Bureaucratic Influence in the U.S.-Zairian Special Relationship

Peter J. Schraeder argues that post-Cold War American policies toward Africa have not been marked by the significant change indicative of a new era, but rather by a continuation of the previously established policies. He uses the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire as a case study to explicate his argument. According to the author, U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has been characterized by a high degree of bureaucratic influence— which in turn leads to a policy process marked by “bureaucratic incrementalism”—that makes it very difficult to change policy even in the dramatically altered post-Cold War international system.

The decline of the Cold War and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union into several smaller and non-communist independent countries initially were hailed by academics and policy analysts as providing opportunities for a reexamination of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Africanists were especially hopeful that Washington would be able to discard the Cold War-inspired policies of containment which often downplayed the authoritarian excesses of various African regimes who were willing to support the United States in its anti-communist quest. Much to the chagrin of those seeking significant changes in U.S. Africa policies, however, the end of the Cold War seemingly has reinforced the tendency of Washington to ignore African issues in favor of other regions of greater concern, such as Western and Eastern Europe and, more recently, the Middle East. An important outcome of this neglect is that U.S. Africa policies often continue to be guided by many of the same rationales and assumptions of the Cold War era. The purpose of this article is to offer one tentative explanation as to why continuity rather than change often remains the norm by focusing on the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire.

Although contacts between the U.S. and Africa have expanded in both quantity and quality during the post-World War II period, Presidents from Harry S. Truman to George Bush traditionally have been the least interested in, and subsequently have paid the least

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amount of attention to, Africa relative to other regions of the world. Even under President Jimmy Carter—recognized by Africanists as pursuing one of the most enlightened policies toward the continent during the post-World War II period—Africa ranked last in terms of foreign policy attention. As a result, the tendency, especially during the emerging post-Cold War era, has been for the President to relegate day-to-day responsibility for overseeing U.S. Africa policies to those national security bureaucracies which comprise the executive branch: the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as their specialized agencies devoted specifically to Africa. A significant outcome of presidential inattention is that U.S. Africa policies, perhaps more so than those directed toward any other region of the world, are subject to the influence of bureaucrats within the national security bureaucracies. The reality of "bureaucratic influence" within the policy-making process has three important implications for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa:

1. Fragmentation of Policy and Bureaucratic Politics. One result of bureaucratic influence within the policy-making process is that U.S. Africa policies become fragmented and interpreted differently according to the established organizational missions of each bureaucracy that historically was created to deal with a particular aspect of the foreign policy relationship. Subsequently, each fosters an institutional culture—what one observer has aptly described as a "curator mentality"—that both supports its mission and socializes individuals into working toward its attainment. The primary mission of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, for example, is the maintenance of smooth and stable relationships with all African governments. The emphasis is on quiet diplomacy and the negotiated resolution of any conflicts that may arise. In sharp contrast, the primary bureaucratic mission of the CIA’s Africa Division traditionally has been to carry the ideological battle against the former Soviet Union and communism to the African continent in efforts that range from the cultivation of local agents to the mounting of covert operations. Openly contemptuous of self-proclaimed Marxist and other "leftist" regimes, liberation movements, and, more recently, "radical" activists (such as Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi) and political movements (such as Islamic fundamentalism), the CIA prefers close liaison with the security services of European allies and friendly African regimes. And, in the Pentagon, the primary bureaucratic mission of the Office for African Affairs (International Security Affairs) is to ensure continued access to strategically located bases and other facilities for responding to local crises and, most important, military contingencies in Europe or the Middle East.
Although other sources of bureaucratic behavior such as the substantive views and personal ambitions of individual bureaucrats are important, the critical theme of this section is that members of a bureaucracy often become the advocates of their agencies and tend to interpret national security according to their agency's role and mission in the foreign policy establishment, often leading to a less than harmonious relationship. Indeed, bureaucracies do not run wild within a political void, but rather constitute part of a political process—in this case, bureaucratic politics. To this end, they bargain and compromise, ultimately seeking to maximize their own positions within the policymaking establishment.\(^5\)

2. *Maintenance of Status Quo Policies.* A second important outcome of bureaucratic influence in the policy-making process is the creation of a bureaucratic mindset which fosters a fundamental resistance to change or a predilection toward maintenance of the established status quo. Among the most important factors contributing to bureaucratic conservatism are the safety of relying on established and accepted standard operating procedures, or the realization that undue risk-taking may permanently damage one's career by effectively blocking any upward mobility through the ranks.\(^6\) The net result, according to Morton H. Halperin, a respected scholar on bureaucratic politics and U.S. foreign policy, is that the "majority of bureaucrats prefer to maintain the status quo, and only a small group is, at any one time, advocating change."\(^7\) Subsequently, members of a bureaucracy—especially its bureaucratic head—will often put up a fierce fight rather than submit to changes that they perceive as infringing on their "territory," or threatening the integrity of their organization's bureaucratic "mission."\(^8\)

3. *Bureaucratic Incrementalism.* The inherently conservative nature of bureaucracies prompts resistance to change. In turn, the self-interested nature of the various departments or agencies propels members to seek to widen the role of their own organization within the policy-making establishment. The primary means of doing this, of course, is through greater amounts of economic and military aid, and by an expansion of activities within the host country. Other ways of achieving closer ties include the Africa Bureau's pursuit of White House visits for African heads-of-state, the Defense Department's growing interest in joint military maneuvers with African regimes, and the CIA's willingness to share intelligence findings with friendly and trusted leaders. Regardless of the strategy pursued in strengthening ties with a country, the term "incrementalism" best captures the resulting process of change: once a foreign policy relationship is established, the self-interested nature of bureaucracies often contributes to the gradual enhancement of relations with that country.\(^9\) In
short, the net result of bureaucratic influence within the policy-making process is an incrementalist outcome in which the potential for change in U.S. foreign policy is extremely limited. Let us now turn to the example of U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire to demonstrate how bureaucratic incrementalism has favored little change in policy even in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR YEARS AND THE CREATION OF THE “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”

