POLICY DILEMMAS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:  
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE 
U.S.-SOMALIA RELATIONSHIP

Peter J. Schraeder  
*University of South Carolina*

and

Jerel A. Rosati  
*University of South Carolina*

The Reagan administration currently provides military aid to Somalia, utilizes its ports and base facilities as staging areas for U.S. troops under the auspices of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and engages in joint military exercises with the Somali Armed Forces. This relationship, with a country the United States had opposed eleven years ago, was summed up in 1983 by the former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley: “Relations between Somalia and the United States have grown even closer during the past five years...and we are pleased at the prospect of still closer, more fruitful collaborations in the future.”¹ Yet, Richard Greenfield, former political adviser to the Somali government for nine years, warns that the United States possibly is headed for disaster in Somalia: “Parallels with the last days of Haile Selassie are emerging in Mogadishu. Interclan conflict over the uncertainty of presidential succession, an economy in severe crisis, human rights violations, and continued military clashes have left President Mohamed Siyad Barre in a weakened political position.”² If Greenfield is correct in his analysis, one has only to recall the deterioration of the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship as a possible harbinger of things to come if Barre is overthrown and an anti-American regime takes his place.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the divergent nature of the U.S.-Somalia relationship and its implications for the future. In this respect, U.S. foreign policy toward Somalia is not unique but rather is treated as indicative of the shortcomings in general of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The first section provides a context by centering on the concepts of globalism, regionalism, incrementalism, and crisis. The next two sections examine the nature and success of the United States and Somalia in achieving their foreign policy goals. In the fourth section a discussion of the convergence and divergence of these objectives concludes that the United States views its relationship with Somalia as expedient rather than long-lasting. The growing regime

*Northeast African Studies*, Volume 9, Number 3, 1987  19
instability and potential for political crisis in Somalia are then discussed, including the implications for the United States. Finally, an analysis is offered of the pitfalls and potential of three possible approaches for U.S. foreign policy toward Somalia—incrementalism, globalism, and regionalism—with the preferred option being a regionalist approach.

POLICY OPTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Regionalism versus Globalism

Debates surrounding the proper substance of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World generally and the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular have divided proponents into two opposed camps: regionalist and globalist. A useful conceptualization for highlighting the major aspects of this debate has been proposed by Charles Doran, who divides his analysis according to how each camp distinguishes the origins of change and stability, foreign policy purpose, and foreign policy strategy and means.\(^3\)

In terms of “change” and “stability,” the globalists perceive the Third World as a mere pawn in the greater East-West conflict, and a particular Third World country’s internal or external conflicts are seen as being caused by Soviet-inspired intervention. It is the belief of the globalist that the USSR and its allies are capable of “exporting” revolution (instability) to the Third World. The regionalists, to the contrary, focus on local questions as legitimate in their own right, arguing that one must center on the regional political, economic, and historical origins and reasons for a particular conflict (such as lack of land reform, starvation, or historical competition among ethnic groups), not on the Soviet Union and its allies.\(^4\) Subsequently, while the globalists seem to dismiss Third World elites as extremely vulnerable to the political wishes of a dominant external power (that is, the communist bloc nations), the regionalists tend to view these elites as relatively autonomous and capable of acting contrary to the wishes of the dominant external power.

The primary difference between the globalists and the regionalists concerning foreign policy “purpose” revolves around the need for the United States to contain Soviet expansionism versus the cultivation of Third World ties. Since the Soviet bloc is viewed by the globalists as the primary threat to U.S. interests in the Third World, it is logical that policy should center on “containment” to keep the Soviet Union from broadening its sphere of influence. The Reagan administration has intensified this policy to include a “rollback” under the auspices of the Reagan Doctrine. The regionalists, to the contrary, argue that U.S. containment of the USSR is unnecessary due to the potent and growing strength of nationalism in the Third World. Regionalists argue that history is replete with examples of so-called Soviet client states—
discussed, in-cluding China, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Somalia, and Sud-an—that have expelled the Russians when their presence had become inimical to the country's foreign policy interests. In Third World politics, it is argued, self-interest and nationalism are thicker than ideology. The correct path, according to the regionalists, is to de-emphasize the Soviet threat and instead actively cultivate ties with Third World elites regardless of their ideology. The key is that the latter should not \textit{a priori} preempt a fruitful relationship between the United States and a given Third World country.

Finally, the regionalists and globalists are divided over what constitutes proper "strategy and means" for U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The globalist, due to a vision of competition with the USSR which perceives outcomes as zero-sum (a U.S. loss is a Soviet gain, and vice versa), and therefore a loss in the Third World as potentially tipping the world balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union, is willing to utilize any means—including military force—to preclude this outcome. Recommendations therefore rely heavily on militarily engaging the Soviets, most notably by acquiring military base rights in strategic Third World countries, establishing capabilities for quick military intervention when necessary, and bleeding the Soviets through support of anti-communist guerrilla groups. The regionalist, to the contrary, asserts the increasing nonutility of military force in achieving long-term foreign policy goals in the Third World, as well as a greater need for U.S. tolerance of social change, regardless of the type of regime that may result. It is argued that the defeat of the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam and failure of the paramilitary war against Castro's Cuba should have taught U.S. policymakers the folly of seeking similar solutions in El Salvador and Nicaragua, respectively, as well as in other areas of the Third World. The guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy instead should center on diplomatic negotiation and economic inducements.

Although no U.S. administration can be categorized as completely embodying the major tenets of either perspective, one can argue that the globalist view has dominated U.S. foreign policy in the Third World since World War II. The well-springs of this dominance lie in the fact that the Soviet Union emerged after 1945 as the primary challenger of U.S. hegemony in the Third World. Moreover, several events, including China's "fall" to communism in 1949, the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1950, and communist North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, seemed to suggest that a monolithic communism led by the Soviet Union was on the march in the Third World. This provided the basis for a Cold War consensus among U.S. policymakers, the public, and Congress which was built on the twin themes of anticomunism and containment and which lasted virtually unquestioned through four administrations until the United States became mired in a losing war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{5}
The U.S. defeat in Southeast Asia shattered the Cold War consensus and led to a questioning of the key tenets of globalism. For example, the Nixon and Ford administration deviated from strict globalism by portraying the Soviet Union as a traditional superpower with which the United States could negotiate rather than as the head of a global communist threat. Yet, as during the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. policy toward Third World conflicts continued to be guided by the overarching importance attached to the East-West struggle and containment of the Soviet Union.

