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Metaphors in the discursive construction of patriotism: the case of Hong Kong’s constitutional reform debate

JOHN FLOWERDEW
CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, HONG KONG

SOLOMON LEONG
CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, HONG KONG

ABSTRACT
This article considers the role of metaphors in the discursive construction of the notion of patriotism in postcolonial Hong Kong. The article examines reports and opinion pieces from two local newspapers published between 1 October 2003 and 1 October 2004 concerning this issue of patriotism. The following questions are posed: (i) What are the different metaphors used in the discursive construction of patriotism? (ii) How do these metaphors vary according to the contrasting ideologies of the two newspapers? (iii) What role does the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic struggle between the two newspapers over what is an appropriate conception of patriotism? The findings and possible answers to these questions will not only assist in gaining a better understanding of the role of language in constructing the identity of a patriotic Chinese, but will also contribute to an understanding of the politics and tensions between the local and the national under the unprecedented ‘one country two systems’ arrangement of postcolonial Hong Kong.

KEY WORDS: constitutional reform, democracy, discursive construction, hegemony, Hong Kong, intercultural discourse, metaphor, news discourse, patriotism, political discourse

1. Introduction

1.1 GLOBAL PHENOMENON
In spite of claims concerning the demise of the nation state (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996; Smith, 1999; Spencer and Wollman, 2002), patriotism, and its associated concept of nationalism, is still a powerful force in many countries (Billig, 1995). Indeed, patriotism appears to be an equally, if not increasingly, influential concept across the world in recent years. This is especially the case after the 9/11 incident in the US, where patriotism has surfaced as a prevalent force and is central to much of the country’s political rhetoric and policies. The focus of this article, however, involves the notion of patriotism not in the context of the US,
but in that of Hong Kong, until recently a British colony, and now a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.

Patriotism usually refers to positive attitudes by individuals to their own nation, culture and interests. The word is derived from the Latin term ‘patria’, which means ‘fatherland’. Nationalism, as distinct from patriotism, generally refers to the ideology which holds that the nation’s ethnicity is a ‘fundamental unit’ of human social life, and makes certain political claims based upon such a belief. In simple terms, nationalism is an ideology advocating the formation of a separate nation-state for each distinct ethnic group. Benedict Anderson (1984) emphasizes that nations are essentially a socially constructed phenomenon. He describes nations as ‘imagined communities’ and a necessary consequence of modernization. Ernest Gellner (1983) comments: ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ (p. 2).

Nonetheless, patriotism as a concept is often intertwined with the concept of nationalism, which in content largely overlap each other. George Orwell, author of 1984 and Animal Farm, differentiated the two concepts in an article titled Notes on Nationalism:

By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ But secondly – and this is much more important – I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

(Orwell, 1945: 1)

Where distinctions between nationalism and patriotism are often made, as raised in Orwell’s quote above, is along the lines of the former being extreme and aggressive and the latter being largely a defensive and personal expression. In practice, there are no clear and steadfast differences between the two and usage of these terms is often ambiguous, context specific and highly malleable.

We might take the USA Patriot Act as an example of where nationalism blurs with patriotism. This act was signed into law on 26 October 2001. It was initially drafted to counter terrorism after the 9/11 attack, yet it is possible that such an act has created a strong patriotic/nationalistic surge which favoured the George W. Bush administration in the run-up to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, while many US citizens viewed supporting the act as patriotic, many others viewed the act as nationalistic and a harmful assault on civil liberties.
As casualties mounted and opposition to the war increased, those who were pro-war considered those opposed to it to be unpatriotic, or even traitors. Some even felt that news reports that reflected the USA in a negative light would support and provide solace to the enemy.

From this, we can see that while patriotism is widely used as a synonym for nationalism and vice versa, their meanings remain ‘fundamentally ambiguous’ (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 2). Unfortunately, often both terms are used as euphemisms for chauvinism, jingoism and racism (Essed, 1991). Although nationalism is prevalent in most nation-states, its presence is often overlooked as the very concept of the nation-state is taken for granted. Michael Billig (1995) describes this as ‘banal nationalism’, referring to various forms of nationalism which discursively shape the minds of a nation’s inhabitants on an everyday basis.

1.2 METAPHORS AS A CONDUIT FOR PATRIOTISM
Discourse is frequently utilized to promote patriotism and maintain national/racial hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), and language is a key discursive element to achieve this aim. As a result of this, the media often becomes a platform for the ideological articulation (Miles, 1989) of patriotism. But the concern of this article is more specific in its linguistic focus. It considers the use of metaphors as a discursive device, not only to construct, but also to relate national identities under different sociocultural contexts and ideological preferences.

In their seminal work on metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point to the fact that the use of metaphor is not only a matter of language usage or poetic license, but a functional mechanism which affects the way we think, act and experience reality. To demonstrate this claim, they take the metaphor of ‘war’ in daily discourse to analyse situations of arguments. Although arguments are mostly verbal and local, the concept of ‘war’ is frequently used to conceive of these situations. To ‘win’ or to ‘lose’ the argument, to ‘attack’ each other’s ‘positions’, for instance, are metaphorical expressions that directly affect the way people experience situations of arguments and confrontations. Consequently, metaphor can be considered a necessary cognitive mechanism through which discourses and, by extension, social reality are formulated.