The U.S.-Zairian “special relationship” was forged in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1960s as Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson oversaw a variety of interventionist practices designed to ensure the territorial integrity and the pro-West orientation of this formerly Belgian-ruled colony during its first seven years of independence. Among these interventionist practices were President Eisenhower’s authorization in 1960 of a covert operation designed to “permanently” remove Zairian Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba from the political scene; President Kennedy’s full support for a UN-led (and U.S.-sponsored) military solution (“Operation Grand Slam”) to the secessionist desires of Zaire’s Shaba province; and President Johnson’s authorization in 1964 of “Operation Dragon Rouge,” a joint U.S.-Belgian military operation which broke the back of a guerrilla insurgency in eastern Zaire and rescued approximately 2,000 Western hostages, as well as a more limited military operation in 1967 which succeeded in defeating a mercenary uprising in eastern Zaire.10

The conclusion of the 1967 military operation was especially significant in three major respects for the evolution of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship. First, it marked the end of approximately seven years of post-independence instability which had made Zaire a superpower flashpoint in the emerging Cold War competition for ideological supremacy in Africa. Second, the military operation marked the strengthening of a consensus throughout the executive branch that Mobutu Sese Seko—the CIA-cultivated leader who took power in a military coup d’etat in 1965—was “our man” in Kinshasa and that U.S. foreign policy should facilitate his ability to maintain stability in Zaire.11 From this point onward, U.S. policies were oriented toward the “man” rather than the country or the government of Zaire. “General, if it hadn’t been for you,” explained President Kennedy in an early example of this viewpoint, “the whole thing would have collapsed and the communists would have taken over.”12 As warmly noted by President Bush twenty-six years later, Mobutu remained one of Washington’s “oldest” and “most valued” friends on the African continent.13 This feeling was reciprocated by Mobutu who came to
view the U.S. as the only external power he historically could count upon to come to Zaire's aid during times of crisis. "There is a saying in my country," noted Mobutu during one of his many trips to the U.S., "that it is in times of need that you know your friends and, indeed, the United States has stood by us and we shall never forget." 14

A third and final outcome associated with conclusion of the 1967 military operation was an almost complete lack of White House attention to events in Zaire as political instability was replaced by stability and order. In direct contrast to the 1960-1967 period in which Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson interjected themselves into the policy-making process as a result of intermittent crises, the lack of crisis in the post-1967 period reinforced the traditional White House proclivity to defer African issues to specialists on African Affairs within the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA. As a result, the next ten years were marked by the process of bureaucratic incrementalism in which each of the national security bureaucracies sought to maintain or enhance U.S.-Zairian ties in accordance with established policies. A critical element of this consensus was the firm belief that "chaos"—meaning territorial disintegration, regional instability, and, ultimately, communist expansion into the heart of Africa—was the only alternative to Mobutu's continued hold over power. 15

Preoccupied with the growing war in Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Defense Department constituted that portion of the national security bureaucracies which was the least supportive of significantly enhancing U.S. ties with the Mobutu regime. Already providing Zaire with one of the largest U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Missions in Africa, as well as two in-country military attachés (Army and Air Force), the basic position of the Defense Department was to meet what it perceived as Zaire's minimum security needs by maintaining small, but effective, established programs. For example, an annual $3-4 million was budgeted for the training of Zairian military personnel through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. One notable exception to the Defense Department's conservative position concerning enhanced military aid to the Mobutu regime was strong support for Zaire's purchase of six C-130s (three each in 1970 and 1973), the maintenance of which would be handled as part of the U.S. military aid program. 16

The CIA served as a stronger proponent within the bureaucracy for an enhancement of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship. Among the many responsibilities shouldered by the CIA in Zaire during the early 1970s were the training of Mobutu's personal bodyguard and providing the Zairian President with intelligence concerning political develop-
ments both internal and external to Zaire. President Mobutu not only constituted an important anti-communist ally in the eyes of the CIA, but also served as an important regional linchpin of U.S. covert involvement in Angola's civil war during 1974 and 1975. Indeed, the CIA perceived Zaire as a growing regional power which increasingly would play an influential independent role in maintaining stability in Central Africa. Already strong CIA links with Mobutu were further enhanced by the return to Zaire of Lawrence Devlin, former CIA Chief of Station in Kinshasa during the early 1960s. An old and trusted friend of Mobutu, Devlin took up duty as the local representative of Maurice Templesman, a powerful U.S. businessperson with significant economic investments in Zaire.

The most vigorous proponent of greater links between the U.S. and Zaire was the State Department's Africa Bureau, especially its representative in Kinshasa, Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance. A career Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who had served in Belgium and was the former director of the Africa Bureau's Office of Central African Affairs, Vance was responsible for the significant expansion of U.S. activities in Zaire from 1969 to 1974. Vance notes in his memoirs, for example, that his primary task upon arriving in Zaire in June 1969 was to change the outmoded perception within the U.S. policy-making establishment that Zaire was "synonymous with chaos." Among Vance's numerous and varied accomplishments toward this end were the creation of a Peace Corps program that eventually would become one of the largest in Africa; the promotion of a public relations bonanza in which the crew of Apollo 11 visited Zaire shortly after returning to earth; and the fashioning of a White House visit built around the theme of foreign investment which ultimately resulted in several prominent U.S. companies establishing facilities in Zaire.

Ambassador Vance's strong advocacy of enhancing the U.S.-Zairian special relationship was indicative of Zaire's firm standing within the State Department's Africa Bureau as a country which would serve as a "showcase" for U.S. efforts in Africa. Several economic and political trends clearly seemed to indicate that Zaire was entering a "golden age" of prosperity unlike many of its less fortunate or mismanaged neighbors. In the economic realm, revenues from copper exports were at all time high, a 1967 International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic reform package succeeded in bringing inflation under control, foreign exchange accounts were in balance, and the country enjoyed a favorable balance of trade. Economic growth and development were further enhanced by the fact that growing numbers of Zairian students were returning home from overseas university training to staff ministry positions in ever-expanding administrative bureaucracies. Finally, in the equally important political realm, presidential
and legislative elections in 1970 (as promised in 1965) led to impressive political victories which seemed to underscore genuine popular support for Mobutu’s leadership among the Zairian people.

