Contents

List of Figures and Tables vii
Preface viii

1 Introduction: Foreign Aid in a Transformed World
Steven W. Hook 1

Part 1 Machinations of Foreign Assistance

2 Rethinking Economic Aid
Robert E. Wood 19

3 From Military Aid to Military Markets
Michael T. Klare and Daniel Votman 39

Part 2 Donors of Foreign Assistance

4 The Assault on U.S. Foreign Aid
Robert F. Zimmerman and Steven W. Hook 57

5 Japan's Emergence as a Foreign-Aid Superpower
Alan Rix 75

6 Cross-Pressures in Western European Foreign Aid
M. Leann Brown and Joanne M. O'Connor 91

7 The Disillusionment of Nordic Aid
Katie Verlin Laatikainen 109

8 The Rise and Fall of OPEC Aid
Timothy Luke 125
Part 3  Recipients of Foreign Assistance

9  Aid and Reform in the Former Second World
    Janine R. Wedel
    141

10 The Fragmentation of Foreign Aid to South Asia
    David I. Steinberg
    157

11 Foreign-Aid Posturing in Francophone Africa
    Peter J. Schraeder
    173

12 Aid and Developmentalism in Southern Africa
    Goran Hyden
    191

13 Progressive Aid to Latin America?
    David Louis Cingranelli and Simon Peter Gomez
    209

Part 4  Conclusion

14 Foreign Aid and the Illogic of Collective Action
    Steven W. Hook
    227

List of Acronyms  239
References         243
About the Authors  259
Index             263
About the Book    269

Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1 Economic Flows to Developing Countries  4

Table 1.1 Major Donors of Development Assistance, 1988–1994  5

Table 1.2 Major Recipients of Development Assistance, 1988–1994  5

Table 4.1 Regional and Functional Distribution of U.S.
    Foreign Aid, 1946–1994  61

Table 5.1 Top Ten Recipients of Japanese Development
    Assistance, 1970–1994  79

Table 7.1 Nordic Development-Aid Flows, 1992–1994  114

Table 10.1 Major Recipients of Development Aid in
    South Asia, 1992–1994  158

Table 13.1 Major Recipients of Development Aid in
    Latin America, 1992–1994  210
Foreign-Aid Posturing in Francophone Africa

Peter J. Schraeder

In October 1884 German chancellor Otto von Bismarck invited the major European colonial powers to Berlin to regulate escalating imperial conflict by defining the boundaries of colonial possessions. The Berlin Conference consecrated the emerging European empires and spheres of interest throughout Africa. Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, independent Africa ultimately ceased to exist.

After World War II and the subsequent decolonization of most of Africa in the 1960s, France was the only former colonial power to maintain and expand its presence on the continent, most notably in what is currently referred to as francophone Africa—those former French and Belgian colonies where French serves as an "official language of administration and education." Indeed, French leaders from the conservative Charles de Gaulle to the socialist François Mitterrand consistently have claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing francophone Africa within France's sphere of influence. "According to this French version of the Monroe Doctrine," explained Martin (1995: 168), "francophone Africa is seen as constituting a natural French preserve."

The belief that francophone Africa constitutes a natural French preserve explains why some Africa specialists within the French policymaking establishment cautiously greeted the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In sharp contrast to the Cold War era, when Western (especially U.S.) leaders sought to strengthen and enhance France's privileged role in francophone Africa as a bulwark against communism, the end of the Cold War has heightened economic and political competition among the Western powers. As a result, French policymakers increasingly claim that the United States and Japan, and to a lesser degree Germany and Canada, pose potential economic and political threats to French interests in francophone Africa. According to correspondent Stephen Smith (1994), such statements on the part of French policymakers
are indicative of a growing duel between Washington and Paris over Africa.

This competition over great-power influence in Africa has been manifest since World War II in several areas of foreign policy, including that of foreign assistance. In this chapter I offer some perspective on this phenomenon by contrasting the ODA policies of France and its two greatest perceived challengers in the post–Cold War era, the United States and Japan.4

French aid flows to the region ($3 billion in 1992) have remained dominant throughout the period, amounting to nearly three-fourths of overall francophone aid; its bilateral packages to Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Morocco, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia have annually exceeded $100 million for many years. The United States has provided the second-largest share of francophone aid, although its disbursements peaked at $702 million in 1991 and have fallen significantly in the mid-1990s. This has in part opened the door for Japan, the world’s leading donor of ODA to all regions, which has doubled its share of francophone aid since 1982 (OECD, 1981–1995a).

