Identity politics and Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty: analysing the discourse of Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive

John Flowerdew *

Department of English and Communication, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong

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Abstract

This paper critically examines the discourse of the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Tung Chee-hwa, during his first five-year period of office, following the return of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Based on a large corpus of primarily speeches, but also interviews, press conferences and other pronouncements, and a parallel corpus of media reports and commentary, the analysis demonstrates that, in the interests of a smooth handover and the policy of “one country, two systems”, Tung’s discourse, in its basic configuration, mirrors that of the last British colonial Governor, Chris Patten. However, there are certain notable variations; in particular, there is a new emphasis on the need for a knowledge-based economy, the importance of Chinese values and identification with China, and a downplaying of democratic development. As did a previous article on Patten [Discourse Soc. 8 (4) (1997a) 493], the present paper focuses on four discursive strategies: the transformation of old political genres and the creation of new ones, presupposition, the use of indexicals, and lexical structuring and reiteration. The paper is presented as a case study of an attempt by a political leader to develop a communal/political identity.

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1. Introduction

In recent decades, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has helped to shift the emphasis from viewing language as an abstract system to seeing our words as carrying meaning

* Tel.: +852-2788-8896; fax: +852-2788-8894.
E-mail address: enjohnf@cityu.edu.hk (J. Flowerdew).
in specific historical, social and political contexts. As a result, as Toolan (2002: xxi) has noted, CDA has become exceptionally influential in a range of disciplines. Language, or discourse, for CDA is a form of social practice (e.g., Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). As such, CDA can be seen as a form of pragmatics, a way of analysing “how people do things with words” (Austin, 1962). For CDA, as for Austin, language is not merely the passing of a message between interlocutors (the locution), but an event, the production of an effect, or perlocution, albeit analysed from a critical perspective. CDA is accordingly concerned with language and power and how those in power use language, wittingly or unwittingly, to exert their power over others (e.g., Fairclough, 1989). The words of the powerful may be accepted by the less linguistically aware as self-evident truths (Fairclough, 1989, 1992). The elites, who control most settings of discourse, have the most power (van Dijk, 1993). The role of CDA is to reveal these relations of language and power to the public, be they linguists or others (e.g., Fairclough, 1989). CDA seeks to link the text at the micro-level with the over-arching macro-power structures in society through the mediation of the various discursive practices by means of which it is manifested (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).

The range of disciplines and fields of activity within which CDA may be applied are limitless, but one of the most obvious fields where language and power are manifested is that of politics. As van Dijk (1997: 38) points out, “most political acts and events consist of text and talk”. In my own work, I have found CDA to be a most valuable means of critically analysing the political events surrounding Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese from British sovereignty. The present study is presented within the context of this agenda.

2. Context of the present paper

In an earlier paper (Flowerdew, 1997a), based on a large corpus of speeches and other public pronouncements, I analysed the discourse of the last British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, over the five years of his period of office, leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper argued that, in his focus on four issues—the free market economy, the freedom of the individual (although not at the expense of the disadvantaged), the rule of law, and democracy—Patten created a myth, defined as “a set of beliefs and values deriving from a shared past which, to varying degrees, may or may not be true” (Flowerdew, 1997a: 455). This myth was promoted as Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong, thus ensuring that Britain could withdraw from its last major colony with honour. The paper’s analysis focused on four discursive strategies employed by Patten in the promotion of his myth: the transformation of old political genres and the introduction of new ones, presupposition, involvement (the use of indexicals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.

In the present study, I will take a similar approach to the discourse of the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC, Tung Chee-hwa, over the five-year period of his first term of office. The corpus used consists primarily of 140 major speeches delivered by Tung. Other sources include television and radio broadcasts, press conferences, government press releases, Legislative
Council question and answer sessions, and newspaper articles (from a corpus of 1369 articles collected from December 19, 1996 until June 3, 2002). I will argue that Tung has sought, on the one hand, to reassert some elements of Patten’s myth and distance himself from others (most notably that of democracy), while at the same time introducing elements of his own. My analysis documents Tung’s unsuccessful attempt to bring about a shift in communal identity for Hong Kong in the post-colonial era.

With regard to the discourse of Tung Chee-hwa, it is important to be aware that I am not talking about the discourse of one man. Tung may be the “animator” of his discourse in Goffman’s terms, the person who takes on the role of speaking the words (Goffman, 1981: 144), but the “author”, the person who has selected the ideas that are expressed and encoded (Goffman, ibid.), is likely to also include Tung’s advisors and officials, as well as the government of the PRC. That said, the fact remains that Tung is also the “principal”, the person whose position is established by the words that are pronounced, who believes in what he is saying, and who is committed to what the words say (Goffman, ibid.).

3. Language choice

The Hong Kong government has set as its goal to make Hong Kong a bilingual society. Because most Hong Kong people are more comfortable in Cantonese (generally considered to be the language of solidarity), the majority of Tung’s public pronouncements are in Cantonese. Nevertheless, in line with his promotion of Hong Kong as an international city, a great deal of his speeches are also given in English and press conferences and radio phone-in programmes are bilingual. (Some speeches, where the audience numbers important Mainland officials, are also given in Putonghua, the spoken standard used on the Mainland.) In whatever language a speech or official statement is given, it is made available immediately on the government web-site in both Chinese and English. This raises the important question of audience design. While the immediate audience for a speech or statement may be predominantly either English- or Cantonese-speaking, the wider audience of the press and other interested parties must be able to read it on the internet in either language. According to the official Government Information Service (personal communication), speeches are usually drafted in the language in which they will be presented and then translated. Tung uses speech writers and does not write his own speeches. For the purposes of this paper, I have taken the English versions of all citations, but have indicated if the speech was actually presented in English, Cantonese, or Putonghua. I have used the English versions, on the grounds that the majority of the readership of an international journal will not understand Chinese. I realise that this mode of analysis has its problems, but I have indicated in footnotes interpolated into the analysis where I think there might be variation in pragmatic uptake across the two languages.

1 When travelling abroad, Tung also speaks in English.
2 The Chinese versions can be accessed by means of the Hong Kong government web site <http://search.info.gov.hk>.
4. Communal identity

In the preceding section, I talked about the creation of a myth. The first salient feature of myth, as listed in Flowerdew (1997a: 456) is that it, “by appealing to common features of a culture or group, provides a sense of individual and communal identity”. The notion of cultural or national identity has been the focus of much study in recent years. Wodak et al. (1999: 290) state that “The national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a national collectivity is manifested, inter alia, in their social practices, one of which is discursive practice. . . . The discursive practice as a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation and in the expression of national identity”. As Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 186) note, the role of discourse in social practice cannot be taken for granted, but needs to be established through analysis. Given this important discursive dimension of identity, identity can be projected onto subjects (Kress, 1989).

Kress (1989: 15) gives the example of the political leader whose role is to give definition to an entirely new group. It is the leader’s role in such a situation to produce texts which bring together hitherto disparate discourses in a unified, coherent manner. Where changes in ideology are rapid (as in the case of Hong Kong), this may be accompanied by a rapid change in the discursive construction of identity. Of course, there is no guarantee that the projected identities will be taken up by individuals. To quote Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 195) again, “a new discourse may come into an institution or organisation without being enacted or inculcated”. As Hall (1996: 6) has noted, given the possibility of such change, however, identities are “points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us”; they are constantly in the process of change and transformation. Nevertheless, the elaboration of cultural and national identity is “a gradual process in which histories, traditions and social memories are invented, revised and reproduced” (Ma and Fung, 1999: 498).

