1. Introduction

Recent literature suggests that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically—viz., from a point of view where (put roughly) epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectual humility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectual humility might have implications for how we should conduct our practice of asserting. The present entry aims to rectify this oversight by connecting these two topics in a way that sharpens how it is that intellectual humility places several distinctive kinds of demands on assertion, and more generally, on how we communicate what we believe and know.

Here is the plan. §2 gives a brief overview of intellectual humility and why it’s valuable. §3 introduces some of the main views in contemporary debate about the epistemic norms governing assertion. §4 then develops the two key ramifications for how valuing humility might shape how we go about asserting.

2. Intellectual Humility

Intellectual humility is typically construed as something like the virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual diffidence. Broadly speaking, the intellectually humble person is one who accurately assesses their intellectual strengths and weaknesses, and who is aware that their beliefs could be mistaken—even when those beliefs are deeply held, and on emotive topics like religion and politics (Church and Samuelson, 2017, 2). When we lack intellectual humility, we’re less likely to be open to revising our beliefs in light of new evidence,
and less likely to work on improving problematic aspects of our intellectual character—and thus, more likely to be led to error in our inquiries. Consequently, as noted above, intellectual humility is valuable from an epistemic point of view, helping us to avoid falsehood and to acquire epistemic goods like truth, knowledge and understanding.

There are now a range of competing accounts of intellectual humility, all of which interpret the above core ideas in a slightly different way. On the underestimation view (e.g., Driver 1989), intellectual humility is chiefly about underestimating one’s intellectual strengths, accomplishments, social status, and entitlements. On the low concern for status view (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2007), intellectual humility disposes one to have low concern for one’s status and social standing. The proper belief view, (e.g., Church and Samuelson, 2017), by contrast, says that intellectual humility requires valuing one’s beliefs as one ought to, and holding accurate beliefs about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. By contrast, the interpersonal account (e.g., Priest 2017) maintains that intellectual humility requires “not [seeing oneself] as intellectually entitled” (p. 479)—a trait that allows one to help others achieve intellectual improvement by treating their intellects with the same respect one accords to oneself.

Finally, according to what is perhaps the most well-known account of intellectual humility—and one that we’ll be drawing from in several places in what follows (e.g., §4.1)—the limitations-owning account (Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, and Howard-Snyder 2015) maintains that what’s central to intellectual humility is being “appropriately attentive to” and “owning” one’s intellectual limitations (2015, 516). Connecting this account of intellectual humility with issues related to norms of assertion (as we shall do in §4.1) requires clarifying the three main concepts referred to in their account—namely, (1) being appropriately attentive, (2) owning, and (3) intellectual limitations. Firstly, to be attentive in Whitcomb et al.’s sense, one has to have a disposition for one’s limitations to come to mind when it’s appropriate to the context—this appropriate attentiveness is to be contrasted with obliviousness to limitations on the one hand, and obsession with limitations on the other. Secondly, to own one’s limitations is to be disposed to have a range of appropriate cognitive, behavioural, motivational and affective responses to the aforementioned awareness of limitations. Thirdly, the nature of the relevant limitations is illuminated by examples provided by Whitcomb et al. (p. 516)—they discuss gaps in knowledge (e.g. ignorance of the political landscape), cognitive mistakes (e.g. forgetting to meet someone), unreliable processes (e.g. poor memory), deficits in learnable skills (e.g. being bad at spelling), and intellectual character flaws (e.g. frequently jumping to conclusions).

Accordingly, on the limitations-owning account, one is intellectually humble when one is properly attentive to and owns one’s intellectual limitations—and, presumably, one is virtuously
intellectually humble when one does this because one is appropriately motivated to pursue epistemic goods (e.g., truth, knowledge, and understanding).

Having summarised some of the main perspectives on intellectual humility, we now turn to the debate about the epistemic norms governing assertion. From there, we will be well placed to consider some of the demands that virtuous intellectual humility places on our practice of asserting.

### 3. Epistemic Norms Governing Assertion

Suppose a friend asserts to you that an event you were planning to attend together has just been cancelled due to an asbestos hazard. You accordingly cancel your taxi, change into your pyjamas, and stay in for the night. The next day, however, you come to find out that the event wasn’t actually cancelled, after all! It turns out your friend had simply made it up, asbestos and all, because he was feeling too lazy to make the effort.

