Contemporary Forms of Prejudice-Related Conflict: In Search of a Nutshell

Margo J. Monteith  
University of Kentucky

Racial ambivalence theory, modern racism theory, and research on prejudice-related discrepancies all suggest that many Whites have conflicting reactions to Blacks. The present research investigated whether these forms of prejudice-related conflict are distinct by determining (a) the extent of association among measures of each form of conflict and (b) the affective reactions associated with each form of conflict. Results revealed virtually no evidence of overlap among the measures of conflict, and scores on measures of each form of conflict were associated with unique patterns of affective reactions. Racial ambivalence was uniquely associated with heightened guilt and discomfort, prejudice-related discrepancies were uniquely associated with heightened guilt and reduced positive affect, and modern racism had no unique affective consequences. Theoretical and applied implications of the existence of numerous contemporary forms of prejudice-related conflict are discussed.

What is the nature of contemporary prejudice? What are its causes? Asking these questions among a group of lay individuals is likely to yield as many different notions about the nature of contemporary prejudice and its causes as there are people in the group. Scientific investigations yield answers that are no less varied. In fact, researchers posit so many different forms of prejudice that they may seem to be caught in the grips of scholastic superfluity. Is it possible to describe the character and causes of contemporary prejudice in a nutshell?

The present article focuses on three conceptualizations of contemporary prejudice toward Blacks, each of which posits that Whites experience a conflict between two competing tendencies in their reactions to Blacks. Generally, in all three conceptualizations, one tendency encourages positive or nonprejudiced responses, and the other encourages negative or prejudiced responses. Despite this common element, research related to each perspective has proceeded rather independently, with little attempt to determine empirically the degree of overlap among the various conceptualizations. Thus the main goal of the present research is to examine the extent to which the three forms of prejudice-related conflict are distinct. This goal is important from a theoretical standpoint because, to the extent that each perspective on prejudice-related conflict describes the same phenomenon, theoretical integration of the various perspectives is necessary. Alternatively, findings suggesting that the forms of conflict are distinct would suggest that future research should proceed in further developing and testing each perspective. Examining distinctiveness is also important from an applied standpoint. For example, if multiple, distinct forms of prejudice-related conflict are present among Whites in their reactions to Blacks, each form and its causal antecedents must be taken into account when devising strategies for reducing prejudice.

Conceptualizations of Contemporary Forms of Prejudice-Related Conflict

According to Katz and Hass’s (Katz, 1981; Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986) theory of racial ambivalence, many White Americans are socialized to hold simultaneously two conflicting value orientations that have implications for their attitudes toward Black Americans. One core value is humanitarianism-egalitarianism, which is thought to reflect “the democratic ideals of equality, social justice, and concern for others’ well-being” (Katz & Hass, 1988, p. 894). This value is believed to produce sympathetic reactions among Whites, because

Author’s Note: Thanks are extended to Jason Debus, Amy Dicke, and Beth Taraban for their help with data collection. I also thank Patricia Devine and Donald Lynam for their comments on a draft of the article, and express gratitude for the helpful feedback obtained during the review process. Address correspondence to Margo J. Monteith, Department of Psychology, 115 Kastle Hall, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0044, E-mail mjmonte@pop.uky.edu.
they identify Blacks as members of a group that has been the target of prejudice and discrimination for years and that has been disadvantaged in society. Such an outlook is thought to result in the development of a genuinely pro-Black, largely sympathy-based attitude. Katz and Hass pointed out that Americans also are taught to value certain elements of the Protestant ethic (Weber, 1904-1905/1958), including personal freedom, self-reliance, discipline, dedication to work, and achievement. This value orientation is referred to as individualism. Katz and Hass argued that individualism results in the development of an anti-Black attitude, because people tend to attribute negative behaviors associated with Blacks (e.g., crime, drug addiction, and unemployment) to personal weaknesses rather than to situational factors.

Because of the coexistence of anti- and pro-Black attitudes, Katz and Hass (1988; Katz et al., 1986) argued that many Whites are ambivalent (i.e., have strong, competing attitudes) about Blacks. When Whites become aware of their ambivalence, psychological discomfort and feelings of guilt should arise (Katz, 1981; Katz et al., 1986). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, ambivalent people's behavior toward Blacks may be amplified, supposedly to alleviate this negative affect (Katz, 1981; Katz et al., 1986). Correlational and experimental findings support the notion that humanitarianism-egalitarianism gives rise to the pro-Black attitude and that individualism underlies the anti-Black attitude (see Katz & Hass, 1988). The link between activating ambivalence and the experience of negative affect also has been supported (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992). Finally, the notion that ambivalence can cause behavioral extremity is well documented (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991; Katz, Glass, & Cohen, 1973; Katz, Glass, Lucido, & Farber, 1979), although research has not yet examined whether ambivalence-related affect mediates behavioral amplification.

A second conceptualization of contemporary prejudice is McConahay's (1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976, see also Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Kinder, 1971) theory of modern racism. According to McConahay, modern racism experience ambivalence in their reactions toward Blacks. On one hand, Whites are committed to the abstract principles of justice (i.e., equality, fairness, and freedom) embodied in the American creed (Myrdal, 1944). On the other hand, Whites experience negative affect toward Blacks, resulting from racial socialization coupled with political socialization that promotes the Protestant ethic. The conflict, therefore, is created because Whites desire to maintain a nonprejudiced image even though they dislike Blacks. Although this type of ambivalence is thought to involve a markedly negative attitudinal component, it is not thought to involve a genuinely positive component (in contrast to Katz and Hass's [Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz et al., 1986] conceptualization of the pro-Black attitude).

In an attempt to protect the self from attributions of prejudice, modern racists supposedly develop negative attitudes toward Blacks that can be justified with reference to nonprejudiced explanations. These beliefs, measured by McConahay's Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), are embodied by the following principal tenets of modern racism:

1. Discrimination is a thing of the past because blacks now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy those things they can afford. (2) Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast and in places where they are not wanted. (3) These tactics and demands are unfair.
4. Therefore, recent gains are undeserved and the prestige granting institutions of society are giving blacks more attention and the concomitant status than they deserve. Two other tenets are added to this psychological syllogism: Racism is bad and the other beliefs do not constitute racism because these beliefs are empirical facts. (McConahay, 1986, p. 93)

Research concerning the theory of modern racism has established that the scale does appear to measure prejudice and anti-Black affect (e.g., McConahay, 1982, 1983; McConahay & Hough, 1976) and that it is to some extent distinct from more old-fashioned racist beliefs (e.g., favoring segregation; see McConahay, 1986). Also, McConahay et al. (1981) found that subjects scored lower on old-fashioned racism items when a Black experimenter administered the questionnaire than when a White experimenter did so but that the race of experimenter had no effect on modern racism scores. Such findings indicate that the MRS does appear to measure anti-Black affect and attitudes that individuals believe they can hold without being perceived by themselves or others as highly prejudiced. A noteworthy limitation of research to date is that it has not investigated whether abstract principles of justice and values related to the Protestant ethic actually do underlie modern racism.