The Carter administration, adhering to the key tenets of regionalism (especially in its first two years), most profoundly questioned globalist ideals. In his now famous 1977 address at Notre Dame University, Carter seemingly rejected past policies of containment and anticommunism: "Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator willing to join us in that fear." Despite initial commitment to a regionalist course, most notably through an active human rights policy, Carter returned to the comfort of globalist precepts as several events rocked his administration in its latter two years: the fall of the shah of Iran and subsequent hostage crisis, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 witnessed the firm embrace of the globalist Cold War internationalism of the 1950s and 1960s and its concomitant tendency to view all Third World conflict and instability as due to Soviet machinations. Transcending mere containment, the Reagan administration has underscored the need to roll back recent communist advances in the Third World, most notably through U.S. paramilitary support of guerrilla forces fighting Soviet-supported Third World regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Although the globalist school clearly dominates the current administration, the Iran-contra affair, public uneasiness with the U.S.-supported contra war in Nicaragua, and clear popular opposition to the direct use of U.S. military force in Central America suggests that consensus remains elusive, and the regionalist-globalist debate is certain to continue.

_Crisis and Incrementalism_

While the substance of the globalist-regionalist debate indeed is important, often ignored in analyses of U.S. relationships with the Third World is the twin process of policy incrementalism and the development of crisis. One pattern appears to be rather common: The United States and its Third World ally often have divergent foreign policy goals, but the United States usually supports the regime in power and the status quo, fearing that the regime will either turn to the Soviet Union or will be replaced by a more radical polity unwilling to serve U.S. interests. This predilection toward the status quo is the
consensus and the Nixon anding the Soviet could negoti-
 attempting to b e struggle and
regionalism (est-alist ideals. In seemingly re-
garding the nunism which ar."6 Despite an active st precepts as the fall of the revolution in
embracing of the its concom- due to Soviet administration as in the Third territor forces stan, Angola, lary dominates iness with the position to the hat consensus continue.

The incrementalist process usually becomes exacerbated in that, over time, a well-entrenched, U.S.-supported Third World regime often loses legitimacy, resulting in domestic instability and a potential political crisis for the society and U.S. foreign policy. This pattern of incrementalism and crisis can be seen in such recent events as the establishment of anti-U.S. regimes in Ethiopia, Iran, and Nicaragua, the sudden toppling of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, the increasingly tenuous racial relations in South Africa, and student riots in South Korea.9

Rather than pursuing a well-designed foreign policy based on clearly outlined objectives, the United States has more often than not followed an incrementalist policy and ultimately has been forced into a reactionary foreign policy once events already have reached a critical or crisis stage. Thus, there is a need for foresight so that the United States does not find itself suddenly confronted with a crisis detrimental to its long-term foreign policy interests.

The U.S. relationship with Somalia is slowly developing along the lines of crisis and incrementalism discussed above. Thus, this relationship needs to be examined in greater depth. Is each nation pursuing complementary or contradictory foreign policy goals? If the latter, whose goals are being achieved? Is this a relationship of expediency, and if so, how stable and how productive are its future prospects? These questions are examined here and provide the foundation for analyzing the policy options open to the United States in its future relationship with Somalia.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN SOMALIA

U.S. foreign policy toward Somalia, largely globalist in perspective, is based on three general goals: regional stability (maintenance of the regional status quo), which seeks to contain Soviet-Cuban advances through the support of regional allies and client states; acquisition of military facilities as part of an overall Indian Ocean presence; and finally, although peripheral in nature, promotion of private enterprise and capitalist development. The first goal is the result of three perceived regional destabilizing factors: the expansion of Soviet-Cuban influence, most notably in Ethiopia and South Yemen; the fall of the shah of Iran in 1978 and the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini; and the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a Marxist regime.

The expansion of Soviet-Cuban influence in the Horn, as well as elsewhere on the African continent, has become the *bête noire* of the Reagan administration, most notably because of the Horn’s strategic location adjoining the Persian Gulf oil routes and its proximity to such traditional regional U.S. allies as Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. In globalist fashion, the Reagan administration perceives Soviet objectives as access to maritime chokepoints in order to threaten oil and shipping lanes vital to the West, as well as to gain a foothold in Africa to destabilize governments throughout the region. According to Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the Horn of Africa has considerable strategic importance for the United States as it is relevant to both the security of the Middle East and to Africa. American interests in this area include safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers which fuel the economy of Western Europe. We seek access to airfields and harbors for our military forces should they, in times of crisis, be required to defend against Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean which challenges our friends in the region. We strive to halt Libyan adventurism and terrorism, which poses a threat to every peace-loving country in the region. We seek to avoid the isolation of Egypt. We work to prevent radical pressures on Saudi Arabia and efforts to destabilize Sudan and Somalia.10

In an interview published in *Africa Report*, President Reagan underscored the need to support Somalia: “In the face of Libyan-promoted and Ethiopian-supported subversion, and in some instances, direct aggression and occupation of territory, we have provided defensive military equipment and supplies to Somalia and Sudan.”11

The Reagan administration sees the provision of military aid as contributing to checking Soviet expansion in the region. The United States incrementally has increased its military and economic support for Somalia since 1978, although the overall level has remained relatively low, keeping foreign policy options open. It is difficult to assess, however, whether U.S. support of Somalia has contributed to regional stability. One can only cite recent developments in the Horn as related to but not necessarily causally linked to U.S. efforts. First, the Barre government has been maintained through Western aid, despite coming under increasing domestic pressure (discussed below). Second, the Somali government reduced tensions with Kenya by signing a border peace pact on December 2, 1984. Third, despite numerous border confrontations between Ethiopia and Somalia, large-scale conflict and the expansion of Ethiopia by military means have been avoided. Conversely, a military coup in May 1985 in the Sudan (preceded by mass uprisings in the urban areas against cruel economic conditions and a repressive state), resurgence of
Oromo and Eritrean guerrilla activities in Ethiopia, and the 1982 attempted military coup in Kenya are perhaps indicative of future instability in the Horn of Africa.

