Self-Directed Versus Other-Directed Affect as a Consequence of Prejudice-Related Discrepancies

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Personal standards for responding toward gay males and affective reactions to discrepancies were examined for low prejudiced (LP) and high prejudiced (HP) Ss in 2 studies. These standards and discrepancies involved responses varying in controllability and acceptability. Results indicated that LP Ss experienced negative self-directed affect in connection with transgressions from their nonprejudiced and well-internalized standards, regardless of the type of response. HP Ss’ personal standards were quite nonprejudiced and well internalized for relatively controllable and unacceptable prejudiced responses. Nevertheless, HP Ss’ transgressions from their standards produced negative affect directed toward others but not toward the self, regardless of the type of response. The findings supported Higgins’s (1987) argument that the standpoint of standards determines affective reactions to discrepancies. Apparently, LP Ss’ standards are based on the own standpoint, but HP Ss’ standards are based on the other standpoint.

Recent research suggests that prejudice reduction can be conceptualized as a process in which eliminating one’s prejudiced responses is gradual, rather than all or none (Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1992). That is, the personal decision to adopt nonprejudiced beliefs will not be followed immediately by the elimination of all types of prejudiced responses because automatic, stereotype-consistent responses persist (but see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). These stereotype-consistent responses can be supplanted only if they are inhibited and then replaced with responses based on internalized, nonprejudiced beliefs. Thus, we have argued that the change process involves at least three steps (see Devine & Monteith, in press): (a) establishing nonprejudiced standards based on one’s personal beliefs for how one ought to respond, (b) internalizing those standards by linking them to the self-concept, defining them as important, and feeling committed to them, and (c) learning how to inhibit stereotypic responses so as to respond consistently with one’s personal standards.

Empirical findings supporting this analysis have optimistic implications concerning low prejudiced individuals’ potential for making progress in the prejudice-reduction process. Specifically, Devine et al. (1991) found that low prejudiced individuals reported nonprejudiced standards for how they should feel toward members of stereotyped groups in various contact situations, and these standards were highly internalized. Even so, these subjects reported that their actual feelings toward stereotyped group members are sometimes more prejudiced than their personal standards suggested was appropriate. Such discrepancies between their actual responses and their personal standards gave rise to feelings of compunction (e.g., guilt and self-criticism). These findings suggest that low prejudiced individuals have completed the initial two steps of the change process, but face the difficult task of mastering the final step of inhibiting spontaneous stereotypic responses.

A second line of research provides reason to believe that low prejudiced individuals can master this final step. In particular, Monteith (1992) found that when low prejudiced subjects believed they had violated their nonprejudiced personal standards, several self-regulatory processes (e.g., feelings of compunction, heightened self-focus, and slowing of responses) aimed at avoiding future discrepant responses were instigated. Moreover, after the engagement of this regulatory cycle, subjects were effective at inhibiting stereotypic responses; in a subsequent situation they responded on the basis of their nonprejudiced beliefs. Therefore, discrepancies from well-internalized nonprejudiced standards appear to facilitate individuals’ efforts to learn how to inhibit stereotypic responses so that belief-based responses can be provided. Theoretically, then, if low prejudiced individuals monitor their responses so as to detect discrepancies, they can make progress in learning to eliminate their prejudicialike responses.

In contrast, we have found little reason for optimism about high prejudiced subjects’ potential involvement at any step in the prejudice-reduction process. For example, Devine et al. (1991) found that high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards for responding to stereotyped group members permitted moderate degrees of prejudice, were not well internalized, and appeared to be derived from prevailing societal norms rather than...
from personal moral standards. Like low prejudiced subjects, high prejudiced subjects reported that they sometimes manifested responses that were more prejudiced than their personal standards permitted. However, their discrepancies were associated only with global discomfort (e.g., bothered and threatened) and not with high levels of self-directed negative affect. Furthermore, their discrepancies appeared neither to instigate self-regulatory processes nor to reduce the likelihood of providing prejudiced responses on an occasion following a discrepancy experience (Monteith, 1992).

This research suggests that there are important differences in the nature of the discrepancies experienced by low and high prejudiced individuals. These differences can be illuminated with reference to Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory. In Higgins’ terms, both low and high prejudiced people appear to be prone to actual/ought discrepancies: By their own assessment, their actual responses are more prejudiced than they ought to be. However, standards for how one ought to respond can be derived from the own personal standpoint or from the standpoint of significant others (e.g., friends, relatives, and societal norms). Higgins’s theory posits that discrepancies from standards involving different standpoints lead to different emotional reactions. Specifically, ought discrepancies involving the own standpoint lead to feelings of self-disappointment and self-criticism, whereas ought discrepancies involving the other standpoint produce feelings of threat and potentially resentment (Higgins, 1987).

Within this framework, Devine et al.’s (1991) results suggest that low prejudiced individuals’ personal standards are based on the own standpoint. When their actual responses were discrepant from their personal standards, they felt guilty and self-critical. In contrast, high prejudiced individuals’ actual responses appear to violate personal standards that are based on others’ conceptions of their duties or obligations for responding, because their discrepancies led to general feelings of discomfort and threat.

The present research extends Devine et al.’s (1991) work by comparing low and high prejudiced subjects’ standards, discrepancies, and discrepancy-associated affect across different types of responses toward stereotyped groups. That is, Devine et al.’s research concerned only feeling-related responses (e.g., feeling uncomfortable sitting next to a gay male on a bus). Yet two other important response domains include people’s thoughts and behaviors. These three response domains can be construed as differing in at least two important ways. First, they generally differ in the degree of control they afford. For the most part, feelings are the least controllable and behaviors are the most controllable (cf. Logan, 1989). Second, although exceptions likely exist, prejudiced behaviors generally are less acceptable than prejudiced feelings and thoughts. Only behaviors are outwardly discriminatory, and society has established laws and social norms that underscore the unacceptable nature of prejudiced behaviors.

The fact that prejudiced behaviors are overt, unacceptable, and controllable makes the behavioral domain particularly interesting. As far as low prejudiced subjects are concerned, because they have already internalized nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint for relatively uncontrollable feelings (Devine et al., 1991), they would also be expected to have such standards in the behavioral domain. The more interesting possibilities, however, concern high prejudiced people. Given the relatively overt and controllable nature of prejudiced behaviors, coupled with existing social norms prohibiting their expression, there is reason to believe that high prejudiced people may at least have established nonprejudiced standards for behaviors. Whether these standards are based on their own standpoint or that of others (e.g., society) is an open question, the answer to which could have important implications. If high prejudiced subjects have established nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint for their behaviors, tactics for encouraging them to generalize such beliefs to other types of responses (e.g., more acceptable and less controllable feelings) might be devised.