A third line of research investigating contemporary conflict is represented by work on prejudice-related discrepancies (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993, 1996; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Zuwerink, Monteith, Devine, & Cook, in press). This research has revealed that many people experience a conflict between how they believe they should respond toward members of various groups (e.g., Blacks and gay men) and how they actually would respond toward these individuals. More specifically, the conflict arises because people often respond in ways that are more prejudiced than their personal standards suggest is appropriate. For example, Whites might feel more uncomfortable around Blacks than they believe is appropriate. When prejudice-related discrepancies are detected, they give rise to feel-
TABLE 1: Summary of the Components and Roots of Prejudice-Related Conflict, According to Three Conceptualizations of the Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualization of the Conflict</th>
<th>Components of Conflict</th>
<th>Roots of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td>Pro-Black attitudes versus anti-Black attitudes</td>
<td>Humanitarian-egalitarian values versus individualism (Protestant ethic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism</td>
<td>Desire to maintain nonprejudiced self-image versus dislike of Blacks</td>
<td>Abstract principles of justice versus negative feelings acquired through socialization and Protestant ethic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice-related discrepancies</td>
<td>Personal standards (shoulds) versus actual responses (wants)</td>
<td>Among low-prejudiced individuals' beliefs versus stereotypes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The causes of prejudice-related discrepancies among individuals whose attitudes are relatively prejudiced toward Blacks are not yet clear.

ings of negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt and self-criticism) as well as general discomfort (e.g., uneasiness). If a sufficient level of guilt is experienced, such discrepancy experiences activate self-regulatory processes aimed at reducing the occurrence of prejudiced responses in the future (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994).

The roots of these prejudice-related discrepancies are more clear with respect to some individuals than others. Among people whose attitudes do not indicate prejudice (e.g., who score low on the MRS), discrepancies are thought to arise because stereotypes are so well learned and highly accessible. More specifically, Devine (1989) argued that stereotypes and personal beliefs exist as independent cognitive structures in memory, and stereotypes often are more accessible because they have been activated more frequently. Theoretically, many people who have established nonprejudiced standards are, therefore, prone to discrepancies because stereotype-based responses occur before these people bring their personal beliefs to mind. Many people whose attitudes reflect prejudice (e.g., who have high MRS scores) also are prone to prejudice-related discrepancies. Such people report, for example, that they would feel extremely uncomfortable sitting next to a Black person but that they should feel only somewhat uncomfortable. The roots of such discrepancies are, at present, not clear. That is, it is not clear what prompts some people who hold prejudiced attitudes and who respond in very prejudiced ways to establish standards for responding to any somewhat prejudiced responses, although possible explanations have been suggested (Monteith, 1996; Monteith et al., 1993).

Possible Relations Among Contemporary Forms of Prejudice-Related Conflict

As can be seen in Table 1, the conceptualizations reviewed above differ in their descriptions of the components of prejudice-related conflict and the roots of this conflict. However, perhaps there is greater similarity among the conceptualizations than their descriptions imply. The present research empirically investigates the degree of overlap among the three forms of conflict in two ways. First, the extent to which scores on measures of each form of conflict predict each other is examined. The specific measures used are the Pro-Black and Anti-Black Attitude Questionnaire (or PAAQ, for assessing racial ambivalence; Katz & Hass, 1988), the MRS (McConahay et al., 1981), and the Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire (e.g., Devine et al., 1991). Importantly, each of these measures arguably does capture the components of the conflict presumed to exist by the respective conceptualization. High scores on both the pro-Black and anti-Black items clearly indicate attitudinal ambivalence. Should-would discrepancies, in which subjects report that they would have more prejudiced responses than they should, reflect proneness to discrepancies. And, given McConahay's (1982, 1983; McConahay & Hough, 1976) research on the validity of his questionnaire (see earlier discussion), one can assume fairly safely that high scores on the MRS reflect anti-Black affect coupled with a desire to maintain a nonprejudiced self-image. Examining the relations among the measures thus will provide information about the extent to which these forms of conflict co-occur.

The distinctiveness of each form of conflict also will be inferred by determining whether each form has unique patterns of affective consequences when activated. According to McConahay (1986), modern racists are not aware of their conflict. They believe that their attitudes are not prejudiced, so that the attitudes pose no threat to their self-image as nonprejudiced individuals. Thus there is little reason to believe that making the racial attitudes of modern racists salient will heighten any type of affect. However, affective consequences should be observed when ambivalence and discrepancies are activated. Previous research has indicated that increasing the salience of racial ambivalence produces negative affect (Hass et al., 1992), and theoretically, this affect includes discomfort and guilt (Katz et al., 1986). These same affective consequences are observed when subjects are made aware of their prejudice-related discrepancies (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). If ambivalence and discrepancies are distinct forms of
conflict, each should significantly and independently relate to subjects' reported discomfort and feelings of guilt (i.e., scores on each conflict measure should predict affect, even after overlap between the measures has been controlled for statistically). In addition, racial ambivalence should not be related to positive affect (Hass et al., 1992) but should be negatively related to discrepancy scores (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993).

This focus on unique patterns of affective consequences as an important criterion for distinctiveness seems particularly appropriate, because the type of affective reactions resulting from a given form of affective conflict should lead to different motivational states and ultimately should have different effects on future behavior. For example, modern racists' supposed justification of their negative attitudes with nonjudged explanations should allow them to avoid any conflict-related feelings, which, in turn, allows them to maintain the same attitudes in the future. In contrast, the negative self-directed affect or guilt individuals experience as a consequence of prejudice-related discrepancies should motivate future attempts to inhibit prejudiced responses and to respond in less prejudiced ways (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993). Finally, both guilt and discomfort are thought to play an important motivational role in racial ambivalence, resulting in attempts to alleviate the negative affect through one's future behavior (e.g., Katz et al., 1986).

