SECOND EDITION

UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

edited by
April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon
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edited by April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon
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Three watershed events have transformed African international relations since the late nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, independent Africa (except for Ethiopia and Liberia) ceased to exist, and African international relations were controlled by the European colonial powers. A second watershed event—the independence of Libya in 1951—marked the beginning of the end of colonial rule and the return of control over African international relations to Africans. African international relations, however, were often subject to the vagaries of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union or to the interests of the former European colonial powers. The third watershed event—the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989—signaled the end of the Cold War but not the end of international rivalry in Africa. As African leaders approach the end of the twentieth century, they must manage their countries’ international relations in an environment marked by the growing competition among today’s economic superpowers; the United States, Japan, France, Germany, and China.

This chapter is devoted to exploring African international relations in the aftermath of Europe’s partition and eventual granting of independence to the fifty-four countries that currently constitute the African continent. After briefly outlining the major themes of what has been called the dependency-decolonization debate, I explore in the remainder of the chapter a variety of factors that are critical to understanding the evolution of African international relations. The topics discussed include (1) the formulation and implementation of African foreign policies; (2) pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity; (3) regional economic cooperation and integration; (4) the role of foreign powers in African international relations; and (5) the United Nations and international financial institutions.
THE DEPENDENCY-DECOLONIZATION DEBATE

Although the independence of Libya in 1951 marked the beginning of the end of “formal” colonial rule—a process largely culminating in 1994 when elections in South Africa led to black majority rule—both African and foreign observers began an ongoing debate over the degree to which these newly independent countries truly control their international relations. According to one group of observers who belong to what has become known as the dependency school of thought, the granting of legal independence did little to alter the constraining web of economic, political, military, and cultural ties that bound African nations to their former colonial masters (Amin, 1973). This conceptualization of African international relations—often referred to as neocolonialism (Nkrumah, 1965)—is especially prominent in writings about the relationship between France and its former colonies, primarily due to active French policies designed to maintain what French policymakers refer to as their chasse gardée (literally, an exclusive hunting ground) in francophone Africa (Suret-Canale, 1975). Even in those former colonies where the European power was either too weak (e.g., Spain) or uninterested (e.g., Britain) to preserve privileged ties, the rise of the Cold War and superpower intervention are said to have ensured the gradual replacement of neocolonial relationships centered in Europe with a new set of ties dominated by Moscow and Washington (Laïdi, 1990). Simply put, direct colonial rule was merely replaced by a series of neocolonial ties that permitted the continued external domination—albeit in a more subtle form—of African international relations.

A second group of observers who belong to what has become known as the decolonization school of thought argue instead that legal independence was but the first step of an evolutionary process permitting African leaders to assume greater control over their countries’ international relations (Zartman, 1976; see also Shaw and Newbury, 1979). According to this school of thought, although external influences may have been extremely powerful in the immediate postindependence era, layer upon layer of this foreign control is slowly being peeled away with the passage of time. Carefully underscoring that individual African countries can follow different pathways, proponents of the decolonization school argue that the most common pattern begins with legal independence followed by efforts to ensure national sovereignty in the military, economic, and (perhaps most important) cultural realms. “In this view, each layer of colonial influence is supported by the others, and as each is removed, it uncovers and exposes the next underlying one, rendering it vulnerable, untenable, and unnecessary,” explains Zartman (1976:326–327). “Thus, there is a natural progression to the removal of colonial influence: its speed can be varied by policy and effort, but the direction and evolution are inherent in the process and become extremely difficult to reverse.”

The end of the Cold War has ushered in a radically changed international environment with important implications for the dependency-decolonization debate. Donald Gordon discusses in Chapter 4 how the fall of communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—the intellectual heartland of single-party rule—reinforced a democratization trend in Africa. In many cases this has led to the replacement of authoritarian regimes with newly elected democratic leaders less enamored of their former foreign patrons (see Schraeder, 1994b). According to optimistic interpretations of the impact of this transforming event, Africa is undergoing a “second independence” or a “second national liberation” in which a second generation of African leaders will assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries (e.g., Joseph, 1994). However, observers associated with the dependency school equate the end of the Cold War with the rising marginalization of African international relations. They imply that African leaders will enjoy less, rather than more, options in the post–Cold War international system (e.g., Shaw, 1991). Focusing on aggressive foreign efforts to promote democratization and economic reform, some observers have even suggested that the “recolonization” or “second scramble” for Africa is occurring (Ake, 1995).

THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES

The principal theme of early studies of African foreign policy is that foreign policy begins and ends with the desires of African presidents (Korany, 1986). The primary reason for what has become known as the “big man” or “big leader” syndrome of African foreign policy is that the majority of the first generation of African presidents, who assumed power during the initial independence decade of the 1960s, systematically suppressed and dismantled all centers of power capable of challenging the foreign policy supremacy of the presidential mansion. The various efforts undertaken by this first generation included the stifling of a free press, the suspension of constitutions, the banning of opposition parties, the jailing of vocal political opponents, the dismantling of independent judiciaries, and, finally, the cooptation or jailing of legislative opponents to create “rubber stamp” parliaments (Chazan et al., 1993). In short, the institutional actors associated with democratic governance who made their voices heard in the foreign policy making process were often marginalized in the name of creating single-party regimes capable of promoting unity and development.

The net result of what in essence constituted a highly centralized foreign policy machinery was the promotion of “personalized” foreign policies derivative of the interests and idiosyncrasies of individual presidents (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). In the case of Zaire, for example, Mobutu
Sese Seko assumed power in 1965 through a military coup d'etat supported by the U.S. government and gradually concentrated all power around the office of the president (Young and Turner, 1989). Often unwilling to listen to his foreign policy experts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and having effectively silenced other potential centers of opposition, most notably by disbanding the Zairian National Assembly, Mobutu is known for declaring policies that create international controversy. During a presidential visit to the United States during 1973, for example, Mobutu made a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he announced his decision to rupture all diplomatic ties with Israel. This decision was notable in that it was made without any warning to the Nixon White House and effectively derailed State Department efforts to win congressional passage of a Zairian foreign aid bill.2

A second outcome associated with the centralization of the foreign policy apparatus is that the first generation of African presidents often pursued foreign policies strongly tied to those of the former colonial powers. In addition to the variety of formal ties (e.g., military treaties) that bound the newly independent countries to the former colonial powers, the primary reason for what proponents of the dependency school would characterize as "dependent" foreign policies (e.g., Shaw and Aluko, 1984) was the shared culture and political values of colonially trained African presidents and their European counterparts. Moreover, although they had actively campaigned for political independence, several first-generation presidents benefited from colonial efforts designed to ensure the victory of leaders sympathetic to European concerns. In the case of Senegal, for example, former president Léopold Sédar Senghor—often described by his compatriots as "more French than Senegalese"—married a Frenchwoman, retired to a home in France, and carries the distinction of being the only African to be inducted into France's highly prestigious and selective Académie Française, the national watchdog of French language and culture (see Markovitz, 1969).

The most important outcome of the rise to power of the first generation of African presidents is that these leaders would often be more responsive to the foreign policy concerns of their external patrons than to the popular demands of their own peoples. Especially in the case of francophone Africa, the first generation of African presidents signed a variety of defense agreements with France that, rather than ensuring protection from threats from abroad, in reality were designed to ensure their political longevity. From 1963 to 1993, France intervened militarily at least thirty times in its former colonies, often at the request of presidents either under threat from internal opposition movements or seeking to be reinstated in power after being overthrown. Even in cases where pro-French leaders were overturned by military coups d'etat during the decade of the 1960s, the guiding principle of French involvement was the willingness of a particular leader to support French foreign policy objectives. For example, when asked why France did not militarily intervene when David Dacko, the democratically elected president of the Central African Republic, was overthrown in a military coup d'etat in 1966, Jacques Foccart (1995:287), architect of France's policies toward francophone Africa under Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, noted in his memoirs that the new leader, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, "after all was a very pro-French military man."