FRENCH AID TO ITS FORMER EMPIRE

In the midst of the decolonization process, France established a large and powerful aid program in francophone Africa during the Cold War era, and it became a keystone of French foreign policy (Morse, 1973: 163). The program’s goal was to reassert France’s historical position in the front rank of global powers, a status the country lost during a seventy-five-year span stretching from the Franco-Prussian War to World War II (Cerny, 1980). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (quoted in Hook, 1995: 66) captured the essence of why francophone Africa fits so well within French aspirations to international leadership:

France’s penchant for associating with countries ready to accept its leadership has been a constant factor in French foreign policy since the Crimean War. Unable to dominate an alliance with Great Britain, Germany, Russia, or the United States, and considering junior status incompatible with its notions of national grandeur and its messianic role in the world, France has sought leadership in pacts with lesser powers.

The evolution of French ODA toward francophone Africa during the Cold War era was driven by cultural, economic, and security interests. First, French assistance was designed to promote the rayonnement (radiation) of French cultural values, particularly “exceptional” values such as the French language, intellectual traditions, and way of living (Kolodziej, 1974: 479). Also referred to as the promotion of French “cultural nationalism” (Grosser, 1965: 61) or the cultivation of la francophonie (a greater French-speaking community), such a policy ensured that a large portion of foreign assistance would be directed to former French colonies in Africa and to other countries (such as the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire) in which French constituted one of the national languages. As explained by de Gaulle (quoted in Grosser, 1965: 205), French leaders have considered it their “historic vocation” to assist in the “ascension of all peoples to modern civilization.”

The extent to which French cultural nationalism shaped foreign policy is illustrated by ODA flows during the 1980s.5 During the transition year of 1989, which marked the fall of the Berlin Wall, the top ten African recipients of French foreign assistance—Algeria, Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, Gabon, Madagascar, Chad, and Guinea—were all former French colonies. In 1989 each of these countries except Guinea received more than $100 million in ODA, with all francophone African countries receiving more than $2.2 billion in ODA during the same year. Throughout the 1980s francophone Africa annually received about 80 percent of all French ODA allocated to Africa—close to $15 billion in aggregate ODA transfers. French ODA flows to francophone Africa surpassed the $3 billion level in 1992, as larger bilateral aid packages were approved for Cameroon ($436 million), Congo ($169 million), Côte d’Ivoire ($500 million), Morocco ($203 million), and Togo ($480 million).

France’s determination to preserve and strengthen la francophonie is perhaps best demonstrated by the regular holding of Franco-African summits attended by the leaders of France and francophone Africa. This summit has been described as the centerpiece of Franco-African cultural relations, most notably in terms of its “familial character” and the “permanent tête-à-tête maintained between the French president and each of the francophone heads of state” (Martin, 1995: 170). Although the worldwide francophone summit also brings together French and African heads of state, it does not play as intimate a role as the Franco-African summit because of the attendance of powerful francophone states, most notably Canada and Belgium, that are perceived by France as cultural rivals (see Dupont, 1995).

The promotion of economic interests was perceived as integral to the furtherance of French culture and served as the second most important determinant of French ODA policies toward francophone Africa during the Cold War era. As explained by Kołodziej (1974: 479), French leaders assumed that French economic interests naturally would develop as French culture spread into the developing world. Toward this end, foreign assistance constituted “one component of a remarkably integrated system of economic relationships” that maintained and enhanced France’s ties to its former colonies (Hayter, 1966: 43).
An example of this integrated system of economic relationships is the membership of thirteen former French colonies and Equatorial Guinea in the “franc zone” (Guillaumont, 1984). The franc zone constitutes a supranational financial system in which France serves as a central bank and in which a common currency—the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc—is tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury. By wedding its fiscal policy to that of the franc zone, France has preserved monetary stability throughout the region. Concurrently, it has coordinated regional financial flows, regulated members’ fiscal policies, provided emergency credit, subsidized private investments to franc-zone members, and offered tax breaks to French companies doing business in the region.

Whereas franc-zone member states gained financial stability, however, they lost a significant degree of autonomy over domestic macroeconomic policy. Nonetheless, scholars have demonstrated that the franc zone and its related flows of foreign assistance and investment capital have had a generally positive impact on francophone Africa. “Quantitative studies showed that until the mid-1980s, the economic performance of franc-zone countries was no worse than that of other developing economies and significantly better than the average for sub-Saharan Africa” (Ravenhill, 1995: 108).