The combination of CIA, State Department, and, to a lesser degree, Defense Department interests in strengthening the U.S.-Zairian special relationship underscored the growing importance of President Mobutu in the calculations of middle-range bureaucrats charged with overseeing U.S. Africa policies. This general consensus about “our man” in Kinshasa was perhaps most aptly captured by David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Nixon administration. “Despite some reservations concerning the nature of Mobutu’s rule, as well as minor disagreement over what form a future U.S.-Zairian relationship should take,” explained Newsom, “a consensus existed within the policy-making establishment that there simply was no acceptable alternative to Mobutu and that we, as the United States, needed to support him.”19 As a result, U.S. policy toward Mobutu from 1967 to 1977 was marked by the steady strengthening of U.S.-Zairian ties in accordance with established policies.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION

The incrementalist trend in the U.S.-Zairian special relationship was seriously called into question for the first time as a result of two invasions of Zaire during 1977 and 1978, dubbed “Shaba I” and “Shaba II,” respectively. On 7 March 1977, less than seven weeks after President Carter’s inauguration, approximately 1,500 Zairian exiles under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) invaded Zaire’s Shaba province from neighboring Angola. With the publicly stated goal of overthrowing the Mobutu regime, the FLNC advanced virtually unopposed and threatened to capture the mining center of Kolwezi, the source of nearly 75 percent of Zaire’s foreign export earnings, until turned back by a joint American-French-Moroccan military operation. Roughly fourteen months later, the FLNC mounted a second invasion of Zaire. Unlike Shaba I, this time the FLNC invaded from Zambia and in just four days was able to capture Kolwezi, the economic heart of Shaba province. Similar to the ultimate outcome of Shaba I, however, the invading force was ultimately defeated by a joint American-French-Belgian military operation.

The most significant outcome of the Shaba I crisis for Zaire’s supporters within the national security bureaucracies was that it firmly placed a critical spotlight on the glaring political and economic shortcomings of the Mobutu regime, as well as Washington’s support for what appeared to be a corrupt, authoritarian ruler.20 Despite
Washington’s provision of over $850 million in economic and military aid to Zaire from 1960 to 1976, the Mobutu regime still was incapable of stemming the advance of only 1,500 insurgents. The leader of a small but growing voice within both houses of Congress seeking to cut off aid to Mobutu, Representative Stephen J. Solarz questioned the decision of the Carter administration to provide the Zairian government with non-lethal aid during the Shaba I crisis. “Why is it in our interest that Mobutu should triumph over the insurgency rather than to have either the insurgents triumph or Mobutu deposed and replaced by someone else who will in turn be able to contain the insurgency,” noted Solarz before the House Subcommittee on Africa while the invasion was in progress, “particularly when the American taxpayer is being asked to spend a substantial amount of money in Zaire, essentially designed to enable Mobutu to survive?”

Despite their willingness to call into question Washington’s Cold War-inspired imperative of supporting authoritarian dictators simply because of their anti-communist beliefs, the so-called “regionalists” within the Carter administration—such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose—believed that cutting off aid to Mobutu constituted too radical a policy option. As Vance frankly noted in his memoirs, “None of us wished to face the uncertain consequences that might flow from the collapse of his [Mobutu’s] regime and the subsequent disintegration of Zaire into unstable segments open to radical penetration.” Rather, the guiding theme of the regionalist approach was to condition the future of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship on Mobutu’s willingness to implement reforms in the political, economic, and military spheres. Whereas some of these were acceptable to Mobutu, as well as the U.S. national security bureaucracies, others were considered ill-conceived and, thus, opposed.

The issue of human rights reforms was a characteristic starting point for the Carter administration and figured prominently in State Department instructions to the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa. Although willing to recognize that human rights “problems” existed in Zaire, the State Department believed that it was improper to designate the country as a “gross and consistent violator” of human rights. More problematic was that several Africa specialists within the State Department’s Africa Bureau had serious misgivings about the human rights approach (which were shared by their counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon). According to these officials, especially those who had served in Zaire, not only was Mobutu an “unavoidable evil” who had to be dealt with, there was, in actuality, “very little” that Washington could do to make Mobutu meet the human rights demands of the Carter White House. In short, for a bureaucracy which perceived its mission as the
maintenance of untroubled relations with African regimes, the touchy question of human rights threatened that mission.

Concern with human rights constituted but one part of a broader interest among the administration’s regionalists to pressure Mobutu to enact political reforms. Intended to enhance Mobutu’s domestic legitimacy and political stability, the central themes of political reform were the partial decentralization of power and the institutionalization of a process ensuring popular input into the policy arena. In this regard, Mobutu himself had recognized the need to ensure greater political competition within Zaire’s one-party system, although his rule would remain unquestioned. For example, whereas previous to the Shaba I crisis the 270 Representatives of the Legislative Council had been appointed by the party’s thirty-member Political Bureau (which, in turn, had been appointed by Mobutu), the Zairian President opened up both bodies to popular elections. Yet although supportive of the concept of political decentralization, career professionals within the State Department’s Africa Bureau, including Ambassador Walter Cutler, as well as officers at the Pentagon and the CIA, argued that Washington should be “extremely cautious” in telling the Zairian government how to reform itself politically. These officers believed that U.S. pressures for political reforms inevitably could prove destabilizing and unintentionally weaken the Mobutu regime—the exact opposite of what Washington was attempting to accomplish.

