INTERVENTION IN THE 1980s

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World

Edited by
Peter J. Schraeder

Lynne Rienner Publishers  Boulder/London
Contents

List of Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
About the Contributors xiii
Acronyms xvii

PART ONE INTRODUCTION
1. Concepts, Relevance, Themes, and Overview
   *Peter J. Schraeder*
   1

PART TWO ORIGINS OF INTERVENTION
2. The Evolution of the Interventionist Impulse
   *Lloyd C. Gardner*
   17
3. The Development of Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine
   *Michael T. Klare*
   31
4. The Globalist-Regionalist Debate
   *Charles F. Doran*
   45

PART THREE TOOLS OF INTERVENTION
5. Economic and Military Aid
   *Doug Bandow*
   63
6. Economic Sanctions
   *Kimberly A. Elliott*
   85
7. Covert Intervention
   *Harry Howe Ransom*
   101
8. Paramilitary Intervention
   Peter J. Schraeder

9. Direct Military Intervention
   Ted Galen Carpenter

PART FOUR
CONSTRAINTS ON INTERVENTION
10. The Domestic Environment
    Jerel A. Rosati

11. Government and the Military Establishment
    Stephen Daggett

12. The Structure of the International System
    Harry Piotrowski

13. International Law
    Christopher C. Joyner

PART FIVE
CASE STUDIES
14. Iran
    Eric Hooglund

15. The Philippines
    Richard J. Kessler

16. Nicaragua
    Peter Kornbluh

17. Grenada
    Tony Thorndike

18. South Africa
    R. Hunt Davis, Jr., and Gwendolen M. Carter

PART SIX
CONCLUSION
19. U.S. Intervention in Perspective
    Peter J. Schraeder

Notes

Selected Bibliography

Index
Tables

5.1  U.S. Foreign Aid as a Percentage of Gross National Product, 1946–1986  66
5.2  U.S. Foreign Aid by Major Region, 1946–1986  67
5.3  U.S. Foreign Aid by Major Program, 1946–1986  69
5.4  Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid by Type, 1946–1986  71
5.5  Recipients of Largest Amounts of U.S. Bilateral Aid, 1986  72
6.1  Cases of U.S. Economic Sanctions in the Third World  92
Acknowledgments

The genesis of this book is the personal desire shared by the eighteen contributors to write a systematic analysis of U.S. interventionist practices in the Third World. More specifically, *Intervention in the 1980s* offers a comprehensive overview of the origins, tools, and constraints of U.S. intervention, with special emphasis placed on analyzing U.S. policies during the post–World War II period. As editor of this volume, I have the distinct pleasure of acknowledging those who contributed to its successful completion. At the same time, however, I accept full responsibility for any remaining deficiencies in the book.

First and foremost, I wish to thank the contributors who, in the process of writing and revising these original submissions, cheerfully and quickly responded to what often must have seemed to be an endless string of queries and requests for revisions and updates. Second, all eighteen of us inevitably enjoyed the support of numerous individuals—administrative staff, colleagues, family members, and students—who were crucial in contributing to the final product but whose numbers preclude personal recognition on these pages. To all these individuals, we extend a heartfelt thank you.

Certain individuals, however, deserve special thanks. Michael Smith, both friend and colleague, was there at the beginning and was influential in sorting out the ideas and themes that eventually would become this book. John Creed, another friend and colleague, provided invaluable advice concerning the revision and clarification of the entire manuscript. At Lynne Rienner Publishers, Steve Barr was crucial in keeping the project on schedule, while Beverly Armstrong’s editorial skill enhanced the readability and coherence of the ideas presented. Especially appreciated is Lynne Rienner’s encouragement and patience as this project slowly made its way to fruition.

In many respects, this book is the product of my years spent in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina. Funds provided by the department and most notably by the West Foun-
dation during 1987–1988 were significant aids and are greatly appreciated. My professors at the University of South Carolina were especially important in my development as a student of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Jerel A. Rosati cultivated my interest in comparative foreign policy theory and empirical analysis, while Paul M. Kattenburg, with his numerous years of experience in the U.S. State Department, fostered my appreciation for policy relevant analysis. Finally, Mark W. DeLancey’s love for Africa and patient guidance nurtured my interest in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa in particular and the Third World in general.

Most important, however, has been the loving support of my wife, Mary. Mary has acted at various times as typist, editor, critic, and, most of all, friend, providing words of encouragement when the light at the end of the tunnel seemed dim indeed. In short, without her there would have been no book.

Peter J. Schraeder
appreciated. My important in my Charles W. Kegwe foreign policy th his numerous appreciation for or Africa and parlard Africa in par-

f my wife, Mary.

cost of all, friend, td of the tunnel en no book.

About the Contributors

DOUG BANDOW is a nationally syndicated columnist for the Copley News Service and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He served from 1981 to 1982 as a special assistant to President Reagan, where he handled military manpower and international development issues. The author and coeditor of several books, including *U.S. Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda* (1985), he is currently writing a book on the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea.