It should be noted that cultural considerations, such as maintaining la francophonie, ensured the continuation and, in most cases, the expansion of ODA despite deteriorating economies and trade relationships. For example, ODA increased despite a significant decline in France’s overall trade relationships with its former colonies. French products made up 38 percent of its former colonies’ total imports between 1958 and 1963 but only 35 percent between 1974 and 1986. Similarly, France purchased 56 percent of its former colonies’ exports between 1958 and 1963 but only 25 percent in the latter period (Moss and Ravenhill, 1989).

France’s tendency to subjugate economic interests to cultural ideals was at the center of its unwillingness from 1947 to 1994 to devalue the CFA franc, despite arguments that such an action would enhance francophone Africa’s economic competitiveness and promote greater trade links with France (see Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 1984). “Although most of the other countries in black Africa undertook (often massive) devaluations of their real exchange rate, the CFA [franc] appreciated in real terms,” explained Ravenhill (1995: 109). “This divergence of exchange rates made it very difficult for franc zone countries to sell their export crops on world markets.”

The third major determinant of French ODA policies was the promotion of security interests. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, French ODA heavily underserved French security interests throughout the Cold War era (see Biarnèès, 1987; see also Bayart, 1984). In order to protect these security interests, French leaders signed numerous defense accords, generously provided arms and military coopérateurs for training purposes, and authorized numerous interventions by French military forces to ensure maintenance of the status quo (see Chipman, 1989; McNamara, 1989; Moose, 1985). In this regard, one can argue that French policymakers sought to spread French culture with the same ideological fervor with which U.S. policymakers sought to prevent the spread of communism. Consequently, when francophone countries attempted to renounce their special relationship with France, as Guinea did in 1958 when it voted against the creation of a revised French community of states, French retribution was swift. In the case of Guinea, all aid was cut off by de Gaulle. But as long as these countries maintained close ties with France, even authoritarian francophone leaders were unlikely to find themselves under heavy pressure from Paris to reform their governments.

THE PERVASIVE U.S. PRESENCE

As World War II drew to a close, the rise of the Cold War and superpower rivalry marked the beginning of widespread U.S. involvement in francophone Africa and other regions of the developing world. A variety of presidential doctrines—beginning with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and culminating in the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s—declared the self-appointed right of the United States to intervene throughout the globe (see Schraeder, 1992: 385–386). To complement U.S. security interests, especially those associated with containing the spread of communism, ODA emerged as a critical foreign-policy tool (see Chapter 4).

The reconstruction of Europe during the 1940s under the auspices of the Marshall Plan served as the centerpiece of U.S. ODA programs at the beginning of the Cold War era. The Marshall Plan indirectly aided francophone Africa, in that a portion of the nearly $3 billion in U.S. aid provided to France was diverted to its African colonies. After 1956, in the wake of the Korean War and the French defeat in Indochina, the United States, fearing communist infiltration across South Asia, shifted its aid priorities. During this period Africa was marginalized within the U.S. foreign-assistance hierarchy, receiving only 3.3 percent of all bilateral U.S. aid from 1946 to 1986 (Bandow, 1992: 75).

Throughout the Cold War the White House expected its European allies—most notably France—to take the lead in their former colonial territories (Schraeder, 1994b: 14–15). As succinctly summarized by George Ball (1968: 240), undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, the United States recognized Africa as a “special European responsibility,” just as European nations were expected to recognize “our [U.S.] particular
were not sufficient to attract Washington's involvement in francophone Africa. The top recipients of U.S. ODA most often were strategically important regional actors, such as Senegal and Morocco, that offered the U.S. special military access or maintained important U.S. technical facilities on their territories. As with foreign-policy relationships cultivated with other authoritarian African governments that were among the major recipients of U.S. ODA during the 1980s—most notably Liberia under Samuel K. Doe, Somalia under Siad Barre, and the Sudan under Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri—overriding preoccupations with anticomunism led Washington policymakers to overlook economic deterioration and politico-military repression in francophone Africa as long as its leaders were willing to support U.S. containment policies (Clough, 1994: 76–100).

The most notable example in this regard was the authoritarian leader of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, who relied upon the Zairian armed forces and foreign assistance to consolidate his power as his popular support progressively eroded (see Kelly, 1993; see also Young and Turner, 1985). The case of Zaire, which finally lost its U.S. financial support in the mid-1990s, is instructive in shedding light on France's regional preoccupation. In Paris, U.S. support for Mobutu was perceived as an outgrowth of low-level U.S.-French competition in francophone Africa during the Cold War. French leaders, especially de Gaulle, were equally concerned about rising U.S. and communist-bloc influence in this French preserve. As a result, French policymakers viewed Mobutu as facilitating the penetration of Anglo-Saxon influence into the largest country of francophone Africa and therefore as striking a clear victory for the United States at the expense of France (Foccart and Gaillard, 1995: 310–311).

