THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

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BEAZLEY AND THE LANGUAGE OF CONNOISSEURSHIP

SUMMARY: In this century, the connoisseurship of Sir John Beazley has provided an important theoretical paradigm for the study of Greek vase-painting. Yet while most scholars have accepted Beazley's classification of Attic pots according to artist and group, few have engaged critically with his methods. In an attempt to remedy this situation, this paper argues two points: first, that Beazley's project is at core, taxonomic; and second, that it has close affinities with (of all things) Saussurean linguistics. Close readings of Beazley's methodological papers reveal his reliance on Romantic tropes (e.g., organic vs. mechanical, native vs. foreign), apparently in an effort to evade the logical implications of his own project. Yet we should not discard Beazley or his painters: rather, attention to his actual practice suggests ways in which classical archaeologists might re-think authorship and reference, and thereby engage in a more fruitful dialogue with other disciplines.

Connoisseurship is the dirty secret of art history. The very word conjures up images of collectors and dealers, of snobs, dilettantes, and filthy lucre. For a discipline that even now is carving a niche in the postmodern vanguard, connoisseurship seems to belong to a past best forgotten. And forgotten it has been. Meisterforschung and its practitioners are conspicuously absent from the field's current spate of critical historiographies. Where Alois Riegl, Heinrich Wolfflin, and Erwin Panofsky have received intense scrutiny in recent years, Giovanni Morelli and Bernard Berenson have gone largely ignored outside the world of museums. 1 And yet, distasteful as it may seem, connoisseurship is the precondition of any art history worth the name. It takes as its primary target the authorship, that is to say the origins, of works of art; and in art history, as in all other forms of criticism, such originary sites remain indispensable as the starting-point of critical practice itself 2 It is at any rate unclear how one could study history without some such enabling premise, some attempt to localize an artefact's spatial and temporal points of origin.

To make that attempt is, of course, the job of connoisseurs: to establish, if not who made the work, then at least when it was made and where. Connoisseurs determine context in the broadest sense of the term, and thereby provide the kernel of immanence at the heart of all

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2 Even Paul de Man, the most rigorous critic to date of such notions, acknowledged as much, describing "the necessary presence of a totalizing principle as the guiding impulse of the critical process." de Man 1983.32.
historicisms. As one scholar has claimed, the gruntwork of attribution and dating is the precondition of any ‘historical’ project whatsoever. When, for example, an art historian like Thomas Crow situates David’s nudes in the context of Revolutionary France, he takes it for granted that the nudes in question are by David, that they come from France, and that they post-date 1789, and only connoisseurship allows him to do so.  

Such being the case, this disreputable activity warrants closer investigation. How do connoisseurs make attributions, what are their theoretical premises? More broadly, how are we to see the maker of an artwork figured in that artwork, if at all? And more broadly still, is it possible to determine the spatial and temporal origins of an object just by looking at it?

Again, connoisseurship takes as its primary target is nothing less than the origin of the work of art — whether that origin be understood as an individual subject, or as a spatial-temporal coordinate. *Connoisseurship is etiology*. While it is not unique in this respect, it is nonetheless distinguished by the intensity of its formalism. Because their work is the precondition of contextualist or historicist reading, connoisseurs tend to ignore the historical significances of objects; they shy away from semantics in general. In many cases — as in the identification of period styles — they go so far as to replace historical context with stylistic context: for them, *style is history*. The life of forms, conceived in a vacuum, is what interests them. In fields that are particularly indebted to connoisseurship, style actually takes over entirely. Classics is one such field, and it is legitimate to ask, Which came first, the Archaic Period or the Archaic Style?

For the purposes of this essay, however, we may restrict ourselves to the notion of personal style, individual authorship — on the grounds that the ‘attribution-game’ presents the problem of origins in a uniquely condensed form.

Here classical archaeologists find themselves in an interesting position, because for them connoisseurship is not such a dirty secret. It has, on the contrary, remained central to their discipline as a paradigm of responsible inquiry. Pottery-sorting, for example, is the very stuff of archaeological work — it is what archaeologists do when they are not actually digging — and it is also a form of connoisseurship: where does this potsherd come from, when was it made? More to the point, the questions that classical archaeologists ask of their materials tend to be of a connoisseurial type. By this I mean that the object — the potsherd, arrowhead, architectural molding, or deposit-layer — is of interest primarily for the information that is thought to lie ‘in’ or ‘behind’ it. Once it has been identified in stylistic terms, the object yields a quantum of information about chronology, or cult-practice, or what have you, it is useful just to the extent that it yields in this way. At the time of this writing, the current (July 1995) issue of the *American Journal of Archaeology* provides a good example of this tendency. The issue contains the following six articles:

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5 Crow 1994. Connoisseurship, of course, includes the study of documentary evidence: I am not suggesting that all attributions to David result solely from the application of Morellian methods. See infra.

(1) A biography of archaeologist Frank Calvert.
(2) The identification of the species of swallow depicted in the frescoes from Thera.
(3) A study of style and iconography on an Attic vase.
(4) A partial rearrangement of the Parthenon frieze.
(5) The identification of some Roman coin-portraits.
(6) A stylistic analysis of the Corinth Amazon.

Composition, style, iconography, and biography are some of the very issues, in short, that occupy connoisseurs. The *AJA* is by no means an isolated case, and it is only a slight overstatement to say that classical archaeology is really connoisseurship writ large. This point, I stress, is no criticism — but it does suggest that when classical archaeologists discuss the theoretical foundations of their own field, they discuss something of fundamental importance to art historians. It is unfortunate that such discussions take place all too rarely.

The work of Sir John Beazley provides ideal terrain for such an exchange. He is arguably the most important connoisseur since Morelli, for like Morelli he created an entire field of inquiry out of virtually nothing. Beginning in 1908, Beazley sorted the massive and diffuse body of Attic painted pottery into individual 'hands,' publishing the results of his work in articles and, later, in massive lists. In so doing Beazley made vase-painting into a respectable object of study, giving what had hitherto been no more than "an inconveniently large class of Kleinkunst" the status of fine art. More to the point, he established Attic pottery as the linchpin of classical archaeology: today pots dated according to his system remain the single most important chronological index for the archaic and classical Aegean. That the study of Greek vases has not gone the way of the other minor arts of antiquity — that is, into total rather than partial obscurity — is almost entirely the result of this one man's work.