The second major U.S. foreign policy goal in Somalia is the acquisition of military facilities as part of an overall Indian Ocean presence. The primary logistical areas desired in Somalia are the Soviet-built port and air facilities of Berbera and the Somali capital of Mogadishu. These two areas, together with Kenya's port of Mombasa and the former British airbase on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, were the object of U.S. military access agreements concluded in August 1980,12 and they are complemented by base rights agreements in Chad, Egypt, and Sudan. Yet, the United States waited until 1983 to begin enlarging the airfield and improving the harbor at Berbera. "Observers have speculated that U.S. annoyance with Barre's repeated claims to the Ogaden and lack of faith in his ability to remain in office led to the delay...There has also been speculation that the U.S. had previously overestimated the strategic value of the Berbera base."13

The primary purposes for acquiring access agreements were to provide forward and rear staging areas for deployment of U.S. troops and logistical capabilities for maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Former U.S. Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Matthew Nimitz clearly outlined the Carter administration's rationale for obtaining these access areas: "What is clear...is that if and when a crisis develops, there will not likely be time or opportunity to provide ourselves with the facilities we may desperately need. We will have to rely on what we have had the foresight to negotiate and put in place ahead of time."14 The Reagan administration clarified this stand in a secret Department of Defense document, "Fiscal 1986-1988 Defense Guidance": "Whatever the circumstances, we should be prepared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear that the security of access to the Persian Gulf is threatened."15 In this respect the United States has conducted numerous military maneuvers with the Somalis, such as the August 1987 "Bright Star" exercises in which U.S. soldiers of the 3rd Army joined with the Somali armed forces in maneuvers launched from the Somali ports of Berbera and Alula and from the base of Uanle Uen, situated 100 kilometers west of Mogadishu.

The United States clearly has been successful in securing bases and access agreements for the projection of military force into the Indian Ocean region. Especially in terms of the Somali agreement, the United States has received facilities in return for limited amounts of foreign aid and restricted promises of military hardware. A question arises, however, as to whether the United States really needs an access-agreement with Somalia in light of the excellent ones reached with Egypt, Kenya, and, to a more limited extent, Oman—three countries offering better facilities and more political stability.16
A third U.S. foreign policy goal in Somalia is to promote private enterprise and capitalist development. This goal, applicable to U.S. economic relations with all developing countries, is consistent with Reagan's liberal economic posture and ideological aversion to socialist development programs and practices. An important aspect of this policy is an emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral aid, through which political concessions and domestic reforms can be achieved. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has put this "Economic Policy Initiative for Africa" in perspective: "The program will offer tangible support for those countries prepared to undertake the policy reforms needed to improve productivity. We will not allocate these funds in advance, but rather will respond to constructive reforms where and when they are undertaken."\(^{17}\)

One example of Somalia's willingness to comply with Western liberal ideology is its adherence to International Monetary Fund (IMF) directives, including devaluing currency to make imports more expensive and exports more desirable. The 1985 devaluation of the Somali shilling necessitated a 30 percent adjustment to bring it in line with the black market rate (81 Somali shillings = U.S. $1.00). The devaluation, rather than aiding the economy, has exacerbated Somalia's tenuous economic position. Urban dwellers' salaries have lost buying power against rising prices for staples. While the demand for imports has remained unchanged, exports have stagnated or declined, adding to the country's balance-of-payments deficit.

In fact, although the *Somali National Development Plan: 1982-1986* claimed that one of its objectives was creation of a "society based on social justice and individual freedom within a socialist framework," scientific socialism was relegated to secondary status in favor of a capitalist path of development.\(^{18}\) This is clearly shown by the Somali 1982-1986 budget objectives in which foreign investment provides 80 percent of development expenditures. To this end, in 1986 the Somali government opened, in conjunction with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, an office of the Somalia Investment Promotion Service to attract U.S. and Canadian investment. Moreover, Abdulkarim Ali Mohamed, head of the Somali investment office in New York, has stated that Somalia's investment law is being reexamined "to make it 'even more attractive' to foreign investors, allowing them to repatriate or reinvest all profits earned."\(^{19}\)

Unfortunately, the Reagan administration's emphasis on private enterprise and capitalism is no guarantee that Somalia will be able to overcome its development problems. The large amounts of Western aid currently extended to Somalia are perhaps only quick fixes which, if not accompanied by political reforms, will be counterproductive in the long run. One has merely to remember that the United States provided Ethiopia with almost $250 million in aid from 1953 to 1974—not accompanied by political reforms—and lost its entire
investment when domestic instability brought to power a regime antithetical to U.S. interests.

SOMALI FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: FADING OF IRREDENTISM?

Somalia's traditional foreign policy goal has been the unification within a "Greater Somalia" of the divided Somali territories currently held by Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. This "irredentism" has led to conflict with both Ethiopia and Kenya and has placed Somalia at odds with the principle of "sanctity of frontiers" as enshrined in the Organization of African Unity, thereby making Somalia somewhat of a pariah within Africa and the international system. It is important to note that this foreign policy is not merely a product of post-independence Somalia but long has been the guiding theme of several nationalist groups, such as the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1943. Somalia's irredentist quest led first to diplomatic negotiations with the colonial powers and regional neighbors, followed by support for guerrilla insurgencies in the Horn and by actual border hostilities and conflict with Kenya and Ethiopia. The most recent and decisive encounter was Somalia's invasion and subsequent defeat in the 1977-1978 Ogaden War with Ethiopia.

That defeat set in motion several negative socioeconomic and political forces which forced the Barre regime to retreat, despite official statements to the contrary, from its irredentist goal. First, Somalia abruptly lost Soviet economic and military aid when Mogadishu abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on November 6, 1977. Second, refugees from war and the recurrent drought in the Horn (estimates range from 550,000 to 1.5 million) have placed an immense burden on resources. Third, Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden discredited the regime, both in the eyes of the people and portions of the military, forcing Barre increasingly to resort to authoritarian tactics. Fourth, intra- and interclan struggle has returned to Somali politics with a vengeance, in part fostered by Barre's recent practice of staffing government positions with members of his own clan. Paul Henze puts the situation in proper perspective: "Siyad's plight and that of his country demonstrate the woe that can come from too warm a Soviet embrace as well as the folly of subordinating all other goals to irredentism. His problem now is that he cannot escape from the consequences of his mistakes." The net result is that Somalia's foreign policy goals have become increasingly eclectic, and the former policy of irredentism has been pushed temporarily into the background.