Identity is usually defined in relation to the Other (Martin, 1995): “The life of a human being as a person requires the presence of the Other, that is, the perception of someone different and the establishment of a relationship with him/her/them” (p. 2). As Hall (1996: 4) puts it: “. . . it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term—and thus its ‘identity’—can be constructed”. If identity is viewed as positive, then the Other must be viewed as negative; the Other is the marked form which is excluded, while the self is unmarked and essential (Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990, cited in Hall, 1996: 5). What this means is that identity politics is inextricably concerned with relations of power, of agents, or agencies, imposing their will. Political leaders have much power in projecting cultural identity. They have ready access to the mass media and use press secretaries, or “spin doctors”, to put over their message.

On the other hand, the exertion of power will always also encounter resistance (Foucault, 1980; Flowerdew, 1997b). In Foucault’s words, the existence of power relationships “depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are everywhere in the power network” (Foucault, 1980: 95).

Identity has also been analysed in terms of narrative (Martin, 1995; Ricoeur, 1992; Wodak et al., 1999). Individuals may consider their identity in terms of the stories they
experience or imagine. Being both real and fictitious, narrative identity is open-ended and amenable to revision. Because individuals are always parts of groups, a group identity can be construed in terms of a narrative, just like an individual’s identity can (Martin, 1995: 3). A collective narrative must define a group in terms of sets of criteria, such as language, ethnicity, social class, attitudes, beliefs, and so forth. In terms of political narrative, Martin (1995: 5) stresses the role of individual leaders and how a few individuals play essential roles in constructing the identity narrative of the group.

5. Hong Kong and the question of identity

The question of identity in Hong Kong has always been problematic. Ma and Fung (1999: 199) describe the development of Hong Kong identity as having followed an “erratic path”: it is a good example of what Martin (1995: 3) refers to as an identity having “nothing to do with homogeneity and permanence”. Although the population of Hong Kong is 95% ethnic Chinese, these people mostly either came to Hong Kong to escape Communist rule or are the children of such people. Colonial policy, by minimising contact with Mainland China, created a space for the creation of a local Hong Kong identity, which thus can be said to be determined in terms of the cultural differences between Hong Kong and the Mainland (Ma and Fung, 1999: 500). Hong Kong people have traditionally seen themselves as sophisticated and Westernised in contrast to the less “civilised” Mainlanders (Ma and Fung, 1999; Flowerdew et al., 2002). Even now, although the former British colony is a Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong people are reluctant to label themselves as “Chinese” when asked to do so in opinion surveys. They prefer to refer to themselves as “Hong Kong people” or (to a lesser degree) as “Hong Kong Chinese”. Of course, identity is multi-faceted and in the case of the people of Hong Kong, three dimensions of identity seem to be particularly salient: ethnic identity, cultural identity, and political identity. However, these dimensions do not necessarily coincide. One can say “I am Chinese”, but such a statement can have different meanings according to these three different dimensions. As to the first, no Hong Kong Chinese would be likely to deny that they are ethnically “Chinese”. However, politically, because they do not want to identify with the PRC government, they might say that they are not “Chinese” in this political sense. Then again, as suggested by Ma and Fung (1999), they might not want to be considered “Chinese” in the sense of sharing cultural values with Mainland Chinese. Given the problematic nature of political and cultural identity, it is these two dimensions that are emphasised in the present paper.

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3 In a survey carried out by the Baptist University for the “1982–2007 Hong Kong Transition Project” in April 2001, 42% of 830 respondents aged 18–85 identified themselves as “Hongkong people”, 28% as “Chinese”, 24% as “Hongkong Chinese”, and only 3% as “Hongkong British”. In a similar survey carried out by the Chinese University’s HK Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies in April 2002, 52% of the 818 respondents regarded themselves as “Hongkong people”, 33.9% as “Chinese”, while 10.9% would describe themselves as both. These results are supported by the results of a poll conducted by a youth organisation, Breakthrough, in April 2001. The results show that only 18.6% of 623 respondents aged between 15 and 18 regarded themselves as “Chinese”, 8.9% as “Hongkong Chinese”, while more than a half considered themselves to be “Hongkong people”.

The cultural identity discussed by Ma and Fung (1999) can be contrasted with the identity as projected for Hong Kong by its political and business leaders. This identity, which stresses the free market economy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and democratic institutions (although not universal suffrage), is designed for the international business community—to encourage them to view Hong Kong as a centre for international trade and investment. Given Hong Kong’s dependence on international capital, much of Tung’s discourse is directed towards this audience.

6. Political background

On July 1, 1997 sovereignty over Hong Kong reverted from Britain to China. Hong Kong became an SAR of China, but was guaranteed a high degree of autonomy in running its affairs, with the Mainland taking responsibility only for defense and foreign relations. The agreement for this unprecedented form of decolonisation—decolonisation without independence, or, in the words of the Chinese leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, “one country, two systems”—had been jointly negotiated by Britain and China during protracted negotiations which took place during the early 1980s. Following the signing, in 1984, of the Joint Declaration, the document which set out the terms of the agreement, China, with input from Britain and Hong Kong, drafted the Basic Law, which was to become the future ex-colony’s mini-constitution. Together, the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration specified the terms and conditions under which Hong Kong’s autonomy was to operate. Included in both documents were provisions for the gradual development of democratic government, with the Basic Law allowing for the possibility of universal suffrage for the election of the SAR’s leader, or Chief Executive, from 2007.4

In the meantime, the Chief Executive would be elected for five-year terms by a small electoral college of local people selected by China. Following provisions in the Basic Law, in 1997, the selection committee was made up of 400 members, while in 2002 it was expanded to 800. On both occasions Tung Chee-hwa, a former Hong Kong shipping magnate, was selected to govern the SAR. Tung had no previous political experience (apart from serving for a short time on the former British Governor’s Executive Council), but was well trusted by the authorities in Beijing.5 Tung has a reputation as a conservative and the local and international media have viewed his policies as directed first and foremost towards pleasing Beijing (see, e.g., Cheng, 1997; Vines, 2001). For example, in spite of suffering from very low popularity among the public, as measured by opinion polls,6 his

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4 This provision, enshrined in Annex I of the Basic Law, stipulates as follows: “If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval”.

(Available from http://www.tdctrade.com/blaw/blaw_ax1.htm)

5 In the 1970s Tung’s shipping company had been in serious financial difficulties. Tung was helped out financially by another local pro-Beijing tycoon (Flowerdew, 1998).

6 For example, according to one survey only 16% of people wanted Tung to run for a second term (Asian Wall Street Journal, 2001, December 14).
main achievement during his first term of office was generally interpreted as maintaining good relations with the central government (Yeung, 2001).

In terms of political philosophy, one of Tung’s early proclamations was that he wanted “less politics” in Hong Kong (Yeung, 1997). This has meant emphasis on livelihood rather than political issues. On the question of constitutional development, Tung has back-pedalled, saying that everything will follow the provisions laid out in the Basic Law, in spite of the fact that decisions need to be made on issues left open in that document, such as the manner and degree to which democratic development is to proceed after 2007.

7. Tung’s discursive formation

As demonstrated in my earlier paper (Flowerdew, 1997a), Chris Patten, during the full five years of his governorship, constantly reiterated a number of themes which were woven together into a coherent discursive formation, his ‘myth’, as I have called it. These themes were essentially expressions of Western values, emphasising laissez-faire economics, the freedom of the individual (although not at the expense of the welfare of the disadvantaged), the rule of law, and democracy. In constantly reiterating these themes, Patten presented them as part of the Hong Kong way of life, and by placing the Hong Kong people in a subject position, he created an identity for them in terms of the values he himself subscribed to.

