ACADEMIC PAPER

BUILDING AN EVIDENCE BASE FOR EMPOWERING WOMEN FOR PEACEFUL COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH AND INDONESIA

JANUARY 2019

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UN WOMEN

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANOVA	Univariate analysis of variance
Banser	*Barisan Ansor Serbaguna* Multipurpose Ansor Front (the youth wing of NU)
BNP	Bangladesh National Party
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGBTQI	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer Intersex
MUHREC	Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NU	*Nahdlatul Ulama*
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PKI	*Partai Kommunis Indonesia* Indonesian Communist Party
PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* Prosperous Justice Party
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	US Dollar
WPS	Women Peace and Security

1 INTRODUCTION

Since 2013 there has been increasing international policy attention on the importance of understanding the gender dynamics of violent extremism. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security first stressed the critical contributions of women and women's organisations to conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building. More recently, UNSCR 2122 (2013) introduced terrorism to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda identifying that women can play important roles in preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and delegitimising and reducing support for extremist groups.

BOX 1

Policy advancements on WPS and P/CVE

2013: **UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED)** mandate was renewed with the passing of **UNSCR 2129**. It includes a passage that calls for the "[i]ncrease [of] attention to women, peace and security issues in all relevant thematic areas of work on its agenda, including in threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" (UN Security Council 2013).

September 2014: **UNSC Resolution 2178** focuses on the emerging threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and calls for the need to empower women as a prevention response and mitigating factor to the spread of violent extremism and radicalization (UN Security Council 2014a).

October 2014: **UNSCR 2242** built on the connection between the CT/CVE and WPS agendas emphasising a gender perspective on prevention and opportunities for experienced women to participate in high-level decision-making where strategies are designed and implemented (see operative paragraphs in note 3).

October 2015: **Global Study on the Implementation of 1325** raises the issue of rising cultural and religious fundamentalisms and the connections to the WPS agenda as an important issue for women's organizations working in the Asia-Pacific region based on consultations with them.

July 2016: **The Fifth Review Resolution of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy** called upon all UN Member States to empower women and consider the impact of counter-terrorism measures on women's human rights and women's organizations and to consider providing funds within these efforts to further women's rights and empowerment.

December 2016: **UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism** identified gender equality and empowering women as one of its seven priority areas for action.

June 2018: **Sixth Review Resolution of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy** urges Member States and United Nations entities to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers of radicalization of women to terrorism into their relevant programmes, and to seek greater consultations with women and women's organizations when development CVE strategies.

Although they are beginning to be more widely acknowledged, women's roles in P/CVE have tended to be overlooked and there is limited knowledge, particularly grounded in primary research, on the intersection of gender and violent extremism. This research project helps to fill that gap in knowledge and understanding. We test the idea that when women are empowered economically and part of decision-making in their communities, societies will be more cohesive, resilient and peaceful.

BOX 2

Women's economic empowerment and P/CVE: Testing a theory of change

Prioritizing women's economic empowerment can have tangible impacts on their security. The 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' regional programme was developed to test the idea that when women are empowered economically and included as part of decision-making in their communities, societies will be more cohesive, resilient and peaceful. Tying women's economic empowerment to P/CVE is a new idea for many, but an idea that could yield significant impact. Economic empowerment programs are conceived as an entry point for engaging and bringing together women to increase their confidence, self-efficacy, and skills to take part in family decision-making and to resolve community problems and conflicts. They contribute directly to easing tensions within the home and community, although women's economic empowerment programmes are not intended to address any perceived root causes of violent extremism.

By conducting research with different communities across Bangladesh and Indonesia, including those who have received support through UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' regional programme,[2] we investigated the impact that women's economic empowerment and their leadership and participation in local communities can have on social cohesion and efforts to challenge extremist ideology and related violence. Our research findings contribute to an understanding of individual and community perceptions of the causes of violent extremism and how to best prevent and counter its threat. We examine the extent to which individuals see themselves and their communities as having a role in P/CVE. Importantly, we identify how these perceptions differ within and between communities and, notably, between women and men.

Our research adopted a mixed-method approach, combining survey analysis and qualitative research in six communities in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Two districts in each country were studied where the UN Women programme had been implemented. One district in each country was studied where there had not yet been any such programming. Hereafter we refer to these districts as 'programme sites' and 'non-programme sites', respectively. The research in all districts involved roughly equal numbers of male and female participants.

The findings of this study indicate that efforts to promote and combine social cohesion and women's economic empowerment programming can catalyse greater levels of a) individual empowerment, which is particularly important for women in societies with lingering gender inequality and discrimination; b) increased awareness of the problem of violent extremism in the country and within communities; c) economic empowerment with respect to different pathways to improve family wellbeing and community resources and finally, d) community engagement. These factors together can act to prevent and counter violent extremism.

Moreover, UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme has been instrumental in contributing to women's empowerment and their increased awareness of and confidence in their contributions to P/CVE within the programme sites in Bangladesh and Indonesia. It has also contributed to developing effective economic empowerment programming, which in turn has alleviated some of the stresses of poverty and gender inequality that sometimes act as drivers of extremist attitudes. The programme has further provided more opportunities for community engagement, outreach and inclusion, in the process raising awareness within families and communities of violent extremism and how it can be prevented.

The remainder of this paper will turn to describing the analytical approach used in the study and the background of violent extremism in Bangladesh and Indonesia, as well as to critically assessing key research findings across the two countries.

2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Women can play a vital role in preventing the spread of extremist ideology and activity. As community leaders, professionals, and as mothers, wives, sisters and daughters in family settings, women shape the values of their community members. However, gender discrimination and inequalities in the family and community may inhibit the full realisation of women's agency in P/CVE.

This research was conducted in conjunction with UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme. We focused on examining social cohesion, women's empowerment and community empowerment, and their relationship to preventing and countering fundamentalist or extremist ideologies in communities. The aim was to understand gender dynamics and differences, and how they affect the promotion of social cohesion and tolerance and, ultimately, prevent and counter violent extremism. We sought to investigate whether and how the empowerment of women impacts efforts to promote social cohesion and tolerance, and prevents and counters violent extremism.

Our research compared different community sites within and between Bangladesh and Indonesia.[3] By observing and analysing sites that have received support from UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme as well as comparing those sites with an area that has not received this or similar programming, the research is intended to shed light on how programmes can help communities to be more cohesive and resilient and less vulnerable to fundamentalist or violent ideologies. Given UN Women's programme focused on economically empowering women and enabling their leadership and participation in local communities, our research intended to illuminate how and in what ways women's empowerment contributes to efforts to prevent violent extremism and to build more peaceful societies.

While not a randomised control design, we used aspects of this quasi-experimental approach to observe the differences between programme and non-programme sites and to assess the impact of social cohesion and women's empowerment programming on attitudes and perceptions of violent extremism, its causes and consequences, and approaches to countering and preventing it. The limitation of the study is that the six sites are not directly comparable, 'most similar' communities. We have not been able to control for all other factors affecting the research findings on awareness of violent extremism, individual and community empowerment and P/CVE engagement. However, despite this limitation, the mixed-method approach has been able to triangulate and tease out some of the causal pathways between more empowered women and more peaceful, cohesive communities, which are critical for preventing violent extremism.

2.1 Research design and methodology

Three overarching questions framed the research:

Are there gender differences in support, participation and perception of terrorist and violent extremist groups as well as efforts to counter or prevent their threat?

1. To what extent are there gender differences in the nature of support (and is support shaped by structural grievances or proximate incentives)?
2. How far and in what ways are women, including women's organisations and civil society groups, able to observe early warning signs and work to prevent and counter violent extremism?

These overarching questions were intended to elicit perceptions and experiences within the chosen communities of violent extremism and of efforts to prevent and counter its threat. They are also intended to illuminate the gender dynamics of violent extremism and P/CVE approaches, in order to better understand violent extremism and what opportunities and untapped potential exists to counter and prevent it.

2.2
Research design and data collection

The study adopted a mixed-method approach, combining survey analysis and qualitative research in six communities in Bangladesh and Indonesia (two in each country where the UN Women programme has been implemented and one in each country where there has not yet been any such programming), with roughly equal numbers of male and female participants. The methods included:

1. A **survey**, administered in all sites in both Bangladesh and Indonesia consisting of 100 respondents in each of the three sites (Dinajpur, Sathkira and Rangpur) in Bangladesh with equal numbers of women and men in each and 386 respondents in Indonesia, with 52 men and 107 women in Klaten, 54 men and 74 women in Sumenep, and 48 men and 51 women in Depok. The additional surveys in Indonesia beyond the 100 per site threshold adds to the rigor of our findings;
2. **Participant observation** with between four and six observations in each of the four UN Women programme sites;
3. **Key informant interviews** in all six sites; and
4. **Community focus group discussions,** including seven in Indonesia and ten in Bangladesh involving women only, and mixed male and female groups.

2.3
Feminist methods of analysis

The research presented here used a rigorous, mixed method analysis of an extensive qualitative dataset, comprising focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KII), as well as observations. Research participants included individual women and men, members and leaders of community groups, school teachers, lecturers, male and female students, and members of religious, social and economic organisations. It was acknowledged that women are not a homogenous category, and a feminist research ethic is attentive to the diversity and intersectionality of women's identities (Ackerly and True 2010).

In line with a feminist research ethic, our research sought to empower young researchers from in-country research partners, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia and Oxfam in Bangladesh, and to share expertise and ideas (True and Eddyono 2017, Ackerly and True 2010). The teams in Indonesia and Bangladesh were able to draw on their extensive networks to select participants and work with communities and UN Women's implementing partners for the programme 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities,' to gather data through KIIs, FGDs and observations, analyse this qualitative data, and contribute to preliminary research reports. The FGDs were led by in-country partners, and discussed attitudes, understandings and causes of iolent extremism, whereby facilitators could use their expertise to hone in on particular gender dynamics of violent extremism and its prevention. Likewise, facilitators' expertise enabled them to draw out apposite findings from their observations and guide KII participants to engage with the core issues under scrutiny for this project.[4]

2.3.1
Quantitative analysis

The survey data was analysed using statistical software programs (STATA and SPSS). Of interest in this study was the effect of the UN Women programme on raising women's sense of self-efficacy (empowerment) with respect to addressing and/or reporting violent extremism. We developed two psychometrically sound scales for assessing two different forms of self-efficacy related to preventing violent extremism.[5]

The first form of self-efficacy (empowerment) captured *'confidence'* in reporting concerns about people involved in violent extremism and supporting community or government-led P/CVE initiatives. This 'confidence self-efficacy' scale included items, such as, 'I am confident that my community would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism'. The second form of self-efficacy (empowerment) centred on peoples' perception that they had the *'knowledge and skills'* to combat violent extremism. This 'knowledge' self-efficacy included statements, such as, 'I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community.' Given the UN Women programme was designed to increase empowerment in communities, we first examined whether the two forms of self-efficacy were higher in the UN Women programme sites compared with the non-UN Women pro-

gramme sites. We also assessed whether this effect may have been higher in men as compared to women, given existing structural gender inequalities and the fact that prevalent gender discrimination against women are known to undermine their autonomy and social status (see Davies and True 2015). In order to test the main effects of gender differences (male versus female) and differences in the types of sites (UN Women programme site versus non-UN Women programme site) on 'confidence self-efficacy,' we conducted two by two, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA).

2.3.2
Qualitative analysis

In terms of the qualitative data, researchers used an overarching feminist research methodology to analyse the FGDs, KIIs and participant observations in several steps. Accordingly, this research uses gender analysis to explore gendered ideas and gender-specific experiences of men and women as they encounter, counter and prevent violent extremism. Research on violent extremism that fails to analyse gender dynamics is incomplete, especially because violent extremist groups use gender regressive ideologies to recruit, garner support and extract resources. Indeed, recent gender-based research has shown that gender analysis is vital in analysing and explaining violent extremism at the level of the everyday, its links and origins within the household, and because it can reveal less visible warning signs for extremism and violence (True and Eddyono 2017). Since a feminist research methodology seeks to both uncover and transform power relations, it is well positioned to understand gender dynamics and support women and men to counter violent extremism using non-military, whole of government and civil society approaches (True and Eddyono 2017, 22). A feminist research methodology starts by asking questions attentive to gendered structural power (Ackerly and True 2010); here, questions pertaining to the gendered differences in support for, experiences of, and understandings of violent extremism and fundamentalism. The first analytical sweep involved dissecting the data according to the research questions (gender differences in data) and in conjunction with the quantitative analysis using STATA. The research questions are part of a gender analysis and therefore aim to disaggregate the gender dynamics of violent extremism by examining men's and women's different attitudes to, and understandings of, violent extremism. Gender analysis involved looking at, for example men's and women's responses to explicit questions regarding gender and violent extremism. The research questions further intended to investigate how the gendered division of labour and gender role expectations drive support for countering violent extremism. The gender analysis also involved digging deeper into areas where survey data pointed to statistically significant differences in their responses and looking at the specific political context of these different responses.

In addition to the triangulation between the quantitative survey results and the qualitative field research data, we made use of NVivo qualitative data analysis software to assess some of the most common themes discussed in FGDs and KIIs. The themes matched up in important ways with the research questions. For example, poverty was considered by many respondents to be a crucial factor in violent extremism, but this is not a simple causal relation, but rather complicated by relative poverty, unmet expectations and the gendered political dynamics in each site.

2.4
Research ethics

Ethics approval was granted by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC) – approval number CF16/1011-2016000540 – from 25 September 2017 until 7 April 2021. All research participants provided informed consent to be included in this study. However, quotes are only attributed by location and to the type of respondent to ensure that all data is de-identified, ensuring confidentiality and adherence to ethical standards that protect the participants from harm. Research questions and the research design were discussed with participants, sometimes at length, using a written explanatory statement on the project in Indonesian or Bengali with explanations provided in additional languages (in Indonesia) where necessary. Participants had an opportunity to ask any questions and to withdraw their participation at any point.