The suggestion that high prejudiced individuals may have internalized nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint for unacceptable and controllable behaviors seems reasonable, given the nature of their more general views on equality. Specifically, many prejudiced theorists have argued that most Americans—presumably including high prejudiced individuals—personally endorse general egalitarian ideals (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Myrdal, 1944; Rokeach, 1973). Although such ideals are inconsistent with prejudiced standards and responses, people apparently can use various strategies to disregard the inconsistency. For example, people might rationalize or justify their prejudiced reactions (McConahay, 1986), exclude them from awareness (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), or simply fail to confront the inconsistency (see Rokeach, 1973). Although these strategies may be successfully applied in the face of relatively acceptable and uncontrollable prejudiced feelings and thoughts toward stereotyped groups, their application might be less successful in the case of clearly unacceptable and controllable prejudiced behaviors. The inconsistency between egalitarian ideals and engaging in prejudiced behaviors is likely to be extremely salient and observable by the self and others. Thus, even high prejudiced individuals may have established internalized, nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint for their behaviors. To the extent that our high prejudiced subjects have established such behavioral standards, we would expect them to feel guilt and self-criticism when their actual behavior is more prejudiced than their standards permit. On the other hand, if their standards are based on the other standpoint, then we would expect these subjects to feel threatened and uncomfortable as a result of discrepancies (thus replicating Devine et al., 1991).

Examining the various response domains has an additional implication that is related specifically to the controllability of the responses: People may be more prone to discrepancies in the less controllable response domains. Assuming that, in general, feelings are the least controllable type of response and behaviors are the most controllable (cf. Logan, 1989), individuals should be most prone to discrepancies in the feeling domain. This result should be observed for both high and low prejudiced subjects.

We conducted a pilot study to identify feeling, thought, and behavioral responses that would be appropriate for use in the main studies. Specifically, we identified particular feeling-related responses that were evaluated as less controllable and
more acceptable than particular thought-related responses, and behavior-related responses that were evaluated as more controllable and less acceptable than the thought-related responses. In Study 1 we examined subjects' personal standards and their perceptions of society's standards in the behavioral domain. The central aim was to determine whether high prejudiced subjects' behavioral standards were fairly nonprejudiced and, most important, were not established merely on the basis of societal norms. In Study 2 we investigated the magnitude of discrepancies from personal standards and the relation between discrepancies and affect in each of the response domains.

Pilot Study

Method

Subjects were 55 female and 39 male heterosexual introductory psychology students participating for extra credit. The design was a 2 (prejudice: low vs. high) × 3 (response type: feelings vs. thoughts vs. behaviors) × 3 (type of judgment: acceptability vs. intention vs. responsibility) mixed model factorial design. Prejudice was the only between-subjects factor. The order of the sorting tasks that subjects completed was counterbalanced but had no significant effects in the initial analyses. Thus, we collapsed across this variable in the reported analyses.

Twenty-one scenarios were generated, each describing a different situation in which a male target person had a negative response toward a gay male. The negative response was either a feeling (6 scenarios), a thought (6 scenarios), or a behavior (9 scenarios). Subjects, participating in groups of 6–12, were seated at different tables and were assured that their responses would be anonymous. Index cards numbered 1–11 were evenly spaced across the table to demarcate the categories for the sorting task. Subjects sorted the 21 cards into categories three times, each time making a different type of judgment. A shuffled set of the 21 index cards was provided for each sorting.

Before completing each sorting, subjects were asked to read the cards and to think about the targets' responses in terms of the relevant judgment to be made. They were instructed to use as few or as many of the categories as they thought were appropriate and were told that each category could be used multiple times. The judgments concerned how acceptable and intentional the target's response was (1 = completely unacceptable/unintentional, 11 = completely acceptable/intentional), and how responsible the target was for his response (1 = not at all, 11 = completely). Subjects were asked to rely on their personal opinions or beliefs, not on what others would think, when doing the task.

After the sorting tasks, the participants completed the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuals (HATH) questionnaire (Larsen, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980). This questionnaire served as the measure of prejudice in each study we report. Subjects rated each of the 20 HATH items on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). Responses then were summed, after reverse scoring when necessary, so that scores could range from 20 (low prejudice) to 100 (high prejudice). For the pilot study, 48 subjects were identified as relatively low prejudiced (HATH range = 25–51) and 46 as relatively high prejudiced (HATH range = 52–98). The mean HATH score was 53.78 (SD = 18.67). Male participants tended to have higher HATH scores than female participants, t(94) = .27, p < .05.

Selection of Stimulus Materials and Analyses

We considered the category number into which each of the scenarios was placed to be a rating of acceptability, intent, and responsibility. The intent and responsibility ratings for each scenario were averaged together to form a measure of perceived control. Then we examined the acceptability and perceived-control ratings to select four each of the feeling, thought, and behavior scenarios. We chose feeling scenarios that were rated as relatively high in acceptability and low in controllability, thought scenarios with relatively moderate ratings on both dimensions, and behavior scenarios that were rated as relatively low on acceptability and high on controllability.

The acceptability and control ratings for the selected scenarios were then examined statistically to ensure that differences between the response types were reliable. Several indices were formed for these analyses. An Acceptability index for the feelings was formed by averaging subjects' ratings of the four feeling response scenarios (Cronbach's α = .89). Similarly, Acceptability indices were formed for the selected thought and behavioral responses (Cronbach's α = .81 and .88, respectively). Finally, the perceived control ratings were averaged together to form separate Control indices for feelings (Cronbach's α = .87), thoughts (Cronbach's α = .85), and behaviors (Cronbach's α = .86).

The Acceptability and Control indices were analyzed using separate 2 (prejudice: low vs. high) × 3 (response type: feelings vs. thoughts vs. behaviors) mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVAs). For both indices, the response type main effect was significant. Subjects evaluated the negative behaviors toward gay males as least acceptable (M = 3.08), followed by negative thoughts (M = 5.10) and negative feelings (M = 7.02), F(2, 184) = 139.70, p < .001. For the Control index, feelings were evaluated as least controllable (M = 4.74), followed by thoughts (M = 6.52) and behaviors (M = 8.77), F(2, 184) = 239.84, p < .001. Thus, we successfully identified feeling, thought, and behavioral scenarios that differed reliably in their perceived acceptability and controllability.

The analyses additionally revealed prejudice main effects on both the Acceptability, F(1, 92) = 66.82, p < .001, and the Control, F(1, 92) = 13.21, p < .001, indices. Overall, low prejudiced subjects found the responses less acceptable (M = 3.84) and more controllable (M = 7.33) than did the high prejudiced subjects (M ś = 6.35 and 6.39, respectively).

Study 1

The primary interest in Study 1 was whether high prejudiced subjects' personal standards for behaving could be distinguished from their perceptions of society's standards for how one should behave toward gay males. The strategy used by Devine et al. (1991, Study 3) for examining feeling-related stan-

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2 We recognize that in reality a particular feeling, for example, may be more controllable and less acceptable than a particular thought. Thus, we do not want to claim that the results to be presented generalize to all feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Nevertheless, for ease of presentation, we refer to each class of responses only by noting the appropriate response domain (e.g., "feeling responses" are used rather than "feeling responses evaluated as uncontrollable and acceptable, relative to the thought and behavioral responses used in the present research").

3 In addition, one woman and one man were not heterosexual, so their data were not used.
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...dards was used to investigate this question. We measured the degree of prejudice manifested both in low and high prejudiced subjects' personal standards for behaviors and in their perceptions of society's standards for behaviors directed toward gay males. Subjects also indicated the degree to which they had internalized their personal standards and society's standards and how obligated they felt to respond consistently with each of these standards.