Metaphors are widely used in political discourse as effective pragmatic devices to perform ideological articulation and sensationalization, as well as emotional arousal (Kitis and Milapides, 1997; Lee, 2005; Wei, 2000; Wilson, 1990). Where different ideologies are at stake, it is likely that there will be variation in the use and interpretation of metaphors. As a number of scholars have noted (Charteris-Black, 2003; Deignan, 2003; Littlemore, 2003; Trompenars, 1993), to achieve its purposes, metaphor has to be interpreted through shared cultural knowledge, and there is variation in the extent to which people from different cultural backgrounds share cultural knowledge and ideologies. With specific reference to Hong Kong, Lee’s (2005) study of metaphors used in Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese discourses over the change of sovereignty has demonstrated that differences in ideological dispositions are often mirrored by the different usage of metaphors.
1.3 RESEARCH FOCUS

Based on the above considerations, this article looks into the role that language, and especially the language of metaphors in the media, plays in the politics of post-handover Hong Kong. It examines reports and articles from two Hong Kong newspapers (a popular tabloid called *Apple Daily* and a Chinese government-endorsed broadsheet *Ta Kung Pao*) published between 1 October 2003 and 1 October 2004 concerning the issue of patriotism in Hong Kong.

We can observe two primarily different and competing discourses presented by the two newspapers, which are generally recognized in society at large. *Apple Daily* is generally regarded as taking a pro-democracy, liberal stance (what Scollon and Scollon, 1995 have referred to as a western utilitarian discourse), while *Ta Kung Pao* is taken as reflecting the Beijing government’s views and promoting the latter’s hybrid Communist/Confucianist discourse (see also Flowerdew, 1997 on these competing discourses). In this article we examine the role of metaphor in instantiating these two discourses in relation to their different conceptions of patriotism.

With regard to the metaphors in the two newspapers, we ask the following questions:

1. What are the different metaphors that are used in the discursive construction of patriotism?
2. How do these metaphors help to express the contrasting ideologies of the two newspapers?
3. What role does the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic struggle between the two newspapers over what is an appropriate conception of patriotism?

The findings and possible answers to these questions help us to gain a better understanding of not only the role of language in constructing the identity of a patriotic Chinese, but also the politics and tensions between the local and the national under the unprecedented ‘one country, two systems’ framework of postcolonial Hong Kong.

2. Historical background of the case: debate on patriotism in Hong Kong

It is useful to provide some background information for readers of this article. A history of public protest underpins the background to the current debate on patriotism. The first public protest occurred on 1 July 2003, the sixth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China from British colonial rule, when over 500,000 people took to the streets protesting against the Hong Kong government’s intended application of Article 23 of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, an article which called for the introduction of an anti-subversion law. Largely middle-class professionals and their families voiced their opposition to the proposed new national security legislation for the city.
The Mainland Chinese government wanted to see the legislation enacted, in accordance with its view of Hong Kong and China as ‘one country’, within the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. But as the protest showed, many Hong Kong people remained wary. This protest was the second biggest public protest ever in Hong Kong, after the demonstration after the 4 June, Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, when almost one million citizens took to the streets of the city.

This first post-handover demonstration was followed by further demonstrations such as the march on 1 January 2004, when 100,000 people demonstrated in support of universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The Basic Law recognizes the goal of gradual democratization, yet it does not specify an exact method or timetable. Nevertheless, the Basic Law leaves the way open for direct elections starting as early as 2007, a date which opinion polls at the time showed a vast majority of citizens to be in favour of.1 A few days after the 1 January 2004 demonstration, the then Chief Executive of the Hong Kong government Tung Chee-Wah (董建華) delivered his annual Policy Address. He announced the formation of the Constitutional Development Task Force. The main function of the task force was to oversee development of the city’s constitution and the possibilities of reform. However, Tung’s concerns were less about setting up a timetable for democratization than the city’s relationships with Beijing. Tung emphasized the need to consult Beijing concerning certain ‘matters of principle’ before any constitutional review could begin.

Despite public demands, the Mainland government was reluctant to allow Hong Kong to democratize further. It appeared that the Beijing government had a set agenda of an extremely gradual pace of development and was keen to get its message across to the Hong Kong people directly by leading the debate on political reform. It argued that political development in the city is not just a local issue, but also a national one. On 10 February 2004, the official Chinese news agency Xin Hua stated that the constitutional reforms and governance of Hong Kong must be led by ‘patriots’. This comment sparked successive waves of heated debate in the Hong Kong media and political circles about what it meant to be a ‘patriot’. To fuel the debate, further coverage by pro-Beijing sources painted a visit to the US senate to lobby for democratization in Hong Kong on the part of Martin Lee, a leading Hong Kong pro-democracy figure, as being treasonous and ‘unpatriotic’. It was generally agreed among political commentators that the purpose of Beijing calling for ‘patriots’ to lead Hong Kong on the one hand, and denigrating pro-democracy campaigners such as Martin Lee as ‘unpatriotic’, on the other hand, was designed to persuade the public not to vote for pro-democracy candidates in the up-coming elections. (Although Hong Kong does not have universal suffrage, as a result of the agreement between Britain and China over the return of sovereignty, as suggested earlier, certain measures are already in place as a step towards this goal. These measures include the election by universal suffrage of a limited number of legislators.) Indeed the debate over patriotism continued right up to the elections (‘Beijing Can Reinterpret the Basic Law Anytime’, Apple Daily, 31 March 2004; ‘Ho Chun Yan Criticized for Lying to Hong Kong People through Constitutional Developments’, Ta Kung Pao,
3. Methodology

For the analysis of this article, two corpora of texts were collected from two Hong Kong Chinese language newspapers, namely Apple Daily (蘋果日報) and Ta Kung Pao (大公報). The references to patriotism in our corpora are primarily the mediated comments of news actors and politicians, not the comments of the journalists themselves. The choice of which person’s opinions to cite, and what to cite, also serves to indicate the ideological positions of the newspapers. In addition, a considerable number of references occur in opinion articles and editorials.

Hong Kong newspapers are habitually classified in terms of their political stance towards China. For instance, one well-established social practice among Hong Kong people involves calling an article ‘pro-Beijing’ or ‘leftist’, on the one hand, and ‘pro-democracy’ or ‘right-leaning’, on the other hand.