TED GALEN CARPENTER is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. An expert on defense and foreign policy issues, his work has appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, *Harper’s*, *Reason*, and other publications. He is the editor of *Collective Defense or Strategic Independence? : Alternative Strategies for the Future* (1989) and is currently writing a book examining the impact of U.S. foreign policy decisions on domestic liberty.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER is adjunct professor of political science and African studies at the University of Florida. A specialist on southern Africa, she has devoted more than four decades to researching, teaching, and writing about the region. She is the author and editor of dozens of books and articles including *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (1979) and *International Politics in Southern Africa* (1982). Her most recent work is *Continuity and Change in Southern Africa* (1985).

STEPHEN DAGGETT is a senior analyst for the Committee for National Security and has written extensively on the U.S. military budget and defense policy planning process. His work has appeared in *Foreign Policy, Arms Control Today*, and the *American Defense Annual*, as well as in various military pub-
lications, including *Army Times*, *Air Force Times*, and *Navy Times*. His current research centers on Soviet strategic defense and space programs and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

**R. HUNT DAVIS, JR.** is professor of history and former director of the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida. From 1980 until 1988 he served as editor of the *African Studies Review*. The author of *Bantu Education and the Education of South Africans in South Africa* (1972) as well as several articles dealing with modern South African history, his work has appeared in *African Affairs*, the *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, the *Journal of African Studies*, and other publications.

**CHARLES F. DORAN** is professor of international relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The author of more than fifty scholarly articles and books on international politics and political economy, his research encompasses security policy; domestic and interstate conflict; and commercial, environmental, and energy resource questions. His most recent books include *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End* (1989) and *Intersecting Parallels: Intervulnerabilities in Trade and Politics at the 49th* (1989).


CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER is associate professor in the department of political science at the George Washington University. Specializing in international law and world politics, he is the author of numerous articles on the international legal implications of U.S. intervention in the Third World. His works also include *The Antarctic Regime* (1987) and the upcoming *Antarctica and the Law of the Sea*.

RICHARD J. KESSLER is former associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has made numerous trips to the Philippines, has served as a visiting research fellow at the University of the Philippines, and has published numerous articles on U.S. foreign policy toward Asia and the Philippines, including the forthcoming book *Repression and Rebellion in the Philippines*.


HARRY PIOTROWSKI is associate professor in the History Department at Towson State University. His specialty is the history of U.S.-Soviet foreign policy, especially as it pertains to the Third World. His most recent work is the coauthored *The World Since 1945: Politics, War, and Revolution in the Nuclear Age* (1988). He is currently working on a study of the origins of the cold war.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM is professor emeritus of political science at Vanderbilt University. A noted scholar of foreign and defense policymaking and strategic intelligence, he has written numerous articles and books, including *The Intelligence Establishment* (1970), *Can American Democracy Survive Cold War?* (1963), and *Central Intelligence and National Security* (1958).

JEREL A. ROSATI is associate professor of government and international studies at the University of South Carolina and was director of the foreign

PETER J. SCHRAEDER, the editor of this volume, is a doctoral fellow at the University of South Carolina. A scholar in international studies, African studies, and U.S. foreign policy in the Third World, he worked in Djibouti for the U.S. State Department and has taught and carried out research under the auspices of Somali National University in Mogadishu, Somalia. He is the coauthor of Cameroon (1986) and Somalia (1988) and is currently working on a book titled Crisis and Incrementalism: Continuity and Change in U.S. Intervention in Africa, as well as a general study on Djibouti.

TONY THORDIKE is professor of international relations at the North Staffordshire Polytechnic, Stoke-on-Trent, England. Extensive travel and research in the Caribbean region have informed his numerous articles and books, on the Caribbean in general and Grenada in particular, including Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (1985) and the coauthored Grenada: Revolution and Intervention (1984).
Concepts, Relevance, Themes, and Overview

Peter J. Schraeder

As U.S. policymakers approach the end of the 1980s and the United States prepares to enter the twenty-first century, the time seems ripe for a critical assessment of nearly forty years of U.S. interventionist policies in the Third World. The primary purpose of such an assessment is to clarify and analyze critically the shortcomings of past and current U.S. foreign policy in the hope that an understanding of past mistakes may provide the basis for a more enlightened foreign policy of the future. This is no mere academic exercise. Ill-conceived past policies have had severe consequences for U.S. society as a whole, the most notable example being U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The secondary purpose of this appraisal is to contribute to the ongoing debate in official policymaking circles, academia, and within the general population as to what should constitute a proper U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. It is only by reasoned debate that a policy consensus—the basis for an effective foreign policy in a democracy—can be achieved. This chapter is devoted to defining key concepts, pointing out the relevance and importance of studying U.S. intervention in the Third World, discussing the major themes around which the book is designed, and providing an overview of the chapters that follow.

■ KEY CONCEPTS

Analysis of U.S. intervention in the Third World first requires a brief explanation of what is meant by “intervention” and “Third World.” Both concepts are widely used and are potentially confusing, meaning many different things to many different people.