Economic reform constituted a third area of concern among the regionalists within the Carter administration. Unlike the topics of human rights and political reforms, pressure for economic reforms—particularly those dealing with high levels of corruption within the upper reaches of the Zairian government—was considered a traditional part of the U.S.-Zairian dialogue and was supported widely by the State Department, including the Africa Bureau. In a landmark speech delivered on 25 November 1979, Mobutu responded to these concerns by noting that Zairian society was pervaded by a “Zairian sickness” (le “mal Zairois”) strikingly reminiscent of, and perhaps purposely patterned after, President Carter’s description of an “American malaise.” The “cure” for this sickness, according to Mobutu, was one in a long line of so-called “Mobutu plans” built around the twin themes of economic reorganization and development.

Reform of the Zairian military constituted the final area of interest among the regionalists within the Carter administration, as well as within the Pentagon. In its final year in office, the Ford administration had laid the groundwork for the transfer of sophisticated military weaponry to Zaire to counter a possible threat from Angola. As demonstrated by Zaire’s inability to single-handedly stem the advance of relatively small insurgent forces during the Shaba I and Shaba II
invasions, the primary failing of the Zairian Armed Forces was, however, not its lack of equipment, but rather the lack of training and discipline, the pervasiveness of corruption, and the lack of a trained officer corps.27 In this regard, the State Department and the Pentagon coordinated with the French and the Belgians to put together a reform package for the Zairian Armed Forces. Whereas the Belgians focused primarily on in-country officer training and the formation of three infantry battalions, and the French assumed the training of a paramilitary commando battalion and the expansion of an existing Mirage fighter program, the Pentagon concentrated its efforts in the areas of ground and air transportation, such as maintenance of U.S.-supplied C-130s and logistics coordination.28

The issue of reforming the Mobutu regime intensified in the aftermath of Shaba II. "After all," noted one FSO formerly stationed in Zaire, "Mobutu had been the target of two invasions in less than fourteen months and neither the Carter administration nor its European allies wished to consider the necessity of having to bail him out yet a third time."29 As expected, the primary push for reforms did not come from the national security bureaucracies, which were generally opposed to placing undue pressure on Mobutu, but rather from the senior-level regionalists within the Carter administration who wished to avoid the occurrence of "Shaba III," or yet another military invasion of Zaire in less than three years. As one of the most prominent members of the regionalists coalition, Secretary of State Vance made a speech in Atlantic City on 20 June 1978, in which he outlined how the future of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship was to be conditioned on Mobutu's adoption of both economic and political reforms.30

Despite the best intentions of senior-level regionalists, the reformist approach suffered two major shortcomings. First, policymakers lacked the cooperation of key U.S. allies in Europe, particularly France and Belgium, who were the leading sources of military aid to the Mobutu regime, as well as significant avenues of trade and investment. According to Robert Remole, former head (1978–1980) of the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa and an outspoken critic of U.S. Zairian policies, although France and Belgium welcomed reform efforts in the economic sphere, they vigorously opposed Washington's efforts to seek political, administrative, and human rights reforms. "Unless we can get the Belgians and French to agree with us, we lack leverage," explained Remole. "All we can do, all we can expect are cosmetic changes, and that is exactly what we have had—cosmetic changes."31 Remole's recommended policy stance, which earned him the disdain of numerous colleagues at the State Department, was for Washington to "brusquely, brutally terminate aid." Remole argued
that such an act would serve as a "sign to the Mobutu regime and to the Zairian man in the street that the United States is serious about reform and really believes in human rights for Africa."\footnote{32}

The second shortcoming of the Carter administration's reform efforts revolved around the willingness of senior-level U.S. policy makers to remain active on the issue of Zaire. In order to achieve optimal effectiveness, pressure for reforms ideally required ongoing, high-level attention capable of overcoming bureaucratic intransigence by career officers who firmly believed that the Carter administration's policies would lead to chaos and instability. In the case of Zaire, the Shaba crises initially focused the attention of President Carter and Secretary of State Vance who offered such high-level attention—at least in the immediate aftermath of Shaba I and Shaba II. Once these crises subsided, however, Zaire was relegated to a relatively "benign" bureaucratic landscape in which efforts to monitor and enforce reforms after 1978 usually did not go beyond the much less influential level of the State Department's Africa Bureau (most often in the person of the Ambassador and only rarely at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs).\footnote{33} Moreover, the Africa Bureau's reluctance to pressure for political reforms undoubtedly meant a less than enthusiastic pursuit of this duty. The net result was a growing "business-as-usual" attitude beginning in late 1978 (and carried over into the Reagan administration) that would support ongoing pressure for economic reforms but tread increasingly softly in the realms of political and human rights reforms. For example, when thirteen prominent members of the newly created Legislative Council (the Zairian equivalent of the U.S. Congress) were arrested in 1980 for printing an open letter questioning Mobutu's honesty, the situation was treated within the Africa Bureau as a routine "snafu" that should not impinge upon the U.S.-Zairian special relationship.\footnote{34} "It pains me to accept that it became business as usual with Mobutu," noted Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Moose as he reflected on the record of the Carter administration in Zaire, "but it probably did."\footnote{35}

THE REAGAN YEARS AND BUREAUCRATIC PRESSURES

Clearly unhappy with the state of U.S.-Zairian relations under the Carter administration, Mobutu's expectations supposedly "soared" when President Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980.\footnote{36} Entering office with a highly ideological worldview that emphasized the need to offer greater support to anti-communist, strategic allies, such as Zaire, the Reagan White House was expected to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S.-Zairian special relationship. Yet, in sharp contrast
to the dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policies toward other regions of the world, such as Central America, which were visible immediately after the President Reagan was inaugurated, initial policies toward Zaire demonstrated significant continuity with the final two years of the Carter administration. "It was clear when I left for Zaire," noted Peter Dalton Constable, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from 1982 to 1984, "that the only thing Washington was going to do was profess its friendship for Mobutu and try to push him into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund."\textsuperscript{37} Although honored by the visits of Vice President George Bush and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick in 1982, the aid levels that Mobutu felt would and "should" be forthcoming from the Reagan administration never materialized. As another U.S. Ambassador to Zaire, Brandon Hambright Grove, Jr., commented, Mobutu was "very disappointed" at economic and military aid levels under the Reagan administration. "He never could understand or believe that President Reagan couldn't pick up the phone, call the speaker of the House, and get aid doubled."\textsuperscript{38}

