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regional peacekeeping. The United States supplies training and equipment relevant to peacekeeping operations to armed forces from stable democratic countries. Howe cites several problems associated with this approach, including its emphasis on peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement, which is often required in Africa’s conflicts; the inclusion of governments whose militaries have been involved in regional conflicts and whose militaries have engaged in questionable behavior; and the lack of Nigerian and South African participation. Some governments have expressed concern about U.S. neocolonialism in deciding who will participate, and there is also concern that ACRi would primarily serve U.S. strategic interests rather than African security. Questions also involve command and control decisions as well as the willingness of African countries to contribute troops to a program that would increase professionalism and perhaps represent a challenge to their governments. Despite the drawbacks, Howe concludes that ACRi is a step in a positive direction. It addresses the issue of professionalism and incorporates several conceptual innovations in security assistance, including “double multilateralism,” interoperability, and prior planning, which may provide a template for future military assistance, whatever ACRi’s ultimate fate (p. 261).

The strength of this volume is Howe’s thorough examination of three recent approaches to insecurity in Africa. In the process, the author clearly illustrates the complexity of the security environment on the continent. He also highlights the economic motivations of both military personnel and PSCs and their role in conflict on the continent. Having examined these approaches and found them all lacking to some degree, Howe falls back to his original assertion that military professionalism is the key to Africa’s security dilemma. If there is a weakness here, it is a lack of specificity on how to accomplish the goal of professionalism. Howe suggests the answer lies in greater democratic control, but he does not fully develop this theme. The conclusion contains a brief case study of how the concentration on the obstacles to controlling the process by which it might be achieved. The way in which accountability, transparency, and control can best be assured is left largely to speculations. Although the circumstances in South Africa are somewhat different, discussion of its efforts to create a civil service secretariat and the efforts to establish effective parliamentary oversight might have been more instructive.

Howe’s analysis goes to the heart of the security problem in Africa: the lack of democratic institutions that foster military professionalism. The author believes that democracy facilitates military professionalism, and we are left with the conclusion that Africa needs something it is lacking, which is hardly a revolution. Does this say more about the state of the literature in the field or the state of African militaries? Howe raises more questions than he answers, but this is valuable nonetheless. No single volume can address all the dimensions of the complex security environment in Africa and their implications, but Howe focuses attention on important problems and makes a solid contribution to the literature on African security and civil-military relations.


Peter J. Schaede, Loyola University Chicago

This book adds to a growing literature on African international relations written by African scholars. The project was an outgrowth of Lumumba-Kasongo’s involvement in a conference sponsored by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), a leading pan-African research center located in Dakar, Senegal, that has sought to promote the scholarship of a new generation of Africans.

Lumumba-Kasongo seeks to contribute to the dependency-decolonization debate, that is, the degree to which the colonial era still influences contemporary African international relations (p. 10). According to the dependency school, the granting of legal independence that began in the 1950s did little to alter the constraining web of economic, political, military, and cultural ties that continue to bind African countries to the former colonial powers. This conceptualization of African international relations, often referred to as neocolonialism, is especially prominent in writings about the relationship between France and its former colonies, primarily due to policies designed to maintain what the French term their chasse gardée (exclusive hunting ground) in francophone Africa. Even in former colonies of European powers either too weak (e.g., Spain) or uninterested (e.g., Britain) to preserve privileged ties, the Cold War and superpower intervention ensured the gradual replacement of European neocolonial relationships with a new set of ties dominated by Moscow and Washington. According to this perspective, direct colonial rule has been replaced by neocolonial relationships that perpetuate external domination of African international relations.

Scholars of the decolonization school argue that legal independence was but the first step in an evolutionary process that has permitted African leaders to assume greater control over their political and social systems. Although external influences were extremely powerful immediately after independence, layer upon layer of foreign control is slowly being peeled away. Noting that individual African countries can follow different pathways, decolonization proponents argue that the most common pattern of political self-realization begins with legal independence, followed by efforts to assure national sovereignty in the military, economic, and cultural realms. “In this view, each layer of colonial influence is supported by the others, and as each is removed, it uncovers and exposes the next underlying one, rendering it vulnerable, unstable, and unnecessary,” explains J. William Zartman, one of the most prominent decolonization scholars. “Thus, there is a natural progression to the removal of colonial influence: its speed can be varied by policy and effort, but the direction and evolution are inherent in the process and become extremely difficult to reverse” (see Zartman, “Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency,” Foreign Affairs 54 [January 1976]: 326–7).

Lumumba-Kasongo’s book clearly falls within the dependency side of the debate. “Nearly four decades after most African countries earned nominal political independence, the social and economic conditions of the majority of people have not improved” (p. 12) he states. “Regardless of significant efforts by some states to change social and political conditions, and the adoption of the stabilization programs of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the SAPs [structural adjustment programs] of the World Bank of the 1980s, all statistics from the national, international, and regional organizations indicate that the living conditions of the majority of the African people are worsening (p. 12).”