Devine et al.'s (1991) conclusion that high prejudiced subjects' feeling-related standards were derived from prevailing societal norms was based on several findings. First, the locations of their personal standards corresponded with the location of their perceptions of society's standards (i.e., the two standards permitted the same degree of prejudice). Second, even though their personal standards were more internalized than their perceptions of society's standards, these subjects had internalized societal standards to a greater degree than low prejudiced subjects. Finally, high prejudiced subjects felt the same degree of obligation to respond consistently with societal standards as with their personal standards. Thus, if the present findings are similar to Devine et al.'s results, high prejudiced subjects' behavioral standards could well be derived from prevailing societal norms. However, significant differences among the location, internalization, and obligation ratings for high prejudiced subjects' personal standards compared with society's standards would suggest that their standards were not simply based on societal norms.

Method

Subjects

Several hundred introductory psychology students completed the HATH scale (Larsen et al., 1980) as a part of a larger survey. Those scoring relatively low or high in prejudice were identified as eligible participants. A total of 62 heterosexual individuals were randomly selected and recruited. This sample included an approximately equal number of men and women who were relatively low (range = 25–45) or high (range = 67–95) in prejudice (M = 54.07, SD = 21.81). Steps were taken to ensure that the experimenter was blind to subjects' prejudice level.

Design

The design was a 2 (prejudice: low vs. high) × 2 (standard type: personal vs. society) × 2 (standard order: society–personal vs. personal–society) × 2 (gender: male vs. female) mixed model factorial. Standard type was the only within-subject variable.

Materials and Procedure

Subjects participated in small groups, and the experimenter emphasized that subjects' anonymity would be ensured by having them place their completed questionnaire in a large envelope at the end of the session. This questionnaire had the same format and instructions used by Devine et al. (1991, Study 3). The initial instructions alerted subjects to the socially sensitive nature of the issues being investigated and underscored the importance of responding openly and honestly. Subjects were also told to keep in mind that the research concerned reactions to gay males only.

There were two main sections in the questionnaire: One included the items relevant to subjects' personal standards, and the other included the items about society's standards. Separate instructions were provided for each section, and before completing the second section, subjects were informed that their responses might or might not be consistent with their previous responses. After all subjects in the session had completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed and thanked for participating.

Personal standards. Subjects were instructed to consider how they should respond in each of four situations and to base their responses on their own personal standards rather than on what others might think or expect. The four behavioral scenarios involved informing a gay couple in a bar that "gays aren't welcome here," "leaving a restaurant to eat elsewhere" after discovering the waiter was gay, muttering "where you're going, queers" after a gay couple who were absorbed with each other accidentally bumped into you, and "writing the word 'faggot' over a bunch of pink triangles" painted on the sidewalk (the triangles were specified as a representation of gay pride, presumably leftover from a recent gay rights march).

After reading each scenario, subjects completed a rating using a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). For two of the situations, subjects rated the degree to which they believed they should have the negative response in the situation described. For the remaining two scenarios, subjects rated the degree to which they believed they should not have the negative response. The four personal should ratings were averaged, after reverse scoring the should not items, to form a Personal Should index (Cronbach's α = .87).

The same three internalization questions used by Devine et al. (1991) were then asked in connection with subjects' personal standards. Subjects indicated how important and how central to their self-concept they felt it was to respond consistently with their standards and how committed they were to trying to respond consistently with their personal standards. Subjects' responses to these three items were averaged to form a Personal Standard Internalization index (Cronbach's α = .88). A fourth question concerned how obligated they felt to responding consistently with their personal standards. All questions were answered using 7-point scales ranging from not at all (1) to very (7).

Society's standards. In this section, subjects were asked to base their responses on the norms that society sets up for how people should behave toward gay males and to think about what society as a whole would consider a socially desirable response (rather than what they personally thought was desirable). Subjects then indicated on scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) how they believed society would say they should respond in the same four behavioral situations. A Society Should index was formed by averaging the four ratings (Cronbach's α = .91).

Subjects then completed the same additional four ratings (i.e., importance, commitment, etc.) described previously with regard to their personal standards. The phrasing of the questions was altered so that the focus was on society's standards. A Society Standard Internalization index was formed by averaging subjects' ratings for the importance, commitment, and centrality measures (Cronbach's α = .84).

Results and Discussion

Mixed model ANOVAs involving all of the factors were initially performed on each dependent measure. Standard order was associated with a significant effect on only one measure. For all other measures, we collapsed across this variable.

Personal Standard and Society Standard Measures

The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for prejudice, F(1, 54) = 23.90, p < .001, which was qualified by a significant Prejudice × Standard Type interaction, F(1, 54) = 4.44, p < .04. As shown in the top row of Table 1, low prejudiced subjects'...


Table 1
Mean Ratings of Personal and Society Behavior Standards as a Function of Prejudice Level: Study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Low prejudice</th>
<th>High prejudice</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
<td>2.58&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;, 1.99&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>3.35&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;, 2.73&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>2.53&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;, 5.32&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>2.66&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;, 4.51&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. For each dependent measure, two types of mean comparisons were performed. First, the society and personal ratings were compared within each prejudice level. Different lowercase subscripts indicate that this comparison was significant (p < .05 at least, by relevant tests of simple main effects). Second, the effect of prejudice was examined, first with respect to society ratings and next with respect to personal ratings. For each of these dependent measures, cell means at different levels of prejudice with different uppercase subscripts are significantly different from each other (p < .05 at least, by Fisher’s least significant difference tests).

...personal standards were less prejudiced than those of the low prejudiced subjects. Low prejudiced subjects also perceived society as permitting lower levels of prejudice than did high prejudiced subjects. The interaction resulted because high prejudiced subjects’ perceptions of society’s standards were more similar to their own personal standards than was the case for low prejudiced subjects.

Nevertheless, the personal standard versus society standard comparison for high prejudiced subjects was significant. Furthermore, the correlation between these subjects’ personal standards and their perception of society’s standards was not significant, r(29) = .26, n.s. These findings suggest that, unlike Devine et al.’s (1991) findings for feeling-related standards, the location of high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards did not appear to be based entirely on their perceptions of societal norms. Instead, their personal standards permitted significantly less prejudice than their perceptions of society’s standards.

The overall ANOVA on subjects’ should standards revealed additional effects, none of which qualify the theoretically relevant effects. A main effect for standard order was obtained, F(1, 54) = 10.11, p < .002, which was qualified by a significant Standard Type × Standard Order interaction, F(1, 54) = 8.26, p < .006. Subjects’ ratings of society’s standards were more prejudiced when they reported their personal standards first (M = 3.60), compared with when their personal standards were reported second (M = 2.32). However, standard order had little effect on subjects’ ratings of their personal standards (personal standards reported first, M = 2.07; reported second, M = 1.85). A significant Standard Type × Gender interaction also was found, F(1, 54) = 6.45, p < .01. The difference between the reports of society’s standards and personal standards was larger for female subjects (M = 3.18 and 1.72, respectively) than for male subjects (M = 2.74 and 2.21, respectively).