3 VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA AND BANGLADESH: BACKGROUND

3.1 Indonesia

As True and Eddyono (2017) have described, globalising, trans-regional and geopolitical trends have seen an uptick in religious fundamentalism in Indonesia, with seventeen terrorist attacks since 2012, and a flourishing of groups committed to politico-religious changes by violent and non-violent means. Violent extremism linked to political groups has a longer history in the country, however. Legacies of violence between different streams of political Islam continue to shape the competition for political power in post-authoritarian Indonesia. While there are diverse Islamic political parties and groups, right-wing parties tend to be associated with Islamic populism and violence (Hadiz 2018). The most-deadly episode of political violence in Indonesian history, the 1965 massacre, was committed by militias affiliated to the orthodox stream of Indonesian Islam and led by influential landholders with links to the established Muslim religious hierarchy and right-wing parties (Cribb 1990, 121). The 1965 massacre marked the establishment of Suharto's secular and authoritarian New Order. Subsequently, the New Order both rigorously policed and tried to shape political Islam to reinforce its rule (Hadiz 2008).

In this context, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) is associated with an orthodox stream of Indonesian Islam, and has strong links to landowners and religious teachers in rural Java regarded as being associated with Islamic populism and violence. Groups associated with right-wing parties are also orthodox Islamic, including more scriptural groups, which range from the mainstream *Muhammadiyah* to groups with more fundamentalist and literal interpretations of scripture. Political campaigns often involve different streams of political Islam and take place in the education sector, with Islamic boarding schools, universities and teachers affiliated with NU, *Muhammadiyah*, fundamentalist groups, and more secular state-based institutions competing for students, allegiances and power. Islamic politics in educational institutions provides an important background to the present study.

While the association between violent extremism and political groups has a historical dimension in Indonesia, recent years have witnessed the development of a continuum between fundamentalism, extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia (True and Eddyono 2017). There is a relationship between the rise of fundamentalist political ideologies – which are conservative and patriarchal – and rising extremism. At the same time, there is continuity between extremist ideologies, violent gangs and vigilante groups, and political parties. There are a number of violent extremist, vigilante organisations/gangs operating at various levels of formality in Indonesia, which seek to uphold conservative or fundamentalist religious ideologies (Wilson 2016). These organisations/gangs, such as the *Front Pembela Islam*, have links to wealthy politicians and so are significant in the Indonesian political landscape (Jones 2016). One of these groups, important to the background of this study because of its political influence in Depok, is *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party. PKS is a political party, founded in 2004, and affiliated with scriptural Islamist groups outside the mainstream groups of NU and Muhammadiyah. PKS originally had links to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. PKS secured around eight per cent of the vote in the 2014 parliamentary elections, and supported Anies Baswedan's successful 2017 campaign for Governor of Jakarta. In the context of the continuum between fundamentalism, extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia, it is important to note that political parties and non-state violent groups in Indonesia often organise around gender regressive agendas, including restricting women's movements and dress, hate speech and acts of gender-based violence (True and Eddyono 2017).

3.2
Bangladesh

Historically in Bangladesh too, the state has developed in the context of widespread, religious-based political violence. The 1970 Bangladesh Liberation War sought to establish a secular state independent of Pakistan. During the war, Pakistan armed militias aligned to the right wing Islamic *Jemaat-e-Islami*, were responsible for extensive political violence, killings, conflict-related sexual violence and other war crimes. Opposing them and fighting for an independent, secular Bangladesh was the Awami League. After independence, the Awami League ruled from 1971 to 1975, at which point a military coup deposed them. During military rule in Bangladesh (1975-1991), Islamic parties such as *Jemaat-e-Islami* enjoyed increasing power, legitimacy and support. *Jemaat-e-Islami* continues to be a major, but currently outlawed, political force in Bangladesh, especially through its close relationship to the Bangladesh National Party (BNP).

Since taking power after a brief period of military rule (2007-2009) following Bangladesh's return to democratic rule in 1991, the Awami League has used state security forces to crack down on the opposition BNP and its affiliate, *Jemaat-e-Islami*. Fifteen men, including several *Jemaat-e-Islami* leaders have been controversially executed over the last decade for war crimes committed in the 1970s, spurring rioting and political violence from their supporters. Responses to these episodes demonstrate that the 'public is aware' that violence and extremism is also conducted by the state, not just non-state actors, and that coercive responses 'fuel the cycle' of political violence (True and Eddyono 2017, 23).

Again, like in Indonesia, upholding a patriarchal order is a key rallying point for many violent groups in Bangladesh. One example is the populist right wing Islamic party, *Hefazat-e-Islam*, which was formed to lobby against any moves to give Muslim women equal rights in inheritance or to reform the religious-led education sector (Griffiths and Hasan 2015). Indeed, as Goetz and Jenkins (2016) highlight, concessions to religious conservatives on issues affecting women, including inheritance, by state representatives has been a feature of Bangladeshi peace settlements over many decades.

Another similarity to Indonesia when examining violent extremism in Bangladesh is the role of religious educational institutions. Bangladesh has a large, privately-run but state-funded Islamic boarding school system, and a smaller, independent religious school sector. These are of varying quality with three important implications for the current study. First, educating children in religious schools is correlated with gender regressive outcomes for family planning, education attainment and labour force participation in Bangladesh (Asadulla, Chaudhury and Rashed 2009). Second, because religious schools do not produce consistent education outcomes, they encourage the feelings of 'unmet expectations,' which Bangladeshi participants identify as a cause of violent extremism (see research finding 2 below). Third, the schools themselves, teachers or leaders, might encourage fundamentalist or extremist ideology, which exists on a continuum alongside violent extremism (True and Eddyono 2017).

3.3
Selection of sites

The six research sites, three in Bangladesh and three in Indonesia, were selected to include variation of rural and urban contexts, low and middle-class income groups, the status of women, heterogeneity or homogeneity of religious beliefs in the society, and religious culture. In each country, the research sites were comprised of two sites where the UN Women programme is being implemented (hereafter referred to as a 'programme site'), and one site where there has been no such or similar programming (hereafter referred to as a 'non-programme site'). Two of the sites were rural and one was urban, to provide a different in context and allow for comparison across sites. Using two country-level cases allows the researchers to probe commonalties and differences necessary for building a robust evidence base for empowerment projects in contexts of violent extremism. A gender analysis adds to this comparison because it disaggregates the responses of men and women across sites, which unearths novel gender-based factors and variables for understanding violent extremism.

Table 1: UN Women programme and non-programme sites

	Indonesia	Bangladesh
UN Women research sites	1. Klaten, Central Java 2. Sumenep, Eastern Java	1. Dinajpur, Northern Bangladesh 2. Sathkhira, Southwestern Bangladesh
Non-research site	3. Depok, (urban) West Java	3. Rangpur City (urban), Northern Bangladesh

3.4 Indonesia

In Indonesia, the three research sites are Klaten district (Central Java Province), Sumenep district (East Java Province) and Depok district (West Java Province). Klaten and Sumenep are UN Women programme sites, while Depok is a non-programme site.

3.4.1. Klaten

Klaten is a rural area, with a variety of agricultural activities including wet-rice cultivation, fruit and vegetable crops. Research was conducted in three villages: Jetis, Nglinggi and Gemblegan. They were elected as multicultural villages by the *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (the Forum for Religious Diversity).[6] Two of the villages, Jetis and Ngelinggi, are led by elected Catholic village leaders, demonstrating community support from a Muslim-majority population. This is in contrast to the recent electoral defeat and jailing of the Christian ex-Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, for blasphemy. Local leadership also supports community cultural and religious activities, which have become key spaces where people of different religious and cultural backgrounds can interact. Klaten thus has several different religious identities (orthodox Islam, syncretic Javanese Islam and Christianity). These identities can exist within a single family, pointing to the fact that the community here is well integrated. This is despite the fact that peace and tolerance has not always been a feature of Klaten, as it was historically the site where the 1965 killings began (Cribb 1990, 121).

In Klaten, as in much of Indonesia, women's microfinance groups are long established. Women's economic participation primarily takes the form of food and handicraft production.

3.4.2. Sumenep

Sumenep is rural district on the eastern edge of Java on the island of Madura. Research was conducted in three villages: Payudan Dundang, Prancak and Guluk-Guluk. Economic activity in the research sites in Sumenep largely comprises agricultural work and farmers use traditional, often non-mechanised, methods of farming.

The population of Sumenep is predominantly Muslim and has a strong association with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a socio-religious organisation.[7] Religious leadership (*Kyai* or *Ustadz)* plays a significant role in the community, and this role becomes more visible during local and national elections, where religious leaders have strong influence over the voting decisions of those within their communities. Sumenep also has many Islamic boarding schools. For example, the largest, *Annuqayah*, was founded in 1887 and has about 8,000 students in attendance, making it one of the largest Islamic boarding schools in Java. The political economy of Sumenep is dominated by the Islamic boarding schools' leaders (*kyai)*, who are the major landowners in the area and the kin-linked long-standing dominant elite (Budiwiranto 2007).

In Sumenep, a stricter interpretation of Islamic doctrine, and strong gender role stereotyping affects women's roles and participation within their communities, and issues like child marriage are a concern.

3.4.3. Depok

Depok is the non-programme site for the Indonesia study, and is also an urban site. Depok is a significant area in West Java as it is the neighbouring city of Jakarta and has a large and well-known university (*Universitas Indonesia* or UI) as well as a number of other tertiary education institutions. Its education sector means the research participants were often wealthier and better educated. It is a very diverse urban community. In Depok, there is a significant presence of PKS. Most Depok locals are PKS members who promote Islamic values in their policies and programmes, and the Mayor of Depok is a prominent PKS member. There is not a visible women's movement in the city, but several activists (including female activists) reside in Depok. The right-wing Islamic vigilante group, *Front Pembela Islam*, has staged several violent protest

actions, including in Depok. This has included vigilante actions against brothels, attacks on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) community and human rights defenders, as well as repeatedly closing a mosque in Depok they consider to be practicing a heretical Islamic faith.[8] Depok is a city situated in Bogor regency, which is the base of *Hizbuttahrir* of Indonesia,[9] especially at Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). *The* Jokowi government banned *Hizbuttahrir in 2017*, but the organisation has an extensive network through various campus organisations.

3.5 Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the study was conducted in three locations: Dinajpur, Sathkhira and Rangpur. The two UN Women programme sites were Dinajpur and Sathkhira, and the non-programme site was Rangpur.

3.5.1. Dinajpur

In Dinajpur, the research was completed in two rural districts (*Upazila*): Nawabganj and Ghoraghat. Economic activity in rural Dinajpur is reliant on agriculture (wet rice production, mangoes, lychees), and there is also coal mining in the area.

During the Indian Partition in 1947, Dinajpur was divided along religious lines into a predominantly Muslim Bengali half, and a predominantly Hindu Indian half. These events led to large-scale religio-political violence, killings and displacement in the area. Currently, while there is diversity in the religious make-up of the area, most of the population identifies as Muslim. In the period following independence, important BNP leaders, including former female Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991-1996 and 2001-2006), were born in Dinajpur. There is a history of violent extremism in this region and attacks (predominantly through destruction of businesses and homes) have been carried out by extremist groups against the Hindu minority in some parts of Dinajpur.

In the post-war context, with extremely low levels of services and development assistance, a number of civil society groups arose in Bangladesh. These included famous NGOs/microfinance institutions such as BRAC and the Grameen Bank. BRAC is now the largest NGO and second largest microfinance institution in Bangladesh. BRAC has around 143,000 microfinance clients in Dinajpur, with a portfolio of around USD 83,000,000 (BRAC 2017). There are current efforts by the government and partner NGOs to work on development projects in Dinajpur, relating to access to electricity, healthcare and water.

3.5.2. Sathkhira

In Sathkhira, the research was conducted in two rural districts: Debhata and Sathkhira Sadar. Sathkhira lies on the border with India on a fertile, alluvial floodplain. Livelihoods are dependent on agriculture, fishing and shrimp farming. Sathkhira is a site for *gher*, a traditional form of agriculture that uses rice fields for fish farming. Sathkhira is prone to floods, salinity intrusion and cyclones (UNICEF 2014). The population here also represents a mix of religions, with Muslims again making up the majority of the population.

Sathkhira has experienced lethal attacks by violent extremists, which have led to the use of deadly force in response from the police in recent years. Sathkhira Sadar in particular is home to a number of cultural organisations, including active women's groups and theatre groups. Again, BRAC, among others, provides microfinance in the district. There are around 70,000 microfinance clients in Satkhira. BRAC also provides a variety of development services such as health centres, libraries, water and sanitation programmes.

3.5.3. Rangpur

Rangpur is a major city in Bangladesh and is the non-programme site in the country for this study. In this site, the research was conducted in the district of Taraganj. Rangpur has commercial, banking, manufacturing and service sectors. There is one public university. It is a multi-lingual district, and the majority of inhabitants speak Rangpuri or Bengali, though other languages are spoken by smaller communities. Most residents are Muslim, though it has a sizeable Hindu minority and a smaller minority of Christians. Muslims here make up a bigger majority than the other districts in this study.

Rangpur has experienced various forms of political unrest, violence and violent extremism. On 7 January 2014, activists

of the BNP and the *Jamaat-e-Islami* destroyed two houses and five shops belonging to the Hindus in Kuptola Union of Gaibandha Sadar Upazila in Gaibandha District. Five people were injured in the attack. In Rangpur, on 14 January 2015, five people including a child, were burnt to death and 15 others were injured as a result of a petrol bomb thrown by members of a BNP-led 20-party alliance. In late 2017, religious extremists called for attacks on the Hindu minority population in Rangpur (though in Thakurpara village, rather than Taraganj), and have relied on using public forms of communication (loudspeaker) as well as Facebook to spread their views.

In terms of women's economic empowerment initiatives, BRAC has nearly 90,000 clients in Rangpur, with a loan portfolio of around USD 1,000,000 (BRAC 2016). Manufacturing employs a number of women. For example, handicrafts and textile company, Karupnnya Rangpur Ltd., is based in Rangpur and employs over 5,000 people, including a considerable number of women. Nonetheless, Rangpur is one of the poorest districts in Bangladesh (BRAC 2016).