“Intervention” is most commonly understood to mean the use of military force by one state to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. A classic example would be the Reagan administration’s invasion of Grenada in 1983 to
overthrow the unpopular military government of General Hudson Austin. This narrow definition may be expanded to include the use of economic force by one state to interfere in the internal affairs of another, such as the U.S. adoption of economic sanctions in 1986 to pressure the South African regime to change its system of apartheid. In an even broader sense, intervention may be defined as any form of outside influence on, or interference with, the domestic policies of a country. It has been argued, for example, that President Jimmy Carter's official declaration in 1979 of U.S. support for the presidential aspirations of South Korea's Lieutenant Colonel Chun Doo Hwan actually prompted Chun to assume the presidency by military force. In the extreme, the definition of intervention could even include the absence of foreign policy behavior in some situations. For example, if Israel were attacked simultaneously by and subjected to an extended military conflict with all of its Arab neighbors, complete U.S. neutrality most likely would ensure Israeli defeat. Although the United States would not have physically intervened, its inaction—contrary to Israeli expectations—would be crucial in determining the outcome of the conflict.

For the purposes of this book, intervention is defined in a broad sense as the purposeful and calculated use of political, economic, and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic politics or the foreign policy of another country. Four important aspects of this definition stand out. First, intervention is seen as purposeful and calculated, underscoring the intentional nature of the act. Second, intervention entails a wide choice of instruments ranging from the extension of economic and military aid to economic sanctions, covert action, paramilitary interference, and, finally, direct application of military force. Third, attempts to influence a regime's domestic or foreign policies need not be restricted to efforts to change those policies but may also support a given regime in order to insulate it from change. Finally, intervention is not limited to affecting the domestic politics of a given country but can be undertaken to affect that country's foreign policy as well. This broad definition of intervention is adopted to capture the richness of U.S. actions in the Third World.

"Third World" is a popular label for the majority of the world's countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East that belong neither to the First World (the United States and other industrialized capitalist nations, including Australia, Canada, Japan, and Western Europe) nor the Second World (the Soviet Union and the industrialized communist countries of Eastern Europe). The concept of a Third World arose from these countries' wish to pursue a third, "nonaligned" path of development during the cold war period, independent of the political-military wishes of either the Soviet Union or the United States. Implicit in this approach was a desire to draw attention to the economic inequalities between the industrialized North (including both the First and Second Worlds) and the developing South (the Third World) and to the need for a restructuring of North-South economic relations through plans like the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Several characteristics further distinguish the Third World from the indus-
adson Austin. This economic force by one U.S. adoption of a regime to change its may be defined as domestic policies of Jimmy Carter's aspirations of South and Chun to assume some situations, subjected to an extreme U.S. neutrality States would not be expectations— a broad sense as d military instrume foreign policy of d out. First, intere intentions national sanctions, application of military foreign policies also support a nation is not limi to be undertaken ition of interv en world's countries in either to the First nations, including Second World (the Eastern Europe). to pursue a third, independent of nited States. Immic inequalities Second Worlds) re restructuring tw International from the industralized North. Third World countries, typically former colonies, exhibit low levels of industrialization, lack well-developed infrastructures in terms of transportation, energy, education, and social services, and exhibit large inequities in the distribution of wealth and resources. Moreover, they are saddled by high rates of population growth, are unable to bring the majority of their populations into the formal economy, and rely on a monocrop or monomineral export to sustain their economies. Most important, the combination of these factors contributes to the economic and political fragility of Third World regimes, making their systems highly vulnerable to external economic, political, and military intervention.

Despite the common label and similarities of underdevelopment, the countries of the Third World do not represent a coherent, unified, or homogeneous group but are, rather, a highly heterogeneous set of countries divided along numerous lines—ideological, ethnic, religious, and economic. Among Third World countries, one finds Marxist, socialist, and capitalist orientations toward development. Some countries, such as Nigeria, comprise several competing ethnic groups that, as was evident during the 1960s, can provide the basis for secessionist or civil wars. At the other extreme are countries, such as Somalia, that have only one ethnic group and have resorted to war to reunify peoples of that group who were incorporated into neighboring territories during the colonial period. Third World countries are also distinguished by religious differences—for example, predominantly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan. In fact, deep divisions within major religions have sometimes exacerbated traditional rivalries. Among the factors contributing to the bloody Iran-Iraq war has been the animosity between the dominant Sunni Muslim regime in Iraq and its Shi'ite counterpart in Iran. Finally, there are major differences in economic levels of Third World countries. Some countries may be members of the oil-rich Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or be one of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) (such as Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan); others belong to what the World Bank has termed the Fourth World, or the "poorest of the world's poor" (such as Bangladesh). In short, although the concept of a Third World is a useful distinction for an analysis of U.S. intervention, one should not lose sight of the characteristics that divide the countries included in this grouping.

### RELEVANCE OF STUDYING U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

U.S. scholars and policymakers have in general paid greater attention to U.S. foreign policy toward the industrialized countries of Western Europe and the West, as well as toward the Soviet Union and other industrialized communist countries, to the detriment of the study of policy toward the Third World. Yet, the study of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World—and, in particular, of U.S.
interventionist practices there—has become increasingly important during the last forty years. Increased attention to, and scrutiny of, U.S. intervention in the Third World is warranted for five reasons:

1. **The Third World constitutes an increasingly important focal point for U.S. trade and investment.** According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, imports from Third World countries in 1984 totaled $122.1 billion, or 35.3 percent of the $345.3 billion in total U.S. imports. Similarly, U.S. exports to the Third World in 1984 were 36 percent of total U.S. exports, earning $76.5 billion for the U.S. economy (out of total earnings of $213.1 billion). Moreover, U.S. direct private investment in the Third World during 1984 exceeded $50 billion, or 23.5 percent of total U.S. private investment in the world. These investments earned nearly $7 billion for U.S. private industry, nearly 32 percent of all U.S. profits earned from overseas private investment.