A priori predictions concerning the extent and nature of overlap among the three forms of prejudice-related conflict were not made, because both the possibility of significant overlap and of no overlap seemed plausible. Two examples should help to illustrate this point. First, consider the relation between modern racism and ambivalence scores. As noted earlier, the roots of conflict among modern racists have not yet been established empirically. Perhaps the underpinnings of the modern racists' conflict are the values that Katz and Hass (1988) have shown to underlie attitudinal ambivalence—namely, egalitarianism and individualism. Indeed, both the theory of modern racism and the theory of racial ambivalence maintain that the Protestant ethic contributes to the negative component of the conflict. Furthermore, McConahay's (e.g., McConahay, 1986) notion of abstract principles of justice seems to have much in common with the humanitarian-egalitarian value orientation. If McConahay and Katz and Hass are describing the same type of conflict but measuring it in different ways, the MRS and ambivalence measures should be significantly related, and the same affective reactions should be observed in relation to both forms of conflict. Alternatively, MRS and ambivalence scores may not be related. Although subjects who score relatively high on the MRS are likely to endorse the anti-Black items on the PAAQ, many may not endorse the pro-Black items. This possibility is consistent with McConahay's (1986) assertion that modern racists do not have genuinely pro-Black feelings stemming from an egalitarian value orientation; rather, they merely seek to express their dislike of Blacks in a way that protects their nonprejudiced image.

Second, a significant relation between discrepancy and ambivalence scores may be observed. The possibility that subjects who respond with more prejudice than they believe is appropriate do so because they simultaneously endorse conflicting value orientations and attitudes seems intuitively plausible. The negative component of the ambivalent attitude may result in prejudiced responses that seem quite acceptable when the response occurs. However, the positive component of the ambivalent attitude may then create the sense among individuals that they should respond in less prejudiced ways. This may be more true for some individuals who are prone to discrepancies than for others. People who have low-prejudiced attitudes do not appear to be ambivalent about what they believe are acceptable responses (Zuwerink et al., in press; see also Devine et al., 1991). In contrast, Devine et al. (1991) suggested that prejudiced individuals who believe that they should respond in ways that are less prejudiced than their actual responses may well experience value and attitudinal ambivalence. Thus discrepancies may be a manifestation of ambivalence but only among high-prejudiced persons. Alternatively, a positive relation between discrepancies and ambivalence would not be expected among prejudiced individuals if some other process produces their discrepancies.

METHOD

Overview

White subjects completed four measures: (a) the PAAQ (i.e., an ambivalence measure; Katz & Hass, 1988), (b) the MRS (McConahay et al., 1981), (c) a Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire concerning reactions to Blacks (e.g., Zuwerink et al., in press), and (d) a mood adjective checklist that measured how subjects were feeling at the time. The items from the PAAQ and MRS were intermixed in a single questionnaire labeled "Personal Opinions." Some subjects completed this questionnaire first, followed by the discrepancy questionnaire and, finally, the affect measure. Other subjects completed the discrepancy questionnaire first, followed by the affect measure and then the PAAQ and MRS items.

Completing the MRS should heighten the salience of modern racists' attitudes. Thus the relation between modern racism and affect can be examined by determining whether subjects' MRS scores predicted their affect after subjects completed the MRS. Note that because subjects
completed the MRS before reporting their affect in only one of the order conditions, any observed relation between MRS and affect should be moderated by the order factor. Affective consequences of discrepancies could be examined by determining how subjects felt after they completed the Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire. That is, this questionnaire heightens the salience of discrepancies among subjects who would respond in ways that are more prejudiced than they believe they should, so that the relation between affect and discrepancy scores can then be measured.

Unlike the modern racism and discrepancy measures, completing the ambivalence measure of conflict (i.e., the PAAQ) may not make the conflict between pro- and anti-Black attitudes salient among ambivalent subjects (see Hass et al., 1992). Therefore, a different ambivalence-inducing strategy was used in the present research. Katz et al. (1986) emphasized that ambivalence is likely to become salient in interracial contact situations. Because the scenarios used in the Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire involve considering interracial contact situations, it was expected that ambivalent subjects, while completing the questionnaire, would become aware of both their sympathy and their disdain for Blacks. Thus the greater the subjects’ ambivalence scores, the more intense subjects’ negative affect should be after they consider the situations described on the discrepancy questionnaire. Importantly, using the discrepancy questionnaire to make both discrepancy- and ambivalence-related conflict salient does not prevent one from determining whether these forms of conflict are distinct. This is because (a) although the same task should serve to activate each form of conflict, the degree of conflict was assessed via different instruments and (b) any overlap between discrepancy and ambivalence scores can be controlled for statistically.

Subjects

The subjects were 203 White, undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course who participated in exchange for extra credit.

Materials and Procedure

Subjects participated in groups consisting of up to 10 individuals. The experimenter explained that the study concerned reactions to various groups of people, and subjects were encouraged to be open and honest throughout the study. Subjects were told that their responses would be kept completely anonymous and that at the conclusion of the session, they would place their completed materials in a box containing materials from many other participants. The experimenter then distributed a packet of questionnaires to each subject. The questionnaires were in one of two orders: should-would discrepancy, affect, and then personal opinions (including both the MRS and PAAQ items, randomly intermixed) or personal opinions, should-would discrepancy, and then affect. Which order subjects received was randomly determined.

Ambivalence measure. The PAAQ consists of pro- and anti-Black attitude scales (Katz & Hass, 1988). Each scale has 10 items, and subjects indicated their agreement with each item using a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from −4 (Disagree strongly) to +4 (Agree strongly). The pro-Black items measure friendly feelings toward Blacks as a disadvantaged group. For example, one item reads, “Many Whites show a real lack of understanding of the problems that Blacks face.” The anti-Black items measure critical sentiments toward Blacks because they supposedly are not achievement oriented, self-disciplined, or dedicated to work. For example, one item reads, “Blacks don’t seem to use opportunities to own and operate little shops and businesses.”