Since its break with the Soviets and defeat in the Ogaden War, Somalia's major foreign policy goal has been to foster an increased U.S. presence in the country, with an emphasis on military cooperation and transfer of equipment. Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, Minister of the Interior and former head of the
National Security Services of Somalia, put this objective into perspective by quoting an appropriate Somali proverb: "Either be a mountain or have a mountain to lean on." Abdulle qualified this statement, explaining that "since a superpower (the Soviet Union) is openly and directly siding with Ethiopia against us, we've no choice but to seek the support of another superpower (the United States)."

The key component of this strategy was to restore the Somali army with sophisticated U.S. weapons. As Donald K. Petterson, former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, recounts:

Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have been mindful of the concerns of Somalia's neighbors and of the U.S. Congress and other interested parties in the United States. Thus it was that of the $65 million allocated for military aid for fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, half was for air defense radar and almost all of the remainder for nonlethal items like radios and trucks. No arms were delivered until the summer of 1982, after Ethiopian and Somali dissident forces occupied Balenbale and Goldcogob in Somalia. Fearing that the enemy would move further east and cut the north-south road, the Somali government appealed for and received two emergency airlifts of small arms and ammunition, and 24 armored personnel carriers armed with antitank weapons.

Between 1981 and 1987 the administration provided Somalia with $340 million in security assistance (roughly half coming from the Economic Support Fund); the request for fiscal 1988 was $46 million. Not surprisingly, Siyad Barre has been dissatisfied with the total amount of U.S. security assistance. Petterson explains: "Because of an exaggerated sense of the importance of Somalia to the United States, the Somalis had gone much too far in trying to extract the maximum amount of U.S. economic and military assistance in return for American use of Somali ports and airfields."

The U.S. military presence in Somalia, although limited, is gradually being upgraded to the point that American lives could potentially become endangered. In addition to the joint military maneuvers, U.S. military sources in Mogadishu have confirmed that U.S. personnel have in the past manned Somalia's radar sites (which are highly vulnerable to Ethiopian attack) and have trained at forward guerrilla bases along the extremely tense Somalia-Ethiopia border in the Ogaden. Interestingly, U.S. military advisers rarely stay longer than one year, thereby allowing the military to rotate greater numbers of them, who are not considered "official" advisers. (This is not unlike the situation in El Salvador, where this policy legally circumvents congressional limits on military advisers in that country.)

Barre's inability to acquire the desired U.S. assistance and weaponry perhaps lends credence to rumors circulating in 1985 that a secret military deal had been made with South Africa, despite Somalia's constant diatribes against
 subjective by an effect or a fact "since Ethiopia is a power (the army with ambassa-

40 million or Fund); Barre has Pettersson to extract the return for

ally being near endan-

soures in f4 manned (tack) and

Somalia rarely stay r numbers unlike the agressional

ponry pers-

lity deal

nes against

apartheid. It is said that Somalia agreed to grant South Africa landing rights and permission to use naval facilities, to sell eight grounded Soviet-built Mig-21 fighters, and to allow the establishment of a trade mission in Mogadishu in return for transfers of captured Soviet arms in Angola, spare parts for ten Hawker aircraft, expenses for the training of Somali pilots and technicians, and antiguerrilla training for units of the Somali army.27 Somalia officially has denied any arrangements, claiming that "reports of such an agreement were nothing but a mere concoction by the Ethiopian regime aimed at misleading and confusing world public opinion."28

Somalia has been only partially successful in fostering a greater U.S. presence in the country. While U.S. military aid to Somalia is gradually increasing along with more frequent and extensive military cooperation between the two countries, the overall level of military aid has remained rather low. Furthermore, Somalia has been unable to acquire the amount and type of armaments desired.

The third Somali foreign policy goal has been the search for extensive economic aid. As previously stated, the country's economic position rapidly deteriorated after its break with the Soviet Union and defeat in the Ogaden War. The sudden loss of Soviet capital and technical aid devastated burgeoning fishery and settlement projects. The limited Somali budget was stretched to the breaking point by hundreds of thousands of refugees requiring basic foodstuffs and resettlement. Currently Somalia is experiencing rampant inflation, declining exports and increasing imports, balance-of-payments deficits, declining food production, and successive devaluations of the shilling.

Yet, Somalia has been relatively successful in increasing foreign economic aid: Total gross receipts grew from $106.3 million in 1976 to $465.6 million in 1982, a quadrupling in six years. Nevertheless, a striking aspect is Somalia's inability to attract greater amounts of U.S. developmental funding. Of the $600 million in total U.S. foreign assistance to Somalia from 1981 to 1987, only 40 percent was for development, and 50 percent of that consisted of U.S. food imports for the Somali people.29 The major underwriters of Somalia's economic needs are OPEC, various Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia), the EEC, and Western European countries. These ties are being manipulated in order to entice Somalia to abandon its call for the self-determination of the Ogadeni people. For example, the EEC has pledged $40 million to Somalia if some level of agreement is reached with Ethiopia over the Ogaden.30 Barre's financial relationship with OPEC remains "less productive of material support than he would like. The Saudis, for example, have never abandoned their skepticism about Siad's economic and religious policies."31 More important, even though Somalia has quadrupled the amount of foreign economic aid received since 1976, the aggregate amount remains woefully short of resolving its major economic problems, causing Somalia to pressure in particular the
United States to increase its financial commitment.