The combination of the end of the Cold War and the rising strength and intensity of prodemocracy movements is contributing to the "democratization" of African foreign policies. The importance of this democratization trend—especially in the countries where multiparty elections have ensured a relatively peaceful transfer of power from one ruling elite to another—is its reinforcement of the rise to power of a new generation of African presidents less tied to their former foreign patrons and more willing to pursue increasingly independent foreign policies. In the case of Senegal, for example, President Abdou Diouf, like many of his second-generation counterparts, is taking advantage of growing economic competition among the industrialized Western democracies in the post-Cold War era to lessen his country's foreign policy dependence on France (Diop and Diouf, 1990). In a sharp departure from past policies, President Diouf withstood intense French pressures and signed contracts with South African and U.S.
nies in 1995 to exploit oil fields discovered off the southwestern coast of Senegal.

The democratization process has also significantly altered the centralized foreign policy structures in several African countries. In some cases, democratization has been accompanied by the implementation of policies designed to decrease both the size of the military establishment and its involvement in governmental affairs, including in the realm of foreign policy. In South Africa during the 1980s, for example, the military strongly argued in favor of the Afrikaner regime’s decision to undertake destabilization policies against its immediate neighbors (Grundy, 1986). In the wake of the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994, however, the new government headed by Nelson Mandela has pledged to restore greater government control over a military force that had become too prominent in both domestic and foreign policies (Mandela, 1993; see also Crawford, 1995).

The democratization process has also led to the strengthening of institutional actors, most notably vocal, powerful, and independent national legislatures capable of challenging the presidency in the foreign policy realm. Indeed, if one can call the 1960s the “decade of the military” due to the explosion of military coups d’état during this period, observers in the future will perhaps call the 1990s the “decade of the African legislature.” The primary reason behind this newfound legislative role is the creation of democratic political systems that embody the concept of separation of powers between the various branches of government. Newly empowered legislatures are beginning to reserve separate legislative budgets that allow them to adequately carry out their constitutionally mandated roles.3 It is still an open question whether these new legislatures will largely restrict themselves to the national arena or if they will continue to have a growing voice within the realm of foreign affairs (e.g., Alderfer, 1995).

The democratization process also portends greater popular input into the foreign policy making process as the policies of the second generation of African leaders are increasingly held accountable to public opinion. Even during the Cold War era, public opinion played an influential, albeit intermittent, role in African foreign policies. For example, it has been argued that public opinion, fueled primarily by radio broadcasts by Radio France Internationale, was the primary factor that led to bloody clashes between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989 (Parker, 1991; see also Pazzanita, 1992). Despite the fact that this conflict was neither desired nor promoted by President Diouf of Senegal or President Ould Taya of Mauritania, both these leaders, despite their best efforts to contain public passions, were confronted by violent clashes that spiraled out of control. In a sense, both leaders, as well as the foreign policies of their respective countries, became “prisoners” of public opinion.4

The role of religion in African foreign policy, especially the impact of the rise of a variety of Islamist movements, constitutes a final element of civil society increasingly confronting today’s African leaders. Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria are three countries in which Islamist movements play a key role either in supporting or opposing government policies in the post–Cold War era. Even during the Cold War, however, religion played a key role in African foreign policies in many countries. In the case of Senegal, Islamic leaders known as marabouts constitute an integral part of the domestic political system and play both informal and formal roles in the making of foreign policy (Villalón, 1995). The marabouts played a critical informal role in reducing tensions between Senegal and Mauritania in the aftermath of the 1989 border conflict by shuttling back and forth across the river that separates the two countries. In a formal sense, one of President Diouf’s closest advisers is Moustaffa Cisse, a marabout who was a former ambassador to Egypt and to Saudi Arabia. In short, if one wants to completely understand the formulation and implementation of Senegal’s foreign policy, as well as that of other African countries with sizable Muslim populations, one must take into account the role of religion. (See Chapter 11 for more on the role of Islam in African politics.)

- PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Inspired by the anticolonial and antiracist activities of peoples of African descent living in North America and the West Indies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, African nationalists sought to promote a unified African front against colonial rule. What subsequently became known as the “pan-African ideal” was most forcefully enunciated for the first time at the 1945 meeting of the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England. There participants adopted a Declaration to the Colonial Peoples that affirmed the “rights” of all colonized peoples to be “free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic,” and “to elect their own governments, without restrictions from foreign powers” (Ajala, 1988:36). In a separate Declaration to the Colonial Powers, participants further underscored that if the colonial powers were “still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom” (Ajala, 1988:36).

The pan-African ideal gained momentum during the heady independence era of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In an opening address to a gathering of independent African nations held in 1958 in Accra, Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah proclaimed: “Never before has it been possible for so representative a gathering of African Freedom Fighters to assemble in a free independent African state for the purpose of planning for a final assault upon imperialism and colonialism” (in Ajala, 1988:39). According to
Nkrumah, the realization of the pan-African ideal required a commitment between African leaders and peoples to guide their countries through four stages: (1) "the attainment of freedom and independence"; (2) "the consolidation of that independence and freedom"; (3) "the creation of unity and community between the African states"; and (4) "the economic and social reconstruction of Africa" (Ajala, 1988:30).

Despite overwhelming agreement among African leaders that the promotion of pan-Africanism required the creation of a transcontinental organization, sharp disagreement existed over the proper structure and goals of such an organization. According to Nkrumah and other leaders who belonged to what became known as the Casablanca Group (named after the famed Moroccan city), the success of pan-Africanism required a political union of all independent African countries patterned after the federal model of the United States of America. In speech after speech, Nkrumah would promote the two key themes—"Africa must unite!" and "Seek ye first the political kingdom!"—that became the hallmark of this international vision (see Rooney, 1988).

A second group of African leaders who belonged to what became known as the Monrovia Group (named after the capital of Liberia) rejected the idea of political union as both undesirable and unfeasible, primarily due to the assumption that African leaders would zealously guard their countries' newfound independence. Led by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, prime minister of Nigeria, the Monrovia Group instead called for the creation of a looser organization of African states. According to this vision of African international relations, African countries would guard their independence but promote growing cooperation and the harmonization of policies, particularly as concerns social and economic development.

On May 25, 1963, thirty-one African heads of state largely embraced the Monrovian vision of African international relations by launching the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the first pan-African, intergovernmental organization of independent African countries based on African soil. Currently numbering fifty-one members, the OAU is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and is headed by a secretary-general elected by member states. All major decisions and resolutions are formally adopted by the annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the aftermath of biannual meetings of the Council of Ministers. The sovereign equality of all member states is an important guiding principle of the organization and stands in sharp contrast to great-power domination of the UN by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States.

Although the creation and continued functioning of the OAU have been described as a "victory for pan-Africanism" (Olusanya, 1988:67), both critics and analysts sympathetic to the role of the OAU have questioned the organization's ability to play an effective role in African international relations. In a special issue of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs that assessed the OAU's continued relevance on the "Silver Jubilee" (twenty-fifth) anniversary of the organization's creation, one Nigerian scholar expressed "sadness" over the fact that, despite the best of intentions, "Africa remains today the least developed continent in the world—a continent plagued by famine, hunger, diseases, illiteracy, heavy indebtedness, a pathetic poverty and high mortality rate" (Olusanya, 1988:70). Such statements by Africans reveal an underlying pessimism about the OAU's ability to move beyond rhetoric and take the lead in African international relations.