   This gradual shift in U.S. financial interests is perhaps best reflected by the changes in the extension of U.S. government foreign grants and credits overseas since the end of World War II. From 1945 to 1955, the lion's share of U.S. grants and credits were targeted toward the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of war-torn Western Europe. Delivered under the sponsorship of the Marshall Plan, over 63 percent (nearly $34 billion) of U.S. government grants and credits went to Western Europe. By 1984, however, Western Europe was receiving a mere 1.8 percent of these resources, whereas the various regions of the Third World were the recipients of nearly 90 percent. Although Western Europe and the other industrialized countries remain the premier economic partners of the United States, there can be no doubt that the Third World has become—and will continue to be—increasingly important in the economic calculations of U.S. policymakers.

2. **The Third World is a theater for conflict of increasing scope and intensity.** Prior to 1945, the center of conflict in the world was Europe—two world wars were fought there in the first half of the twentieth century. In the second half of this century, however, the major portion of conflict moved to the Third World. Although the Third World has served as a battlefield for U.S.-Soviet ideological competition during the last forty years, increasingly significant has been the rise of regional powers attempting to pursue strategies of regional hegemony, often through the use of military force. This trend toward the diffusion of power away from the superpowers has been complemented by the growing salience of nationalism, ethnic strife, and religion in contributing to conflict in the Third World. A cursory overview of Third World conflict in 1988 turns up wars between Cambodia and Vietnam, Iran and Iraq, and Libya and Chad; domestic uprisings in the search for national self-determination by black nationalists in South Africa, Palestinian nationalists in the Middle East, and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka; and civil wars in Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Indeed, the origins and theater
of any future world war involving the United States very likely could be in the Third World.

3. U.S. strategic planning is being reoriented toward the Third World. U.S. strategic thinking in the 1980s has begun to question the traditional emphasis on preparing for a conventional, full-scale military conflict with the Soviet Union and has focused more on the rise of "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) in the Third World and the need for the United States to reorient its military capabilities to deal with this "unconventional" threat. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger captured this growing sentiment within the U.S. national security bureaucracy in his 1987 annual report to Congress:

Today there seems no shortage of adversaries who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses . . . these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security.

The Pentagon, with strong support from the Reagan administration, has supervised the development of LIC doctrine and the expansion of U.S. projection forces—the army’s Green Berets, the navy’s SEALs (sea-air-land commando forces), the U.S. Central Command (formerly Rapid Deployment Forces), and similar groups—to prepare U.S. armed forces for dealing with five major types of operations in the Third World: counterinsurgency, proinsurgency, peacetime contingency operations, terrorism counteraction, and antidrug operations. As Michael T. Klare argues in Chapter 3, just as a growing emphasis on counterinsurgency during the 1960s led to increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, so the current evolution in strategic thinking ensures that LIC “will be an increasing U.S. strategic concern of the 1990s, potentially leading to ever-increasing U.S. involvement in regional conflicts.”

4. Official recognition of U.S. strategic interests in the Third World provides the basis for increased U.S. intervention. The United States currently maintains a worldwide network of bases, allies, and client states in which nearly half a million U.S. troops are stationed at 374 military bases, many of which are in the Third World. This worldwide network, when coupled with the designation of particular Third World countries or regions as “vital” to U.S. strategic interests, provides the basis for potential U.S. intervention to safeguard these interests. The Carter Doctrine, for example, identifies the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf as one of the paramount strategic interests of the United States, to be defended with U.S. military force if necessary; the doctrine provided the basis for the 1987 Reagan administration policy of reflaging Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf. Analysts have cited other examples of paramount U.S. strategic interests, both past and present, including the maintenance of an open and free Panama Canal, continued U.S. access to leased bases in the Philippines, continued Western access to strategic minerals in south-
ern Africa, and the maintenance of Western control over strategic maritime "choke points" (such as the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa).7

Although individuals from all points of the ideological spectrum agree that the United States has strategic interests worth defending in the Third World, differences arise over where they are, their relative level of importance, and the proper means of maintaining their integrity. For example, although the conservative Committee on the Present Danger considers the Persian Gulf to be a region of vital strategic importance to the United States and favors the Reagan administration’s policy of reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers, policy analysts from the libertarian Cato Institute have questioned both the strategic value of the Gulf to the United States and the reflagging policy. Even when schools of thought agree upon a region of vital strategic importance to the United States (such as Central America), policy prescriptions often differ greatly. Whereas the Committee on the Present Danger favors expanding U.S. support for the contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the Cato Institute views such a policy as counterproductive to long-term U.S. foreign policy interests in the region.8 Despite these differences, the fact remains that the official designation of areas of vital strategic importance provides the basis for increased U.S. intervention in the Third World.