There are many ways in which your friend’s assertion is criticisable. One of them is morally. From a perspective from which what matters are things like being a good person and doing the right thing, your friend shouldn’t have asserted what he did. But let’s bracket the moral shortfalls of your friend’s assertion and home in on an entirely different problem, one that has to do with (put roughly) your friend’s take on the accuracy of what he was saying.

According to one very popular view in speech act theory in the philosophy of language, as well as in social epistemology, your friend’s assertion—one that is not only false but based on no evidence whatsoever—is going to count as defective for reasons that are entirely epistemic. On this way of thinking, assertion, as a kind of speech act—viz., a speech act by which a sentence is uttered in the indicative or declarative mood—is normatively constrained in the sense that one should assert something, A, only if one possesses some (to-be-specified) epistemic credential (e.g., true belief, justified belief, knowledge), with respect to A. The matter of what this credential is supposed to be is controversial. But to the extent that this general idea is on the right track, an implication is that your friend may be understood as lacking the epistemic authority to assert what he did (fabricating on the basis of no evidence whatsoever is, after all, not asserting on the basis of a very good epistemic credential).

One of the first philosophers to appreciate that assertions are subject to this kind of criticism was G.E. Moore (1944, 524–25), who registered that it seems paradoxical to assert a sentence such as the following:

(1) It is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining.
Asserting (1) would certainly sound odd. But here we need to be careful. The most obvious way that an assertion can be paradoxical is if what is asserted is (like the liar sentence—i.e., “This sentence is false”) is semantically paradoxical, viz., if it is true only if false. But notice that the content of (1) isn’t paradoxical in the sense that the liar sentence is. After all, suppose that, when S asserts (1), both conjuncts are true: it is raining and you don’t believe that it is raining (as might be the case if one asserts (1) when inside a windowless room, when it is in fact raining outside). In such a context of utterance, what one asserts when one utters the sentence in (1) would be a true proposition! So, in what sense did Moore think asserting something like (1) is paradoxical?

In order to appreciate what’s amiss with asserting a proposition like (1), it’s important to think not only about semantics of assertion but also the pragmatics. Put another way, we need to look not only at what is explicitly said when one asserts something, but also at what is presupposed and implied.

For illustrative purposes, consider by way of comparison the speech act of questioning. You might ask:

(2) Is it raining?

In uttering a sentence like (2) in the interrogative mood, it’s of course possible that you already know the answer to what you are asking (you might be pretending not to know, or just asking to see whether someone else knows). However, in normal circumstances, by uttering (2), you are thereby representing yourself as not knowing whether it is raining, or more generally as being in some way epistemically impoverished or ignorant with respect to the matter of whether it’s raining; at least, you represent yourself as in need more information to settle the matter for yourself. And that’s why (for example) asking “Is it raining?” while also making explicit that you know whether it’s raining seems so odd. It’s because you are implying one thing (ignorance) and then immediately and explicitly contradicting what you’ve just implied with what you say. As Hawthorne (2004, 24) puts it: *ceteris paribus*, we criticise people for asking what they already know because ignorance, incompatible with knowledge, is the norm of questioning.

Asserting is, as a speech act, a kind of ‘epistemological mirror image’ of questioning, at least, in a mirror that reverses how it is you represent yourself, epistemically, with respect to the content of these respective speech acts. On one simple and popular way of thinking: ignorance is
the norm of questioning just as knowledge is the norm of asserting; and so asserting stands to questioning as knowledge to ignorance.\textsuperscript{6}

Williamson and others have attempted to get a lot of mileage out of this simple idea. For one thing, it looks as though if by asserting you represent yourself as knowing, then there’s a simple story for why (1) sounds so odd. Knowledge asymmetrically entails belief. And so, if knowledge is the norm of assertion, then by asserting \textit{<It is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining>} you represent yourself (via asserting the first conjunct) as believing something that you then immediately explicitly commit yourself to not believing by (via asserting the second conjunct) claiming that you \textbf{know} it.

Here though a clarification is needed. If the apparent paradoxicality of ‘Moore-paradoxical’ sentences like (1) were all that needed explaining by considerations to do with how we represent ourselves, when asserting, then we might be inclined toward something weaker than the Williamsonian line that knowledge is the norm of assertion. After all, if the idea that belief is the norm of assertion were true, then this would suffice to explain why (1) seems paradoxical.

