Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region

edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala
Contents

Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen vii
Acknowledgments xi

1 Toward Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region
   Gilbert M. Khadiagala 1

Part 1 Regional Actors and Issues

2 Governance and Security in Rwanda
   Filip Reyntjens 15

3 Burundi at a Crossroads
   René Lemarchand 41

4 Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict
   Mwesiga Baregu 59

5 Nonstate Actors and Governance in Uganda
   Angela Ndinga Muvumba 81

6 The Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the Region
   Gérard Prunier 103

Part 2 The Role of External Actors

7 South Africa
   Chris Landsberg 121

8 The United Nations
   Adekeye Adebajo 141
9  Belgium, France, and the United States
   Peter J. Schraeder  
   163

Part 3 Conclusion

10  Building Security for Peoples, Societies, and States
    Gilbert M. Khadiagala  
    187

List of Acronyms  
Bibliography  
The Contributors  
Index  
About the Book  

199
203
211
215
231
Belgium, France, and the United States

PETER J. SCHRAEDER

Louis Michel, Belgium's outspoken minister of foreign affairs, rationalized his country's renewed involvement in the Great Lakes region beginning in 1999 as a moral duty. He argued that proactive involvement by Western democracies was necessary to remove the "stain" on the "collective Western conscience" of decades of self-serving and indifferent foreign policies toward Africa. As recently as 1994, for example, genocide in Rwanda that claimed as many as 1 million lives was downplayed by US policymakers fearful of being drawn into a military quagmire, fueled by French policies that had provided arms and aid to the Rwandan government that carried out the genocide and facilitated by Belgian policymakers who had withdrawn their military forces at the outbreak of hostilities when ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed. The magnitude of the local impacts exerted by this and other cases of intervention from the colonial era to the present has been enormous. "No other part of the continent has been so thoroughly exposed to the penetration of so many international actors on so many occasions, and with so few positive results," explained René Lemarchand. "And all bear some degree of responsibility for either doing too little too late, or too much at the wrong time on behalf of the wrong party."

According to Michel, however, the ongoing violence in the Great Lakes region is not permanent or indelible. It can be resolved as long as Western democracies pursue the "right" kinds of policies, most notably by facilitating regional efforts in peace building, socioeconomic development, and democracy promotion. Although Michel does not simply suggest that the "dirty laundry" of the Great Lakes region can be "sent out" for cleaning (that is, that durable solutions can only be achieved from abroad), his approach is based on three sets of assumptions: (1) the leaders of Belgium, France, and the United States—the so-called troika or parrains (godfathers)—which have both influence and a historical stake in the Great Lakes region, need to make that region a foreign policy priority, (2) these
policies need to be designed to further local and regional priorities as opposed to more self-interested foreign policy concerns, and (3) it is desirable for policymakers in Brussels, Paris, and Washington to cooperate in order to forge sustainable policies.

The historical record offers some sobering counterpoints to these assumptions. Rarely has the Great Lakes region served as the foreign policy priority of Belgium, France, and the United States, and when it has, self-interested goals have tended to dominate. Cooperation among Western democracies for the betterment of the Great Lakes region has been elusive and sporadic, with the US-French relationship particularly exhibiting rising strains and tensions in the post–cold war era. This is not to say that cooperation among Western democracies in the common pursuit of peace building in the Great Lakes region is impossible. To the contrary, the primary thesis of this chapter, which focuses primarily on US, Belgian, and French foreign policies, is not only that such cooperation is possible but also that we are at a historic turning point that is especially propitious for such cooperation. How and why the US, Belgian, and French policymaking establishments have arrived at this historic juncture and the degree to which their policies have contributed to the consolidation of peace building in the Great Lakes region serve as the focal points of this chapter, which is divided into three sections: (1) policymaking legacy of the cold war era (1960–1989), (2) intensification of great power rivalry amid genocide and continental warfare (1989–1999), and (3) convergence of interests in promoting peace and security in the aftermath of Lusaka (1999–present).

Policymaking Legacy of the Cold War Era (1960–1989)

Any discussion of the role of the Western countries in the Great Lakes region must begin with the legacy of Belgian colonialism in Congo, which was expanded when Belgium assumed control over the German colonies of Burundi and Rwanda in the aftermath of World War I. The consensus within the decolonization literature is that Belgium “did virtually nothing” to promote the political conditions, such as the training of an indigenous university-educated elite, that would be conducive to an orderly transfer of power. In no less than five days following Congo’s independence, a series of mutinies ushered in a period of civil war and foreign intervention that would become the first true African crisis of the cold war. Equally important, this decolonization process, which was followed by the granting of independence to Burundi and Rwanda in 1962, marked the beginning of the steady erosion of Belgian political ambitions in the African arena. By the end of the cold war in 1989, a process of generational change had ensured the emergence of more insular-minded policymaking elites who were largely
r local and regional priorities as policy concerns, and (3) it is desirable, and Washington to cooperate in

sobering counterpoints to these region served as the foreign policy United States, and when it has, inane. Cooperation among Western Great Lakes region has been elusive nship particularly exhibiting rising era. This is not to say that coop- the common pursuit of peace buildable. To the contrary, the primary narity on US, Belgian, and French cooperation is possible but also that especially propitious for such coop- and French policymaking establishture and the degree to which their ation of peace building in the Great 

this chapter, which is divided into of the cold war era (1960–1989), ry amid genocide and continental ace of interests in promoting peace (1999–present).

far Era (1960–1989)

tern countries in the Great Lakes Belgian colonialism in Congo, which control over the German colonies of of World War I. The consensus at Belgium “did virtually nothing” as the training of an indigenous conducive to an orderly transfer of ing Congo’s independence, a series war and foreign intervention that is of the cold war. Equally impor was followed by the granting of 1962, marked the beginning of the itions in the African arena. By the of generational change had ensured policymaking elites who were largely disinterested in African affairs and who had a tendency to view the colonial era as a shameful period that was best left to the dustbins of Belgian political history.5

In sharp contrast, French policymakers, who were proud of French accomplishments in Africa, sought to strengthen and promote the further rayonnement (spread) of the French language and intellectual traditions.5 Referred to as the promotion of la francophonie (a greater French-speaking community), this policy is best represented by the biennial Franco-African Summit that is attended by the leaders of France and Francophone Africa. Nineteen such summits were held during the cold war, including those in Kigali (the sixth summit, 1979), Kinshasa (the ninth summit, 1982), and Bujumbura (the eleventh summit, 1984). Regardless of whether France was led by the conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle or the socialists of François Mitterrand, French policymakers predictably claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing Francophone Africa, including Belgium’s former colonies, within France’s sphere of influence.6 The implicit assumption of the French version of the Monroe Doctrine is that Francophone Africa constituted France’s chasse gardée (private hunting ground) and therefore remained off limits to other great powers, regardless of whether they were “friends,” such as the United States, or “enemies,” such as the Soviet Union.7