3.6 Research findings

3.6.1 Perceptions and attitudes toward violent extremism

Across all research sites almost half of all survey respondents – equal proportions of men and women – considered extremism and violent extremism to '*not be a problem at all*' in their community.[10] However, when the question changed to '*is it a problem in your country*' over two-thirds of all respondents in Bangladesh (70 per cent) said it was '*a very big problem*' (a little over one third of all respondents agreed in Indonesia – 36 per cent).[11]

Qualitative research corroborates these survey findings. For example, in Indonesia most respondents said that violent extremism did not exist in their communities, but that fundamentalist and radical ideologies did in a number of ways. Participants recognised the differences between violent extremism, fundamentalist ideologies and radical movements. Nonetheless, many saw linkages between these distinct phenomena. For instance, in two of three of sites in Indonesia (Klaten and Depok), both men and women saw that fundamentalism and its rise are potential threats that can lead to violent extremism and as such needs to be prevented. This finding about the continuum of fundamentalism, extremism and violent extremism echoes previous research (True and Eddyono 2017). Only in Sumenep, did community members not openly discuss any connection between fundamentalism and violent extremism. In this site, the district local government had not taken any concrete measures to prevent violent extremism by promoting diversity and tolerance, for instance, prior to the current UN Women's programme.

BOX 3

Women mention novel indicators of rising (violent) extremism

Several interesting early warning indicators for the spread of extremist ideologies were flagged by women during qualitative interviews. They included:

- Domestic violence and children not talking to their mothers
- People becoming 'aloof' and/or separating themselves from their communities for periods of time
- Violence during elections, including threats to steal property and animals
- The connection between elections, and a sudden uptick in the activity of vigilante groups and violence
- Sudden acquisition of money and wealth, especially by youth
- The exclusive use of mosques by people on university campuses
- Husbands controlling women's behaviour, particularly relating to clothing

The survey showed significant differences between men and women in Indonesia, and between programme and non-programme sites, in support of the statement (attached to a scenario): '*How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?*'[12] More women strongly disagreed with the statement, especially in the programme sites (in Indonesia 44 per cent of all women compared with 40 per cent of all men, with the difference being statistically significant). Women's attitudes are more well-disposed to P/CVE than men's, according to this finding, which also suggests the impact of the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme in bolstering their opposition to the use of violence.

Further evidence of gender differences and differences between the programme and non-programme sites in support for violent extremism is suggested by the fact that fewer women (48 per cent) than men (59 per cent) agreed with the statement that '*Violent extremism is caused by the way Muslims are treated in the West.*'[13] The fact that fewer women agreed with the seemingly anti-Western statement than men, makes them potentially more open to international P/CVE initiatives or those supported or funded by Western or non-Muslim actors.

Novel indicators of rising extremism and violent extremism were raised in qualitative research by women and men. In Bangladesh, women noted domestic violence and children 'not talking with [their] mother' were indicators, alongside people becoming aloof and/or separating themselves from their communities for periods of time. This 'aloofness' was something many respondents alluded to, both female and male across all sites mentioned, and is something the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme can help effectively address through promoting dialogue and raising awareness.

In Indonesian FGDs, early warning signs mentioned included violence during elections, such as threats to steal property or animals if the person would not vote for a certain candidate. Respondents in Klaten observed the connection between politics, crime and vigilante groups, noting that 'those who lose [in the election] will tell the thugs to rob' the villagers in retribution. Suddenly having money was seen as an indicator among all groups that a person may have started working for an extremist group. For instance, a female respondent in a FGD in Debhata stated: "If youth suddenly start to earn more money, they should be monitored properly. How they are earning money and how they are spending it? We should try to investigate that." Other early warning signs included the exclusive use of mosques on university campuses, judging people negatively because they are different, and teaching very young children at school to hate others. This final indicator is also part of the context of the role that educational institutions play in both preventing and increasing violent extremism. Finally, as other research has found, controlling women's behaviour was also seen as an early warning sign (True and Eddyono 2017). This included a husband not allowing his wife to participate in community events because as one person stated, "it will not assist her in the afterlife."[14] Echoing earlier research in Indonesia, where 'women's concern for warning signs of radicalisation is the *judgement* as well as the *coercive direction* about *what not* to wear' (True and Eddyono 2017, 23), in Bangladesh women pointed more to the overlap of controlling women's behaviour as being an indicator of extremism. In Djanapur, one woman said:

> "I know that my behaviour and the way I lead my life is correct. But if someone says that I am doing wrong or says my behaviour is wrong and makes bad comment that means he is into fundamentalist ideology."

In terms of survey responses, there was a small but significant difference between males (mean=12.4) and females (mean=12.6).[15] This gender difference is explained by an interaction effect, where women in the non-programme sites reported stronger affirmative responses to the question on how much of a problem extremism and violent extremism are in their community and country, as compared to all other groups.

FIGURE 1

People perceive violent extremism as a big problem in their countries, but not their communities

Perception of violent extremism as a big problem



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018) "Building an Evidence Base on Empowering Women for Peaceful Communities" Commissioned by UN Women, forthcoming.

3.6.2
Gender differences in perceptions of causes of violent extremism

More women than men across all the research sites agreed that violent extremism is caused by poverty and inequality (41 per cent compared with 31 per cent),[16] and this gender difference was statistically significant. A female respondent in Satkhira sums up this perception:

> "There are many types of problems in our village and poverty is the most crucial one. When someone is living in abject poverty and some random person comes to him and tells him to do something and in return offers him a handsome amount of money, the poverty-stricken person gets manipulated very easily. This is how [violent extremism] is spreading here."

When asked specifically if women, men and young people engage in violent extremism because of poverty and inequality, women agreed to a greater extent than men in the communities studied. For instance, with respect to young people, 38 per cent of women strongly agreed with the statement compared with 24 per cent of men.[17] Women also more strongly agreed that women and young people engage in violent extremism because they have limited access to job opportunities (40 per cent compared with 23 per cent[18]). In one case in Djanupur, echoing findings in True and Eddyono (2017), motivations for women to get involved in violent extremism also included poverty linked to domestic violence:

> "... women are tortured by their husbands and suffer from poverty. Their needs are not met and as a result they leave their family and get involved in bad things to earn money. They may get involved in this kind of activities."

Moreover, in Rangpur, Bangladesh, 56 per cent of women compared with 39 per cent of women in the UN Women programme sites strongly agreed that poverty and inequality are causes of violent extremism, a statistically significant difference.[19]

In the non-programme sites in both Indonesia and Bangladesh, Depok and Rangpur, respectively, which are both urban, substantially more women than men (38 per cent compared with 8 per cent[20]) strongly agreed that young people engage in violent extremism due to limited access to job opportunities with the difference being statistically significant. A young woman from Rangpur suggested:

> "People are becoming extremists, especially university students, because of unemployment."

FIGURE 2

More women than men strongly agree that poverty, inequality and limited access to job opportunities are part of the causes of violent extremism

Strong agreement with the statements, by sex



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

This finding corroborates our qualitative research that suggests parents, and mothers in particular, are concerned about the future prospects of their sons and daughters. Although poverty was considered a driver, unemployment and lack of opportunity was also seen as driving 'affluent' youth towards joining extremist groups (noted in particular in the FGD with mothers in Rangpur). Feelings of 'unmet expectations' are thus seen as critical to fuelling violent extremism. Women as mothers are typically more directly involved with their children and young adults, and interacting with educational institutions. It is not surprising, therefore, that they express stronger agreement than

men about the lack of access to job opportunities as a potential driver of violent extremism. In the FGD with mothers in Rangpur, one respondent claimed violent extremism was caused by:

> "... scarcity and needs from poverty. Sometimes the extremist leaders offer fake job opportunities and this attracts a huge number of people towards them. Sometimes people sell their assets to get a job, but often times they do not get any. It makes them depressed and this depression works as a motivation to join the extremist groups."

FIGURE 3

Women and men in UN Women programme sites tend to agree more with the statement that "most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the community"(as compared to non-programme sites)

Agreement that most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the community

Note: the scales of agreement in Bangladesh and Indonesia were different; Bangladesh had only two categories (agreement/disagreement) and Indonesia had a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

3.6.3 Gender differences in perceptions of the community's role in P/CVE

We found significant gender differences, as well as differences between programme and non-programme sites, in response to the statement that '*most initiatives to counter or prevent extremism are led by the community.*'

In Bangladesh, just 58 per cent of men in the non-programme site (Rangpur) agreed with the statement, compared with 94 per cent of women in the non-programme site, and 90 per cent of men and 90 per cent women, respectively, in the programme sites.[21] This finding was strongly supported by qualitative data: women in Bangladesh programme sites were much more likely than men or those in non-programme sites to think the community has a key role to play in P/CVE.

Across the whole survey there is a significant relationship between those who agree with the statement (and related statements) that *'violence is never a solution to problems and extremist groups needs to be stopped'* and agreement with statements about government support and cooperation with communities on P/CVE initiatives. The correlation was especially strong in UN Women programme sites. Men in programme sites were more vocal about the role of formal, governmental actors in P/CVE, suggesting a key gender difference. By contrast, women in non-programme sites did not appear aware that their roles in the community, such as raising awareness of women's education, child marriage and dowry issues, actually contributed to P/CVE.

In Indonesia, just 16 per cent of women in the non-programme site strongly agreed that the community leads most P/CVE initiatives compared to 44 per cent in the two programme sites. Women in the two programme sites were also more likely to agree with the statement than men (44 per cent compared with 32 per cent),[22] indicating a significant gender difference. FGDs highlighted that it is easier to involve women than men in P/CVE community activities due to cultural norms that enable informal engagement with women; engagement with men, on the other hand, tends to be more formal, sometimes requiring invitation from the head of the village or other leadership. Due to men's, on average, greater engagement in formal, paid work, women were more likely to be available to take part in community activities. This point was also consistently made in Bangla-

desh. Bangladeshi men gave many reasons for their limited engagement compared with women, many of whom articulated the roles they had in P/CVE during the FGDs. Some men said they did not have enough time to engage in PVE or were concerned about ramifications (such as 'chaos in society') of involvement beyond sharing names with officials.[23]

FIGURE 4

Men perceive violent extremism as a bigger problem in their community than women in Indonesia, but the opposite is true in Bangladesh

Perception of violent extremism as a problem in community, by sex



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

However, women's participation in P/CVE is determined by context and not ensured due to their greater availability and engagement in informal social networks. For instance, in Sumenep, where there is stricter gender segregation in roles and activities due to the more conservative nature of the community, their husbands may still prevent some women from participating in community activities. Overall, women's roles and social networks can be seen as informal mechanisms for P/CVE, which are not as open or available to men. As such, they should be recognised and harnessed in approaches to PVE.

Women's stronger perception of community leadership on P/CVE aligned with their seemingly greater engagement in P/CVE at the community level, especially in the programme sites. In programme sites, women were more engaged in P/CVE and were much more likely to stress the value of communities, families and mothers in prevention, while men were less involved and more likely to credit formal institutions for P/CVE.

3.6.4 The important role of mothers

KIIs and FGDs in Bangladesh and Indonesia strongly highlighted the role of mothers. Indeed, mothers were often perceived to have the most important role in PVE by many research participants. For instance, in Dinajpur, Bangladesh, one participant stated that "because women are at home and, if she is knowledgeable about violent extremism and has a good relationship with her children, she can help steer them away from extremist ideologies."

Mothers were seen to be particularly effective in this regard because of their ability to observe their children over time: "Only a mother can understand the changes her child is going through and only she can bring them back. Only she can tell the difference between yesterday and today." Women participants in another Dinajpur FGD said that because men are busy and often outside the homes, and "a mother is always there for her children," she hears "when [her son] starts to say emotional things" and thus best able to prevent violent extremism. The gender division of labour means that mothers are held responsible for children's activities, whereabouts and wellbeing.

In Djanapur for example, one FGD participant said: "Fathers are often absent from home, or feel that it is the mother's job to interact with the children." Another participant described it further:

> "A mother can understand if her son is on the right path or not. She can understand by looking at his face and through his behaviour."

BOX 4

Women can counteract extremist messages in educational institutions in Indonesia

In Depok, Indonesia, one discussion focused on how mothers can stop bigotry. The discussion began as a mother retold the story about how teachers at her child's school teach their students to hate others who are different, even stating that killing kafirs or hypocrites would be acceptable. In this case, women participants attempted to use their influence as mothers to counteract the messages communicated in such prayer groups that instil particularly intolerant values. In that sense, tolerant mothers can help bolster the critical thinking skills of their children when faced with intolerant worldviews.

Another example, involved a woman who attempted to counteract fundamentalist teaching when her daughter went to a prayer session held by an *ustadz*, or qualified Islamic scholar. She mentioned how during the prayer sessions, her daughter's grandfather came to know how the *ustadz* was 'delivering misleading teachings.' The mother then described how she coincidentally knew another *ustadz* and attempted to introduce him into the prayer session: 'when we held a prayer session in the Cilembar area, I brought the *ustadz* there. Most of the pupils could accept and understand what he was delivering, because his sermons were relatable to their daily routine and did not contain misguided teachings.'

Unfortunately however, the woman was not able to replace the previous *ustadz*. In fact, the university continued to support the original *ustadz*. However, her attempt to counteract the prevailing narrative demonstrates the many ways in which women stand at the crux of the messages that educational institutions instill in youth and raise possibilities for how they can be further supported in advancing a counter-narrative against extremism.

A still further respondent added: "A mother is always there for her children. Fathers are busy outside most of the time."

Meanwhile, fathers in Dinajpur confirmed that it was the mother's responsibility to check up on children's behaviour, with one person stating:

> "A mother is most concerned about her children's well-being. She takes care of everything. I am a labourer. I leave early in the morning. I cannot always check by calling home what my children are doing."

Other women in the Bangladeshi FGD underscored the importance of women engaging in P/CVE initiatives, explaining that women had previously stayed in the home and were not aware of such things as P/CVE efforts. Crediting the work of BRAC, one respondent said: "Now I can tell these things to others and create awareness. I got this experience and I am very happy about this." Women participants mentioned that women have a key role to play in P/CVE because they have a particular responsibility in the home and are able to monitor and check the behaviour of husbands, brothers and children (notably, some participants assumed that only men are radicalised).

