Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts

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A model suggesting that prejudice-related discrepancy experiences facilitate prejudice reduction efforts is proposed and tested. Prejudice-related discrepancies concerning gays were activated among low and high prejudiced Ss in 2 experiments. Results indicated that low-prejudiced (LP) Ss’ violations of their LP and well-internalized attitudes produced compunction, self- and discrepancy-focused thoughts, attention to discrepancy-relevant information (Experiment 1), and a slowing of responses (Experiment 2). These findings indicated that LP Ss’ discrepancies instigated a self-regulatory cycle that, theoretically, should help in achieving control over subsequent prejudiced responses. Evidence of effective self-regulation was found in a task following discrepancy activation. Specifically, LP Ss effectively inhibited prejudiced responses to jokes about gays as a consequence of discrepancy activation (Experiment 2).

Considerable empirical evidence indicates that despite societal trends toward liberalism and individual rejection of cultural stereotypes, prejudiced responses among Americans persist (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Observations that even low prejudiced individuals (i.e., those who score low on attitudinal measures of prejudice) engage in prejudiced responses are especially unsettling. For example, many low prejudiced people feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a Black person (Pettigrew, 1971) and are less likely to help a Black than a White victim when other bystanders are present (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).

Few if any researchers would disagree with the conclusion that prejudice-related discrepancies (i.e., responses that are more prejudiced than one’s personal standards for responding suggest are appropriate) are common. However, the theoretical explanations for such discrepancies are diverse and varied (see Crosby et al., 1980; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz et al., 1986; McConahay, 1986; Sigall & Page, 1971). According to Devine’s (1989) analysis, prejudiced responses persist among many low prejudiced individuals because of spontaneous, unintentional stereotype use. Specifically, Devine argued that stereotypes are highly accessible knowledge structures that can be automatically activated, even if they are not actually endorsed. She argued that personal beliefs or attitudes about stereotyped groups are, in contrast, less accessible and are not necessarily consistent with the stereotypical associations stored in memory. Thus, responding in a low prejudiced manner requires that one inhibit spontaneous stereotype-based (prejudiced) responses and deliberately replace them with belief-based responses. Because achieving control over spontaneous responses is difficult, Devine argued that prejudiced responses may occur even after genuinely low prejudiced beliefs have been internalized.

Consistent with this analysis, Devine et al. (1991, Studies 1 and 2) and Monteith et al. (1993, Study 2) found that the vast majority of low prejudiced subjects reported that they were prone to prejudice-related discrepancies. For example, these subjects reported that they would feel uncomfortable sitting next to a gay male on a bus, although they believed that such a response was inappropriate. Furthermore, low prejudiced subjects were prone to discrepancies even though their personal standards were well internalized (Devine et al., 1991, Study 3; Monteith et al., 1993, Study 1). That is, low prejudiced subjects viewed their low prejudiced standards as highly important and as central to their self-concept, and these subjects were very committed to responding consistently with their standards. Evidence also was found that transgressing such standards had strong affective consequences: Low prejudiced subjects experienced negative affect that was directed at themselves (e.g., guilt and self-criticism) as well as general discomfort in connection with their discrepancies (Devine et al., 1991, Studies 1 and 2; Monteith et al., 1993, Study 2). It is important to note that high prejudiced subjects also were prone to discrepancies in this research, indicating that their actual responses to stereotyped group members would be highly prejudiced even though their personal standards called for moderately prejudiced responses.

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However, high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards were not well internalized, so that they experienced general discomfort but not guilt as a consequence of their discrepancies.1

These findings indicated that many low prejudiced people realize that they are prone to prejudice-related discrepancies, that they experience personal conflict over their discrepant responses (see also Allport, 1954; Myrdal, 1944; Rokeach, 1973), and apparently, that they genuinely want to control their prejudiced responses. Cast in this light, achieving control over prejudiced responses after internalizing low prejudiced beliefs appears to be a gradual process rather than an all-or-none event—much like the breaking of other habits (cf. Devine, 1989; Devine & Monteith, in press).

However, previous work has not addressed whether or how the prejudice-reduction process can be completed. It is possible that people will never be able to evade the spontaneous use of stereotypes or the guilt that accompanies awareness of such responses. The underlying assumption of the present research was that people can learn to achieve control over the potential influence of negative stereotypes. The goal, then, was to develop and test a model for understanding how people can learn to inhibit their prejudiced responses so as to respond instead on the basis of their personal beliefs. The general thesis of the model is that discrepancies involving well-internalized, low prejudiced beliefs have a variety of consequences that facilitate people's prejudice-reduction efforts. Drawing from various theoretical frameworks, the most functionally significant consequences appear to be related to the motivating properties of discrepancy-associated affect and the initiation of several self-regulatory mechanisms.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Many theorists have suggested that discrepancies between standards and actual responses motivate discrepancy-reduction efforts (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Bandura, 1986; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1986, 1987; Rokeach, 1973; Wicklund, 1975). The actual cause of the heightened motivation is assumed to be discrepancy-associated negative affect, rather than the discrepancy itself. Furthermore, discrepancies that implicate one's self-concept and thus give rise to self-directed negative affect are especially likely to motivate efforts at discrepancy reduction (Bandura, 1986; Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Duval, Duval, & Mullis, 1992; Rokeach, 1973). This work provides a theoretical basis for expecting prejudice-related discrepancies to motivate subsequent discrepancy-reduction efforts, especially among low prejudiced individuals. That is, one would expect greater motivation for discrepancy reduction among low than among high prejudiced individuals because only low prejudiced individuals experience negative self-directed affect when they transgress their well-internalized standards (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993).

Discrepancies can be reduced in a variety of ways, such as changing one's goals (Carver & Scheier, 1990), values, or attitudes (Rokeach, 1973; more generally, see the dissonance literature) so that they are consistent with one's responses. One would hope that low prejudiced individuals would neither abandon their goal to be nonprejudiced nor change their low prejudiced attitudes. Rather, low prejudiced individuals might reduce their discrepancies by engaging in careful self-regulation so as to inhibit prejudiced responses and to replace them with belief-based responses.

One mechanism that may initiate the self-regulation of prejudiced responses is heightened self-focus after a discrepancy experience. Specifically, Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1986, 1987) suggested that self-relevant discrepancies and their associated negative affect heighten self-focus, which in turn activates a self-regulatory cycle aimed at reducing discrepancies. After the initiation of such a cycle, the exact processes that produce successful discrepancy reduction most likely will vary, depending on the factors that are responsible for producing the discrepancy. For low prejudiced individuals, discrepancies presumably arise because they use spontaneously activated stereotypes when responding before bringing their low prejudiced beliefs to mind (Devine, 1989; Klinger & Beall, 1992). Thus, successful discrepancy reduction necessarily must entail the initiation of controlled (i.e., thoughtful and deliberate) processing that, over time, helps to inhibit the more automatic, prejudiced responses so that low prejudiced responses can be made.

Portions of Gray's (e.g., 1981, 1982; see also Fowles, 1980) neuropsychological model of motivation and learning are useful for understanding how control over prejudiced responses might be achieved. In particular, Gray's description of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) provided a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in learning to inhibit discrepant responses that have resulted in aversive consequences in the past. Because of its detail, Gray's account allows one to generate theoretically derived predictions relevant to the prejudice-reduction process that do not follow from more simple behavioral models of learning.

Gray (1982) argued that the BIS is initially activated when an unexpected or aversive event occurs (a mismatch), such as a response that results in punishment. This is followed by increased arousal and an automatic, momentary pausing or interruption of ongoing behavior (i.e., behavioral inhibition), similar to an orienting response (see Gray, 1982; Fowles, 1980; Patterson & Newman, 1990). Then, the sequence of responses occurring when the mismatch was detected is tagged with a "faulty, needs checking" indicator and is allotted enhanced attention. In addition, the organism engages in exploratory-investigative behavior, searching for indications of the discrepant response. Gray (1982) argued that the enhanced attention and exploratory-investigative processes work in concert, enabling the organism to identify stimuli and responses that predict the aversive event. In other words, through reflection, an association is built between cues present when the discrepancy occurred and the discrepant response with the punishment (Patterson & Newman, 1990). Such response-contingent punish-

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1 Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) used Black people (Study 1; see also Zuwerink, Devine, & Cook, 1992) and gay men (Study 2) as the target group, and Monteith, Zuwerink, and Devine's (1993) studies concerned reactions to gay men. The same patterns of findings reported by these researchers were also obtained when women served as the target group (Pressly & Devine, 1992).
Consequently, the sequence of responses previously tagged as discrepant responses. According to Gray (1982), the BIS should be activated again whenever cues that were previously associated with response-contingent punishment are presented. Consequently, the sequence of responses previously tagged as being faulty is executed with greater restraint (e.g., more slowly and more readily abandoned) so that other, presumably more desirable responses can be executed. In short, the organism learns to inhibit or to control responses that previously resulted in aversive consequences.