This conception of Francophone Africa was accepted and even encouraged by US policymakers whose Africa policies were principally guided by the ideological interest of preventing the spread of communist regimes to the African continent.8 The White House expected its European allies, including Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, to take the lead in their former colonial territories. In those crisis situations in which a weakened and withdrawing European power was perceived by Washington as either unable or unwilling to confront a perceived communist threat in its former colony, however, the tendency was for the White House to take an active role in the policymaking process, sometimes transforming US foreign policy toward the country in question. In the Belgian Congo, for example, the combination of Belgium’s inability to maintain stability amid the specter of Soviet-bloc intervention transformed a foreign policy backwater into a series of crisis situations that from 1960 to 1967 periodically received sustained White House attention during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, a relatively rare occurrence in US foreign policy toward Africa. The net result of presidential involvement in the policymaking process was a series of interventions ranging from President Eisenhower’s authorization of a covert operation to assassinate Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba to White House backing for a 1965 military coup in which the pro-US and CIA-cultivated Mobutu Sese Seko assumed power.9
The historic reality of White House disinterest in African affairs nonetheless ensured that US foreign policy toward Africa, perhaps more so than that toward any other region, was typically delegated during the cold war to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the executive branch. To understand the continuity and change in US foreign policy toward Africa, one must focus on the policies of the African affairs bureaus of the traditional national security bureaucracies, most notably the State Department, the Defense Department (Pentagon), and the CIA. In the case of genocide in Burundi in 1972, for example, the Nixon White House deferred the handling of the US policy response to the Africa specialists in the State Department’s Africa Bureau, almost certainly because the massacres were taking place in a region of little strategic interest. The net result was a bureaucratically inspired policy of inaction that underscored the need to follow the lead of the OAU and the majority of its member states, which opposed interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.

The French policymaking system represented the polar opposite of its US counterpart. French presidents from de Gaulle to Mitterrand had to be knowledgeable of African affairs because Francophone Africa was important to their foreign policies outside of Europe. This entailed nurturing of close, high-level personal ties between French presidents and their Francophone counterparts in Africa, as witnessed by the informal réseaux (networks) created by Jacques Foccart, the architect of French-African relations in the immediate postindependence era. French presidents also sat at the apex of a highly centralized foreign policy apparatus that theoretically allowed for a more focused and long-term approach to the African continent, although several foreign policy actors, most notably Foccart’s Cellule Africaine (Africa Unit) within the Elysée, the Ministry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, competed for influence. In short, Francophone Africa’s special place in French foreign policy ensured that the region would enjoy a high level of presidential attention and coordination that was envied by other regional specialists in the French foreign policy-making establishment and their Africanist counterparts in the US government.

Differences in decisionmaking procedures did not necessarily lead to more enlightened foreign policies in the Great Lakes region by either France or the United States. The importance that both countries attached to cultivating African allies during the cold war often resulted in contradictory policies, especially when the normative goal of promoting democracy clashed with the pursuit of strategic interests. In the case of France, a desire to more closely knit Belgium’s former colonies into France’s sphere of influence prompted French policymakers to court the military regimes of Captain Michel Micombero (1966–1976) and Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza.
ause disinterest in African affairs icy toward Africa, perhaps more so typically delegated during the cold political appointees within the executive and change in US foreign policy; the policies of the African affairs' bureaus, most notably the pentagon, and the CIA. In 72, for example, the Nixon White House response to the Africa special Bureau, almost certainly because the regions of little strategic interest. The red policy of inaction that underpinned OAU and the majority of its members in the domestic affairs of African represented the polar opposite of its de Gaulle to Mitterrand had to be. Francophone Africa was important to Europe. This entailed nurturing French presidents and their Francophone relationships with Francophone states, for example, the informal reseaux (network) of French-African relations. French presidents also sat at the policy apparatus that theoretically accepted the African continent, most notably Foccart’s Cellule, the Ministry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, competed for a’s special place in French foreign policy. It enjoyed a high level of presidential oversight by other regional specialists in disarmament and their Africanist coun-
ced procedures did not necessarily lead to the Great Lakes region by either of the two countries attached to it. War often resulted in contradictory, pro-democracy policies. In the case of France, a desire to colonize France’s sphere of influence into the military regimes of Cameroon and Colonel Jean-Baptiste Baga-
za (1976–1987) in Burundi and the military regime of Major General Juvenal Habyarimana (1973–1994) in Rwanda, at the expense of democracy. Similar contradictions were evident in Washington’s approach to the Great Lakes region. Beginning in 1965, US presidents publicly reiterated Washington’s special relationship with Mobutu, providing his military dictatorship with approximately $1.5 billion in economic and military aid. As long as Mobutu was willing to pursue Washington’s anticommunist agenda in the Great Lakes region, US policymakers overlooked his regime’s authoritarian character and severe violations of human rights.

The combination of Belgium’s gradual withdrawal from its former colonies with the fact that the United States and France were pursuing fundamentally different but complementary foreign policy interests—containment of communism for the United States and promotion of la francophonie for France—ensured that the Great Lakes region was the beneficiary of a complementary cold war order in which US-Belgian-French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable. Especially in the strategic realm, complementary interests served as the basis for joint military interventions, such as the 1972 joint US-Belgian-French military operation in Congo’s Shaba province to defeat the Front de Libération Nationale du Congo (FNLC), which for the second time in two years had launched an invasion of Congolese territory. In this and other cases, the United States provided military transport and logistical support for Belgian and French troops that would engage insurgents on the ground.

Disagreements among Brussels, Paris, and Washington over Congo’s long-term stability in the aftermath of the Shaba interventions nonetheless demonstrated why cooperation among the Western democracies for the benefit of the Great Lakes region was sporadic and elusive during the cold war. To its credit, the Carter administration sought to usher in a new era in US-Congolese relations that, over the objections of most specialists of Congo in the national security bureaucracies, sought to force the Mobutu regime to undertake political and human rights reforms. A shortcoming of this reformist approach was that the Carter administration lacked the cooperation of key US allies in Europe, particularly Belgium and France. According to Robert Remole, former head (1978–1980) of the political section of the US Embassy in Kinshasa and an outspoken critic of past US support for Mobutu, although Belgium and France welcomed reform efforts in the economic sphere, they opposed Washington’s efforts to seek political and human rights reforms. “Unless we can get the Belgians and French to agree with us, we lack leverage,” explained Remole. “All we can do, all we can expect are cosmetic changes, and that is exactly what we have had—cosmetic changes.”