5. U.S. intervention in the Third World has had a spillover effect into U.S. society. Perhaps the most important reason for studying U.S. intervention in the Third World is to understand the effects it has had on U.S. institutions and society. In the case of the Vietnam War, for example, the wiretaps initiated to uncover who had leaked highly sensitive information concerning secret U.S. B-52 bombing raids into Cambodia gradually mushroomed into the Watergate scandal, which drove Richard Nixon from the presidency.9 The Iranian hostage crisis revealed the seeming impotence of the Carter administration in protecting U.S. citizens abroad, contributing to President Carter’s ultimate defeat and the subsequent election of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential elections. U.S. intervention in Nicaragua under the Reagan administration led to the Iran-contra affair, which led to further straining of relations between the executive branch and Congress over the proper role each should play in the foreign-policy-making process. In short, U.S. intervention in the Third World has contributed to U.S. domestic crises of legitimacy.

Moreover, the study of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World will aid in clarifying and understanding past U.S. failures and in providing the basis for formulating future policy prescriptions. The most destructive of these failures was U.S. involvement in Vietnam: Social costs included over 200,000 American casualties (including nearly 60,000 dead) and the erosion of the social fabric of U.S. society; experts have estimated that the cumulative economic costs of carrying out the war exceeded $156 billion.10 Vietnam was not unique, but rather is indicative of a foreign policy whereby the United States intervened in more than seventeen major Third World civil wars during the post-World War II period.11
strategic maritime

Foreign policy failures are not endemic to particular president or political party but may be found in all administrations: Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy both lusted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1961; Lyndon B. Johnson became increasingly mired in a losing war in Vietnam; Nixon expanded the Vietnam War to Cambodian territory, prompting ever greater unrest in the United States; Gerald R. Ford inherited a policy toward Iran and the Shah that ended in disaster; and Reagan provided the essential underpinning of U.S. Marines with a truck bomb. Only by understanding the past—cognitively, not emotionally—can one look to the future.

Major Themes

Five themes serve as the guiding principles and intellectual underpinnings of the nineteen chapters of this book:

1. Overemphasis in U.S. foreign policy on what has been called the globalist perspective. The globalist vision, which has dominated U.S. foreign policy in the Third World during the post-World War II period, stresses the international importance of East-West confrontation at all levels. The international system was once divided into two great camps, representing the world body, and the countries of the world were divided into two great blocks, representing the two superpowers. The Cold War, in fact, was a war fought by the superpowers to control the Third World and to impose their will on the Third World. The Third World was seen as an arena for the superpowers to demonstrate their strength and their ability to influence the world.

2. The rise of the United States as a global power. The United States has emerged as a global power in the post-World War II period. The United States has been able to maintain a significant military presence in the Third World, and it has been able to use its military power to influence the actions of other countries. The United States has also been able to use its economic power to influence the actions of other countries.

3. The role of ideational factors. The role of ideational factors must be considered when analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The United States has often been guided by ideational factors, such as the belief that it is a moral duty to spread democracy and freedom to the world. These ideational factors have often influenced U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.

4. The role of domestic politics. The role of domestic politics must also be considered when analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The United States has often been guided by domestic politics, such as the desire to maintain public support for U.S. foreign policy. This has often influenced U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.

5. The role of historical factors. The role of historical factors must also be considered when analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The United States has often been guided by historical factors, such as the desire to maintain the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. This has often influenced U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.
to Central America during the 1960s, he met with failure. The guerrilla forces were easily defeated because of their inability to attract a major following. The example of the Sandinista-led revolution in Nicaragua during the 1960s is especially instructive. Although the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) received Cuban arms during the 1960s, this aid was discontinued in the early 1970s and did not begin again until the insurrection against Somoza was already well under way. 14

This is not to say, however, that the Soviet Union and radical revolutionary regimes cannot exacerbate or profit from revolutionary upheaval within a given Third World country. Rather, this evidence underscores the misplaced emphasis on the Soviet Union and its allies as deus ex machina or as catalysts for regional turmoil, once the social, economic, and political conditions for revolution are ripe. As distinguished specialists on Central America have noted,

... those who point to external assistance as responsible for exploiting internal problems often miss the depth of these internal problems. It is not poverty and inequality that suddenly get ignited by outside arms and ideas; it is the brutal suppression of attempts at nonviolent reform by oligarchs and officers that moves numbers of people to pick up arms and risk their lives to make revolutions. By pointing to insurgents who seek outside arms, policymakers in Washington mistake symptoms for causes and justify aid for the very military and security forces whose opposition to reform generated armed insurgency in the first place. 15

2. Desirability of a U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes a regionalist perspective. Rather than placing undue emphasis on the Soviet Union and its allies as the chief provocateurs of conflict and instability in the Third World, the regionalist approach emphasizes the regional economic, cultural, political, and historical roots of these upheavals. Several internal conditions have led to the downfall of numerous Third World regimes: increasing income gaps between rich and poor; accumulation of vast wealth by the ruling family through personal control of major aspects of the economy; accentuated mass poverty (from already low levels) in the rural areas and urban shantytowns; limited access to basic social services; lack of meaningful political participation for the majority of the population; exclusion of the rising middle class from sharing in the political and economic benefits of the ruling class; lack of equitable land reform; and government suppression of peaceful attempts at reform. 16