The OAU's effectiveness can be tentatively assessed by exploring four elements of the OAU Charter, each of which holds important implications for the dependency-decolonization debate. The most important theme of the OAU Charter is respect for the territorial integrity of frontiers inherited from the colonial era. Due to the multiethnic nature of most African states, African leaders remain fearful that changing even one boundary will open a Pandora's box of ethnically based secessionist movements and lead to the further "balkanization" of the African continent (i.e., the splitting of countries into ever smaller and unviable economic and political units) (see Davidson, 1992).

In the case of the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970), for example, the OAU not only refused to sanction the provision of aid to Biafra, the secessionist southeast portion of the country, but voted a series of resolutions that underscored official support for the central Nigerian government (Bukarambe, 1988:98). This decision was particularly upsetting to human rights activists and several African countries aiding the secessionist government because the military-dominated Nigerian government was using very effective starvation methods to bring the Biafrans—government and general population alike—to their knees (see Stremlau, 1977).

As ethnic tensions and separatist movements intensify in the post–Cold War era, the second generation of African elites remains firmly committed to maintaining borders inherited from the colonial era. Although the OAU recognized in 1993 the sovereignty of Eritrea after a UN-sponsored referendum in that country resulted in overwhelming popular support for independence, African leaders subsequently noted that this process did not call into question the hallowed concept of the inviolability of frontiers. Unlike the majority of African countries, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia in the aftermath of independence from colonial rule and therefore enjoyed the legal right to withdraw from that voluntary union (see Iyob, 1995). However, in similar cases of voluntary federation that have unraveled in the post–Cold War era, such as northern Somalia's unilateral declaration of independence as the Somaliland Republic in 1991 and disgruntled southern Sudan's search for independence through military arms, the OAU continues to reaffirm the concept of territorial integrity (see Omaar, 1994).

The second most important guiding principle of the OAU Charter is
noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. In the early years of the organization, African leaders debated whether to allow military leaders who had illegally deposed their civilian counterparts to maintain their OAU seats. This debate was resolved in favor of recognizing whatever group controlled the reins of power within a particular country (Akindele, 1988b:82–85). More significant was the silence among African leaders concerning human rights abuses in OAU member states. "Increased repression, denial of political choice, restrictions on the freedom of association, and like events occurred, with rare murmurs of dissent," explains Claude Welch, Jr., a specialist on human rights in Africa. "The OAU seemed to function as a club of presidents, engaged in a tacit policy of not inquiring into each other's practices" (Welch, 1991:537). A notable example of this in the 1970s was the election of the notorious Idi Amin as OAU chair, despite his personal involvement in "politically sanctioned repression and murders" while he was president of Uganda (Welch, 1991:538).5

Despite a tacit unwillingness to criticize their counterparts, African leaders are beginning to accept a growing role for the OAU in addressing human rights abuses. In 1981, the annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Banjul, Gambia, adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (popularly referred to as the Banjul Charter). This human rights code officially entered into force in October 1986 and has served as the guiding principle for a variety of human rights groups that began emerging in the 1980s in a trend that has intensified in the post–Cold War era (Welch, 1991). In addition to encompassing "first-generation" rights (civil and political liberties usually associated with the Western world), as well as "second-generation" rights (economic and social rights usually associated with the socialist world), the Banjul Charter has been described as "breaking some new ground" through the adoption of "third-generation" rights intended to protect the rights of individual peoples or ethnic groups (Welch, 1991:538–539).

Despite the ratification of the Banjul Charter, the OAU's response to events in Nigeria during 1995 demonstrate the continued difficulty of translating human rights rhetoric into policy action. In response to an uprising among the Ogoni ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria that began in 1990 over control of that region's vast oil resources, the military-dominated Nigerian government unleashed a brutal campaign of repression that culminated in November 1995 with the execution of Nobel Peace Prize candidate Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists on trumped-up murder charges (French, 1995:E3; see also Osaghae, 1995). Although OAU secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim expressed "disappointment" over the fact that the Nigerian generals failed to "respond positively" to OAU appeals for clemency, the organization did not adopt concrete measures to punish or internationally isolate the Nigerian regime (in French, 1995:E3).

The peaceful settlement of all disputes by negotiation, mediation, con-
ciliation, or arbitration constitutes a third guiding principle of the OAU. Yet, strict adherence to the first two principles—support for territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs—historically has impeded the OAU's ability to mediate either internal conflicts or those between two or more member states. In the case of the 1967–1970 Nigerian civil war, automatic support for the territorial integrity of Nigeria seriously called into doubt (at least from the viewpoint of the secessionist Biafrans) the OAU's ability to serve as an impartial negotiator. It is precisely for this reason that the OAU Commission of Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation was "stillborn" (Zartman, 1995b), and the majority of African-initiated arbitration efforts have been carried out on an ad hoc basis by African presidents. For example, Djiboutian president Hassan Gouled Aptidon utilized his country's stature as the headquarters for the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to mediate the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. According to Zartman (1995a:241), such efforts have led to success in only 33 percent of roughly twenty-four cases, and this success was often only temporary in nature as warring parties returned to the battlefield.

The capacity to respond with either peacekeeping or peacemaking forces once a conflict has broken out constitutes a critical aspect of peacefully resolving disputes. The OAU founding fathers attempted to prepare for this eventuality by planning the creation of an OAU defense commission composed of military contingents from several African countries. Although the defense commission was never actually created, in 1981 the OAU did construct an all-African military force in an attempt to resolve civil conflict in Chad that had become internationalized after the introduction of Libyan troops. Composed of approximately 4,800 troops from Nigeria, Zambia, and Senegal, the OAU force "failed to achieve any concrete solution" due to financial, logistical, and political difficulties and within a few months was "forced to withdraw" (Gambari, 1995:229). As discussed later in this chapter, the ineffectiveness of the OAU within this realm favors continued diplomatic and military intervention by external powers.

In an attempt to reinvigorate the OAU's ability to play a more proactive role in African conflicts in the post–Cold War era, the 1993 Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a resolution creating a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Zartman, 1995a:243). Building on a conference convened in 1991 by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo that produced a forward-thinking document, "Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa" (popularly referred to as the Kampala Document), the 1993 OAU meeting also considered but ultimately rejected a proposal to create a Council of Elders composed of former African presidents who could serve as mediators in African conflicts.6 The OAU has even discussed the possibility of reviving the defunct African Defense Commission as part of a comprehensive approach to peacemaking in Africa. However, these discussions
remain at an exploratory stage, and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution has yet to be seriously tested in any African conflict.

The final and most successful principle embodied within the OAU Charter revolves around unswerving opposition to colonialism and white minority rule. Principally concerned with the former existence of white minority–ruled regimes in Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe), Namibia, South Africa, and the Portuguese-controlled territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe, the OAU established a Liberation Committee based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to aid liberation movements with both economic and military assistance (see Akindele, 1988a). Although disagreements often arose over which tactics would best ensure transitions to black majority–ruled governments (e.g., should one support “dialogue” with the white regime or fund a guerrilla insurgency?), every OAU member expressed public opposition to the continued existence of white minority–ruled governments. In this regard, the work of the Liberation Committee largely came to an end when South Africa in 1994 made the transition to a multiracial, multiparty democracy.

### REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

Inspired by the success of the European Union (EU) and encouraged by the UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first generation of African leaders sought to create regional entities capable of promoting regional cooperation and integration. This vision of African international relations was best captured in 1981 by the OAU’s publication of a document, *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000*, which proposed the “eventual establishment of an African Common Market (ACM) as the first step towards the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000” (Martin, 1992:70). According to the *Lagos Plan of Action*, the creation of intergovernmental economic organizations in each of Africa’s five major regions—North, East, West, Southern, and Central Africa—is the best means for ensuring the ultimate creation of a transcontinental AEC. (See Chapter 5 for information on the economic crises that have inspired these efforts.)

The flourishing of experiments in regional cooperation and integration during the postindependence era demonstrated the firm commitment of the first generation of African leaders to this economic dimension of the pan-African ideal. By the end of the 1980s, it was estimated that at least 160 intergovernmental economic groupings existed on the African continent, with thirty-two such organizations in West Africa alone (Martin, 1992:73).

Among the most notable and far-reaching economic groupings in each of Africa’s major regions are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created in 1975; the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM) in North Africa, created in 1989; the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), created in 1980 (now the Southern African Development Community (SADC)); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), created in 1983; and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in northeast Africa, created in 1986. These regional organizations are complemented by a few larger groupings, such as the Lomé Convention, which promotes preferential trade links between the European Union and dozens of countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (the so-called ACP countries)(see Ojo, 1985:146–150).

African leaders offer three rationales for seeking regional cooperation and integration. The simplest is the firm belief that there is strength in numbers. To effectively compete within an increasingly competitive international economic system dominated by economic superpowers (e.g., the United States and Japan) and powerful regional economic entities (e.g., the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] zone), African nations must band together and pool their respective resources. A second rationale revolves around the desire to promote self-sustaining economic development and particularly the industrialization of the African continent. Struggling with the reality that many of their countries are economically impoverished and lack the tools for the creation of advanced industries, African leaders believe that they can build upon the individual strengths of their neighbors to forge integrated and self-sustaining regional economies.

Most important, regional economic schemes are perceived as the best means for creating self-reliant development to reduce the ties of dependency inherited from the colonial era (Asante and Chanaiwa, 1993:741–743). For example, African leaders are rightfully concerned that national control over the evolution of their respective economies is constrained by Africa’s trade dependency on Europe at the expense of intraregional trade links with African countries. It is precisely for this reason that the primary objective of early regional economic schemes was to promote intraregional trade with neighbors who theoretically share a common set of development objectives—because of special geographic features, historical ties, or a common religion, such as Islam in North Africa (e.g., see Grundy, 1985). By strengthening these ties with like-minded neighbors, a stronger African economic entity is expected to emerge that will be capable of reducing foreign influence and strengthening Africa’s collective ability to bargain with foreign entities on a more equal basis.

Early optimism began to wane in the aftermath of the launching of several regional integration efforts that included the creation of supranational authorities and formal economic unions designed to promote intraregional
trade and investment. In the case of the original East African Community (EAC), the 1967 decision of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to create a common market with common services coordinated by a supranational governing body collapsed less than ten years later and was followed in 1978–1979 by Tanzania’s military intervention in Uganda to overthrow the dictatorial government of Idi Amin (Potholm and Fredland, 1980). As concisely explained by Olutunde Ojo (1985), a specialist on regional cooperation and integration in Africa, several factors that contributed to the EAC’s decline clarify why other similar efforts from the 1960s to the 1980s either failed or demonstrated minimal progress at best.

The first problem that led to the breakup of the EAC was the polarization of national development and the perception of unequal gains (Ojo, 1985:159–161). As typically occurred in other cases in Africa where the creation of a common market served as the cornerstone of the regional grouping, the most industrialized country (Kenya) usually reaped the benefits of economic integration, while the poorest country (Uganda) became increasingly marginalized. For example, Kenya’s share of intra-community trade increased from 63 percent in 1968 to 77 percent in 1974, whereas Uganda’s share decreased from 26 to 6 percent during the same period. In addition, despite the fashioning of a common policy toward the establishment of new operations by multinational corporations (MNCs), the majority of these firms decided to locate their site of operations in Kenya due to its more advanced economy and workforce as well as its extensive infrastructural network of roads, railroads, ports, and airports.

A second factor that led to the EAC’s decline was the inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures (Ojo, 1985:161–166). In every integration scheme, some countries inevitably benefit more than others. As a result, policymakers can implement a series of measures, such as the creation of regional development banks or the disproportionate sharing of customs revenue, to correct the imbalance and compensate those countries expected to lose out in the short term. In the case of the EAC, a regional development bank was created to disburse funds in the following manner to the three members: Kenya (22 percent), Tanzania (38 percent), and Uganda (40 percent). However, in this and other cases of integration in Africa, even the richest members are usually incapable of subsidizing bank operations. The actual finances provided to the most needy members, therefore, never even begin to approach true development needs or completely compensate for losses incurred.

A third factor that led to the EAC’s decline was ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism (Ojo, 1985:168–169). Simply put, ideological differences often ensure a radically different approach to the concept of development, which in turn can significantly hinder regional integration. In the case of Kenya, a pro-West capitalist regime was very open to private enterprise, the introduction of foreign investment with few restric-

tions, and a very liberal policy concerning the activities of MNCs. In sharp contrast, the socialist-oriented regime of Tanzania opted for a self-help strategy known as ujamaa (the Kiswahili term for brotherhood) that denounced private enterprise as exploitative, restricted the flow of foreign investment, and strongly controlled MNCs. When combined with the growing public perception of unequal gains between these two countries, these ideological differences led to often acrimonious public debate between President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and to the rise of economic nationalism in both countries.

A fourth element that contributed to the EAC’s decline was the impact of foreign influences (Ojo, 1985:169–171). Whereas Kenya developed close relationships with the Western bloc nations (e.g., the United States and Great Britain), Tanzania pursued close links with the socialist bloc (particularly the People’s Republic of China) and Uganda sought links with the former Soviet Union and the Arab world. These links ensured that the EAC became embroiled in the Cold War rivalry of the 1960s and the 1970s and contributed to the creation of a “strategic image” that prompted EAC member states to look “outward” toward their foreign patrons rather than “inward” toward their natural regional partners.

The failure and stagnation of classic integration schemes prompted the first generation of African leaders to undertake looser forms of regional economic cooperation in a variety of functionally specific areas, such as transportation infrastructure (e.g., regional rail links), energy (e.g., hydroelectric projects on common rivers), and telecommunications (see Aly, 1994). The logic of pursuing this form of regionalism is that it does not require the creation of supranational authorities that can become the arena for acrimonious political debate, nor does it require policymakers to sacrifice national control over the sensitive areas of foreign trade and investment. This looser form of economic cooperation is gathering strength in the post–Cold War era, particularly as second-generation elites assume power and seek to promote cooperation with other democratically elected governments within the region.

The transformation in 1992 of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference into the renamed SADC provides a good example of this growing trend in African regional relations. Originally conceived as a vehicle for reducing the economic dependence of the Frontline States on South Africa during the apartheid era, the newly reformed SADC now counts South Africa among its members and is seeking to enhance traditional cooperation in a variety of functional realms, most notably transportation. The new SADC stands poised at “the threshold of a new era” according to a report recently published by the African Development Bank in conjunction with the World Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa. “Although its effects and the inequities it has embedded will linger for a long time to come, the demise of apartheid opens up prospects unimag-
Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security (Morna, 1995:67). In a statement applicable to all regions of the African continent, the 1992 Windhoek Treaty (named after the capital of Namibia), which created the restructured SADC, underscored that attentiveness to the political dimension of regional relationships is critical to the continued expansion of economic cooperation. More precisely, the treaty states that southern African leaders “must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and cooperation, in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region; and to free resources from military to productive development activities” (in Morna, 1995:67).

