The author of the present work studied under Dickson and the work itself is the first serious extended book-length treatment in English of any aspect of Ozbeg Central Asian history. It has two supreme merits. First, it provides readers with extensive information about the Ozbegs in general, and the Balkh appanage in particular, during the four centuries it covers, and thereby starts filling this gap in the English-speaking world's knowledge of the eastern Islamic area during this period. Second, it brings fully into Western ken the great mass of Soviet research on the subject, the key to which can be found in an invaluable bibliography.

In such a pathbreaking work, it would be unreasonable to expect a tightly focused monographic study, and, in fact, the source material that exists on the Balkh waqf, at least until the 18th century, is found too infrequently for such a study. In addition, as the author points out in a superb introductory chapter that reviews the work which has been done to date on waqf, much more research needs to be undertaken before the institution is fully understood and a clear analytic framework constructed into which new studies can be fitted. Because documentation exists at widely scattered intervals, the author has covered a long period, but with the information at his disposal McChesney has done an excellent job in outlining the history and development of the shrine and its role in the area, extolling the "tenacity, adaptability and durability of the waqf and its administrators" and its ability to "[maintain]... itself over a long period of time and in the face of forces [including the impact of Nader Shah] that seem at times to have been quite hostile to the longevity of any independent economic institution" (p. 197).

In addition, as the author points out in his preface, "I discovered that it was necessary to create a narrative of the history of the region, for no satisfactory one now exists, and to try to sketch in the political, economic and social conditions that had the greatest influence on the way in which the institution and its endowments evolved" (p. xi). Thus the history of the region in which the shrine operated—effectively the whole area of present-day Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush, with the exception of the provinces of Herat and Bâdakhshan—is disentangled, and the work as a whole is roughly divided between this aspect and the treatment of the waqf. While focusing in detail on the region cited, the work is also successful in illuminating the history of the entire area, describing the complex relationships between the various appanages—for example, Samarqand and Bukhara—and the khans, sultans, and amirs (all terms with technical meanings different from those employed in other contemporary Islamic states) and showing the strength of the Chingizid legitimizing tradition until the mid-18th century.3 There is much less on the economic background, but the information on this subject appears to be much more meager.4

Students of both the early modern Islamic world and the eastern part of the greater Iranian world are much in McChesney's debt for opening a large window onto a scene hitherto almost unknown in the West. It is hoped that others will follow with detailed studies of the remaining parts of this Central Asian world.

John Emerson, Harvard College Library

HORN OF AFRICA


2. A German study of this latter area, covering much the same period of time, is Jan-Heeren Grewemeyer, Herrschaft, Raum und Gegenzeitigkeit: die politische Geschichte Badakhshans, 1500–1883 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982).

3. A briefer and more balanced treatment of the political history of this area by the same author may now be found in the Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. V, pp. 176–93 (16th to 18th centuries), and by Yuri Bregel for the 18th-19th centuries, pp. 216–21.

4. A brief general account of the economic history of the whole Central Asian area, also by McChesney, is found in Encyclopædia Iranica, pp. 216–21.

Reviewed by Peter J. Schraeder

Jeffrey Lefebvre’s book, an updated version of his doctoral dissertation, is an impressive piece of scholarship that offers the best analysis to date of US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. The primary purpose of the book is to clarify the ways influence is wielded in “great power supplier-small power recipient” relationships, by focusing on the evolution of US arms transfer policies to Ethiopia and Somalia from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s. Adopting what he terms a “supplier-recipient bargaining model,” Lefebvre analyzes ten case studies of arms transfer policies—six for Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977, and four for Somalia from 1977 to 1990—and the ways the United States, Ethiopia, and Somalia adopted two general sets of bargaining strategies based on “the manipulation of weakness” and “the threat of defection” to achieve their national security interests.

Several aspects of this book make it unique within the broad body of scholarship devoted to understanding superpower intervention in the Horn of Africa. First, the book is comprehensive in the sense that it describes US foreign policy toward both Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as describing the evolution of those policies from their beginnings in the 1950s through 1991—a tremendously important year in which the Ethiopian dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–1991) and the Somali dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre (1969–1991) were overthrown by guerrilla insurgencies.