Ambivalence scores were computed later, as suggested by Hass et al. (1991; see also Hass et al., 1992). The pro-Black items were summed, using reverse scoring as needed, so that higher scores reflected a more pro-Black attitude (alpha = .79). Anti-Black scores were formed similarly, with higher scores being more anti-Black (alpha = .79). The pro- and anti-Black scores then were converted to standard normal (t) scores (distribution M = 50 and SDs = 10), and then ambivalence scores were computed by multiplying the pro and anti t scores. A decent range and distribution of ambivalence scores was obtained in the present sample (range = 1186-4144, M = 2.467, SD = 594).

Modern racism measure. The 7-item MRS (McConahay et al., 1981) had the same scale format as described for the PAAQ. The MRS items are designed to tap into negative attitudes toward Blacks that—among people who hold such attitudes—will not be subjectively defined as prejudiced. For example, one item reads, “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Later, the MRS items were summed, after reverse scoring when necessary, so that larger scores reflected greater levels of modern racism (alpha = .76). A constant of 29 was added to each subject’s score, so that the possible range of MRS scores was 1-57. The actual range in the sample was 1-53 (M = 23.05, SD = 10.81). This represents a decent range, and the distribution was not skewed.

Discrepancy measure. Proneness to prejudice-related discrepancies was measured using the method developed by Devine et al. (1991). Subjects imagined themselves in five different situations involving Blacks. For each situation, subjects first indicated the extent to which they would have a particular negative response. For example,
one scenario read, “Imagine that you saw a few Black kids outside a convenience store in the early evening. You would think—’Probably up to no good.’” Three of the scenarios used this would phrasing, and the two remaining scenarios were phrased as should not. Subjects recorded their agreement with whether they would (or would not) have the response described on scales ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Next, subjects imagined themselves in each of the five interracial situations again, this time thinking about how they personally believed they should respond in the situations. Paralleling the would scenarios, three scenarios used the should phrasing, and the remaining two used the should not phrasing. Subjects recorded a rating for how they believed they should (or should not) respond in each situation using the same type of 7-point scale as was used for the would ratings.

Later, ratings from scenarios with the would not and should not phrasing were reverse scored, so that higher ratings were always more negative. A would score was formed by summing the would ratings (alpha = .70), and a should score also was formed (alpha = .66). Discrepancy scores were computed by subtracting the should rating from each scenario from the corresponding would rating and by summing these differences across the scenarios (alpha = .63). Of the 203 subjects, 15 had negative discrepancy scores (i.e., provided should ratings that were more negative than their would ratings). Following previous discrepancy-related research, data from these subjects were excluded in subsequent analyses that involved discrepancy scores. A decent range and distribution of nonnegative discrepancies was obtained (range = 0-28; M = 4.71, SD = 4.94).

Affect measure. The affect questionnaire instructions informed subjects that those in charge of the study were interested in determining how the participants were feeling at the moment. Subjects’ affect then was assessed using a 51-item mood adjective checklist. (The affect items are noted in the Results section.) For each affect item, subjects circled a number on a scale ranging from 1 (Does not apply at all) to 7 (Applies very much). Subjects were instructed not to think too much about their ratings and instead to give quick, gut-level responses.

RESULTS

Relations Among PAAQ, MRS, and Discrepancy Scores

In all analyses, the ambivalence, MRS, and discrepancy scores were treated as continuous variables. The variable representing the order in which subjects completed the questionnaires was dummy coded. Initial regression analyses revealed that the order in which subjects completed the questionnaires was not related to subjects’ scores on the PAAQ, MRS, or discrepancy measures.

An explanation about how the ambivalence scores were analyzed is necessary. In previous research (Hass et al., 1991, 1992), ambivalence has been operationalized as a multiplicative score (i.e., interaction) between the pro- and anti-Black t scores. Specifically, people who score high on both the pro- and anti-Black scales are ambivalent. In this research, the linear components of the ambivalence score (i.e., main effects for pro- and anti-Black scores) were not partialed from the ambivalence scores. As Evans (1991) explained, failure to partial out main effects when analyzing multiplicative scores can be problematic. Thus, in all analyses involving ambivalence scores in the present research, hierarchical regression was used, and the pro- and anti-Black t scores were entered into the equation before the ambivalence scores. The effect of ambivalence then was assessed on the step at which it was entered. Although main effects of the pro- and anti-Black scores are noted in the results for those who are interested, the primary interest concerns their interaction.

The relations among MRS, ambivalence, and discrepancy scores are summarized in Table 2. This table also summarizes the intercorrelations of the other indexes formed in the present research (i.e., pro-Black, anti-Black, personality, social psychology, bulletin, prejudice, attitudes, ambivalence, discrepancy, scores, analysis).
would scores, and should scores), as well as the relation between these indexes and the conflict-related indexes.

MRS and ambivalence scores. The regression analysis performed to determine whether ambivalence predicted MRS scores revealed that, not surprisingly, the less pro-Black subjects were, the higher they scored on the MRS, \( F(1, 200) = 80.87, p < .001 \) (\( B = -.4863 \)). Also, the more anti-Black the subjects were, the higher they scored on the MRS, \( F(1, 200) = 85.67, p < .001 \) (\( B = .5005 \)). More important, the effect for ambivalence (i.e., the interaction between pro- and anti-Black scores) was negligible, \( F(1, 199) = .05, ns \).

Discrepancy and ambivalence scores. The regression analysis examining the relation between discrepancies and ambivalence revealed a main effect for anti-Black scores, \( F(1, 185) = 5.55, p < .02 \) (\( B = .0882 \)), such that subjects with higher anti-Black scores tended to be more prone to discrepancies. This finding is not readily interpretable and does not appear to be of theoretical importance for the goals of the present study. Of greater interest, ambivalence scores were not related to proneness to discrepancies, \( F(1, 184) = 1.37, p = .24 \). However, the rationale was developed earlier, suggesting that ambivalence and discrepancies may be related among subjects with relatively prejudiced attitudes only. To test this notion, degree of prejudice was operationalized as subjects' MRS scores. Then, regression analyses were performed among the relatively low and high MRS groups, which were created by dichotomizing the MRS distribution. As expected, the analysis performed among low-prejudiced subjects revealed that ambivalence was not related to discrepancy scores, \( F(1, 87) = .04, ns \). Moreover, ambivalence also was not related to discrepancies among relatively high prejudiced subjects, \( F(1, 93) = .005, ns \). This result suggests that even among subjects with relatively prejudiced attitudes toward Blacks, attitudinal ambivalence does not overlap with the likelihood of engaging in discrepant responses.