But as Moore (1962, 277) had also observed—and as Williamson (1996) has drawn particular attention to—sentences like (2) also sound paradoxical, and not just sentences like (1).\textsuperscript{7}

(3) It is raining, but I don’t \textbf{know} that it is raining.

Moreover, challenges like \textit{You didn’t know that!} (and not merely: \textit{You don’t believe that!}) sound perfectly reasonable when used as challenges to assertions made in ignorance. The best explanation for this and other data about our patterns of using ‘know’ (and more generally, of asserting as a communicative practice) recommend, according to Williamson (2000, 253–55), identifying the kind of epistemic credential that’s needed to warrant assertion as not merely belief, or true belief\textsuperscript{9}, or justified belief\textsuperscript{10}, but \textbf{knowledge}. Expressed, as it often is, as a \textit{necessary} condition on epistemically permissible assertion, the idea is as follows:

\textbf{Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA-Nec):} One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that \textit{p} only if one knows that \textit{p}.\textsuperscript{11}

But there might be more to the idea that knowledge is norm of assertion. As Mona Simion (2016) puts it:
[...] it looks as if a knowledgeable speaker need not do more – regarding his warrant for p – in order to be in a good enough epistemic position to transmit testimonial knowledge that p to her hearer. Thus, for the characteristic epistemic purpose associated with the practice of assertion, knowledge seems to be both necessary and good enough.

The idea that speakers who assert knowledgeably are beyond epistemic reproach has led Simion, along with DeRose (2002) and Hawthorne (2004) to embrace, along with KNA-Nec, a further sufficiency thesis according to which:

**Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA-Suff):** One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p.\(^{12}\)

Here is not the place to adjudicate whether knowledge is either necessary or sufficient for epistemically proper assertion.\(^{13}\) Rather, the aim has been to just briefly outline both why assertion is thought to be normatively constrained, epistemically, and then to register ‘knowledge’ as popular way to think substantively about such an epistemic norm. This will provide us with the relevant background to see how intellectual humility and assertion might interact in interesting ways.

### 4. Assertion and Humility

Let’s now connect the previous two sections; in particular, in what follows, we outline two distinct ramifications that valuing intellectual humility might have for debates about epistemic norms governing assertion. The first concerns polarisation and KNA-Suff and the second concerns the social-epistemic value of forbearing from asserting.

#### 4.1. First ramification

Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, the Whitcomb et al. view that a central element of intellectual humility involves being “appropriately attentive to” and “owning” one’s intellectual limitations (2015, 516).

Within the class of intellectual limitations, it will be helpful to distinguish between two varieties: *individual* intellectual limitations and *social* intellectual limitations. The former, which Whitcomb et al. are principally concerned with, include various ways that individuals fall short in their capacity as inquirers (e.g., gaps in knowledge, cognitive mistakes, unreliable processes, deficits in learnable skills, etc.). Owning our individual intellectual limitations, however, may be
only part of the story for what is needed to own our intellectual limitations in a way that a characteristic intellectually humble person should aspire to. Along with intellectual limitations that impede our capacity as inquirers, we also have intellectual limitations that impede our capacity to share and exchange information or rely on others. Call these social intellectual limitations.

Within the class of social (rather than merely individual) intellectual limitations, some are socially inherited and others are socially triggered. In socially inherited cases such as testimonial injustice (e.g., Fricker 2007), one’s being regarded as having a certain negatively perceived epistemic property (e.g., “X is a minority” “X is a woman”) is (unfortunately) often enough in itself to problematically limit a thinker in her capacity to communicate and exchange information. Such individuals are on account of being perceived in this way not believed as they should be, even if they believe (and assert) as they should.

What will be of interest for us, however, are social intellectual limitations that fall in the socially triggered category. These are more complicated. Consider, for example, what happens in cases of group polarisation, which is the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions (post deliberation) than those initially held by their individual members. When one is imbedded within a polarized group, one becomes unable to communicate information one knows to those with opposing views, though not because of any particular perceived property of the individual per se (as in cases of testimonial injustice) but rather because the dynamics of group polarisation function so as to counter the persuasive force of what one is arguing.

