touch on the subject of the book. Where these case studies (of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the role of the media) engage with peacekeeping, they do so without any special reference to the major powers, and where they deal with the big powers, this is usually in contexts other than peacekeeping properly defined. This is pity, because there is a lot to be said about – and learned from – the very mixed record of major power engagement in peacekeeping in those parts of the world. The chapter on Africa by David J. Francis, for example, fails to explore in any detail America’s disastrous entanglement with Somalia, or France’s highly suspect intervention in Rwanda in the last stage of the genocide in 1994. In a study of the major powers and peacekeeping these, surely, are the areas which demand attention above the much more detailed accounts offered here of ECOWAS and SADC ventures. Conversely, Ali M. Ansari’s chapter on the Middle East has some important things to say about cultural dissonance and military intervention by big powers, particularly in Iraq. It does not, though, explore the historic role of these powers in peacekeeping as such, especially on Israel’s borders.

The section of the book on ‘Major Power Perspectives’ is generally stronger and more relevant to the business in hand. Rachel Utley’s own chapter on France and Germany, and Gary D. Rawnsley’s on China and Japan, provide useful overviews of the national politics of peacekeeping at the upper levels of the international hierarchy. Isabelle Falcon offers a particularly insightful reading of post-Soviet Russia’s complex attitude to military multilateralism. The chapter by Edward M. Spiers on the United States, though informative on the 1990s period, seems unhelpfully to include the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the invasion and occupation of Iraq under the general heading of peacekeeping.

In total, this is a book with some strong contributions but which, ultimately, doesn’t quite do ‘what it says on the tin’.

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US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa by Peter Woodward
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Peter Woodward has written an excellent book that will be of great interest to Horn of Africa scholars, and specialists on US foreign policy towards Africa and the Middle East. The book focuses on the evolution of US foreign policy towards the Horn (with a special focus on the case studies of Somalia and Sudan), one of the strategic battlegrounds of the Cold War that the Bush administration now characterises as one of the ‘second fronts’ in the global war on terrorism. Although Woodward focuses on the Horn, this region is but one of three that comprise part of an Islamic littoral that has witnessed the emergence of several US counter-terrorism programmes, including the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCCTI) in North Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA – which Woodward discusses in this book), and the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI).

The themes of the book – the historical Cold War context of US foreign policy, emerging trends in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001, and US perceptions of the Islamic dimension of conflicts in the Horn – make this a must read for both African and Middle East studies specialists. Chapter 1 provides a detailed analysis of US policymaking actors as concerns Africa (e.g. White House, Congress, national security bureaucracies and interest groups). Subsequent chapters focus on a variety of topics: US foreign policy during the Cold War (chapter 2); the evolution of US intervention in Sudan, including involvement in peacemaking in southern Sudan (chapters 3, 6 and 7); intervention in Somalia during the 1990s and the long shadow that it has cast on Washington’s willingness to become more greatly involved in subsequent years (chapters 4 and 8); and the challenges of searching for new friends (Djibouti and Eritrea) and placating old friends (Ethiopia) within the interlocking conflicts of the region (chapter 5). The conclusion (pp. 153–60) is particularly insightful, assessing the range of US interventionist practices in the Horn.

The book, nonetheless, would have benefited from a more extensive analysis of the links between the policymaking process in Washington and the formulation and implementation of US policies in the Horn. The net result of White House and congressional neglect of Africa is that US foreign policy towards Africa, perhaps more so than that towards any other region of the world, remains largely delegated to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the bureaucracies of the executive branch. Exceptions of course exist, such as the willingness of both the White House and the Congress to pressure Sudan’s government to seek a peaceful resolution of civil conflict in the southern portion of the country, but these are rare occurrences typically due to pressures from grass-roots constituencies (in this case, a wide array of Christian groups), that have the ear of the president and senior congressional leaders, and that most importantly are considered crucial to re-election. In order to fully understand the US approach to the global war on terrorism in Africa, one must therefore focus on the policies and interactions of the African Affairs Bureaus of the traditional national security bureaucracies, including the State Department, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and how these subsequently affect US foreign policy towards Africa. To be sure, the Bush White House sets the overall parameters of policy of this global war, as was the case of its predecessors during the Cold War. But the unique nature of the US policymaking system ensures that specific policy initiatives towards the African continent often emerge from and are coordinated by the national security bureaucracies with little White House input.

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