MRS and discrepancy scores. The correlational analysis performed to determine whether a linear relation existed between MRS and discrepancy scores revealed that these two forms of conflict were not related, \( r(186) = .10, ns \).

In sum, the analyses in which each conflict-related measure was used to predict the other indicated that there appears to be little, if any, relation among ambivalence, proneness to discrepancies, and modern racism. The distinctiveness of these forms of conflict was examined next by determining whether each form of conflict has unique affective consequences.

Affect Results

Based on previous work (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993; Zuwerink et al., in press) and the results of a factor analysis performed on the affect ratings, five affect indexes were formed by averaging subjects' ratings for the relevant items. These indexes are Negself (angry at oneself, guilty, embarrassed, annoyed with oneself, disappointed with oneself; disgusted with oneself; regretful, shameful, and self-critical; alpha = .92); Discomfort (uneasy, bothered, fearful, anxious, frustrated, tense, threatened, and uncomfortable; alpha = .87); Positive (friendly, consistent, happy, energetic, optimistic, content, and good; alpha = .84); Angry at Others (irritated at others, disgusted with others, and angry at others; alpha = .88); and Down (depressed, low, helpless, and sad; alpha = .76). Ratings for a final item (i.e., consistent) were not included in the analyses. The intercorrelations of these affect indexes are shown in Table 3.

Initial hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine whether the order in which subjects had completed the various questionnaires affected the magnitude of the association between subjects' reported affect and the various measures of prejudice-related conflict. For example, an analysis of the relation between discomfort and discrepancies included the main effects for order and discrepancy scores, and the interaction between these two variables when predicting discomfort ratings. Main effects were assessed simultaneously, and interactions were assessed at the step at which they were entered. Order was associated with significant effects in a couple of instances, and these effects are summarized in relation to the relevant affect results below. When order was not associated with significant effects, subsequent analyses excluding this factor are reported.

In the following summary of the affect findings, the results of hierarchical regression analyses examining the relation between ambivalence and a given affect (in which pro- and anti-Black scores were entered prior to the interaction between these factors) are summarized first. Next, results concerning the relation between discrepancy scores and the relevant affect are reported, followed by results concerning MRS scores and the relevant affect. Finally, the relations between each conflict-related measure and a given affect, independent of the shared variance among the conflict-related measures, are reported. These results were obtained using hierarchical regression analyses in which the pro- and anti-Black scores were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Interrelations of Affect Indexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Negself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discomfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Anger at others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( *p < .001 \).
entered on the first step, and the ambivalence, discrepancy, and MRS terms were entered and assessed simultaneously on the second step.

**Negself.** According to both the theory of racial ambivalence (e.g., Hass et al., 1992; Katz et al., 1986) and the work on prejudice-related discrepancies (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1995; Monteith, 1993), the theoretically most important affective consequence of the prejudice-related conflict is negative self-directed affect. Therefore, examining whether ambivalence and discrepancies produce Negself feelings and whether each does so independently of the other is of central importance.

The hierarchical regression analysis performed to examine the relation between ambivalence and Negself revealed significant main effects for pro- and anti-Black scores, $F(1, 200) = 15.15, p < .001$ (β = .0412), and $F(1, 200) = 4.53, p < .05$ (β = .0225), respectively. Greater Negself was reported by subjects with both high pro-Black and high anti-Black scores. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant effect for ambivalence (i.e., a significant interaction between the pro- and anti-Black scores), $F(1, 199) = 5.16, p < .03$. As expected, ambivalent subjects (subjects who scored high on both the pro- and anti-Black attitude items) reported greater Negself after considering the interracial scenarios ($\bar{Y} = 3.61$; the mean score being lower than more ambivalent subjects (low-pro, low-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.41$; low-pro, high-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.39$; high-pro, low-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.71$). Subjects with large discrepancy scores also reported greater Negself than subjects with small discrepancy scores after considering their actual responses and personal standards for responding in the interracial situations, $r(186) = .34, p < .01$.

The regression analysis on Negself, which included MRS scores, order, and the interaction between these variables, revealed an unexpected Order × MRS interaction, $F(1, 199) = 3.99, p < .05$. Considering subjects who completed the affect measure after their modern racism attitudes were made salient (i.e., after the MRS), greater Negself was reported among low-MRS subjects ($\bar{Y} = 2.91$) than among high-MRS subjects ($\bar{Y} = 2.30$), $r(101) = -.23, p < .05$. However, when the affect measure was completed before the MRS, the relation between MRS scores and Negself was not significant (low-MRS subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.68$; high-MRS subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.88$), $r(98) = .06, ns$. This pattern of findings suggests that completing the MRS may have resulted in a slight decrease in Negself feelings among high-MRS subjects.

In sum, subjects with larger ambivalence and discrepancy scores reported greater negative self-directed affect than their counterparts with smaller scores. In contrast, modern racism scores tended to be negatively related to negative self-directed affect. As shown in Table 4, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affect Index</th>
<th>Measure of Prejudice-Related Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negself</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discomfort</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger at others</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The three forms of prejudice-related conflict were partialled from each other in the analysis of each affect index.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The relation between ambivalence and Negself, and between discrepancies and Negself, remained significant—even after shared variance among ambivalence, discrepancy, and MRS scores was partialled out. A separate analysis was performed using only subjects who completed the affect measure after the MRS. This analysis revealed that when ambivalence and discrepancies were partialled out, the relation between Negself and MRS was no longer significant, partial $r(97) = .06, ns$.

**Discomfort.** The analysis examining the relation between ambivalence and discomfort revealed that both pro- and anti-Black scores were positively related to discomfort, $F(1, 200) = 9.44, p < .003$ (β = .0292), and $F(1, 200) = 13.40, p < .001$ (β = .0347), respectively. As was the case with the Negself findings, these main effects were qualified by the effect for ambivalence, $F(1, 199) = 8.48, p = .004$. Ambivalent (i.e., high-pro, high-anti) subjects reported greater discomfort after considering the interracial scenarios ($\bar{Y} = 3.77$) than did nonambivalent subjects (low-pro, low-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.58$; low-pro, high-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.73$; high-pro, low-anti subjects, $\bar{Y} = 2.56$). In the analysis of the discomfort data, subjects with larger discrepancy scores reported greater discomfort than those with smaller discrepancies, $r(186) = .15, p < .04$. Finally, as anticipated, completing the MRS did not produce feelings of discomfort among subjects who scored high on this scale. Specifically, the interaction between order and MRS scores was not significant, nor was the correlation between discomfort and MRS among subjects who completed the affect measure after the MRS.