Many respondents in Bangladesh pointed to the role of money in violent extremism (indicating that poverty or greed was a key motivating factor). As one mother said, "parents create pressure on children since they are not getting money." Another respondent in Djanapur said that to allay concerns about money: "A child might say to his mother, 'don't be sad, think of it as a sacrifice to Allah. Don't worry about your future. Allah will show you the way. I will meet you in Jannat.'" They acknowledged, "these are the signs that show that the children are going wayward" or becoming radicalised. Parents can counteract extremism, but the expectation that sons, in particular, provide livelihoods to support their families and their parents as part of their filial piety and responsibility may work against efforts to combat violent extremism.

Indonesian FGDs reflected comparable ideas that that the role of the mother is significant in educating children and protecting them from fundamentalist ideology. Women, as mothers with the gendered division of labour in child-rearing similar to that in Bangladesh, are also seen as those who mediate between families and educational institutions.

The example in Box 4 highlights the tension that sometimes exists between parents and educational institutions. Aside from extremist and intolerant ideologies being communicated

through some such institutions, sometimes students are actively targeted in both Bangladesh and Indonesia, for recruitment into vigilante and extremist organisations. Both those from poorer backgrounds may be targeted with the promise of money, as well as those from affluent backgrounds. In Indonesia, respondents said 'intelligent children are often targeted' for recruitment into extremist organisations.

With respect to the second example highlighted in the box above, similar issues of the reluctance of educational institutions to address community concerns about extremist teachings were reported by the head of the village in Sumenup. The village head suggested that although *kyai* and Islamic boarding schools had a role to play in P/CVE, the '*kyai* himself is reluctant to prevent such issues'.
Aside from the key direct role women have in P/CVE, initiatives to economically empower women were bolstering women's decision-making roles within their families, where the husband is often seen as the head, by allowing them to contribute financially to the household. This was observed by mothers in Klaten and Sumenep in Indonesia. In Bangladeshi FGDs, this economic empowerment was regarded by many participants, notably male, as contributing to easing tensions within the family and thus the wider community, and by extension, having implications for security. Conversely, there is the perception that those women who are not economically empowered are at increased risk of domestic violence. This was highlighted by a number of respondents, particularly in Sumenep, who indicated that stress associated with poverty contributes to domestic violence and that women's economic dependence on men can also help create conditions conducive to domestic violence. Others saw that the political empowerment resulting from economic empowerment, which gives women a voice and increases her confidence, could have a direct and positive impact on reducing violence, both in the home and in wider society.[24]

3.6.5
Empowerment and self-efficacy in P/CVE

Individual self-efficacy or empowerment is indicated by responses to the survey question *"I would feel confident in joining a community initiative to counter or prevent extremism."* In Indonesia, there was much greater confidence in joining a community P/CVE initiative expressed by respondents in programme sites. Women's responses in programme sites largely explain this greater confidence. For example, in Depok, the non-programme site, just 33 per cent of women strongly agreed with the statement compared with 61 per cent of women in both programme sites, Sumenep and Klaten.[25]

There was also a significant difference on the 'confidence self-efficacy' scale between programme and non-programme sites, with people in the programme sites reporting higher confidence self-efficacy than people in the non- programme sites.[26] In other words, people in programme sites feel more confident than those in non-programme sites in joining a community initiative to counter or prevent extremism. As shown in figure 5, women in the programme sites have higher confidence and self-efficacy to join a P/CVE initiative or report violent extremism than women in the non-programme sites.[27]

FIGURE 5

Women and men in programme sites have higher levels of self-efficacy to join a C/PVE initiative (as compared to non-programme sites)

*Confidence self-efficacy (mean group scores)**

Note: The confidence self-efficacy scale is a 6-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I am confident that my community would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding reporting violent extremism, with a sample size of n=686. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .78), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.54).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

The survey results further suggest that across sites people are slightly more confident about joining a community than a government initiative. Most importantly, people in the four programme sites in Bangladesh and Indonesia are more confident to join government initiatives than were people in the two non-programme sites (and people in Bangladesh feel more confident overall in joining a government initiative than those in Indonesia).

FGDs on similar questions of empowerment reinforce the survey responses. For example, even in Sumenep, Indonesia,

the conservative and more gender-segregated site, women's strength was emphasised, likely elicited by economic empowerment programming targeted at them for the first time. One female respondent stated: 'Many people say that women in Sumenep are weak and their positions are subordinate to men's but, in reality, women here are very strong, stronger than men, we do almost every activity at home...in the field...earning money.' Field observations of family and household relations further supported this statement. The government's 30 per cent gender quota policy was also noted as a positive influence on women's participation at village level in decisions about government programmes and activities. High levels of self-efficacy and empowerment, as evident in the survey measures, were linked to stronger disagreement with statements justifying violence on the basis of inequality (statements such as *'sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and people's needs'*). This relationship was substantially stronger for men than for women. We can therefore conclude that greater empowerment leads to a greater reluctance to use violence for political ends, especially among men.

During the FGDs in Bangladesh, female participants in programme sites said they *do have the ability to influence the people in their community to take part in P/CVE*. In contrast, while women in the non-programme sites are engaged in preventing child marriage and promoting female education, they did not see these as contributing to P/CVE. Some of those women who recognised they were contributing to P/CVE indicated that they were not listened to in their PVE efforts because of their gender, but one mentioned that with persistence, people listen. Many women said they received support from neighbours and husbands in this work, and that they did not face challenges in doing this work. However, some of their husbands initially discouraged them as they considered it to be dangerous or were doubtful or confused.

In both Bangladesh and Indonesia, gender differences were evident in responses to the statements 'I *know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family*' and '*... in my community.*' The difference with respect to prevention in the family was more marked than with respect to the community. More men agreed or strongly agreed (69 per cent) than women (53 per cent) that they have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in their community,[28] and in their families (their responses on this statement were highly correlated with their responses on 'I know what to do to prevent violent extremism').[29] There was also a strong relationship between the self-efficacy scale (see appendix 2), which aggregates agreement with statements on confidence to join a P/CVE initiative and to report concerns about violent extremism, and a higher score on the trust in institutions scale (where trust in institutions refers to the police, the law courts, the government, the media and political parties). These findings suggest the need to enhance women's knowledge and skills further especially with respect to their community actions, where they were less confident than in the family in knowing what to do to prevent violent extremism.

FIGURE 6

Women and men in UN Women programme sites feel more confident in joining community initiatives to C/PVE (as compared to non-programme sites)

Strongly agree with feeling confident in joining a community initiative to counter or prevent violent extremism, by sex and type of site

Note: The confidence self-efficacy scale is a 6-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I am confident that my community would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding reporting violent extremism, with a sample size of n=686. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .78), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.54).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

A significant finding regarding the impact of UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme is that more than half of all women in the programme sites strongly agree that they *know what to do in order to prevent violent in their families* (49 per cent of women), compared with just under a third (31 per cent) of women in non-programme sites.[30] In Bangladesh, 57 per cent of women in the programme sites said they knew what to do, compared with 32 per cent of women in the non-programme sites.[31] In Indonesia, 45 per cent of women said they knew what to do, compared with 29 per

cent of women in non-programme sites. Irrespective of gender, results indicate that more people in programme than in non-programme sites strongly indicated that they know what to do to prevent violent extremism in their families. This is borne out by the numbers: Fifty-nine per cent in programme sites agreed with the statement compared with 29 per cent in the non-programme sites in Bangladesh and 46 per cent in programme sites compared with 34 per cent in non-programme sites in Indonesia.[32] As shown in figure 7, there was also a significant difference in 'knowledge self-efficacy' between UN Women programme and non-UN Women programme sites,[33] with people in the UN Women programme sites reporting higher 'knowledge self-efficacy' than people in the non-UN Women programme sites.[34] In other words, people in programme sites are more likely to know about violent extremism and what to do to help prevent and counter the threats it poses.

FIGURE 7

Women and men in programme sites have higher levels of knowledge self-efficacy about preventing violent extremism (as compared to non-programme sites)

*Knowledge self-efficacy (mean group scores)**

Note: The knowledge/skill self-efficacy scale is a 3-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding knowing how to counter violent extremism, with a sample size of n=686. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .73), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.29).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

Significantly, these results suggest that both forms of self-efficacy or sense of empowerment (confidence and knowledge measures, see appendix 2) were higher in the UN Women programme sites compared to the non-UN Women programme sites.

It is also worth noting that both forms of self-efficacy appear to be slightly higher in men compared with women, which is what we would expect given societal gender inequalities and discriminatory norms affecting women's self-efficacy in particular.

Using statistical regression modelling, we tested the relationship between (the presence of) a UN Women programme, gender and self-efficacy/empowerment and support for P/CVE initiatives. The results showed that self-efficacy is higher both in programme sites and in women in programme versus non-programme sites, as illustrated in the above graph. Self-efficacy and empowerment were strong predictors of both women and men's support for initiatives for P/CVE and for trust in institutions.

Overall, there are large differences between programme and non-programmes sites on knowledge and capacity to prevent violent extremism in the community. Bangladeshi women were also more confident than Bangladeshi men in reporting any concerns they may have about family members being involved in violent extremism; while in Indonesia, women in the programme sites, though less confident than men to report their concerns about family members involved in violent extremism, were significantly more confident in doing so than women participants in non-programmes sites.

3.6.6 Community cohesion and trust in institutions

We expected trust in institutions to be aligned with confidence in reporting to these same institutions (police, government, community groups). In this study, we also expected that both trust and confidence in reporting would be stronger in programme than non-programme sites. We found support for both assumptions. Strikingly, among all sites, the relationship between trust in the police and confidence in reporting to the police was strongest for women in the Indonesian programme sites (closely followed by Indonesian men in the programme sites). This suggests that if women trust law and justice institutions then they are more likely to feel confident in reporting violent extremism to them and thus able to contribute to P/CVE in this way.

With respect to the univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), in the survey measures (see appendix 2) there was no significant difference in '*support for initiatives for countering violent extremism*' between males and females. However, as figure 8 shows,

there was a significant difference between programme and non-programme sites, with programme sites reporting higher support for P/CVE initiatives, than non-programme sites.[35]

FIGURE 8

Support for P/CVE initiatives

*Knowledge self-efficacy (mean group scores)**

Note: The knowledge/skill self-efficacy scale is a 3-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding knowing how to counter violent extremism, with a sample size of n=686. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .73), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.29).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

Arbitrary and politicised policing may reduce both community cohesion – through reporting community members to the police – and trust in institutions in Bangladesh. Nonetheless, as figure 9 shows, in both Bangladesh and Indonesia, people in programme sites express greater trust than those in non-programme sites, in the police and other institutions.[36]

For example, consider the contrast between these low levels of trust in the non-programme site of Rangpur, and the programme site of Dinajpur, in Bangladesh. In Dinajpur, a young man stated that: "We have to take help of the police and other people to rehabilitate extremists and to prevent it. We have to work together." Moreover, there is much higher confidence in reporting violent extremism to the police in Bangladesh than in Indonesia (91 per cent compared with 64 per cent), to a community leader (94 per cent compared with 51 per cent) and to a religious leader (89 per cent compared with 55 per cent),[37] indicating the need for improvement in public trust in these institutions and access to justice. In both countries, there is also higher confidence in the programme sites to report violent extremism to the police than to community and religious leaders (in that order).

FIGURE 9

Trust in institutions is higher for both women and men in programme sites (as compared to non-programme sites)

*Trust in institutions (mean group scores)**

Note: Trust in Institutions was assessed with a 5-item scale with participants required to indicate how much they trust (1=no trust at all to 5=a lot of trust) a range of different institutions (e.g. police, law courts, political parties) with a sample size of n=686. Higher scores represent greater trust in institutions. Reliability for the scale was good (α = .79), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.18).



Source: Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre (2018).

Reasons for lower trust in institutions between the two sites are contextual. In Bangladesh, there has been a recent upsurge in the politicisation of the policing in Bangladesh, resulting in cynicism towards the justice system (International Crisis Group 2016), as expressed among men in the FGD in Rangpur. The politicisation of the police force reduces overall community trust in the police in Bangladesh. Thus, one person stated:

> "Even if a criminal is caught, he gets out to the loopholes of law. So there has to be proper application of the laws. If the laws were applied properly, then extremism would have decreased."

The FGD with men in Satkhira reported how this process appears on the ground, where social jealousy or political allegiance has resulted in neighbours reporting one another to the police for alleged involvement in violent extremism, with the commonly-held view that those "who have more money or power gets the other arrested by sending the police." In Rangpur, there was a perception that police arbitrarily arrest men and boys in the night in order to extract bail money and bribes from the community. In response, men described how they had created a neighbourhood watch scheme to prevent police from arbitrarily detaining community members in the night, demonstrating community cohesion, but not trust in institutions.

Significant gender differences were evident in the Bangladeshi non-programme site (Rangpur) with women far more confident than men in reporting incidents or concerns related to violent extremism to a community leader, than to religious leaders and the police (in that order). For instance, 82 per cent of women compared with 44 per cent of men strongly agreed that they felt confident in reporting violent extremism to a community leader; 72 per cent of women compared with 52 per cent of men felt confident in reporting to a religious leader; and 70 per cent of women compared with 44 per cent of men felt confident in reporting to the police.[38] This finding appears to reflect women's engagement in Rangpur in activities indirectly contributing to P/CVE and both the need and the potential for their engagement in PVE to be tapped. At present, women in Rangpur FGDs tended to view violent extremism as decreasing in their communities and to credit the government with this outcome. As mentioned previously, they were less likely than women in programme sites in Bangladesh to credit themselves as having an important role in this endeavour or, indeed, even recognise that their engagement at the community level (including addressing gender equality issues) contributed to PVE efforts.