While Beazley's connoisseurship owes much to that of Morelli and Berenson, its formalism seems if anything more extreme. Where Berenson, for example, stressed the importance of documentary evidence in attribution, Beazley operated entirely on the basis of style. He was in a sense forced to do so, for the documentary evidence was (and still is) simply nonexistent. Nonetheless, the decision to press on in the absence of textual sources carried with it consequences that Beazley must have found acceptable. Chief among these is the fact that the number of variables going into an attribution has been reduced, drastically, to two: the scholar on

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7 For a complete bibliography of Beazley's writings see Ashmolean Museum. 1967.177-88.


9 The first of these volumes, *AI,*, was followed in 1942 by *ARI*. Later works, *ABI* and *ARI²*, combined with the posthumous addendum *Para*, remain the standard reference works for the field. Their format derives from the indices in Berenson's *Florentine Painters of Renaissance*, *Venetian Painters of the Renaissance*, etc.; see below.

10 Bothmer 1987. 201.

11 Kurtz 1985b. For histories of the study of Greek vase-painting, see Cook 1972. 275-311; Bothmer 1987.

12 Berenson 1962. 111-16.
the one hand, and the pot on the other. Gone are the various testimonia, inventory lists and archival notes that occupy students of other, more recent epochs. For Beazley, attribution may therefore be defined as a critical judgment based on looking and nothing else. This is connoisseurship degree zero.

For just this reason, Beazley's project provides an ideal site for an investigation of authorship and etiology. Stripping art history down to its bare bones, it provides a limit-case answer to Morelli's most basic question: "What is the form in a painting by means of which the soul, the turn of the spirit' of a painter expresses itself?"\(^{13}\) What if anything is it about the work of art — the work of art, and not a sales receipt, or a catalogue, or a studio photograph — that figures its origin? To answer such questions with full rigor requires precisely the minimalist approach adopted by Beazley, an approach that dispenses with documentary correlates and focuses solely on the image in its scene of viewing.

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It is important to note from the outset that the difference between Beazley's connoisseurship and that of Morelli and Berenson goes beyond the radical reduction of variables involved.\(^{14}\) Traditional connoisseurship has two main goals: attribution, of course, but also the judgment of quality.\(^{15}\) The former is made largely on the basis of perceived morphological similarities between two or more works — similarities that, crucially, are understood to result from unconscious habit. "As most men," writes Morelli, "we are accustomed to make use of habitual modes of expression, favorite words and sayings, which they often employ involuntarily and sometimes most inappropriately, so almost every painter has his own peculiarities, which escape him without his being aware of it."\(^{16}\) Such involuntary renderings or Grundformen are sought most avidly in minor details — the ear, the ankle — where the artist is thought to have most fully let down his guard.\(^{17}\) In this light, it is no surprise that Freud himself declared the Morellian approach to be "closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis."\(^{18}\) Concurrently,

\(^{13}\) Giovanni Morelli, quoted in Zerner 1978.212. My translation.


\(^{15}\) I am grateful to Whitney Davis for drawing my attention to this important distinction. Henri Zerner (Zerner 1978) argues that Berenson introduced the question of quality, and that it was no concern of Morelli's. However, he goes on to show that one of Morelli's chief objectives was to define art as that form of personal expression which is open to connoisseurial analysis, and since "art" is a qualitative term, his objection cannot stand. Quality, for Morelli, may be roughly defined as a combination of a work's expressive power with the nobility of the sentiments it expresses.

\(^{16}\) Morelli 1900.74.

\(^{17}\) Macginnis 1990 cautions against overestimating the importance of Grundformen in Morelli's project, but in my opinion goes too far in the other direction.

however, the connoisseur appraises the quality of the work. Indeed, for Berenson this part of the job is what really counts. the methods of attribution, he says, are "merely aids to the more essential consideration of the question of quality." Quality in his view comes down to the successful realization of authorial intention in form. Thus, for instance, it is more difficult to attribute great works than poor: the former are by definition intentional through and through, which means that there are proportionally fewer unconscious slips for the connoisseur to notice. "The greater the artist," he writes, "the more weight falls on the question of quality in the consideration of a work attributed to him." It quickly becomes clear that this approach is dialectical: it joins conscious and unconscious, accidental trace and deliberate intent, in a totalizing system of great power. Everything in a given image points to the identity of its one true maker.

Beazley, significantly, departs from this tradition. He does so by ignoring the issue of quality altogether, focusing instead on all vases. This maneuver — frequently applauded in the archaeological literature — in effect jettisons the whole issue of intentionality, for if quality just is realized intention, then to dispense with the former is by definition to dispense with the latter as well. Beazley thus restricts himself to the classification of works by morphological similarity: a lopsided application of Morellian methods that creates serious problems. His own project, at any rate, is strictly taxonomic: the clustering of pots around certain shared traits. The early essays actually list these traits in some detail, of the Villa Giulia Painter, for instance, Beazley writes that: "The frontal collar-bones have the elegant shape shown in [Figure 1]. One of these two lines renders the profile collar-bone. The nipple is either not marked at all, or discreetly indicated by a small brown circle or dot. When the torso is in profile, the median-line from chest to navel is black: when it is frontal, the median-


20 Berenson 1962:147.

21 For a recent restatement of this normative intentionalism, see Wollheim 1987a, esp. 37-39.


23 Berenson 1962:147.

24 See, for example, Robertson 1985:27: "One of the splendid things about Beazley's work is, it seems to me, the steadfast devotion with which he did apply his method to the whole field of Attic vase-painting, regardless of quality." But see the next note, infra.