When we consider Tung’s discursive formation, we find it broader than that of Patten’s, narrowly targeted one. While we encounter Patten’s four themes also in Tung’s discourse, there is a new emphasis on the development of a “knowledge-based” economy (not just the free market in general), which was not found in Patten’s speeches. In addition, there is much less emphasis on democratic development. All four basic elements were evident, however, in a speech that Tung made in Shanghai in 2001, for example:

There are other dimensions of good governance on which we are working hard to improve .... A government that delivers better service at lower cost and a smaller government that does not stand in the way of the market and the individual. A government that promotes citizen participation and democracy, in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law .... And, a government that stresses rule of law, safeguarding of the freedoms that its citizens enjoy, and public security especially in times that demand heightened vigilance.

(APEC CEO Summit in Shanghai on October 18, 2001—given in English) (emphasis added)

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7 See Fairclough (1992) on the term “discursive formation”. Fairclough explains that it is a term borrowed by Pêcheux from Foucault. According to Pêcheux, a discursive formation is “that which in a given ideological formation ... determines “what can and should be said” (Pêcheux, cited in Fairclough, 1992, p. 31; original italics).

8 It is notable, however, that this discourse has been down-played since the bursting of the dot.com “bubble”.
In addition to these themes of Patten’s myth, we find two other related topics: Asian, or Confucian values,\(^9\) and the Hong Kong people’s identity as an essential “Chineseness” (Hong Kong as part of the Motherland).

On Confucian values, for example, Tung made the following statement in his manifesto for his selection as Chief Executive in 1996:

As we move forward there is a need for us to renew our commitment to the values we hold dear. These values have been with us for thousands of years and are as relevant today as they ever have been: Trust, love and respect for our family and our elders; integrity, honesty and loyalty towards all; commitment to education and a strong desire to strive to improve and advance oneself; a belief in order and stability; an emphasis on obligations to the community rather than rights of the individual; a preference for consultation rather than open confrontation. These are some of the shared values which make our society more cohesive. Together with a strong identity, they will provide us with clarity of direction and unity of purpose. (Building a 21st Century Hong Kong Together, October 22, 1996—both Chinese and English versions available)

In a speech given to a group of local youths, he asserted the Chineseness of Hong Kong people as follows:

I believe that every Chinese takes pride in the development of our nation and is proud of being Chinese. (“Coming of Age” ceremony, May 4, 2000—given in Cantonese)

Speaking to an audience in New York, he also stressed the Chinese identity of Hong Kong people:

... in Hong Kong ... over 95% of us are Chinese. We ourselves were on the receiving end of colonialism. We share the sense of dignity and pride on the return of Hong Kong to China, and at long last our new found responsibilities of managing our own affairs. China is our sovereign, and naturally, like Americans, we have an affinity for our own fellow countrymen. And like Americans, our patriotic feeling is something very natural to us. (Speech at a luncheon hosted by the Asia Society, New York on September 12, 1997—given in English)

On many occasions, Tung stressed that “what is good for Hong Kong is good for China” and “what is good for China is good for Hong Kong”. The following quotation from a BBC interview shortly before the handover is just one of many occasions when Tung used this expression:

Our economic future is interlinked with China. Our culture is linked with China. **What is good for Hong Kong is actually good for China**, because we do contribute

\(^9\) It should be noted that Patten also complimented the Hong Kong people for their work ethic, family culture, and care for the elderly, which may be considered as characteristics of Confucian culture. However, it must be emphasised that Patten insisted that so-called Asian, or Confucian, values were universal and not specific to Asian societies.
to China’s modernization. **And what is good for China is very good for Hong Kong.** The long-term interests of China and Hong Kong are the same. (BBC interview, June 10, 1997, emphasis added)

8. Discursive strategies

This section will demonstrate how Tung used the same range of discursive strategies as Patten (Flowerdew, 1997a) did in the projection of his own myth. These strategies operate at both a macro- and a micro-level. At the macro-level, the principal strategy used by Patten was the transformation of old political genres and the creation of new ones (Flowerdew, 1997a). At the micro-level, Patten used presupposition, involvement strategies (primarily the use of indexicals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.

8.1. The transformation of old political genres and the creation of new ones

Tung needed to maintain confidence on the part of the Hong Kong people that there would be little change from the old system. For this reason, his discursive formation maintained most of the elements of that of Patten, with a few additions of his own. Tung’s style contrasts strongly with Patten’s. Patten wanted to promote democracy, so he acted as if he were an elected politician, which was indeed his previous background. Tung was selected by Beijing primarily to maintain stability. He had no political background and is constantly accused of running the SAR like a family company (Lau, 2002). One commentator referred to “[H]is shy reluctance to face the public and displays of intolerance to dissenting views...” (Yeung, 2002), while another contrasted Tung’s personality with that of Patten:

Mr Tung himself does not consider persuasion and negotiation important. The Chief Executive’s paternalistic and conservative image does not appeal to a crowd who still remember former governor Chris Patten’s friendliness and casual manner. (Hung, 2002)

It is certainly true, as agreed by many commentators, that Tung is a much less effective speaker than Patten (Ho, 1997; Schwartz, 2001; Shamdasani, 2001).

Tung’s vision of his role and his personality has affected the way he approaches the various political genres. He is very reluctant to face the public; whereas Patten had made great play about attending question and answer sessions at the Legislative Council on a monthly basis, Tung appears only three times a year, in spite of repeated requests for more visits (Ku, 1998; Li, 1999). Tung gives far fewer interviews and makes fewer public “walkabouts”, which had been one of the hallmarks of Patten as Governor. Patten had also instituted a series of public meetings following his annual policy addresses; Tung abandoned these. Tung has been described as a Confucianist (e.g., Lau, 2001). According to this reading, the reason he accepted the office of Chief Executive has to do with his sense of social responsibility. He takes a paternalistic view in his dealings

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with his subjects. He has a vision: he knows what is best for Hong Kong and is not concerned about critics. As a Confucianist, he is ultimately accountable only to his conscience (Lau, 2001).

In terms of political discourse, Tung’s style reduces the emphasis placed on those already existing genres, while he has not taken any initiative to introduce new ones. Accordingly, his need to face the public has been reduced, which may be one of the reasons for his very low popularity ratings, as compared to Patten. On the other hand, this style fits in with Tung’s avowed desire for “less politics” in Hong Kong.

There are other public genres over which Tung has control, but in which he does not actively participate. One of the first decisions taken by Tung and his Beijing advisers, even before the Handover, was the replacement of the Legislative Council by a Provisional Legislative Council, the role of which was to reverse legislation which had been introduced by Patten but which was not acceptable to the Mainland government. Another important decision was to disband the two municipal councils (Yeung, 1999) on the grounds that they were inefficient. Even so, since the members of these councils were elected by popular suffrage, their abolishment meant the disappearance of a tier of elected government and of a forum for public debate and participation. On the other hand, Tung has been tolerant of public demonstrations—Government officials have even proclaimed such activities as a sign of Hong Kong’s continuing freedom of expression. Similarly, the Falun Gong movement, in spite of being banned on the Mainland, has also been allowed to hold meetings in Hong Kong (although, in a show of solidarity with the Mainland government Tung has labelled it as “an evil cult”; Ho, 2001). Tung’s desire for a less confrontational style of politics is summed up in a rare public attack on Hong Kong’s leading pro-democracy politician, Martin Lee. “Our culture is changing, Mr Lee”, Tung stated, “you only criticise without offering solutions . . . It’s no solution if there are only criticisms. It’s not in anyone’s interest to keep bad-mouthing Hong Kong” (Lee, 2002). As an indication of his disdain for democratic processes, Tung refused to produce a manifesto for his reselection for a second term as Chief Executive.