For women in Bangladesh, their confidence in reporting to a community leader was related to their personal trust in community groups, whereas for men in Bangladesh it was related to their trust in religious institutions. In all Indonesian sites, trust in community groups and reporting to a community leader was aligned, as was trust in religious institutions and reporting to a religious leader. For both men and women in programme sites, being very religious was correlated with a higher degree of trust in institutions. This may be a feature of selection bias – given that programme sites chosen were largely Islamic and religious. However, for females in the Indonesian non-programme site (Depok) this association was the opposite: being very religious was associated with lesser trust in institutions.

Data from FGDs and KIIs revealed that the local government provided substantial support for efforts to promote tolerance and social cohesion in Klaten in Indonesia. In fact, the local government actively supported multiculturalism and religious tolerance, which includes programmes and budgets dedicated to maintaining diversity, peace and tolerance. The head of villages would organise, for instance, cultural events in which residents that claimed different religious affiliations could participate. The head also provides support for initiatives from community members and facilitates collaboration with interfaith movements, such as *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (FKUB) or Forum for Religious Harmony. In contrast to the high levels of tolerance evident in Klaten, Sumenep has a leadership that is strongly tied to religious leaders (*Kyai*) in part through *Pesantren* boarding schools. Depok also has limited support from local government for community-building initiatives. Additionally, the people in Depok are more reticent to report violent extremism to the relevant authorities. This is because where institutions themselves have been closely connected to the emergence of religious intolerance and violent extremism, people report being reluctant to report violent extremism to those same institutions people see as supporting the extremist views to begin with. This was confirmed during the FGDs in Depok. Thus, in some areas, both limited engagement of the local authority to support community-building initiatives and increasing association of local authorities with extremist ideologies (or links with those who espouse such ideologies) undermines public confidence in state institutions as well as efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.

A key factor discussed in Indonesian FGDs potentially explaining a community's cohesiveness and tolerance of difference was the extent and type of local leadership. A number of respondents in Indonesia talked about the ability of community cohesion and empowerment to enable members to resist external influences from extremists. For example, an Islamic school board member in Klaten suggested that the point of the empowerment programme is to strengthen the bond between members of the community, as it can 'contain the community from external influence', which he attributed as the main cause of violent extremism.

A number of respondents in Indonesia thought that historic Islamic political groups NU and *Muhammadiyah,* would be able to revive the acceptance of diversity. While others consider that this confidence in NU and its youth wing *Banser* (*Barisan Ansor Serbaguna*) would be seen by some respondents as a bulwark against rising radical tendencies.

3.6.7
New knowledge and new freedoms: Evidence of programme impact

Research in both Indonesia and Bangladesh elicited positive and enthusiastic responses by women and local governments to novel programming targeting women and PVE.

For example, one respondent in Klaten, Indonesia commented:

"As I see it, it is already a breakthrough. During my position as head of the village, Wahid Foundation has brought new colours to the locals...they never put any burden upon the village. When gatherings are held, knowledge increases..."

Similarly, women participants in Sumenep stated:

"We are better off with neighbours and family. We used to be shy but now we are more keen to express our opinions and thoughts."

"After the training from Wahid Foundation we realised the importance of women is not only near a well, a bed and a kitchen. Women must also have a good education..."

In Bangladesh, women in particular noted increased awareness of issues related to violent extremism and how to address it, as well as other issues relevant to building more peaceful and resilient communities (gender equality, religious tolerance, domestic violence, access to education). Many respondents said they believed these changes have decreased the likelihood of children engaging in violent extremism, decreased the rate of crime in their areas, and contributed to women's empowerment. As one respondent in Dinajpur in Bangladesh said:

"We were unaware before, now we are aware. We did not know what to do, we were out of date in our thinking and our husbands did not allow us to go out of our house and forbid us to do many things. Now in the meetings, we can discuss many things and exchange ideas. We think if others from the other villages can do something then we can also do it. We are women but we can do it. We are becoming aware."

Other respondents emphasised the impact of economically empowering women, which "helps us women to become self-sufficient and allows us to help other women," as highlighted by a respondent in the Satkhira FGD in Bangladesh. Both men and women across FGDs in Bangladesh underscored how economic empowerment of women contributed to P/CVE by addressing poverty and gender inequality, both of which were seen as causally related to violent extremism. For example, a respondent in Satkhira said:

"You see, there are many types of problems in our village and poverty is the most crucial one. What happens is, when someone is living in abject poverty and some random person comes to him and tells him to do something and in return offers him a handsome amount of money, the poverty-stricken person gets manipulated very easily. This is how [violent extremism] is spreading here."

In KIIs, participants in the programmes sites said that they had greater certainty and confidence in raising concerns and opinions in village forums following 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' activities. This qualitative finding is corroborated by the survey responses discussed in the previous section.

Perhaps the best example of empowerment though the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme in the research is in Klaten, Indonesia. Here, villages taking part in the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme have been declared 'peace villages.' The village leadership has supported the initiative and an event was held in December 2017 to launch the peace declaration. Peace villages embody a notion of 'nested peace'; that if women together with men can help to create peace in families and communities, they can, in turn, create peace in the nation. The peace villages can be considered a major local government policy innovation in collaboration with UN Women's implementing partners. They have begun to forge a new collective awareness that women can play a role in P/CVE and should be encouraged to speak their opinions and be active in decision-making processes both within their families and communities.

In Depok, Indonesia, the site which is outside the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programming areas and has also not been the focus of either any previous gender and P/CVE education or local government initiative, participants in FGDs said that there needs to be more effort to involve women as promoters of peace to help contribute to P/CVE. Women, they argued, have both a stake in their own children and can also influence other women/mothers across social classes. Likewise, in the non-programme site in Bangladesh (Rangpur) women emphasised the role of women as mothers, and as family and community members, in contributing to P/CVE.

4 CONCLUSION

4.1 Main outcomes

This study in Bangladesh and Indonesia has identified the many ways in which women and men influence values, attitudes and behaviours within their communities, from raising awareness of violent extremism, challenging belief systems that cause harm to women and children, to advocating education for women and girls. Four key outcomes can be discerned from the research conducted across programme and non-programme sites in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Each is described in detail below.

Greater individual empowerment of women was found with respect to both confidence in joining P/CVE initiatives, as well as reporting violent extremism and knowing what to do to counter or prevent violent extremism in the UN Women programme sites versus the non-programme sites.

A major finding of the research related to the greater level of self-efficacy and confidence on the part of both women and men in joining community P/CVE initiatives in UN Women programme sites in Bangladesh and Indonesia. *Where there is more empowerment and self-efficacy, people (particularly men) reported being less likely to use violence as a political tool to address poverty and inequality and more likely to report concerns about violent extremist*. Women in programme sites in Bangladesh also reported being able to influence others in their community to take part in initiatives aimed at P/ CVE. Greater self-efficacy and confidence to join P/CVE initiatives were also positively associated with greater trust in public institutions. In fact, this relationship is mutually reinforcing: where women trust law and justice institutions, they are more confident in reporting incidences of violent extremism to them, and thus able to become active community players in efforts to quell violent extremism.

Increased awareness related to women's empowerment and greater confidence in engaging in P/CVE initiatives was evident in programme sites.

Women in the four programme sites in both Bangladesh and Indonesia were much more aware than women in non-programme sites of the problem of violent extremism and how their roles in the family and in community could contribute to P/CVE. Women in the non-programme sites had experience with community engagement and some gender equality issues but did not recognise the connection between these and P/CVE. As a result, they were less aware of the role they had and could have in P/CVE.

In fact, in the UN Women programme communities, women's engagement in community meetings and economic empowerment training were valued by the women themselves, their husbands and community and government leaders. However, it was clear during the qualitative research phase that one of the successful elements, as well as one of the challenges in the programming, was convincing men to allow their wives to participate. Thus, it is important to recognise that *empowering women involves empowering their husbands*. Most men recognised the benefits of women's economic empowerment, their access to business skills, and finance. Yet they still need to be made aware of the broader benefits of women being educated and involved in decision-making within the family and community, beyond bringing more money into the family. Without men's awareness, understanding and support for women's empowerment and participation in public discussions and decisions there will continue to be major constraints on women's participation and societal contribution.

Both women and men in the programme sites recognised that greater economic empowerment of women decreased tensions within the family and community and thereby contributed to more peaceful and resilient societies.

Respondents viewed economic empowerment of women—and the greater income it generates for the family—as a positive factor that reduced tension and domestic violence within the family. It also helped to alleviate economic pressure and violence within the greater community. As one respondent emphasized, this empowerment "helps us women to become self-sufficient and allows us to help other women." *Men and women in Bangladesh underscored how economic empowerment of women contributed to P/CVE by addressing poverty and gender inequality, both of which were seen as related to violent extremism.* Poverty

and gender inequality served not only as drivers of extremist attitudes, but also increased people's vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups and dependence on those groups offering money, livelihoods and even an intimate partner.
However, despite the benefits of the economic empowerment programming made evident during programme observations and FCDs, our respondents in Indonesia expressed some dissatisfaction with the types of economic empowerment training being offered**.** Programmatic interventions at present focus heavily on economic empowerment through the attainment of business and entrepreneurship skills. This programming was not always viewed as having long-term benefits or being tailored to the strengths and existing resources of the community. Moreover, the programming did not always take into account constraints on women's participation given their substantial existing livelihood and household activities.

Community engagement was found to be a key factor in P/CVE.

Across research sites in Bangladesh and Indonesia, women and men underscored the important role of communities and families in P/CVE. They particularly stressed the role of mothers on the frontline of P/CVE. Respondents in both Bangladesh and Indonesia consistently stressed the *critical role of mothers* in detecting any possible slide into extremist ideologies within their families and amongst their children. The women, in particular, were particularly careful to point out that poverty may be a factor in radicalizing youth as many children may feel the pressure to provide for their families and therefore engage in violent extremist activity for money. It was striking how little respondents mentioned *the role of fathers given their influence, typically as head of the family and in communities* where men comprise the majority of decision-makers. Fathers can also promote both support for – and opposition to – violent extremism. Moreover, masculine identity and brotherly loyalty are known to be factors in attracting young men to join extremist groups (Ismael 2018; Kimmel 2018).

Related to this was general agreement that increased awareness within families and communities of violent extremism and how it can be prevented was critical to the success of P/CVE efforts. Given 'aloofness' was frequently said to be an indicator of potential development of extremist attitudes or behaviours, the increased awareness and opportunities for community engagement, outreach and inclusion provided by the UN Women programme is especially important.

Taken together, UN Women's 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme has been particularly successful in catalysing changes in important dimensions of the effort to prevent and counter violent extremism. First, it contributed directly to women's confidence and their subsequent contribution to PVE. Second, it contributed to women's increased awareness of violent extremism, and their confidence in engaging in, and contributing to, P/CVE programmes. Third, it contributed to the development of economic empowerment programmes designed to reduce tensions within the family and community. This by extension may reduce people's vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups. Finally, the programme increased awareness within families and communities of violent extremism and how it can be prevented, contributing to the overall effectiveness of P/CVE efforts.

4.2 Ways forward

It is evident that women, in particular, are engaged in P/CVE, even when they do not themselves see their family and community activities as PVE-related. That insight from our field research suggests that *it is crucial to recognise, support and learn from women's activities and leadership in order to better respond to the challenges of violent extremism and build more resilient, cohesive and peaceful societies.*

Therefore, scaling up the 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programming as well as finding ways to address the sustainability of the economic empowerment initiatives will be imperative in the future. While women's economic empowerment has been an entry point into discussions about PVE, in some cases, P/CVE had not yet taken a central part of the programming due to time and capacity constraints. This makes it even more vital to sustain the programme.

The results point in particular to the need to *continue improving trust in public institutions,* especially law and justice institutions. In terms of economic empowerment programming, other types of economic engagement could be considered in future, such as education on access to and management of natural resources to *diversify and contextu-*

alise the programming in different localities. Finally**,** matters of *masculinity and fatherhood need to be examined explicitly* in the next phase of research. While it is crucial to recognize mothers and support the important roles they play in the family and sometimes beyond the family, there is a danger that focusing on their roles exclusively will inadvertently reinforce existing gender stereotypes and inequalities.

Overall, building and supporting women's leadership and networks for social cohesion through economic engagement is a novel approach to PVE. The UN Women's programming in Bangladesh and Indonesia has already had some positive impacts on household and community wellbeing observed during this research study. However, women's empowerment requires a longer time horizon than the urgency of preventing and countering violent extremism. That does not mean the synergy between these goals should not be pursued but rather that we need to be realistic about the changes we will be able to see in a relatively short period of time.

5 ENDNOTES

1 At Monash University, the research team was led by Professor Jacqui True and consisted of Associate Professor Kerry O'Brien, Dr. Eleanor Gordon, Dr. Melissa Johnston, Ms. Yasmin Chilmeran and Ms. Yolanda Riveros-Morales in the Centre for Gender. Peace and Security (Monash GPS) who each have expertise in gender, peace, conflict and qualitative and quantitative community-based research methods. In Bangladesh, the research team was from Oxfam Bangladesh was led by Mr. Tarek Aziz and Ms Nazmun Nahar and in Indonesia, the research team from Gadjah Mada University (UGM) was led by Dr. Sri Wiyanti Eddyono, an adjunct fellow at Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre, and consisted of Dr. Arvie Johan, Rizky Septiana Widyaningtyas, Devita Kartika Putri, S.H., LL.M and Tody Sasmitha, S.H., LL.M. This project has ethics approval through the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (Monash University Human Ethics Research Approval 2017-7344-14240) and followed the guidelines and protocols set out by this Committee.

2 The UN Women 'Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities' programme is being implemented through the Wahid Foundation, BRAC and partners in Indonesia and Bangladesh respectively.

3 Our findings observe some country differences though that was not the primary purpose of study, given the very different contexts and sites within each country, which are not directly comparable.

4 The measures/scales used displayed good psychometric properties i.e., internal and split-half reliability, face and predictive validity, and eigenvalues for scale dimensions were all above 1.0.

5 This forum is a non-governmental multi-faith body, initiated by religious leaders. It has been established since 2002 and has networks in 30 cities. Information provided by a KII 16 December 2017.