Gray's (1982) notion of mismatches has clear, conceptual parallels with the experience of prejudice-related discrepancies and their associated negative affect. However, in applying Gray's model to understanding the mechanisms by which the controlled regulation of prejudiced responses can be achieved, a couple of extrapolations seem appropriate. First, the personal importance of the discrepancy is likely to affect the operation of the inhibitory system. Any type of discrepancy may be sufficient for producing a momentary interruption of ongoing behavior, but the reflective behavior necessary for the establishment of punishment cues may be most likely for personally significant discrepancies that have strong affective consequences (see Fowles, 1988, for a similar suggestion). Recall that only low prejudiced individuals' standards for responding to stereotyped groups are well internalized (i.e., important, self-defining, and involving commitment) and that only these subjects experience guilt when their standards are violated (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). One might expect, therefore, that the inhibitory system will be fully engaged only among low prejudiced individuals after prejudice-related discrepancy experiences.

A second extrapolation concerns the types of activities involved in the operation of the inhibitory system. Previous research has not examined whether these activities might be cognitive. For example, people's heightened attention to environmental stimuli that are associated with the discrepancy might entail generating thoughts relevant to their personal discrepancy experiences. Similarly, exploratory-investigative behavior instigated to search for indications of the discrepancy might entail paying particular attention to discrepancy-relevant information in an attempt to understand why the discrepancy occurred and how to avoid it in the future.

MODEL OF THE SELF-REGULATION OF PREJUDICED RESPONSES

The above theoretical and empirical research converges to suggest that prejudice-related discrepancies should facilitate the prejudice-reduction process among low prejudiced individuals. As shown in Figure 1, prejudice-related discrepancies arise when the presence of a group membership cue spontaneously activates the stereotype and use of the stereotype results in a prejudiced response. With awareness of the discrepant (prejudiced) response, an important sense of low prejudiced individuals' self-concept is violated. According to the model, several consequences will follow. First, negative self-directed affect will increase, which constitutes a punishment and heights motivation for discrepancy reduction. Second, self-focus will be heightened, which will instigate attempts to regulate responses relevant to the discrepancy. Third, attention will be allocated to discrepancy-relevant stimuli (e.g., generating thoughts relevant to one's personal discrepancy experiences). Finally, exploratory-investigative behavior will be initiated to search for indications of the discrepant response (e.g., enhanced attention to discrepancy-relevant information). The third and fourth activities specified in the model help the individual to note the cues present when the discrepancy occurred. Consequently, associations can be built among the cues present when the discrepancy occurred, the discrepant response, and the punishment (i.e., guilty feelings). In this way, cues for punishment will be established.

Theoretically, these discrepancy-associated events serve the adaptive function of increasing the likelihood that discrepant responses will be inhibited in the future. According to the model, the inhibitory system will be activated on future occasions that afford a prejudiced response when the previously established cues for punishment are present (see boxed area of Figure 1). The activation of the system will cause responses to be slowed and executed more carefully, so that prejudiced responses can be inhibited through controlled processing and replaced with belief-based, low prejudiced responses.

Two experiments examined the present model. In both experiments, low and high prejudiced subjects were led to believe that they had engaged in prejudice-related discrepant responses. However, the discrepancies entailed the violation of
well-internalized and clearly nonprejudiced standards among low prejudiced subjects only. After the discrepancy induction, both experiments investigated whether the discrepancy-associated consequences specified by the model occurred among low but not high prejudiced subjects. Theoretically, these consequences should increase the likelihood that control can be achieved over future spontaneous, prejudiced responses. Thus, Experiment 2 also explored whether engaging in a response that is discrepant with low prejudiced, internalized standards facilitated subsequent attempts to inhibit prejudiced responses, so that belief-based responses could be generated instead.

**EXPERIMENT 1**

Under the ruse of an elaborate cover story, low and high prejudiced heterosexual subjects in a discrepancy-activated condition were led to believe that they had evaluated a gay law school applicant negatively because of his sexual orientation. A pilot study ensured that this behavior was more prejudiced than both low and high prejudiced subjects' standards suggested was appropriate. However, the behavior served to violate an extremely well-internalized and nonprejudiced standard for low prejudiced subjects only. Other low and high prejudiced subjects participated in a discrepancy-not-activated condition.

The consequences of the discrepancy manipulation were then examined. Subjects reported their current feelings by completing a mood-adjoint questionnaire. Of particular interest was whether subjects would experience general discomfort (e.g., tense and bothered) and more specific negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilty and disappointed with self).

A second supposedly separate task was then introduced to examine other theoretically relevant discrepancy consequences. The task involved reading an essay concerning reasons why people sometimes respond more negatively toward gays than they think they should and how to reduce the occurrence of these negative responses. The experimenter inconspicuously monitored the time taken to read the essay. After reading the essay, the participants recorded all of the thoughts they had while reading the essay. Two theoretically relevant measures were extracted from these data. First, the number of self-focus thoughts was determined. Second, the degree to which these self-thoughts specifically concerned subjects' personal discrepancy experiences was determined (e.g., wondering how stereotype-based responses can be avoided), so as to provide a measure of discrepancy-focused thoughts. Finally, subjects completed a recall measure for the essay content. Theoretically, heightened self-focus is indicative of the instigation of self-regulatory processes. Essay reading time and recall were measured to determine subjects' attention to the discrepancy-relevant information in the essay. Finally, the generation of discrepancy-focused thoughts presumably would indicate that subjects were searching for indications of their discrepant responses.

For all of the measures, higher numbers would be indicative of the instigation of regulatory processes aimed at inhibiting future discrepant responses. For all of the measures, therefore, low prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition were expected to have higher scores than their counterparts in the not-activated condition. However, the high prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated and not-activated conditions were not expected to differ on any of the measures as a function of the discrepancy manipulation.

**Method**

**Subject Selection**

Several hundred undergraduate introductory psychology students responded to the Should–Would Questionnaire, developed by Devine et al. (1991), as part of a larger survey administered early in the semester. The students indicated their sexual orientation on the questionnaire. They also imagined themselves in four different contact situations, each of which involved a gay man. For each situation, subjects indicated their agreement with a statement that they would experience a negative emotion in the situation (e.g., feeling upset that a gay couple moved in next door), using scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Then they considered the situations again and indicated their agreement with a statement that they would experience a negative emotion in the situation. The average of subjects' should ratings served as the measure of prejudice. In previous research (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993), this measure correlated highly with a standard measure of prejudice toward gays (Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuals or HATH, Larsen, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980; rs > .65, ps < .001). Thirty-two heterosexual women and 31 heterosexual men who scored relatively low (should score range = 1–1.25; M = 1.03) or high (should score range = 4–6.75; M = 4.75) in prejudice toward gay men were selected at random, contacted by phone, and successfully recruited for participation. Subjects were not informed of the relation between the experiment and their responses to the Should–Would Questionnaire.

**Design**

The design was a 2 (gender: men or women) X 2 (prejudice: low or high) X 2 (discrepancy activation: activated or not activated) between-subjects factorial. Eight men and women at each prejudice level were randomly assigned to each of the discrepancy conditions, with the
exception that only seven low prejudiced men participated in the activated condition.

**Materials and Procedure**

Subjects participated individually. The person who recruited the subjects was different from the experimenter so that the experimenter could remain blind to subjects’ prejudice level. The experiment included three phases.

**Phase 1: Law School Application**

The cover story for this phase was based on a procedure used by Linville and Jones (1980). The gist of the information communicated to subjects was that they would review materials submitted several years ago by a law school applicant. The supposed purpose of the study was to examine which parts of the law school application materials best predicted admission to the law school program (see Linville & Jones, 1980, for details).

Subjects were given a folder containing an applicant’s materials and were instructed to review the materials, complete the evaluation form, and then to place their form in an envelope provided by the experimenter. The experimenter explained that all materials completed during the session would be put in this envelope and that all responses would remain anonymous.

**Application materials.** The application materials included three forms. First, a “General Information Form” designed to look like an actual law school application form, provided descriptive information (e.g., birth date and grade point average). It also included an optional section, supposedly provided so that various organizations that the applicant might want to join could contact him or her. Within this section, the applicant’s gender and sexual orientation was marked. The second form was a resume that included several sections (e.g., work experience and personal interests). Third, a letter of recommendation was provided.

The materials reviewed by subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition differed only in a few respects. For the activated group, the applicant was specified as male and gay on the General Information Form and one activity listed on the resume was membership in a gay activist group. Also, this applicant’s materials were designed to be somewhat weak, so that subjects would form a somewhat negative impression of the applicant. In contrast, the applicant was noted to be male and heterosexual in the not-activated group, and an activity unrelated to sexual orientation was substituted for the membership in the gay activist group. Finally, the materials for the heterosexual applicant conveyed a rather positive impression of the applicant’s intellectual ability and potential. The strength of the gay and heterosexual applicants’ materials was varied so that subjects in the activated condition would be likely to reject the gay applicant from the law school program and so that subjects in the not-activated condition would not be likely to do so. Results from a pilot study indicated that subjects at various levels of prejudice evaluated the two applicants in the intended manner.

**Evaluation forms.** The evaluation forms included 14 questions (e.g., concerning motivation and intellectual ability), and ratings were recorded on 10-point scales with higher ratings being more positive. The participants were instructed at the end of the evaluation form to add their ratings to generate a total evaluation score. Below this score, five decision categories were listed, ranging from definitely accept the applicant and offer a scholarship to definitely reject. Each decision category was paired with a range of the total evaluation scores that would qualify the applicant for the given decision. Subjects were instructed to determine which decision corresponded to the total evaluation score they had computed and to place an X next to the appropriate decision. (For example, if a perfect evaluation score of 140 was generated, the subject marked the definitely accept and offer scholarship decision.) Thus, subjects were well aware of the decision they had made concerning the applicant.