25 With characteristic sensitivity, Martin Robertson has expressed reservations about this aspect of Beazley's project, suggesting that his methods may not be applicable to second-rate works. The gist of Robertson's argument is that in the absence of a Berensonian appeal to quality, connoisseurship is lopsided to the point that it cannot stand: the dialectic fails. Of course, he never phrases matters in quite this way. For reasons that will become clear, I share Robertson's concerns, though in most ways my position differs from his. Robertson's views have been worked out in a series of arguments spanning some forty years, culminating in Robertson 1992:2-6. See also Robertson 1950; Robertson 1976; Robertson 1985; Robertson 1987.
line is not indicated either above or below the navel, the navel is then a black ring, the ends not meeting."\textsuperscript{26}

The above is merely an excerpt from a much longer schedule of forms; indeed, many of the early essays consist almost entirely of such listings, with little or no additional commentary. They often come with Morelli-esque drawings. (\textit{Figures 1 and 2}) Unlike Morelli, however, Beazley determines these traits comparatively: he sifts particular systems of rendering out from the larger corpus of Attic pottery. "The process of disengaging the work of an anonymous artist," he wrote, "is the same as that of attributing an unsigned vase to a painter whose name is known. It consists of drawing a conclusion from observation of a great many details: it involves comparing one vase with another, with several others, with all the vases the enquirer has seen."\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Fig. 1: Drawings by Beazley: Some distinctive traits of the Villa Giulia Painter. After Beazley 1912. 239.}

This constant comparison, "continually referring back and across,"\textsuperscript{28} is the heart of Beazley's approach. He recognizes similarities and distinguishes differences in order to classify pots into distinct groups. After clustering two or more pots together in this way, he applies a name (e.g., 'The Villa Giulia Painter') which is understood to stand for the real maker. But — and this is crucial — \textit{the sorting comes first}. The name is just an after-effect of that initial distribution.

\textsuperscript{26} Beazley 1912. 292. I have omitted the parenthetical references Beazley gives to vases listed in his article.

\textsuperscript{27} Beazley 1918.v.

\textsuperscript{28} Beazley 1922.80.
The Villa Giulia Painter provides a good case in point. The name is short for 'The Person Who Painted the Calyx-Krater from Falerii in the Museo di Papa Giulio' (Figure 3) If one were to consider that pot in a vacuum — neither likening it to, nor distinguishing it from, any others — then it would be the merest tautology to speak of a 'Villa Giulia Painter' at all. It would be tantamount to saying, 'This krater was painted by the person who painted it'; which is true enough, but meaningless as an attribution. It is only when a second pot has been paired with the first that one can speak of a painter at all. The hope is that this second pot will be judged to be by the same hand: now the painter has two works to his name, and the tautology vanishes. But in fact the result of this judgment is of minimal importance to Beazley's system; all that is required is that some comparison be made in the first place. That this is so becomes clear from the case of singletons like the so-called Gotha Cup, a work that stands alone and unattributed in Chapter Two of ARV. Its isolation in no way implies that it has not been sorted like any other pot. On the contrary, the comparisons in this case are just tacit, they are negative: the Gotha Cup is unlike anything else. It has been 'segregated' or 'disengaged' from its fellows. To quote Beryl Lang, style "is known always, necessarily, by what it is not, as well as by what it is." In short, before christening a new painter — or, for that matter, making any attribution whatsoever — it is necessary first to set the relevant artwork into some relation, positive or negative, with other works.

29 Villa Giulia 909. ARV 2 618.1; Para 398; Addl 2 270.

30 Cf. Hodder 1990 45: "An individual event cannot have a style of its own."

31 Gotha 48. ARV 2 20; Para 322; Addl 2 153.

32 Beazley 1922 83.

33 Lang 1987 178. Cf. Beazley 1914 179, where he apologizes with some irony for being unable to illustrate all the vases that are unlike those of the newly-identified Achilles Painter, though he only shows the vases that are similar, by implication the innumerable dissimilar ones are equally meaningful from the attributor's point of view.

34 The relational aspect of style is stated eloquently by James Ackerman in Ackerman and Carpenter 1963 165-66. More recently, Davis 1990 and Hodder 1990 make the same point.
There is an intriguing parallel here with Saussure's notion of a diacritical sign. It is by now a truism that a word on its own is just an arrangement of sounds; only when set in relation to other phonetic assemblages does it come to bear meaning. This differential process occurs not just on the level of the signifier — where we distinguish the sound-unit /b/ at only by contrasting it to /c/ at, /f/ at, /h/ at, and so on — but also on the level of the signified, where the notion of, say, blue only operates in relation to red, yellow, green, orange, and so forth. Blue is the one color that is not any of those other colors. Thus, as Saussure argues,

"In all cases - we discover not ideas given in advance but values emanating from the system. When we say that these values correspond to concepts, it is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not positively defined by their content but negatively defined by their relations the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is that they are what the others are not."

He illustrates this principle with the analogy of a chess set, where the actual shape of a given piece is irrelevant so long as it may be distinguished from the others. If a pawn gets lost you can substitute a button and it will work just as well; all that matters is the token's value within the system.

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35 For an alternative account of style as a language see Davis 1990.27-29. See also Sauerländer 1983 258-59.

36 Saussure 1959.117.
overall system of the game. This analogy also illustrates another Saussurean principle, corollary to the first: the famed arbitraire du signe. The motivation of signs, such as it is, comes wholly from within language, not from outside. Any relationship between signifier and signified is determined by relations within the linguistic system and not by some ideal, Cratylan fit between word and thing.

In much the same way, Beazley construes the vase as a kind of sign, its referent being the artist; and the connoisseur's task is to 'read' the vase correctly and come up with the correct meaning, the correct author. As with any sign, however, the sense here is constructed through a play of difference: no vase signifies on its own, but rather must be set alongside others to produce meaning. In other words, the comparative method of the connoisseur works along the same lines as the linguist's phonemic principle: in each case, as Saussure put it, "there are only differences, without positive terms." The corpus of Attic pottery thus provides a general system within which individual vases acquire meaning as they are viewed. It is, to quote Saussure again, "a system of inter-dependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others" — "all the vases the enquirer has seen."