Focus on the regional or internal causes of a particular conflict lends importance to that conflict in its own right and renders it amenable to resolution based on regional or internal structural change. For example, in the case of mounting guerrilla insurgency in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) during the late 1970s, the Carter administration supported Great Britain's initiatives in pressuring the white minority regime of Ian Smith to accept universal suffrage and transition to black majority rule—even though this ensured a regime dominated by the Patriotic Front, a coalition of two guerrilla groups led by avowed Marxists and
e guerrilla forces or following. The 1960s is especially notable for regional conflicts, such as the war between Ethiopia and Somalia which erupted in the early 1970s.

Regionalist policies and armed insurrections represent the regionalist perspective and its allies. The regionalist perspective emphasizes the role of direct military intervention, and the political and economic changes that have led to the region's current state. It is characterized by the reevaluation of poverty (from a political perspective) and the pursuit of regionalism as a means to achieve political and economic goals. This perspective is often characterized by the use of armed forces to achieve these goals, such as the FSLN in Nicaragua and the PRC's support for the People's Republic of China.

By avoiding the traditional U.S. reflex to attribute the growing guerrilla conflict to Soviet-Cuban interference and to back the beleaguered government, the United States correctly perceived that alleviation of the conflict depended on internal political and economic reforms and that its influence could aid in bringing such a settlement about. The United States was rewarded for pursuing this policy. Despite the Marxist rhetoric of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, he has clearly followed a pragmatic policy of socioeconomic reform and maintained extensive links with the West.

The regionalist logic may be applied to many other examples. In El Salvador, as has been argued persuasively, continued guerrilla insurgency is fueled by lack of agrarian reform and by political repression. In the Horn of Africa, the arbitrary colonial drawing of boundaries significantly contributed to the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict over the Ogaden region. In the Middle East, conflict between Iran and Iraq is fueled, in part, by opposing and hostile interpretations of Islam (Shiite for the former and Sunni for the latter). In short, the argument of regionalist logic is that, although the importance of Soviet involvement in a particular region must be recognized, the East-West dimension of a conflict should be deemphasized in favor of its regional dimension. By overplaying the East-West dimension of a Third World conflict, the United States is usually forced to take a side, unnecessarily and unproductively alienating one or more of the belligerents.

Increasing nonviability of military force in achieving long-term U.S. foreign policy goals in the Third World. The international system and the role of direct military intervention therein by the major powers has changed substantially since the end of World War II. First, one is struck by the way unwritten norms governing the use of military force have been altered in the post–World War II period. For example, when the government of Nicaragua did not pay its debts in the 1930s, the United States sent its marines to force payment. Yet, it is extremely difficult to conceive of Washington in 1989 dispatching the marines should either Mexico or Brazil decide to default on its substantial loan repayment to the West in general and to the United States in particular. As the interdependence theorists correctly have noted, although military force is "ultimately necessary to guarantee [national] survival" and is therefore a "central component of national power," it is "often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important."

A more important constraint is found in the evolution of the Third World itself, whereby former colonial empires have evolved into a system of independent states of widely varying and increasing levels of power. Although the major powers of the colonial era, including the United States, still predominate militarily within the international system, there can be no doubt of the increasing diffusion of power within the system as individual Third World countries acquire more sophisticated weapons systems. As one author has noted:
Compared to the situation that the colonial powers found in the heydays of imperialism, when a small flotilla of gunboats could handle an ancient civilization or conquer disorganized territories, many of today's Third World states wield much more formidable degrees of organized power. While most Third World states may not yet be powerful enough to guarantee their own sovereignty, it has certainly become more problematical for foreign powers arbitrarily to impose their will upon them.

U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War is especially instructive. Whatever lessons may be drawn from U.S. intervention in Vietnam—indeed, there are as many conflicting interpretations as there are days in a month—two themes in particular stand out: (1) Even the most sophisticated levels of military technology make victory against popular revolutionary nationalism, at the least, highly unlikely and, at the most, prohibitively costly; and (2) the American people are not willing to support protracted, direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World. Although the latter condition could potentially change sometime in the future, the former is likely to persist.

4. U.S. inability to control Third World nationalism. U.S. intervention against revolutionary nationalism in the Third World is based upon the assumption that revolutionary elites are extremely vulnerable to the political wishes of a dominant external power (such as the Soviet Union) in the sense of becoming a "tool" for international communism. The Pentagon Papers, for example, dismissed the possibility that Ho Chi Minh or Mao Zedong could be both nationalists and communists. Despite the more sophisticated view of the fragmented nature of international communism that exists in Washington in the 1980s—a result primarily of U.S. recognition of the enduring Sino-Soviet split—U.S. policymakers still view with suspicion Third World leaders seeking close relationships with the Soviet Union. This "tool-for-communism" thesis is dubious at best. Although Soviet allies such as Cuba surely follow the Soviet lead when such a course is viewed in Cuba's own national interests, these common interests should not be construed as Soviet control or ability to dictate policy. History is replete with examples of former so-called Soviet client states—including China, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Somalia, and Sudan—that have expelled the Soviets when the Soviet presence became inimical to the client states' foreign policy interests. In Third World politics, self-interest and nationalism are stronger than ideological affinity.