8.2. Presupposition

By presupposition, we mean the background assumptions that speakers make about their hearers when they make an utterance. Such assumptions have to be made in the interests of economy, as communication would not be possible if everything had to be defined and

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11 Insofar as many of these were instituted by Patten in the last 5 years of over 150 years of British rule, one can sympathise with Tung’s desire to distance himself from them. Nevertheless, the population at large generally accepted them and Tung’s overall downplaying of them may be a cause of his very low popularity ratings.

12 Results of popularity polls conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of Hong Kong University show that although support ratings for Tung stayed in the high 50s during the first two years of his office, the ratings have, on average, hovered around the lower 50s since July 1999. At times, the ratings even dropped below 50, the first time being in July 2000. Although Tung received a very high rating of 70.4 in September 1997 and the highest rating that Patten ever received is about 6 points less (64.1 in October 1992), Patten’s ratings remained in the high 50s throughout his five years as Governor of Hong Kong. (POP Express Combined, 1997).

13 In fact, there was no need for one, as he was the only candidate. See, e.g., Leung, A. (2002); Tung stays true to the electorate that counts most (South China Morning Post, February 19).
explained every time we spoke (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). However, the degree of explicitness required will vary depending upon the presumed shared knowledge on the part of the interlocutors. In particular, a number of linguistic structures and lexemes, referred to as “presuppositional triggers” by Levinson (1983: 179), have certain properties which give rise to inferences (see Levinson, 1983: 181–185 for a list of examples).

If speakers willfully make assumptions about their hearers which they know not to be the case of presupposition may turn into manipulation. In Patten’s discourse, there is evidence that he made such assumptions concerning the degree to which his hearers shared his conception of the myth he was promoting about Britain’s heritage to Hong Kong. For example, he described the view he promoted about free market economics and the rule of law as “bedrock principles” and “the very essence of our [the Hong Kong people’s] way of life” (Flowerdew, 1997a: 461), in spite of the fact that both ideas, from an alternative perspective, were open to question (Flowerdew, 1998). As for Tung, it seems that he was happy, in the interests of a smooth political transition, to perpetuate the essential components of Patten’s myth and its underlying presuppositions, with changes of emphasis and additions of his own, as indicated above, concerning Hong Kong’s Chinese identity.

Let us take as an example an extract of a speech made on July 1, 1997, the first day under Chinese sovereignty:

Hong Kong is at present the freest and the most vibrant economy in the world. Free enterprise and free trade; prudent financial management and low taxation; the rule of law, an executive-led government and an efficient civil service have been a part of our tradition. All these factors which underlie our success have been guaranteed in the Basic Law.

Leaders in China have said time and again that the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong will contribute to the modernisation of our country. Furthermore, the successful implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”, “a high degree of autonomy” and “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” is the first step towards the ultimate re-unification of China.

(Ceremony to Celebrate the Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997—given in Putonghua)

In terms of subject matter, Tung refers to various aspects of the myth: the free market economy, the rule of law, and Hong Kong’s Chinese identity. In terms of presentation, these aspects are all statements of fact: they express a high degree of certainty and presuppose that the audience will have the necessary background assumptions for accepting these assertions as facts. The tenses used are either the simple present (used for the expression of universal or axiomatic truths) or the present perfect (used to anchor present truths in the past).14 The emphatic nature of Tung’s assertions is reinforced by the use of the verb

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14 Chinese does not have tense as such. Hence, in the Chinese version, the axiomatic nature of the statements is expressed through the absence of specific temporal markers, while present truths are anchored in the past through the use of temporal markers such as 一直 (all along).
“guaranteed” and of the adverbial “time and again”, while the sentences are combined in an additive paratactic relationship (Halliday, 1994), where one sentence builds on its predecessor, adding new information in the development of a logical series of meanings. The same happens at the level of the noun phrase, with the long list in the second sentence of the first paragraph. The use of “Furthermore”, which begins the last sentence, provides a sense of finality to this cumulative build-up of meaning. The high degree of certainty is further reinforced by the use of the strong modal “will”, in “will contribute to the modernization of our country”.\(^\text{15}\) Note moreover how the use of “our” in “our country” here is also a highly marked presuppositional trigger.\(^\text{16}\) This phrase had only become possible because the change of sovereignty had just taken place; a few hours earlier, Hong Kong was not yet a part of China. Given their ambivalence towards, and concern for, a future under Chinese rule, many in the audience would have been made uneasy by this allusion to Hong Kong as part of China, so soon after the Handover. The expression “the first step towards the ultimate re-unification of China” provides a final sense of certainty and inevitability to this extract.\(^\text{17}\)

Let us take now an extract from a speech made in 1999, this time on the theme of the “knowledge-based” economy and the need to invest in education to prepare for it:

A new era with remarkable and dynamic technological development is unfolding. Technological advances will change fundamentally the manner in which the world competes. For any country, region or individual, the only way to maintain a competitive edge in the long run is to acquire knowledge. To maintain Hong Kong’s position as a leading cosmopolitan city in the new millennium, the SAR Government will continue to make substantial investments in education, innovation and technology, as well as infrastructural developments, so as to make Hong Kong more competitive and to achieve our vision.

(Millennium Address, December 31, 1999—given in English)

As in the previous extract, the sentences are presented as statements of fact. They all express a high degree of certainty and presuppose that the audience will have the necessary background assumptions for accepting the statements. Again, the sentences are held together in a relationship of additive parataxis; each sentence develops from the previous one, adding to the development of the logical argument and creating a sense of inevitability. The certainty is increased by the strong modality of the future tense (“will change”, “will continue”). Certain of the verbs also act as strong presuppositional triggers: “change”, “maintain”, and “continue” all presuppose a certain state of affairs which must already exist, if the conditions in questions are to be modified or persist. The construction “the only way . . . is to . . .” presupposes that there is no possible alternative. Finally, the use of “our”

\(^{15}\) In Chinese, this is rendered by the 需要 (require/need).

\(^{16}\) This is rendered in the Chinese version by the expression 祖国 (literally “the ancestral country”); there is thus the same presuppositional effect.

\(^{17}\) “the first step towards the ultimate re-unification of China” refers to the impending retrocession of Macau from Portuguese to Chinese sovereignty, which was due to take place in 1999 and the goal of reunification with Taiwan.
in “our vision” insinuates the presupposition that Tung and the people of Hong Kong share the same view of the future.

8.3. Involvement strategies: the use of indexicals

In order for a myth to be accepted, it must provide a sense of communal identity. In the political context, this means that leaders need to discursively construct a set of values which they can share with their constituents; they need to integrate themselves into the society that they want the common myth to be accepted by. One way to do this is through the use of first person plural indexicals (“we”, “us”, and “our”). The meaning of these indexicals is unspecific outside of their context of use, and even then they can be imprecise. Seidel (1975) refers to indexicals as ‘shifters’, where potential ambiguity can be exploited by politicians. As to Patten, he used first person plural indexicals to refer to the Hong Kong government (of which he was the leader), the United Kingdom government (which he represented in Hong Kong), the people in his audience (with whom he shared a presupposed common view) and, more widely, the population of Hong Kong (of which he was not a member, but into which he nevertheless insinuated himself). At times it was difficult to work out which of these groups was being referred to (Flowerdew, 1997a).