JAPAN'S GROWING AID TO AFRICA

In sharp contrast to the United States, a superpower after World War II, Japan was physically and economically ravaged at the end of the war and was a net recipient of foreign assistance for the next two decades (see Chapter 5). Prohibited from rebuilding a sizable military under its postwar constitution, Japan concentrated on internal economic reconstruction and development. After regaining full sovereignty in 1952, Japan embarked on a modest ODA program that took the form of delayed reparation payments to such regional neighbors as Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Japanese ODA eventually surpassed that of any of the other industrialized democracies in 1989 and encompassed all regions of the Third World, including francophone Africa, where French policymakers noted the rising economic strength and Anglophobe proclivities of the United States's Asian protégé.
As a rising economic superpower with the world’s second-largest GNP, Japan sought to use ODA in its quest for economic expansion during the Cold War (Soroos, 1988: 21).

Many analysts agree that economics constituted the overriding motivating factor of Japanese foreign-assistance policies during the Cold War. Critics charged that Japan conducted a “business foreign policy” in which governmental and corporate actors promulgated an industrial policy targetted toward enhancing exports through concessional aid. Taking it one step further, Scalapino (1992: 206) observed that Japan’s protection under a U.S.-led military umbrella enabled Japanese leaders to reconstitute national security in largely economic terms. In short, the Japanese were able to pursue a neomercantilist foreign-assistance strategy that concentrated on securing Japan’s regional geo-economic interests while eschewing any political entanglements.

Economic self-interest clearly shaped Japanese ODA toward francophone Africa during the Cold War era. Specifically, Japanese policymakers consciously targeted ODA to those francophone African countries that 1) constituted important sources of raw materials—such as copper in Zaire, uranium in Niger, and chromium in Madagascar—that were vital to Japanese industry; 2) represented potential future sources of such raw materials, including oil in Gabon; 3) offered access to highly valued Japanese imports, such as fish products from Senegal; and 4) constituted important economic markets for Japanese exports (e.g., Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were critical markets for Japanese automobiles).

In comparison to France and the United States, Japan is a newcomer in francophone Africa. It was only in 1986 that Japanese ODA to the region surpassed $200 million, and from that year aid flows rose quickly, reaching $494 million in 1989. Although approaching the level of U.S. ODA for that same year, Japanese assistance nonetheless lagged far behind the $2.26 billion in French ODA. Japanese aid to francophone Africa in the early 1990s exceeded $500 million; these levels increased in the mid-1990s in line with generally higher Japanese ODA allocations, which proved an exception to the general rule of aid reductions among most members of the OECD.

Japanese policymakers were less likely than the United States to impose ideological litmus tests as the basis for extending ODA, preferring instead to secure markets for both imports and exports (Orr, 1990: 58). During the 1980s, for example, Japan on average provided 21 percent of its ODA to socialist countries (as opposed to 6 percent by the United States). One of the most noted examples of this policy was the extensive levels of ODA provided to Tanzania under the leadership of former president Julius Nyerere, the so-called dean of African socialism and prominent leader of the anti-apartheid struggle against South Africa.

As with French ODA policies toward francophone Africa, a country’s colonial past seemingly played an important role in Japanese ODA calculations. However, in contrast to France, Japan targeted a vast portion of its ODA toward former British colonies during the 1980s, whereas only 23 percent was directed toward former French colonies. Although many reasons for this relationship can be offered (e.g., greater facility of doing business in English-speaking, former British colonies), Japanese business leaders often noted that the francophone economies were more difficult to penetrate because of powerful French monopolies and a conscious governmental policy that supported them. By the end of the 1980s, France remained the premier, if not unchallenged, ODA actor within francophone Africa.

AID PATTERNS AFTER THE COLD WAR

The most notable political development that accompanied the end of the Cold War across Africa was the rise of democratic reform movements seeking an end to single-party rule (e.g., see Schraeder, 1994a; Martin, 1993; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). Out of fifty-four African countries for which data were provided to international organizations, fifteen (roughly 28 percent) were described as either maintaining or having ensured a successful transition to democratic forms of governance. This number stood in sharp contrast to the five democracies (roughly 9 percent of the total) that existed as late as 1990. Another twenty-six countries were described as being “in transition” as of 1994 from various types of authoritarian rule to more democratic forms of governance.