A virtuously intellectually humble person will be suitably attuned to this kind of social intellectual limitation—and to the conditions under which it’s triggered in group dynamics—and not merely to her individual intellectual limitations. Compare: the intellectually arrogant individual fails to appreciate that (in contexts of group deliberation) she is socially intellectually limited as she is. Imagine here your misguided friend who is shocked to see what happens when she attempts to debate politics on Facebook. She initially expects her friends (regardless of viewpoint) to be more deferential to her own testimony, assertions and viewpoint than they are. She falsely assumes her testimony will, in that context, carry epistemic weight that it turns out to lack almost entirely.

This is an example of a serious kind of social intellectual limitation, one whereby a subject is severely limited in her capacity to share and exchange information. Virtuously humble individuals, by owning this social intellectual limitation just as they might own other individual intellectual limitations, do not expect their assertions, in such contexts, to perform the function that their assertions would ordinarily perform: the function of imparting knowledge (see, e.g., Kelp
Consequently, they are better at avoiding assertoric misfires: assertions that fail to fulfil their function of imparting knowledge.

At this point, it is helpful to make explicit an important connection between (i) the demands of virtuous intellectual humility; and (ii) the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion. KNA-Suff (no less than KNA-Nec) is in the business of describing one specific sense in which our assertions are normatively epistemically constrained, one where the constraint is keyed to the epistemic position of the asserter vis-à-vis the truth of the proposition asserted. KNA-Suff says that, in the case of this normative epistemic constraint, ‘knowledge is enough’ to satisfy it.

That might well be right. But to the extent that we are inclined to the plausible idea that the function of asserting is (a la Kelp) to impart knowledge in the hearer, knowledge that the propositions one asserts are true won’t be enough to ensure that function is fulfilled. Consider again the plight of the individual engaged in a fruitless and polarising Facebook political discussion, who is (unlike many of us who know better) surprised to find that her assertions seem to carry little weight in that context; even if she is asserting (by posting) knowledgeably, her assertions unreliably fulfil their aim; she is mostly asserting in vain.

What the knowledgeable asserter lacks in the above scenario, we submit, is a very specific form of intellectual humility: one whereby one suitably owns her social intellectual limitations, and in doing so, is attuned to the way in which she is limited in her capacity to communicate and impart knowledge to others. By owning social and not merely individual intellectual limitations, one is better positioned to avoid assertoric misfires in contexts where the risk of such misfires is higher than average, and in doing so, becomes a better asserter, one whose assertions more reliably fulfil their aim as assertions.

Cultivating intellectual humility is, accordingly, valuable to the practice of asserting in a way that is not ‘swamped’ by the value of complying with the norm that one should assert only when one knows. In this way, we maintain, the ramifications humility has for our practice of asserting are important and worthy of further exploration.

4.2. Second ramification

In this section, we outline a further way in which valuing intellectual humility has ramifications for how we should conduct ourselves as asserters. Here we take as a starting point Priest’s (2017) idea that essential to intellectual humility is not seeing oneself as intellectually entitled (2017, 479). One way an individual might see herself as intellectually entitled is by regarding herself as deserving of what is in fact an inflated level of credibility, either relative to what would be an
accurate assessment of her own capacities, or relative to others’ capacities. Compare here, the successful CEO who, at a dinner party, expects others at the table to listen attentively when they speak on matters of politics and policy, while not affording others the same respect or attention.

With respect to the doxastic triad of belief, disbelief, and the withholding of judgment, those who have an inflated sense of entitlement will be prone to inflated levels of self-trust. A consequence of this kind of self-trust is that intellectually arrogant individuals will be inclined to believe on the basis of their initial intellectual assessments of things when they should withhold (or disbelieve) as well as withhold when they should disbelieve. In this respect, intellectual arrogance (viz., the lack of intellectual humility) can harm us in our capacity as inquirers.

But there is a flip side to this coin. Just as one who sees herself as intellectually entitled will believe when, instead, they should withhold judgment, they will also be inclined to assert when they should forbear from asserting; both of these mistakes flow naturally from a vicious sense of intellectual entitlement, as both are different ways of manifesting a regard of oneself as deserving of an inflated level of credibility.