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POWERS IN AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

From the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, France was the only former colonial power that maintained and expanded its presence throughout Africa, most notably in what is still referred to as “francophone Africa”—those former French and Belgian colonies where French serves as an “official language of administration and education” (Martin, 1995b:163; see also Martin, 1995a). French officials, from the conservative Charles de Gaulle and the recently elected Jacques Chirac to socialist president François Mitterrand, have consistently claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justify placing significant portions of Africa within France’s traditional sphere of influence (Wauthier, 1995). “According to this French version of the Monroe Doctrine,” explains Guy Martin (1995b:168), a noted observer of French foreign policy toward Africa, francophone Africa is perceived as “constituting a natural French preserve (domaine réservé, or pré carré), off limits to other foreign powers,” regardless of whether they constitute “friends” (e.g., the United States) or “foes” (e.g., the former Soviet Union).

In sharp contrast, Britain’s official interest in maintaining formerly privileged colonial ties (rivaled only by those of France) dramatically waned during the postindependence era, except in the case of South Africa (Legum, 1994). Other, traditionally less powerful colonial powers, such as Spain, were never important diplomatic players due to the lack of extensive colonial holdings (Segal, 1989), or they at best demonstrated sporadic interest in their former colonies during times of crisis. For example, Belgium and Italy mustered only intermittent interest in resolving a series of crises in Central Africa (Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea), respectively (Ercoleossi, 1994). Although less actively involved in the political realm, Germany continues to foster unique trade relationships throughout Africa (consistently serving as either the second or
third most important trading partner of the majority of African countries) (Hofmeier, 1994; 1986). Finally, Portugal has demonstrated a renewed interest in strengthening cultural ties with its former colonies and played an important role in promoting the resolution of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique during the 1990s (MacQueen, 1985).

Despite extensive involvement during the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China drastically reduced their presence on the African continent (Patman, 1990; Snow, 1988). Other socialist bloc nations that once enjoyed privileged relations with the African continent either completely disappeared (e.g., the former East Germany, which now constitutes part of a reunified Germany) (Winrow, 1990) or became marginalized (e.g., Cuba and North Korea) due to their pariah status within the international system and a drastic reduction in aid formerly provided by their socialist patrons (Mesa-Lago and Beikin, 1982). An important result of socialist bloc involvement in Africa from the 1950s to the 1980s is that it prompted extensive U.S. involvement in countries perceived as threatened by communist influence (Schraeder, 1994b). As discussed below, these relationships are significantly changing as the United States attempts to refashion its former Cold War–oriented foreign policy.

A variety of middle-range powers also play varying roles on the African continent. Canada and the Nordic countries, most notably Sweden, demonstrate a strong humanitarian interest, particularly in the area of famine relief in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa (e.g., Stokke, 1989). During the height of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Israel pursued an aggressive policy that exchanged Israeli technical aid for continued or renewed diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel (Chazan, 1987). Other Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia, pursue religiously based policies toward the predominantly Muslim states of North and northeast Africa (Creed and Menkhau, 1986). Iran especially seeks to foster links with Islamist regimes and movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria; and Iraq’s previously expanding relationships with several African countries, notably Mauritania, were sharply curtailed after Iraq was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War (Lesser, 1993). Finally, India, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Chile, are fostering the expansion of economic relations with a variety of African countries (Badejo, 1987; Nester, 1992:235–255; Payne, 1992:97–124).

The specific impact of foreign powers can be illuminated by analyzing the evolving policies of the two countries—France and the United States—that remain the most active on the African continent. During the Cold War era, the foremost element of French Africa policies was the rayonnement (radiation) of such “exceptional” French values as the French language, intellectual traditions, and way of life (Kolodziej, 1974:479). Also referred to as the cultivation of la francophonie (a greater French-speaking community), this policy is best characterized by the regular Franco-African summits attended by the presidents of France and francophone Africa, the eighteenth of which was held in Biarritz, France, November 8–9, 1994 (Guillou, 1993).

The promotion of economic interests was integral to the promotion of French culture during the Cold War era. An example of this element of French policy was the decision by thirteen former French colonies and Equatorial Guinea (a former Spanish colony) to accept membership in la zone franc (the franc zone), a supranational financial system, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), in which France serves as a central bank and underwrites a common currency. The CFA franc is tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury (Vallée, 1989; Guillaumont, 1984). While the members of the franc zone gained financial stability and achieved levels of economic performance “no worse than that of other developing countries and significantly better than the average for sub-Saharan Africa” (Ravenhill, 1995:108), they nonetheless lost a significant degree of autonomy over domestic macroeconomic policy (Martin, 1986). For example, one of the most effective tools for promoting exports—devaluation of the national currency—is deferred to French authorities and thus unavailable to member states.

The third major determinant of French policies was the promotion of security interests. To protect French security interests, French leaders signed numerous defense accords, provided arms and military coopérants for training purposes, and authorized numerous interventions by French military forces to ensure maintenance of the status quo (Chipman, 1989). Consequently, when francophone regimes tried to renounce their special relationship with France, as Guinea did in 1958 when it voted in a referendum against the creation of a revised French community of states, French retribution was swift (in this case, all aid was cut off by an angry de Gaulle). But as long as these countries maintained close ties with France, even their most authoritarian leaders were unlikely to find themselves under heavy pressure from Paris to democratize.

In the case of the United States, the rise of the Cold War and superpower rivalry marked the beginning of widespread U.S. involvement in Africa and other regions of the Third World (Spanier and Hook, 1995). Throughout the Cold War era, the White House expected its European allies—most notably France—to take the lead in their former colonial territories (Schaeder, 1994b:14–15, 26–28). As succinctly summarized by George Ball (1968:240), undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, the United States recognized Africa as a “special European responsibility,” just as European nations were expected to recognize “our [U.S.] particular responsibility in Latin America.” In short, the White House intended for its European allies to take responsibility for thwarting communist and other “radical” powers from exploiting instability in Africa.

Direct U.S. involvement in Africa was driven by a combination
tion and politico-military repression as long as African leaders were willing to support U.S. containment policies (Clough, 1994:76–100).

The end of the Cold War and the rise of democratization movements throughout Africa led French and U.S. policymakers to reassess their policies toward Africa. France’s initial response to these events suggested that democratization would become the guiding principle of policy toward Africa. At the sixteenth Franco-African summit held in La Baule, France, in June 1990, President Mitterrand announced that France henceforth would favor those countries that were either democratic or promoting democratic change. According to what became known as the La Baule Doctrine or the “Paristroika” of francophone Africa (Boulaga, 1993), French policymakers urged their francophone allies to initiate a process of democratization if they intended to maintain privileged ties with France. As demonstrated by the distribution of French aid in the 1990s, however, the idealist goals associated with Paristroika were never intended to replace the more traditional goals of preserving and strengthening la francophonie (Agir Ici et Survie, 1995; Bayart, 1991). In Côte d’Ivoire, the Mitterrand administration rewarded President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s co-optation of the democratization process by providing their favored client with over $1.46 billion in foreign aid from 1990 to 1992—a dramatic increase from the already high level of $549 million received during the preceding three-year period.10

The unwillingness of France to strongly embrace democratization movements accompanied by instability was underscored at the seventeenth Franco-African summit held in Libreville, Gabon, October 5–7, 1992. The French prime minister, Pierre Bérégovoy, stated that when confronted with the simultaneous and potentially conflicting goals of promoting democracy, ensuring development, and maintaining security, francophone African leaders were expected to adhere to the following order of priorities: first and foremost, security; followed by development; and, finally, democratization (Glaser and Smith, 1994:102).