Research procedures were as follows:

1. Dates: from 1 October 2003 to 1 October 2004, 1 October being the national day of China and February 2004 (i.e. the middle of this period) being the height of the debate on patriotism.
2. Data collected through the search engine of Wisenews, with keywords (in Chinese characters) being ‘Hong Kong’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘constitutional reform’.
3. 250 articles were found from Ta Kung Pao and 85 from Apple Daily.
4. Each article was examined in search of common themes, discursive strategies, and, in particular, metaphors.
5. Implications were then derived from the findings of the research.

4. Themes of the metaphors

By examining the reports and articles published by Apple Daily and Ta Kung Pao, we have observed numerous metaphors related to patriotism in the discourses of both newspapers. These metaphors are often utilized to construct identities and relationships between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and they can be categorized into the following dominant themes: family, war, the body, and traitors (see Table 1 for the distribution of these themes within the corpora).

Under each of the themes, we examine the similarities and differences in the usage of the same metaphor by the discourses of the two newspapers.

As can be observed, the discourses of both newspapers have largely shared similar themes of metaphors. This reflects not only the cultural common ground between Hong Kong and the Mainland as Chinese-speaking communities, but
also, and perhaps more importantly, the power struggle between the two discourses in setting the agenda and framing (Goffman, 1974) issues that were to be addressed in the debate.

As mentioned in Part 2 earlier, following successive public protests and demonstrations by Hong Kong citizens in 2003 and 2004, the Beijing government was determined to get its message across to the Hong Kong public directly. This can clearly be seen in its unusually active participation in commenting on the subject of constitutional reforms in Hong Kong via mouthpieces such as *Ta Kung Pao*. As a consequence, the discourse promoted by the Beijing government took the lead in setting the agenda and framed the entire debate over patriotism. In doing so, Beijing’s discourse successfully established the parameters and priority of the debate over patriotism, actively promoting the notion of patriotism and marginalizing other issues that were not aligned with Beijing’s political and ideological preferences.

This strategy of framing is closely reflected by the themes of metaphors chosen by the discourse of *Ta Kung Pao*, which initiated and framed a particular ‘grammar of context’ (Scollon and Scollon, 1995) over patriotism, and which were subsequently expanded or resisted by *Apple Daily*, which by then was required to respond with the discourse established by the former.

Moreover, by taking the lead in framing the debate, the Beijing government also established itself as the ‘primary definer’ of the entire discourse. By the term primary definer, we refer to a source of information that is usually official, that generates control and establishes initial definitions of particular events, situations and issues (Chibnall, 1977). This enabled the pro-Beijing discourse to manipulate social information to its advantage, leaving less room for competing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Ta Kung Pao</th>
<th>Apple Daily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250 articles</td>
<td>85 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>338,121 words</td>
<td>91,854 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>29 times in total</td>
<td>6 times in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12% of 250 articles</td>
<td>7% of 85 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once in every 11,659 words</td>
<td>Once in every 15,309 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>12 times in total</td>
<td>12 times in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% of 25 articles</td>
<td>14% of 85 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once in every 28,176 words</td>
<td>Once in every 7,654 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The body</td>
<td>7 times in total</td>
<td>Twice in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3% of 250 articles</td>
<td>2% of 85 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once in every 48,303 words</td>
<td>Once in every 45,927 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traitors</td>
<td>14 times in total</td>
<td>7 times in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6% of 250 articles</td>
<td>8% of 85 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once in every 24,151 words</td>
<td>Once in every 13,122 words</td>
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</tbody>
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alternative discourse, as any other source of information would be deemed as secondary to the primary definers and therefore less credible. Ta Kung Pao, as a pro-Beijing newspaper, was at the forefront of this framing through its presentation of Beijing’s position.

Examples of primary definers in the form of experts for the Beijing government’s discourse frequently include opinions from Mainland legal scholars, for example, Xiao Wei Yun (萧蔚雲), who were accredited with special status and authority regarding the Basic Law and issues relating to Hong Kong and China. Ta Kung Pao, as a pro-Beijing mouthpiece, took the lead in presenting these people as primary definers.

By contrast, the pro-democracy Apple Daily, as pro-democracy and anti-Beijing, features expert comments from pro-democracy lawyers and other professionals as definers in resisting the agenda being set by the pro-Beijing discourse. Nonetheless, under the political framing of the pro-Beijing discourse, these expert comments appear to be passive responses or defenses against the criticisms launched by the primary definers. Consequently, at least in terms of discursive strategies, one might consider the hegemony of the pro-Beijing discourse to be largely successful in marginalizing alternative political voices.

The strategic use of expert advice and comments as primary definers introduces the complex issue relating to ‘voices’, where the roles and voices of the media (newspaper editors for the current case), primary definers (politicians and commentators) and the ideological stance of the Beijing government or the democratic camp are often intertwined and at times overlapping.

Goffman’s idea of participation statuses addresses this issue well. According to Goffman (1981), a speaker can have three participation statuses in relation to any utterance. They may be the ‘animator’ (the one who is physically making the utterances), the ‘author’ (‘someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded’, p. 144), and the ‘principal’ (‘someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say,’ p. 144).

In the case of our research, as previously mentioned, the majority of the texts from our corpora that feature metaphors are news reports. In this context one might consider the newspaper as the animator, which is mechanically reporting and quoting what the authors have said, while the authors are the politicians and commentators who have actually made the statements. The principals are the ideological motivations behind these authors. However, in reality, the newspaper’s role cannot be strictly classified as the animator, because it is frequently involved in selecting and editing news items to be published, or paraphrasing and quoting certain statements as headlines. In that sense, the editors’ voice of the newspaper is also actively participating in the role of the author and even that of the principal, in the articulation of certain political voices, albeit under the guise of the passive animator. In fact, it is rare to find the editors of either Ta Kung Pao or Apple Daily risking forfeiting their social role of impartial news gatekeeper by explicitly committing themselves to align with more extreme political stances.
As a result, the voices of the newspaper editors often surface through the layout of the newspaper content, prioritization and treatments of headlines, rather than through the use of more radical metaphors.