The existence of a complementary cold war order did not mean that competition did not surface in US-Belgian-French relations but rather that such conflict remained at acceptable levels and never occurred in public. In
the case of the US-French relationship, there were muted tensions about US intervention in Congo and the creation of a special relationship with the pro-US Mobutu. Jacques Poccart aptly documented these tensions, noting that French policymakers, especially under de Gaulle, equated the potential US threat to Francophone Africa with that posed by the Soviet Union; in the extreme, some French policymakers depicted the United States as the primary long-term threat to French interests. According to Poccart, Washington’s successful effort in 1965 to put Mobutu in power was perceived as the penetration of “Anglo-Saxon influence” into Francophone Africa, a “victory” for the United States. Years later, relations between Mobutu and France warmed up considerably. Despite French misgivings over US intentions, Washington’s explicit acceptance of France’s chasse gardée ensured that tensions over Congo remained insignificant in the overall complementary cold war order of US-French relations.14


The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the complementary cold war order and its gradual replacement by a “cold peace” in which the Western countries increasingly competed for economic and political influence in various regions of the Southern Hemisphere.15 Francophone Africa emerged in the 1990s as the most publicly contested arena of great power competition on the African continent.16 Journalists delighted in reporting on the tendency of French minister of foreign affairs Hubert Vedrine to refer to the United States as a hyper-puissance (hyperpower) that, “although lacking a worthy international opponent truly capable of challenging its power, remains incapable of implementing a viable Africa strategy—in essence conjuring up the much-acclaimed image in Gulliver’s Travels of the giant Gulliver finding himself hamstrung by hundreds of ropes tied by six-inch Lilliputians.”17 The hyperpower reference led to countercharges among US policymakers that such extreme statements reflected an ill-founded paranoia among French policymakers who were having difficulties accepting changes in France’s special role in Africa.18

It was in this context that the Rwandan genocide of 1994 emerged as one of the most contentious focal points of debates over foreign intervention on the African continent. The Clinton administration’s response to the Rwandan genocide was influenced by the earlier US-led military intervention in Somalia under a UN mandate, in which eighteen US soldiers were killed and seventy-eight others were wounded in a battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993.19 Confronted with popular demands to intervene,
ere were muted tensions about US of a special relationship with the ocumented these tensions, noting or de Gaulle, equated the potential ated the United States as the s. According to Foccart, Wash- . Mobutu in power was perceived ence” into Francophone Africa, a tions between Mobutu and French misgivings over US intensive’s chasse gardée ensured significative in the overall complement.

Africa’s

icitation of

egning of the end of the comple-
replacement by a “cold peace” in mpeted for economic and polit-
Southern Hemisphere.15 Franco-
most publicly contested arena of ntry.16 Journalists delighted in
ister of foreign affairs Hubert s a hyper-puissance (hyperpower) nional opponent truly capable of e of implementing a viable Africa uch-acclaimed image in Gulliver’s tmsel hamstrung by hundreds of e hyperpower reference led to ers that such extreme statements ug French policymakers who wererance’s special role in Africa.18
andan genocide of 1994 emerged as of debates over foreign interven-
and administration’s response to the e earlier US-led military interven-
which eighteen US soldiers were wounded in a battle in Mogadishu, with popular demands to intervene, the Clinton administration not only initially blocked the dispatch of several thousand troops requested by UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali but also instructed the administration to avoid labeling the conflict as “genocide,” because such a label would have triggered intervention under international conventions.20

Belgium, which had committed peacekeeping troops to the UNAMIR, was traumatized by the assassination of ten Belgian soldiers along with Rwandan prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana on 7 April 1994. The Belgian government’s response was to order an immediate withdrawal of Belgian peacekeeping forces, which was followed on 21 April by a UN Security Council decision to withdraw the majority of UNAMIR forces, leaving behind a symbolic force of 270 peacekeepers. This event touched off a national debate over Belgium’s proper role in the Great Lakes region, with policymakers expressing reluctance to commit Belgian soldiers to future peacekeeping missions. The fact that the withdrawal of Belgian and other UN peacekeepers took place while the Rwandan genocide was unfolding also led to soul-searching among Belgian policymakers, as well as their US counterparts, as to the degree of their individual and collective moral responsibility for permitting the genocide to take place. In contrast, France took the lead in undertaking a series of military interventions in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, ranging from Operations Panda and Noroit in support of the Rwandan government to a UN Security Council–authorized humanitarian intervention, Operation Turquoise, designed to establish humanitarian safety zones in southern Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Mitterrand’s decision to intervene must be viewed against the backdrop of the long-term French goal of integrating the former Belgian colonies of the Great Lakes region into the French sphere of influence. These interventions fostered one of the rare examples of popular outrage in France regarding policy toward Francophone Africa, especially when it was learned that the administration had provided the Habyarimana military dictatorship with over $160 million in economic aid and an untold amount of military aid from 1990 to 1994, essentially contributing to the genocide that unfolded in 1994.21

French military operations prior to Operation Turquoise were aimed at stemming the invasion in October 1990 by the RPF, which was supported by Uganda and perceived by French policymakers as hostile to France and “under Anglo-Saxon influence.”22 Operation Turquoise itself permitted thousands of those responsible for the genocide to flee into eastern Congo ahead of the advancing RPF forces. From the perspective of several French policymakers, the RPF’s military victory in 1994 constituted the first time that a Francophone country had “fallen” to Anglo-Saxon influence, with long-term implications for the future role of a member of la francophonie. Some even perceived Rwanda as the beginning of a series of regional dominoes that eventually could lead to Anglo-Saxon domination of the entire
Great Lakes region. According to this culturally inspired fear, often referred to as France’s “Fashoda complex,” the Great Lakes region could become a Trojan horse projecting Anglo-Saxon influence throughout Francophone Africa.