6 NU is a socio-religious organisation based in Indonesia, established in 1923.

7 See http://www.wluml.org/node/6261 and https://www.rabwah.net/indonesia-shuts-ahmadiyya-mosque-depok/.

8 See http://www.newmandala.org/hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-go/.

9 See table 1, appendix 2.

10 See table 2, appendix 2.

11 See table 3, appendix 2.

12 See table 4, appendix 2.

13 KII, Klaten, 6 December, 2017.

14 See table 5, appendix 2.

15 See table 6, appendix 2.

16 See table 7, appendix 2.

17 See table 8, appendix 2

18 See table 9, appendix 2

19 See table 10, appendix 2

20 See table 11, appendix 2

21 See table 12, appendix 2

22 For example, FGD Satkhira, 30 December 2017. Other men also indicated fears or concerns, more so than women ['We still don't have courage to work for them directly. But I think if we have a representative who can guide us, it will help' and 'Many people tell us not to get involved in this as it might create trouble']. Others say they are engaged or try to be engaged but are not effective because they are not powerful enough for people to listen to [FGD Satkhira 30 December 2017]. Some men did, however, see that everyone has a role to play and that awareness raising, talking and acting together can help [FGD Satkhira, 30 December 2017].

23 For example, one female interviewee said that 'the rate of domestic violence decreases when women are empowered and help their husbands in to provide for their families'. Similarly, a male key informant interviewee in local government agreed that 'the dependence of women towards men is also a factor which causes domestic violence. To prevent such things, it is important to motivate women to be economically independent.' Furthermore, some interviewees said how economic empowerment can lead to other forms of empowerment which can positively impact security for women (themselves, their daughters, and others) by instilling the type of confidence that would enable the woman to express her opinion on matters of concern: 'For example, when there is a possible suitor for her daughter, a woman can express her opinion and ask for her daughter to finish school before marrying.'

24 See table 13, appendix 2

25 This scale/measure covers Q17 to Q22 such as 'I would feel confident in joining a community/government initiative to counter or prevent violent extremism,' or 'I am confident that my community/family would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism,' or 'I have the confidence to report individuals/groups/family members involved in violent extremism.'

26 See table 14, appendix 2

27 See table 15, appendix 2

28 See table 16, appendix 2

29 See table 17, appendix 2

30 See table 18, appendix 2

31 See table 19, appendix 2

32 See table 20, appendix 2

33 The knowledge to prevent violent extremism scale/measure included Q23 to Q25, such as "I know what to do to prevent violent extremism in my family, community," or "I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community."

34 See table 21, appendix 2

35 See table 22, appendix 2

36 See table 23, appendix 2

37 See table 24, appendix 2

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7 APPENDICES

7.1

Appendix 1: Survey instrument

Demographic/background details:

1. What is your age?
2. What is your gender? (Male/Female/Other)
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your religion?
5. In general, how religious do you consider yourself to be? (Response scale inserted).
6. How much is your income monthly? (Various income bands in respective currencies included).
7. What is the name of the regency/district in which you currently live?

Perception of the problem of extremism and violent extremism:

We are interested in your perceptions of the problem of extremism and violent extremism in your community/country. Please respond to each of the questions below using the scale below ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 = No problem at all and 5 = A very big problem.

No problem at all — A very big problem
1 2 3 4 5

1. How much of a problem do you think extremism is in your community?
No problem at all — A very big problem
1 2 3 4 5

2. How much of a problem do you think violent extremism is in your community?
No problem at all — A very big problem
1 2 3 4 5

3. How much of a problem do you think extremism is in your country?
No problem at all — A very big problem
1 2 3 4 5

4. How much of a problem do you think violent extremism is in your country?
No problem at all — A very big problem
1 2 3 4 5

Initiatives to prevent violent extremism:

Please respond to each of the questions below using the scale below ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree.

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

1. The government supports community level initiatives to counter and/or prevent violent extremism.
Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5

2. Most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

3. Most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the government.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. I *would prefer that initiatives to reduce violent extremism be led by communities.*

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. The government cooperates well with communities in addressing violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Self-efficacy/empowerment:

Please indicate your level of agreement from 1 to 5, for each of the statements below. Please just circle the response on the scale that best fits how much you agree.

1. I would feel confident in joining a community initiative to counter or prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. I would feel confident in joining a government initiative to counter or prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

3. I am confident that my community would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. I am confident that my family would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. I have the confidence to report any concerns I have about individuals and groups in the community involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

6. I have the confidence to report any concerns I have about family members involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

7. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

8. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

9. I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

10. I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my family.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

11. Other people in my community do not have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

12. Other people in my family do not have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

13. Other people in my community would not act prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

14. Other people in my family would not act prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

15. I worry that my family would be angry with me if I reported people who are involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

16. I worry that people in my community would be angry if I reported people who are involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

17. I worry that my family may become violent toward me if I reported people who are involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

18. I worry that people in my community might be violent toward me or my family if I reported people who are involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

19. I am confident that my community would support other people in the community if they reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

20. I am confident that my family would support other people in my community if they reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Perceptions of the causes of violent extremism and barriers to preventing:

Please indicate your level of agreement from 1 to 5, for each of the statements below. Please just circle the response on the scale that best fits how much you agree.

1. I think that in part violent extremism is caused by poverty and inequality.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. I think that in part women engage in violent extremism because of poverty and inequality.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

3. I think that in part men engage in violent extremism because of poverty and inequality.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. I think that in part young people engage in violent extremism because poverty and inequality.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. Violent extremism is caused by the way Muslims are treated by the West.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

6. *Women engage in violent extremism in part because they have limited access to job opportunities.*

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

7. *Men engage in violent extremism in part because they have limited access to job opportunities.*

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

8. *Young people engage in violent extremism in part because they have limited access to job opportunities.*

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

9. People engage in violent extremism because they have limited access to education.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

10. People engage in violent extremism because they have limited opportunity to influence political decisions.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

11. People engage in violent extremism because they feel that existing political means are not addressing their concerns.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

12. Women engage in violent extremism do so because they have limited opportunity to have their concerns addressed.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

13. Men engage in violent extremism do so because they have limited opportunity to have their concerns addressed.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

14. People who engage in violent extremism do so because they have limited opportunity to have their concerns addressed.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

15. Young people engage in violent extremism do so because they have limited opportunity to have their concerns addressed.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

16. Groups that are involved in violent extremism provide support for people in my community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

17. Groups that are involved in violent extremism are able to recruit people from my community to their cause because they offer financial and other support.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

18. As long as there is inequality in our community there will be people in the community always support violent extremist groups.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Trust in different institutions:

1. I trust the police in my community to counter or prevent violent extremism.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to police.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

3. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a community leader

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a religious leader

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

We list below a number of organizations in the community. For each one, could you tell us how much you personally trust each of them. Please circle the number on the scale that indicates your level of trust, the scale ranges from 1 = no trust at all and 5 = a lot of trust).

1. The media (e.g., TV, newspapers, radio)

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

2. The police

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

3. The law courts

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

4. Political parties

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

5. The (Indonesian/Bangladeshi) government

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

6. Medical services (e.g., doctors and hospitals)

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

7. Community groups

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

8. Religious institutions (e.g., mosques, temples, prayer groups etc.)

No trust at all				A lot of trust
1	2	3	4	5

Support for violent extremism:
We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism.

For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question:
"Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?"

The person's response:
"Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them."

1. How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. How much do you support this person's views?

No Support				Strongly Support
1	2	3	4	5

3. The views of this person are common among men in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. The views of this person are common among women in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. The views of this person are common among young people in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

We asked another general question: "Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?"

The person's response:
"Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the needs of the people"

1. How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. How much do support this person's views?

No Support				Strongly Support
1	2	3	4	5

3. The views of this person are common among men in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. The views of this person are common among women in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. The views of this person are common among young people in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

We asked the same general question to another person, "Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?"

The person's response:
"Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped."

1. How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. How much do support this person's views?

No Support				Strongly Support
1	2	3	4	5

3. The views of this person are common among men in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

4. The views of this person are common among women in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. The views of this person are common among young people in your community.

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

7.2

Appendix 2: Tables and variable measures

Table 1. How much of a problem do you think extremism is in your community? by country and gender

	Bangladesh		Indonesia	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
No Problem at all	100	89	47	95
% Col	66.7	59.3	30.5	40.9
2	8	15	33	61
% Col	5.3	10.0	21.4	26.3
3	10	11	25	44
% Col	6.7	7.3	16.2	19.0
4	14	12	16	20
% Col	9.3	8.0	10.4	8.6
A very big problem	18	23	33	12
% Col	12.0	15.3	21.4	5.2
Total	**150**	**150**	**154**	**232**

Table 2. How much of a problem do you think extremism is in your country? by country

	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
No Problem at all	5	11	16
% Col	1.7	2.9	2.3
2	13	39	52
% Col	4.3	10.1	7.6
3	23	87	110
% Col	7.7	22.5	16.0
4	50	111	161
% Col	16.7	28.8	23.5
A very big problem	209	138	347
% Col	69.7	35.8	50.6
Total	**300**	**386**	**686**

Table 3. How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views? by country, gender and UN program

	Bangladesh						Indonesia					
	Non-Intervention			Intervention			Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	30	35	65	77	72	149	25	25	50	42	79	121
% Col	60.0	70.0	65.0	77.0	72.0	74.5	52.1	49.0	50.5	39.6	43.7	42.2
2	4	1	5	10	6	16	13	19	32	15	18	33
% Col	8.0	2.0	5.0	10.0	6.0	8.0	27.1	37.3	32.3	14.2	9.9	11.5
3				1	0	1	5	3	8	15	34	49
% Col				1.0	0.0	0.5	10.4	5.9	8.1	14.2	18.8	17.1
4	6	4	10	4	10	14	4	2	6	10	36	46
% Col	12.0	8.0	10.0	4.0	10.0	7.0	8.3	3.9	6.1	9.4	19.9	16.0
Strongly agree	10	10	20	8	12	20	1	2	3	24	14	38
% Col	20.0	20.0	20.0	8.0	12.0	10.0	2.1	3.9	3.0	22.6	7.7	13.2
Total	**50**	**50**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**200**	**48**	**51**	**99**	**106**	**181**	**287**

**Fisher's exact test 0.003*

Table 4. Violent extremism is caused by the way Muslims are treated by the West, by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Disagree	125	195	320
% Col	41.1	51.0	46.6
Agree	179	187	366
% Col	58.9	48.9	53.4
Total	**304**	**382**	**686**

Table 5. Univariate analysis of variance: Perception of violent extremism as a problem, by gender and UN program

Gender	Intervention UN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	Non-Intervention	11.16	4.319	98
	Intervention	13.01	4.48	206
	Total	12.42	4.506	304
Female	Non-Intervention	13.35	3.548	101
	Intervention	12.32	3.489	281
	Total	12.59	3.53	382
Total	Non-Intervention	12.27	4.086	199
	Intervention	12.61	3.95	487
	Total	12.51	3.99	686

Table 6. I think that in part violent extremism is caused by poverty and inequality, by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	57	47	104
% Col	18.8	12.3	15.2
2	42	43	85
% Col	13.8	11.3	12.4
3	29	34	63
% Col	9.5	8.9	9.2
4	83	101	184
% Col	27.3	26.4	26.8
Strongly agree	93	157	250
% Col	30.6	41.1	36.4
Total	304	382	686

Person chi2(4)= 10.79 Pr = 0.029

Table 7. I think that in part young people engage in violent extremism because poverty and inequality, by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	**31**	**23**	**54**
% Col	*20.7*	*15.3*	*18.0*
2	**25**	**29**	**54**
% Col	*16.7*	*19.3*	*18.0*
3	**5**	**9**	**14**
% Col	*3.3*	*6.0*	*4.7*
4	**53**	**32**	**85**
% Col	*35.3*	*21.3*	*28.3*
Strongly agree	**36**	**57**	**93**
% Col	*24.0*	*38.0*	*31.0*
Total	**150**	**150**	**300**

Table 8. Young people engage in violent extremism in part because they have limited access to job opportunities, by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	**21**	**21**	**42**
% Col	*14.0*	*14.0*	*14.0*
2	**45**	**30**	**75**
% Col	*30.0*	*20.0*	*25.0*
3	**8**	**6**	**14**
% Col	*5.3*	*4.0*	*4.7*
4	**41**	**33**	**74**
% Col	*27.3*	*22.0*	*24.7*
Strongly agree	**35**	**60**	**95**
% Col	*23.3*	*40.0*	*31.7*
Total	**150**	**150**	**300**

Table 9. Women think that in part violent extremism is caused by poverty and inequality, by country and UN intervention

	Bangladesh*			Indonesia		
	Non-Intervention	Intervention	Total	Non-Intervention	Intervention	Total
Strongly disagree	3	16	19	3	25	28
% Col	6.0	16.0	12.7	5.9	13.8	12.1
2	3	22	25	5	13	18
% Col	6.0	22.0	16.7	9.8	7.2	7.8
3	0	1	1	6	27	33
% Col	0.0	1.0	0.7	11.8	14.9	14.2
4	16	22	38	17	46	63
% Col	32.0	22.0	25.3	33.3	25.4	27.2
Strongly agree	28	39	67	20	70	90
% Col	56.0	39.0	44.7	39.2	38.7	38.8
Total	50	100	150	51	181	232

*Fisher's exact test = 0.011

Table 10. Young people engage in violent extremism in part because they have limited access to job opportunities, by UN program and gender

	UN Non - Intervention			UN Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	4	3	7	17	18	35
% Col	8.0	6.0	7.0	17.0	18.0	17.5
2	24	14	38	21	16	37
% Col	48.0	28.0	38.0	21.0	16.0	18.5
3	2	4	6	6	2	8
% Col	4.0	8.0	6.0	6.0	2.0	4.0
4	16	10	26	25	23	48
% Col	32.0	20.0	26.0	25.0	23.0	24.0
Strongly agree	4	19	23	31	41	72
% Col	8.0	38.0	23.0	31.0	41.0	36.0
Total	50	50	100	100	100	200