Internalization Indices

The ANOVA performed on the internalization indices revealed a significant main effect for prejudice, F(1, 54) = 4.85, p < .03, and for standard type, F(1, 58) = 88.98, p < .001. These effects were qualified by a significant Prejudice × Standard Type interaction, F(1, 58) = 10.86, p < .002. As shown in the second row of Table 1, whereas low prejudiced subjects reported considerably greater internalization of their personal compared with society’s standards, this difference was much smaller for high prejudiced subjects. The results of the a priori comparisons revealed several notable significant differences. First, both low and high prejudiced subjects had internalized their personal standards to a greater degree than society’s standards. Second, in contrast to Devine et al.’s (1991) findings concerning the feeling domain, high prejudiced subjects had not internalized society’s standards for behaving to a greater degree than had low prejudiced subjects. Finally, although high prejudiced subjects’ personal behavioral standards appeared to be better internalized than societal standards, their personal standards were still not as well internalized as those of the low prejudiced subjects.

Obligation

The only significant effect found in the analysis of the obligation data was a main effect for standard type, F(1, 58) = 88.98, p < .001. Overall, subjects felt more obligated to respond consistently with their personal standards (M = 4.91) than with society’s standards (M = 2.59). Although the Standard Type × Prejudice interaction was not significant, F(1, 58) = 2.81, p < .10, a priori comparisons were performed and are summarized in the third row of Table 1. Most important, in contrast to Devine et al. (1991), high prejudiced subjects felt significantly more obligated to respond consistently with their personal standards than with society’s standards. Also, low prejudiced subjects felt only marginally (p < .07) more obligated to respond consistently with their personal standards than did high prejudiced subjects.

Altogether, the results suggest that high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards for behavior toward gay males were not based exclusively on the standpoint of prevailing societal norms. The two types of standards could be distinguished in terms of the location, internalization, and obligation measures. Moreover, high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards for behaving were significantly less prejudiced than their perceptions of society’s standards and involved greater levels of internalization and obligation. Given these findings, one may be tempted to conclude that these high prejudiced subjects have established relatively nonprejudiced behavioral standards based on the own standpoint. However, standards derived from the other standpoint may be based either on societal norms or standards of specific others (Higgins, 1987). The findings from Study 1 do not rule out the possibility that high prejudiced subjects’ behavioral standards are based on those of specific others, such as friends or relatives. By focusing on the affective consequences of discrepancies from these standards, Study 2 should help determine whether these standards are based on the own or other standpoint.

Study 2

Subjects reported their personal standards for responding to gay males in various feeling-, thought-, and behavior-re...
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related situations, and they reported how they actually would respond in these situations. Subjects also indicated their feelings about the match between their personal standards and their actual responses. This procedure allowed us to address several new issues.

First, we compared the affective consequences of discrepancies for the three response types. Extending Devine et al.'s (1991) findings, all subjects should experience general discomfort when their actual responses are more prejudiced than their personal standards permit, regardless of response type. Additional more specific affective reactions to discrepancies should depend on whether subjects' standards are based on the own or the other standpoint. Because low prejudiced subjects' standards are based on the own standpoint in the most acceptable and least controllable domain of feelings (Devine et al., 1991), we expected the same to be true in the thought and behavioral domains. Thus, we expected that their discrepancies in all response domains would produce negative self-directed affect (i.e., guilt). In contrast, the only domain in which high prejudiced subjects may have established standards based on the own standpoint is that of behavior. The experience of guilt in connection with behavioral discrepancies would strongly suggest that these subjects' standards were based on the own standpoint. To the extent that feelings of guilt are not associated with behavioral discrepancies, we explored whether the affect experienced is consistent with discrepancies from the other standpoint. Specifically, Higgins (1987) suggested that conflict involving one's actual responses and personal standards based on the standpoint of others can produce resentment toward others. The presence of resentment-related feelings would provide strong support for the idea that high prejudiced subjects' standards are based on the standpoint of others.

We addressed two other issues in Study 2. One concerned the location of subjects' standards in the feeling, thought, and behavioral domains. Given that the prejudiced behaviors used in the present research were judged to be quite unacceptable and controllable, high prejudiced subjects' behavioral standards were expected to be significantly less prejudiced than their feeling- and thought-related standards. Replicating and extending the findings of Devine et al. (1991), we expected low prejudiced subjects to report non-prejudiced standards for all three response types. The second issue concerned subjects' proneness to discrepancies in the three response domains. Logan's analysis of controllability (Logan, 1989) and our own pilot data suggest that both high and low prejudiced subjects should be most prone to discrepancies in the feeling domain, followed by the thought and then the behavioral domain.

Method

Subjects

The subjects were recruited in one of two ways. First, 178 heterosexual students from an introductory psychology class participated in exchange for extra credit. These participants' prejudice levels were assessed using the HATH scale, which they completed after they responded to the experimental questionnaire. Second, to obtain an approximately equal number of men and women with various levels of prejudice, an additional 121 subjects were recruited after a pretesting session in which several hundred introductory psychology students completed the HATH scale as part of a larger survey. Heterosexual respondents in the lower (scores = 20–46), middle (scores = 47–73), and upper (scores = 74–100) range of the HATH distribution were selected at random, contacted by phone, and asked to participate. (For the sample of subjects who participated in Study 2, HATH score M = 57.02, SD = 20.20.) The experimenter conducting the sessions was different from the recruiter and was kept blind to subjects' prejudice level. Data from two subjects were discarded because they did not follow instructions.

Materials and Procedure

Subjects participated in mixed gender and mixed prejudice-level groups ranging from 12 to approximately 45 individuals. Anonymity was ensured using the same procedure as in Study 1. Each subject was randomly assigned to complete one of three questionnaires (i.e., regarding feeling, thought, or behavioral discrepancies). The format and instructions were identical for the three questionnaires and followed the format used in previous research (see Devine et al., 1991, for additional details). After they completed all measures, subjects were debriefed and thanked for participating.

Should, would, discrepancy, and affect measures. The initial instructions were identical to those used in Study 1 and were followed by a three-section questionnaire. The first section constituted the should measure. The instructions and the 7-point scales on which subjects recorded their responses were the same as those used in Study 1 for the Personal Standards index. The four personal should ratings (for feelings, thoughts, or behaviors, depending on condition) were averaged to form a Total Should index (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$). The second section of the questionnaire constituted the would measure and assessed how subjects believed they actually would respond in the same four situations. The instructions emphasized that the subjects' actual would ratings may or may not be consistent with their personal should ratings. Subjects then considered each of the four scenarios again and indicated the degree to which they would (or would not) have the particular negative response described. The would rating scales were identical to the should rating scales. A Total Would index was computed by averaging the four would ratings after reverse scoring when necessary (Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$). In addition, a Discrepancy index (Total-d) was calculated by subtracting subjects' should rating from their would rating for each scenario and summing the discrepancies across the four situations (Cronbach's $\alpha = .66$).

The third section of the questionnaire contained the affect measure. Subjects indicated the degree to which each of 35 affect items described their feelings about how well their actual (would) responses matched their personal (should) standards. Ratings were made on a scale ranging from does not apply (1) to applies very much (7). The particular affect items used are specified in the Results section. After the affect ratings, subjects were reminded that three of the ratings they made concerned negative affect directed toward others (i.e., angry at others, irritated at others, and disgusted with others). Then, if they had indicated that they felt at least somewhat negative toward others on these items, they were asked to explain toward whom these negative feelings were directed.