In the speeches made by Tung, who unlike Patten, could genuinely claim to be a Hong Kong person, the first person plural indexical is nevertheless used as a ‘shifter’. The four opening paragraphs of his July 1st 1997 speech show this variation. The themes of this speech evoke the elements of the myth: the rule of law, freedom, democracy, integration with the Motherland and Chinese values.

1. Reunification with China opens up new opportunities for Hong Kong.
2. Successful implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” requires us to develop a better understanding of our country, cultivate a congenial relationship with the Mainland, embrace a distinctive set of values; safeguard the rule of law; protect our freedoms; promote democracy; and establish a common long-term purpose.
3. The interests of Hong Kong and the Motherland are intricately linked and intertwined. Due to our long separation, there is a general lack of understanding about China among the people of Hong Kong. The reunification has created a new environment and better conditions for us to understand our country and our people, and to love our country and our people. Only then can we firmly establish our roots and make “One Country, Two Systems” a success. We must strengthen the understanding and relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, through mutual trust, mutual economic benefits, cultural interaction, and mutual respect for each other’s way of life. We know Hong Kong and the Mainland will move forward together, hand in hand.

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18 Tung was in fact born in Shanghai, but emigrated with his family at the time of the Communist takeover. He also spent long periods at school and university in the UK and worked for a number of years in the US.
19 Although I have analysed the English version of this speech, there is variation in the usage of indexicals. Where this is the case I have indicated so in footnotes.
17. Every society has to have its own values to provide a common purpose and a sense of unity. Most of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese, some are not.
18. For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the eastern and western cultures.
19. We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese values, including filial piety, love for the family, modesty and integrity, and the desire for continuous improvement. We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority views but also shoulder collective responsibilities. I hope these values will provide the foundation for unity in our society.
20. Maintaining and developing the legal system and the rule of law in Hong Kong is immensely important. We will continue to ensure that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government will operate independently. We will keep up our efforts against corruption and maintain a clean society. We will ensure equality before the law and provide an attractive environment for investors and the people of Hong Kong.

(Ceremony to Celebrate the Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997—given in Putonghua)

In the first paragraph, “us” in line 2 seems to refer to the people of Hong Kong (preceding referent in line 1 is “Hong Kong”). In line 3, however, “our country” integrates the people of Hong Kong with those of the Mainland. In the Chinese version “our (我們的) country” is replaced with (國家) (literally “the ancestral country”).

The second paragraph continues with this alternation between the people of Hong Kong and those of China in general. There is not, however, a simple correspondence between “we” = the people of Hong Kong and “our” = the Chinese people in general, including those in Hong Kong. In lines 10–11, where we have the expression “better conditions for us to understand our country”, there does seem to be such a correspondence. However, if we look at the expression in lines 11–12, “only then can we establish our roots”, both indexicals seem to refer to the people of Hong Kong.

In the third paragraph, which is an interesting overt statement of Tung’s desire to develop a community identity (through the affirmation of the presupposed identity that he maps out), there is again ambiguity. In line 20, for example, “We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also respect the fine traditional Chinese values . . .”, is Tung referring to his government or to the Hong Kong people? Perhaps a better way to put it would be to say that he is speaking on behalf of the Hong Kong people. This certainly seems to be the case with the series of parallel antithetical structures, beginning with “We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation” and continuing with “we strive . . .” and “we respect . . .” The final sentence of this paragraph gives credence to this .

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20 In the Chinese version “our (我們的) country” is replaced with (國家) (literally “the ancestral country”).
21 Again “our country” is expressed with the term (國家) (the ancestral country).
22 Here “our roots” is expressed as (中華民族的根) (literally “the roots of the (Chinese) nation”), thus even more strongly integrating the Hong Kong people as part of China’s heritage.
23 Here, in the Chinese version, “our society” is rendered as (香港文化), literally “culture of Hong Kong”, while, because in Chinese the subject is often presupposed, the equivalent for “we” is absent.
interpretation, with its reference to “these values provid[ing] the foundation for unity in ‘our society’”. The use of indexicals in this paragraph is a case of manipulative presupposition, with Tung projecting values onto the Hong Kong people which they may or may not share.

In contrast to the preceding paragraphs, the fourth paragraph is relatively unproblematic. Here, the series of sentences beginning with “we” seems to refer fairly unambiguously to the Hong Kong government.

8.4. Lexical reiteration

Lexical reiteration and patterning is the most obvious way of establishing the major themes of a corpus. This is also the most systematic way in which politicians may signal the preoccupations which make up their discursive formation (Flowerdew, 1997a). Through constant reiteration of the same themes, politicians attempt to naturalise the myths they create; they do this by developing what Fowler et al. (1979) refer to as patterns of “overlexicalization”, that is to say, concentrations of interrelated terms which occur together as markers of a fundamental preoccupation of the given discourse. The following analysis of lexical reiteration and patterning will confirm the dimensions of Tung’s discursive formation and indicate the similarities and differences with that of Patten, as earlier identified in this paper. The analysis is based on the 140 major speeches delivered by Tung since he took office. Out of these, 26 were made in 1997; 30 in 1998; 26 in 1999; 30 in 2000; 23 in 2001 and 5 in 2002 (cutoff point: May 2002). The total number of words is 255,225. The data was analysed using a word frequency and concordancing package (Scott, 1999).

8.4.1. The free market economy

Results from the concordancer show that members of the word family, or lemma, economy/economies/economic/economically (經濟) occur 1784 times in the speeches, and that the semantic environment, or prosody, is mostly positive. As shown in Table 1, the lemma economy (經濟) in Tung’s speeches is frequently collocated with the words growth (增長) (135), development (發展) (87), free (自由) (48), open (開放) (40), vitality (活力) (38), largest (最大) (35), strong (強大) (31), success (成功) (31), growing (增長) (29), opportunities (機會/機遇) (27), competitive (競爭/強大) (26), grow (增長) (24), sustain (持續/維持) (24), stimulate (刺激) (22), remarkable (重要) (21), stability (穩定/安定) (18), progress (進展/成效) (17), enhance (增強/強化/加強) (15), strength (力量/優勢) (15), opening (開放) (14), successful (成功) (14), vibrant (活力/生氣勃勃) (13), advantage (優勢) (12), competitiveness (競爭力) (12) and grown (發展) (12).

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24 In the Chinese version “our society” is rendered as 香港 (Hong Kong).
25 In the Chinese version, because of the lesser need for the use of a grammatical subject, “we” (line 30) and “we” (line 31) are absent. In addition, “our efforts” is realised in a verbal form, removing the need for the first person plural pronoun in subject position.
26 Louw (1993) defines “semantic prosody” as “a consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates” (p. 157).
However, in contrast to Patten, who invariably used these words in positive contexts, Tung also associates the “economy” lemma with negative collocates, such as bubble, challenges, downturn, turmoil, difficult, crisis, recession, difficulties and challenge. The use of such negative collocates reflects the fact that while Patten was fortunate to be governing during an economic boom, Tung had a severe economic downturn to deal with. The negative prosody of economy mainly appeared in the speeches made after 1997, thus corresponding to the onset of the Asian economic crisis. Out of the 134 collocations of economy which contain the words bubble, challenges, downturn, turmoil, crisis, difficult, recession, difficulties and challenge, only one comes from a speech made in 1997. Similarly, only two out of the 38 entries containing the word recovery occurred in a speech made in 1997 (see Table 2 for examples). This aspect of the free market economy was not developed by Patten.