Because the discrepancy manipulation required that the gay applicant be rejected and the heterosexual applicant be accepted, the range of total evaluation scores paired with each decision category was varied across the discrepancy conditions. Specifically, pilot study data were used to determine likely evaluation scores for the applicants. Then the evaluation score point breakdowns were constructed so that subjects in the discrepancy-not-activated condition were likely to accept the applicant and subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition were likely to reject the applicant. All of the subjects in the discrepancy-not-activated condition did accept the law school applicant. Unfortunately, 11 subjects who evaluated the gay applicant also generated accept decisions. These subjects are not included in the number of subjects reported in the Method section and their data are not included in the reported analyses, as a discrepancy clearly was not activated. No unique subject characteristics such as prejudice level or gender were associated with these subjects.

**Phase 2: Discrepancy Manipulation**

After subjects informed the experimenter that they had completed their evaluation, the experimenter performed an ostensible debriefing. The study was described as investigating whether people’s evaluations of others are influenced by knowledge of sexual orientation. The experimenter explained that some subjects evaluated a gay applicant whereas others evaluated a heterosexual applicant, but that other than varying sexual orientation all of the materials for both applicants were identical. Subjects were asked not to indicate the sexual orientation of the applicant they evaluated but simply to indicate whether they had noticed it. All subjects noticed this information.

The experimenter then explained that because the materials were identical for the gay and heterosexual applicants, the evaluation scores could be compared to determine whether people were influenced by the applicant’s sexual orientation. The experimenter said

> If we find that people who thought the applicant was gay make more negative evaluations than people who thought he was heterosexual, it would indicate that prejudice was operating. In other words, if the ratings of the gay applicant are substantially lower than those of the heterosexual applicant, we would take it as evidence of prejudice toward the gay applicant.

The experimenter mentioned that the present research was designed to determine whether the results of an identical, previous study were replicable. She presented a figure that summarized the previous findings, which indicated that the subjects had accepted the heterosexual applicant but rejected the gay applicant. After describing the findings, the experimenter reminded subjects that the materials for both applicants were identical, other than sexual orientation, so that people must have been influenced by the applicant’s sexual orientation. The experimenter concluded by noting that if the same pattern of results was found in the present research, strong evidence would be obtained for the idea that prejudice somehow had affected people’s evaluations.

It is important to note that subjects in the gay applicant condition were well aware that they had decided to reject the applicant, which implied that they had evaluated the applicant negatively because of his sexual orientation. The implication for subjects in the heterosexual applicant condition was that others had been biased.
Phase 3: Measurement of Discrepancy Consequences

Subjects completed a 16-item affect questionnaire, which supposedly "typically is included in most psychological research." They rated the degree to which each affect item applied to how they were feeling at the moment on a scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies very much). These items are noted in the Results section. Then the experimenter explained that the faculty member responsible for the study they had just done was thinking about offering an undergraduate workshop on stereotyping and prejudice. Supposedly, the faculty member had written an essay that summarized the main issues to be covered in the workshop and wanted some feedback about the ideas.

Thus, subjects were asked to read the essay, taking as much time as was needed, after which a form would be provided for recording any comments they might have.

The essay had two main sections. The first concerned why people often have difficulty avoiding negative responses toward gay men. It was explained that because stereotypes about gay men generally are known and are somewhat ingrained in most individuals, they can be used in a rather automatic fashion. In all, five main ideas were communicated. The second section concerned how people can eliminate their negative responses toward gay men. Several techniques were suggested (e.g., equating the process to the process of breaking a bad habit). Eight main ideas were communicated.

Subjects' reading time for the essay was unobtrusively monitored. Subjects then completed a thought-listing task, in which they recorded any and all of the thoughts they had while reading the essay, including feelings about and reactions to the issues addressed in the essay. Next, subjects were told that determining how much and what they could recall from the essay might help the faculty member to improve the workshop. A form for this recall task was provided, and subjects were instructed to write down everything they could recall.

Subjects then were thoroughly debriefed. Great care was taken to explain how and why deception was used. The debriefing served another important purpose. The experimenter elicited information from subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition that could serve as a check on the effectiveness of the procedures for creating a discrepancy. Subjects were reminded that the procedure was intended to make them believe that their applicant evaluations had been biased by knowledge of their sexual orientation. The experimenter then asked whether subjects had believed at any time during the experiment that their evaluations had been biased and asked the subjects to explain their response. All comments made by the subjects were recorded by the experimenter, and a judge later examined the comments to determine whether a discrepancy was effectively activated. The comments of 14 subjects, in addition to the 63 noted as participants in the Method section, persuasively indicated that they were not convinced in the least at any time during the session that the applicant's sexual orientation had influenced their evaluations. Two additional judges also examined the comments, and high interjudge agreement was found between the initial judge and each of the two other judges (93 and 95; agreement was computed as the number of agreements divided by the total number of agreements plus disagreements). Because a discrepancy clearly was not activated for some subjects, their data were not included in the primary analyses. (Results involving the excluded data are summarized in Footnote 6.)

Results

Affective Consequences of Discrepancy Activation

Formation of Affect Indexes

The mood questionnaire items were used to construct five affect indexes. Ratings of how bothered, uneasy, and uncomfortable subjects felt were averaged to form a Discomfort index (Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$). A Negself index included the items disappointed with myself, guilty, annoyed at myself, and self-critical (Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$). In addition to these theoretically relevant indexes, three other indexes were formed: Positive (including the items friendly, good, happy, and optimistic, Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$), Depressed (including the items low, sad, and depressed, Cronbach's $\alpha = .71$), and Negother (including the items irritated at others and disgusted with others, $r(62) = .78$).

A 2 (gender) $\times$ 2 (discrepancy) $\times$ 2 (prejudice) between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed on the five affect indexes. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for discrepancy, $F(5, 51) = 8.58, p < .001$, a significant Gender $\times$ Discrepancy interaction, $F(5, 51) = 2.85, p < .02$, and a significant Discrepancy $\times$ Prejudice interaction, $F(5, 51) = 4.82, p < .001$. The affect indexes subsequently were examined at the univariate level using 2 (gender) $\times$ 2 (discrepancy) $\times$ 2 (prejudice) analyses of variance (ANOVA's). Except when noted, all analyses in Experiment 1 used this type of analysis.

Primary Affect Indexes

The ANOVA performed on the Discomfort index revealed the predicted significant main effect for discrepancy, $F(1, 55) = 5.00, p < .03$, such that the activated group reported higher levels of discomfort ($M = 3.64$) than the not-activated group ($M = 2.72$). Although the effect of discrepancy on discomfort did not significantly depend on subjects' prejudice level, the interaction approached significance, $F(1, 55) = 3.01, p < .09$. Post hoc analyses revealed that low prejudiced subjects in the activated condition reported significantly greater discomfort ($M = 4.21$) than their counterparts in the not-activated condition ($M = 2.56$), but this difference was not significant for high prejudiced subjects (activated $M = 3.08$, not activated $M = 2.87$).

Unexpectedly, the discrepancy main effect was qualified by a significant Discrepancy $\times$ Gender interaction, $F(1, 55) = 6.62, p < .01$. Women experienced greater discomfort in the activated ($M = 4.06$) than in the not-activated condition ($M = 2.06$), but men experienced moderate discomfort, regardless of their discrepancy condition (activated $M = 3.23$, not-activated $M = 3.37$). The only significant differences were between the women's not-activated group mean and all other group means.

Whereas subjects' prejudice level had only a small impact on their experienced discomfort, a different pattern emerged in

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3 All reported post hoc analyses were performed using Fisher's least significance difference tests and are significant at the $p < .05$ level at least.

4 Although Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) and Monteith, Devine, and Zuwerink (1993) found that high prejudiced subjects reported heightened feelings of discomfort in association with discrepancies, the present procedure differs in important ways from this other research. For example, subjects were not instructed to think about their personal standards in the present experiment, but they were instructed to do so in the previous research. Thus, perhaps the psychological impact of transgressing personal standards for high prejudiced subjects is minimized when their standards are not made salient.
the analysis of the Negself feelings. The main effect for discrepancy was significant, $F(1, 55) = 24.92, p < .001$ (activated $M = 4.36$; not activated $M = 2.38$). Most importantly, the interaction between prejudice and discrepancy was also significant, $F(1, 55) = 11.42, p < .001$. As shown in the top panel of Table 1, low and high prejudiced subjects who evaluated the heterosexual applicant reported relatively low Negself feelings, as did the high prejudiced subjects in the activated condition. However, low prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition reported significantly greater Negself feelings than subjects in any of the other conditions.

As with discomfort, a significant Gender $\times$ Discrepancy interaction was obtained on the Negself index, $F(1, 55) = 9.67, p < .003$. Post hoc analyses revealed that women experienced significantly greater Negself feelings in the activated ($M = 5.03$) than in the not-activated condition ($M = 1.81$), but this difference was not significant for the men ($Ms$ for activated and not-activated groups were 3.70 and 2.95, respectively). It is important that the effect of gender did not qualify the Discrepancy $\times$ Prejudice interaction ($F < 1$).