Mobutu's fortunes within the U.S. policy-making establishment only began to shift in 1985 when, as the result of bureaucratic and congressional politics, Zaire once again became an important regional component of U.S. intervention in Angola. Culminating a five-year struggle principally waged by CIA Director William Casey and conservative forces in Congress (most notably Senator Jesse Helms), the House of Representatives in July 1985 followed the Senate's lead and repealed the Clark Amendment, allowing for renewed U.S. aid to anti-communist insurgents in Angola.\textsuperscript{39} Despite the vigorous opposition of Secretary of State George Schultz and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, as well as the House Subcommittee on Africa and the Congressional Black Caucus, conservative elements within Congress successfully sought to make Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrilla forces the recipients of U.S. paramilitary aid under the rubric of the so-called Reagan Doctrine: an ideologically-based program for arming insurgencies intent on overthrowing self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the Third World.

The CIA assumed the primary responsibility for implementing the specifics of the Reagan Doctrine in southern Africa. Similar to the covert action program designed to defeat the MPLA in the mid-1970s, Mobutu's cooperation was perceived as crucial to the CIA's anti-communist bureaucratic mission; he not only hosted one of the largest CIA contingents on the African continent, but his country's well-established links with Savimbi and strategic southwestern border with Angola made it one of two logical conduits (the other being South Africa) of covert paramilitary aid to the UNITA forces. The cornerstones of this paramilitary program were the alleged creation of at least
six training camps for UNITA insurgents along Zaire’s southwestern border and the establishment of the St. Lucia air network to facilitate the direct transfer of U.S. weapons to Savimbi’s forces. Zaire’s importance especially grew in the aftermath of the U.S.-brokered Angola Accords in 1988 in which both South Africa and Angola agreed to “non-interference” in each other’s domestic affairs, effectively cutting the land-based link of U.S. covert aid to Savimbi through South Africa and Namibia. One of the stark reminders of still-sketchy CIA involvement in this conflict was the death of four CIA personnel when their plane crashed on 30 September 1989, while en route from Zaire’s Kamina air base to Savimbi’s headquarters in Jamba, Angola.

An issue of concern for congressional critics who lost the debate over renewed U.S. involvement in Angola’s civil war had been whether the CIA prior to 1985 illegally prompted “third” parties to provide aid to Savimbi’s forces while the Clark Amendment was in force. As already noted, the 1976 Clark Amendment prohibited the executive branch from providing any aid to guerrilla factions in Angola, inclusive of seeking the support of other countries to serve as proxies for U.S. interests. According to several critical accounts, among those countries approached included Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and, most relevant to our current discussion, Zaire. Similar efforts by the Reagan administration to aid the Nicaraguan contras—despite congressional restrictions in the form of the Boland Amendments—clearly demonstrated that such allegations were not beyond the stretch of the imagination. Regardless of these allegations, officials in the post-1985 period clearly pressed Mobutu to become involved in CIA efforts to aid Savimbi’s UNITA forces. In fact, one official with oversight responsibilities for the CIA’s efforts in Angola noted that he “wouldn’t be surprised if, in the aid to Angola, the CIA has figured out a way to cut in Mobutu either directly with the aid or indirectly through some other covert program.” According to this official, the CIA’s operation in Angola presented “at least the possibility that people could find ways of aiding Mobutu—especially in light of congressional restrictions on military and economic aid—that were not the normal ways.”

Pressures for strengthening U.S.-Zairian ties also emerged during the 1980s from Pentagon strategists who demonstrated a growing interest in Africa. In the case of Zaire, the Pentagon in 1985 began focusing on Kamina airbase, which one military official described as an “irresistible attraction.” The strategic importance of this airbase—described as a natural transshipment gateway to central and southern Africa—derived primarily from growing Pentagon involvement in military contingencies in Chad, the Sudan, and elsewhere in Africa.
Other bureaucratically inspired reasons for rising Defense Department interest in Kamina were the need to maintain a base for future contingency operations in the region and the acquisition of “training space” for exercises of the U.S. European Command. Toward these ends, Air Force General Richard Lawson inspected Kamina in November 1985 presumably to assess its potential benefits to overall U.S. defense needs. Prior to this visit, a group of engineers had determined that the cost of refurbishing and upgrading the airbase to suit U.S. military needs would range between $60–100 million.45

Fully aware of the potentially lucrative payoff to Zaire due to evolving U.S. interests in the region, Mobutu visited Washington in late November 1985 to make a pitch for, among other things, a major Pentagon presence at Kamina airbase. Although supported at the lower bureaucratic levels of the Defense Department, the upper levels, most notably the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vetoed the project as both unnecessary and overly risky.46 Ironically, even if the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought such a presence at Kamina, this would have been fiercely opposed by the CIA which reportedly was “horrified” that Pentagon officials were even considering such a commitment. According to one official, the CIA wanted “absolutely no part” of the Defense Department “stumbling in on top” of, and attracting a lot of unwanted attention to what was an important CIA asset.47

The rejection of Mobutu’s offer set in motion a scramble among various Defense Department officials who, among other reasons, had sought the commitment to Kamina as a means for rewarding the Zairian President. For example, several members of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, argued that Washington owed Mobutu a favor for supporting U.S. military efforts in Chad, as well as facilitating the application of the Reagan Doctrine to Angola.48 Especially frustrating for these proponents of rewarding Mobutu was the success of the House Subcommittee on Africa in incrementally reducing the levels of congressionally-mandated U.S. military assistance to the Zairian government to only $5 million in 1987. In short, the primary complaint of these individuals was that, despite Zaire’s repeated support for U.S. initiatives during both the 1970s and the 1980s, Washington had failed to reciprocate by allocating appropriate levels of security assistance to the Mobutu regime.