Table 1
Positive environments of text extracts containing the lemma economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>we are, after all, the world’s 7th largest trading economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>we have been rated consistently as the freest economy in the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>the world economy is becoming increasingly open, increasingly competitive, and ever more integrated through information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hong Kong’s economic vitality and sustain economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>our huge foreign reserve and our sound economic and financial fundamentals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>the main objective of our country is its economic development and its direction is very clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The depth of economic opportunities in the coming decade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>our long-term focus of building a hong kong which is fair, free, prosperous and economically competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ours is a free market and an economy which adjusts upward and downward very quickly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>a new string to our economic bow, and stimulate growth in the value added areas of our economy, as well as improving our competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>our continued economic success and competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>our free and market-oriented economy with fair competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>our economy is also rebounding strongly and we are optimistic that the recovery is here to stay now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>we are in the centre of the fastest growing economy anywhere in the world—the Pearl River Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>economic restructuring is necessary if we are to preserve our economic vitality, create greater prosperity and maintain a higher living standard for Hong Kong people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tung’s determination to develop Hong Kong as a “knowledge-based” society and reap the purported benefits of globalisation is demonstrated by another range of collocates, including the following: knowledge (知識型/知識) (150), new (新) (60), restructuring (轉型) (60), market (市場) (54), recovery (經濟復蘇) (40), technology (技術/科技) (37), rapid (急速) (36), education (教育) (19), changes (改進/轉變) (18), information (資訊) (17), reform (改革/調整) (17), globalisation (經濟全球化) (15), innovation (創新) (14), adjustment (調整) (12) and change (改進/轉變) (11). Notice in particular the very high frequency of the collocate knowledge (知識型/知識) (150). See Table 3 for examples in context.

When Tung speaks about the economy on a positive note, very often he is referring to the state of the Chinese economy (119 entries). His tone on the Chinese economy is overwhelmingly positive, both praising the rapid development and growth of the PRC economy in the past 20 years and describing its positive future projections. Tung also frequently talks about the unique relationship that exists between Mainland China and Hong Kong. While the continuing growth of the Chinese economy and China’s accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) might bring about new challenges to Hong Kong’s economy, the long-term impact should be positive and the benefits are mutual, according to Tung. In

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27 See Flowerdew (2002) for a detailed analysis of Tung’s discourse on globalisation.
Table 3
Text extracts related to the “knowledge-based” economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>for the free, information based market economy of tomorrow, investment in high quality education is the single most important initiative that we can take to ensure sustained success. 09-10-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>we can be a key processor in the worldwide networked economy of the information age. 09-10-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>In a knowledge-based global economy, innovation and technology are important drivers for economic growth. 04-11-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>we know that the 21st century economy will be a knowledge-based economy. 17-05-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>having a knowledge-based and information economy will benefit the entire society. 23-07-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>there is a pressing need for us to revamp our education system and encourage innovation in order to maintain the competitive edge and leading position of Hong Kong as a knowledge-based economy in the long run. 26-10-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>globalisation of the world’s economy and advances in information technology are rapidly reshaping the world we live in and intensifying competition. 30-03-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>the world’s economy is becoming more globalised as a result of free trade and advances in information technology. 06-04-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hong Kong remain at the forefront of the global knowledge economy. 22-02-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>we have recognised the importance of IT to our future in the knowledge-based economy. 22-03-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>we must invest in human capital in a sustained manner and on a vast scale, sufficiently to form a deep, strong base of brainpower to support a knowledge economy with high value-added economic activities. 12-10-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>the world is rapidly transforming from an industrial economy to a knowledge-based economy. 06-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The globalised new knowledge economy provides an infrastructure for us to co-operate with each other, to promote the free flow of people, knowledge and wealth, and to create a world of peace and shared prosperity. 28-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The most important success factor in the knowledge economy is education. 13-04-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

many instances Tung also emphasises that as a Special Administration Region, Hong Kong, with its geopolitical proximity to China, also has much to contribute to the Mainland’s economic prospects. This association between economic development in Hong Kong and the Mainland thus brings together two elements of Tung’s discursive formation: the benefits of the free market economy and Hong Kong’s identity as essentially Chinese (Hong Kong as part of the Motherland). See Table 4 for examples in context.

8.4.2. The individual

Results obtained from the concordancer show that the keyword individual(s) (個體) occurs 69 times out of Tung’s 140 speeches, suggesting that this concept is not so central to Tung’s discursive formation as it was to Patten’s (Flowerdew, 1997a). As the examples in Table 5 demonstrate, Tung does present safeguarding individual rights as
an element essential to good governance and to the upholding of the Basic Law under the “one country, two systems” principle. He also stresses the need for individual self-development, which he sees as crucial to Hong Kong’s economic growth in the new global economy. However, positive collocations only occur sporadically; the most frequent of these—rights (權利)—occurring just five times.

8.4.3. The rule of law

Turning now to the semantic field relating to the rule of law, Table 6 shows examples of this term in context. The term appears in Tung’s speeches 146 times and collocates with words such as free (自由) (14), upholding (秉持) (9), strong (密切/緊密) (6), uphold (支持) (6), freedom (自由) (5), freedoms (自由) (5), protect (保護/保障/捍衛) (5), service
Table 5
Text extracts containing the word individual(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority views, but are mindful of all of our wider interests; we will protect individual rights, but also must shoulder collective responsibilities.</td>
<td>02-07-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>We must retain and further enhance those distinctive features which have been critical to Hong Kong’s vitality and success, including, for example, a society underpinned by the rule of law; the independence of the judiciary, protection of freedom of the press and rights of individuals, all of which, is institutionalised in the basic law.</td>
<td>21-02-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The SAR Government welcomes contributions of ideas, comments and criticisms from individuals and organisations on all matters and aspects of government.</td>
<td>10-08-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>This emphasis on the initiative on the part of the individual as the prime motivating force for a person to improve his own fortunes is no different from that underlying our economic philosophy, which all of you already know so well.</td>
<td>16-10-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Governance in a modern society involves three main elements . . . second, to respect the rights and dignity, and to safeguard the freedoms of each individual.</td>
<td>31-10-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>If individuals, companies and the Government all join together to invest in human capital in a serious and sustained manner, then HK will definitely be able to become what we want to be—a economic powerhouse where high-value-added economic activities is the norm.</td>
<td>12-10-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>There are other dimensions of good governance on which we are working hard to improve, a government that delivers better service at lower cost and a smaller government that does not stand in the way of the market and the individual . . .</td>
<td>29-10-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I believe that a society should allow individuals, be they women or men, to make free and informed choices for their own lives and realise their potential to the full.</td>
<td>10-05-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(服務) (5), underpins (支持) (5) and upheld (支持) (5). These collocates are overwhelmingly positive. Tung therefore accepts Patten’s presupposition that the rule of law is essential to Hong Kong’s well-being. In example 5 of Table 6, he even accepts it as part of “the fine legacy that Britain has given us”. One difference between Patten and Tung on the rule of law is that the latter frequently relates it to the Basic Law (a document drawn up by China; e.g., examples 12 and 13 of Table 6), whereas references to the Basic Law are far less frequent in the case of Patten. This is a further signal of Patten’s desire to distance himself from China, in contrast with Tung’s wish to emphasise the positive influence of the central government whenever he can.