In sum, low and high prejudiced subjects alike experienced discomfort after violating their personal standards for responding to a gay man, but only low prejudiced subjects experienced negative self-directed affect. It is also important to note the effects of gender, prejudice, and discrepancy on Negself and Discomfort, independent of the correlations between these affects. Thus, two analyses of covariance were performed, in which each affect measure was partialed out of the other. When Negself was partialed out of Discomfort, neither the discrepancy main effect nor the Gender $\times$ Discrepancy interaction was significant ($F < 1$ in both cases). However, when Discomfort was partialed from Negself, both the discrepancy main effect, $F(1, 54) = 18.45, p < .001$, and the Discrepancy $\times$ Prejudice interaction, $F(1, 54) = 7.88, p < .007$, remained significant. The Gender $\times$ Discrepancy interaction was no longer significant. These findings provide clear evidence that low but not high prejudiced subjects experienced guilt after violating their personal standards.

**Other Affect Indexes**

The only significant finding obtained in the analysis of the Positive index was a main effect for Discrepancy, $F(1, 55) = 12.21, p < .001$. Overall, subjects in the activated condition reported feeling less positive ($M = 5.80$) than subjects in the not-activated group ($M = 7.30$). No significant results were obtained in the analyses of the Depressed and the Negother indexes.

**Additional Consequences of Discrepancy Activation**

**Self- and Discrepancy-Focused Thoughts Generated After Reading the Essay**

No significant effects were obtained in the ANOVA performed on the total number of thoughts generated (overall $M = 8.62$). To examine predictions relevant to the types of thoughts generated, subjects’ protocols were content analyzed by two judges who were blind to the subjects’ gender, prejudice level, and discrepancy condition. An initial examination of subjects’ protocols suggested the formation of three main categories: *Thoughts about the essay* concerned ideas presented in the essay and about the workshop (e.g., suggestions about how to improve the workshop). A second category concerned *thoughts about gay men* (e.g., wondering what being gay is like and thoughts about how society treats gay men). The final category, *thoughts about the self*, included any explicit consideration of gay men in relation to the self (e.g., subjects wondering why they have negative responses toward gay men or how to change those responses and subjects describing their interactions with gay men). All thoughts that could not be coded into any of these categories (6% of the total number of thoughts) were coded as miscellaneous. Interrater agreement, computed as the number of agreements as to whether a given thought belonged in a given category divided by the total number of agreements plus disagreements, was .96. All analyses involving the thought categories used as the unit of analysis the number of thoughts coded in a given category divided by the total number of thoughts (with one noted exception).

Because the supposed purpose of reading the essay was to obtain feedback on the workshop, it was not surprising to find that many thoughts concerned the essay and the workshop (overall mean proportion = .34) and that no significant findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Low prejudice</th>
<th>High prejudice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activated</td>
<td>Not activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negself feelings</td>
<td>5.36(a)</td>
<td>2.03(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-focused thoughts</td>
<td>0.42(a)</td>
<td>0.16(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy-focused thoughts</td>
<td>0.63(a)</td>
<td>0.21(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading time</td>
<td>4.37(a)</td>
<td>3.80(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid recall score</td>
<td>2.31(a)</td>
<td>1.19(bc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note* Means not sharing common subscripts differ significantly from each other ($p < .05$ at least, by Fisher’s least significant difference tests).
emerged in the ANOVA. The analysis of the thoughts related to gay men also did not reveal any significant findings (overall mean proportion = .25).

The more theoretically pertinent analysis was relevant to whether low prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition were especially focused on the self. The ANOVA revealed the expected Discrepancy × Prejudice interaction, \(F(1, 55) = 6.04, p < .02\). As shown in the middle panel of Table 1, the difference between the proportion of self-focused thoughts in the activated and not-activated conditions was significant for the low prejudiced subjects, whereas this difference was not significant for the high prejudiced subjects.

It was also expected that low prejudiced subjects’ self-thoughts would concern personal discrepancy experiences. Theoretically, allotting enhanced attention to discrepancies is part of the self-regulatory cycle aimed at avoiding similar experiences in the future. Two additional categories were formed, therefore, based only on the self-focused thoughts: discrepancy-relevant self-thoughts and other self-thoughts (e.g., some subjects noted whether they knew any gay people). Discrepancy-relevant thoughts included such things as subjects wondering why they have negative responses toward gay men and subjects indicating that they find it hard to overcome, avoid, or eliminate their negative responses.

The discrepancy-relevant thoughts were summed and divided by the total number of self-thoughts. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for discrepancy, \(F(1, 55) = 4.97, p < .03\), as well as a significant Discrepancy × Prejudice interaction, \(F(1, 55) = 4.38, p < .04\). As shown in the middle panel of Table 1, low prejudiced subjects in the activated condition generated a significantly higher proportion of discrepancy-relevant self-thoughts than the other groups. In addition, in an analysis of the proportion of discrepancy-relevant to total thoughts, the Discrepancy × Prejudice interaction was significant, \(F(1, 55) = 4.79, p < .03\). Again, low prejudiced subjects in the activated condition were significantly more focused on their personal discrepancy experiences (\(M = .26\)) than their counterparts in the not-activated condition (\(M = .09\)) and than the high prejudiced subjects in both discrepancy conditions (activated \(M = .11\), not-activated \(M = .12\)).

**Attention to Discrepancy- Relevant Information in the Essay**

The two measures relevant to the extent of attention subjects gave to the discrepancy-relevant information in the essay were subjects’ reading time and recall scores for the essay. The correlation between these measures was not significant, \(\rho(63) = .11, n.s.\)

The 2 (gender) × 2 (discrepancy) × 2 (prejudice) ANOVA performed on the reading time data revealed that the expected interaction between discrepancy and prejudice was significant, \(F(1, 55) = 5.10, p < .03\). As shown in the bottom panel of Table 1, whereas low prejudiced subjects in the activated group spent significantly more time reading the essay than their not-activated counterparts, this difference was not significant for high prejudiced subjects. Unexpectedly, all high prejudiced subjects spent a relatively long time reading the essay. No other effects were significant.

To examine recall of the essay, subjects’ free-response recall protocols were scored by giving one point for each correctly recalled idea from the essay and giving no additional points when the same statement was repeated or summarized using different wording. The ANOVA performed on the total recall scores revealed a significant main effect for prejudice, \(F(1, 55) = 4.52, p < .04\), such that the recall scores were higher for low (\(M = 5.52\)) than for high (\(M = 4.16\)) prejudiced subjects.

A marginally significant Prejudice × Discrepancy interaction also was found, \(F(1, 55) = 3.36, p < .07\). Further examination of the recall protocols revealed that this effect was primarily due to the recall of specific portions of the essay. In particular, an avoid recall score was generated to index subjects’ recall for the section on why negative reactions toward gay men are difficult to avoid (overall \(M = 1.46\)). A reduce score reflected recall for the section that discussed techniques for changing one’s negative reactions toward gay men (overall \(M = 3.37\)). The ANOVA performed on the reduce score revealed no significant effects. However, the analysis of the avoid score revealed a significant main effect for prejudice, \(F(1, 55) = 5.67, p < .02\), as well as a significant Prejudice × Discrepancy interaction, \(F(1, 55) = 17.92, p < .001\). As shown in the bottom panel of Table 1, the avoid score for the low prejudiced, activated group was significantly higher than the avoid score in the other groups. These subjects therefore seemed to allot enhanced attention to discrepancy-relevant information concerning why people are prone to prejudice-related discrepancies. It is interesting that the high prejudiced, activated group’s avoid recall score was significantly lower than that of their not-activated counterparts.

**Mediating Role of Negative Self-Directed Affect**

Analyses were performed to examine whether negative self-directed affect mediated the effect of the discrepancy manipulation on the initiation of self-regulatory mechanisms among the low prejudiced subjects. If this effect is a mediator, the interactions between prejudice and discrepancy obtained for self- and discrepancy-focused thoughts, reading time, and avoid recall should be reduced substantially when negative self-directed affect is used as a covariate in the analyses of these measures. The results of the ANCOVAs provided fairly good support for the mediating role of negative self-directed affect. The Prejudice × Discrepancy interaction was only marginally significant for subjects’ self-focused thoughts, \(F(1, 54) = 3.28, p < .08\), and was no longer significant for subjects’ discrepancy-focused thoughts, \(F(1, 54) = 2.50, p < .12\), and their reading time, \(F(1, 54) = 2.36, p < .13\). For the avoid-recall measure, the interaction remained significant, but it was attenuated, \(F(1, 54) = 9.96, p < .003\).