KNA-Nec already offers a simple explanation for why we should refrain from asserting in those cases where our epistemic position with respect to what we are asserting is impoverished; we should assert only if we know. But what about situations when our epistemic position is good enough to warrant assertion but nonetheless not as good as someone else’s, where that other individual is also a potential informant on the matter. Here it will be helpful to consider the following case:

CPR: Aria is lying by the pool, nonresponsive. The only person close enough to assist is her aunt Kara, who does not know what to do to apply CPR. Fortunately, there are many friends standing on the balcony above (too high to safely jump down). One of these friends is an experienced paramedic. Another is Aria’s uncle Jimmy. Jimmy knows what to do to do CPR only because the paramedic had told him the night before. Kara calls up to the balcony asking for instructions, noting that time is of essence. The paramedic begins speaking, but Jimmy interrupts and begins shouting the instructions.

Cases like CPR are importantly different from cases in which the capacity to inform is not a ‘zero-sum game’. Compare, for example, Jimmy’s situation as an asserter in the CPR case with his situation as an asserter as, say, student in a 3-hour graduate seminar when everyone has an opportunity to wax expansively. In the grad seminar, Jimmy’s asserting is not at the expense of others’ assertions; in CPR, it is.
For the present purposes, let’s assume for the sake of argument that KNA-Suff is correct, and thus, that Jimmy is properly epistemically positioned to assert what he does precisely because he knows what he says. There is a clear sense in which, even so, Jimmy’s assertion is criticisable; once he made it, it passes epistemic scrutiny. And yet, epistemically speaking, he shouldn’t have made it. He should have forborne from asserting, deferring in his capacity as an informant to an expert. Epistemic norms governing proper assertion, like KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff give us no guidance as to when to forbear and when to assert within the class of cases where, if we assert, our assertion will pass epistemic scrutiny. Here, intellectual humility has a special value.

What prevents Jimmy from forbearing from asserting, as he ought to, is not any defect he has, epistemically, with respect to the truth of what he says. He knows what he says. The problem instead lies with his sense of intellectual entitlement; he views (like the CEO at the dinner party) his assertion as deserving of an inflated weight relative to others’ assertions, and this leads him to refrain from forbearing from asserting on occasions when he ought to forbear.

The antidote to Jimmy’s defect as an asserter is intellectual humility. One who lacks the sense of entitlement the lacking of which is (on Priest’s view) at the core of virtuous intellectual humility, will not be inclined to overweight her own capacity to inform in relation to others, especially in cases where asserting comes at the expense of blatantly silencing known experts. Here again, we find a way in which cultivating intellectual humility is valuable to the practice of asserting in a way that is not ‘swamped’ by the value of complying with the norm that one should assert only when one knows.

5. Conclusion

The value of intellectual humility has been well explored, though thus far, not yet in its connection with the practice of assertion. Meanwhile, debates about the norms governing assertion have principally concerned themselves with describing how assertion is normatively epistemically constrained, where the constraint of interest is keyed to the epistemic position of the asserter vis-a-vis the truth of the proposition asserted. In so far as we value asserting well, this kind of normativity is limited. We’ve shown two ways in which intellectual humility can make us better asserters, and in ways that won’t be secured simply by (even perfectly reliable) compliance with more traditional epistemic norms, such as the norm that one should assert only when one knows. In this respect, we’ve signalled to what we take to be valuable avenues for future research.24
References


Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2009. ‘Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries’. In Williamson on Knowledge,