The importance of nationalism and self-interested elites in stemming Soviet influence in the Third World is also relevant to U.S. special relationships with various Third World regimes. As is suggested by Panamanian General Manuel Noriega's purported sharing of U.S. military secrets with Cuba, his involvement in the international drug trade, and his clear defiance of U.S. demands in 1988 that he step down, U.S. client states may act against the wishes of Washington. Some authors have argued that, in fact, a case of "reverse dependency" often exists in which the United States falls prey to the demands or interests of the client state. Indeed, a more apt description of Third World elites
the heydays of an ancient order... While guarantee their... foreign policy...

uctive. Whatever deed, there are as—two themes in military technol-
t least, highly American people are nation in the Third... sometime in the

J.S. intervention upon the assumption... political wishes of... of becoming... for example; dis-

sion of the fragmentary leaders seeking... thesis is... follow the Soviet rests, these com-

ity to dictate political client states—

dan—that have... to the client self-interest and

es in stemming... peruvian... en... Cuba, his... the... against... of “reverse de-

of the demands or... World elites

is that they are relatively autonomous actors who may act contrary to the wishes of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

The failure of U.S. policymakers to comprehend their limited power in controlling Third World nationalism has been especially acute concerning its populist revolutionary variant. Despite Castro’s political and economic excesses by Western standards, there should have been little doubt in Washington in 1959 that his revolution generated mass support and ignited Cuban nationalism. Rather than accept the legitimacy of Castro’s revolution, the United States attempted to isolate the regime diplomatically, initiated a trade embargo, authorized assassination attempts, and ultimately managed the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of the island in 1961 by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)-trained exiles. Rather than overthrow Castro, these actions served as focal points whereby Castro strengthened his position on the island by whipping up “anti-yankee” nationalism and painting those elements still opposed to his rule as mere lackeys of U.S. imperialism. The lesson to draw from this—which should become the guiding principle for U.S. relations with revolutionary nationalism—is simple: “When a regime has any large degree of popular support and legitimacy, a foreign state’s force, pressure, and propaganda directed against the country may only cause the people to rally around their government.”

5. Need for greater U.S. tolerance of social change in the Third World, regardless of ideology. Despite the heritage of the United States as a revolutionary nation that fought against oppression and external control, U.S. policymakers have consistently failed to understand the growth of this phenomena in the Third World. Although the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine, as enunciated in 1823, was to protect Central American revolutions from external influence, these revolutions, and the economic and political instability that accompanied them, were increasingly viewed by U.S. policymakers as injurious to U.S. interests. This regional antirevolutionary propensity became globalized and fused with a virulent anticommunism as the United States embarked on an ideological competition with the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The net result is that all U.S. administrations in the post–World War II period have been hostile in varying degrees to revolutionary change in the Third World, combining antagonism toward radical regimes with support for traditional authoritarian allies, often with dire consequences for U.S. foreign policy.

The key to U.S. tolerance of social change is recognition that opposing ideologies should not automatically preclude mutually beneficial relationships and that similar ideologies should not automatically provide the basis for strong U.S. support. Indeed, growing U.S. ties with Marxist Mozambique, despite U.S. conservative calls to support a noncommunist guerrilla insurgency titled the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), demonstrate that fruitful relationships can be sought with revolutionary communist regimes. To the contrary, the downfall of Fulgencio Batista’s Cuban regime and the fallout then experienced by the United States underscores the dangers in supporting a tradi-
tional dictator who, although joining the United States in its anticommunist crusade, rules through a repressive regime marked by immense social inequality.

OVERVIEW

This book is divided into five major sections. The first three provide analysis concerning the origins, tools, and constraints on U.S. intervention in the Third World, and the final two comprise the case studies and a concluding essay.

Part 2, "Origins of Intervention," begins with Lloyd C. Gardner's chapter on the evolution of the interventionist impulse. Gardner shows how the American revolutionary spirit and western continental expansion spawned a mythic belief in the universalism and innocence of the U.S. cause, which led to extracontinental expansion in the early part of the twentieth century and the globalization of U.S. intervention in the Third World in the immediate post–World War II period. Michael T. Klare, in Chapter 3, continues this historical perspective, tracing the origins and evolution during the post–World War II period of the military doctrine of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Klare also examines the application of LIC to direct and indirect U.S. military involvement during the 1980s and beyond in five types of operations in the Third World: counterinsurgency, proinsurgency, peaceetime contingency operations, terrorism counteraction, and antidrug operations. He notes that U.S. military strategy in the 1980s rests on two fundamental assumptions: (1) Vital U.S. interests are threatened by radical and revolutionary violence in the Third World; and (2) the United States must be prepared to use military force to protect its vital interests in the Third World. In Chapter 4, Charles F. Doran examines the nature of the globalist-regionalist debate surrounding the proper role of U.S. intervention in the Third World. Whereas globalists stress "the primacy of East-West confrontation at all levels of international political behavior, in all parts of the international system," regionalists emphasize "the dilemmas of North-South relations, the idiosyncracies of politics and culture within the various geographic regions, and the comparative autonomy of the struggles that go on within and between the states inside each of these regions." The differences between these divergent perspectives are discussed within three broad categories: the origins of change and stability; foreign policy purpose; and foreign policy strategy and means.