Additional analyses were performed using data from the 14 subjects who did not believe their evaluations of the gay applicant were influenced by knowledge of sexual orientation. The subjects were all low in prejudice, with an approximately equal number of men and women. It is not surprising that high prejudiced subjects were more easily convinced that their behavior was biased by knowledge of sexual
Discussion

Experiment 1 examined subjects' reactions to rejecting a law school applicant because of his sexual orientation. This was a discrepant response for both low and high prejudiced subjects. However, the response violated low prejudiced, well-internalized standards for low prejudiced subjects only, so that the discrepancy was larger and more personally significant for low than for high prejudiced subjects. The central question was whether low prejudiced subjects experiencing such a discrepancy would manifest evidence of the engagement of self-regulatory mechanisms that, theoretically, should facilitate the subsequent inhibition of discrepant responses. The results provided clear, converging evidence that the discrepancy experience did engage these self-regulatory mechanisms.

First, the discrepancy experience produced negative self-directed affect among low but not high prejudiced subjects. Theoretically, such guilty feelings should motivate discrepancy reduction (e.g., Rokeach, 1973) and should serve to establish strong cues for punishment (cf. Gray, 1982). Second, the discrepancy experience heightened low but not high prejudiced subjects' self-focus. This finding is consistent with Pyszczynski and Greenberg's (1986, 1987) contention that ego-relevant discrepancies increase self-focus, which promotes subsequent regulation of behavior. Further examination of the self-thoughts provided a third indicator of the activation of self-regulatory mechanisms: Low prejudiced subjects in the discrepancy-activated condition were uniquely preoccupied with their personal prejudice-related discrepancy experiences. In fact, over half of their self-thoughts were focused on such discrepancies. Finally, the low prejudiced, discrepancy-activated subjects appeared to attend carefully to discrepancy-relevant information. They spent significantly more time reading the essay than their not-activated counterparts, whereas this difference was not significant for the high prejudiced subjects. The low prejudiced, discrepancy-activated subjects also showed superior recall for the portion of the essay concerning why prejudice-related discrepancies arise. Theoretically, the enhanced attention to discrepancy-relevant information and the heightened attention to personal discrepancy experiences should help low prejudiced individuals eventually gain control over their discrepant responses (see Gray, 1982).

The present findings substantially extend the findings of Devine et al. (1991) and Monteith et al. (1993). These authors also reported that low but not high prejudiced subjects experienced negative self-directed affect in connection with discrepancies. However, the researchers relied on imagined rather than experimentally induced discrepancies. That is, subjects imagined various situations and reported whether they would be prone to discrepant responses in the situations, but they did not actually engage in a discrepant response. In addition, and unlike the present experiment, Devine et al. (1991) and Monteith et al. (1993) explicitly instructed subjects to think about their personal standards during their participation. Finally, in the previous research, subjects reported their feelings about their discrepancies rather than simply indicating how they were feeling after the discrepancies were activated. Despite these differences, the more "realistic" discrepancy situation used in the present research replicated the previous affect findings.

Perhaps more important, the results extend previous research by suggesting that the guilty feelings associated with discrepancies from low prejudiced, well-internalized standards are related to a number of other discrepancy-associated consequences. Theoretically, these consequences involve the initiation of self-regulatory mechanisms that should play a critical role in the future inhibition of discrepant responses. That is, according to the present model (see Figure 1), the initiation of self-regulatory mechanisms should produce more controlled and careful responding on future occasions when prejudiced responses are possible. Thus, people should be better able to inhibit prejudiced responses that are based on spontaneous stereotype activation and to replace such responses with belief-based responses. The central goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether discrepancy experiences produce efforts to control discrepant responses and, ultimately, facilitate the inhibition of prejudiced responses.

It is important to note that the initiation of self-regulatory mechanisms is dependent on recognizing and interpreting one's responses as discrepant from one's personal beliefs. This point is underscored by the finding that the low prejudiced subjects who did not believe that their negative evaluations of the gay applicant reflected prejudice showed no evidence of engaging in self-regulatory responses (see Footnote 6). Analyses indicated that these subjects were not lower in prejudice or generally less willing to recognize their prejudiced responses than the subjects for whom the manipulation was effective. Thus, from the present findings, it is not clear why some subjects were not convinced that they had discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.

One possibility is that the subjects who did not experience a discrepancy were less naive about the requirements for admit-
tance to law school and thus were more critical of the applicant. Subjects who believed they were not influenced by sexual orientation were, in fact, more critical of the applicant, generating evaluation scores that were lower ($M = 89.86$) than the score of subjects who believed they had been biased ($M = 98.13$), $F(1, 27) = 3.62, p < .07$. A second interesting possibility stems from Gaertner and Dovidio's (1986; Dovidio, Gaertner, Anastasio, & Sanitioso, 1992) theory of aversive racism, which states that many people are unwilling to recognize their prejudiced responses, so they generate nonprejudiced rationalizations or justifications for such responses. The weak materials used in the gay applicant condition may well have provided subjects with the opportunity for rationalizing their negative evaluations. Thus, the low evaluation scores among subjects who believed they had not discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation may reflect subjects' efforts to rationalize their responses by focusing on the negative qualities of the gay applicant. This is an important issue for future research, because reducing prejudice through the careful self-regulation of one's responses would be impossible if rationalization occurred.

Regardless of the explanation for the ineffectiveness of the discrepancy manipulation among some subjects, the findings from Experiment 1 indicated that the low prejudiced people who believed they had engaged in a prejudiced response showed evidence of several self-regulatory processes, relative to the subjects in other conditions. Because the primary aim of the present research was to examine the effects of engaging in responses that are recognized by the self as more prejudiced than one's standards permit, a different prejudice discrepancy activation procedure was used in Experiment 2 that more effectively convinced all subjects that they had engaged in a discrepant response.

### EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 2 consisted of two ostensibly unrelated studies. In the "first" study, half of the low and high prejudiced subjects completed a computerized questionnaire that supposedly measured their tendency to have subtle biases toward gay men that were more negative than their personal attitudes dictated were appropriate. Actually, the questionnaire items were ambiguous, so that any response could be construed as more prejudiced than subjects' personal attitudes. After each response that subjects provided to the items, feedback about the consistency between the response and subjects' personal attitudes was given. Subjects were informed that their responses were consistent with their personal attitude toward gay men on several trials and, on other trials, the feedback indicated that their responses were more prejudiced than their personal attitudes. Note that this procedure made it possible to hold the magnitude of the discrepancy constant across low and high prejudiced subjects, so that the effects of violating low prejudiced, well-internalized standards could be examined, independent of discrepancy magnitude. In contrast, the magnitude of the discrepancy in Experiment 1 differed between low and high prejudiced subjects, because low prejudiced subjects believed that rejecting a law school applicant because of sexual orientation was less acceptable than did high prejudiced subjects. Also, because of the ambiguity of the questionnaire items, the discrepancy induction procedure was more effective for inducing discrepancies among all subjects. The other half of the low and high prejudiced subjects completed a similar discrepancy-induction task, but one that was unrelated to prejudice and did not entail the violation of a well-internalized standard for any of the subjects.7

Subjects' effort to control their discrepant responses was measured during the discrepancy activation task by recording the time taken to respond to the questionnaire items after discrepancy feedback. Long response times should reflect the activation of controlled processing, in which responses are restrained and efforts are made to avoid additional discrepant responses. An advantage of this measure is its similarity to measures used by other researchers for examining the functioning of the inhibitory system after discrepant responses occur (for example, see Nichols & Newman, 1986; Patterson et al., 1987, Study 1). It was expected that the personal significance of the discrepancy would influence the operation of inhibitory processes and thus the degree to which subjects' responses were slowed after discrepancy feedback. The prejudice-unrelated discrepancy was not intended to be of personal significance to any of the subjects, and the prejudice-related discrepancy should violate well-internalized standards for low but not high prejudiced subjects. Thus, low prejudiced subjects in the prejudice-related discrepancy condition were expected to take longer to respond to the questionnaire items after the first discrepancy feedback trial than their counterparts who were experiencing a prejudice-unrelated discrepancy. However, the difference between the discrepancy conditions was not expected to be significant among high prejudiced subjects.

Data also were collected to check on the effectiveness of the discrepancy manipulation. According to Gray (1982), the occurrence of unexpected events results in a momentary interruption of ongoing behavior, much like an orienting response. Thus, if the discrepancy feedback violated subjects' expectations, then

7 A pilot study examined whether the procedure for activating prejudice-related discrepancies in Experiment 2 would be effective among low prejudiced subjects. Eighteen low prejudiced subjects were preselected and randomly assigned to complete either the prejudice-related or prejudice-unrelated discrepancy-induction procedure (described fully in the context of Experiment 2). After the manipulation, subjects rated how they felt as a result of their participation in the study. If subjects in the prejudice-related condition experienced greater negative self-directed affect than subjects in the prejudice-unrelated condition, evidence for the effectiveness of the manipulation would be obtained. The nine affect items in the 35-item questionnaire that concerned negative self-directed affect included "angry at self," "guilty," "annoyed at self," "disappointed with self," "disgusted with self," "regretful," "shameful," "self-critical," and "irresponsible." Subjects' ratings for these items were averaged (Cronbach's $\alpha = .95$). A $t$ test performed on the index indicated that subjects in the prejudice-related condition experienced significantly greater negative self-directed affect ($M = 2.76$) than subjects in the prejudice-unrelated condition ($M = 1.20$), $t(16) = 3.31, p < .005$. This finding suggested that the prejudice discrepancy activation procedure would more effectively convince low prejudiced subjects that they had engaged in a prejudiced response than the procedure used in Experiment 1.
their behavior should be briefly interrupted after the discrepancy feedback trials. This was measured by recording the time that subjects paused before initiating the presentation of the next questionnaire item each time after they received feedback concerning their response. Longer pausing times after discrepancy than consistency feedback trials would indicate that the discrepancy feedback was effective in creating a discrepancy. Note that this pausing time need not entail the operation of processes aimed at the future regulation of discrepant responses. Thus, all subjects were expected to pause longer after discrepancy than after consistency feedback trials.8