A corollary to Somalia's search for increased Western aid is an attempt to reduce regional tensions and increase economic links with its eastern and southern neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Kenya. It is hoped in Mogadishu that fostering better relationships with these two regional keystones of U.S. foreign policy will yield increased aid in the future. In fact, the Saudis, who have acted as a go-between in Somalia's territorial dispute with Kenya, have been unhappy with Barre's intransigence. Repeated Saudi efforts, however, contributed to the Somalia-Kenya transportation and tourism agreement, signed on December 2, 1984, which declares that both countries will "increase bilateral trade and approach international financiers for assistance in joint projects."32

In similar fashion, Barre met Haile Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia in Djibouti in 1986 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to discuss regional problems. Initial talks, like those conducted at an earlier meeting in 1982, seemed unlikely to result in reduced tensions. Because of Ethiopia's overwhelming military superiority and Somalia's increasing domestic instability, Mengistu made Barre's recognition of the OAU's principle of "territorial integrity" (recognition of the existing Somalia-Ethiopia frontier) the sine qua non of normalization of diplomatic relations. To the contrary, Barre argued that discussion concerning the frontier should come after both countries had agreed upon steps to disengage their troops from the contested area, exchange prisoners of war, and resume diplomatic relations. In a surprising and welcome about-face, Ethiopia announced on April 4, 1988, after high-level negotiations in Mogadishu, that it was willing to accept Somalia's demands and that both countries had agreed to restore diplomatic relations.33 Although a promising start, the stumbling bloc to true peace in the region—resolution of the Ogaden question—still remains.

CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND EXPEDIENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS

An examination of U.S. and Somali foreign policy goals shows that although they are similar in certain respects at a superficial level, as a whole they represent divergent perspectives, especially over the long term. First, the U.S. goal of acquiring more military facilities in the region is potentially congruent with Somalia's goal of fostering a greater U.S. military presence. The Reagan administration, however, does not want an extensive military relationship, viewing Somalia's facilities as a complementary component of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. Conversely, Somalia desires an extensive U.S. military presence and large transfers of offensive hardware. Furthermore, although the U.S. goal of regional stability, which is linked with fostering private enterprise and economic development, is potentially congruent with Somalia's
quest for aid to stabilize its faltering economy, the United States has broader regional interests, including blunting Soviet-Cuban expansionism and protecting the Persian Gulf oil routes. The Reagan administration is not prepared to underwrite Somalia's economy, especially in light of the poor performance with previously disbursed funds. Conversely, the Barre regime desires considerable aid to prop up its economy and quell potential mass discontent.

Although there may be some degree of congruence in U.S.-Somali goals in the short run, divergence is complete in the long run. The United States is primarily interested in promoting regional stability, whereas Barre wants to unify the Somali people throughout the Horn of Africa under the government in Mogadishu. At a minimum, Somalia wants to reclaim the Ogaden from Ethiopia, its traditional enemy and a country whose present borders it perceives to be a result of Ethiopian expansion and empire. Barre's policy is summed up sardonically by a highly placed U.S. official working in Somalia: "Barre doesn't care a rat's ass about his people or development, all he cares about is irredentism and maintaining himself in power." This statement is particularly revealing: Even if one accepts the assumption that Barre has put aside, for the time being, pursuit of self-determination for the Ogaden region, his primary concern may well be maintaining his own power, literally at any cost. From the U.S. perspective, neither Somalia's irredentist goal nor its desire to maintain power at any cost can promote regional stability.

So far, the United States clearly has set the foreign policy agenda in its relationship with Somalia. While the United States has acquired extensive military facility rights in Somalia, military aid to the country has been small and limited to defensive weapons, much to the chagrin of the regime. While Barre undoubtedly has fostered a greater U.S. presence by casting the conflict in the Horn of Africa within an East-West prism, the United States only has offered marginal amounts of security and development aid. The Reagan administration regularly denounces the Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia (as well as in Angola), yet U.S. deeds do not match U.S. rhetoric. Moreover, Barre has joined the Reagan administration in denouncing Soviet-Cuban expansionism, supporting U.S. strategic initiatives in the Indian Ocean, advancing liberal economic initiatives, and relieving regional tensions, even going so far as to enter into negotiations with Ethiopia. Why, then, has the United States, which has set the foreign policy agenda of the relationship, refused to embrace fully the Barre regime, even though Somalia obviously wishes an enhanced U.S. presence in both the military and economic realms?

The obvious answer is that the Reagan administration is treating its relationship with Somalia as one of expediency rather than of a lasting nature, remaining wary of latent Somali irredentism and the precariousness of the Barre regime. More important, the United States has maintained its distance from the Barre regime in hopes that the Soviets will "wear out their welcome"
in Ethiopia, leaving the door open for the United States to return to its traditional ally in the Horn. Chester Crocker recently stated that "the United States has been ready to engage with Ethiopia to bring about an improvement in relations between us on a basis that would not only improve bilateral relations but allow Ethiopia to regain its once proud role in the region." Petterson reveals the deep debate which has gone on in U.S. policy circles over this issue:

There were very strong differences about our Somalia policy between the African Affairs Bureau and the Political Military Affairs Bureau in the State Department and also between State and the National Security Council. Those who believed the United States would be much better off without an agreement were influenced by their strong distrust of Siad, their belief that Ethiopia meant much more to the United States than did Somalia and that a military relationship with Somalia would finish any chance of resuming closer ties with Ethiopia, and their fear that the United States would get entangled in an African conflict (and be on the wrong side).36

As one observer noted, the "return of Ethiopia to a position of neutrality or to a pro-Western stance would be a far greater gain than Somalia can ever hope to be."37 Somalia simply seems to be a convenient host for short-term military strategic objectives to be obtained at the lowest cost possible.

The Barre regime is partially to blame for U.S. hesitation; it has presented itself as a willing ally to any country ready to provide economic and military aid. Initially denied arms desired from the West in 1961 (in particular from the United States), the Somalis signed a military agreement with the USSR in 1963. Somalis never grew to like the Soviets, who were sarcastically referred to as the "big boots." Once abandoned by the Soviets in the Ogaden War, the Somalis then turned to the United States, only to become disenchanted with the paucity of arms delivered. Despite continued diatribes against apartheid, it has been rumored that the Barre regime struck a military deal with the South Africans. Although vehemently denied by the Barre regime, this step would not be inconsistent with past Somali foreign policy.

In the economic realm, Barre also has appeared unwilling to be flexible in achieving his foreign policy goals. "Scientific socialism" was adopted in 1972 with the expectation of extensive economic aid from the Eastern block. This help not forthcoming, Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974 to reap the benefits of the burgeoning petrodollar wealth. Finally realizing the insufficiency of the Arab link, Somalia has now adopted liberal economic practices (although officially maintaining a Marxist stance) to tap Western financial reserves.