4.1 THE FAMILY
We shall begin with the category of the family. This is one of the most dominant and salient themes of the metaphors used in the debate over patriotism. In our data, metaphorical variations on this theme are found in both pro-democracy and pro-Beijing discourses, as represented by *Ta Kung Pao* and *Apple Daily*. These thematic variations include notions of family business, ancestral country, and parent and child.

In general, these metaphors are used to symbolize relationships between Hong Kong and China, where Hong Kong is the son and China is the parent. However, this comparison automatically implies not only a difference in status and power between a child and his parent, but also the duties and expectations arising between a son and his parent. Consequently, although our database is not large in terms of numbers of metaphors for each category, it is not surprising that our research reveals that the majority of thematic variations on the metaphor of family were found in the pro-Beijing *Ta Kung Pao* (almost five times as many as in *Apple Daily*), and that their political messages were very much tied to the Confucian value of filial piety. *Apple Daily* at times also used the same metaphoric variations, but frequently its goal in doing so was to undermine the unequal power hierarchy as framed by the Beijing discourse.

4.1.1 Family business
We shall look at the metaphor of ‘family’ in more detail by starting with the thematic variation of family business. Use of this metaphor focuses on the belief that Hong Kong’s affairs should be considered ‘internal’ because Hong Kong is now a part of China. Tung Chee-Wah (董建華), the then Chief Executive, for instance, was quoted by *Ta Kung Pao* as commenting on the issue of constitutional reform as a matter of ‘family business’ in which foreigners should not intervene (Extract 1, in bold). In this extract, Tung used foregrounding as a discursive strategy which gradually built up extra dimensions and substance to his politically charged metaphor, first addressing the issue by claiming that it was a ‘family business’, then extending it to become a ‘national business’, and finally bringing it home with ‘our business’. Here one can note that Tung was playing the roles of both author and primary definer. On the one hand, he was the author in so far as he articulated the principal voice of the Confucian Beijing ideology. On the other hand, he was primary definer, as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, the ultimate insider in Beijing–Hong Kong affairs. As a result, Tung’s use of the family business metaphor and its connotations, aided by *Ta Kung Pao*’s editorial discretion in and co-constructing and instantiating his role as a primary definer (by choosing to cite him and which of his comments to cite), had the potential to exert much influence in articulating Beijing’s political messages and framing the public’s perception.
Extract 1

All extracts are first presented in Chinese followed by English translations.

Under the notion of ‘One country, two systems’, Hong Kong’s constitutional development is a matter of family business. It is a matter of national business. It is our business. Foreigners should not intervene, and we will not let them intervene, let alone going abroad seeking for their intervention. What does this whole thing involve? It involves the question of whether or not we love our country and Hong Kong.

(‘Tung Chee Wah: We Will Not Let Foreigners Intervene, Let Alone Going Abroad Seeking for Their Intervention’, Ta Kung Pao, 5 March 2004, Feature News, A01 Headline.)

4.1.2 Ancestral country

Another variation on the theme of the family metaphor is the ancestral country ‘祖國’. Unlike the variation of the family business, which concerns immediate familial relationships, the ancestral country metaphor takes on a more historical and traditional angle in relation to the notion of the family. In Chinese culture, the notion of ancestral country is closely tied in with the concept of family. It is a Chinese tradition that key dates are set in the calendar for sweeping graves of the ancestors, and shrines are installed at home for worshipping one’s ancestors. In other literature, the term ‘祖國’ is often translated as the ‘Motherland’ or in some cases the ‘Fatherland’. However, as indicated in Note 2, it may be more appropriate, for the purpose of this article, to translate the term more directly. Generally, the character ‘祖’ refers to ancestor and ‘國’ refers to the concept of a country. This translation highlights the relationship between this term and the metaphorical theme of the family.

Given this, from Beijing’s point of view, the use of this metaphor automatically implies a naturalized state of power difference between Hong Kong and the Mainland. An example can be seen in the opinion of Xiao Weiyun (蕭蔚雲), one of the drafters of the Basic Law (see Extract 2), in which he claims that the return of Hong Kong to the ancestral country is already a form of power to the people. Similar to Tung as a primary definer due to his status as Chief Executive in Extract 1, Xiao’s status as a drafter of the Basic Law, and through the pro-Beijing editorial of Ta Kung Pao, has credited him with the status of the primary definer of the situation of constitutional reform in Hong Kong. Moreover, like Tung, Xiao made use of foregrounding, in the form of a series of questions, as a discursive strategy to give depth and practical relevance to the more abstract metaphor of the ancestral country.
Concerning the fact that some Hong Kong social groups have called for the ‘return of power to the people’, Xiao Weiyun says that the return of Hong Kong to its ancestral country has already expressed the return of power to the people (Chinese people). He says ‘the level of democracy now (in Hong Kong) is a million times higher than before. Who elected the past 28 governors for the previous Hong Kong British Government? The British did. Why did you not cry for returning power to the people then? Why did you not complain about the lack of democracy? And why did you not take to the streets?’ He considers that this view held by very few people in the Hong Kong society is rather biased.


While the metaphor of the ancestral country serves Beijing’s purposes and is consequently found relatively frequently in Ta Kung Pao, from pro-democracy Apple Daily’s perspective the metaphor implies unequal power relationships, and so is best avoided. Indeed, no examples of its use were found in the Apple Daily.