Feeling, thought, and behavior scenarios. All scenarios (chosen on the basis of the results of the pilot study) included sufficient detail to allow the subjects to fully imagine themselves in the situations described. The four feeling scenarios involved feeling uncomfortable that a job interviewer was a gay man, irritated that the topic of a talk show concerned gay males, uneasy about going to work after discovering that a co-worker is a gay man, and upset that a gay male couple moved in next door. The four thought scenarios involved thinking “typical job for a gay,” upon seeing a hairstylist who happened to be homosexual; “that guy must be gay,” upon seeing a “rather effeminate”
waiter; "homosexuals are disgusting," after seeing an advertisement for an annual gay and lesbian dance; and "gays must have some personality quirk that causes them to be gay," after spotting a newspaper article concerning gay rights in America. The four behavioral scenarios were the same as those used in Study 1.

Results and Discussion

Overview of Analyses

The data were analyzed using hierarchical regression. Gender was coded so that male = −1 and female = 1, and the response type variable was represented using orthogonal contrast coding. Both Total-d and prejudice level were continuous variables. Main effects were assessed simultaneously to test the significance of the unique portion of variance attributable to each variable. The increment in $R^2$ for each interaction was assessed at the step when the interaction term was entered into the regression equation. Power polynomial analyses were also performed to test for a curvilinear relation between prejudice and the dependent measures. Thus, the quadratic aspect of prejudice was entered into the regression equation after the linear component was entered, and each interaction term involving the quadratic aspect of prejudice was entered after the appropriate term involving the linear component was entered. The effect for the quadratic aspect of prejudice was assessed only after the linear main effect was assessed; the same was true for the interaction terms. Results including the quadratic component of prejudice are reported when significant.

Total Should and Total Would Scores

A hierarchical regression analysis using gender, prejudice, response type, and all interaction terms to predict subjects' Total Should scores was performed. The increment in $R^2$ attributable to gender was significant, $F(1, 263) = 7.20, p < .008$ (B = −159), indicating that the men's personal standards were more prejudiced than the women's standards. The increment in $R^2$ also was significant for prejudice, $F(1, 263) = 223.43, p < .001$ (B = .044), and for response type, $F(2, 263) = 34.65, p < .001$ (feelings $\bar{Y} = 2.57$, thoughts $\bar{Y} = 2.88$, behaviors $\bar{Y} = 1.71$). However, these main effects were qualified by an interaction between prejudice and response type, $F(2, 261) = 8.41, p < .001$. As shown in the top row of Table 2, the difference between low and high prejudiced subjects' personal standards was considerably smaller for the behaviors than for either the feelings or the thoughts. It is important to note that the high prejudiced subjects' personal standards for behaviors were considerably less prejudiced than their standards for thoughts or feelings. It does appear, therefore, that these subjects had established relatively nonprejudiced standards regarding behaviors toward gay males. However, additional analyses performed separately within each domain revealed significant effects for prejudice. Thus, in all three domains, low prejudice subjects' personal standards were still less prejudiced than those of high prejudiced subjects.

The analysis of subjects' Total Would scores revealed a significant increment in $R^2$ due to prejudice, $F(1, 263) = 257.50, p < .001$ (B = .051), as well as a significant increment due to the quadratic aspect of prejudice, $F(1, 262) = 9.46, p < .002$. The curvilinear relation was such that subjects' Total Would scores increased with prejudice, but leveled off at very high levels of prejudice. The main effect for response type also was significant, $F(2, 262) = 107.48, p < .001$ (feelings $\bar{Y} = 3.73$, thoughts $\bar{Y} = 4.34$, behaviors $\bar{Y} = 2.16$). In addition, the Prejudice × Response Type interaction added a significant increment in $R^2$, $F(2, 260) = 5.68, p < .004$. As shown in the bottom row of Table 2, the difference between low and high prejudiced subjects' Total Would scores was less pronounced for the behaviors than for the feelings and thoughts.

Discrepancy Scores

Out of the 297 usable cases, 10% had negative Total-d scores (i.e., their woulds were less prejudiced than their shoulds indicated was appropriate). Because our central theoretical interest concerned subjects' reactions to positive discrepancies, these data were not included in the primary analyses and are summarized instead in a later subsection. Of the 268 remaining cases, 22% had a Total-d score of 0 (such that their actual responses, overall, were consistent with their personal standards). The percentages of subjects with 0 discrepancies for the feeling, thought, and behavioral response types were 20%, 5%, and 45%, respectively. The other 78% of the subjects reported positive Total-d scores (indicating their actual responses were more prejudiced than their standards permitted).

The regression analysis performed on subjects' Total-d scores revealed a significant main effect for prejudice, $F(1, 263) = 57.8, p < .02$ (B = .029) and a significant increment in $R^2$ attributable to the quadratic aspect of prejudice, $F(1, 262) = 20.24, p < .001$. Total-d scores increased as prejudice increased, but decreased slightly at high levels of prejudice. A marginally significant interaction between gender and prejudice also was revealed, but this interaction was not investigated further.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Feeling response</th>
<th>Thought response</th>
<th>Behavior response</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LP</td>
<td>HP</td>
<td>LP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total should</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total would</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. For each dependent measure, comparisons between low and high prejudiced subjects within each domain were performed. The effect for prejudice was significant in every case ($p < .05$ at least). LP = low prejudice; HP = high prejudice.

4 The two codes used to represent each response type were 1 and −1 for feelings and 0 for thoughts, and −1 and 1 for behaviors. Initially, effects for response type were tested by entering the two codes simultaneously. If this omnibus test resulted in a significant increment in the squared multiple correlation, the difference between feelings and behaviors was then tested by computing the $t$ value associated with the first code. Other comparisons between the response type levels were then conducted by reanalyzing the data and varying the response type to which the various codes were assigned.
found for the Total-d scores, $F(1, 257) = 3.74, p < .054$. This interaction was such that the difference between low and high prejudiced subjects' Total-d scores for men ($\bar{Y}_s = 3.76$ and $4.69$, respectively) was smaller than the difference for women ($\bar{Y}_s = 3.47$ and $6.25$, respectively).

Of particular interest was whether subjects' Total-d scores would differ across the three response types such that subjects would be most prone to discrepancies in the least controllable (feeling) domain. As expected, the response type main effect was significant, $F(2, 262) = 26.96, p < .001$. Specific comparisons revealed that Total-d scores were significantly smaller in the most controllable behavioral response domain ($\bar{Y} = 1.81$), compared with feelings ($\bar{Y} = 4.66$) and thoughts ($\bar{Y} = 5.99, ps < .001$). In contrast with our expectations, Total-d scores for thoughts were actually significantly larger than for feelings ($p < .05$), even though thoughts are presumably easier to control (Logan, 1989).

One possible explanation for this last effect, given the imagination technique used, is that it is simply easier to imagine having a stereotypic thought than a prejudiced feeling. It could be argued that the thoughts were more concrete than the diffuse types of feelings (e.g., uneasy and bothered) that the subjects imagined. Perhaps with more concrete or personally relevant feeling scenarios (e.g., discovering a friend was a gay male, having a gay male friend make a sexual advance), discrepancies would be larger. Alternatively, and perhaps more theoretically interesting, is the possibility that our subjects did not have a lot of personal contact with gay males but still had well-learned stereotypic representations of them (e.g., through media and discussions with others), making the cognitive component of the stereotype highly accessible. Despite this departure from expectations, one clear finding was that feeling- and thought-related discrepancies were much larger than behavior-related discrepancies.