Table 11. Bangladesh: Most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the community, by UN program and gender

	Non-Intervention*			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Disagree	21	3	24	10	10	20
% Col	42.0	6.0	24.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Agree	29	47	76	90	90	180
% Col	58.0	94.0	76.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
Total	50	50	100	100	100	200

* Pearson chi2(1) = 17.76 Pr = 0.000

Table 12. Indonesia: Most initiatives to counter or prevent violent extremism are led by the community, by UN program and gender

	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	4	4	8	15	33	48
% Col	8.3	7.8	8.1	14.2	18.2	16.7
2	6	11	17	14	23	37
% Col	12.5	21.6	17.2	13.2	12.7	12.9
3	11	12	23	26	20	46
% Col	22.9	23.5	23.2	24.5	11.1	16.0
4	13	16	29	17	26	43
% Col	27.1	31.4	29.3	16.0	14.4	15.0
Strongly agree	14	8	22	34	79	113
% Col	29.2	15.7	22.2	32.1	43.7	39.4
Total	48	51	99	106	181	287

Table 13. I would feel confident in joining a community initiative to counter or prevent violent extremism, by regency and gender

	Dinajpur			Satkhira			Rangpur		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	2	2	4				1	3	4
% Col	4.0	4.0	4.0				2.0	6.0	4.0
2				1	1	2	0	1	1
% Col				2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	1.0
3	0	1	1						
% Col	0.0	2.0	1.0						
4	5	8	13	9	11	20	11	9	20
% Col	10.0	16.0	13.0	18.0	22.0	20.0	22.0	18.0	20.0
Strongly agree	43	39	82	40	38	78	38	37	75
% Col	86.0	78.0	82.0	80.0	76.0	78.0	76.0	74.0	75.0
Total	50	50	100	50	50	100	50	50	100
	Klaten			Depok			Sumenep		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	2
% Col	0.0	1.9	1.3	2.1	0.0	1.0	1.9	1.4	1.6
2	1	2	3	3	2	5	2	3	5
% Col	1.92	1.87	1.89	6.3	3.9	5.1	3.7	4.1	3.9
3	6	12	18	8	16	24	10	14	24
% Col	11.5	11.2	11.3	16.7	31.4	24.2	18.5	18.9	18.8
4	8	22	30	11	16	27	12	14	26
% Col	15.4	20.6	18.9	22.9	31.4	27.3	22.2	18.9	20.3
Strongly agree	37	69	106	25	17	42	29	42	71
% Col	71.2	64.5	66.7	52.1	33.3	42.4	53.7	56.8	55.5
Total	52	107	159	48	51	99	54	74	128

Table 14. Univariate analysis of variance: Empowerment and self-efficacy in P/CVE, by gender and UN program

Gender	Intervention UN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	Non-Intervention	24.82	4.342	98
	Intervention	25.94	4.165	206
	Total	*25.58*	*4.248*	*304*
Female	Non-Intervention	24.06	4.679	101
	Intervention	24.74	4.955	281
	Total	*24.56*	*4.887*	*382*
Total	Non-Intervention	24.43	4.521	199
	Intervention	25.25	4.67	487
	Total	*25.01*	*4.639*	*686*

Table 15. I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community, by UN program and gender

	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Disagree	38	41	79	64	133	197
% Col	*38.8*	*40.6*	*39.7*	*31.1*	*47.3*	*40.5*
Agree	60	60	120	142	148	290
% Col	*61.2*	*59.4*	*60.3*	*68.9*	*52.7*	*59.5*
Total	98	101	199	206	281	487

Table 16. Correlation matrix, by country and UN program

Bangladesh																
	Non Intervention - Male				Non Intervention - Female				Intervention - Male				Intervention - Female			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1)	1				1				1				1			
(2)	0.85*	1			0.57*	1			0.63*	1			0.83*	1		
(3)	0.64*	0.64*	1		0.46*	0.29*	1		0.53*	0.48*	1		0.52*	0.58*	1	
(4)	0.67*	0.65*	0.94*	1	0.50*	0.36*	0.62*	1	0.36*	0.44*	0.73*	1	0.54*	0.49*	0.69*	1
Indonesia																
	Non Intervention - Male				Non Intervention - Female				Intervention - Male				Intervention - Female			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1)	1				1				1				1			
(2)	0.21	1			0.36*	1			0.41*	1			0.27*	1		
(3)	0.14	0.45*	1		0.48*	0.56*	1		0.32*	0.43*	1		0.07	0.64*	1	
(4)	0.41*	0.22	0.1841	1	0.66*	0.31*	0.47*	1	0.55*	0.27*	0.28*	1	0.42*	0.31*	0.28*	1

(1) I know what to do in order to PVE in my family

(2) I know what to do in order to PEV in my community

(3) I I have the knowledge and skills necessary to PEV in my community

(4) I have the confidence to report any concerns I have about family members involved in VE

**Correlation coefficients significant at the 5° level*

Table 17. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family, by UN program and gender

	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	1	5	6	7	12	19
% Col	1.02	4.95	3.02	3.40	4.27	3.9
2	13	11	24	15	12	27
% Col	13.27	10.89	12.06	7.28	4.27	5.54
3	7	19	26	23	35	58
% Col	7.14	18.81	13.07	11.17	12.46	11.91
4	45	35	80	51	83	134
% Col	45.92	34.65	40.20	24.76	29.54	27.52
Strongly agree	32	31	63	110	139	249
% Col	32.65	30.69	31.66	53.40	49.47	51.13
Total	98	101	199	206	281	487

*Fisher's exact test: 0.047

Table 18. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family, by Country, UN program and gender

	Bangladesh						Indonesia					
	Non-Intervention			Intervention			Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	0	3	3	0	5	5	1	2	3	7	7	14
% Col	0.0	6.0	3.0	0.0	5.0	2.5	2.1	3.9	3.0	6.6	3.9	4.9
2	11	7	18	9	3	12	2	4	6	6	9	15
% Col	22.0	14.0	18.0	9.0	3.0	6.0	4.2	7.8	6.1	5.7	5.0	5.2
3	0	1	1	1	2	3	7	18	25	22	33	55
% Col	0.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.5	14.6	35.3	25.3	20.8	18.2	19.2
4	26	23	49	30	33	63	19	12	31	21	50	71
% Col	52.0	46.0	49.0	30.0	33.0	31.5	39.6	23.5	31.3	19.8	27.6	24.7
Strongly agree	13	16	29	60	57	117	19	15	34	50	82	132
% Col	26.0	32.0	29.0	60.0	57.0	58.5	39.6	29.4	34.3	47.2	45.3	46.0
Total	50	50	100	100	100	200	48	51	99	106	181	287

Table 19. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family, by country and UN program

	Bangladesh			Indonesia		
	Non-Intervention	Intervention	Total	Non-Intervention	Intervention	Total
Strongly disagree	3	5	8	3	14	17
% Col	3.0	2.5	2.7	3.0	4.9	4.4
2	18	12	30	6	15	21
% Col	18.0	6.0	10.0	6.1	5.2	5.4
3	1	3	4	25	55	80
% Col	1.0	1.5	1.3	25.3	19.2	20.7
4	49	63	112	31	71	102
% Col	49.0	31.5	37.3	31.3	24.7	26.4
Strongly agree	29	117	146	34	132	166
% Col	29.0	58.5	48.7	34.3	46.0	43.0
Total	100	200	300	99	287	386

Table 20. Univariate analysis of variance: Knowledge self-efficacy, by gender and UN program

Gender	Intervention UN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	Non-Intervention	11.21	2.438	98
	Intervention	12.06	2.703	206
	Total	11.79	2.646	304
Female	Non-Intervention	10.78	2.711	101
	Intervention	11.43	2.916	281
	Total	11.26	2.874	382
Total	Non-Intervention	10.99	2.583	199
	Intervention	11.69	2.842	487
	Total	11.49	2.786	686

Table 21. Univariate analysis of variance: Support for P/CVE initiatives, by gender and UN program

Gender	Intervention UN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	Non-Intervention	16.06	2.503	98
	Intervention	16.88	3.287	206
	Total	16.62	3.076	304
Female	Non-Intervention	15.59	3.141	101
	Intervention	16.72	3.373	281
	Total	16.42	3.346	382
Total	Non-Intervention	15.82	2.847	199
	Intervention	16.79	3.334	487
	Total	16.51	3.228	686

Table 22: Univariate analysis of variance: Trust in institutions, by gender and UN program

Gender	Intervention UN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	Non-Intervention	18.89	3.831	98
	Intervention	19.67	4.271	206
	Total	*19.41*	*4.144*	*304*
Female	Non-Intervention	18.25	4.453	101
	Intervention	19.26	3.842	281
	Total	*18.99*	*4.031*	*382*
Total	Non-Intervention	18.56	4.16	199
	Intervention	19.43	4.03	487
	Total	*19.18*	*4.084*	*686*

Table 23. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism, by country

	Police		
	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
Disagree	27	138	165
% Col	*9.0*	*35.8*	*24.1*
Agree	273	248	521
% Col	*91.0*	*64.2*	*75.9*
Total	300	386	686
	Community leader		
	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
Disagree	19	189	208
% Col	*6.3*	*49.0*	*30.3*
Agree	281	197	478
% Col	*93.7*	*51.0*	*69.7*
Total	300	386	686
	Religious leader		
	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
Disagree	32	174	206
% Col	*10.7*	*45.1*	*30.0*
Agree	268	212	480
% Col	*89.3*	*54.9*	*70.0*
Total	300	386	686

Table 24. Bangladesh: I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism, by UN program and gender

	Community leader					
	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	2	0	2	2	3	5
% Col	4.0	0.0	2.0	2	3	2.5
2	8	2	10	1	1	2
% Col	16.0	4.0	10.0	1	1	1
4	18	7	25	25	24	49
% Col	36.0	14.0	25.0	25	24	24.5
Strongly agree	22	41	63	72	72	144
% Col	44.0	82.0	63.0	72	72	72
	Religious leader					
	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	3	0	3	4	6	10
% Col	6.0	0.0	3.0	4	6	5
2	9	3	12	2	1	3
% Col	18.0	6.0	12.0	2	1	1.5
3	3	0	3	0	1	1
% Col	6.0	0.0	3.0	0	1	0.5
4	9	11	20	17	16	33
% Col	18.0	22.0	20.0	17	16	16.5
Strongly agree	26	36	62	77	76	153
% Col	52.0	72.0	62.0	77	76	76.5
	Police					
	Non-Intervention			Intervention		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	1	1	2	3	4	7
% Col	2.0	2.0	2.0	3	4	3.5
2	10	1	11	0	3	3
% Col	20.0	2.0	11.0	0	3	1.5
3	2	0	2	0	2	2
% Col	4.0	0.0	2.0	0	2	1
4	15	13	28	17	19	36
% Col	30.0	26.0	28.0	17	19	18
Strongly agree	22	35	57	80	72	152
% Col	44.0	70.0	57.0	80	72	76
Total	50	50	100	100	100	200

7.3

Appendix 3: Variable measures (scales)

Along with demographic measures, age, location, gender, income, we developed measures of two forms of self-efficacy/empowerment (confidence self-efficacy and knowledge/skill self-efficacy); Trust in institutions; Support for P/CVE initiatives; Perceptions of violent extremism; Perceived reasons for engagement in extremist violence (poverty and equality); Perceived reasons for engagement in extremist violence (powerlessness); Support for violent extremism to address inequality and; Opposing violent extremism as solution to problems.

Confidence selfeEfficacy (empowerment)
The confidence self-efficacy scale is a 6-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I am confident that my community would support me if I reported concerns about people involved in violent extremism." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding reporting violent extremism. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .78), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.54).

Knowledge/skillsSelfeEfficacy (empowerment)
The knowledge/skill self-efficacy scale is a 3-item scale that assesses people's agreement (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I feel I have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent violent extremism in my community." Higher scores indicate greater self-efficacy (empowerment) regarding knowing how to counter violent extremism. Cronbach's alpha test for reliability of the scale indicated that reliability was good (α = .73), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.29).

Trust in institutions
Trust in Institutions was assessed with a 5-item scale with participants required to indicate how much they trust (1=no trust at all to 5=a lot of trust) a range of different institutions (e.g. police, law courts, political parties). Higher scores represent greater trust in institutions. Reliability for the scale was good (α = .79), and an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.18).

Support for P/CVE initiatives
Support for P/CVE Initiatives was assessed with a 4-item scale with participants required to indicate how much they agree or disagree (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I would prefer that initiatives to reduce violent extremism be led by communities." Higher scores represent greater agreement with such approaches to P/CVE. Reliability for the scale was mediocre (α = .55). However, the items were conceptually sound and face validity was good. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.05).

Perceptions of violent extremism
Perceptions of Violent Extremism was assessed with a 4-item scale with participants required to indicate how much they agree or disagree (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I would prefer that initiatives to reduce violent extremism be led by communities." Higher scores represent greater agreement with such approaches to P/CVE. Reliability for the scale was mediocre (α = .55). However, the items were conceptually sound and face validity was good. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 1.05).

Perceived reasons for engagement in extremist violence (poverty and equality)
Perceived Reasons for Engagement (Poverty and Equality) was assessed with a 5-item scale with participants indicating their agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "I think that in part women engage in violent extremism because of poverty and inequality." Higher scores represent greater agreement with this perception. Reliability for the scale was good (α = .85). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.60).

Perceived reasons for engagement in extremist violence (powerlessness)
Perceived Reasons for Engagement in Extremist Violence (Powerlessness) was assessed with a 6-item scale with participants indicating their agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with statements such as "People engage in violent extremism because they have limited opportunity to influence political decisions." Higher scores represent greater

agreement with this perception of powerlessness as a reason for engagement in violent extremism. Reliability for the scale was good (α = .85). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 3.04).

Support for violent extremism to address inequality
To assess support for violent extremism to address inequality, we provided a supposedly true, but actually bogus, statement from a supposed community member and then asked participants to indicate their agreement and support with this statement.

> Statement:
> "Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the needs of the people."