Still determined to reward the Mobutu regime, a new proposal focused on the initiation of U.S.-Zairian joint military training exercises combined with the limited upgrading of facilities at Kamina. Even this more limited proposal caused bureaucratic tension with the State Department when, at the recommendation of Air Force lawyers, the Defense Department announced it was seeking a formal access
agreement with the Mobutu regime. According to the Air Force, a formal access agreement not only was necessary to authorize the expenditure of military construction monies, but would better ensure U.S. access whenever needed. Yet it was the opinion of the State Department that an access agreement would make U.S. involvement in Angola too visible and would create unnecessary problems with a Congress unwilling to appropriate the necessary funds. Backing away from any further talk of an access agreement, Pentagon officials finally succeeded in establishing a small program by rewarding the Mobutu regime which, beginning in 1987, included annual outlays of between $1-2 million for joint U.S.-Zairian military maneuvers and selected military construction projects at Kamina.

Whereas the CIA and the Pentagon sought to reward Zaire’s willingness to get involved in the paramilitary side of U.S. foreign policy toward Angola, the State Department’s Africa Bureau since June 1989 began hailing Mobutu as a distinguished “peace-broker” for his mediation efforts between the MPLA and UNITA in the Angolan civil war. In efforts that grew out of the 1988 U.S.-brokered Angolan Accords between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, Mobutu presided over an African diplomatic effort which resulted in an historic cease-fire between the MPLA and UNITA on 22 June 1989. Although the cease-fire began unraveling two months later, the State Department described Mobutu’s efforts as a “watershed” in African diplomacy and a “decisive step” in the path to regional peace. Indeed, Mobutu’s efforts were part of a regional peace process that resulted in an agreement between the MPLA and UNITA to end civil hostilities and establish a multiparty political system complete with presidential elections that were held in November 1992.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND A CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE SPLIT

Zaire’s critical role as a regional ally in U.S. foreign policy toward Angola resulted in Mobutu being honored as the first African leader to be invited by the Bush administration for an official White House visit. Engineered by the State Department’s Africa Bureau as the best way to reward Mobutu in a time of constrained financial resources, the meeting clearly underscored Mobutu’s strengthened image among the national security bureaucracies and within the White House. “Just last week, he brought together, for the first time, in the presence of 18 African Chiefs of State, the leadership of Angola’s warring factions, setting the stage for national reconciliation in that country,” noted an appreciative Bush on 29 June 1989. “And thanks to President Mobutu, we are nearer the goal long sought, yet long elusive—peace and opportunity in southwestern Africa.”
Despite the accolades offered by President Bush and other members of the executive branch, two important factors during the emerging post-Cold War era constrained any major strengthening of the foreign aid dimension of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship: budget constraints and ongoing concern over corruption and human rights violations. First, the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act in 1986 served as an important brake on any major increases in U.S. foreign aid, especially in Africa. As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen frankly explained in 1989, overall allocations to Africa declined because of greater U.S. priorities in Egypt, Israel, and base-rights countries, such as the Philippines, Turkey, and Greece. "So after you give money to all of those," noted Cohen, "there's very little left." This trend intensified at the beginning of the 1990s as the Bush administration sought to reward the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as pay for the enormous costs associated with the U.S. war against Iraq in 1991, known as "Operation Desert Storm."

Apart from very real budget difficulties, an activist Congress, particularly House Subcommittee on Africa, served as the most important constraints on the strengthening of the U.S.-Zairian special relationship. As Mobutu was made painfully aware during his June 1989 Washington visit, described by State Department officials as being "marred" by public demonstrations coordinated by the New York-based U.S.-Congo Friendship Committee and the Washington, DC-based Rainbow Lobby, as well as by the public statements of both Senators and Representatives underscoring the authoritarian nature of Mobutu's rule, the issues of human rights and corruption in Zaire increasingly were becoming the focus of activists both within and outside the halls of Congress. As even noted in the 1989 edition of the annual State Department human rights report to Congress, freedom of speech and other civil rights in Zaire were "substantially circumscribed," with numerous human rights abuses stemming from "endemic corruption" among Zairian officials. Adopting a much harsher tone, the House Foreign Affairs Committee labeled the Mobutu regime as a "gross violator" of human rights. Of particular concern to budget-conscious critics within Congress was the allegation that Mobutu had amassed a personal fortune of over $5 billion—a sum roughly equal to Zaire's entire national debt—by treating the Zairian economy as if it were his private estate. Indeed, despite the best efforts of the World Bank to trace their disappearance, nearly $400 million in foreign exchange receipts of the Zairian government were said to have disappeared in 1988 alone.
According to congressional critics, the combination of human rights abuses and endemic levels of corruption—largely verified by specialists of Zaire regardless of their partisan beliefs—confirmed the utter uselessness of any further aid to the Mobutu regime. Although successful in incrementally reducing the amount of military aid from a cap of $6 million in 1982 to $3 million in 1990, these activists, such as Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA), the sponsor of several anti-Mobutu bills, sought even further restrictions. As a result, several influential members of Congress responded to a request by the Bush administration to provide approximately $56 million in aid (including $4 million in military aid) to Zaire in 1991 by calling for the complete termination of all security assistance, as well as the channeling of all humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations. For example, in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on 5 April 1990, Representative Solarz supported a cut-off in aid by comparing the future of Mobutu to the fates that befell other dictators, such as Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, Eric Honecker of (the former) East Germany, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua. “Sooner or later, Mobutu will go,” explained Solarz. “When that time comes, it will not be in our interest to have been perceived as propping up this discredited dictator.”62 Other members of Congress sought to rationalize the cut-off by citing the decreased importance of regional clients in the aftermath of the Cold War. “With the reduction of tensions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship,” explained Howard Wolpe, former chairperson of the House Subcommittee on Africa, “Mobutu’s relevance has been substantially diminished.”63 None, however, quite matched the frankness of Representative David R. Obey (D-WI), Chairperson of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. “No bill that bears my name,” asserted Obey, “will have any money for that turkey.”64