8.4.4. Democracy

Among the 80 entries for the lemma democracy (民主), words which collocate frequently with this keyword seem to be positive. The most frequent examples are

28 It comes as no surprise, however, to find that this speech was made at a banquet hosted by the British Prime Minister.
Table 6
Text extracts containing the term *rule of law*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31-07-97</td>
<td>Mark my words, the <strong>rule of law</strong> must be preserved by all means and it will be preserved by all means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-09-97</td>
<td>Part of Hong Kong’s success is also as a result of our promotion of free competitive environment, the strict adherence to the <strong>rule of law</strong>, minimum bureaucracy and a level playing field and a strong commitment against corruption—all provided and supported by an efficient civil service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-03-98</td>
<td>Those with free markets, strong regulations, <strong>rule of law</strong> and stringent fiscal discipline, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have passed the test of fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-06-98</td>
<td>We know strict adherence to the <strong>rule of law</strong>, the need for corruption free society, predictable government policies as well as free flow of information and capital and people are some of the other very important factors which will put investors, local and international alike, at ease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-10-98</td>
<td>We are determined to uphold the <strong>rule of law</strong>, which together with good public administration as have been the fine legacy that Britain has given us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-11-98</td>
<td>Most important of all is that there must be a <strong>rule of law</strong> as well as a legal system that create an environment to ensure and protect freedom of press and freedom of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-07-99</td>
<td>The fact also is that the <strong>rule of law</strong> is very much intact and is going from strength to strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-10-99</td>
<td>We will continue to provide a pro-business environment, underpinned by the <strong>rule of law</strong>, the clean and effective administration, and a level-playing field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04-11-99</td>
<td>But it is crystal clear that international investors are fully confident about the <strong>rule of law</strong>, freedom of speech, the openness of our economy and level playing field in Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-03-00</td>
<td>Our ability to meet these challenges and to sustain economic success is built upon the <strong>rule of law</strong>, a clean, transparent and accountable government, the free flow of information, a free and tolerant society, adherence to the prevailing international standards and a level playing field for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-05-00</td>
<td>And the pillars of our success—the <strong>rule of law</strong>, an independent judiciary, a level playing field for business, free and open markets, the free and unfettered flow of information, and the freedoms of individuals that are so essential in today’s society—are thriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-06-00</td>
<td>The Basic Law has also underpinned the <strong>rule of law</strong> in Hong Kong, enhanced the stability of the entire community and safeguarded the rights of the Hong Kong people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-08-00</td>
<td>there is also the resolute preservation of the <strong>rule of law</strong> as guaranteed under the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-03-01</td>
<td>we have been focusing on ensuring that those quintessential qualities that have made Hong Kong such a unique and successful city are rigorously protected. These qualities include the <strong>rule of law</strong> . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-11-01</td>
<td>a government that stresses <strong>rule of law</strong>, safeguarding of the freedoms that its citizens enjoy, and public security especially in times that demand heightened vigilance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite of these positive comments, commentators are generally agreed that Tung is not keen on the development of democracy. Results from the concordancer show that in many of his speeches, Tung emphasises that the provision for democracy is enshrined in the Basic Law, thereby exonerating himself from further consideration of the matter, when in fact that document allows for a lot of leeway in the extent to which the suffrage will be extended and, as many have argued, the matter should have already have begun to be considered at the time of Tung’s speech (Wan and Leung, 2000; Ng, 2001). In his earlier speeches, in particular, when referring to democracy and the Basic Law, Tung repeated standard

Table 7
Examples of the lemma democracy in context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-07-97</td>
<td>The Special Administrative Region Government is fully committed to preserving the Hong Kong way of life, maintaining Hong Kong’s free and open economic system, upholding the rule of law, and building a more democratic society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-09-97</td>
<td>In seven years’ time, we will have more democracy in the legislature than we ever have in 156 years of colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-09-97</td>
<td>The Basic Law provides that further democratic evolution will depend on the wish of Hong Kong people and the overall environment at that time with universal suffrage being the ultimate objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-09-97</td>
<td>In fact, the progress we will achieve in 10 years from 1997 in terms of democratic process will be far more comprehensive and far-reaching than what we had achieved under 156 years of colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-09-97</td>
<td>Given the fact that the democratic process for the Legislature only began in the early nineties, and for the post of Chief Executive only in 1996, I believe we need a suitable period for transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-10-97</td>
<td>Our constitution, the Basic Law, requires us to develop democratic institutions: our commitment as a society is to do the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-10-97</td>
<td>In 10 years’ time, that is after 2007, according to the Basic Law, Hong Kong people will decide how to take forward the democratic process with the ultimate aim of universal suffrage to elect both the Chief Executive and the Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-03-98</td>
<td>In fact, the process of democratic evolution in the next decade will be far more comprehensive and far-reaching than what we had under 156 years of colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-03-98</td>
<td>We are also carrying on with the development of democracy in Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-05-98</td>
<td>The Government will move forward to a more democratic form of government in accordance with the provisions in the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-08-00</td>
<td>Aside from electoral politics, there are other forms of participatory democracy that we are promoting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-10-01</td>
<td>A government that promotes citizen participation and democracy, in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples in context are shown in Table 7.
formulae, even often “cutting and pasting” the exact same words into different speeches (see Table 8). It is also significant that Tung failed to discuss constitutional development in any of his five annual policy addresses (Yeung and Cheung, 2002)—this is in total contrast to Patten, who made democratic development one of the main themes of each of his five policy addresses.

Another feature worthy of note with regard to Tung’s attitude to democratic development is that out of the 80 entries for the lemma democracy (民主), 60 come from speeches made in 1997, 13 from 1998, while only one is from 2000, 6 are from 2001, and none from 2002. In spite of the fact that the time for the possibility of extending the franchise is getting closer, Tung’s interest in it seems to be declining. Another often used formula for de-emphasising the development of democracy is that little democracy was developed during the 156 years of colonial rule, a fact that Patten did his best to play down. For example, when Tung was asked by a reporter of the Oriental Daily News in 1997 why he did not accept the democratic formula proposed by Patten in 1995, he answered: “Well the fact is, A: we are going by the Basic Law and secondly is that, don’t forget, for 156 years, until the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Examples of democracy collocating with the Basic Law in context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Basic Law provides that further democratic evolution will depend on the wish(es) of Hong Kong people and the overall environment at that time with universal suffrage being the ultimate objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Basic Law has also established the framework for the democratic evolution of our political structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Basic Law, requires us to develop our democratic institutions: our commitment as a society is to do the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Basic Law also requires us to develop our democratic institutions: we as a society are fully committed to doing that. The blueprint for the democratic evolution of our political structure over the first 10 years has been laid down in the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>In 10 years’ time, that is after 2007, according to the Basic Law, Hong Kong people will decide how to take forward the democratic process with the ultimate aim of universal suffrage to elect both the Chief Executive and the Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Government will move forward to a more democratic form of government in accordance with the provisions in the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A government that promotes citizen participation and democracy, in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1990s, there were no elections” (Hong Kong Bank headquarters in London, October 21, 1997).

8.4.5. Chinese cultural values

The lexical item *culture* (文化) occurs 77 times in Tung’s major speeches. Some of the common words that collocate with this keyword include: *our* (我們的) (25), *different* (不同) (11), *history* (歷史) (11), *best* (最佳/最好) (10), *Chinese* (中國/中華/中文) (9), *blending* (交融/融合) (7), *ideas* (構想) (7), *technology* (科技) (6) and *education* (教育) (5). Using the computer-assisted analysis, we see that Tung regards the Chinese culture as an element which plays an important role in projecting Chinese values as part of the Hong Kong cultural identity. (See the examples shown in Table 9.)