Part 3 centers on the different instruments of intervention that have been employed by the United States in the pursuit of foreign policy goals in the Third World. Each author explores how Washington's use of a particular instrument has changed or evolved during the post–World War II period, presents the field of case studies in which it has been employed, and asks why it has been successful or unsuccessful. In Chapter 5, Doug Bandow examines Washington's use of official economic and military aid to Third World governments in pursuit of
U.S. foreign policy goals. Kimberly A. Elliott, in Chapter 6, reviews fifty-four cases of U.S. implementation of economic sanctions, defined as the "deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary . . . trade or financial relations." In Chapter 7, Harry Howe Ransom examines U.S. covert intervention in the Third World, including assassination plots, coups d'état, election intervention, and propaganda or psychological warfare. In Chapter 8, Peter J. Schraeder examines Washington's use of paramilitary intervention, or external economic and military aid to an armed insurgency intent on overthrowing a government deemed inimical to U.S. foreign policy interests. This interventionist tool is made use of by the Reagan Doctrine—U.S. support for guerrilla insurgencies attempting to overthrow Soviet-supported Marxist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Ted Galen Carpenter, in Chapter 9, reviews Washington's use of the ultimate interventionist tool: direct U.S. military force in the Third World.

Part 4 consists of four chapters centering on the domestic and international constraints inhibiting successful U.S. intervention in the Third World. In Chapter 10, Jerel A. Rosati presents an analysis of the U.S. domestic environment, exploring how a domestic consensus built upon the twin themes of anticommunism and containment of the Soviet Union has favored an interventionist Third World policy led by the executive branch during much of the post–World War II period. U.S. involvement in Vietnam shattered this consensus, however, making it increasingly difficult for presidents to continue implementing interventionist policies and leading "to such crises of leadership and legitimacy as Watergate, the Iran hostage crisis, and the Iran-contra scandal." In Chapter 11, Stephen Daggett analyzes significant barriers to the effective application of U.S. force that persist in the U.S. government—especially within the military establishment—despite recent efforts by some elements of the political leadership and by parts of the military to prepare for armed responses to conflict in the Third World. Factors discussed include the interplay between bureaucracy and ideology, priority of large-war planning in the military establishment, bureaucratic politics, and interservice rivalries. In Chapter 12, Harry Piotrowski argues that the evolving structure of the international system increasingly inhibits successful U.S. intervention in the Third World. He focuses on resurgent nationalism and anticolonialism, indigenous applications of Marxism-Leninism, communist polycentrism, proliferation of both conventional and nuclear weapons, the rise of regional powers, and the relative decline of U.S. economic and military power. In Chapter 13, Christopher C. Joyner examines the role of international law and of the internationally accepted norms of intervention and nonintervention. Joyner argues that U.S. policymakers have adopted "convenient legal license to interpret international law such that it serves their own interests as a supportive foreign policy instrument rather than as a force of restraint conducive to a greater public world order."

The case studies presented in Part 5 provide an overview of U.S. interventionist practices in five Third World countries. Each case study includes a de-
scription of the historical nature and evolution of the particular country’s relationship with the United States, the instruments that the United States has adopted in pursuit of specific foreign policy goals, why these have been successful or unsuccessful, and general lessons that may be drawn from U.S. involvement. In Chapter 14, Eric Hooglund examines U.S. intervention in Iran, ranging from the landing of 30,000 U.S. troops in that country during World War II, to U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup d’état that restored the shah to power, to U.S. relations with the revolutionary and Islamic fundamentalist government of the Ayatollah Khomeini. In Chapter 15, Richard J. Kessler focuses on the U.S.-Philippine relationship as it evolved from colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century to development of the patron-client relationship with President Ferdinand Marcos and culminated in the democratic revolution led by Corazon Aquino. Peter Kornbluh, in Chapter 16, analyzes the equally extensive U.S.-Nicaraguan relationship, focusing on how the United States has dealt with what it perceived to be radical revolution led by the Sandinistas in Washington’s backyard. Indeed, Washington’s support for the contras provided the principal battlefield for the U.S. military’s LIC strategy and served as the test case for the Reagan Doctrine. In Chapter 17, Tony Thorndike examines the October 25, 1983, U.S. direct military intervention in Grenada to overthrow the Marxist revolutionary government of General Hudson Austin. In Chapter 18, R. Hunt Davis, Jr., and Gwendolen M. Carter examine U.S. policy toward the apartheid regime of South Africa, tracing its evolution from U.S. complacency and quiet willingness to work with the white minority regime in the 1960s to increasing intervention as U.S. domestic groups have successfully lobbied for the imposition of economic sanctions. In the final chapter, Peter J. Schraeder draws several conclusions concerning U.S. intervention in the Third World.