The key questions are whether the U.S.-Somalia relationship is indeed one of expediency, how stable it is, and what negative potential it has for U.S. for-
eign policy interests, especially when one notes the incremental enhancement of U.S.-Somalia ties. As will be discussed below, the Barre regime is unstable, encountering increasing mass pressure and military unrest. Even though the United States is not overwhelmingly involved with the Barre regime, a coup d'etat or renewed hostilities in the Ogaden, especially if Americans stationed in the region become victims of rapidly moving events, could embroil the United States in a conflict it never desired. More important, by adopting a status quo stance that provides Barre with the minimum aid needed to maintain himself in power (but do little else), the United States is contributing to the polarization of Somali society and close identification of the United States with the hated regime. If Somalia's deepening political crisis leads to a military coup, struggle for power among clan leadership, or a popular rebellion, the likely result is an anti-U.S. regime.

REGIME INSTABILITY AND IMPENDING POLITICAL CRISIS

Somalia's complementary foreign policy objectives of greater U.S. military and economic assistance are strongly linked to the rise in domestic instability. Increased military support is sought to placate a restless armed forces, and economic aid is need to dampen mass dissent. Although a unique nation in certain respects, the Somali state increasingly is unable to overcome the numerous crises and challenges of underdevelopment comparable to those faced by most African countries during the 1970s and 1980s. These include environmental degradation (such as drought), deterioration of the economy (particularly declining terms of trade), massive refugee movements, authoritarian rule, power struggles among competing elites and ethnic groups, and guerrilla insurgency. All these factors contribute to an impending political crisis for Somali society, the reverberations of which will be felt in the U.S. foreign policy establishment if an anti-U.S. regime gains power.

Political instability in Somalia has been exacerbated by the deteriorating economy. One of the poorest and least developed societies in the world, Somalia's major sources of income as well as foreign currency are foreign assistance, money remitted from Somalis working abroad (especially in the Persian Gulf), and livestock exports. In the last decade the Somali economy has been consistently near bankruptcy and increasingly dependent on external support. Most of the people live a life of bare subsistence, and a limited number of goods and services are available, especially in the urban areas. "A secondary school graduate, if he can obtain work, may expect to earn some 800 shillings a month; even the salary of a minister is only 4,000 shillings—at least from official sources. Yet a soft drink now costs 200 shillings, a kilo of meat 180, a three or four kilo fish 500." Not surprisingly, a large underground
economy has been built on misappropriated foreign aid, especially that directed toward refugees and resettlement.41

The deteriorating economy and failure to achieve foreign policy goals have led to discontent with the Barre regime at all levels of Somali society. According to a communiqué issued by Concerned Somalis, a group committed to the overthrow of Siyad Barre: “During 1981-83, mass discontent with the regime intensified to such an extent that it has become a national phenomenon. The series of anti-government demonstrations during this period in Hargeisa, Burao, Erigavo, Borama and Sheikh in the north, ambushes of military convoys in the Belet Uen and Mudug areas in the central regions and the series of bomb explosions in the capital itself provide good examples of the nation-wide manifestation of discontent with the regime.”42 A blatant manifestation of discontent was the November 24, 1984, highjacking of a Somali airliner by dissidents led by Captain Awil Adan Bourham, a Somali military officer. The hijackers’ demands included the release of seven students who had been jailed for taking part in antigovernment activities (accused of being accomplices in the July 1984 bomb explosion in Hargeisa) and the release of fourteen other political prisoners. The hijackers were only able to gain assurances that the students would not be executed, although they were to remain in jail.

Opposition to the regime also has fostered the growth of numerous antigovernment guerrilla groups. One of these, the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), based in Ethiopia, recently has been weakened by a concerted Barre campaign questioning its legitimacy (the Ethiopian link displeased even anti-Barre sympathizers) and the departure from the group of moderate elements. Some former members of the DFSS have created a small splinter group, the Somali Patriotic Liberation Front (SPLF), based in Aden, South Yemen, and led by Said Jama. The SPLF leadership hopes that breaking the Ethiopian link will increase their legitimacy in Somalia and internationally. A northern dissident organization, the Somali National Movement (SNM), based in Isaq, is recognized as “being strongly pro-western,” with a new leadership that has “close ties with the Saudis.”43

Although the goal of these organizations is to topple the Barre government, differences among them and vigorous Barre attempts to defuse their appeal have prevented them from coalescing into a unified, legitimate, national movement. For example, ideological differences caused a split between the pro-Ethiopian leadership of the DFSS and the more pro-West SPLF. Likewise, the Saudi Arabian links of the SNM, part of whose financing comes from significant contributions made by Somalis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, circumscribe the SNM’s latitude to deal with Ethiopia, seen by the Saudis as a Soviet-backed communist threat to the stability of the Horn. Furthermore, Barre has been successful in curtailing external support through numerous diplomatic offensives, the most notable being a resumption of diplo-
matic relations with Libya in April 1985. Libya, which has previously supported both the DFSS and SNM, reportedly agreed to cut off funds to these groups as part of the April diplomatic agreement. Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that Barre’s political maneuvering is the key to the weakness of the anti-government guerrillas. Indeed, their core problem is their inability to forge a unified opposition which can galvanize popular support that transcends clan or regional boundaries.

Barre’s response to increased domestic instability has been political repression. This “campaign of obliteration” of guerrilla activity and its supporters in the north was outlined in a leaked top secret policy paper sent to President Barre by Major-General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi (nicknamed Morgan), the sector commander of the northwest region. In the past the northern and central region have been put under states of emergency, and it has become increasingly difficult for the government to maintain security through military garrisons in the north. It is well known that political tensions exist between clans from the formerly British-controlled northern and north-central regions and those in the south, once under Italian rule. The Majertaan clan (north-central region) wielded power in Somalia from 1961 onward, but the coup d’état led by Barre in 1969 shifted the power base to the southern portion of the country, including the Ogaden. The net result of Barre’s subsequent centralization of power has been to staff important government positions with individuals from his clan groupings in the south: Marchan, Ogadeni, and Dullbahante (the so-called MOD alliance). The policy implications of the divided nature of Somali society have been summed up as follows by the U.S. Agency for International Development: “While not exactly a cultural factor, strains in relations between Northern and Southern Somalia are an important element of the nation’s political make-up. Northerners’ concerns that the central government is excluding them from the decision-making process are analogous to those of disenfranchised clan groups.” The Somali government, however, is attempting to cover up unrest (both to its citizens and to the international community) by reporting it as either Ethiopian inspired or the result of direct Ethiopian violations of Somaliland territory.