**Construction of Affect Indices**

A principal-axis factor analysis performed on the 35 affect items yielded a solution that was nearly identical to the solution obtained by Devine et al. (1991). On the basis of the results, five separate affect indices were created by averaging the ratings of items included in the index. The indices constructed were as follows: Negself (angry at myself, guilty, annoyed with myself, disgusted with myself, regretful, shameful, and self-critical), Negother (angry at others, irritated at others, and disgusted with others), Discomfort (fearful, uneasy, embarrassed, bothered, tense, threatened, and uncomfortable), Positive (friendly, happy, energetic, optimistic, content, and good), and Depressed (low, depressed, sad, helpless, anxious, and frustrated). Separate hierarchical regression analyses were performed on each affect index, using gender, prejudice, response type, Total-d, and all possible interactions as the predictor variables. Significant effects are reported in Table 3.

Discomfort and Negself. Our prediction was that the magnitude of subjects' discrepancies would be positively related to their level of discomfort, regardless of prejudice level and response domain. As expected, larger Total-d scores were associated with greater discomfort than were smaller Total-d scores. Consistent with Devine et al.'s (1991) results, we also found that, overall, subjects higher in prejudice experienced greater discomfort than did subjects lower in prejudice. Although this prejudice main effect is open to various explanations, one possibility is that high prejudiced subjects experienced discomfort because they were required to think about gay males throughout the experiment.

Of particular interest in the present research was whether low and high prejudiced subjects would differ in their reported Negself feelings as a function response type as well as discrepancy magnitude. For low prejudiced subjects, Negself feelings were expected to increase as Total-d increased for all types of responses. Furthermore, if high prejudiced subjects' relatively nonprejudiced behavioral standards were based on the own standpoint, Negself should increase as Total-d scores for the behaviors increase. This three-way interaction among Total-d, prejudice, and response type was not significant, $F(2, 255) = 2.19, n.s.$ Instead, the regression analysis revealed significant main effects for both Total-d and prejudice (see Table 3), and these effects were qualified only by a significant Prejudice X Total-d interaction. Replicating Devine et al.'s (1991) findings, low prejudiced subjects with larger discrepancies reported greater Negself feelings ($\bar{Y} = 3.19$) than those with smaller discrepancies ($\bar{Y} = 1.65$); this difference was much smaller for high prejudiced subjects (small Total-d, $\bar{Y} = 1.79$; large Total-d, $\bar{Y} = 2.02$). Additional analyses were performed to examine the effects of four predictor variables on Negself and Discomfort, independent of the correlation between the two indices. The hierarchy-

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Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affect index</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$p &lt;$</th>
<th>B</th>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The significant effect noted involves the quadratic aspect of prejudice.

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*We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion.

* This interaction was further qualified by a marginally significant Total-d X Prejudice X Gender interaction, $F(1, 246) = 3.80, p = .052$. The nature of this interaction was such that the effects of Total-d on Negself feelings was somewhat stronger for low prejudiced female subjects than for their male counterparts.
cational regression analysis in which Negself was partialled out of Discomfort indicated that the main effect for Total-d remained significant, \( F(1, 261) = 7.69, p < .01, \beta = .052 \). Furthermore, the Prejudice \times Total-d interaction remained significant when Discomfort was partialled out of Negself, \( F(1, 260) = 18.60, p < .001 \).

In sum, even though high prejudiced subjects’ personal standards for the behaviors were significantly less prejudiced than their standards for feelings and thoughts, the degree of compunction experienced in association with their behavioral discrepancies was not particularly high. Because restricted power possibly could have precluded the detection of a significant three-way interaction, analyses that were more specific to examining high prejudiced subjects’ affective reactions to their discrepancies were performed. First, an analysis involving only subjects assigned to the behavioral response type revealed that the Prejudice \times Total-d interaction remained significant, \( F(1, 77) = 7.38, p < .01 \). Second, we examined whether high prejudiced subjects experienced greater Negself feelings in association with behavioral than feeling or thought discrepancies. This analysis did not reveal a significant Response Type \times Total-d interaction, \( F < 1 \). Together, these analyses provide further evidence that high prejudiced subjects experienced little compunction as a result of their discrepancies, even concerning responses for which their standards were relatively nonprejudiced and well internalized. The theoretical implication is that high prejudiced subjects’ behavioral standards did not involve the own standpoint.

**Negother.** If high prejudiced subjects’ standards are based on the other standpoint, then one might expect to find that their discrepancies are associated with negative feelings directed toward others, in addition to global discomfort. In the analysis of the Negother index, a significant effect for the quadratic aspect of prejudice was found, which again was qualified by a significant interaction between prejudice and Total-d. In this case, high prejudiced subjects with large discrepancy scores experienced greater Negother feelings (\( Y = 3.54 \)) than those with small discrepancy scores (\( Y = 2.57 \)). However, there was little difference between low prejudiced subjects’ Negother feelings when they had large (\( Y = 2.62 \)) compared with small discrepancy scores (\( Y = 2.94 \)). Thus, rather than directing negative affect inward as a result of their discrepancies, the high prejudiced subjects appeared to externalize their negative feelings by becoming angry, irritated, and disgusted with other people. These Negother feelings were qualitatively distinct from general Discomfort-related feelings, as the Total-d \times Prejudice interaction remained significant when Discomfort was partialled from Negother, \( F(1, 259) = 11.65, p < .001 \). Theoretically, the nature of the Prejudice \times Total-d interaction provides further evidence that high prejudiced subjects’ standards involved the other standpoint. That is, Higgins (1987) maintains that discrepancies from standards involving the other standpoint produce resentment, due to the anticipation of negative sanctions from others, in addition to more global discomfort.

To investigate toward whom subjects’ Negother feelings were directed, we content analyzed the explanations provided by subjects who scored greater than 1 on the Negother index (\( N = 204 \)). The percentages of low, moderate, and high prejudiced subjects scoring greater than 1 were 72%, 72%, and 84%, respectively. Two independent judges, blind to subjects’ prejudice level, coded each protocol into one of four categories. Two of the categories were of theoretical interest: (a) statements indicating that subjects were feeling negative toward people who are prejudiced toward gays or who perpetuate negative stereotypes about gays and (b) statements indicating that subjects were feeling negative toward gays. A third category consisted of miscellaneous statements (20% of the protocols). Unfortunately, 29% of the subjects (distributed approximately equally among prejudice levels) failed to provide any explanation of the target of their negative feelings. These protocols were coded in a “no response” category. The two coders disagreed on only 10 cases, which were resolved by a third judge.

Examination of these data revealed interesting differences between low and high prejudiced subjects. Whereas 56.9% of the low prejudiced subjects’ protocols were in Category 1 (feeling negative toward those who are prejudiced), only 5.3% of the high prejudiced subjects’ protocols were in this category. In contrast, the percentage of low prejudiced subjects’ protocols fitting in Category 2 (feeling negative toward gays) was only 6.2%, compared with 44% of the high prejudiced subjects’ protocols. The moderately prejudiced subjects’ protocols were approximately evenly split between the two categories, with 21.9% indicating anger at gay males and 17.2% indicating anger at people who are prejudiced toward gay males.