As shown in Table 4, the relation between ambivalence and discomfort remained significant when variance attributable to discrepancy and MRS scores was taken into account. However, the relation between discomfort and discrepancies was no longer significant when ambivalence and MRS scores were partialled out. Overall, these findings indicate that the only type of prejudice-related conflict that was uniquely associated with general feelings of discomfort was ambivalence.
Positive. A significant relation was found between subjects' anti-Black scores and positive affect, $F(1, 196) = 4.37, p < .05$ (B = -.0224), indicating that as anti-Black scores increased, subjects' positive affect decreased. This finding makes intuitive sense; activating anti-Black attitudes may well reduce positive affect. Replicating the findings of Hass et al. (1992), the relation between ambivalence and positive affect was not significant ($F < 1$). In contrast, the analysis examining the relation between discrepancies and positive affect revealed that subjects with larger discrepancies reported less positive affect than subjects with smaller discrepancies, $r(184) = .35, p < .01$. This result replicates several previous findings (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993).

The analyses involving MRS scores revealed a significant Order x MRS interaction, $F(1, 195) = 7.96, p < .006$. Among subjects who completed the affect measure after the MRS, low-MRS subjects reported a level of positive affect ($\bar{Y} = 4.15$) that was similar to the level of high-MRS subjects ($\bar{Y} = 4.20$), $r(99) = .02, n.s.$ However, among subjects who completed the affect measure before the MRS, subjects with high MRS scores reported less positive affect ($\bar{Y} = 3.49$) than subjects with low MRS scores ($\bar{Y} = 4.57$), $r(96) = -.37, p < .01$. Recall that subjects in this latter order condition had just considered the interracial situations on the Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire before they reported their affect. Thus a likely explanation for the finding is that the subjects who dislike Blacks (as inferred from their high MRS scores) experienced a reduction in their positive affect because they had just considered these interracial situations. Although interesting, this finding is not informative with respect to the specific goals of the present research.

A regression analysis on the positive feelings index revealed that the negative relation between discrepancies and positive affect remained significant when the other forms of prejudice-related conflict were partialled out (see Table 4). An additional analysis was performed involving subjects who completed the affect measure before the MRS. The results revealed that the negative relation between MRS scores and positive affect among these subjects remained significant after the other forms of conflict had been partialled out, partial $r(92) = -.20, p = .052$.

Down, and Anger at Others. Pro-Black scores were positively related to the extent to which subjects were feeling down, $F(1, 200) = 16.59, p < .001$ (B = .0379). Perhaps thinking about the disadvantages Blacks experience caused subjects with pro-Black attitudes to feel sad. A smaller but significant positive relation was also found between anti-Black scores and feeling down, $F(1, 200) = 6.84, p < .01$ (B = .0243). This finding is not readily interpretable. Pro- and anti-Black scores were significantly and positively related to subjects' reported anger at others, $F(1, 199) = 6.88, p < .01$ (B = .0361), and $F(1, 199) = 4.84, p < .03$ (B = .0502), respectively. It is possible that subjects with pro-Black attitudes felt angry toward individuals who contribute to Blacks' disadvantaged status and that subjects with anti-Black attitudes felt angry toward Blacks themselves. Most important, no significant findings were obtained in the analyses testing the relation between the various forms of prejudice-related conflict (i.e., ambivalence, discrepancies, and modern racism) and the extent to which subjects were feeling down or angry at others.

Conflict-Related Prejudice Versus “Plain Prejudice”

The question of whether conflict-related forms of prejudice are different from plain prejudice—or a non-conflicted form of prejudice—also deserves some attention. For example, several researchers (e.g., Weigel & Howes, 1985) have argued that modern racism, in particular, is not distinct from more old-fashioned, less subtle forms of prejudice. Although the present study did not include a standard measure of an old-fashioned or plain prejudice, such a measure was constructed post hoc. First, subjects' pro-Black attitude ratings were reverse scored so that higher scores indicated disagreement with pro-Black sentiments. Then, a linear composite index was formed by summing (a) the reverse-scored pro-Black index scores, (b) the anti-Black index scores, (c) the should index scores, and (d) the would index scores. (All index scores were standardized prior to being summed.) The reliability of the composite index (computed as suggested by Nunally, 1978) was quite high, $r_x = .87$.

Following the two-step approach used when testing the relation among conflict-related forms of prejudice, the relation between the plain prejudice measure and the conflict-related measures was examined first. The correlation between MRS scores and the composite index of prejudice was significant, $r(201) = .70, p < .001$. This correlation is similar in magnitude to correlations that McConahay (1986) obtained between the MRS and measures of old-fashioned racism and also similar to the correlation that Brigham (1993) obtained between modern racism and his Attitude Toward Blacks Scale. Thus modern racism clearly covaries with but is not identical to single-dimension measures of prejudice.

To avoid item overlap, only the sum of the should and would indexes (composite index reliability = .80) was used to predict ambivalence (i.e., the interaction between pro- and anti-Black scores, after partialling out the main effects). No relation between ambivalence and the single-dimension measure of prejudice was apparent, partial $r(199) = .01, n.s.$ Item overlap likewise was avoided in the analysis of the discrepancy scores by using only the sum of the pro- and anti-Black indexes (composite index reliability = .84). The relation between scores on
this index and discrepancies also was not significant, \( r(186) = .14, \) ns.

The next step in testing whether the conflict-related forms of prejudice are different from the single-dimension view of prejudice involved examining whether each conflict measure was associated with unique patterns of affective reactions, independent of the effects of plain prejudice. In other words, modern racism, discrepancy, ambivalence, and the composite index of prejudice were used simultaneously to predict ratings for each affect index. Because item overlap could not be avoided in this case, the composite index consisting of all four indexes was used. This provides a more conservative test than if item overlap could be avoided.

The results of this analysis indicated that the patterns of affect findings for ambivalence, discrepancy, and modern racism were not altered by including the composite index in the analysis. Furthermore, the single-dimension measure of prejudice was uniquely associated with several effects: the higher the prejudice score, the more discomfort and anger at others subjects reported, partial \( r = .30 \) and \( .21, \) respectively, \( p < .01. \) Higher scores on the composite prejudice index also were associated with less positive affect, partial \( r = -.19, \) \( p < .01. \)

Thus, in contrast to modern racism, activating plain prejudice does appear to have affective consequences. This finding suggests that although the MRS and single-dimension measures of prejudice covary, they appear to be distinct.