The reasons this is occurring—and how the situation may evolve in the future—are discussed in four relatively brief chapters. Chapter 1 explores a variety of theoretical strands from the dependency school that emphasize Africa’s continued marginalization within the international system. An emphasis is placed on the economic and political dimensions
of dependency, particularly the rising influence of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Two chapters then focus on specific case studies: Liberia’s relationship with the United States from the colonial era to the collapse of the Samuel K. Doe regime in 1990, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (formerly Zaire) relationship with Belgium from the colonial era to the collapse of the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. A final chapter assesses how the decline of the Cold War’s bipolar international system and subsequent emergence of an increasingly multipolar international system will affect African international relations.

As is the case with all provocative books, one can quibble with a variety of issues. These range from simple errors associated with copyediting (e.g., it is stated on p. 74 that President Clinton “has not made any firm commitment to visit Africa,” but on p. 27 it is recognized that an extended presidential visit to six African countries occurred in 1998), to more substantial matters, such as the time frame (e.g., the analysis of Liberia does not cover events subsequent to 1990, but an important focus of the book is the post-Cold War era) and case study selection. For example, why focus on the more unique and limited colonial experience of the United States and Belgium as opposed to Great Britain and France, not to mention the more minor roles played by Germany, Italy, and Spain? Of greater interest, however, are three broader questions that emerge from Lumumba-Kasongo’s analysis.

In keeping with dependency theory, a dominant theme of the book is Africa’s increased marginalization within the international system, a process undergone to have gathered strength during the post-Cold War era. Although most Africanists would agree that marginalization is a key adaptive process in general, several would question whether one can broadly generalize across the universe of African cases (e.g., a resurgent South Africa under democratically elected administrations since 1994) or whether all outcomes of such marginalization are necessarily negative. To cite just two cases, corrupt dictatorships can no longer play the ideological card to the extent possible during the Cold War, when the superpowers competed for realms of influence, and African countries themselves are increasingly focused on African solutions for African problems, most notably a greater commitment to regionally based security efforts. Indeed, Lumumba-Kasongo notes that marginalization is “providing opportunities for various African social groupings to invent new options” (p. 29), but this counterargument to the basic thrust of his book is not developed in the case studies or in the concluding chapter.

A second issue revolves around Lumumba-Kasongo’s interest in determining how multipolarization of the international system since the Cold War will affect the ties of dependency inherited from the colonial era. The dependency literature suggests a negative outcome, most notably because France, Germany, Japan, and the United States—the four major powers with extensive economic links to the continent—are all capitalist systems. My work on francophone West Africa suggests, however, that multipolarization enables African elites to take advantage of the highly competitive international economic system (see Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 [2000]: 395–419). In contrast to the expectations of dependency theory, the decline of the rigid bipolar system has afforded African elites more maneuverability, especially in negotiating access rights to their highly lucrative telecommunications, petroleum, and transportation industries. In short, they can play foreign firms against each other. Lumumba-Kasongo alludes to this when he notes that the Cold War’s end has prompted “the search for new alignments in power relationships” (p. 113), but the overall thrust of his book seems to be that such realignments will do little to alter dependency ties.

The most noteworthy omission from Lumumba-Kasongo’s analysis, and one that carries important implications for dependency theory, is the tendency of African countries to intervene militarily in their neighbors’ affairs at a time when such intervention by the great powers is declining. A decade after the Cold War, Africa’s so-called new bloc of leaders—including Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda—as well as other regional military powers, most notably Nigeria and South Africa, are becoming the new power brokers in African international relations. A prime example is the continuing conflict in Congo-Kinshasa, which is one of Lumumba-Kasongo’s two case studies. Foreign observers now commonly refer to this as Africa’s “First World War” due to the introduction of ground troops by at least five countries (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Precisely for this reason one wishes that Lumumba-Kasongo had included the post-1997 period in Congo-Kinshasa.

In sharp contrast to great power conduct in the region during the 1980s, when the United States launched a series of very aggressive covert (and overt) operations to counter the spread of perceived “radical” influences, the Clinton administration employed its Security Council veto to block the dispatch of any UN-sponsored peacekeeping force. This is a clear signal that the United States (and other great powers) are either unwilling or perceive themselves as unable to impose peace in this vast arena. It appears that peace can only emerge from the evolving regional military balance of power and the mutual political, military, and economic interests of regional actors, contrary to the dependency arguments of Lumumba-Kasongo and others, who stress the overriding influence of foreign powers on African international relations.


William D. Coleman, McMaster University

This well-written book makes an important contribution to the growing literature on how changes in the international economy, particularly globalization, affect domestic economic sovereignty. Moses argues, correctly, that the experiences of small states are particularly interesting in this regard. Long faced with problems of adjustment to international markets, they have had little ability to shape international markets and politics. Their example is instructive because they are more experienced in dealing with such phenomena as globalization than are larger states, such as the United States or Japan. Moreover, as economic globalization proceeds and the markets for goods and capital become more integrated, even larger states are finding their policy autonomy to be shrinking. In this respect, understanding the experience of small states in maintaining policy autonomy will have increasingly broader relevance.

The author situates his argument in relation to three schools of comparative political economy. The first, termed the “Left/labor” approach, looks at relative class power to explain the electoral strength of leftist governments in Europe. A strong labor movement is seen as crucial to the election of social democratic governments that have pursued