Implementing the traditional colonial policy of divide and conquer, Barre also has escalated the confrontation “by embarking adventurously on a program of inciting a civil war through the direct instigation of clan hostilities.” Noting that the SNM is largely supported by the Isáq clan in northwestern Somalia (also inhabited by the Issa and Samaroone clans), as well as in the northeast and the Haud areas, the government has isolated the Isáq by subdividing one region within which they preside into the “Northwest” region, almost entirely inhabited by Isáq, and the new “Awdal” region almost entirely inhabited by Samaroone and Issa. In return, the latter do not allow the SNM free movement within their region, which was not the case when the Isáq
dominated the entire area.

Osman Mohamoud characterizes Barre’s policies as his “survival strategy” and claims they are likely to polarize domestic opposition, radicalize dissident organizations, and lead to Somalia’s political disintegration. Mohamoud places Somalia’s growing domestic instability and its implications for U.S. foreign policy into perspective: “An expanded security assistance to Somalia legitimizes American acquiescence to General Barre’s counter-insurgency. American subsidies cannot offset his costly military expenditure but can exacerbate the country’s considerable economic difficulties and perpetuate both instability and the regime’s dependence on external assistance.”

Barre successfully has ruled Somalia for nearly nineteen years, following a military takeover of a democratic government in 1969. Since that time government policy has been based on Barre’s personification as the Somali leader throughout the country. Barre, however, is almost 80 years old and reportedly in poor health, exacerbated by a traffic accident in July 1986 which required airlifting him to Saudi Arabia for treatment of undisclosed wounds. Barre’s physical condition and speculation that the end of his rule looms have led to a vicious power struggle among the country’s ruling elites (within Barre’s Marehan clan as well as among clans). For example, several powerful Marehan members, such as Brigadier-General Maslah Mohammed Siad and Brigadier-General Mohammed Siyad, oppose the ascension of Prime Minister Lieutenant-General Muhammed Ali Samatar as president once Barre has passed away. Moreover, Minister of Foreign Affairs (and Barre’s half-brother) Abdurahman Jama Barre is positioning himself as the future leader of the Marehan clan and the nation. As Greenfield notes, “most leaders of other, often much larger clans and subclans are apparently content to look on for the time being. But several harbor resentment at being dispossessed and persecuted in the past. If economic stagnation worsens, as seems likely, and tensions rise, the passing months will present a built-in dynamic for instability.”

It is thus highly likely that Somalia is heading for crisis. Clan politics increasingly are creating rifts among the top leadership, traditional north-south cleavages are being exacerbated by increasingly powerful and popularly supported guerrilla groups, the helmsman of Somali society for the last nineteen years is losing his authoritarian grip, and economic problems, aggravated drought, and the Ogaden War have disrupted both the economy and society. The foreign policy ramifications of such a crisis are indeed important and merit a discussion of U.S. policy options and prescriptions.

INCREMENTALISM, GLOBALISM, OR REGIONALISM?

Future U.S. foreign policy toward Somalia has three general options: incremental, regional, and global. The incremental approach, matched with
certain tenets of globalism, is presently being followed by the Reagan administration. The policy is characterized by a slow but increasing economic and military commitment to an ally without a clear concept of the future relationship. Laitin points out the danger of incrementalism: “We could find ourselves in a few years entrenched in Somalia, with real positions to defend. This is not because anyone believes we ought to be there, but because we have no vision of a desired future that can change our course.”

Furthermore, the pattern of incrementalism is that the United States and its Third World ally often have divergent foreign policy goals, with the United States usually supporting the status quo because it fears the regime either will turn to the Soviet Union or will be replaced by a more radical one unwilling to serve U.S. interests. The Barre regime has not been fully embraced by the Reagan administration, as would be the case under a strictly globalist policy. Rather, the relationship is one of expedience to blunt Soviet-Cuban expansionism at minimal cost, while the real prize—Ethiopia—is sought.

The dangers of this type of policy are immense. First, the United States fosters false hopes of an even closer relationship and support of Somali foreign policy objectives. This led to estrangement after the 1977-1978 Ogaden War (when Somalia assumed it had the support of the Carter administration) and currently causes bitterness in Somalia because the desired levels of military aid have not been received from the Reagan administration. Second, the United States risks falling prey to the foreign policy objectives of Somalia. Although the United States diplomatically was able to distance itself from the Ogaden War, what would be the response if Ethiopia mounted a full-scale invasion of Somalia? The United States, with its newly acquired base rights, could become caught up in a war it neither wants nor supports. Third, a more dangerous and likely implication is that even though the United States does not consider Somalia to be a staunch, irrereplaceable ally on a par with the Philippines, the anti-Barre groups in Somalia perceive the United States as the major prop of the regime. If the Barre leadership is overthrown, the most likely result is an anti-U.S. coalition. In essence, the United States will become the whipping boy of the new and potentially radical regime, whereas a correct and positive relationship might have developed if links to the Barre government had not been so close. Clearly, an active and positive policy toward Somalia is required.

The second U.S. foreign policy option, a globalist approach, would entail wholehearted support of the Barre regime as a staunch defender against an expansionist Ethiopia supported and guided by Soviet-Cuban forces. This would call for dramatic increases in U.S. military aid to Somalia, and in the case of the Ogaden War, it would have entailed giving full military support to Barre to consolidate his control over the Ogaden and thus contribute to toppling Mengistu. Such an approach would have included covert activities to
destabilize Ethiopia, adding Mengistu's regime to the list of Marxist Third World countries targeted by the Reagan Doctrine for overthrow through support of guerrilla "freedom fighters."