After the discrepancy-activation task, subjects completed the “second,” supposedly unrelated study. The measure of primary theoretical interest concerned the effect of the discrepancy experiences on subjects’ ability to inhibit subsequent discrepant (prejudiced) responses. Subjects were led to believe that the study concerned humor and that their task involved rating several jokes on various dimensions (e.g., how funny the jokes were). Two of the jokes used humor at the expense of gay men, and the question of interest was whether subjects would evaluate these jokes positively. The joke rating task was considered to be appropriate for measuring the inhibition of discrepant responses because, in a pilot study, both low and high prejudiced subjects responded more favorably to the jokes than they believed they should.9 Regulatory processes aimed at inhibiting prejudiced responses should be engaged among low prejudiced subjects in the prejudice-related-discrepancy condition only. Thus, low but not high prejudiced subjects were expected to be effective at inhibiting their prejudiced responses to the jokes related to gay men, thus providing less prejudiced ratings in the prejudice-related than in the prejudice-unrelated-discrepancy condition.

Method

Subject Selection

As part of a larger mass survey, several hundred introductory psychology students completed the HATH questionnaire (Larsen et al., 1980). Participants also recorded their sexual orientation. Heterosexual individuals scoring relatively low or high in prejudice were identified as eligible participants. Forty low (HATH range = 20–41) and 39 high (HATH range = 67–99) prejudiced subjects were then randomly selected and successfully recruited for participation. Subjects were not informed of the relation between the study and their responses to the HATH questionnaire.10

Design

A 2 (prejudice: low or high) × 2 (discrepancy type: prejudice discrepancy or Type-d discrepancy) between-subjects design was used. Twenty men and women at each level of prejudice were randomly assigned to one of the discrepancy conditions, with the exception that nine high prejudiced women were in the prejudice-discrepancy condition. Gender was included in all initial analyses, but was collapsed across when it was not associated with significant results.

Materials and Procedure

The experimenter remained blind to subjects’ prejudice level using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. Each subject participated individually. The experimenter explained that her research investigated various aspects of humor, but that the experiment was very short and therefore was being coupled with a separate, unrelated study. Supposedly, this study was being sponsored by a faculty member from a large northeastern state university who was conducting a nationwide survey and had forwarded all materials necessary for data collection.

Phase 1: Discrepancy Manipulation

Survey instructions. Subjects read and signed a consent form for the survey, and they were told the general purpose of the survey. The experimenter then read a set of instructions while the subjects followed along. The introductory instructions encouraged the participants to respond honestly throughout the survey and emphasized that their responses would remain anonymous.

The instructions in the prejudice-discrepancy group then indicated that subjects would first complete a straightforward, direct measure of their attitudes toward gay men (called the General Attitude Questionnaire), followed by a more subtle, indirect measure of prejudice toward gay men (called the Subtle Questionnaire). Supposedly, this latter measure was more sensitive for detecting subtle, negative biases, so that subtle prejudice could be detected if people were more negative toward gay men on the Subtle Questionnaire items than would be expected on the basis of their General Attitude Questionnaire responses.

Similar instructions were provided in the Type-d discrepancy group, except subjects were informed that the general and subtle questionnaires corresponded to direct and indirect measures of Type-d personality. This personality dimension was defined as having a sense of the norms that people tend to follow in society, so that people with high Type-d scores are tuned in to how people tend to behave within society. Subjects were also told that although the Type-d construct helps researchers to differentiate among people, it is not related to any positive or negative characteristics in particular.

A detailed overview of the survey procedure was then provided, using a flowchart of events for illustrative purposes. Subjects were told that a general attitude (Type-d) score would be computed on the basis

8 In some instances, pausing time could reflect time spent retrospectively analyzing the discrepancy information (for example, see Patterson, Kosson, & Newman, 1987). However, no evidence of this was found using the present procedure.

9 Using a method similar to Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991), subjects in the pilot study indicated how funny they should and then how funny they would perceive five gay-related jokes to be. Subjects also indicated how they felt about the match between their should and would ratings. The majority of the subjects (86%) at all levels of prejudice reported discrepancies in connection with the jokes. Replicating previous findings, larger discrepancies were associated with greater levels of discomfort among both low and high prejudiced subjects, $F(1, 56) = 13.59, p < .001$. Also, a significant interaction between prejudice and size of discrepancy indicated that negative self-directed affect increased with size of discrepancy more for low than for high prejudiced subjects, $F(1, 55) = 3.92, p < .05$.

10 Five additional subjects participated whose data were not used. Three of these subjects did not follow directions and another subject's data were discarded because his pretesting HATH score indicated that he was high in prejudice, but all measures completed during the experiment and his postexperimental comments indicated that he was low in prejudice. Finally, another subject reported a long history of friendship with several gay males, and she had received formal training concerning the reduction of prejudice toward gays. Because of these unique personal experiences her data were not used.
of their responses to the general questionnaire, and this score would be compared with each of their responses to the subtle questionnaire items. Also, subjects were informed that the computer would provide them with feedback after each response that they gave to the subtle items. More specifically, subjects in the prejudice-discrepancy group were told that, for each subtle item, the feedback could indicate that their response was consistent, less prejudiced, or more prejudiced than their general attitude score. The feedback for subjects in the Type-d condition could be that their response was consistent, more Type-d, or less Type-d than their general Type-d score. Finally, all subjects were led to believe that the subtle questionnaire was a valid and reliable measure.

Completion of the questionnaires. Subjects were seated at a computer, and after starting the computer program, the experimenter situated herself at a table from which she would not be able to monitor their responses. (The computer program was written using the Micro Experimental Laboratory software, Schneider, 1990.) Each general questionnaire item was presented in turn and subjects made their ratings using the keyboard with 1 indicating strong agreement and 5 indicating strong disagreement. The items in the prejudice-discrepancy group were 18 questions from the HATH scale (Larsen et al., 1980). The 18 general Type-d questions were taken from various "Lie Scales" (e.g., "Most people have done things that they are not willing to tell other people about").

After answering the General Attitude Questionnaire items, subjects waited for approximately 12 s while the computer supposedly generated their general attitude (Type-d) score. Then subjects read instructions for the Subtle Questionnaire. Subjects were instructed to indicate their extent of agreement with each of the 13 Subtle Questionnaire items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 8 (strongly disagree). The instructions emphasized that even ratings around the middle of the scale (e.g., 3 or 5) could be indicative of subtle prejudiced (Type-d) responses. Subjects also were told that they could take up to 30 s to respond to each subtle item, but they would be prompted to respond immediately if they took longer than 30 s. This response time interval was recorded in milliseconds. Subjects then were informed that after the feedback about the consistency between their responses and their general attitude (Type-d) score, they could take up to 30 s before pressing the "enter" key to go on to the next item. If the time limit was exceeded, the computer would automatically proceed to the next item. This pausing time interval was recorded in milliseconds. No subject's pausing or response time for any given trial exceeded the 30-s time limit.

The subtle questionnaire then was completed. The first two items were straightforward and were followed by consistency feedback. These were considered practice trials, and the data were not used in analyses. The remaining 11 questionnaire items were rather ambiguous, affording various interpretations. For example, one item in the prejudice-discrepancy group was "Homosexuals are just like everyone else." An item in the Type-d discrepancy group was "People generally know why they like things." On 6 of the 11 trials, consistency feedback was provided. However, subjects received discrepancy feedback on the other five trials. This feedback stated "Response was more prejudiced than your general attitude score" for the prejudice-discrepancy group, and "Response was less Type-d than your general score" in the Type-d discrepancy group.11 Both the order in which the 11 ambiguous items were presented and the order in which each type of feedback was provided were randomly determined for each subject. This ensured that no question was consistently preceded or followed by a particular type of feedback. Three seconds elapsed between each rating that subjects made and the onset of the feedback screen, and one second elapsed between the time that subjects pressed the enter key to terminate the feedback and the presentation of the next item.

At the conclusion of the survey, subjects' discrepancy was emphasized. A computer-generated summary indicated that, in comparison with their general attitude (Type-d) score, 8 of their responses were consistent, 0 were less prejudiced (more Type-d), and 5 were more prejudiced (less Type-d). Also, subjects read "You have a rather strong tendency to be more prejudiced (less Type-d) on the subtle items than would be expected based on your responses to the general attitude (Type-d) questionnaire." Then subjects were thanked and they were asked to inform the experimenter that they were done.

Phase 2: Measure of the Inhibition of Discrepant Responses

Subjects completed a consent form for the "humor study." Then the experimenter explained that several different theories on humor exist and that the present study investigated which aspects of jokes are the most important determinants of people's overall evaluation, so that subjects would read several jokes and rate them on various dimensions. The experimenter explained that the humor questionnaire would be presented on the computer because such a procedure was much easier than using paper-and-pencil questionnaires. The experimenter started the humor study computer program. The presentation of the humor study differed substantially from the former survey study (e.g., colors appearing on the monitor were different and subjects used different keys for responding).