4.1.3 Parent and child
The third variation on the theme of the family metaphor is that of parent and child. Framed by the pro-Beijing discourse, this metaphor is again charged with hierarchical power differences. In our Ta Kung Pao corpus, Mainland China was often compared with the tolerant parent, whereas Hong Kong was compared with that of the lost son who identifies a bandit as his father (Extract 3). The bandit in this extract refers to Great Britain, which was the colonial ruler of Hong Kong for 150 years.

Extract 3
我們覺得對於愛國者的標準，要嚴格按照鄧小平先生的指示，不宜訂得過高過嚴，除了對個別背叛祖國、貳薦為父、挾洋自重、出賣港人利益、要求外國政府干預香港的分子以外，盡可能團結最大多數的香港市民，結成最廣泛的愛國愛港陣營，防止出現日前台灣選舉中反映的對立與分裂現象。

顧國華，‘團結最大多數防止對立分裂’, 大公報, 2004-03-26, 大公論壇/華南工業城, A14
We feel that we should follow Mr Deng’s [Deng Xiaoping, former Chinese leader and the architect of the ‘one country, two systems’ concept] instructions strictly, and not set the standards for being patriots too high or too strict. Other than those individuals who betray their ancestral country, or those who identify the bandit as their father, those who seek self interests by supporting foreigners, those who betray Hong Kong people’s interests, and those who seek foreign intervention, we should include as many Hong Kong citizens as possible to form a most extensive patriots’ camp, so as to avoid confrontational and divisive scenarios as seen recently in the Taiwan election. 

(Koo Kwok Wah. ‘To Include the Majority So as to Prevent Confrontational and Divisive Scenarios’, Ta Kung Pao, 26 March 2004, Ta Kung Forum/South China Industrial City. A14.)

The author of this opinion article, Mr Koo, is a well-known Hong Kong shipping business tycoon who is also the uncle of Tung Chee-Wah. Not surprisingly, his political stance was much aligned with the policies of Beijing. Given this intertextual reference, it would only be consistent to observe that his role in the whole debate over patriotism is another primary definer of the Hong Kong constitutional situation, co-constructed along with other mass media by Ta Kung Pao. The metaphor of parent and child was generally resisted by the pro-democracy discourse of the Apple Daily, although it was at times used in a sarcastic manner. This is noticeable in the way in which the metaphor was quoted, manipulated and ridiculed (see Extract 4). Instead of the respectable and tolerant parent, the parental figure portrayed by Apple Daily (Beijing) is replaced in a sarcastic fashion by an old-fashioned and stubborn grandfather (阿爺).

Extract 4

今次報告避而不談卻又最關鍵的議題，是政改啟動權誰屬。有港區政協私下和中方官員討論時，北京最關心只是主導權誰屬，「佢你 applications 特首又點？只要阿爺（北京）鍊住啟動權，就係鍊住政改要害，唔改亦改由佢話事。」

‘北京可隨時再釋法’，蘋果日報 2004-03-31, 港聞, A02

This report (referring to the first report by the Constitutional development task force) has avoided talking about the most important issue, which is who has the power to initiate constitutional reforms in Hong Kong. Some national commissars of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from Hong Kong have discussed the issue with some Beijing officials privately. They found that Beijing is most concerned about who holds the right of initiation. They said: ‘So what if you can have universal suffrage for electing the Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2007? As long as granddad (Beijing) is holding onto his power to initiate, which is the core of constitutional reforms, he can still decide otherwise.’

Resistance is also found in this extract from *Apple Daily* on the level of the discursive style, where part of the quotation was written in colloquial Cantonese rather than standard written Chinese. This can be seen as an attempt not only to resist Beijing’s homogenization of Hong Kong and the Mainland under the metaphor of the parent and son, but also to build a distinct local identity with its own voice, in the use of the colloquial Cantonese language.

However, it should be noted that the role of the newspaper is not only the animator in this extract. It is also playing the role of the author who articulates the pro-democracy political agenda. One example illustrating this overlapping of roles is the title of the article ‘Beijing Can Reinterpret the Basic Law Anytime’. Although being sensational is a common strategy employed by commercially driven newspapers such as *Apple Daily*, in order to push sales and profits, it appears that the editors of the newspaper have created the article’s title with the aim of inducing worry: that Beijing might overstep into Hong Kong’s affairs. Moreover, by positioning the report by an anonymous reporter as A02 (immediately following the headline), the ‘voice’ and resistance of the editors of *Apple Daily* has quietly surfaced through the form of a news report.

The pro-democracy discourse in *Apple Daily* was also quick to extend the parent and son metaphor, a key element in traditional Confucian discourse, by associating it with ‘free lunch’, a concept drawn from western Utilitarian discourse, implying that Hong Kong people’s right for universal suffrage has been sacrificed for economic benefits (Extract 5). Such appropriation of the parent and child metaphor not only reflects the differences in the ideological underpinnings of *Ta Kung Pao* and *Apple Daily*, but also the effort on the part of the latter to resist the connotations of the metaphor as framed by the pro-Beijing discourse.

**Extract 5**

奈何董建華政府把特區矮化為只懂向母親招手討飯的「二世祖」，似乎港人命中注定只有免費午餐，卻無普選權利。

何喜華, ‘政制檢討未開始已結束’, *蘋果日報*, 2004-03-30, 蘋果論壇, E17

Tung Chee-Wah’s government has belittled the SAR to become the frivolous son who only knows how to get meals from his mother. It seems that Hong Kong is destined to be only entitled to free lunches, but not universal suffrage.

(Ho Hei Wah, ‘Constitutional Reforms Have Finished Before They Start’, *Apple Daily*, 30 March 2004, Apple Forum, E17.)