French concerns over Francophone dominos intensified with the emergence in 1997 of a guerrilla insurgency determined to overthrow the Mobutu dictatorship. As was the case with its socialist predecessor, the Chirac administration, elected in 1995, perceived this Great Lakes crisis in Francophone-Anglophone terms: the guerrilla insurgency in eastern Congo was led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who was supported by the Rwandan regime of Paul Kagame and the Ugandan regime of Yoweri Museveni. As a result, the French considered Kabila’s guerrilla movement to be under Anglo-Saxon influence and therefore hostile to France. The worst-case scenario envisioned by French policymakers occurred when Kabila’s guerrilla army overthrew Mobutu in May 1997 and installed a new regime, with Kabila as president, that was allied with US friends Rwanda and Uganda. According to this vision, Kabila’s presidency not only constituted a victory for Anglo-Saxon influence but also raised the possibility that Congo might serve as a springboard for the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence throughout Francophone Africa. This fear was dampened after Kabila fell out with his Rwanda and Uganda allies, who subsequently launched a second guerrilla insurgency in 1998 designed to install a more compliant regime in Kinshasa.

French suspicions were fueled by an emerging US policy stance that underscored the benefits of promoting close ties between Washington and a “new bloc” of African leaders that included Isayas Afwerki of Eritrea and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa and Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of Rwanda in the Great Lakes region. Having won power as a result of their control over strong and disciplined guerrilla armies, this new generation of elites shared a commitment to create “responsible and accountable” but not necessarily democratic governments. In the Great Lakes region, French policymakers viewed the rising fortunes of Museveni and Kagame as part of a US policy designed to supplant French influence.

Although it is impossible to ignore the impact that US ties with these two leaders has had on US-French rivalry, this impact was both unintended and unforeseen. Rwanda and Uganda became important throughout the 1990s primarily owing to the US objective of containing the Islamist threat posed by the Sudanese regime of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (1989–present). All three of the national security bureaucracies, the State Department and especially the CIA and the Pentagon, supported the containment policy that included the provision of economic and military aid to Sudan’s neighbors, especially Uganda, which served as a conduit for US support to the SPLA, led by John Garang. Rwanda under Kagame benefited in terms of US attention due to the RPF’s long exile in and continued close ties with
ultimately inspired fear, often the Great Lakes region could on influence throughout Fran-

chis intensified with the emergence to overthrow the Mobutu
alist predecessor, the Chirac
this Great Lakes crisis in an insurgency in eastern Congo
 supported by the Rwandan
ime of Yoweri Museveni. As a
rilla movement to be under
to France. The worst-case sce
secured when Kabila’s guerrilla
installed a new regime, with
friends Rwanda and Uganda.
only constituted a victory
 possibility that Congo might
Saxon influence throughout
after Kabila fell out with his
ly launched a second guerrilla
compliant regime in Kinshasa.
merging US policy stance that
ties between Washington and a
Isaiah Afwerki of Eritrea and
ica and Museveni of Uganda
region. Having won power as
d guerrilla armies, this new
 to create “responsible and
 governments.”
In the Great
the rising fortunes of Museveni
 to supplant French influence.
impact that US ties with these
s impact was both unintended
are important throughout the
of containing the Islamist threat
issan Ahmad al-Bashir (1989–

bureaucracies, the State Depart-
, supported the containment
nic and military aid to Sudan’s
as a conduit for US support to
der Kagame benefited in terms
in and continued close ties with
Uganda. Some have argued that no other African leader in 1999 was more popular with the Pentagon than Kagame, leading to a series of US military aid programs.

Kagame’s decision in October 1996 to launch military attacks against
refugee camps in eastern Congo that were serving as bases of operation for
Interahamwe militia attacks not only signaled the start of a wider war that
would ultimately topple the Mobutu dictatorship seven months later but
also prompted the Chirac administration to attempt to play a more proactive
military role in the region in support of Mobutu. The specific strategy,
French leadership of a multinational peacekeeping force into eastern Congo
(ostensibly for the protection of refugees but in reality designed to stop the
further advance of anti-Mobutu military forces), was stymied for a variety
of reasons, two of which are particularly relevant to this analysis. First,
the lack of commitment from the other Western democracies, including US
opposition, led to the withdrawal of UN support that originally had been
granted for such an operation. Second, the option of unilateral French inter-
vention was out of the question because of the publicly stated promise of
the Rwandan regime and Kabila’s guerrilla forces to militarily engage
French forces. Unlike earlier French military intervention in Rwanda,
French forces would be confronted by battle-hardened troops capable of
inflicting heavy casualties.

The irony of rising US-French tensions over the Great Lakes region,
particularly Congo, was that the Clinton administration early on adopted a
conservative policy approach that, similar to that of its predecessors, per-
ceived Mobutu as both “part of the problem” and “part of the solution” to
what was expected to become a violent political situation. At the heart of
the Clinton administration’s conservative approach was the implicit accept-
ance of the “Mobutu or chaos” argument that had been advanced by spe-
cialists in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA since Mobutu
took power in 1965. With the experiences of Somalia and Rwanda still
fresh in the minds of most policymakers, the Clinton administration sought
to tread softly as, according to a Foreign Service officer, the situation in
Congo “could easily turn into a Somalia and a Rwanda rolled into one,
although this time in one of Africa’s largest and most populous nations.”

In essence, the Clinton administration during spring 1997 adopted a
relatively benign approach that neither actively sought to remove nor openly
sought to strengthen the Mobutu regime. A gradualist approach was deemed
necessary to achieve a “soft landing” for the Mobutu dictatorship.

In contrast, the Chirac administration provided firm support to Mobutu
that included covert military aid (complete with the hiring of Serbian, Bel-
gian, and French mercenaries) designed to keep Mobutu in power. As
Foccart underscored, French policy was driven by Congo’s status as the
largest and most populous country in Francophone Africa and therefore as
a linchpin to the continued strengthening of la francophonie. "Congo has the means to be a regional power," concluded Foccart, and therefore "the long-term interest of France and its allies is evident." To this must be added the close personal ties that developed between Mobutu and Chirac. As explained by Roland Marchal, it was precisely for these reasons that France "absurdly" supported Mobutu until the very end (in contrast to the policies of other Western countries), subsequently seeking to strengthen ties with the Kabila regime, most notably in the aftermath of Kabila's falling out with his former Rwandan and Ugandan military patrons and their ordered expulsion from the country in 1998.

The renewal of conflict in 1998 when Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo for the second time posed several dilemmas for fostering cooperation among the troika to secure a peaceful end to a conflict that some observers had called Africa's First World War. Belgian foreign policy was adrift, the United States was firmly associated with its "new bloc" allies of Rwanda and Uganda, and France had a particularly troubled relationship with Rwanda and to a lesser extent Congo. The fact that Rwanda, arguably the crucial intervening power, enjoyed a "genocide credit" in Brussels and Washington (that is, the tendency to mute criticisms owing to US and Belgian inaction during the events of 1994) but a near-rupture in relations with France ensured that a common (let alone critical) approach to Rwandan (and by association, Ugandan) intervention was highly unlikely.