Subjects read the instructions presented on the monitor and learned that they would read 12 jokes and rate how funny, witty, and creative each joke was. Subjects were told that interest was centered on their initial "gut" reactions to the jokes. All of the jokes were presented in turn, and for each one subjects rated how funny they perceived it to be on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 8 (very). The third and the eighth jokes were about gay men. The other jokes varied considerably in content, and some of them were mildly offensive so that the gay-related jokes would not seem anomalous. After subjects recorded the funny ratings, each joke was presented again and a witty rating was made for each. Finally, the creative ratings were made. The joke rating data were collected in this manner because it seemed possible that subjects' responses would be most spontaneous for the funny ratings and completing all three in succession for each joke may have decreased such spontaneity.

An extensive debriefing followed in which subjects were asked whether they believed the survey and the humor studies were related. Eleven of the 79 subjects expressed suspicion (six of whom were high in prejudice), but four of these subjects said they became suspicious only after finishing the humor study. Also, none of these or any of the other subjects were able to guess the experimental hypotheses, even at a very general level. The experimenter carefully explained the actual purpose of the study, how deception was used, and the reasons for using deception.

Results

Discrepancy Manipulation Check

It was important to examine whether subjects' expectations actually were upended when they received discrepancy feedback. Thus, two pausing time mean scores were computed for each subject: one for time spent pausing after discrepancy feed-

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11 The less Type-d discrepancy feedback was used so that subjects would experience a negative discrepancy if they believed that a high score on the subtle questionnaire was more favorable than a low score.
back and one for time spent pausing after consistency feedback. Because the disruption of expectancies was expected to produce a momentary interruption of ongoing behavior, longer pausing times after discrepancy than consistency feedback would indicate that subjects had experienced a discrepancy.

The pausing time data were analyzed using a 2 (prejudice level: low vs. high) × 2 (discrepancy type: prejudice vs. Type-d) × 2 (type of feedback: discrepancy vs. consistency) mixed-model ANOVA, with type of feedback as the only within-subjects factor. The main effect for discrepancy type was significant, \( F(1, 75) = 7.65, p < .007 \), and it was qualified by a significant Discrepancy Type × Feedback Type interaction, \( F(1, 75) = 24.37, p < .001 \). The difference between the discrepancy and consistency trials was larger in the prejudice-discrepancy group (discrepancy feedback \( M = 2,482 \) ms; consistency feedback \( M = 1,278 \) ms) than in the Type-d group (discrepancy feedback \( M = 1,697 \) ms; consistency feedback \( M = 1,271 \) ms). Subsequent analyses revealed that the main effect for type of feedback was significant within both the prejudice-discrepancy group, \( F(0, 37) = 86.87, p < .001 \), and within the Type-d discrepancy group, \( F(1, 38) = 22.22, p < .001 \). In sum, the two discrepancy-induction procedures resulted in a different extent of behavioral interruption, but both procedures effectively induced discrepancies.

**Response Times to Items**

Subjects' response times provided information about the extent to which they showed restraint when responding to the subtle questionnaire items. Response times should be slow after receiving discrepant feedback, but only for the low prejudiced subjects in the prejudice-discrepancy group. The response time included time for reading items as well as time for responding. Because the length of the items in the two discrepancy conditions was not matched, the response time data were converted to z scores within each discrepancy condition. Then two indexes were formed. One consisted of the average response time for trials after the first discrepancy feedback trial and the other was the average response time for consistency feedback trials that preceded the first discrepancy trial.

The consistency feedback index was used as a covariate when analyzing the discrepancy feedback index to control for subjects' reading speed and differences in the extent of reflection that subjects gave to their responses before receiving the discrepancy feedback. A 2 (prejudice level) × 2 (discrepancy type) × 2 (gender) ANCOVA revealed a significant effect for the covariate, \( F(1, 74) = 16.34, p < .001 \). More important, the Prejudice × Discrepancy Type interaction was significant, \( F(1, 74) = 7.24, p < .002 \). As expected, low prejudiced subjects in the prejudice-discrepancy condition responded slower (\( M = .3446 \)) than their counterparts in the Type-d discrepancy group (\( M = .1785 \)). This difference was marginally significant when a planned contrast was performed, \( t(37) = 1.84, p < .07 \). Surprisingly, high prejudiced subjects tended to respond more slowly in the Type-d condition (\( M = .1785 \)) than in the prejudice-discrepancy condition (\( M = .3628 \)), \( t(36) = 1.94, p < .06 \).

**Joke Ratings: Evidence of Inhibition**

The most important question in the present research was whether the self-regulatory mechanisms that were presumably activated by the prejudice-related discrepancy experience subsequently would facilitate the low prejudiced subjects' controlled inhibition of stereotype-consistent responses to the gay-related jokes. To examine this question, each funny, witty, and creative rating for each of the gay-related jokes was first examined individually. Subjects' three ratings for each joke were very similar, so they were combined to form several joke indexes. Specifically, the funny, witty, and creative ratings for each of the two jokes were averaged together to form a Joke 1 index and Joke 2 index (Cronbach's \( \alpha = .90 \) and .92), and all ratings for both jokes were averaged to form a Combined index (Cronbach's \( \alpha = .95 \)).

A 2 (prejudice level) × 2 (discrepancy type) × 2 (gender) between-subjects ANOVA performed on the Combined index revealed a significant main effect for gender, \( F(1, 71) = 5.62, p < .02 \), with men rating the gay-related jokes more favorably (\( M = 4.65 \)) than women (\( M = 3.70 \)). The main effect for prejudice level was significant, \( F(1, 71) = 29.90, p < .001 \), and it was qualified by a marginally significant Prejudice Level × Discrepancy interaction, \( F(1, 71) = 3.08, p < .08 \).

To examine this interaction and to test the more specific predictions that the discrepancy manipulation would affect low but not high prejudiced subjects' joke ratings, a series of planned contrasts was performed. Thus, for each joke index and within each prejudice level, ANOVAs were performed treating discrepancy type and gender as between-subjects variables. The results for the Combined index revealed that the low prejudiced subjects' ratings were significantly less favorable in the prejudice-discrepancy condition (\( M = 2.44 \)) than in the Type-d condition (\( M = 3.70 \)), \( F(1, 36) = 4.84, p < .03 \). The effect for discrepancy type also was significant for the Joke 1 and Joke 2 indexes, \( F(1, 36) = 4.53, p < .04 \), and 4.77, \( p < .03 \). As expected, no significant differences between the prejudice-discrepancy (\( M = 5.36 \)) and the Type-d discrepancy (\( M = 5.20 \)) conditions was found for the high prejudiced subjects on the combined index or on the individual joke indexes (all \( F < 1 \)). Thus, the pattern of findings for all joke indexes indicated that low prejudiced subjects were able to effectively self-regulate their prejudiced responses to the jokes as a consequence of the prejudice-discrepancy activation. In contrast, the discrepancy manipulation had virtually no impact on high prejudiced subjects.

No significant results were found in the analysis of the average of the funny, witty, and creative ratings for the gay-unrelated jokes. Also, the gay-related jokes were reanalyzed treating the gay-unrelated joke ratings as a covariate. Inclusion of the covariate did not change the pattern of significance of the gay-related joke results. Altogether, these findings indicated that the activation of a prejudice-related discrepancy uniquely affected low prejudiced subjects' ratings of the gay-related jokes.

**Discussion**

Experiment 2 indicated that low prejudiced subjects' violation of their low prejudiced, internalized standards for re-
sponding to gay men had two important effects. First, low prejudiced subjects responded slowly after discrepancy feedback, presumably reflecting enhanced analysis of the items and careful response generation, in an attempt to avoid additional discrepant responses. The prejudice-related discrepancy feedback had the opposite effect on high prejudiced subjects, who responded quite rapidly after the feedback. This unexpected finding corresponds well with the finding in Experiment 1 that high prejudiced subjects' recall score was quite low. Together, the findings are suggestive of a selective exposure effect (e.g., Frey, 1986); the high prejudiced subjects avoided thinking about and attending to information relevant to their prejudice-related discrepancies.

Most important, a second finding in Experiment 2 was that the prejudice-related discrepancy experience enabled the low prejudiced subjects to be more effective at inhibiting prejudiced responses at a later time, so that their responses could be better aligned with their personal standards. Specifically, the gay-related jokes were evaluated less favorably by the low prejudiced subjects who had experienced a prejudice-related discrepancy, relative to low prejudiced subjects experiencing a prejudice-unrelated discrepancy. In contrast, the discrepancy manipulation had no impact on high prejudiced subjects' joke ratings.