### 4.2 War

Similar to the theme of the family, the theme of war is also prevalent in both the discourses of *Ta Kung Pao* and *Apple Daily*. Yet complex issues surrounding voices remain, as this metaphor directly involves the emotions of aggression and violence, which go against the common social expectation of the news media being level-headed, rational and an impartial gatekeeper. Consequently, it is not
uncommon in our corpora to observe that ‘othering’ as a strategy was frequently used alongside the metaphor of war, where ‘self’ and ‘other’ is often presupposed, and authors would justify their own principal viewpoints as necessary and exclusive, while marginalizing and criticizing alternative views.

The pro-democracy discourse of Apple Daily, for example, has highlighted the metaphor of war, through editing and paraphrasing comments made by primary definers such as the controversial pro-democracy Bishop Joseph Zen, known for being a tenacious defender of religious freedoms and democracy (see Extract 6), to portray the Beijing government as an oppressive and irrational other which Hong Kong needs to fight against in order to maintain its survival. In fact, when we observe the statistics given in Table 1, the projection of self as the victim has been repeated throughout the Apple Daily corpus. This perhaps can partly explain the higher percentage of Apple Daily compared with use of the metaphor by Ta Kung Pao.

Extract 6 is a lead-in for a news report published by Apple Daily on 16 March 2004 (A2).

Extract 6

今年 7.1, 風雲再起。北京官員與左派政客近數周以來打壓香港民主發展的言論，激起天主教領袖的反擊。天主教香港教區主教陳日君呼籲信徒今年七月一日起街，參加民主大遊行，因為「我們需要讓人們知道，我們對更多民主的強烈願望。」

The cloud of war is looming for 1 July this year. The suppressive opinions against Hong Kong’s democratic development by Beijing officials and leftist politicians have incited a counterattack by the leader of the Catholics. Bishop for the Hong Kong region Joseph Zen appeals for Catholics to take to the streets on 1 July and participate in the pro-democracy march, because ‘we [referring to Hong Kong’s Catholics as Hong Kong citizens] need to let people know about our strong desire for democracy’.

(‘Joseph Zen Calls for Catholics to Take to the Streets on 1 July “to Let People Know About Our Strong Desire for Democracy”’, Choi Yuen Kwai, Apple Daily, 16 March 2004, Domestic News, A2.)

It is interesting to note that although using the emotion-laden metaphor of war, the editor of the news report has justified its usage as a ‘self-defense’ through actively othering leftist and Beijing officials’ comments as suppressive. Moreover, through re-contextualizing and re-defining the situation as one that was provoked by the pro-Beijing discourse, and the high priority of the news item (A2), the use of the metaphorical term ‘counter-attack’ has not only emphasized Bishop Zen’s role as a primary definer for the pro-democracy discourse, but also helped to reinforce the newspaper’s own ideological principal, which is to promote and gain support for universal suffrage as well as undermine and resist the hegemony framed by the pro-Beijing discourse.
Similar to *Apple Daily*, the use of war as a metaphor in *Ta Kung Pao* is often accompanied by the discursive strategy of othering and presupposition, where personal pronouns like ‘we’ or ‘us’ are often presupposed, represented and utilized by these conflicting discourses to serve their own ideological purposes. These presuppositions limit the readers of the text to fixed subject positions offered by the discourse, where alternative readings are heavily marginalized. In Extract 6, from *Apple Daily*, the ‘us’ referred to is the pro-democracy public. It presumes the reader to be one of ‘us’, and by doing so it effectively marginalizes any possible alternative subject positions. One would risk being the threatening ‘other’ if one does not agree with the definition provided by the discourse of the text. By way of contrast, Extract 7 shows clearly that under the framing of *Ta Kung Pao*’s anonymous report, the ‘us’ is more the patriot who values China and Hong Kong’s collective interests, than one who fights for individual rights.

**Extract 7**

刚才何先生说到三十三条, 保不保持一黨專政, 愛不愛國, 流露了他與大家的理念不同, 但大家應該要考慮現在香港的政治現實, 是要去傾向？還是去『砌』好？...我們五十萬人上街，西藏新疆也不難找到一百萬人上街，是否每一地方都可以決定地方本身的事？大家由一個整體的利益，還是個人的利益去找個平衡點，找回對大家都最有利的。


Earlier on Mr Ho commented on Article 23, and his opinions on whether or not China should remain a one party country and what should be counted as patriotism have shown that his views are different from ours. However, we must consider the political reality of Hong Kong at the moment. Should we talk, or should we ‘fight’? ... Hong Kong has 50,000 people participating in a march, but it is not that difficult to have a million people protesting on the streets of Tibet either. Can every city decide its own business? It should be the best for all of us if we could find a balance point between collective and individual interests.

(‘Ho Chun Yan Criticized for Lying to Hong Kong People Through Constitutional Developments’, *Ta Kung Pao*, 27 February 2004, Domestic News, A03.)

Whereas the pro-democracy discourse of *Apple Daily* stresses the civil right of the individual to be autonomous, the pro-Beijing *Ta Kung Pao* clearly positions their argument at the other end of the spectrum. Focusing on the collectivistic value of the Confucian tradition, the discourse of *Ta Kung Pao* stresses that the welfare of the country (China) as a whole should come before that of Hong Kong, which is only a part of China. Such discrepancies between the emphases of the two discourses tend to reflect their respective political motivations in attempting to sustain or subvert the discursive hegemony as established and framed by the pro-Beijing discourse.
4.3 THE BODY
The theme of the body as metaphor is not as prevalent in either Ta Kung Pao or Apple Daily as the themes of war and family. However, the ways that the body is used as a metaphor to represent sociopolitical ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland are similar to both the metaphors of family and war.

In the case of the pro-democracy Apple Daily, only a handful of articles were found to make use of the body metaphor to describe the Hong Kong/Beijing relationship. This is perhaps not too surprising as the body metaphor, like the ancestral country metaphor, implies inseparable yet hierarchical relationships between Hong Kong and Beijing.