In place of phonemes one might therefore speak of 'graphemes,' individual traits — like the ears and eyes of the Villa Giulia Painter — by means of which particular referents are determined. These basic units of painterly signification acquire value through and only through the continual 'referring back and across' that is sorting. In short, Beazley's method is relational, not inherent — and it is as elements in a relational system, rather than as originary subjects, that we should view his painters. They are, in a sense, simply labels attached to vases that share what Beazley called a "coherent and comprehensive system of rendering the form of the human body naked and clothed." The signified artist just is, precisely, this similarity of form: he or she has no existence outside the vases themselves. In Beazley's rigorously mechanical system — a system that ignores intention and quality in favor of a strictly differential conception of the pictorial sign — authorship is a figural effect among others. This means that 'system of rendering' on a given vase is not, as Beazley claims, "the child, above all else, of one man's brain and will," but is rather the result of a post-hoc critical taxonomy. Pots produce their painters rather than vice-

37 Saussure 1959.110.
38 Saussure 1959 120.
39 Saussure 1959 114.
40 I am not using the term "grapheme" in Derrida's sense of "the nonpresent remainder [restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative 'production' or origin" (Derrida 1988.10), but rather as a simple analogue to the Saussurean phoneme, or Lévi-Strauss' mythemes (units of myth) and gusitemes (units of a culinary code). I prefer it to the somewhat barbarous "styleme" coined by Beryl Lang (Lang 1987.174-82).
41 Beazley 1922 81.
42 Mary Beard comes close to this position when she calls Beazley's painters "notional constructs from the style of the painting." See Beard 1991. Since writing this section, Eliasson 1990 has come to my attention: his position is essentially the same as my own, though stated a bit more obliquely (via Eco and Ginzburg).
43 Beazley 1922.84. On genealogical metaphors see Derrida 1981.76-78.
versa: graphemes do not emerge from an artist's unconscious, but rather are the means by which an artist comes into being. Beazley's own methods lead to the conclusion that the relation of a vase to its painter is precisely as uncertain, as aporetic, as the relation of word to thing. It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that Morelli spoke of painting as "a language which expresses itself in form."\textsuperscript{44}

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The differential nature of connoisseurship has not escaped the notice of its critics, though to my knowledge none has stressed the parallel with semiotics to quite this degree.\textsuperscript{45} I am not certain whether it escaped Beazley's. He was, after all, adamant in his belief that style is "originally inherent,"\textsuperscript{46} and not relational at all. Yet there are moments in which he seems close to acknowledging the figurality of his approach. In the introduction to the chapter on Douris in \textit{ARV}\textsuperscript{2}, for example, Beazley admits to some uncertainty as to "what point in the chronological development of the Douris sequence Douris himself stops and the succession of Douris begins."\textsuperscript{47} This sentence is unsettling, not because Beazley is uncertain about some attributions, but because he draws attention to the problem of distinguishing an individual painter from a morphological category or 'sequence'. That the category and the artist both bear the name 'Douris' only adds to the difficulty. Though Beazley is in no doubt as to the possibility of making the necessary distinction (at least in theory), skeptical readers may remain uneasy: just what is 'Douris', they may ask, if not an extrapolation from the purely morphological sequence? Where does 'disengagement' end and the man himself begin?

Beazley never addressed such objections head-on, but he did make his own position clear in a pair of essays. Published in the 1920's, \textit{Citharoedus} and \textit{The Antimenes Painter} are his only methodological expositions.\textsuperscript{48} Beazley's reticence on these matters was legendary; even Bernard Ashmole could not recall his "ever having spoken of his methods or of the importance of comparing details of drawing on one vase with those on another."\textsuperscript{49} This silence may have been motivated to some extent by the desire to create a professional mystique; but that cannot be the whole story. As will become clear, Beazley's reluctance to discuss method has deeper roots, and greater significance.

\textit{Citharoedus}, the earlier of the two papers, is ostensibly devoted to the late-archaic artist known as the Berlin Painter — "the painter of grace,"\textsuperscript{50} as Beazley called him — but is in fact a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Morelli 1900.76.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cf. Lang 1987; Previtali 1978; Preziosi 1989.27-33; Hodder 1990.45; Elsner 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Beazley 1922.84.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{ARV}\textsuperscript{2} 426. Italics original.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Beazley 1922, Beazley 1927.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Bernard Ashmole, quoted in Kurtz 1985b.243.
\end{itemize}
lengthy justification of connoisseurship itself. (Figure 5) Beazley starts off by sorting out a group of vase-paintings on the basis of morphological similarities, and then goes on to suggest three possible ways in which those vases might have been produced: "The whole group," he writes, "... may consist of substantive works [original in design, style and execution]; or of copies [original in execution but not design or style]; or of translations [original in execution and style but not design], or of any two; or of all three." Naturally he lumps for the first possibility, 'substantive works' by the Berlin Painter, but it is interesting to note his reasoning in excluding the other two.

Fig. 5 (left): Amphora by the Berlin Painter. ARV² 196.3; Para 177, 342; Add² 190.
Fig. 6 (right): The namepiece of the Antimenes Painter. ABV 266.1; Para 117; Add² 69.

Translation is ruled out because, says Beazley, "a system so clearly and carefully thought and felt out, so adequate to express a definite conception of the human form, must have been originally inherent, must have had its home, in a number of finished figures." In other words, the vases are too good to be derivative. One has difficulty taking this claim seriously, and not just because judgments of quality are so notoriously subjective. No: the problem is that (as cannot be stressed too often) Beazley's method does not and cannot take quality into account. Perhaps the Berlin Painter's works are clear and careful; but what of the Nikoxenos Painter — a hack who, in

50 Beazley 1918.35. On the Berlin Painter see especially: ABV 407-9; ARV² 196-219, Para 177, 341-45, Add² 106, 190; Beazley 1911; Beazley 1922; Beazley 1961; Beazley 1974; Beazley 1989.66-77; Cardon 1977; Kurtz and Beazley 1983. The Citharoedus amphora is ARV² 196.3; Para 177, 342; Add² 190.