A search on the lemma “value” also reveals a preoccupation with traditional Chinese values. There are 37 entries for the keyword *values* (價值). When Tung refers to *values* in terms of standards and principles, he mostly points to the set of Chinese traditional values

### Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text extracts containing the item <strong>Chinese culture</strong></th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. As Hong Kong becomes a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, we must step up civic education so that our youngsters will have a better understanding of China, the <strong>Chinese culture</strong> and history, the concept of “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law</td>
<td>04-07-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In the assimilation of the essence of the fine Western culture in a cosmopolitan and pluralistic place like Hong Kong, they will hand down and further enhance the <strong>Chinese culture</strong> and build a better Hong Kong and China</td>
<td>20-12-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. We must work hard to familiarise ourselves with the <strong>Chinese culture</strong> and get to know the Chinese values. I stress this point because in one’s lifetime, adolescence is the period when one is most imaginative, energetic, creative and innovative. It is in this way that the glorious cultural history of a civilisation has been written down from generation to generation</td>
<td>20-12-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Because of the long separation from our motherland, promoting the knowledge of <strong>Chinese culture</strong> has become an important task of the SAR Government. From the practical viewpoint, this is the basis for the successful implementation of the “One Country, Two Systems” concept</td>
<td>20-12-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. While we preserve the virtues of <strong>Chinese culture</strong>, we will continue to assimilate the knowledge and experiences of the West. Combining the best of the East and the West make each and every one of us a better person and in turn make our society that much stronger</td>
<td>17-06-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Some overseas Chinese newspapers have to struggle hard in order to survive. Apart from the coverage of news of their hometown, they help to promote the <strong>Chinese culture</strong> and enhance inter-communal communication</td>
<td>23-11-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. With thousands of years of <strong>Chinese culture</strong> and history behind us, we are doing more to highlight the tourism potential of our heritage by preserving historical sites and trails, and making them more accessible so people can get a better understanding of our culture and heritage</td>
<td>01-05-00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which he claims are part of the cultural identity of Hong Kong. In a few cases, he refers to Hong Kong as a place where eastern and western values meet. This, according to Tung, has been beneficial to Hong Kong. Examples associated with values are shown in Table 10.

9. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated how Tung Chee-hwa, the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC, has developed the mythical identity established for Hong Kong by Chris Patten, the last colonial Governor. The paper has shown how the core elements of the myth have been maintained, with additional emphasis on the knowledge-based economy with regard to the free market, but downplaying the role of democratic development. In addition, the notions of the Hong Kong people as believers in Confucian values and their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Text extracts containing the word “values”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02-07-97</td>
<td>We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese values, including filial piety, love for the family, modesty and integrity, and the desire for continuous improvement. We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority views, but are mindful of all of our wider interests; we will protect individual rights, but also must shoulder collective responsibilities. I hope these values will provide the foundation for unity in our society for a long time to come.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-10-97</td>
<td>In social terms, my vision is for Hong Kong to be a place in which the majority of families have the security of owning their own home, where our traditional values are upheld, where the elderly can enjoy a dignified retirement and where care and compassion are encouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-12-97</td>
<td>We must work hard to familiarise ourselves with the Chinese culture and get to know the Chinese values. I stress this point because in one’s lifetime, adolescence is the period when one is most imaginative, energetic, creative and innovative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-02-00</td>
<td>... our goal must be to maintain a socially cohesive and stable society, increasingly affluent and well educated, proud of our Chinese heritage, and at the same time assimilate the best cultures and values of the East and West. We recognise diversity brings us many advantages and that it strengthens our cosmopolitan outlook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-01-01</td>
<td>Chinese New Year is the most important festival in our tradition. It is an occasion for family reunion and for reminding ourselves of the need to care for one another; I am sure that Hong Kong people will be able to build on our values, treasure the family and contribute to the development of our community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-12-01</td>
<td>While safeguarding the openness and diversity of our society, should we not have a set of community values which foster mutual help and support? The answer is definitely affirmative. I believe the next administration not only needs to lead Hong Kong to economic recovery, but also to foster a community discussion on these issues. Our aim should not only be economic fulfilment. It is only with such shared values that we can take pride in our identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
essential Chineseness have been emphasised or grafted onto the myth, in an attempt to establish a new identity for the people of Hong Kong.

The question arises, of course, as to how effective Tung has been in projecting this myth onto the people of Hong Kong; to what extent he has been able to ‘naturalise’ it (Barthes, 1972; Flowerdew, 1997a). As is the case of Patten, there is no direct way of knowing the answer to this question. However, a number of factors suggest that Tung has not been particularly effective. First, his weak oratorical skills are likely to have detracted from the power of his discourse. Second, his popularity ratings suggest that people do not agree with him (although this may to a great extent be attributed to the negative economic conditions). Most importantly, however, Hong Kong people do not see themselves as Chinese in the political sense of identity any more now than they did during the colonial era.

This relatively weak sense of Chinese political identity is evident in the results of anniversary surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of Hong Kong University. This poll, entitled “People’s Ethnic Identity Before and After the Handover”, has been carried out every June since 1997. People of age 18 or above were interviewed and asked whether they were proud of formally becoming a national citizen of China after the 1997 Handover. The 1997 results show that advocates for “Yes” and “No” were close to equal, with 46.6% and 45.7%, respectively. However, after 1998 there has been a significant change in the results, and they have remained fairly steady since. In June 1998, 31.6% of the 555 respondents said “Yes”, 65.7% answered “No”, and the remainder said “Don’t know/Hard to say”. In the latest poll conducted in June 2001, 35.4% of the 1074 respondents said “Yes”, 59.9% said “No”, and the rest “Don’t know/Hard to say”.

Some people may criticise the wording of this question and suggest that other measures of association with being Chinese, such as people’s responses to significant symbols and events, such as the national flag, China’s becoming a member of the World Trade Organization, or the news that the Olympic games will be held in Beijing, might be more appropriate. Nevertheless, these results add to the general picture that Hong Kong people do not want to be directly labelled as Chinese in the political sense and that Tung’s patriotic discourse has had little impact. While it is true that more people may identify themselves as Hong Kong Chinese, the majority of Hong Kong people want to retain their identity as either “Hong Kong people” or “Hong Kong Chinese”. They do not want to accept Tung’s line, which would seem to want people to identify themselves as simply “Chinese” (Fung, personal communication, April, 2003). According to a poll conducted by the Chinese University’s Hong Kong’s Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on March 13–16, 2002, 75.9% of the 1002 respondents wanted to elect the Chief Executive through universal suffrage. When asked how long they think it would take for universal suffrage to be realised in Hong Kong, 38% said not until 10 years or more, 21% said 5–10 years, and 8% said never (Abraham, 2002; Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2002). In the terms of Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 195), cited above, Tung’s discourse has not been “enacted” or “inculcated”; in a Foucauldian sense, there has been resistance to his discourse. The Hong Kong people, at least during the first five years of Chinese sovereignty, have maintained their identity as distinct from that of the Mainland.

29 The Handover took effect on July 1, 1997, so the first poll was just before the Handover.
Acknowledgements

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John Flowerdew is Professor in the Department of English and Communication at City University of Hong Kong. His research interests cover a wide field, including discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. In critical discourse analysis, he has published a series of papers concerning Hong Kong’s political transition and a book, “The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal” (Macmillan and St Martins Press).