Despite President Clinton's historic 1998 trip to Africa (including stops in Kampala and Kigali), US policy suffered from the lack of sustained high-level attention. As a result, the national security bureaucracies assumed a critical role in the making of Africa policy. Since the State Department was in the lead, initial policy declarations were reminiscent of past pronouncements on the Mobutu regime. It was striking to hear members of the State Department's Africa Bureau argue that, like his predecessor at the beginning of the 1990s, Kabila was both "part of the problem and part of the solution" to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes region. There was a tendency, at the beginning of the conflict in 1998, for US diplomatic personnel to argue against pushing Kabila too hard or too fast, for fear that US efforts would unintentionally exacerbate an already chaotic situation marked by the involvement of at least seven different armies and several guerrilla groups.

The net result of this diplomatic quandary was that the US response to the 1998 conflict followed the least common denominator of what was acceptable throughout the national security bureaucracies: (1) denunciation of the use of military force by all parties to the conflict; (2) desirability of a peaceful diplomatic solution, as witnessed by the undertaking of aggressive shuttle diplomacy by Susan Rice and the appointment of Howard Wolpe, former chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, as special envoy for the Great Lakes region; (3) maintenance of smooth and stable relations with all
ing of la francophonie. “Congo has included Foccart, and therefore “the allies is evident.” To this must be sloped between Mobutu and Chirac. was precisely for these reasons that until the very end (in contrast to the bsecuantly seeking to strengthen ties in the aftermath of Kabila’s falling Ugandan military patrons and their 1998.22 when Rwanda and Uganda invaded indal dilemmas for fostering coopera- peacefull end to a conflict that some- world War, Belgian foreign policy was associated with its “new bloc” allies of a particularly troubled relationship ngo. The fact that Rwanda, arguably a “genocide credit” in Brussels and anti-criticisms owing to US and Bel- but a near-rupture in relations with lone critical) approach to Rwandan nation was highly unlikely.

The 1998 trip to Africa (including stops toed from the lack of sustained high- al security bureaucracies assumed a cicy. Since the State Department was were reminiscent of past pronounce- triking to hear members of the State like his predecessor at the beginning the problem and part of the solution” ces region. There was a tendency, at for US diplomatic personnel to argue to fast, for fear that US efforts would y chaotic situation marked by the armies and several guerrilla groups. understand was that the US response to common denominator of what was unity bureaucracies: (1) denunciation to the conflict; (2) desirability of a sed by the undertaking of aggressive the appointment of Howard Wolpe, ee on Africa, as special envoy for the f smooth and stable relations with all parties to the conflict, most notably Congo and Rwanda, as represented by statements calling on local powers to respect the sovereignty of Congo (that is, sensitivity to Congo’s desire for the withdrawal of foreign forces) and to stop transborder attacks by genocidal groups (that is, a reference to Rwanda’s desire for security provisions against the continued attacks by Hutu militias based in eastern Congo); and (4) African solutions for African problems, as represented by a willingness to embrace regional efforts at conflict mediation, including strong support for the mediation efforts of former South African president Nelson Mandela and the importance of making African troops the centerpiece of peacekeeping in Congo.

The last point was particularly characteristic of both Belgian and US approaches to the 1998 conflict. In the case of Belgium, the idea of “reciprocal responsibility,” later translated to mean “African solutions for African problems,” served as a central guideline for Belgian foreign policy toward the Great Lakes region in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the deaths of Belgian peacekeepers.33 In the case of the United States, this approach was primarily the result of the lead role being played by the State Department’s Africa Bureau. In the absence of a major political catastrophe, such as the complete collapse of the Congolese state and the breakup of the Congolese nation, which would prompt sustained high-level involvement on the part of President Clinton and his White House staff, the State Department’s Africa Bureau would continue to pursue a balancing act. Such an act neither fully endorsed nor fully denounced the Kabila regime, all the while supporting local and international initiatives with the hope that one such effort eventually would be successful in ameliorating the conflict. “The potential problem with such an approach,” explained a report written for the EU that aptly captured French and especially Chirac administration criticisms, “is that it can be interpreted both positively and negatively; either as a stimulus for Africans to take their fates into their own hands, or as an excuse for an attitude of indifference by the international community.”34

Convergence of Interests in Promoting Peace and Security in the Aftermath of Lusaka (1999–Present)

The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 represented a watershed in the evolution of peace and security in the Great Lakes region, serving as the road map for peace. It soon became apparent, however, that among other shortcomings, the agreement had largely frozen armies in their respective positions but had failed to stop the fighting, including the eruption of warfare between allies Rwanda and Uganda in eastern Congo. This situation led one influential monitoring group to declare in December 2000 that the agreement “proved hollow.”35 The primary stumbling block, according to a rare consensus
shared by all three members of the troika, was Kabila, whose political intransigence had fostered the worsening of ties with Brussels, Paris, and Washington since his emergence as president.36

The Congolese political dynamic dramatically changed on 16 January 2001, with the assassination of Kabila and the assumption of the presidency by his son, Joseph Kabila. Unlike his father, Joseph Kabila has reached out to and was embraced by all three members of the troika, the policymakers of which praised his commitment to implementing the Lusaka Agreement.37

Kabila met with the ambassadors of the troika ten days after his father's death, during which time he received and accepted an invitation from US ambassador Thomas Pickering to attend a breakfast prayer in Washington, DC, with the newly elected president, George W. Bush, at which Kagame would also be present. This, the first official visit abroad of Kabila as president, began with a stop in Paris, followed by stops in Washington and Brussels, prior to returning to Kinshasa.

By all accounts, Kabila enjoys excellent personal ties with the leaders of all three countries: Chirac warmly received him at the Franco-African Summit held in Paris in February 2003; he enjoys close ties with Belgian foreign minister Michel and King Albert II (the latter publicly snubbed Kabila senior in front of the Belgian cameras by refusing to shake his hand); and he has met with Bush on a number of occasions since assuming office, including during a visit to Washington, DC, in October 2003. The visit to Washington was particularly important. Kabila's father considered the Clinton administration to be too close to and too supportive of Rwanda and Uganda, a belief that significantly strained US-Congolese ties and made progress on the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement difficult. This dynamic changed with the emergence of new presidents in both Kinshasa and Washington, most notably with the Bush administration's decision to take a more neutral posture toward the Great Lakes region by somewhat distancing itself from Rwanda (although ties with Uganda remained steadfast) and more proactively courting the "young and untested Kabila" (a statement applicable to Bush as well). This and later meetings between the new presidents put Congo on a more equal footing with Rwanda and Uganda, signaling a shift in great power (especially US) approaches to the Great Lakes region.