Although partisan differences of opinion in both the House and the Senate forestalled attempts at radically altering the U.S.-Zairian special relationship, events in 1990 further underscored the human rights shortcomings of the Mobutu regime and provided ample ammunition for congressional activists. In response to growing popular demands for some sort of multiparty political system, Mobutu made a major address on 24 April 1990 in which he announced significant political reforms, most notably the legalization of opposition parties. An important aspect of the reform process was the establishment of a “national conference on democracy”—a political body comprised of prominent government and opposition political figures which assumed the task of refashioning Zaire’s political system, particularly the constitution, in preparation for national, multiparty elections. Similar
was faced with territorial disintegration. The consensus opinion within the national security bureaucracies was that, despite his shortcomings, Mobutu had contributed to domestic and regional stability and, most important, had served as a faithful U.S. ally in Africa. "The point is we need him," explained Irwin Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who lauded Mobutu's "important role" in U.S. initiatives in Chad, Mozambique, and "particularly Angola." If we push Mobutu too hard," explained another State Department official, "we will only have ourselves to blame for the political chaos and instability that surely will ensue." This type of reasoning was firmly rejected by congressional critics. "What jeopardizes the prospects of regional stability," explained Representative Solarz, "is the existence of a kleptocracy in Zaire that has driven the standard of living lower than it was at the time of independence three decades ago." Pointing to the civil instability spreading throughout Liberia and Somalia—countries in which authoritarian dictators once supported by the U.S. had been overthrown in brutal civil wars—one congressional critic warned in August 1991 that time was quickly running out for U.S. foreign policy. "If we wish to avoid the bloodshed currently raging in both Liberia and Somalia—countries in which the deaths of innocent victims are at least partially due to shortsighted policies—we must adopt a proactive policy that firmly supports the departure of Mobutu and the creation of a truly democratic political system."

In one of the most serious challenges to Mobutu's twenty-six years of authoritarian rule, nearly 3,000 mutinous troops protesting the lack of pay touched off two days of violent riots in Kinshasa during September 1991 that quickly spread to regional capitals and cities, most notably in Shaba province, and left thirty dead and more than 1,250 injured. Fearful that the mobs were going to turn on Westém nationals living within the country, approximately 1,750 French and Belgian troops intervened on 24 September with the blessing of Mobutu to ensure the evacuation of nearly 8,000 foreigners, including over 700 U.S. citizens. Although the U.S. did not directly take part in the rescue operation, several C-141 military transport planes were "loaned" to France to facilitate the evacuation of foreigners living within the country.

Despite the regime-threatening nature of the September 1991 riots, two factors contributed to the lack of a perception of crisis at the highest levels of the policy-making establishment and, as a result, White House inattention, as policy was largely left to the Africa specialists within the national security bureaucracies. First, the willingness of Belgium, aided by France, to take the lead in its former colony effectively precluded the necessity of deciding on the issue of
direct military intervention by U.S. forces. As indicated by Pentagon statements concerning the limited U.S. role in the evacuation operation, U.S. policy reflected French and Belgian desires to remain neutral in the growing conflict between Mobutu and opposition forces. “The sole purpose of this activity is to assist in the protection and evacuation of Americans and other foreigners,” explained a spokesperson for the Defense Department. “It does not constitute an involvement in the internal affairs of Zaire.”

The decline of the Cold War was of even greater importance in contributing to the lack of a crisis atmosphere at the highest levels of the policy-making establishment. In sharp contrast to earlier conflicts, such as the 1978 Shaba crisis, in which a perceived communist threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies served as the primary justification for intervention, the September 1991 riots and the possibility of Mobutu’s removal from power were not perceived through the ideological context of Cold War competition. The obvious reasons for the lack of high-level concern were the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union into several independent and non-communist countries, as well as the resolution of regional conflicts which had become East-West flashpoints. In the case of Angola, for example, the resolution of civil conflict between the MPLA and UNITA and the steady movement toward multiparty elections that took place in September 1992 meant that the U.S. no longer needed a regional ally capable of funneling U.S. paramilitary aid to anti-communist insurgents.

However, the decline of Zaire’s strategic importance to U.S. interests in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War did not mean that either the White House or the Africa specialists of the national security bureaucracies were willing to accept the critical arguments of certain portions of Congress and seek the removal of the Mobutu regime.

Less than three weeks after Belgium and France intervened during the September 1991 riots, for example, a career FSO in the State Department’s Africa Bureau cautioned that any transition from the Mobutu regime to some sort of multiparty system had to proceed “peacefully, logically, and, above all, slowly.” “Regardless of the fact that we are no longer faced with a communist threat,” explained this officer, “the destabilization of Zaire—which borders nine other African countries—could have a tremendously negative impact on regional stability.” Although this FSO supported U.S. involvement in gently pressuring Mobutu to “recognize the inevitable” and accept the growing involvement of opposition politicians, such as Etienne Tshisekedi, the UDPS’ leader who was elected prime minister by delegates of the national conference on democracy in September 1992, the approach was tempered by the strongly ingrained belief that a
"Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed by chaos." 77 "It is not in our interest that Mobutu suddenly disappear," explained another diplomat with extensive experience within the region. "What may replace him is unclear, and meanwhile, the situation could prove chaotic." 78

It is the continued importance of the "Mobutu or chaos" argument which has led U.S. officials to cautiously respond to Mobutu's efforts at maintaining himself in power, including his appointment (over the vociferous protest of opposition parties) of Nguza Karl-I-Bond as Prime Minister in November 1991, his suspension of the national conference on democracy from January to April 1992, and his refusal to relinquish control over the Zairian military and intelligence services prior to the holding of national, multiparty elections. "We're not asking him to leave," explained Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Cohen in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa. "We feel he should remain as president so he can control the military force until there is an election at which point the people will decide." 79 In short, Mobutu is perceived throughout the national security bureaucracies as both "part of the problem" and "part of the solution" to what may become an increasingly violent political situation in Zaire. "If Mobutu, with his control of the security apparatus, including people who engage in covert operations... does not support a transition process," concluded Cohen, "then it cannot succeed." 80