France’s initial behavior suggested that the democratization process would become the guiding principle of French ODA in francophone Africa in the post–Cold War era. At the sixteenth Franco-African summit, held in June 1990, Mitterrand announced that French ODA commitments henceforth would favor those countries that either were democratic or undergoing democratic change. Individuals from all major elite groups were invited to take part in a political summit to debate the outlines of a new democratic political order (Bouilaga, 1993). In the case of Benin, the summit declared its sovereignty over the political process, stripped dictator Mathieu Kérékou of his official powers (but granted him political amnesty), and drafted an electoral calendar that led to the country’s first free multiparty elections (Nzouankeu, 1993).

In addition to assuming that other authoritarian leaders could be forced out by pressure from a summit conference, proponents also believed that France would punish recalcitrant leaders by applying economic and political sanctions. As demonstrated by the distribution of French ODA in the years immediately following the La Baule summit, however, it became clear
that the idealistic goals associated with African “Paristroïka” were never intended to replace the more traditional goals of preserving and strengthening la francophonie (see Bayart, 1991). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, despite President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s co-optation of the democratization process, the Mitterand administration sent its favored client more than $1.5 billion in official development assistance from 1990 to 1992—a dramatic increase from the already high level of $549 million in ODA provided during the preceding three-year period.

France’s unwillingness to embrace democratization movements when accompanied by instability was underscored at the seventeenth Franco-African summit, held in October 1992. At this meeting, Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy stated that when confronted with the simultaneous and potentially conflicting goals of promoting democracy, ensuring development, and maintaining security, francophone African leaders should adhere to the following order of priorities: first and foremost, security, followed by development and then democratization (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 102). This shift in priorities also reflected growing support for a “cohabitation” model of governance that became the hallmark of French politics during the 1980s. Under the Africanized version, often referred to as a gouvernement de l’unité nationale (government of national unity), incumbent regimes that had no intention of relinquishing power were expected to compensate for the lack of democracy by asking opposition leaders and parties to join a government of national unity (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 103).

A second trend that significantly affected French ODA policy in the post–Cold War era was the intensification of a continentwide economic crisis that strongly affected francophone Africa. An important dimension of this crisis was the often severe economic dislocation that accompanied the implementation of structural-adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Equally important, internal economic decline, often resulting from bad policy choices, was hastened by bloated, corrupt, and inefficient bureaucracies—the so-called “crisis of the state”—that increasingly were incapable of responding to the day-to-day needs of their populations (e.g., see Widner, 1994; Callagh and Ravenhill, 1993; Sandbrook, 1993). In response to this economic crisis, France devalued the previously sacred CFA franc for the first time since the franc zone’s creation in 1948. The extraordinary decision clearly suggested the rising importance of economic factors in French foreign-policy calculations in the post–Cold War era.

The seriousness French officials accorded to the growing necessity of bailing out financially threatened francophone regimes rather than devaluing was clearly demonstrated by a dramatic increase in ODA commitments at the beginning of the 1990s. From 1990 to 1992, total French ODA to francophone Africa exceeded $8.2 billion—a more than $2 billion increase over the amount of ODA provided during the previous three-year period. Francophone Africa zone members constituted a privileged subgroup of an already privileged group (Francophone Africa) in that they received the largest share (79 percent) of French ODA in 1992, despite constituting only 56 percent of francophone African countries.

Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a concomitant increase in global economic competition that forced France seriously to reconsider its relationship with francophone Africa. “Ultimately,” concluded Martin (1995: 175), “the deepening economic and financial crisis in francophone Africa, coupled with a severe recession in the former metropole, led to the sobering realization that France could no longer afford to foot the bill.” Interestingly enough, but clearly not by accident, the French decision to devalue the CFA franc was only announced and implemented after the death on December 7, 1992, of the dean of francophone Africa, President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire (see Whiteman, 1994; French, 1994). Before his death, Houphouët-Boigny could be counted on by other francophone leaders to utilize his diplomatic clout to squelch any French attempts at devaluation.

A third security-related trend of the post–Cold War era that has captured the attention of French policymakers is the rise of Islamic revivalist movements, particularly in the Maghreb region of North Africa, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Algeria offers an especially poignant example of this evolving French security concern. Having fought a bloody war to gain independence from France in 1962, Algeria in the early 1990s was engulfed in an intensifying civil war. Tensions began to mount in 1991 after the Algerian army annulled the country’s first round of multiparty elections since independence, then assumed governmental control in a military coup d’état. Tensions peaked when the military government canceled parliamentary elections scheduled for 1992. The military intervened because an Islamic revivalist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was on the verge of winning democratic elections.