The book is also unique in terms of the depth of documentation that is brought to bear. In addition to carrying out dozens of interviews with important figures who were critical to the evolution of US policies, such as Edward Korry, the US ambassador to Ethiopia from 1963 to 1967, and Richard Moose, assistant secretary of state for African affairs under the Carter administration, the author makes extensive use of government documents and publications, as well as the vast amount of available secondary literature.

A wide-ranging analysis of policy debates at three separate levels of the policymaking establishment—the White House, the bureaucracies of the executive branch, and Congress—also makes this book unique within the general literature. As the White House historically has remained uninvolved in the policymaking process with regard to Africa, and Congress only began to play a more important role in Africa policies in the 1970s, the author pays particular attention to the importance of bureaucratic politics and the often acrimonious infighting that has marked US foreign policy toward the Horn.

The final, and perhaps most unique, contribution of the book is its discussion of the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of Middle Eastern politics. Specifically, the author does an excellent job of describing the foreign policies of various Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel, toward the Horn of Africa, as well as the ways the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has affected those policies.

Although this book is definitely a must for scholars and policymakers alike, it is not without shortcomings. One simple but important problem, which no doubt is due to the publisher’s desire to keep costs down, rather than any action on the part of the author, is the lack of a bibliography and a list of those interviewed (included in the original dissertation). Second, the analysis is at its weakest in the description of the most recent events in the Horn of Africa, particularly the overthrow of the Siad and Mengistu regimes in 1991, which is treated in an 11-page conclusion.

The most important critique emerges from what appears to be an underlying assumption of “rationality” within the policymaking process. For example, the author implies in the beginning of the book (p. 5) that suppliers and recipients are rational actors who seek to “maximize benefits and minimize costs.” In-
deed, the issue of rationality is crucial, it seems, to the author's discussion of the bargaining model as applied to US relations with Ethiopia and Somalia. This characterization, however, is at odds with much of the evidence presented throughout the book, which seems to imply that US policies in the Horn of Africa were often anything but rational, resulting instead from such potentially irrational processes as parochial institutional operating procedures and infighting between the various bureaucracies of the executive branch. These critiques, however, are minor in comparison to the tremendous contributions of Lefebvre's book.

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IRAN


Reviewed by Mohammad H. Faghtoory

In this book, Jahangir Amuzegar intends to present a new perspective on the Iranian revolution. He succeeds in his work. The book is rich in fresh analysis and information, and is strengthened by its objectivity and scholarly presentation.

Amuzegar's text is divided into six parts. Part one discusses the salient features of the Iranian revolution and maintains that the revolution was both unforeseen and unforeseeable. The discussion reveals, however, that a confrontation between the state and the nation—especially the clergy—was inevitable at some point in time. The only question was when and how this confrontation would take place.

Part two examines several theories on the Iranian revolution, arguing that, despite their validity, no single theory can explain this monumental event. Part three addresses historical and deep-rooted causes of the revolution. The fourth and fifth parts examine Iran's development strategies following World War II, and the shah's understanding of the revolutionary crisis. The final part is an analysis of the collapse of the Iranian monarchy and the lessons learned from the Pahlavi triumph and tragedy. Although the author gives the regime proper credit for its accomplishments, Amuzegar's negative assessment of the Pahlavi monarchy is revealed by a glance at such titles and subtitles of the book as "Hegemony of Style over Substance," "Nationalism without a National Purpose," "The Lyrical Illusion of Abundance," "Castles Built on Sand," and "A No-Exit Scenario."

According to Amuzegar, the emergence of the revolutionary situation in 1977 and the downfall of the regime in 1979 were neither spontaneous nor unprovoked. Rather, they were the outcome of diverse factors at work for several decades. These factors were rooted in institutional anomalies and contradictions; controversial policies and strategies; Iranian national character; the shah's own complex personal make-up, mind-set, and behavior; and the leadership role played by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

According to the author, the inherent contradictions in the constitution of 1906 planted the seeds of serious conflict between the religious establishment and a secular state (p. 119). Through their actions and policies, the Pahlavis reinforced contradictions between rule and reign. They could not understand that without grass roots political participation, it is impossible to build a modern secular state. By suppressing intellectuals, the clergy, and the radical left, the shah helped to unite them against himself, at a time when the country was experiencing profound economic changes. Imbalance between political and economic development made the regime particularly vulnerable to external attacks.

Amuzegar criticizes Iran's development strategies under the Pahlavis because of their preference for symbols over substance and disregard for native culture and psychology. Although the most advanced military hard-