We then asked participants four questions, the first three being: "How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the necessity of violent extremism in order to bring about change?"; "The views of this person are common among men in your community?"; and "The views of this person are common among women in your community?" Participants indicated their agreement with these three questions on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). For the fourth question "How much do support this person's views?" participants indicated their support with this statement on a 5-point scale (1=no support to 5=strongly support). The reliability of the scale was good (α = .89). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.70).

Opposing violent extremism as solution to problems
To assess agreement with the idea that violent extremism is no solution to problems, we provided a supposedly true, but actually bogus, statement from a supposed community member and then asked participants to indicate their agreement and support with this statement.

> Statement:
> "Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped."

We then asked participants four questions, the first three being: "How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the necessity of violent extremism in order to bring about change?"; "The views of this person are common among men in your community?"; and "The views of this person are common among women in your community?" Participants indicated their agreement with these three questions on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). For the fourth question "How much do support this person's views?" participants indicated their support with this statement on a 5-point scale (1=no support to 5=strongly support). The reliability of the scale was good (α = .88). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 2.57).

7.4

Appendix 4: Focus group discussion (FGD) participants

7.4.1
Indonesia

Klaten, 11/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Position
1	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
2	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
3	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
4	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
5	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
6	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
7	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
8	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
9	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
10	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
11	Cadre of Wahid Foundation

Sumenep, 22/12/2017 (Mixed)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Sumenep	Young resident of Sumenep
2	Sumenep	Young resident of Sumenep
3	Sumenep	Young resident of Sumenep
4	Sumenep	Young resident of Sumenep

Sumenep, 21/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
2	DESA Guluk-Guluk Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
3	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
4	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
5	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
6	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
7	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
8	DESA Guluk-Guluk Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
9	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
10	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
11	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
12	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
13	Desa Payudan Dundang Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
14	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
15	DESA Guluk-Guluk Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation
16	DESA Guluk-Guluk Sumenep	Cadre of Wahid Foundation

Depok, 19/12/2017 (Lecturers) (Female)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Depok	Lecturer from UI
2	Depok	Lecturer and Researcher at Center for Legal and Community Studies

Depok, 19/12/2017 (Students) (Mixed)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Depok	Student -PMII
2	Depok	Student -HMI
3	Depok	Student
4	Depok	Student
5	Depok	Student-HMI
6	Depok	Student
7	Depok	Student
8	Depok	Student-PMII
9	Depok	Student-HMI
10	Depok	Student-PMII
11	Depok	Student
12	Depok	Student
13	Depok	Student
14	Depok	Student-HMI
15	Depok	Student
16	Depok	Student
17	Depok	Student
18	Depok	Student
19	Depok	Student-HMI
20	Depok	Student
21	Depok	Student-Persekutuan Okuwewe
22	Depok	Student
23	Depok	Student-HMI
24	Depok	Student
25	Depok	Student

Depok, 20/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
2	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
3	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
4	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
5	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
6	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
7	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
8	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
9	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
10	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
11	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
12	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
13	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
14	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
15	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
16	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
17	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
18	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
19	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
20	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah
21	Depok	Cadre of Muhammadiyah

Depok, 20/12/2017 (Church members) (Mixed)

Respondent	Area	Position
1	Depok	Church member
2	Depok	Church member
3	Depok	Church member
4	Depok	Church member
5	Depok	Church member
6	Depok	Church member
7	Depok	Church member
8	Depok	Church member
9	Depok	Church member
10	Depok	Church member
11	Depok	Church member
12	Depok	Church member
13	Depok	Church member
14	Depok	Church member
15	Depok	Church member
16	Depok	Church member
17	Depok	Church member
18	Depok	Church member
19	Depok	Church member
20	Depok	Church member
21	Depok	Church member
22	Depok	Church member
23	Depok	Church member

7.4.2
Bangladesh

Satkhira, 27/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Social worker
2	Satkhira	Social worker
3	Satkhira	Social worker
4	Satkhira	Social worker
5	Satkhira	Social worker
6	Satkhira	Social worker
7	Satkhira	Social worker

Satkhira, 26/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Business
2	Satkhira	Clerk
3	Satkhira	Barber
4	Satkhira	Barber
5	Satkhira	Barber
6	Satkhira	Business
7	Satkhira	Shopkeeper
8	Satkhira	Day labourer

Satkhira, 29/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Social worker
2	Satkhira	Social worker
3	Satkhira	Social worker
4	Satkhira	Social worker
5	Satkhira	Social worker
6	Satkhira	Social worker
7	Satkhira	Social worker
8	Satkhira	Social worker

Satkhira, 27/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Business
2	Satkhira	Business
3	Satkhira	Day labourer
4	Satkhira	Day labourer
5	Satkhira	Service
6	Satkhira	Carpenter

Satkhira, 29/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Social worker
2	Satkhira	Social worker
3	Satkhira	Social worker
4	Satkhira	Social worker
5	Satkhira	Social worker
6	Satkhira	Social worker
7	Satkhira	Social worker

Satkhira, 30/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Driver
2	Satkhira	Van driver
3	Satkhira	Business
4	Satkhira	Business
5	Satkhira	Business
6	Satkhira	Day labourer
7	Satkhira	Business

Satkhira, 29/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Day labourer
2	Satkhira	Shopkeeper
3	Satkhira	Day labourer
4	Satkhira	Electric works
5	Satkhira	Agriculture
6	Satkhira	Agriculture
7	Satkhira	Day labourer

Satkhira, 26/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Social worker
2	Satkhira	Social worker
3	Satkhira	Social worker
4	Satkhira	Social worker
5	Satkhira	Social worker
6	Satkhira	Social worker
7	Satkhira	Social worker

Majhi Parulia, Debhata, Satkhira, 26/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Social worker
2	Satkhira	Social worker
3	Satkhira	Social worker
4	Satkhira	Social worker
5	Satkhira	Social worker
6	Satkhira	Social worker
7	Satkhira	Social worker

Satkhira, 30/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Satkhira	Van puller
2	Satkhira	Van puller
3	Satkhira	Auto driver
4	Satkhira	Business
5	Satkhira	Farmer
6	Satkhira	Day labourer
7	Satkhira	Driver

Dinajpur, 28/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Housewife
2	Dinajpur	Housewife
3	Dinajpur	Housewife
4	Dinajpur	Housewife
5	Dinajpur	Housewife
6	Dinajpur	Housewife
7	Dinajpur	Tailor

Dinajpur, 28/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Student
2	Dinajpur	Business
3	Dinajpur	Agriculture
4	Dinajpur	Student
5	Dinajpur	Student
6	Dinajpur	Student
7	Dinajpur	Business
8	Dinajpur	Student

Dinajpur, 26/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Tailor
2	Dinajpur	Housewife
3	Dinajpur	Housewife
4	Dinajpur	Housewife
5	Dinajpur	Housewife
6	Dinajpur	Housewife
7	Dinajpur	Housewife
8	Dinajpur	Housewife
9	Dinajpur	Housewife
10	Dinajpur	Tailor

Balurchora, Nababganj, Dinajpur, 27/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Student
2	Dinajpur	Student
3	Dinajpur	Student
4	Dinajpur	Student
5	Dinajpur	Student
6	Dinajpur	Student
7	Dinajpur	Student
8	Dinajpur	Student

Dinajpur, 26/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Housewife
2	Dinajpur	Housewife
3	Dinajpur	Housewife
4	Dinajpur	Housewife
5	Dinajpur	Housewife
6	Dinajpur	Housewife
7	Dinajpur	Work at BRAC School
8	Dinajpur	Housewife
9	Dinajpur	Housewife
10	Dinajpur	Private Tuition

Dinajpur, 27/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Farmer
2	Dinajpur	Mason
3	Dinajpur	Student
4	Dinajpur	Student
5	Dinajpur	Student
6	Dinajpur	Driver
7	Dinajpur	Motor mechanic
8	Dinajpur	Student

Dinajpur, 28/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Farmer
2	Dinajpur	Van puller
3	Dinajpur	Labourer
4	Dinajpur	Farmer
5	Dinajpur	Labourer
6	Dinajpur	Labourer
7	Dinajpur	Unemployed
8	Dinajpur	Farmer

Bibahimpur (Guccho Gram), Singna, Ghoraghat, Dinajpur, 28/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Labourer
2	Dinajpur	Labourer
3	Dinajpur	Mason
4	Dinajpur	Student
5	Dinajpur	Student
6	Dinajpur	Labourer
7	Dinajpur	Student
8	Dinajpur	Student

Dinajpur, 29/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Housewife
2	Dinajpur	Housewife
3	Dinajpur	Housewife
4	Dinajpur	Housewife
5	Dinajpur	Housewife
6	Dinajpur	Housewife
7	Dinajpur	Housewife
8	Dinajpur	Tailor

Dinajpur, 27/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Dinajpur	Housewife
2	Dinajpur	Housewife
3	Dinajpur	Tailor
4	Dinajpur	Housewife
5	Dinajpur	Housewife
6	Dinajpur	Housewife
7	Dinajpur	Housewife

Rangpur, 26/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Housewife
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 26/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Day labourer
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 27/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 27/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Housewife
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student
8	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 27/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Housewife
2	Rangpur	Housewife
3	Rangpur	Housewife
4	Rangpur	Housewife
5	Rangpur	Housewife
6	Rangpur	Housewife

Rangpur, 28/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Business
2	Rangpur	Farmer
3	Rangpur	Worker
4	Rangpur	Farmer
5	Rangpur	Day labourer
6	Rangpur	Service
7	Rangpur	Business

Rangpur, 28/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Housewife
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 28/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 29/12/2017 (Female)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student
7	Rangpur	Student

Rangpur, 29/12/2017 (Male)

Respondent	Area	Occupation
1	Rangpur	Student
2	Rangpur	Student
3	Rangpur	Student
4	Rangpur	Student
5	Rangpur	Student
6	Rangpur	Student

7.5

Appendix 5: Key informant interviews

7.5.1
Indonesia

Informant	Area	Position	Date
1	Gemblegan Klaten	Female Leader in Gemblegan	1-Dec-17
2	Gemblegan Klaten	Head Village of Gemblegan	4-Dec-17
3	Klaten	Local Coordinator in Klaten	6-Dec-17
4	Jetis Klaten	Community Organisation WF Jetis	6-Dec-17
5	Nglinggi Klaten	Community Organiser at Nglinggi	5-Dec-17
6	Nglinggi Klaten	Head Village of Nglinggi	4-Dec-17
7	Gemblegan Klaten	Community Leader of WF Gemblegan	1-Dec-17
8	Klaten	Leader of Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama Klaten	16-Dec-17
9	Depok Lama	Nahdatul Ulama follower	19-Dec-17
10	Desa Payudan Dundang	Community Leader WF Sumber Makmur Group	26 October 2017 and 20 December 2017
11	Desa Prancak Sumenep	Community Leader WF As Salamah Group	14-Dec-17
12	Pondok An Nuqayah Sumenep	Community Leader Pondok An Nuqayah	13-Dec-17
13	Sumenep	Local Coordinator of WF Sumenep	27-Oct-17
14	Pondok An Nuqayah Sumenep	Islamic Boarding School Caretaker	26-Oct-17
15	Pondok An Nuqayah Sumenep	Islamic Boarding School Caretaker	13-Dec-17
16	Desa Guluk-Guluk Klaten	Village Head	22-Dec-17

7.5.2
Bangladesh

Informant	Area	Position, Organisation	Date
1	South Sokhipur, Debhata, Satkhira	President, Shanti O Sompritite Nari	28-Dec-17
2	Nalkora, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	Businessman	31-Dec-17
3	Lafsa, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	Asst. Teacher, Lafsa Dakhil Madrash	31-Dec-17
4	Millbazar, BRAC Office, Satkhira Sadar, Satkhira	SDM (CEP), BRAC	28-Dec-17
5	Millbazar, BRAC Office, Satkhira	SS (SLG & Networking) CEP, BRAC	28-Dec-17
6	Krisnojobonpur, Dinajpur	Shova Prodhan, Polli Somaj	31-Dec-17
7	Guccho Gram, Dinajpur	Shova Prodhan, Polli Somaj	30-Dec-17
8	Guccho Gram, Dinajpur	Cashier, Polli Somaj	30-Dec-17
9	Dinajpur Sadar, Dinajpur	District Coordinator, BRAC	31-Dec-17
10	Nobabganj, Dinajpur	PO (CEP), BRAC	31-Dec-17

7.6
Appendix 6: Records of participant observation

7.6.1
Indonesia

Number	Date	Area	Type of Group / Participant(s)	Total No. of Participants
1	27/10/2017	Sumenep	Assalamah Community Meeting	28
2	14/12/2017	Sumenep	Meeting - Community for Welfare Resource	16
3	25/10/2017	Sumenep	Meeting - Community Members for Sumber Makmur (Canvas Business Model Training)	20-30
4	15-16 December 2017	Klaten	Peaceful Village Declaration	300
5	21/10/2017	Klaten	Weekly bird competition at Nglinggi Meeting Hall	30
6	28/11/2017	Klaten	Packaging Training (Women's Economic Empowerment training by Wahid Foundation)	28
7	Date Unknown	Klaten	Meeting for Group Selection in Nglinggi village (Wahid Foundation activity)	17
8	21/10/2017	Klaten	Meeting for Preparation for Peaceful Village Declaration	50

7.6.2
Bangladesh

Number	Date	Area	Type of Group / Participant(s)	Total No. of Participants
1	1/09/2018	Dinajpur	Action Committee Meeting	19
2	1/09/2018	Dinajpur	Courtyard Meeting	20
3	1/10/2018	Dinajpur	Action Committee Meeting	19
4	1/10/2018	Dinajpur	Courtyard Meeting	36
5	1/11/2018	Dinajpur	Courtyard Meeting	30
6	14/1/2018	Satkhira	Courtyard Meeting	46
7	15/1/2018	Satkhira	Action Committee Meeting	20
8	14/1/2018	Satkhira	Courtyard Meeting	32
9	15/1/2018	Satkhira	Courtyard Meeting	20
10	14/1/2018	Satkhira	Action Committee Meeting	18

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