A second important change within the Great Lakes region involved the growing normalization of ties between Rwanda and all three members of the troika. Just as Rwanda in 1994 served as the epicenter of the political crises that would engulf the region for the next twelve years, so too will it serve as an epicenter of the success or failure of conflict resolution measures for the foreseeable future. An important international dimension of this normalization process has involved various high-level "acts of contrition"38 on the part of the Western countries for their collective failure to prevent
oika, was Kabila, whose political tug of ties with Brussels, Paris, and London dramatically changed on 16 January after the assumption of the presidency ther, Joseph Kabila has reached out to his former allies, the policymakers promoting the Lusaka Agreement. Three troika ten days after his father's untimely death, Kabila accepted an invitation from US President George W. Bush, at which Kagame officially visited Rwanda as a guest of the US. The excellent personal ties with the leaders he enjoyed close ties with Belgium and the Franco-African Community have been strengthened by his refusal to shake hands on occasions since assuming office in Washington, DC, in October 2003. The 3rd and 4th sessions of the General Conference of new presidents in both Kinshasha and the Bush administration's decision to support the Great Lakes region by sending a delegation to Kigali (although ties with Uganda remained strained), are the key events since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. Kagame's approach to the reconciliation process in Rwanda and his efforts to restore normal relations with the US and the EU are key developments.

The Rwandan side of the normalization process involves Kagame's search for greater international legitimacy. The cornerstone of this process was the holding of national elections on 25 August 2003 in which Kagame was elected president with 95% of the vote; a pro-Kagame coalition of parties then won 74% of the vote in legislative elections held on 3 October 2003. Although criticized by various human rights groups for his actions, Kagame welcomed the elections as an important step in the right direction. As part of this normalization process, Kagame reached out to France, and France responded in kind, marking the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations. "We want to move forward," explained Kagame in a statement clearly targeted toward France, "with any partner who wants to move forward with us." In a striking and symbolically rich departure from the past, Kagame for the first time since the 1994 genocide participated in the twenty-second Franco-African Summit, held in February 2003 in Paris (he was not even invited to the eighteenth summit held in Biarritz, France, in November 1994), and was warmly received by Chirac.

One of the most noteworthy international developments with important implications for the Great Lakes region was the election in 1999 (and re-election in 2003) of a Liberal-Socialist government in Belgium intent on playing a more activist role in Africa, especially in its former colonies. In a departure from its Christian-Democrat and Conservative predecessors, this government has raised Africa's standing within the Belgian foreign policy-making establishment and is playing an activist role in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. One of the reasons for this newfound activism is the leadership roles played by Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel. Michel is widely regarded as a passionate and energetic proponent for peace who has established excellent ties with both Kabila and Kagame as well as with Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in France. It is also argued that Belgium, unlike its
US and French counterparts, enjoys an "absolute neutrality" vis-à-vis the various African participants to the Congolese crisis and therefore is well positioned to play a leading role as a true "honest broker" in the peace process.43

In the case of the United States, however, early statements of the Bush administration suggested the continent’s decreased standing at the White House and therefore little possibility for an activist approach to conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. A statement made during the presidential election campaign of 2000 was revealing. In response to a question concerning Africa’s place in a future Bush administration, Bush noted that the continent did not “fit into the national strategic interests” of the United States “as far as I can see them.”44 Secretary of State Colin Powell and the State Department’s Africa Bureau emerged as the lead voice in Bush administration foreign policy toward Africa. During the first year in office, Powell emphasized the strategic imperative of cultivating strong links with Africa’s leading regional powers, most notably South Africa, harkening back to the Nixon administration strategy of relying on such powers to ensure stability within their specific regions. As demonstrated by Pretoria’s crucial role in promoting peace accords in the Great Lakes region, most notably via its sponsorship of the Sun City negotiations as concerns Burundi and Congo, such a policy is seemingly validated by events on the ground, although it remains unclear what influence (if any) Bush administration policy exerted in this regard.

Powell’s most important theme with direct relevance to the Great Lakes region as a whole was that Africans needed to “do more for themselves” in the realm of conflict resolution. As he put it: “In Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Congo and elsewhere, this means stopping the killing, taking the weapons out of the hands of children, ending corruption, seeking compromises, and beginning to work in peace and dialogue rather than war and killing.”45 According to what could be labeled the Powell Doctrine for Africa, African diplomats and military forces, and not those of foreign powers (including the United States), must take the lead in responding to African crises and conflicts. US forces, if they were to be used at all, must be perceived as the source of last resort and in any case must be severely limited in terms of size, mission, and timetable.

In the post-September 11 era, the Bush administration has realized that failed states run the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terrorist activities. This realization, however, has led to neither the elaboration of an official policy as concerns failed states nor a willingness to commit US troops in such situations. In African countries such as Congo, which are considered to be marginal to the war on terrorism, the Bush administration, like its cold war predecessors, increasingly has relied on the conflict resolution efforts of three sets of actors: the former colonial powers, African regional
n “absolute neutrality” vis-à-vis the Congolese crisis and therefore is well advised, particularly in the peace process, to adopt a true “honest broker” role in the peace process.

However, early statements of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, along with the White House’s own activist approach to conflict resolution, were belied by the failure of negotiations and the continued violence in the Congo. The U.S. government’s stated strategy of relying on strong regional players to achieve peace in the Congo was undermined by the continued intransigence of the region’s actors, including the government of President Joseph Kabila, the rebel groups operating in the eastern Congo, and other external actors, such as the United Nations and the African Union.

France has been the most activist of the troika in committing its military forces to peacekeeping operations in Congo, a policy stance that is in line with the Chirac administration’s philosophical rejection of “African solutions for African problems.” The most recent case of French military intervention involved the deployment of Operation Artemis, a short-term (June–September 2003) EU-sponsored and UN Security Council-authorized military operation that was designed to temporally quell violence in Congo’s Ituri province, subsequently paving the way for the reinforcement and deployment of UN forces already stationed in Congo as part of MONUC. Operation Artemis, also known in French circles as Operation Mamba, constituted a watershed in UN-sponsored military operations in Congo. Initially rejecting French-led intervention as “unwelcome,” Kagame ultimately relented and acceded to a French request to provide written assurances that Rwanda would pose no obstacle to the deployment of French troops in the region. This change of heart not only was indicative of the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations but also was the direct result of intense pressure that London and Washington exerted on both Kagame and Museveni to permit the entry of French-led forces. This operation also demonstrated that the Bush administration’s desire for its European allies, most notably France, to take the lead in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in the Great Lakes region, as well as a willingness to pressure its regional allies to accept such operations. Indeed, perhaps the most noteworthy signal of this operation’s success was Kabila’s request in June 2004 for a second deployment of EU-sponsored military contingents to quell renewed violence in Congo’s eastern provinces.