51 Beazley 1922.84.
Beazley's own words, works "wholly by rote" to produce "figures, passably human, which serve to diversify the surface of a pot, but please neither as pattern nor as representation of life". Why can't his woefully inadequate pictures be 'translations'? If quality is the guarantee of attribution, then this question cannot be answered. It should be impossible to attribute a second-rate work (whatever that may be), which means, in turn, that most of $ABV$ and $ARV$ would have to be jettisoned. As if that were not enough, another contradiction arises from Beazley's claim that the renderings are careful and 'thought out'. Such elements are precisely not the ones of interest to a Morellian connoisseur: the unconscious mannerism has disappeared, replaced by a Berensonian intuition of the master's touch. That may be acceptable when, like Berenson, we are dealing with a known historical entity like Titian or Lotto, but it will not do when, like Beazley, we are trying to establish the existence of an artistic personality in the first place. The argument from quality fails even on its own terms, and would undermine Beazley's entire project if left unchecked. It seems, therefore, more like a decoy than a substantive thesis.

Beazley soon shows his hand. His true purpose is not so much to argue down the notion of translation as to out-gun it with a value-laden binary. The clear and careful system, he says, "cannot have been meant to be clapped beside alien designs like a kind of substitution table. And if merely a copyist's system, how could it have kept itself pure through a number of years, always at the beck of others, yet not losing or altering anything in itself? The foreign forms continually in front of him, and the constant criticism of his superiors, must have ended by wrecking some change or confusion in the copyist's style." In short, we have mere juxtaposition on the one hand, and true organic relations on the other. Translation is characterized by "alien designs" and "foreign forms", by being "at the beck of others", by a mechanistic "substitution table", and by things rudely "clapped" together. Substantive renderings, on the other hand, have "a home," are "originally inherent" and "pure", lose nothing of themselves, and "express" something "thought and felt." Servitude, foreign-ness, and mere contiguity contrast with home-ownership, unity, and pure self-expression. Metonymy versus metaphor.

This table of binaries does not amount to a coherent argument against translation. On the contrary, the paragraph quickly dissolves into a bundle of unsupported assertions — derived, it seems, from the polemics of the Arts and Crafts Movement. By the end, Beazley is declaring it inconceivable that the person who painted these vases could have had "foreign forms" in front of him, that he could have been criticized by his superiors, and that a uniform style could signify anything other than a single, magisterial author. It is not intuitively obvious, however, that any of these possibilities should be ruled out in advance. Indeed, the very notion of "foreign forms" begs the question, implying as it does a corresponding 'native' form, a singular style that resides in a person, the existence of such a style is precisely the burden of the argument, and cannot be taken

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52 Beazley 1918.25-26.

53 For an opposing view of the role of unconscious ticks in Morelli see Wollheim 1974.177-201.

54 Beazley 1922.84.

55 On Beazley and the Arts and Crafts Movement see Vickers and Gill 1995 80-83.
for granted. Again, Beazley seems less concerned with argument than with the opposition between good, organic art and bad, mechanical art. In place of syllogism he conjures up the image of a vase-painter who works alone, expressing his inner feelings and brooking no interference from superiors (because he has none). The result is a cliché, pure and simple. translation is impossible simply because it does not accord with Romantic theories of what an artist ought to be.

Beazley invokes the same binaries when he turns to copying.

"It seems to me that the tendency to degrade the actual executant of the vase-painting into little more than a mere mechanic, and to separate him from the presumed designer, "the only true artist" in the matter, is incorrect. We do not know very much about the organisation of potter's industry in Athens, but we know enough to be sure that the analogy of great modern industrial establishments like Creusot or Renault is a fallacious one."  

Here again, Beazley downgrades the mechanical in favor of "the only true artist". He does, however, have an argument this time: if there were routine copying, he points out, then one would expect to find lots of more or less identical vessels, but such replicas occur, he notes, "on nothing like the scale which we should expect to find if the industry was regularly organised on the principle of one design copied in great numbers." Without such masses of replicas, what remains is a single, masterful artist, self-present in the vase.

Though he is arguing from silence, Beazley does have a perfectly valid point: the theory predicts many replicas; there are very few, so the theory is wrong (or at least unproven). Even so, it is telling that his tone remains hyperbolic. Although the argument stands or falls on its empirical basis, Beazley leaves the quasi-scientific proof until the very end of his paragraph. Instead, he gives pride of place to the opposition between artist and mechanic, craft and industry. The attendant images — Renault and Creusot among them — add nothing of substance to the debate; their purpose is purely suasive. They are not mere embellishments, however, for they maintain the key oppositions from the case against translations. Indeed, the one consistent thread that runs through CITHAROEUS is its obsessive concern to degrade industrial juxtaposition — mere, unthinking replication — in favor of artisanal wholeness and

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56 That this opposition should also take the quasi-imperialist valence of native freedom versus foreign servitude is probably to be expected from a classicist writing in last decades of the British Empire. Which opposition is definitive — native/foreign or organic/mechanical — is impossible to say. Both, however, are clearly Romantic in derivation.

57 Beazley 1922.85.

58 Beazley 1922.85. Michael Vickers and David Gill contest this data, unconvincingly to my mind. Though the authors demonstrate that compositionally similar vase-paintings do exist (a fact Beazley never denied), they fail to address the central point: such objects exist "on nothing like the scale which we should expect" if the practice were the norm and not the exception. Given their rarity, such "replicas" as do exist seem best understood as examples of ad hoc workshop tradition — copying, to be sure, but on a small not a massive scale. See Vickers and Gill 1995.161-63. For workshop tradition see Bothmer 1987, Hudczeck 1972-75; Schmidt 1980 (all three cited by Vickers and Gill).

59 Compare Beazley 1974.3, where Beazley describes the late work of the Berlin Painter as "slight, mechanical productions of the master's own decline."
originality. Where the latter suggests a thrilling bond between maker and object, a shared "home" that unites them both, the former is dreary, alien machinery. These binaries, I suggest, are an end in themselves: their reinforcement is the essay's primary function.