**DISCUSSION**

The present findings point to a straightforward answer to the question, Can the nature and causes of contemporary forms of prejudice-related conflict be described in a nutshell? Based on this investigation of racial ambivalence, proneness to discrepancies, and modern racism, the answer appears to be no. The various forms of conflict appear to be orthogonal, and their distinctiveness implies that each form likely has different causal antecedents or roots. The conclusion that each form of conflict is distinct is based on two patterns of findings. First, analyses examining the interrelations among measures of the various forms of conflict provided no evidence of overlap. This was the case even in analyses involving groups of subjects who might have been expected to show an overlap in the various forms of conflict. For example, contrary to the possibility raised earlier in this article and suggested by Devine et al. (1991), the relation between discrepancies and ambivalence did not approach significance even among relatively high prejudiced subjects.

Second, each type of conflict was associated with a unique pattern of affective consequences that, for the most part, was unaltered by statistically controlling for alternative forms of conflict. The activation of modern racism attitudes was not uniquely associated with any type of feelings. Although a negative correlation between negative self-directed affect and MRS scores was obtained among subjects who completed the affect measure after the MRS, this relation was no longer significant when the other forms of conflict were partialled out. The general absence of affective consequences in relation to modern racism attitudes is consistent with McConahay’s (1986) portrayal of the modern racist. That is, modern racists’ attitudes supposedly allow them to express their dislike of Blacks and at the same time to protect their non-prejudiced self-images. The nature of the attitudes thus protects modern racists from recognizing the presence of conflict, so that considering the attitudes does not result in self-threat or other types of conflict-related affect.

The type of affective consequences observed when prejudice-related discrepancies were made salient included heightened negative self-directed affect and discomfort, and a reduction in positive affective. This pattern replicates several previous studies (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993; Zuwerink et al., in press). The relation between discrepancies and discomfort did not remain significant when the other forms of conflict were controlled for statistically, suggesting that there is not a unique relation between discrepancies and discomfort. However, the effects of discrepancies on positive affect and negative self-directed affect did remain significant when the other forms of conflict were simultaneously considered. The finding that feelings of guilt were uniquely associated with discrepancies is perhaps the most important outcome here, because the experience of discrepancy-associated guilt motivates individuals to try to reduce their prejudiced responses in the future (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993).

The experience of guilt also figures importantly in Katz and Hass’s (e.g., Katz, 1981; Katz et al., 1986) theory of racial ambivalence. Theoretically, the conflict created when ambivalent individuals’ competing pro- and anti-Black attitudes are made salient is self-threatening and should produce guilt. The present research indicated that increasing the salience of subjects’ racial ambivalence was associated with increased discomfort and negative self-directed affect and that both of these relations remained significant when discrepancy as well as modern racism scores were simultaneously considered. Unlike the discrepancy-associated affect findings, ambivalence was not related to positive affect. Ambivalence also was not associated with positive affect in the research of Hass et al. (1992), even though these researchers used different methods for activating ambivalence and for measuring affect than were used in the
present research. The question of why discrepancies but not ambivalence reduce positive affect deserves consideration in future research. One possibility is that the experience of prejudice-related discrepancies is more self-threatening, causing a reduction of global positive feelings (e.g., happiness) as well as an increase in guilt.

The present research also suggests that conflict-related forms of prejudice appear to be distinct from plain prejudice, or single-dimension, negative attitudes toward Blacks. Only the modern racism measure was related to the measure of plain prejudice, and the magnitude of this relation was comparable to previous findings concerning the overlap between MRS attitudes and other measures of prejudice (Brigham, 1993; McConahay, 1986). However, the affect findings supported the distinction between these forms of prejudice. In contrast to modern racism, the measure of plain prejudice was uniquely related to subjects’ reported affect. Higher prejudice scores were associated with more discomfort and anger at others, and less positive affect. Identical effects of activating prejudiced attitudes on affect have been obtained in several studies concerning prejudice toward gay men and lesbians (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1996; Monteith et al., 1993). Such findings suggest that thinking about individuals that one dislikes and feels hostile toward generates discomfort and negative feelings directed toward the disliked individuals and reduces positive affect. In contrast, modern racists do not report such affect, presumably because they do not harbor extreme hostility toward Blacks and because they justify their views with nonprejudiced explanations.

The notion that conflict-related forms of prejudice are distinct from the single-dimension form of prejudice deserves additional investigation, using a more conventional measure of plain prejudice than was used in this study. Although some research has been conducted along these lines (see McConahay, 1986; Weigel & Howes, 1985), comparisons of various conceptualizations of prejudice are rather uncommon. In such work, researchers should keep in mind that scores on various measures of prejudice may well covary (e.g., modern racism and old-fashioned measures of prejudice), regardless of their distinctiveness. Other strategies, such as examining the affective consequences of activating a particular type of prejudice, must also be used to address the distinctiveness issue. Also, future research may benefit by examining various forms of prejudice in separate testing sessions. Although the present results supported the distinctiveness hypothesis, uniqueness may be even more apparent when multiple measures are not completed in the same session. Finally, one should keep in mind that various measures of prejudice may be more or less distinct depending on the subject sample. The college sample in the present research perhaps was optimal for detecting distinctiveness, because proneness to different forms of prejudice varied considerably across the students, and decent ranges and non-skewed distributions were obtained for each prejudice measure. Such heterogeneous attitudes may not be observed on other college campuses or with some noncollege samples.

Beyond demonstrating the uniqueness of contemporary forms of prejudice-related conflict, the present research makes several more specific contributions to understanding racial ambivalence. First, the previous investigation of ambivalence-related affect (Hass et al., 1992) did not distinguish among different types of negative affect. Items such as down, stupid, angry, depressed, mad, confused, and uneasy all were included in a general negative affect index. Considering the exact type of affect resulting from the experience of prejudice-related conflict seems an important issue, because different types of affect are likely to be associated with different motivational and behavioral consequences. The present research established more precisely the link between the experience of negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt and self-criticism) and ambivalence, and demonstrated that ambivalence was not related to other types of negative affect (e.g., sadness or anger at others).