In the case of Ta Kung Pao, however, the metaphor of the body is often utilized as a strategy to manipulate public perception regarding the current economic and political well-being of Hong Kong. For instance, the democrats were compared with poison that is affecting the ‘body’ of Hong Kong, and unless this poison is leached in time, this ‘body’ will not recover fully (Extract 8).

**Extract 8**
大律師公會主席陳景生「不認為現階段需要釋法」。現階段「釋法」，正是需要、非常及時，早了「亂象」還沒充分呈現，晚了流毒必釀禍害，不早不晚，來一個當頭棒喝。

金察柯：‘釋疑止爭人大說了算’，大公報2004-03-30，大公論壇/工商載訊，A12

The chairman of the Barrister’s association ‘does not agree that this is an appropriate time for the NPC to reinterpret the Basic Law (the law regarding the method of electing the Chief Executive for Hong Kong in 2007 and legislative council in 2008)’. It is very necessary to reinterpret the Basic Law now, as ‘chaos’ has still not set in. **There will be grave consequences if we leave it too long before we leach the poison.** This is the right time to set the record straight.


The body metaphor was also used (Extract 9) to compare Hong Kong’s economic situation with a recovering body that could not risk falling ill again (Extract 10). Such a comparison again mirrors the ideological dispositions of the pro-Beijing discourse, which places great emphasis on the collectiveness of Hong Kong and China as one single entity.

**Extract 9**
香港經濟的復甦從去年底今年初剛有著色。目下正需要是社會和諧，人們和衷共濟，求同存異，把握內地提供的多種機遇，搞好經濟，固本培元，改善民生，才是真正符合港人的利益。

王國興：‘爭拗已偏離基本法軌道 釋法來得正是時候’，大公報，2004-03-29，大公論壇/工商載訊，A11
Hong Kong’s economy has shown **signs of recovery** starting from the end of last year and the beginning of this year. What the society needs most at the moment is harmony. People should live in harmony with and be tolerant of each other. They should make good use of all the beneficial opportunities provided by the mainland and improve Hong Kong’s economy, thereby **strengthening the original body and develop further from it.**

(Wong Kwok Hing, ‘Arguments on Constitution Reforms Have Strayed from the Basic Law, Reinterpretation is a Timely Move’, *Ta Kung Pao*, 29 March 2004, Ta Kung Forum/ Business news, A11.)

### 4.4 TRAITOR

The difference in emphasis between the collective and the individual as articulated by the Confucian and utilitarian discourse systems as represented by *Ta Kung Pao* and *Apple Daily* is further magnified in the theme of the traitor as metaphor. As with the themes of metaphor discussed previously, the traitor metaphor is again framed by the pro-Beijing discourse and articulated by primary definers and authors to criticize the democrats for their ‘unpatriotic’ behaviours, namely the demand for universal suffrage in 2007 for the election of the Chief Executive, and 2008 for the election of the legislative council.

An example of this can be seen in Extract 10, where the author, a former high court judge of Hong Kong, plays the role as the expert in defining the situation. We can notice that alongside the discursive strategy of the traitor metaphor, other strategies such as foregrounding, presupposition and othering were also used in defining the China/Hong Kong collectivity as ‘self’ against the ‘intervening foreigners’. It is also worth noting that the author has borrowed the voice of another author/primary definer by paraphrasing comments made by a judge from Guangdong province to express the more extreme accusations against the democrats’ ‘slave mentality’ and ‘traitor’s mentality’.

**Extract 10**

所謂民主人士不是持續長期地發表歪論嗎？不是日以繼夜地在電台、電視、報章、討論會、文章上大聲疾呼、煽動群眾嗎？不是馬不停蹄地威脅策動街頭運動嗎？這不是「反中亂港」又是怎麼？ . . . 以往一位廣東省大法官形容一、兩位所謂民主人士為太重「奴隸思想」、「漢奸心態」。多年觀察這數位人士的言行，同是香港土生土長的中國人，我真的很希望可以名正言順的為他們找出一點辯解理由，可惜實在找不到。

廖子明, ‘人大釋法不僅有權而且必要’, 大公報 2004-03-29, 港聞, A08

Aren’t the so-called democrats persistently expressing their twisted views? Are they not constantly crying out subversive opinions on radio, television, forums, and in writings? Aren’t they keeping on instigating campaigns on the streets? What would you call these if they are not ‘anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong’ behaviours? . . . A Judge from the Guangdong province once described a few so-called democrats as too enrooted in ‘slave mentality’ and ‘traitor’s mentality’. After observing these people for a few years, I as a Hong Kong born Chinese would really like to find some reasons to defend their behaviours, but unfortunately I cannot find any.
In response to the criticisms framed by the pro-Beijing discourse, the pro-democracy discourse of *Apple Daily* made deliberate attempts to detach the emotional link of the traitor metaphor by subjecting it to counter-arguments found in ‘western’ utilitarian thought, such as the concept of falsification (Extract 11), thereby undermining the validity of the pro-Beijing discourse argument. Moreover, if we look at the author of this article, who is a member of the Hong Kong democratic development network, it would only be consistent to observe the presuppositions on what constitutes ‘us’ and ‘them’ again reflect the underlying principal ideological position of the *Apple Daily* discourse.