Why does Beazley fear mechanical, repetitive action so much that he will attack it even to the potential detriment of his larger project? An answer suggests itself, one derived from what is already known about the relational, semiotic nature of Beazley's project. I argued earlier that his conception of the bond between artist and image is equally a conception of the relation of signs to referents: that his theory of style is a theory of semiotics. For Beazley, the signified inhabits the signifier, makes its "home" there, just as the vase-painter inhabits his distinctive "system of rendering." The link in each case is organic, natural, and necessary, it is metaphorical and not metonymic. In such a situation, it is easy to see how any remainder of language's own mechanical properties — any suggestion, that is, to the effect that language is itself like a machine — would provoke immediate and emphatic denial. Beazley's hostility to repetition and copying is, I suggest, motivated by a desire to foreclose any such suggestion. In order to preserve his particular conception of the pictorial sign, he opposes an originary moment of inscription — a single artwork that expresses the thoughts and feelings of its maker in an organic fashion — to the mindless replication of that moment in the "industrial establishment."

The need to do so is pressing, for his method relies heavily mechanical repetition; so heavily, in fact, that repetition threatens to undermine everything Beazley hoped to achieve. This reliance takes two forms. First of all there is Beazley's practice of tracing vase-paintings — "a very central part of [his] 'method'," according his student Dietrich von Bothmer. The idea is to internalize style through a re-enactment of the artist's own bodily movements. "Who draws learns," writes Beazley, "and the hand remembers no less well than the eye." In this activity he is actually rather like the industrial artist denigrated in CITHAROEUS. Indeed, by the logic of that article such tracings (along with the freehand copies he made from them for publication) should be useless both as records of an individual's style and as educational tools. Beazley has argued strenuously against the idea that it is possible to reproduce a line-drawing without losing its distinctive stylistic qualities. Everything else may be reproduced, but style is the one thing a tracing cannot show. It cannot impart the expressive essence of the original. At the same time, the arguments of CITHAROEUS suggest that it is impossible to internalize style through mindless copying: for, if such were indeed the case, then style would no longer have to be "originally inherent" but might, on the contrary, be reproduced faithfully through mechanical means. In each case, therefore, the use of tracings contradicts the theoretical foundations of the project as a whole.

It is perhaps to head off such reasoning that Beazley is at pains to show that his tracings are really not mechanical after all, at least, not when compared to photography.

"The ideal publication of a vase is not a photograph, nor a series of photographs, but a series of photographs accompanied by a careful drawing. The camera is always stupid if always honest, and if honesty cannot be said to lie, yet it often gives false information: the camera cannot distinguish in certain cases between the

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60 D. von Bothmer, in Kurtz and Beazley 1983. 8.

61 Beazley 1989. 65.
ome lines of the artist, accidental sketches, dirt, or smudges, restorations, and the incised sketch-lines: only the student or the artist can do that consistently, holding the vase in human hands and scanning it with human eyes.\footnote{Beazley 1913.143.}

Where photography lacks discrimination, Beazley's approach is definitively human, definitively organic. It thus becomes possible to degrade mechanical copying while at the same time celebrating the truth in tracing.

Though symptomatic of the internal contradictions of Beazley's approach, repetitive tracing is incidental to its basic theoretical underpinnings. Omit tracing and the edifice does not fall. Entirely more significant, however, is the way in which the very concept of style depends on repetition. As noted above, style is relational by definition. By itself an object has no style; only when it is played off against other objects — likened to some, distinguished from others — does such a description become applicable. It follows that for a style to be identified as such, it must be shown that two or more objects share at least some traits.\footnote{Cf. Hodder 1990.45.} In other words, the positive recognition of a style depends upon a degree of formal repetition among the objects at hand.\footnote{On the Antimenes Painter see, in addition to Beazley 1927: Burow 1989; Moore 1984; Robertson 1986; Shapiro 1990.} In a way, style just is repetition as it occurs against a background of contrast and difference; and attribution, by extension, is the process of recognizing and determining those repetitions and contrasts. Beazley's obsessive downgrading of mechanics in favor of an organic conception of style denies this basic fact; which is perhaps why he does not argue the point so much as assert it ever more stridently.

At any rate, the question arises as to what, if anything, would constitute the originary moment of inscription postulated by Beazley. Where in the sequence of repeating graphemes is the first trace, the primal mark that defines all the others? Put differently, what in a given style is \textit{not} repetition? Beazley addresses this issue, albeit covertly, in his second methodological essay — \textsc{The Antimenes Painter}. Of course, he does not frame matters in this way: he does not pose any of these question explicitly. Yet, to the extent that \textsc{Citharoedus} and \textsc{The Antimenes Painter} may be read as any sort of coherent argument in favor of Beazley's approach, it is striking that the later essay addresses the most salient shortcoming of its predecessor: its failure to reconcile repetition and organicism.

Devoted to a black-figure artist of the later sixth century, \textsc{The Antimenes Painter} takes the form of a narrative, with Beazley describing how he 'disengaged' this personality and defined its oeuvre.\footnote{The exact degree of correlation may vary, and it would be impossible to establish hard-and-fast rules. Instead, following Whitney Davis, we may characterize stylistic groups as \textit{polythetic} — that is, as meeting the following three criteria: "(1) each artifact possesses a (large) number of the attributes of the group; (2) each attribute may be found in a (large) number of the artifacts in the group; and (3) no single attribute is found in every artifact in the group." (Davis 1990.19). The use of these "attributes" to determine the boundaries of a set or group — of a painter's oeuvre — is what Beazley calls "disengagement".} The plot-structure is strictly linear, a step-by-step progression from namepiece to
corpus. First in line is the 'Antimenes-hydra' in Leiden, from which the painter takes his name. Beazley describes this vase in considerable detail, and then moves on to the job of sorting. He begins with a contrast, noting some vases that are "not [from] the same hand, but the same period," and then proceeds to a positive comparison.