The convergence of interests among Belgium, France, and the United States in promoting peace building in the Great Lakes region, especially in the aftermath of Kabila’s assumption of power in January 2001, contributed to an international dynamic conducive to unlocking the diplomatic stalemate in the Lusaka process that existed from 1999 to 2001. Especially with Belgium willing to take the lead, there emerged an international leadership coalition that, among other actions, put pressure on foreign actors to withdraw their military forces from Congo and on domestic Congolese actors to reach an internal political settlement as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This leadership has taken on a wide variety of forms, ranging from providing the external funding necessary for the more than 300 delegates who participated in the Sun City negotiating process for Congo and supporting the creation of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region that...
brings together representatives from industrialized countries and intergovernmental organizations, to the direct participation of the Western leaders themselves in the negotiations. In this regard, Foreign Minister Michel is the highest-ranking Western official who also has been the most actively involved in a wide series of regional negotiations related to the Great Lakes, most notably as concerns Congo. Michel’s commitment was demonstrated by his decision to make conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region Belgium’s priority when it assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the EU in 2001.

It is difficult to quantify the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the Great Lakes region by Western special envoys who have engaged in a form of “shuttle diplomacy” among the regional actors. The most renowned current special envoy to the Great Lakes region is Aldo Ajello, who represents the EU. Ajello has not shied away from speaking bluntly, as witnessed by his declaration on 1 November 2001 that the first phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was “a total failure,” subsequently noting that the EU was “considering a number of initiatives that could facilitate dialogue.” The latter portion of Ajello’s statement captures the presumed benefits of the special envoy: appointed to serve a region as opposed to one country, special envoys are presumably better able to get to know all of the regional belligerents to a crisis and therefore should be more effective in either promoting or facilitating specific conflict resolution measures. According to critics, however, special envoys actually muddy the diplomatic waters by creating parallel diplomatic tracks that may run counter to existing official policy toward a particular country and in any case may not carry true diplomatic weight unless such envoys have the power to report directly to the most influential leaders in their countries as well as to have their recommendations taken seriously by those leaders. It is precisely for this reason, for example, that the Bush administration rationalized reducing the record number of special envoys that existed under the Clinton administration, which most notably included Howard Wolpe, a distinguished Africanist who served as the elected chair of the Subcommittee on Africa in the US House of Representatives, as special envoy to the Great Lakes region. At least in the special case of the EU—an intergovernmental actor in which the member states still maintain independent foreign policies—it is clear that Ajello has made a positive contribution to the harmonization of EU policies toward the Great Lakes region.

Ajello’s activities as EU special envoy and Kabila’s request for a second EU-sponsored military deployment in Congo also underscore the special foreign policy role of the EU in the facilitation of peace building in the Great Lakes region. Although the EU in a sense signaled its rising importance as a separate foreign policy actor in the region when it decided to suspend EU development assistance to Congo at the beginning of the 1990s,
rialized countries and intergov-
ernment relations, Foreign Minister Michel has also been the most actively engaged in the Great Lakes region, where efforts undertaken in the Great Lakes region, who have engaged in a form of mediation, is the most renowned current Aldo Ajello, who represents the EU's interests, as well as his first phase of the Inter-Congoese dialogue, noting that the EU was "a catalyst for dialogue." The latter presumed benefits of the special envoy concept to one country, special envoy to the regional belligerents or effective in diplomatic measures. According to critics, the diplomatic water by creating "tunnel" to existing official policy may not carry true diplomatic influence to report directly to the most influential states to have their recommendations precisely for this reason, for rationalized reducing the record of the Clinton administration, and a distinguished Africanist on Africa in the US Congress, to the Great Lakes region. The external governmental actor in which foreign policies—either the harmonization of EU policies—by and Kabila's request for a cease-fire and Kabila's request for a cease-fire and Kabila's request for a cease-fire and Kabila's request for a cease-fire in the sense signaled its rising importance region when it decided to suspend at the beginning of the 1990s, it took on a more prominent role in the region in the period following the signing of the Lusaka Accords. The impetus behind this growing foreign policy role is the gradual strengthening of the EU as an independent actor, not to mention the success of the EU experiment as witnessed by the introduction of a common currency (the euro) by the majority of its members and the enlargement of EU membership from fifteen to twenty-five countries in May 2004. One manifestation of the deepening of the EU integration process has been the positive response of EU member states to institutional and elite pressures for the greater harmonization of member state foreign policies toward the Great Lakes region, the ultimate goal of course being that the EU (both member states and central institutions alike) must speak with one voice. In January 2002, for example, the foreign ministers of three leading EU member states—Michel of Belgium, Vedrine of France, and Jack Straw of the United Kingdom—made a joint visit to the Great Lakes region to provide a common front for EU peace-building initiatives. This event served as a poignant symbol of the growing harmonization of EU member state policies as concerns a wide range of issues in the Great Lakes region.

The degree of foreign policy independence exerted by the EU as a unified institutional actor, however, should not be exaggerated. As aptly noted by Gorm Rye Olsen, the foreign policy activities of regional organizations remain constrained by the interests and concerns of their individual members. The requirement of achieving consensus prior to taking action has ensured that recent policies have been representative of the lowest common denominator of the varied foreign policy interests of the EU's twenty-five member states. Equally important, there is a tendency for EU foreign policies to follow the foreign policy lead of one of its members, if that member "demonstrates a special interest or historical involvement in a particular country." According to this logic, the EU's activist foreign policy role in the Great Lakes region is largely due to the willingness of Belgium and France to pressure their EU partners to follow their lead. For instance, the EU voted in December 2001 to resume development aid to Congo after prodding from Belgium and France, which supported the resumption of aid. But Great Britain had initially objected to the resumption, preferring to wait until Congolese parties had made more progress in the Inter-Congoese Dialogue. This demonstrates that the willingness of Belgium and France to lead remains the salient explanatory factor in the EU's increasingly prominent role in the Great Lakes region.