France’s concerns over Islamic fundamentalism were evident beginning in the 1980s. Fearing that an Algeria governed by fundamentalists would pose a direct threat to French interests in the Maghreb region and radicalize the substantial Islamic community in France itself, French policymakers increased ODA commitments from the $192 million provided between 1986 and 1988 to $574 million over the following three years. The Mitterrand administration supported Algeria’s decision in 1992 to cancel parliamentary elections by providing an additional $103 million in ODA. France’s preoccupation with Islamic revivalism in Algeria was not unique; it simply was the latest manifestation of a long-term security interest in francophone Maghreb states.10

The French response to genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is also illustrative of how French security interests evolved in the post–Cold War era. Due to a
conscious effort to integrate the former Belgian colonies of Central Africa into the French sphere of influence, the Mitterrand administration during the 1980s provided significant amounts of ODA to Burundi ($243 million), Zaire ($461 million), and Rwanda ($199 million). The ODA provided to Rwanda was especially noteworthy in that the annual amount provided during the 1980s was doubled, to an average of $40 million, during the initial three years of the 1990s.

Specifically, the Mitterrand administration sought to stem the invasion and steady advance beginning in October 1990 of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a guerrilla army supported by Uganda and perceived by French policymakers as hostile to France and “under Anglo-Saxon influence” (Smith, 1995: 452). The RPF’s military victory constituted the first time that a francophone country had “fallen” to Anglo-Saxon influence, and some French officials perceived Rwanda as the first in a series of regional dominos that eventually could bring Burundi and an independent Shaba (the southeastern province of Zaire) under Anglo-Saxon domination, to the detriment of France and la francophonie (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 182–185). Despite the fact that the new RPF regime neither initiated nor participated in the genocide by ethnic Hutus (which ultimately ended when the RPF achieved military victory), the Mitterrand administration refused to invite Rwanda to the Franco-African summit of November 1994.

As for U.S. aid, the end of the Cold War reinforced the historical tendency among U.S. policymakers to place Africa on the back burner. Adopting a play on words of the Reagan administration’s much-debated policy of “constructive engagement,” Clough (1992: 1) pointedly argued that the Bush administration engaged in “cynical disengagement,” in which policymakers were guided by three principles:

1. Do not spend much money [on Africa] unless Congress makes you.
2. Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world. And, above all else,
3. Do not take stands that might create domestic political controversies in the United States.

Although one can argue that the Clinton administration’s neglect of sub-Saharan Africa is not cynically motivated (see Schraeder, 1995), these three guiding principles still appear to characterize Washington’s approach to francophone Africa in the post–Cold War era.

The Clinton administration’s avoidance of policies that might create domestic controversies was clearly demonstrated by its tentative response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Fearful of reviving the domestic uproar that accompanied the killing in October 1993 of eighteen U.S. soldiers taking part in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the Clinton White House not only initially blocked the dispatch to Rwanda of 5,500 peacekeeping troops requested by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali but actually instructed U.S. spokespeople to avoid labeling the unfolding ethnic conflict “genocide”—lest such a label inflame U.S. public opinion and cause demands for U.S. intervention (see Des Forges, 1995). A variety of Africanist groups, such as Human Rights Watch/Africa, claimed that the administration’s foot-dragging contributed to the deaths of thousands of civilians (see Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994: 2), but Clinton’s decision nonetheless matched the growing popular sentiment against U.S. involvement in UN-sponsored peacemaking operations.

The second guiding principle for U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War era—avoiding issues that will complicate policies toward other, more important regions of the world—was demonstrated by U.S. policy toward Zaire. During the 1992 presidential election campaign, candidate Clinton attacked the Bush administration for failing to distance itself from “corrupt and dictatorial leaders” in Africa, specifically in terms of being “trepid, when it should have been decisive” with respect to terminating aid to the Mobutu regime (quoted in Cason and Martin, 1993: 2). Contrary to his espoused intentions, however, Clinton ultimately adopted a more status quo policy before finally being persuaded to suspend aid to Zaire by congressional critics.11

The avoidance of financial commitments to Africa—the third guiding principle for U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War era—constituted the consensus viewpoint within both the White House and Congress in the mid-1990s. Regardless of whether the White House has been occupied by a Democrat or a Republican, since the mid-1980s U.S. foreign assistance to Africa has been steadily cut because of popular pressures to trim the budget deficit. From 1985 to 1995, U.S. bilateral assistance to Africa declined both in aggregate terms (from $1.9 to $1.1 billion) and as a percentage of the U.S. foreign-aid budget (from 10.3 to 6 percent). Although military and other security-related forms of assistance (such as economic support funds) have been almost totally abolished and account for the majority of these cuts, the Republican Party—which as of January 1995 controlled both the Senate and the House of Representatives—vowed to slash even these lower ODA levels because of the lack of U.S. strategic interests in Africa in the post–Cold War era.