BUREAUCRATIC INCREMENTALISM IN PERSPECTIVE

The evolution of the U.S.-Zairian relationship clearly portrays the significance of the process of bureaucratic incrementalism as an important driving force in U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire. Once the basic parameters of that relationship (i.e., the "Mobutu or chaos" argument) were established during the early Cold War period of the 1960s, bureaucratic influence in the policy-making process ultimately led to growing pressures for enhancing the nature of U.S.-Zairian ties. Indeed, the bureaucratically-inspired imperatives for maintaining Mobutu in office—whether the political rationales of the State Department or the military-related imperatives of the Defense Department—eventually prevailed over the Carter administration's initial attempts at reforming the Mobutu regime. And, once Zaire became the cornerstone of U.S. intervention in Angola during the latter half of the 1980s, these same bureaucratic rationales led to the further strengthening of U.S.-Zairian ties.

Viewed in this context, it should come as little surprise that the basic assumptions of U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire at the beginning of the 1990s have largely remained unchanged even in the aftermath of the
end of the Cold War. As Mobutu continues to seek some sort of solution that enables him to remain in power, the Africa Bureau most likely will continue to argue for a policy stance favoring slow, incremental change. Other portions of the policy-making establishment, of course, will demonstrate different levels of interest and activism in what potentially may become a growing debate over how to respond to changes in Zaire—especially if the political condition in the country continues to deteriorate. Whereas members of the CIA and the Pentagon have argued more strongly than their State Department counterparts for greater caution as concerns any type of political pressure designed to remove Mobutu from power, congressional critics have noted a desire to see Mobutu removed from power as quickly as possible. "He has established a kleptocracy to end all kleptocracies, and has set a new standard by which all future international thieves will have to be measured," explained Representative Solarz, a long-time critic of U.S. support for the Mobutu regime. "He makes Marcos look like a piker by comparison."81 In the absence of any major crisis event capable of reordering U.S. priorities, however, the most likely result of an ongoing congressional-executive deadlock will be an incrementalist approach to change within the bureaucratic and congressional confines of the established status quo.

NOTES


2. Despite the fact that Africa accounted for 10.9 percent of the Carter administration’s foreign policy actions in 1977, this figure still trailed all other regions of the world (the second to lowest region was the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with 14.6 percent) and, in fact decreased in importance by nearly 50 percent over the next three years. For an explanation and discussion of these figures, see Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 123, 130, 139, and 147.

3. For a more extensive discussion of this theme, from which the following three points were derived, see Peter J. Schraeder, "Speaking with Many Voices: Continuity and Change in U.S. Africa Policies," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 29, no. 3 (December 1991):373-412.


7. Ibid., 99.


16. For discussion, see Memorandum for the President. From: The Secretary of Defense. Subject: Visit of Zaire’s President Mobutu. Date: 4 October 1973, 1–2. Document obtained from the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.


43. Confidential interview. This individual was referring to the alleged secret plan of the Reagan administration to reward the leadership of Honduras for their increased support for the Nicaraguan contras while the U.S. was prohibited from such actions under the Brooke Amendment. See Walter Pincus, “New Reagan File Uncovered by Senate Intelligence Panel,” Washington Post, 24 June 1989, A1, A11.

44. Confidential interview.


46. Confidential interview.

47. Confidential interview.

48. Ibid.


50. Confidential interview.


55. Interview with Jack Aubert, Desk Officer for Zaire in the State Department’s Africa Bureau, Washington, DC, 8 June 1989.

56. President George Bush, “Remarks by the President,” 1.


61. This figure—advanced by Mike Wallace on Sixty Minutes in 1984—also was contained in a leaked classified briefing paper prepared for President Reagan by the State Department’s Africa Bureau just prior to his December 1986 meeting with Mobutu. See William Claiborne, “Mobutu Refurbishing Image Tainted by Corruption Charge,” Washington Post, 30 June 1989, A32.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.


69. See Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos?


71. Confidential interview.

72. Quoted in Krauss, “U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire, A7.”

73. Confidential interview.


77. Confidential interview.


80. Quoted in Ibid.

21. This viewpoint was shared by both Representative Charles Diggs and Senator Dick Clark, chairpersons of the House and Senate subcommittees on Africa, respectively. For discussion, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1978 (Part 3) Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa (Hearings and Markup, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29 March and 28 April 1977), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), 143.


26. Confidential interview.


28. Ibid., 192.

29. Confidential interview.


32. Ibid., 365.

33. Pachter, Our Man in Kinshasa, 300.

34. Ibid., 300.


37. Ibid.


39. The House repealed Clark by a vote of 236 to 185, despite the strong opposition of the House Subcommittee on Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus, and TransAfrica. The Senate previously had repealed Clark by a vote of 63 to 34, including 17 Democrats who voted in favor. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Legislation to Require That Any United States Government Support for Military or Paramilitary Operations in Angola be Openly Acknowledged and Publicly Debated (H.R. 4276) (Hearings and Markup, 22 and 23 April 1986), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC, 1986).

40. Initial efforts on the part of the CIA quickly bore fruit as demonstrated by the admission of the MPLA government in November 1986 that UNITA forces had opened up a new guerrilla front in northeastern Angola along the Zairian border. For Angolan allegations of the creation of at least six training camps, see Stephen Morrison, "Mr. Savimbi Goes to Washington," Africa Report, vol. 33, no. 5 (September-October 1988):56. See James Brooke, "C.I.A. Said to Send Weapons via Zaire to Aid Angola Rebels," New York Times, 1 February 1987, A11.


42. For discussion, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Possible Violation or Circumvention of the Clark Amendment,