Conclusion

The general conclusion of this chapter is that both the local and international environments are propitious for the further strengthening of peace
and security in the Great Lakes region. As of 2004, the leaders of the epicenters of conflict in the region (Kabila and Kagame) enjoyed close or steadily improving ties with all three members of the troika. Two members of the troika (Belgium and France) exhibited strong levels of interest at the highest levels of their policymaking establishments in playing activist roles. Belgium is particularly important in this regard, playing a catalytic role in peace-building efforts. This role, which is unique in recent Belgian history, is clearly due to the election in 1999 (and reelection in 2003) of a Liberal-Socialist government under the leadership of Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Foreign Minister Michel and is unlikely to continue if this coalition does not win the elections scheduled for 2007. And although Africa and especially the Great Lakes region do not constitute US foreign policy priorities, the attacks of September 11 have made the Bush administration more willing to diplomatically and financially support the conflict resolution efforts of African (most notably South Africa) and European (especially Belgium and France) allies willing to take the lead.

A potentially limited and unique window of opportunity exists to build on existing international political dynamics to facilitate regional efforts at creating more enduring forms of peace and security in the Great Lakes region. This reality has provided an important impetus behind the holding of a series of conferences, such as the UN and AU International Conference on Peace, Security, and Development in the Great Lakes in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in November 2004. The key question in Western engagement in the region revolves around how the troika can best take advantage of this historic turning point to further deepen the consolidation of a durable peace in the Great Lakes region. Based on the analysis of this chapter, at least three sets of conclusions stand out.

First, diplomacy in the post-Lusaka era (1999–present) has demonstrated the importance of a consultative process that brings senior policymakers together for face-to-face meetings. In this regard, the troika’s foreign policy initiatives would greatly benefit from the creation of a regular consultative process between senior Africanists of the troika itself. The most effective policy is one in which the troika “speaks with one voice,” which in turn assumes a high degree of policy coordination that historically has not been characteristic of the troika’s policies toward the Great Lakes region. Although sporadic consultation among EU foreign policy officials represents an important start, ideally this consultation should include the United States and should regularly occur among the most senior Africanists of the equivalent of each administration’s ministry of foreign affairs (in the case of the US State Department, the level of assistant secretary of state for African affairs) and ideally at the level of minister of foreign affairs (secretary of state in the United States). Equally important is the need to support similar face-to-face confidence-building measures in the Great Lakes region.
As of 2004, the leaders of the epistle and Kagame enjoyed close or embers of the troika. Two members exhibited strong levels of interest at the establishment in playing activist roles in regard, playing a catalytic role in uniqueness in recent Belgian history, and reelection in 2003) of a Liberal-ship of Prime Minister Verhofstadt. It is likely to continue if this coalition for 2007. And although Africa and constitute US foreign policy priorities, the Bush administration more likely support the conflict resolution in Africa and European (especially the lead).

A window of opportunity exists to build dynamics to facilitate regional efforts at peace and security in the Great Lakes region. The most important impetus behind the holding of the IAU International Conference in the Great Lakes in Dar es Salaam, question in Western engagement in the region can best take advantage of this the consolidation of a durable peace the analysis of this chapter, at least.

The troika era (1999–present) has demonstrated that a process that brings senior policymakers together. In this regard, the troika’s foreign policy benefits from the creation of a regular Africanists of the troika itself. The troika “speaks with one voice,” policy coordination that historically has driven the Great Lakes region among EU foreign policy officials. This consultation should include the four among the most senior Africanists in the ministry of foreign affairs (the level of assistant secretary of state for the office of minister of foreign affairs is secretarial important is the need to support measures in the Great Lakes region.

The troika should fund regional meetings or “summitry” among members of various groups of government officials in the Great Lakes region, including military officers, parliamentarians, ministers of justice, and ministers of foreign affairs. Funding for the implementation of the provisions of the UN International Conference in the Great Lakes region will serve as an essential part of this process.

Second, the members of the troika need to reduce the "genocide credit" typically accorded Rwanda as a result of Western action and inaction during the 1994 genocide. The troika should embrace Kagame’s desire for increased legitimacy within the international system, which essentially was one of his most important reasons for holding legislative and presidential elections in 2003. This acceptance should be accompanied, however, by a willingness to publicly confront Rwanda as concerns serious domestic and international transgressions, such as evidence related to Rwandan military operations in eastern Congo during both 2003 and 2004. The ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in 2004 marked an important turning point for the troika and other members of the international community to commemorate the Rwandan tragedy of 1994 and to once again underscore their collective guilt as concerns their collective response to that tragedy. The time has come, however, to treat Rwanda in a more regularized diplomatic fashion.

A third and related point is the need for the troika to expand the internationally sponsored peacekeeping presence in eastern Congo to definitively suppress cross-border insurgent groups. Rwanda, in particular, will never feel secure unless the international community takes a leading role in securing the border regions that Congo, at the present time, is incapable of securing. There is a need to recognize the special security role to be played by the EU and especially France. The intensification during the 1990s of rivalry between Paris and Washington had serious, negative implications in the search for a durable peace within the Great Lakes region.

Washington needs to publicly recognize what it already has accepted in the post–September 11 era: the special ability of France to play a constructive role in peacekeeping. Belgium does not want to shoulder this role, France—owing to historical and cultural factors—is interested in assuming this role, and Washington is willing to support such a role by France and other powers within the region but is obviously not willing to commit US troops. The success of the French-led Artemis mission in 2003 suggests that such an approach is viable, as long as French involvement is under the auspices of a multilateral EU or UN force that includes forces from other countries. French success in leading the 2003 Artemis operation in an even-handed manner, combined with the beginning of a thaw in French-Rwandan relations, suggests that this military operation could become a model for future peacekeeping operations in the Great Lakes region. As already noted, the success of the
Artemis operation was clearly demonstrated by Kabila’s June 2004 request for a second EU-led military operation on Congolese soil. In this regard, the international community needs to rethink whether the current UN-sponsored MONUC operation, a renewed EU-led military operation, or some combination of the two will be better equipped to effectively meet the security challenges in the region.

Notes

trated by Kabila's June 2004 request on Congolese soil. In this regard, rethink whether the current UN-sponsored EU-led military operation, or some equipped to effectively meet the secu-

Kappes-Grange, "Louis Michel: 'L'Afrique...", Jeune Afrique Intelligente, no. 2233 (26


NGO Crisis: Background and International 01.


Containment in Africa: From Truman to Rea- pp. 7–34.

Foreign Policy in the Congo: 1960–1964 1974); Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmil-

Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism: Towards a New Agenda (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

, and Kay Miller, Passing By: The United Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for


e Gaillard, Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec 1, 1995).

e: America, Japan, Germany and the Strug- ntieth Century Fund, 1993).


18. Ibid., p. 49.


24. Ibid.


29. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, p. 107.


32. Roland Marchal, correspondence from author, no date.


34. Ibid.


36. Ibid., p. 83.


39. Ibid.


48. Ibid., p. 144.