Additional analyses indicated that high prejudiced subjects’ proclivity to experience Negother feelings directed toward gays, rather than some other target, was related to the magnitude of their Total-d score. Specifically, we computed the point-biserial correlation between statements falling in this category as opposed to any of the other categories and their Total-d scores. A significant correlation was found, \( r(73) = .26, p < .025 \), indicating that as Total-d increased, high prejudiced subjects were more likely to direct their anger toward gay males.

There are a number of possible explanations for the finding that gay males are the targets of high prejudiced subjects’ Negother feelings. For example, the high prejudiced subjects may have construed gay males as the cause of their threatening predicament (e.g., without gay males, discrepancies would not arise). Second, high prejudiced subjects may have felt aggressive toward those upon whom their personal standards were based, but displaced their feelings onto gay males. Finally, the procedure itself most likely increased the accessibility of gay males by referring frequently to the group.

In sum, the Negother findings indicated that discrepancy experiences among high prejudiced people may be associated with an affective reaction more specific than just diffuse discomfort. In contrast with low prejudiced subjects, whose negative affect was directed inward (i.e., guilt), high prejudiced subjects’ negative affect appeared to be directed outward (i.e., negative feelings toward others).

**Positive.** The quadratic aspect of prejudice was significant in the analysis of the Positive index, so the power polynomial results are reported (see Table 3). In addition to this effect for prejudice, a significant effect for Total-d was found. These main effects were qualified by an interaction between the quadratic component of prejudice and Total-d. Replicating Devine et al.’s (1991) findings, the basic form of this interaction was that low prejudiced subjects with large discrepancies felt consid-
erably less positive ($\bar{Y} = 2.95$) than those with small discrepancies ($\bar{Y} = 4.46$); however, little difference was observed between high prejudiced subjects with large ($\bar{Y} = 3.18$) as compared with small discrepancy scores ($\bar{Y} = 3.70$).

Depressed. Replicating Devine et al. (1991), a significant main effect for Total-d was found on the depressed index. Increases in Total-d scores were associated with heightened feelings of depression.

**Analyses of Negative Discrepancy Data**

The theoretical interest in the present research centered on instances in which subjects' actual responses either matched or were more prejudiced than their personal standards. However, it may also be instructive to examine data from subjects whose actual responses were less prejudiced than their personal standards.

The 31 negative discrepancy scores could reflect subject errors, or true discrepancies, or both. If they reflect true discrepancies, one would expect negative discrepancies to be most common in the behavioral domain. That is, laws and social norms are most likely to deter one from behaving in a manner that is as prejudiced as one's standards. In addition, negative discrepancies should be most common among high prejudiced subjects because, compared with low prejudiced subjects, their standards do permit fairly prejudiced responses. Analyses of the data revealed that negative discrepancies were far more common for the behaviors ($n = 20$) than for the feelings ($n = 7$) and thoughts ($n = 4$). Furthermore, the HATH scores of the negative discrepancy subjects were high ($M = 68.97$, $SD = 16.44$). Thus, the negative discrepancy data consisted mostly of moderately to highly prejudiced subjects. In fact, only three of the subjects would be classified as low in prejudice, using the bottom third of the HATH distribution (i.e., scores between 20 and 46) as the criterion.

If the standards of high prejudiced subjects with negative discrepancies involve the other standpoint (as appears to be the case for high prejudiced subjects with 0 and positive discrepancies), their discrepancies should be associated with Discomfort and Negothe feelings. For example, realizing that “I cannot behave as prejudiced as my friends maintain I ought to behave” constitutes an actual-own versus ought-other discrepancy, and thus should give rise to feelings of threat, fear, and resentment (see Higgins, 1987). To examine this possibility, we included the quadratic aspect of Total-d in analyses involving the negative discrepancy data along with the 0 and positive discrepancy data. The reasoning was that for both Discomfort and Negothe, an interaction between prejudice and the quadratic aspect of Total-d should be found if the high prejudiced subjects' negative discrepancies were from standards involving the other standpoint. More specifically, low prejudiced subjects should show steady increases in Discomfort as Total-d increases. However, high prejudiced subjects with either large positive or negative discrepancies should experience high levels of discomfort, relative to high prejudiced subjects with small positive discrepancies. The same would be expected for the Negothe index, except that no relation necessarily should be found between low prejudiced subjects' Total-d scores and their Negothe feelings.

The results for the Discomfort index revealed significant main effects for Total-d, $F(1, 295) = 12.79$, $p < .001$ (B = .058) and prejudice, $F(1, 295) = 10.97$, $p < .001$ (B = .013), and a significant effect for the quadratic aspect of Total-d, $F(1, 294) = 3.88$, $p < .05$. In addition, the interaction between prejudice and the quadratic aspect of Total-d was significant, $F(1, 292) = 3.71$, $p < .05$. Further examination of the findings indicated that high levels of discomfort were experienced by high prejudiced subjects with either large positive or negative discrepancies, relative to high prejudiced subjects with 0 or small positive discrepancy scores. For low prejudiced subjects, Discomfort increased steadily as Total-d increased. Analysis of the Negothe index revealed that the interaction between prejudice and the quadratic aspect of Total-d was the only significant effect, $F(1, 292) = 9.39$, $p < .002$. For high prejudiced subjects, the pattern of the Negothe results was identical to the findings on the Discomfort index. In contrast, low prejudiced subjects with moderate discrepancy scores experienced slightly greater Negothe affect, relative to those with smaller and larger discrepancy scores.

These findings indicate that negative discrepancies, which were experienced almost exclusively by moderately to highly prejudiced subjects, entail the violation of standards involving the other standpoint. Consistent with this interpretation, inclusion of the negative discrepancy data in an analysis of the Negothe index neither attenuated the significance of the Prejudice X Total-d interaction nor changed the pattern of this interaction. Altogether, the findings suggest that some fairly high prejudiced individuals monitor their behaviors to produce responses that are less prejudiced than their personal standards permit. Such discrepancies foster discomfort as well as negative affect directed toward others, just as do high prejudiced subjects' positive discrepancies.

**General Discussion**

The results of the present studies both replicate and extend Devine et al.'s (1991) research by looking at personal standards and the affective consequences of discrepancies from those standards in a number of response domains. Whereas Devine et al. examined responses in the feeling domain only, the present research also examined responses in thought and behavioral domains. Low prejudiced subjects reported nonprejudiced personal standards in all response domains. In contrast, 

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5 Explanations provided by subjects with negative discrepancy scores concerning the targets of their anger were content analyzed. We found that 29.16% of the subjects reported feeling negative toward gay males and 4.16% felt negative toward people who are prejudiced toward gay males. We coded 37.5% of the protocols as miscellaneous, and the remaining 29.16% of the subjects failed to indicate the targets of their anger.

6 Subjects' personal standards, actual responses, discrepancy scores, positive affect, and depressed affect were all reanalyzed using the negative discrepancy data in addition to the 0 and positive discrepancy data. Virtually no differences were found between the results of these analyses and those reported in this article.
the location of high prejudiced subjects' personal standards depended on the response domain. In comparison with feeling and thought standards, they reported relatively nonprejudiced standards only for the relatively overt and controllable behavioral responses. Even so, their standards for behavioral responses were neither as nonprejudiced nor as well internalized as those of the low prejudiced subjects.