The end of the Cold War was also accompanied by the intensification of a continental economic crisis—the so-called crisis of the African state—that increasingly made it difficult for the first generation of African leaders to respond to the day-to-day needs of their populations (Callaghan and Ravenhill, 1993; Sandbrook, 1993). Given that the CFA franc had not been devalued since the creation of the franc zone in 1948, the member states that convened for a conference in Dakar, Senegal, on January 10–11, 1994, were obviously surprised when informed by French officials that their currency would be devalued by 50 percent—and consequently the purchasing power of their economies would be cut in half—beginning on January 12. According to Guy Martin (1995a:18), “The deepening economic and financial crisis in francophone Africa, coupled with a severe recession in the former metropole [France], led to the sobering realization that France could no

Only after he committed large-scale atrocities against his own people, including allegedly beatiing some schoolchildren to death, did France in 1979 finally turn against and depose “Emperor” Jean-Bedel Bokassa, its client ruler in the Central African Republic.

of ideological and security interests (Schraeder, 1994b). The importance of ideology was illustrated by the fact that whereas capitalist countries received on average 88 percent of U.S. aid to Africa during the 1980s, Marxist and socialist countries received on average only 6 percent each. The United States also sought special relationships with strategically important regional actors, such as Morocco, that offered special military access rights or maintained important U.S. technical facilities (e.g., telecommunications stations) on their territories. An overriding preoccupation with anticommu

longer afford to foot the bill." Interestingly enough, but clearly not by accident, the French decision to devalue the CFA franc was announced and implemented only after the death in December 1993 of President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire (Whiteman, 1994). Before his death, Houphouët-Boigny could be counted on by other francophone leaders to utilize his diplomatic clout to squelch any French attempts at devaluation. The decision to devalue the previously sacred CFA franc clearly suggested the rising importance of economic factors in French calculations in the post—Cold War era.

The French response to the genocidal conflict in Rwanda in 1994 is especially instructive for understanding how French security interests have evolved since the end of the Cold War (Krop, 1994). Due to a conscious effort to more effectively integrate the former Belgian colonies of Central Africa into the French sphere of influence, the Mitterrand administration during the decade of the 1980s provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Zaire ($461 million), Burundi ($243 million), and Rwanda ($199 million). The last figure is noteworthy in that the annual amount (approximately $20 million) provided during the 1980s was doubled to an average of $40 million during the initial three years of the 1990s. The strategic significance of maintaining la francophonie served as one of the central reasons for the increase in French aid to Rwanda, as well as for the series of French military interventions both before (Opération Noroît) and after (Opération Turquoise) President Juvenal Habyarimana's death in 1994 and the subsequent slaughter carried out by extremist members of his Hutu ethnic group. Specifically, the Mitterrand administration unsuccessfully sought to stem the invasion and steady advance beginning in October 1990 of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi guerrilla army supported by Uganda and perceived by French policymakers as "hostile to France" (Smith, 1995:452).

According to some French officials, the RPF's military victory constituted the first time a francophone country had "fallen" to Anglo-Saxon influence—a reference to the threat posed by the intrusions of anglophone countries that use English as the language of international diplomacy and business. Moreover, Rwanda was perceived as the first in a series of regional dominos that eventually could bring Burundi and an independent Shaba (the southeastern province of Zaire) under Anglo-Saxon domination to the "detriment" of France and la francophonie (Glaser and Smith, 1994:182—185). According to this culturally inspired theory, Central Africa could become a Trojan horse projecting Anglo-Saxon influence throughout the remainder of francophone Africa. Indeed, French hostility toward the new RPF regime—despite the fact it neither initiated nor participated in the genocide that ultimately ended when it achieved military victory—was underscored by the Mitterrand administration's refusal to invite Rwanda to the Franco-African summit held in Biarritz, France, in November 1994 (special edition of Jeune Afrique, 1995).

Despite official pronouncements to the contrary, the end of the Cold War reinforced the historical tendency among U.S. policymakers to treat Africa as a back-burner issue. Adopting a play on words of the Reagan administration's much-debated policy of "constructive engagement," Michael Clough, a specialist on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, poignantly argued that the manifestation of this historical tendency during the Bush administration was a policy of "cynical disengagement" guided by three principles: (1) "Do not spend much money [on Africa] unless Congress makes you." (2) "Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world." And, above all else, (3) "Do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States" (Clough, 1992:1). Although some argue that the Clinton administration's neglect of Africa, like that of previous administrations, is not cynically motivated (Schaedler, 1995), each of these guiding principles appears to characterize Washington's approach to Africa in the post—Cold War era.

The Clinton administration's avoidance of policies that might create domestic controversies was clearly demonstrated by its initial response to events in Rwanda in 1994. Fearful of recreating the politically damaging domestic uproar that accompanied the killing in October 1993 of eighteen U.S. soldiers taking part in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (Schaedler, 1995:57—60), the White House initially blocked the dispatch to Rwanda of 5,500 peacekeeping troops requested by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In addition, U.S. spokespersons were instructed to avoid labeling the unfolding ethnic conflict as "genocide," lest such a label inflame public sympathy and cause Americans to demand U.S. intervention as in Somalia during the Bush administration (Des Forges, 1995). While a variety of Africanist groups, such as Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994:2), claimed that the administration's foot-dragging contributed to the deaths of thousands of civilians, Clinton's decision nonetheless matched growing popular sentiment against U.S. involvement in UN-sponsored "peacemaking" operations.

The avoidance of financial commitments to Africa constitutes the consensus viewpoint within both the White House and the Congress as of 1996. Regardless of whether the president has been a Democrat or a Republican, U.S. foreign aid since the mid-1980s has been steadily cut due to popular pressures to trim the budget deficit and enhance spending for domestic social programs. From 1985 to 1995, bilateral aid to Africa declined in both aggregate terms (from $1.87 to $1.08 billion) and as a percentage of the U.S. foreign aid budget (from 10.3 to 6.03 percent). Although military and other security-related forms of assistance, such as Economic Support Funds (ESF), were almost totally abolished and account for the majority of these cuts, the Republicans who in 1995 controlled both the Senate and House of Representatives have vowed to severely slash even development aid due to the lack of U.S. strategic interests in Africa (see Chapter 14).

Yet, regardless of whether the levels of foreign aid significantly change,
the form of even limited U.S. commitments since the end of the Cold War, coupled with new directions in foreign policy toward Africa, have contributed to growing tensions with France (see Smith, 1994). The promotion of democracy is the foremost element of this changed U.S. policy. In numerous countries throughout Africa, relatively small but effective amounts of aid from the United States have been utilized to facilitate the transition to democracy (e.g., sending representatives to monitor elections), as well as to consolidate successful transitions that have already taken place. In the case of Benin, the United States provided $41 million in aid during the election year of 1991 and $14 million during 1992 after the installation of a democratically elected government (Diamond, 1995).11

Unlike their French counterparts, U.S. policymakers often have little to lose in strongly denouncing francophone administrations that clearly manipulate the transition to a new political order. To the consternation of some French diplomats, the State Department condemned President Biya’s clear-cut manipulation of the 1992 Cameroon elections and subsequently suspended U.S. aid (Huband, 1993:42). In contrast, the Mitterrand administration, which provided Cameroon with over $400 million in aid in 1992, “sent a letter to Biya congratulating him on his victory” (Huband, 1993:43). The cases of Benin and Cameroon are not unique, but rather indicative of calculations by U.S. policymakers that the promotion of democracy (most notably the emergence of a second generation of ruling elites) throughout francophone Africa is a very low-cost strategy with potentially high returns (i.e., a new, more pro-U.S. regime may be installed). Similar to the case of France, however, the United States has been much more reluctant to strongly pressure its traditional African allies, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, especially when such pressure is expected to lead to instability and therefore threaten U.S. interests (e.g., Kelly, 1993; Schatzberg, 1991).