Low prejudiced subjects inhibited their discrepant responses even though their initial discrepant responses were quite different from those that were later inhibited. This indicated that the effect of discrepancy-associated consequences on later inhibition is somewhat general. The extent of this generality should be examined in future research, in addition to examining whether inhibition is observed when a greater amount of time elapses between the discrepant response and the subsequent inhibition task. If the discrepancy experience is strong enough to engage the self-regulatory cycle fully, inhibition may result even after a protracted period of time.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

The present experiments investigated a model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (see Figure 1). Although considerably more research is needed to examine the processes involved in learning to inhibit prejudiced responses, the present results provided initial support for the model. Experiment 1 demonstrated that low prejudiced subjects who believed they had violated their low prejudiced, internalized standards for responding to a stereotyped group experienced negative self-directed affect, self-focused attention specifically concerning personal discrepancy experiences, and enhanced attention to discrepancy-relevant information. These consequences, which appeared to involve the activation of an inhibitory system (see Gray, 1982), theoretically constitute self-regulatory activities that facilitate control over discrepant responses in the future. Experiment 2 demonstrated that low prejudiced subjects' responses were slowed after discrepancy activation, thus providing further evidence consistent with the activation of an inhibitory system. More important, Experiment 2 demonstrated that low prejudiced subjects were less likely to respond in a prejudiced manner after a prejudice-related discrepancy experience than they were after the activation of a prejudice-unrelated discrepancy. Thus, the experience of a prejudice-related discrepancy improved low prejudiced subjects' ability to inhibit prejudiced responses and to respond consistently with their personal standards.

Throughout the present research, the reactions of low prejudiced individuals to discrepancy experiences have been attributed to the consequences of transgressing their low prejudiced, well-internalized standards. The low prejudiced identity is central to the self-concept, and discrepancies that challenge that identity threaten low prejudiced individuals' sense of self and motivate attempts to restore their self-integrity (see Aronson, 1968; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980; Steele, 1988). The present research suggests that the means to restoring the self-concept involves the engagement of a self-regulatory cycle that serves the adaptive function of helping individuals to inhibit future discrepant responses and to respond consistently with their standards.

However, Steele (1988; Steele & Liu, 1983) contended that restoration of one's self-image after a discrepancy experience may not entail discrepancy reduction if other opportunities for self-affirmation are available. For example, Steele (1988) suggested that a smoker who wants to quit might spend more time with his or her children to resolve the threat to the self-concept engendered by the psychological inconsistency created by smoking. Similarly, Tesser and Cornell (1991) found that different behaviors appeared to feed into a general "self-evaluation reservoir." It follows that prejudice-related discrepancy experiences may not facilitate the self-regulation of prejudiced responses if other means to restoring one's self-regard are available.

This line of thought is not consistent with Dutton and Lake's (1973) results. They found that low prejudiced subjects who were experiencing a prejudice-related discrepancy were more generous to a black panhandler than subjects whose nonprejudiced identity was not threatened; however, the discrepancy manipulation had no impact on subjects' generosity toward a white panhandler. Perhaps individuals' self-integrity following a prejudice-relevant discrepancy experience is not restored by affirming any type of self aspect that could create positive self-regard (e.g., "I am a generous person"), so that prejudice-irrelevant self-affirmation opportunities will not necessarily short-circuit the regulatory cycle. As Tesser and Cornell (1991) suggested, if self-content is hierarchically organized, then threats to higher levels of self that generate very negative affect may not be resolved by engaging in behaviors that have positive self-implications with regard to lower levels of self. Future research should explore the effect of prejudice-irrelevant self-affirmation opportunities in addition to examining whether other factors might impede progress in the self-regulatory discrepancy-reduction process.

Even if progress can proceed without many impediments,
the “unlearning” of automatic stereotypical responses is not likely to ensue from a single or even numerous discrepancy experiences. Unfortunately, individuals consequently may become frustrated and disengage from the self-regulatory cycle, abandoning their goal to eliminate prejudice-like responses. Recognizing that prejudice reduction is a process rather than an all-or-none event (Devine, 1989) should encourage individuals to continue their goal-directed efforts despite instances in which they fail. Also, monitoring one's responses so as to detect successes in addition to failures should create sufficiently favorable expectations regarding goal attainment so that discrepancy-reduction efforts will be continued (Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Duval et al., 1992; Scheier & Carver, 1988). Empirically, it will be important to investigate the relation between the number of success-versus-failure experiences and low prejudiced individuals' subsequent efforts to inhibit discrepant responses.

Future research also should investigate the conditions under which low prejudiced individuals are more or less likely to recognize their discrepant responses. Although Devine et al. (1991) and Monteith et al. (1993) found that the vast majority of their subjects (78% averaged across the studies) recognized that they are prone to discrepancies, other researchers maintain that people often rationalize their prejudiced responses with nonprejudiced justifications (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986). Some conditions may increase the salience of discrepant responses (e.g., observing that others have engaged in a low prejudiced response when one's own response was prejudiced), and other conditions may have the opposite effect (e.g., drinking while at a crowded party).

In addition to focusing on the prejudice-reduction efforts of low prejudiced individuals, considerable research is needed to address possibilities for change among high prejudiced persons. In contrast to low prejudiced individuals, high prejudiced persons have not linked their standards for responding to stereotyped groups to their self-concept (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). Thus, the findings that discrepancy experiences did not produce negative self-directed affect, engage regulatory mechanisms, or facilitate stereotype inhibition among the high prejudiced subjects were not surprising. However, as discussed in greater detail by Monteith et al. (1993), even high prejudiced persons apparently view general egalitarian ideals as central to their self-concept (see, for example, Myrdal, 1944, and Rokeach, 1973). Therefore, a potential first step in promoting change among these individuals may entail heightening their awareness of the discrepancy between their prejudiced tendencies and their egalitarian self-image. Such discrepancy experiences may then encourage subjects to ascribe greater importance to their personal standards for responding to stereotyped groups (see Rokeach, 1973) and to embark eventually on the stages of change described herein.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary approach to studying prejudice in the context of the cognitive processes involved in stereotyping (see Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stephan, 1985, 1989; Tajfel, 1981) may foster an “inevitability of prejudice” perspective, which holds that prejudice is a consequence of natural stereotyping (categorization) processes inherent in our information-processing systems (see Billig, 1985; Devine, 1989). The present findings, coupled with previous research, suggest that prejudiced responses need not be viewed as inevitable. Prejudiced responses based on the use of well-learned stereotypes can be avoided if people bring their low prejudiced attitudes to mind before responding (Devine, 1989; Higgins & King, 1981; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Although automatic stereotype activation makes this task difficult (Devine, 1989; Klinger & Beall, 1992), the present findings suggest that self-regulatory processes can facilitate the inhibition of prejudiced responses so that less prejudiced responses can be generated instead.

Future investigations of the possible long-term implications of self-regulating prejudiced responses may further challenge the inevitability of prejudice perspective (see Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, in press). Because failures are likely to be experienced during the initial stages of attempting to inhibit prejudiced responses, a strong association should be built between cues (e.g., group labels), responses (e.g., prejudiced responses), and aversive consequences (i.e., negative self-directed affect). This “learning” process should make stereotype activation less likely as well as facilitating the controlled inhibition of prejudiced responses. For example, one might say “typical for a woman” when observing a woman who is crying and then experience guilt. The punishment (i.e., guilt) should be associated not only with engaging in the prejudiced response but also with the activation of the stereotype that women are emotional. Therefore, with practice, one should become more effective at inhibiting both prejudiced responses and stereotype activation. Also, relying on low prejudiced beliefs as a basis for responding should strengthen the association between such beliefs and group membership cues and should increase the accessibility of the beliefs because of their frequent activation. Thus, the long-term implications of practiced self-regulation may be that the default cognitive structure activated in response to many group membership cues may become one’s personal beliefs, rather than stereotypes. As Kanfer and Gaelick (1986) argued in connection with the elimination of habitual responses, individuals “need to deautomatize” troublesome behavior patterns, making them accessible to the self-regulation process, and to then ‘reautomatize’ newly learned and more adaptive behavior chains” (p. 296).

It is also important to consider the larger role that society can play in facilitating prejudice reduction. Societal-level changes in the laws and norms concerning people’s responses to stereotyped groups undoubtedly have encouraged some people to adopt and internalize low prejudiced attitudes. Such attitudes will become more accessible and more likely to provide a basis for responding if societal institutions repeatedly communicate nonprejudiced messages. Also, negative stereotypes will become less accessible and less likely to provide a basis for responding to the extent that societal institutions avoid negative stereotyped depictions of racial, ethnic, and minority group members.

The present analysis is not meant to provide excuses for or to
excuse discriminatory actions. However, as the following quotes from thought protocols in Experiment 1 illustrate, many people are neither ignorant of nor indifferent about their prejudiced tendencies.

When I was younger... my brother, who I idolized, used "fag" as an insulting comment. I picked it up but as I aged and slowly began to assimilate knowledge about homosexuality... I began to feel bad about myself. I felt that this was not how I wanted to respond toward minorities.

I know I shouldn't feel uncomfortable around gays but I do—I don't know why.

Old stereotypes die hard and I find prejudice creeping into my opinion even though I try to resist.

An advantage to recognizing individuals' genuine attempts to change is that a more realistic assessment of the progress some people have made in the prejudice-reduction process becomes possible. In addition, with an understanding of the prejudice-reduction process, it should become possible to promote further change through the development and implementation of strategies for prejudice reduction that are relevant to peoples' experienced difficulties.

References


conscious and unconscious effects of stereotype activation. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago.