This approach is extremely naive and antithetical to the realities of the Horn for four reasons. First, Ethiopia is viewed both within the continent and internationally as the victim of illegal Somali territorial expansion. The Organization of African Unity, for example, which was founded on the principle of the "sanctity of frontiers," has consistently denounced Somalia's aggrandizement. Second, traditional Western allies in Africa, such as Kenya, consistently have supported Ethiopia. In fact, Soviet use of Kenya's port of Mombasa to transship weapons and Cuban troops in the Ogaden War was instrumental in Ethiopia's victory. Third, the Soviet-Cuban presence in the Horn is not the source of regional problems—a canard of globlists not only in regard to the Horn but also to southern Africa and Central America—but instead has prospered from the historical conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Fourth, it can be argued that unequivocal support of Barre would make his regime increasingly intransigent and authoritarian toward domestic pressures for reform. One has merely to refer to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974; unequivocal U.S. support for a dictator led to a mass uprising and the inevitable radicalization of the political structure of that country.

The third and preferred U.S. foreign policy option is a regionalist approach. Its primary component is realization that regional tensions cannot be resolved by force but only by a peaceful solution of the nationalities problem in the Horn, most notably through diplomatic negotiations and compromise among all parties involved. Laitin argues that rather than call for self-determination in the Ogaden—a highly unlikely prospect given the current power configurations in the Horn—Barre should instead be trying to work out an equitable arrangement whereby ethnic Ogadeni Somalis would be guaranteed basic rights and services within an Ethiopian federation. According to Laitin, such a guarantee would make the question of self-determination moot, and when he presented this argument to Barre during an interview in 1983 "the President replied that mine was a good idea and worth exploration. He challenged me to pursue the idea elsewhere." This is not an inconceivable possibility, since a similar resolution was reached between Djibouti and Kenya. Only by solving the macro-political issue of sovereignty will Ethiopia and Somalia be able to stem the flow of dislocated peoples. In this respect, the United States should back wholeheartedly the IGADD process, which has provided the basis for increased economic cooperation among the countries of the Horn and has been a forum for political talks which have reduced military tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.

A second component of the regionalist strategy is the gradual withdrawal of U.S. military support for the Barre regime.
the Reagan administration's foreign policy goals of maintaining regional sta-

bility and acquiring access to military bases, continued support of the Barre 

regime is unnecessary and even counter-productive. The United States has no 

need for military access to Berbera or Mogadishu in light of other excellent 

facilities readily available in the area, and the continued halfhearted subsidiza-

tion of the Barre regime does not guarantee against a popular overthrow and a 

more radicalized anti-U.S. government. In fact, one can argue that support for 

an inherently unstable government insures that it will ultimately be replaced by 

a more radical one. To understand the strength of this argument, consider the 

historical examples of past U.S. support for Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, Ngu 

Dinh Diem of Vietnam, Anastasia Somoza of Nicaragua, and the Shah of Iran. 

The third component of a regionalist strategy calls for the United States to 

pressure Barre to make his government more representative of the disenfran-

chised elements in the country, most notably in the north. Since it is highly 

unlikely Barre will do so, the United States should open up its own discreet 

communication with the guerrilla opposition, most notably the SNM, which 

represents that portion of the country now denied its rightful place in the gov-

dernment and whose inclusion will be necessary in a future national reconcili-

ation. Although the United States should maintain correct relations with any 

government that may come to power, it should be made known that a closer 

relationship (including more military aid and preferential trade agreements) 

will depend on whether the government is indeed representative.

A fourth component, directly related to the third, is the need for the 

United States to denounce the human rights record of Somalia. As Greenfield 

states, "the regimes's neglect of human rights is currently a major issue with 

Somalis at home and abroad. Clearly, the U.S. and the EEC would gain great 

respect among Somalis world-wide should they urge the release of all those 

imprisoned—often under appalling conditions—for years without charge or 

trial...Amnesty International's long list of detainees includes schoolchildren, 

as well as religious leaders, professionals, and parliamentarians."55 It is im-

portant that the United States take an active stand in calling for the release of 

political detainees. Even if Barre does not acquiesce, such a policy could in-

gratiate the United States with a future regime.

Finally, a regionalist approach does not mean that economic relations and 

U.S. humanitarian aid—most notably for drought relief and refugees—cannot 

continue. It merely emphasizes the need for the United States to avoid the 

military aspect of the relationship and, in Somalia and elsewhere, reserve its 

closer ties for governments which are representative and desire to further their 

people's welfare. A case in point is the Philippines, clearly a regime that mer-

its U.S. support and aid; so far there is no reason to doubt the intentions of the 

Aquino government to promote broadly shared economic development.

The pitfalls of both incrementalism and globalism are such that pursuing
these policies most likely will exacerbate tensions in the Horn, ultimately radicalizing regional politics, and the only ones to benefit will be those who wish to profit from instability. Precaution must be taken that the United States does not fall prey to the foreign policy agenda of another country for short-term interests, especially when the long-term implications are ill-defined and potentially detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals. These latter will only be advanced in the Horn when a peaceful settlement of the nationalities problem is found. Furthermore, a regionalist approach should not be limited to the countries of the Horn but should become the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy throughout Africa and the Third World generally.

NOTES


5For a comprehensive overview of the rise and decline of the Cold War consensus, see Richard A. Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam and Revisionism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983).


8Ibid., pp. 2-3.

9Although the majority of regimes in this pattern are anti-American, there are notable exceptions: Haiti, although unrest continues, and the Philippines, which is the most promising.

10Crocker, “U.S. Interests,” p. 3.


15Liang Gencheng, “U.S. Policy toward the Horn of Africa,” Northeast African Studies 6, 1-
tely radi-o wish to
ates does
short-term
id potentially be ad-
problem is the coun-

Kenya, however, also is experiencing increasing political instability. For an examination of this point, see Lindsey Hilsum, "The Dynamics of Discontent," *Africa Report* 33, 1 (1988): 22-26.


Somali territory was divided by colonial powers, with parts going to French-ruled Djibouti, British-ruled Kenya, and Ethiopia. For the historical background of Somali irreden-


"Ethiopian Propaganda is a Hearsay," *Heegan* (Mogadishu), 18 January 1985, p. 2.

*USAID, Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1987*, p. 383.


Understandably, the person interviewed wanted to remain anonymous.


"Somalia is different because virtually all the people within the boundaries of the Somali Democratic Republic share a common tradition. They speak the same language, respond to the same poetry, derive their wisdom (and their experience) from the camel economy, and worship the same God." See Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia*, p. xvi.


See Schraeder, "Involuntary Migration," especially pp. 652-53. See also "The Other


51Ibid., p. 49.


53Ibid., p. 39.

54Ibid.