**Extract 11**

許秉德怒斥別人「打叉」，李柱銘卻要被冠以「吳三桂」、「賣國賊」、「忤逆仔」的稱號，有如「只許州官放火，不准百姓點燈」，令人哭笑不得。著名哲學家卡爾．波柏（Karl Popper）以證偽原則（Falsification）見稱，他在《開放社會及其敵人》一書中指出，民主制度不是一種選出明君的制度，而是一種防止獨裁集權力的制度。

‘可以打叉才是真民主’，盧偉明，蘋果日報，2004-03-25，蘋果論壇，E15

Hsu Cheng De scolds people for putting crosses on his pictures, yet Martin Lee is labelled as 'Wu Sangui', 'treasonous thief' and 'the ungrateful son'. This simply is 'allowing the officials to commit arson while forbidding civilians to light their lamps'. This is contradictory. The famous philosopher Karl Popper, whose theory of falsification is well known, once points out in his work *Open Society and its Enemies*, that the function of democracy is not to elect an enlightened leader, but to prevent the accumulation of power on the part of a single despot.


**5. Conclusion**

At the beginning of this article we stated our intention to address, through analysing two corpora of newspaper articles, the role of metaphors in discursively formulating the patriot in post-1997 Hong Kong. We asked three questions:

1. What were the different metaphors that were being used to address the issue of patriotism?
2. How did these metaphors vary according to the contrasting ideologies of the two newspapers?
3. What role did the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic struggle between the two newspapers over what is an appropriate conception of patriotism?
With respect to the first research question, we have found that a variety of metaphors have been used in both *Apple Daily* and *Ta Kung Pao*, and that these can be grouped and categorized under several common themes relating to various social domains in traditional Chinese culture and in a way that is common to both Mainland China and Hong Kong. For instance, the theme of the family and the body are linked to the Chinese traditions of filial piety and familial duties, while the themes of war and traitor are intertextualized with historical references and collective memories. The appeal of common social experience that these themes of metaphors connote also partly accounts for the fact that both *Ta Kung Pao* and *Apple Daily* often share the same themes of metaphors when trying to articulate their messages to the public. However, while both newspapers tend to share the same themes of metaphors, the ways that these metaphors are used and defined tend to be context specific and subject to appropriation and manipulation in different circumstances.

This brings us to our second question: ‘How did these metaphors vary according to the contrasting ideologies of the two newspapers?’ Differences in the usage of the same metaphors also reflect the ideological principals behind a particular piece of text. For instance, in Extract 5 the pro-democracy *Apple Daily* author has appropriated ‘the frivolous son’ metaphor by injecting the ‘free lunch’ concept, thereby challenging the hegemonic framing of the pro-Beijing discourse. Nonetheless, it is rare in our corpora to find metaphors being used alone as a discursive strategy when articulating messages. A more common scenario is that metaphors are combined with and used alongside other discursive strategies such as foregrounding, presupposition, framing, othering and subject positioning.

This leads us onto the discussion of the third question for this article, which is to look at the way metaphors help to sustain or undermine hegemonies. We have found in our corpora that hegemonic dominance can be successfully maintained, or even reinforced, by metaphors, especially when they are authored and articulated by primary definers. Many of the themes of metaphors in our corpora have either been authored by primary definers such as experts or politicians directly, or paraphrased by the newspapers indirectly. Metaphors, when articulated by primary definers, who are themselves partly created by the newspapers’ political leanings and editorial discretions, can aid in setting and framing situations and social information to the advantage of certain ideological positions by marginalizing alternative views and limiting subject positions. For instance, the role of the retired high court judge Liao Zi Ming (Extract 10) as a legal expert has added considerable weight to the framing of the situation of patriotism in terms of the traitor metaphor. Nonetheless, although primary definers can be considered as authors of the ideological principals behind them, their influence in framing depends much on the newspapers’ editorial boards, which decide who and what to cite and at what time. In fact, through strategies of editing, prioritization and layout, the impartiality of the newspaper as animator can also be easily manipulated by various hidden principals, highlighting the complex issue of ‘voice’ that underlines contentious subjects such as patriotism. Finally, resistance to dominant hegemonic metaphorical framings is possible through...
negotiations and appropriations. In our corpora, many of the Apple Daily articles and reports (as seen, for example, in Extracts 4 and 6) have to a certain extent managed to resist the hegemonic discourse, albeit in a defensive position, by actively engaging in appropriating or challenging the validity of the metaphors used by the pro-Beijing discourse.

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NOTES

1. Some of the polls were conducted by the Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong. Relevant poll findings can be found in http://hkupop.hku.hk.
2. In the broader scheme of things, however, the pro-Beijing camp’s policy of promoting ‘patriots’ and demonizing ‘traitors’ must be deemed to have failed, as evidenced by the level of support for the pro-democracy candidates in the elections referred to earlier. Thus the discourse, although successfully introduced, in the broader context, must be interpreted as not having been inculcated.
3. ‘Ancestral country’ here refers to what Hong Kong English language media refer to as ‘the motherland’. It is, however, more literally appropriate to term it as ‘ancestral country’.
4. All translations are our own.
5. Wu Sangui is a historical figure in the Ming dynasty (approximately fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) famed for betraying the Ming court by collaborating with the Manchurians in the northeast of China, which hastened the downfall of the Ming dynasty and the rise of the Qing dynasty towards the end of the 17th century.

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JOHN FLOWNDEW is a professor in the Department of English and Communication, City University of Hong Kong. His research interests include discourse analysis (public and academic) and corpus linguistics. In public discourse, he has published a book and a series of articles on Hong Kong’s transition from British to Chinese sovereignty under the slogan of ‘one country, two systems’. ADDRESS: Department of English and Communication, City University, 83 Tat Chee Ave, Kowloon, Hong Kong. [email: enjohnf@cityu.edu.hk]

SOLOMOM LEONG is currently a research fellow at the Department of English and Communication, City University of Hong Kong. His main research area focuses on racial identities and representations. His other research interests include discourse analysis, media studies and racial discourse. He has attained his Bachelor Degree (Media Studies) and Master Degree (Media Studies/Multi-Media) at the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK. His PhD degree was completed at the City University of Hong Kong.