 1–3 (1929).


14. Some of Dugin’s most important texts as well as the programme of the neo-Eurasian Movement appear in the journals Milyi Angel, Elementy and the newspaper, Den’ (since 1993 Zavtra). Dugin’s main books include Mysteries of Eurasia (1991), Hyperborean Theory (1992), and Consiprology (1992).


16. Ellena affirms this indirectly: Coudenhove’s “claim that Europe does not exist geographically but only culturally and will exist politically through Paneurope corresponds with his claim that Africa exists geographically but not culturally and that it will enter the world market only through the enhancement of European technology” (247). Further, I would question her claim that Coudenhove (who was half Japanese himself) “defines [the European’s] superiority in terms of cultivation, and in terms of awareness of the highest reaches of intellectual comprehension and aesthetic refinement” (249). I do not find any such statements in Coudenhove’s writings but rather respectful allusions to the superiority of Chinese culture and to the strength of Japanese civilization.


18. The notion of Nationalbegriff, which has since been developed, is still relevant. See Antonina Kloskowska, “National Conversion: A Case Study of Polish-German Neighbourhood,” in The Neighbourhood of Cultures, ed. R. Grathoff and A. Kloskowska (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 1994). I thank a reviewer of my article for having pointed this out to me.

19. Trubetzkoy, “Europe and Mankind” (1920), in The Legacy of Gengis Khan and Other Essays on Russian Identity (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991), 75; all essays from which I quote are included in this collection and are cited in the text.

20. For Danilevsky, “no civilization can pride itself on having attained the point of civilization that is highest compared to predecessors and contemporariens—and this in all domains of development” (Россия и Европа [Russia and Europe] [1867] [St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 1995], 87; my translation). Out of Danilevsky’s multilinear conception of world history flows a system that is reminiscent of anti-Darwinian theories of convergence. For Danilevsky, Greek civilization was sparked off through the reception of Persian influences and Greco-Roman civilization was spread by Byzantine emigrants; finally, overseas discoveries initiated the main advances of modern European civilization. Danilevsky pronounced no real cultural theory of convergence through contiguity as developed by Eurasians. Darwinist as he remained, his theories are clearly inscribed in a Pan-Slavist line (for Danilevsky a war with the West remains unavoidable), which led to his being classified as a “totalitarian philosopher” (MacMaster).


22. Gilles Deleuze, Mille Plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980): “Tout rhizome comprend des signes de segmentarité d’après lesquelles il est stratifié, territorialisé, organisé, signifié, attribué, etc. mais aussi des lignes de déterritorialisation par lesquelles il fuit sans cesse. Il y a rupture dans le rhizome chaque fois que des lignes segmentaires explosent dans une ligne de fuite, mais la ligne de fuite fait partie du rhizome” (16).