"I would beg the reader to give to give the pictures on the Leyden hydra a good general look, then to go over the bodies, the drapery on the trees, the horses, and that done to turn to another well-known vase, the neck-amphora with olive-pickers in the British Museum." The London amphora, it turns out, exhibits "the same bodily forms" as the Leiden hydra, and therefore is judged to be by the same hand.

The linear structure now becomes explicit, as Beazley likens his account to a roadway down which he is leading the reader. "From the London vase," he writes, "there are several routes: I choose that which I myself took." The text is now a path, with each new vase appearing as it were from around a bend, 'turning' from one pot to the next, the reader seems to be rounding corner after corner. After two such twists — and two new attributions — there comes a rest-stop: "to refresh the reader's eye," as Beazley puts it. This interlude consists of "a hydra which is contemporary with ours, or only a trifle later, has the same subject and a similar design, but is not by the same hand." The point is that the system is capable of registering fine differences: it is both flexible and discriminating. The tour then presses on, following Beazley as he re-enacts his own reasoning. The article culminates in a long list of works; a discussion of borderline cases; and a final, definitive contrast with some contemporaries. The result is a new Attic vase-painter.

Sorting is obviously prominent throughout this account, yet the linear structure works powerfully to suppress it. Drawn out along a storyline, the synchronic activity of sorting, of putting two or more vases together at once, falls away before a diachronic progression from Antimenes-hydra to catalogue raisonné. Connoisseurship appears as an additive process, beginning with the Leiden vase and proceeding by way of a well-trodden 'route'. Even contrasts

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66 ABV 266 1; Para 117; Add 69.

67 Beazley 1927.65.

68 Beazley 1927.65.

69 Beazley 1927.66.

70 Beazley 1927.67.

71 Beazley 1927.69.

72 Beazley 1927.69.

73 The text thematizes narrative as explicitly as any detective story: following Beazley's "route," one is reminded of nothing so much as "The Musgrave Ritual," the story in which Sherlock Holmes combines trigonometry and textual criticism to retrace the footsteps of a missing butler. On "The Musgrave Ritual," see Brooks 1984.23-28. For the connoisseur as Holmes see Ginzburg 1983.
which would seem to dramatize sorting as something more than mere addition — fit smoothly into the sequence as refreshing pauses by the wayside.

The net effect of this emplotment is to isolate the namepiece as a unique point of origin. Not only does it receive pride of place as the first object discussed, but it also names the artist, and is the only work that Beazley asks us to examine closely. We stare at it, by itself, and only then do we "turn to" the others. The hydria has primacy, anchoring and defining the article's additive chain. From the outset, it seems, the namepiece is 'by' the Antimenes Painter and emblematic of his style: we begin with this one vase by this one artist, and proceed from there. Beazley thus comes dangerously close to the solipsistic fallacy of attributing an isolated pot to an independent painter: the Antimenes-hydria seems, falsely, to have been by the Antimenes Painter before it was put into play with other vases.

This narrative structure makes sense, however, in light of Beazley's organic conception of artistic production. The problem raised by Citharoedus is, How to reconcile the unique, organic moment of painterly inscription with the repetitive — that is to say, mechanical — definition of style? The Antimenes Painter seeks to resolve this quandry by postulating a primal moment of inscription, an exemplary mark that somehow predates the connoisseur's recognition of style in, through, and as repetition. This position receives no cogent argumentation, but rather is built into the structure of the essay itself: the linear narrative elides synchronic comparison in favor of diachronic addition, and thereby masks the fundamentally relational determination of the Antimenes Painter's "system of forms." As a result, artistic personality seems not to emerge from the mechanical process of sorting but rather to be 'originally inherent' in the work itself. Beazley mandates the all-important originary inscription by fiat: it is always already 'there', a pure anteriority.

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A choice metaphor for this primal mark is Divinity itself. The signifying power of the line is so great that, as it summons a long-dead maker into full presence, it acquires all the status of divine incarnation. Expressing faith in this doctrine, Beazley declares, "I was always brought up to think of style as a sacred thing, as the man himself." This conceit belongs to a longstanding critical tradition: as Murray Abrams has shown, it was in just these quasi-religious terms that Romantic theorists understood a poem to manifest the personality of its writer. For Schlegel and others, "the parallel between [divine] creator and poet serves as the intellectual model for conceiving the poem as a disguised projection of the author." The pantheistic presence of God in the world, at once everywhere and elsewhere, was for the Romantics a perfect analog to the relation of writer to text, painter to pot. Given that his conception of painting is fundamentally expressive — the author manifests himself in the work — it comes as no surprise to find Beazley adopting the clichés of his nineteenth-century forebears.

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74 ABV, x.

75 Abrams 1953.239.

76 On the Romantic foundations of connoisseurship see Wind 1985.30-46.
On closer examination, however, his remark seems less straightforward. If one reads the final clause of his remark literally — if style is indeed the man himself, *style and nothing but* — then an underlying paradox emerges: the painter, the man himself, really is nothing but a collection of distinctive, relational traits. To say, with Beazley, that the painter just is his style is to conflate signifier and signified: the 'man himself' becomes nothing more (or less) than a reified semantic value. His identity collapses into the index that gestures to him; he becomes one with the material inscription. 'He' has referential productivity, to be sure, but that productivity must now be understood as without external guarantee. It is unstable.

It is thus all the more unsettling to realize that Beazley's profession of faith is lifted verbatim from the Comte de Buffon's *Discourse sur le style* of 1753: "style is the man himself," is a direct translation of Buffon's famous dictum, "le style est l'homme même". 77 Beazley, we find, appropriates another man's words to make his claim that signs always point to their author — with the unwanted implication that signs may not so transparent after all. The sentence contradicts itself, much as Beazley's diacritical method led straight to the aporia of an arbitrary sign. It is small comfort that we can recognize the phrase as somehow 'belonging to' Buffon, for there is nothing in the text itself to suggest that the words are anything but Beazley's own. At most, they may be attributed to his upbringing, as part of the intellectual apparatus of any cultivated person. In short, the original author has disappeared, either appropriated by Beazley or displaced into the realm of traditional wisdom. Beazley is not being ironic, what irony there is runs against the text's grain and not along it.