Second, the present research extends what is known about the types of situations that will elicit ambivalence-related affect. In the research of Hass et al. (1992), ambivalence was activated by exposing White subjects to others’ reactions to a poignant racial incident (the Howard Beach incident). In the present research, subjects considered rather innocuous situations involving Blacks, which apparently was sufficient for activating subjects’ ambivalent attitudes. Poignant situations involving Blacks thus do not appear to be necessary to activate ambivalence-related affect.

Finally, Hass et al. (1992) had subjects complete the PAAQ prior to introducing their ambivalence-inducing manipulation, which introduces the possibility that priming pro- and anti-Black attitudes prior to exposure to a race-related situation is necessary for activating ambivalence. In the present research, the results associated with the order in which subjects completed the questionnaires help to establish that explicit priming of pro- and anti-Black attitudes by completing the PAAQ is not needed to elicit racial ambivalence. That is, subjects considered the interracial situations and reported their affect either before or after completing the PAAQ, and this order factor did not moderate the relation between ambivalence and affect. All in all, the present findings suggest that racial ambivalence is likely to be elicited in a variety of situations (e.g., fairly innocuous interracial situations and situations that do not explicitly prime pro- and anti-Black attitudes) among people who hold conflicting attitudes about Blacks.
Directions for Theoretical and Applied Work

The finding that modern racism, racial ambivalence, and prejudice-related discrepancies appear to be distinct, rather than being alternative manifestations of a single conflict with the same underlying roots, implies that each form of conflict deserves individual attention. This is true both with regard to theoretical development and testing, and in connection with more applied attempts to reduce prejudice and discrimination toward Blacks. A priority issue on the theoretical agenda should be to gain a better understanding of the roots of each form of conflict. For example, the roots of modern racism have been the subject of theoretical speculation (McConahay, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976) but little empirical investigation. Likewise, only speculations (Monteith, 1996) and indirect evidence (see Monteith et al., 1993) are presently available for making inferences about the roots of prejudice-related discrepancies among people who espouse relatively negative attitudes toward Blacks.

Understanding the causal antecedents of different forms of prejudice-related conflict is essential for determining how prejudice reduction might be encouraged. Without knowledge of the roots, prejudice reduction research tends to have a hit-or-miss quality about it and often meets with failures to achieve change (Monteith et al., 1994). Using knowledge of the likely roots of racial ambivalence (i.e., competing value orientations), researchers should explore what sorts of strategies are effective in reducing prejudiced responses that can result from this conflict. For example, Katz and Hass (1988) suggested a two-prong educational approach for reducing prejudiced responses resulting from racial ambivalence: (a) stressing egalitarian values and linking them directly to Blacks’ rights and (b) encouraging people to realize that evaluating others using the standards implied by the Protestant ethic is proper only when people have equal opportunity and incentives. The current understanding of the likely roots of prejudice-related discrepancies among people with low-prejudiced beliefs (i.e., competition between stereotypes and beliefs) suggests different strategies for reducing this form of conflict. For example, increasing the accessibility of these individuals’ low-prejudiced beliefs should increase the likelihood that the beliefs will guide their behavior (see Fazio, 1986). Also, knowledge about the processes involved in learning to inhibit stereotype-based responses (Monteith, 1993) can be used to devise strategies for encouraging low-prejudiced individuals to persist at efforts to inhibit their discriminatory responses.

In sum, change strategies must be tailored to individuals, according to the type(s) of conflict present—modern racism, ambivalence, or prejudice-related discrepancies. Before change strategies can be devised and tested, an understanding of the roots of the conflict must be gained. Moreover, other types of prejudice not focused on in this research must be taken into account (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio’s theory of aversive racism; see Dovidio, Gaertner, Anastasio, & Sanitioso, 1992; Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In addition, those individuals who experience no conflict but, rather, unabashedly harbor and act on their prejudices must be considered. The great diversity in the various forms of prejudice that have been identified may seem overwhelmingly daunting to people who desire to understand prejudice and promote its reduction. However, that different forms of prejudice can be identified implies that a better understanding of the roots of different people’s prejudices can be achieved, and appropriate change strategies can then be implemented. Although the use of different types of change strategies may be necessary, depending on the form of prejudice, knowing which strategies to use with whom will facilitate efforts to reduce prejudice.

NOTES

1. A fourth conceptualization of prejudice-related conflict, the theory of aversive racism (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), is not investigated in the present research because a scale for measuring the degree to which individuals can be characterized as aversive racists does not exist.

2. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) noted a similar problem with the theory of symbolic racism (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981, 1985).

3. Note that according to the theory of racial ambivalence (e.g., Katz et al., 1986), prejudiced or negative responses would not always be the default. When the situation clearly calls for positive behavior, a positive response should be observed.

4. Negative discrepancies may reflect a real form of conflict, rather than being the result of subject insensitivity (see Monteith et al., 1993). Nonetheless, these data were excluded from analyses because (a) treating them as falling on a continuum with positive discrepancies is not sensible and (b) separate analyses involving the data were not possible with only 15 negative discrepancy subjects.

5. Throughout the Results section, the degrees of freedom (df) for analyses involving discrepancies are slightly lower than in other analyses due to the exclusion of the negative discrepancy data. Other slight variations in the dfs resulted from occasional missing data.

6. For all significant ambivalence effects (i.e., Pro-Black × Anti-Black interactions), predicted values were calculated using 1 SD above and 1 SD below the mean of the pro- and anti-Black scores.

7. Previous research has demonstrated that people who score relatively low on attitudinal measures of prejudice experience more Neg- self as a consequence of their discrepancies than people who score higher on these measures of prejudice (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1998; Zuwerink et al., in press). This pattern also emerged in the present data. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the relation between discrepancies and Negself typically is significant among individuals with high-prejudiced attitudes—albeit more modest than among relatively low prejudiced individuals (see Monteith, 1996). Because the goals of the present research did not involve comparing the degree of discrepancy-associated affective experienced among low- and high-prejudiced subjects, analyses involving the joint combination of prejudice level and discrepancies are not reported.

8. An exception was an unanticipated interaction between order and ambivalence (i.e., Order × Pro-Black × Anti-Black) for the Anger at Others index, F(1, 195) = 4.10, p < .05. The nature of this interaction made little sense and appeared to be a chance finding.
REFERENCES


Received September 23, 1994

Revision accepted March 27, 1995