The growing centrality of promoting democracy, in terms of both rhetoric and viable policies, is one of the most notable changes in U.S. policies toward Africa during the post–Cold War era (e.g., see Diamond, 1995). In numerous countries throughout francophone Africa, relatively small but effective amounts of ODA have been provided to facilitate the transition to democracy (e.g., sending representatives to monitor elections) as well as to consolidate successful transitions that already have taken place. In the case
of Benin, the U.S. provided $41 million in ODA during the election year of 1991 and $14 million in ODA in 1992 after the installation of a democratically elected administration.

The gradual decline of ideologically based policies in favor of ones based on economic self-interest is a second important element of changing U.S. involvement in Africa in the post–Cold War era. U.S. policymakers increasingly are in agreement that foreign policy should facilitate U.S. private enterprise in all regions of the world, including francophone Africa. The net result of this growing economic component of U.S. foreign policy is to strengthen further the small but growing expansion into francophone Africa of certain key U.S. industries, most notably oil and telecommunications, that has accompanied the end of the Cold War.

In the eyes of many French policymakers, however, the growing penetration of U.S. companies into francophone Africa constitutes “at best an intrusion” and “at worst an aggression” into their chasse gardée (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 186). The seriousness with which this issue was treated at the highest levels of the French government was demonstrated by the public admission of Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin that a series of meetings was held on the theme of how best to “defend” French interests—including those within the economic realm—against those of the United States (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 187).

A growing cultural interest in African affairs, which led to greater economic interaction, has served as another dimension of U.S. foreign policy toward francophone Africa in the post–Cold War era. The first U.S.-African summit was held in Côte d’Ivoire in April 1991, an expanded second summit was held in Gabon two years later, and a third summit, which took place in May 1995 in Senegal, earned the distinction of the largest U.S.-African gathering ever held. Originally designed to strengthen African/African-American cultural ties, the summit evolved into a major forum for promoting trade and investment between the United States and Africa and threatened to overshadow the only other comparable francophone equivalent—the Franco-African summit (see Triay, 1993).

As in the case of France, a final element of U.S. policies toward Africa in the post–Cold War era is a growing fear that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the African continent threatens U.S. interests (Esposito, 1992). Many officials observed that the demise of the Soviet Union and communism created a power vacuum on the African continent that was partially being filled by what they perceived as radical forms of Islamic revivalism sponsored by Iran, Libya, and the Sudan (e.g., see Lesser, 1993). This perception of Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to U.S. interests is not new, dating back to the Iranian revolution. But it has been heightened in the 1990s in the wake of political turmoil in Egypt and its potential impact on the Middle East peace process.

Unlike their French and U.S. counterparts, who had to realign ODA policies in light of changing national interests after the end of the Cold War, Japanese policymakers simply reinforced their ongoing pursuit of economic self-interest in francophone Africa. In order to enhance Japanese trade and investment opportunities, the Japanese government hosted a major conference on African development in October 1993. A substantial rise in Japanese ODA in the post–Cold War era underscores the seriousness with which Japanese policymakers have sought to penetrate francophone Africa. Whereas an average of $101 million in Japanese ODA was provided between 1980 and 1982, this average increased significantly, to $460 million, between 1990 and 1992. Not surprisingly, major Japanese trading partners—most notably Morocco, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire—received large increases in Japanese ODA.

It is interesting to note that despite the fact that Japan’s ODA average for the 1990–1992 period was not much lower than the U.S. ODA average for the same period ($560 million), Japanese efforts in francophone Africa have not attracted the same level of criticism leveled by France at the United States. Japan, like Germany, is not perceived as encroaching upon French cultural institutions and leadership, as the United States was in the case of the African/African-American summit or Canada is within the francophone summit. Moreover, Japan does not compete within the extremely lucrative and jealously protected oil industry. However, significant Japanese inroads within the telecommunications and automobile industries of francophone Africa clearly underscore Japan’s movement away from its past role as purchaser of primary products and toward greater penetration of traditional French export realms.

Whatever the reason for its success relative to U.S. aid, the expanding Japanese ODA program in francophone Africa nonetheless has generated both criticisms and concerns. Japan has nothing to lose and everything to gain by pressing for the political and economic liberalization of francophone African states (witness its provision of $14 million in ODA to Benin in 1992) and is criticized as a strong supporter of Anglo-Saxon culture, most notably in terms of its adoption of English as the language of international diplomacy and business (see Mazzri, 1995: 81–84).