It seems inevitable that such a moment should occur somewhere in Beazley's writing — that his most sincere declaration of piety should, for want of a better term, deconstruct itself before our very eyes. The precedent is impressive: discussions of connoisseurship seem to attract such frankly bizarre occurrences. Thus Morelli used a pseudonym, pretending that his books were written in Russian by one 'Ivan Lermolieff' and translated into German by 'Johannes Schwarze' — respectively, an anagram and a translation of Morelli's own name. Berenson systematically transformed himself over the course of his life, converting to Catholicism, moving into a Florentine palazzo, and even changing the spelling of his name from Bernard to Bernhard. 78 When Freud came to discuss Morelli (in *The Moses of Michelangelo*) he felt compelled to publish the article anonymously. 79 And now Beazley states his faith in authors but somehow forgets the quotation-marks. Connoisseurship seems to encourage this pattern of self-effacement, misnaming, and ventriloquism, as if its secret conflation of author and work must assert itself in the end. It seems clear at any rate that the discipline's virtual effacement of the omnipotent author in favor of the material trace, cannot be acknowledged openly, it is after all a form of parricide, as the vase, "the child of one man's brain and will" usurps its father's place. 80 Yet, however

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77 Buffon 1975 (1753) 25.


80 Lest this familial metaphor be thought an exception, it is worth remembering that Beazley often described stylistic affinities between painters in familial terms: thus, for example, the Antinemes Painter is "brother" to Psix. as is the Borzoi Painter to the Florence Painter, the Niobid Painter to the Altamura Painter, and so on. On
forcefully it may be repressed, nonetheless this impulse makes its inevitable return, and connoisseurs with clockwork regularity lose the ability to speak for themselves. Incapable of occupying the position of author, they seem compelled to leave room for the paternal figure they have secretly displaced. Beazley's case is the most complex of the lot, for he does not deny his own authorship outright but rather hides his denial in plain sight, asserting the divine presence of authors with words that are obviously not his own. So obviously purloined are they, in fact, that it seems inevitable that he should be caught out. He is, to borrow a phrase, "wrecked by success."

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Beazley hopes to bind the pictorial sign to its referent — the painter — organically and naturally. Yet he fails to make a strong case for that connection, relying instead on a blitz of Romanticized metaphors. The result is a series of disruptions and peculiarities, ranging from a marked unwillingness to discuss methods all the way to the case of textual mis-appropriation noted above. This failure is in fact exemplary, for it draws attention to a somewhat neglected aspect of style: its mechanical or repetitive determination. Although this quality has been noted in the past, somehow the basic point appears to have been missed. If style is visible only through difference — if it really is "a system of inter-dependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others" — then clearly there is no primal moment of inscription. There is no paternal mark to guarantee all the others, no pre-existing namepiece to identify a painter prior to the connoisseur's arrival on the scene. On the contrary, the very existence of a particular grapheme depends upon the simultaneous availability of other graphemes, both similar and different. A grapheme, a vase, never speaks for itself, but only quotes other graphemes and other vases, repeating or citing some earlier mark.

Yet it would be quite wrong to conclude that Beazley's project is a failure and that all his painters are useless fictions. There has of late been a tendency to draw such conclusions in certain, mostly British, quarters, but I think we should resist it, because it is simplistic. The analogy with semiotics implies no such thing. On the contrary, while language may be differential, arbitrary, and citational through and through, nonetheless reference cannot simply be escaped into a vacuum of freplay. What the analogy does suggest is that pictorial authorship, like other sign-systems, is pragmatically determined. The relation of painter to work is mediated through and in a constellation of social, cultural, and political forces. Authorship is thus a textual effect, a culturally-determined value and not a mystical "given". The "author", accordingly, need not have anything to do with the actual agent who made the work. In the words of Alexander Nehamas,

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these terms see Martin Robertson in Add6 xiii-xiv. Cf. Wöltheim 1974.185: "It does not seem to me fanciful to connect this continuing concern over questions of authorship, of the paternity of paintings, of who it was who with his penello made the object before one, with the feelings and anxieties of the orphaned child, persisting into manhood, there to be experienced as the unconscious desire to repair and retain the dead father."


the author is "not a person but a character," something read out of the work in the act of interpretation.

Every picture or text is made by someone, obviously, but this fact is not always relevant for the beholder. It is only relevant, only figured in the works themselves, at certain times and in certain places, with regard to certain objects. It seems to me that some of the vases produced in the Athenian Kerameikos between, say, 600 and 350 BC do indeed mobilize a host of rhetorical devices in order to create the sense that they were made by particular individuals. They are signed, they are painted in bravura styles. This is not really the case with, say, late Corinthian pottery, that is why the application of Beazley's methods to Corinthian has not been entirely satisfactory. In this light, the really interesting question is not so much, Who painted this pot? but, Why does this pot assert the importance of its maker? If stylistic meaning is no more universal than linguistic meaning — if personal idiom is a social construct — then it follows that the rhetoric of style is a legitimate topic of investigation for the historian. In brief, style always has an ideology.

What I am suggesting is that we can use Beazley to historicize the relation of artist to work. Such a project would concern itself with, precisely, the gap between author-effect and agent, for it is in this space that ideology (broadly conceived) goes to work on the image. If the relation of image to maker is pragmatically determined, then that relation may be viewed in a historical perspective; and, moreover, the variation perceived in that relation will be the very stuff of history. More specifically, it should be possible to examine the ways in which pots mobilize author-effects within a social field. The linguistic analogy, in short, permits one to embed authorship in social forms, and thereby holds open the possibility of seeing ideology in action. Through such work, classical archaeology is poised to make a real contribution to the broader history of art. For by critically examining not just style and authorship, but the historical moment at which style and authorship came to be understood as determinate aesthetic categories — by examining, that is, the discursive practices of art production in the late Archaic and early Classical eras — it should be possible to arrive at conclusions that are relevant for anyone working with paintings and painters. Far from sealing off classical archaeology, the dull and "retardaire" methods of connoisseurship are, potentially, its greatest strength.

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