NOTES

1 For some representative recent work, see for example Whitcomb et al. 2015; Church and Samuelson forthcoming; Samuelson et al. 2015; Priest 2017; Gregg and Mahadevan 2014; Kallestrup and Pritchard Forthcoming; Spiegel 2012; Tanesini 2016; Kidd 2016; Hazlett 2012.
2 See Brown and Cappelen (2011) for a notable collection of essays.
3 For discussion, see Beall, Glanzberg, and Ripley (2017).
4 See, for example, Pagin (2016) and Stalnaker (1978).
5 For further discussion, see Turri (2016).
6 This picture is embraced by Williamson (2017).
7 See Benton (2015) for a helpful overview of Moore-paradoxicality and the knowledge norm of assertion.
8 The infelicity of asserting that one’s lottery ticket is a loser, even when odds are astronomically high that this is true, is another popular line of argument in favour of a knowledge norm on assertion. See, e.g., Hawthorne (2004).
9 For a defence of the truth norm of assertion, see Dummett (1959) and Weiner (2005).
10 For proponents of the view that one should assert that p only if p is rational or justified for one, see for example Lackey (2007), Douven (2006) and Kvanvig (2009).
11 Of course, sometimes we assert things in a way that is perfectly epistemically responsible, but and yet, what we assert nonetheless falls short of knowledge. This might happen on occasions where one asserts on the basis of misleading evidence, or in cases of ‘Gettiered’ assertions, viz., where one’s assertion is justified and true but still fall short of knowledge. While criticisms of the knowledge norm of assertion appeal to such cases to argue that something weaker than knowledge is the norm of assertion, proponents have a ready diagnosis for these alleged problem cases: they are examples of biomeme norm violations. For recent discussion on this point, see Williamson (Forthcoming).
12 For criticisms of the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion, see for example Lackey (2011) and Carter and Gordon (2011).
13 Note that a further position one who accepts the KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff pair might embrace is that being subject to these norms is that it is constitutive of something’s being an assertion that it is governed by the (relevant) knowledge norms. This is Williamson’s (2000) own position. One needn’t embrace the further constitutive claim by simply embracing KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff. For recent criticism of the position that there is one and only one norm that is constitutive of assertion, see Kelp and Simion (2016).
14 Consider, for instance, testifiers from marginalised groups whose assertions are not given appropriate evidential weight. Such individuals, in virtue of having a kind of unjust credibility deficit, are intellectually limited; such a perceived credibility deficit limits their ability to share and exchange information normally. It’s debatable whether and to what extent one with virtuous intellectual humility should own this particular form of limitation, apart from simply recognising it. For social and moral reasons, the normative background within which this kind of marginalisation takes place should plausibly be strongly resisted.
15 It is debatable within social psychology what explains group polarisation. There are three principal views here. These include pervasive arguments theory, social comparison theory and social identity theory. For an overview of these differing accounts of the mechanisms of group polarisation, see Broncano-Berrocal and Carter (2019).
16 To be clear, this kind of intellectual limitation described here is not an example of an individual intellectual limitation, as we’ve defined it earlier. One might be, individually, operating perfectly well despite being severely limited in her capacity to share and exchange information. Nonetheless, we submit that having one’s capacity to share and exchange information subverted or undermined (including by environmental factors) is a kind of social intellectual limitation.
17 See, for example, Kelp (2018) for a sustained development of the view that the etiological function of assertion is to impart knowledge.
18 We have elsewhere challenged this idea, e.g., in Carter and Gordon (2011, 2016b, 2016a) and Carter (2017), though taking issue with KNA-Suff substantively is beyond the scope of what we aim to do here.
19 It’s worth noting that not all failures to own this particular kind of social intellectual limitation implicate arrogance, even if owning them corresponds with a kind of intellectual humility. After all, one might potentially simply misjudged (albeit, in a responsible way) the group dynamics at play. Thanks to Alessandra Tanesini for raising this point.
21 Note that withholding, with respect to some proposition, p, might not be best described as a mere absence of any positive or negative epistemic attitude toward p; on some views, e.g., Friedman (2017), withholding, or suspending, judgment is a distinctive kind of inquiring attitude in its own right, one that is important to positive inquiry.
22 We are using ‘intellectual arrogance’ here simply as a contrast point to intellectual humility understood along Priest’s (2017) lines. For some positive discussions of intellectual arrogance and what it might involve, see for example Tanesini 2016b; Goldberg 2016; Gregg and Mahadevan 2014; Tiberius and Walker 1998.
23 This case is a case of what Lackey (2011) calls isolated second-hand knowledge. Lackey appeals to cases of isolated second-hand knowledge to argue against KNA-Suff. Crucial to Lackey’s argument is the idea that certain institutional roles carry with them certain epistemic expectations on the part of the asserter which are such that
merely possessing second-hand knowledge will not always suffice to satisfy. In the present case, these kinds of considerations are not relevant, and for that matter, we are not appealing to the case in an attempt to challenge KNA-Suff. We are, however, sympathetic to Lackey’s argument in this case (see, e.g., Carter and Gordon 2011). For opposition to the line that cases of isolated second-hand knowledge undermine KNA-Suff, see Simion (2016) and Benton (2014).

24 Thanks to Alessandra Tanesini for helpful feedback on a previous version of this chapter.