The gradual decline of ideologically based policies in favor of the pursuit of economic self-interest is a second important element of changing U.S. involvement in Africa in the post–Cold War era.12 A contradiction seemingly exists, however, between official U.S. government actions and increasing U.S. support for the private sector. Specifically, when the Republican majority in Congress was vowing in February 1995 to slash already reduced levels of aid as a result of Africa’s strategic and economic unimportance, Herman Cohen, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs under the Bush administration, was presiding over a conference in Libreville, Gabon, designed to strengthen U.S.-African trade and investment. Despite their hesitation to provide the African continent with financial assistance at the same levels as their French counterparts, few if any in Congress would disagree with the central theme of Cohen’s opening presentation that the concept of a chasse gardée in Africa has no place in the post–Cold War world. “The African market is open to everyone,” explained Cohen. “We must accept free and fair competition, equality between all actors” (in Vernet, 1995:40). Toward this end, U.S. policymakers increasingly agree that foreign policy should serve as the facilitator of U.S. private enterprise in all regions of the world, including Africa.

The net result of this evolving economic component of U.S. policy is to strengthen further the small but growing expansion into Africa of certain key U.S. industries, most notably oil and telecommunications, that has accompanied the end of the Cold War. In the eyes of many French policymakers, however, it constitutes “at best an intrusion” and “at worst an aggression” into their chasse gardée when U.S. policymakers aggressively pressure francophone leaders to sign preferential contracts with U.S. companies (Glaser and Smith, 1994:185). The seriousness with which this issue is treated at the highest levels of the French government was demonstrated by the public admission of Michel Roussin, minister of cooperation, that a series of meetings had been held on the theme of how best to “defend” French interests, including those within the economic realm, against those of the United States (Glaser and Smith, 1994:187).

The so-called oil war between the government of the Congo, Elf-Aquitaine (the French oil corporation), and the Congo division of Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy), a U.S.-based oil company, serves as an excellent example of the potential future stakes involved in rising French-U.S. economic competition. Desperately in need of funds to pay the salaries of 80,000 civil servants prior to rapidly advancing legislative elections, the newly elected president, Pascal Lissouba, “naturally turned for help to Elf-Aquitaine, which controls 80 percent of the country’s oil production.” When its French manager refused to approve a $300 million mortgage on the future production of three promising new offshore oil deposits, Lissouba initiated secret negotiations with the U.S.-based Congo-Oxy. The net outcome of these negotiations was a signed agreement—ultimately renounced by the Lissouba administration eight months later due to “intense French pressure”—that resulted in a cash payment of $150 million in return for 75 million barrels of oil originally promised to Elf-Aquitaine (Martin, 1995a:15–16).

Rising economic competition between the United States and France holds important implications for the dependency-decolonization debate. In sharp contrast to the Cold War era when the West (especially the United States) sought to strengthen and enhance France’s privileged role in francophone Africa as a bulwark against communism, the end of the Cold War has heightened great-power competition within the political and (especially) economic realms among the nations of the West. As a result, French policymakers increasingly claim that the United States and Japan, and to a lesser degree Germany and Canada, pose economic and political threats to French interests in francophone Africa. According to Stephen Smith (1994), the
Africa correspondent for the French daily *Libération*, such statements are indicative of a growing duel within the West over Africa, particularly between Washington and Paris.

From the viewpoint of the second generation of African leaders, this rising economic competition provides an opportunity to lessen previously privileged ties of dependence and pursue special relationships and especially economic contracts with countries willing to provide the best offer. Although the ultimate resolution in favor of France of the “oil war” in the Congo suggests that the ties of dependency are not automatically broken by the end of the Cold War, the Lissouba government nonetheless was able to obtain a better agreement from the French as a result of “playing the American card.” In other cases, such as Senegal’s decision to offer lucrative exploration rights to U.S. and South African companies at the expense of previously privileged ties with the French oil industry, the second generation of African leaders are successfully utilizing their increased independence within the international system to acquire the best deals for their respective countries, thereby ensuring future electoral victories in democratic political systems where public support—not authoritarian force—increasingly is the key to power.

## THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The relationship of African countries to the UN and to a host of international financial institutions is critical to understanding the relevance of the decolonization-dependency debate. During the independence era of the 1960s, a variety of factors suggested that membership in the UN was facilitating the ability of the first generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries (Mathews, 1988). In addition to serving as a concrete symbol of African independence, membership in the UN provided African leaders with an important international forum for promoting African views on a variety of international issues, such as unequivocal support for complete decolonization, opposition to apartheid in South Africa, the promotion of socioeconomic development, and the need for disarmament and attention to regional security. Most important, the UN provides a unique forum for diplomatic negotiations. Financially unable to maintain embassies throughout the world, let alone throughout the African continent, African diplomats take advantage of the fact that almost all countries maintain a permanent mission in New York to carry out the day-to-day business of diplomacy.

In an era when it has become fashionable for Americans and other Westerners to criticize their countries’ involvement in the UN as providing little if any tangible economic or political benefits, it is important to recognize that UN agencies often play a critical role in most African countries. Indeed, a visitor to an African capital is immediately struck by the importance of a variety of UN offices whose budgets and staffs often approach those of their counterparts within the host government. In Dakar, the capital of Senegal, for example, the visitor will find offices representing a variety of UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Capturing the sentiment of African policymakers during the 1960s, a Senegalese diplomat noted that “these agencies were perceived as critical to the fulfillment of African development goals during the initial independence era, and provided a source of hope especially for those impoverished countries lacking both the resources and the expertise to implement the studies and programs pursued by each of these agencies.”

In the post–Cold War era of the 1990s, however, a growing segment of African intellectuals and policymakers increasingly criticize the UN as synonymous with foreign intervention and the imposition of Western values. The primary reason for this development is the UN’s increased involvement in a variety of largely ethnic-based crises, such as in Somalia and Rwanda, which seemingly have intensified in the post–Cold War era. As succinctly summarized by Zartman (1995a:1-14), these crises often occur against the backdrop of “collapsed states”—the temporary disintegration of the legitimate, sovereign authority of the nation-state that is responsible for maintaining law and order within its territory. This collapse can be complete, as was the case in Somalia when civil war engulfed the country in the aftermath of the overthrow of Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991; or it can entail the breakdown of effective central authority over the majority of the country despite the fact that the ruling regime remains in power, as is currently the case in Zaire under the dictatorial rule of Mobutu Sese Seko.

The cornerstone of debate over the proper role of the UN in the post–Cold War era revolves around an emerging Western consensus that downplays the international legal norms of sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs of UN member states “in favor of human rights protection and humanitarian intervention,” particularly to save refugees and other peoples threatened by civil conflict and starvation (Deng et al., 1996:5). As summarized by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:9), “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.” It is for this reason that the UN sponsored a series of humanitarian interventions, including the U.S.-led military operation in 1992 known as Operation Restore Hope, despite the lack of an official invi-
tation from any legally constituted Somali authority and in direct opposition to heavily armed militia groups who shared a historical mistrust of UN intentions and operations dating back to the colonial era (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995). From the perspective of the UN, however, the civil war, which had intensified in the aftermath of the collapse of the Somali state, not only was spilling over into the neighboring territories of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, but also had contributed to the creation of a humanitarian crisis in which approximately 330,000 Somalis were at “imminent risk of death” (Lyons and Samatar, 1995:24). According to this logic, the UN could justify international intervention—even in the absence of an official invitation by a legally constituted authority—on the grounds of “abatement” of a threat to international peace (Joyer, 1992).