The greatest potential impact on French interests lies in what is often referred to as the Japanese model of development. As highlighted by Prime Minister Habib Thiam of Senegal, the virtues of this model are its openness to modernity, its utilization of the state as a motor for rapid economic development, and its allowing the country to “preserve its own identity” (see Samb, 1995: 4). The implication of the latter portion of this statement is that francophone Africa can and perhaps should develop in association with foreign partners who do not seek to impose their ideological and cultural biases and preconceptions on LDCs.
CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War has had a dramatic effect on the flows of foreign aid from all donors to francophone Africa, particularly the three primary donors of France, the United States, and Japan. Although Japan simply reinforced and expanded its focus on trade and private investment, French policymakers were prompted to reassess a culturally based ODA policy of promoting la francophonie, and U.S. policymakers had to restructure its containment-based policy once the threat of communism no longer existed. The common element of each of these three cases was a growing recognition (or reaffirmation, in the case of Japan) of the importance of economics in the emerging post–Cold War era.

Despite their continued strong attachment to promoting the cultural ideal of la francophonie, French policymakers have emerged as the protectors of the status quo in an increasingly competitive international economic environment. If one perceives economics as a zero-sum game, as French policymakers appear to do, the process of economic and political liberalization throughout francophone Africa poses strong risks to the high levels of influence previously enjoyed by France. According to this perspective, both the United States and Japan have much to gain from the creation in francophone Africa of multiparty democracies that are more fully integrated into the international economic system. In this regard, French policymakers have perceived a growing U.S. threat and, to a lesser degree, have begun to voice concern over rising Japanese influence.

Whereas Japan in the early 1980s committed only 6 percent of the total ODA provided by the three major donors, its share rose to 9 percent in the mid-1980s and to 12 percent at the beginning of the 1990s. In March 1995 it signed a major foreign-assistance agreement with the Senegalese government, and other major packages were under consideration. In this regard, the observation of a Cameroonian businessman (quoted in Maunick, 1993: 25) concerning the U.S. economic threat to French interests in francophone Africa is revealing: "If one looks closely, it is not the Americans that are threatening the French, but rather the Japanese."

3. "a tradition of moderation and compromise arising out of a peaceful transfer of power at independence"; and 4) "the perpetuation of Franco-African relations characterized by a pattern of continuing French political, economic, and cultural power and influence.

3. For the purposes of this chapter, francophone Africa includes twenty-five independent states from the following regions: Central Africa (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, and Zaire); East Africa (Djibouti); Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles); North Africa or the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia); and West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).

4. Neither Germany nor Canada will be treated in this chapter.

5. All statistical references, unless otherwise cited, are derived from a data set of thirty-six African countries that served as the basis of Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1996).

6. These countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo.

7. U.S. aid to Africa, of course, has been overshadowed by its massive annual transfers to Egypt, but these are listed by USAID as aid for the Near East, not Africa.

8. The largest ODA package in 1992 was $55 million for Morocco, but this represented a deep cut from the $127 million allocation of the previous year (OECD, 1994a).

9. The importance of ideology in U.S. calculations was further illustrated by the fact that capitalist countries received, on average, 85 percent of all U.S. ODA to Africa during the 1980s, whereas Marxist and socialist countries received only 6 percent each.

10. Other outlets of French concern included Morocco and Tunisia, which together received approximately $1 billion in French ODA from 1990 to 1992.

11. At the heart of the Clinton administration's revised approach to Zaire in 1993 and 1994 was an apparent acceptance of the "Mobutu or chaos" argument advanced by Zairian specialists in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency since Mobutu took power in the mid-1960s (Schatzberg, 1991). "Regardless of the fact that we are no longer faced with a communist threat," explained a foreign service officer of the State Department (quoted in Schraeder, 1994a: 107), "the destabilization of Zaire—which borders nine other African countries—could have a tremendously negative impact on regional stability."

12. The rising economic importance of Japan suggested by these figures is perhaps best symbolized by the ongoing construction of a massive Japanese cultural center overlooking the Atlantic Ocean in Dakar, Senegal.

NOTES

1. The U.S. attended the proceedings as an observer nation, and its representative, John A. Kasun, signed the Berlin Convention (see M'Bokolo, 1992: 278–282).

2. According to Martin (1995: 63), among the other factors that make francophone Africa distinctive are 1) "a common (French or Belgian) colonial experience"; 2) "a broad cultural unity" resulting from a fusion of African and French cultures";