The Somali case, extreme but not unique, constitutes part of a growing international trend of prompting even internationally recognized governments to accept UN-sponsored humanitarian intervention (Deng, 1993). In the case of Sudan, for example, a combination of civil war and drought-induced famine that led to the deaths of over 500,000 civilians since 1986 prompted the United Nations Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) to undertake a humanitarian intervention in 1989 known as Operation Lifeline Sudan (Deng and Minear, 1992). Constituting one of the largest peacetime humanitarian interventions ever undertaken in the history of the UN, Operation Lifeline Sudan was made possible only by mounting international pressure on the Sudanese regime to recognize the scope of the problem and to accept UN-sponsored intervention. Ultimate acceptance, however, did not ensure ultimate happiness on the part of the Sudanese regime. “Even when the initial issues of involvement are resolved, relations between the donors and the recipient country or population are never entirely harmonious,” explains a group of specialists on conflict resolution that includes Francis M. Deng, a Sudanese national who serves as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons. “The dichotomy expressed between ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes inevitable as the nationals feel their pride injured by their own failure and dependency, while the donors and relief workers resent the lack of gratitude and appreciation” (see Deng et al., 1996:11).

An even more important development from the perspective of the dependency-decolonization debate is the rising impact of “conditionalities” on African economies by international financial institutions. This trend emerged in full force in 1981 with the publication of a World Bank (1981) study, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, which argued that wrongheaded policy decisions of the first generation of African elites were the primary cause of the mounting economic crisis of the 1980s. To resolve this crisis, the World Bank and the IMF proposed linking any future development aid to the willingness of African countries to completely restructure their economies according to what have become known as structural adjustment programs, discussed in more depth in Chapters 4 and 5. Simply put, this orthodox economic strategy argued that African nations needed to pursue an export-oriented strategy of economic growth that promoted the private sector and systematically dismantled many forms of government intervention in their economies. In case after case, the IMF and World Bank oversaw the application of policy reforms (i.e., no reform, no aid) that demanded an end to food subsidies, the devaluation of national currencies, the trimming of government bureaucracies, and the privatization of parastatals (state-owned corporations) (Commins, 1988; Campbell and Loxley, 1989).

The end of the Cold War has had a dramatic effect on the role of conditionalities in African economic relations. The terms of the debate have shifted away from Cold War-inspired questions such as whether Marxism or an African variant of socialism is favorable to capitalism, or whether single-party or multiparty regimes can better promote the welfare of their respective peoples. The main issue now is how to facilitate and institutionalize the liberalization of African economic and political systems (i.e., create capitalist, multiparty systems in the Western image). The orthodox economic and political conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank are largely accepted and promoted by the major Western powers; they allow the second generation of African elites only limited room to determine their own economic priorities.

Whereas cautiously optimistic interpretations of the potential impacts of SAPs in the post-Cold War era suggest that the second generation of African leaders will find themselves “hemmed in” by these externally imposed conditionalities that restrict policy choices but do not necessarily prevent policy success over the long term (Callaghly and Ravenhill, 1993), more pessimist interpretations suggest that African countries “desperate for access to international capital” are now “uniquely vulnerable” to the demands of the IMF and the World Bank. “While dependency analysts long argued that international capitalist structures provided the context within which development in Africa occurred,” explains Reed (1992:85), “it was only as Africa approached the 1990s that international financial institutions—controlled by the leading capitalist powers and designed to bolster the international capitalist economy—were able to impose policy prescriptions directly upon African governments.” One of the harshest critiques of the impact of conditionalities draws upon the involvement of the international financial and donor communities in restructuring the formerly Marxist-inspired political and economic systems of Mozambique:

Recent developments in Mozambique and elsewhere suggest that the most likely successor to post-colonial sovereignty will be neo-colonial vassalage, in which the Western powers assume direct and open-ended control over the administration, security, and economic policies of “deteriorated” states under the banner of the UN and various donors. The interests of many Africans may have been poorly served in nation-states ruled by aid-sponsored despots, but there is no reason to suppose that they will be bet-
TOWARD THE FUTURE

The end of the Cold War and the rise of democratization movements served as transforming events in the evolution of the international relations of the African continent. These events in turn allow us to draw some tentative conclusions about the dependency-decolonization debate. Although neither approach was completely supported or rejected by the analysis, two trends—the democratization of African foreign policies and rising competition among Western powers—suggest the increased ability of the second generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries. Yet proponents of the dependency approach can point to the increasingly pervasive nature of intervention on the part of the UN and international financial institutions as supportive of their vision of international relations. Moreover, despite some promising developments related to SADC and ongoing discussions within the OAU about the possible creation of African regional mechanisms to promote democracy and regional security, neither the OAU’s pursuit of pan-Africanism nor regional experiments in economic cooperation and integration offer compelling evidence to resolve the dependency-decolonization debate. A common element in all five of the topics we have discussed, however, is the importance of the democratization process and its impact on the rise of a second generation of African leaders committed to democratic principles. Although it is perhaps too early to tell, one can hypothesize that if democratization succeeds, it will facilitate the peeling away of another layer of dependency and allow the second generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries.

NOTES

1. The only remaining territorial questions revolve around the future disposition of Western (Spanish) Sahara (partitioned by Morocco and Mauritania), and Spain’s continued control over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, both of which are claimed by Morocco.

2. Aware that the State Department was seeking to guide a Zairian aid package through an Intransient Congress that surely would not look favorably on Mobutu’s hostile act toward Israel, Kissinger, in a private meeting with Mobutu, is said to have sarcastically made clear his distaste for the Zairian president’s actions: “Well, Mr. President, you certainly know how to reach the American people” (quoted in Schraeder, 1994a:82).

3. For example, although the Senegalese constitution underscores the independent role of the National Assembly, few if any financial resources are provided to legislators, who have no staffs and have to share offices without such basic tools as telephones.

4. Interview with Elhadji Mbojd, professor of law and international studies at Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar, Senegal.

5. When Amin was overthrown in 1979, after Tanzanian troops under President Julius Nyerere invaded Uganda, many African governments condemned Nyerere’s actions.

6. Among those who volunteered their services were Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Aristide Pereira of Cape Verde, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.

7. These countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

8. For purposes of this chapter, francophone Africa includes twenty-five independent states from the following regions: Central Africa (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, and Zaire); East Africa (Djibouti); Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles); North Africa or the “Maghreb” (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia); and West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). Our definition of francophone Africa therefore is inclusive of both Sub-Saharan and Saharan Africa (i.e., “trans-Saharan” Africa or the entire continent) rather than the more exclusionary set of sub-Saharan African countries.

9. These countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.


11. Ibid.

12. The classic understanding of the Cold War era is that U.S. foreign policy was primarily driven by ideologically inspired goals and interests. For an economically based interpretation that, although recognizing the importance of ideological factors, nonetheless argues that economic interests predominated even during the Cold War era, see Gibbs (1991).


14. Somali distrust of the UN stems from the decision of that international body to support the reimposition in 1950 of Italian colonial rule over what is currently known as the Republic of Somalia.

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