Further replicating and extending Devine et al. (1991), discrepancies from personal standards for the low prejudiced subjects led to not only feelings of global discomfort, but also to more specific negative affect directed toward the self (e.g., guilt and self-criticism). As expected, this pattern was true across all response domains. Perhaps the most intriguing finding of the present work concerns high prejudiced subjects' reactions to discrepancies. First, consistent with Devine et al. is the finding that high prejudiced subjects experienced global discomfort in connection with their discrepancies. However, in contrast to our previous findings, they also reported a more specific type of negative affect, one that was directed at others. Thus, rather than feeling guilty and self-critical (directing the negative affect inward) like the low prejudiced subjects, high prejudiced subjects felt angry, irritated, and disgusted with others (directing the negative affect outward). Finally, it is important to note that the pattern of affect experienced by these subjects was the same in all response domains. So, even for the relatively unacceptable and controllable behaviors, high prejudiced subjects show little evidence of having established and internalized nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint.

The distinct types of negative affect experienced by low and high prejudiced subjects in association with their discrepancies are consistent with the notion that their personal standards involve different standpoints. Following Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory, it appears that low prejudiced subjects' standards involve the own standpoint, so that guilt and self-criticism arise when they are transgressed. High prejudiced subjects' standards appear to involve the standpoint of significant others and how these others believe they should respond, so that anger at others is experienced when the standard is transgressed.

**Future Research**

It will be important to examine systematically the consequences of the affect experienced by low and high prejudiced people. Initial research concerning this issue has encouraging implications for low prejudiced subjects' efforts to overcome prejudice. For example, Monteith (1992) demonstrated that feelings of guilt and self-criticism following a prejudice-relevant discrepancy experience can actually facilitate low prejudiced people's prejudice-reduction efforts. However, the results of the present study have less encouraging implications for prejudice reduction among high prejudiced individuals. That is, these subjects' feelings of negativity directed toward others after discrepancy experiences could have the unfortunate outcome of fueling or escalating prejudice. Such other-directed negative affect, then, could decrease the likelihood that high prejudiced people will enter into the prejudice-reduction process.

Nevertheless, there is room for optimism about the potential for change among high prejudiced people. To encourage them to establish and internalize nonprejudiced standards based on the own standpoint, those promoting change may need to emphasize explicitly the fundamental conflict between endorsing egalitarianism and simultaneously holding prejudiced standards. Indeed, Rokeach (1973) argued that change can be brought about by encouraging individuals to confront the inconsistency between their self-conception as fair, tolerant, unselfish, and democratic and their prejudiced values and/or attitudes. According to Rokeach, realizing this inconsistency gives rise to self-dissatisfaction, which in turn motivates cognitive and behavioral change. If Rokeach's method can be applied in a supportive and nonthreatening manner, negative self-directed (rather than other-directed) affect should result from the realization of the contradiction. This affect, then, may provide the motivation among high prejudiced people to reconsider their standards and the impetus for initiating the prejudice-reduction process.

However, the effectiveness of Rokeach's (1973) method rests on two assumptions: (a) that egalitarian values and ideals are self-defining and (b) that these values are more self-defining than specific prejudiced attitudes. To the extent that these assumptions are true for an individual, Rokeach's method may indeed produce change (i.e., a reduction of prejudiced attitudes so as to maintain one's egalitarian self-conception). However, these assumptions may not hold true for all people. In particular, we argue that the veracity of Rokeach's second assumption is likely to depend on the specific function (i.e., psychological need) served by the prejudiced attitude (D. Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956; see also Herek, 1986, 1987).

Rokeach's (1973) self-confrontation technique might be particularly well suited for reducing prejudice when prejudiced attitudes serve an instrumental function. Rather than being tied to the self-concept, such attitudes are based on the costs and benefits that are directly or potentially derived from the attitude object (Abelson & Prentice, 1989). Thus, the nature of the conflict between an attitude that serves an instrumental function and one's more general egalitarian self-conception favors revision of the more specific attitude to be consistent with the global self-image.

When prejudiced attitudes serve a symbolic function, however, Rokeach's (1973) technique may be less effective. Because such attitudes are used as a means of expressing and/or protecting one's sense of self, they are by definition self-relevant (i.e., self-defining). Thus, with regard to prejudiced attitudes serving a symbolic function, Rokeach's method brings two aspects of one's self-concept into conflict. Resolving such an inconsistency (i.e., changing either aspect) would require substantial change and reorganization of the self-concept as a whole. In
general, people resist such changes (Greenwald, 1980; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Swann, 1990). Consequently, rather than dealing with the conflict by changing the prejudiced attitude, people may be more likely to find alternative ways to cope with the conflict (e.g., repress it or rationalize it away).

Another important issue for future research concerns whether people will spontaneously bring their standards to mind and compare them with their prejudiced responses in the "real world." The method used in the present research has little potential for answering this question, because we required subjects to compare their responses with their personal standards. Other research, however, has indicated that at least low prejudiced subjects spontaneously compare their prejudice-related responses with their personal standards when they actually engage in behaviors (rather than imagining behaviors) that violate those standards (Monteith, 1992). Additional research aimed at systematically investigating factors that may affect the likelihood of such comparisons is needed. Situational factors such as who one is with, how many distractions there are, how much time is available for reflection, and so forth, are likely to affect whether actual responses are compared with personal standards. The salience and severity of the transgression also may affect the likelihood of such comparisons. Finally, the accessibility of one's standards should be important: The more accessible one's standards, the more likely one will be to bring them to mind and compare them with one's actual responses.

A final issue for future research concerns the need for longitudinal data to test directly our assumptions regarding the prejudice-reduction process. There is no evidence, for example, that the low prejudiced subjects in this research were, at some previous point, higher in prejudice. Likewise, there is no evidence that low prejudiced individuals without discrepancies did at one time experience discrepancies between their standards and their actual responses. Thus, to fully test and validate our assumptions, longitudinal data are needed.

Conclusions

Although the present research focused on gay males as the stereotyped group, the theoretical rationale for the research maintains that the findings and their implications should hold for other groups for which well-learned stereotypes exist. That is, to the extent that the stereotype is well learned, spontaneous stereotype activation may result in prejudiced responses that conflict with one's personal standards (Devine, 1989; Klinger & Beal, 1992). Supporting this reasoning, the general pattern of results reported herein have also been found when prejudice-related discrepancies concerned Black people (Devine et al., 1991; Zuwerink, Devine, & Cook, 1992) and women (Pressly & Devine, 1992). Thus, regardless of the stereotyped group, the completion of the prejudice-reduction process appears to require learning to inhibit the spontaneous influence of stereotypes.

In sum, the findings across a number of studies suggest that people who abjure prejudiced beliefs but still experience some difficulty inhibiting (especially their less controllable) stereotype-based responses, are truly struggling to achieve change. Experienced failures in their efforts to learn to control their stereotype-based responses threaten their nonprejudiced self-conceptions and thus arouse compunction. We argue, as did Rokeach (1973), that this self-dissatisfaction serves to motivate further efforts to change (see Monteith, 1992). Unfortunately, our data suggest that realizing discrepancies between standards and actual responses is not likely to have this facilitating effect on prejudice reduction for high prejudiced individuals. It may, in fact, only escalate intolerance of the target group. Thus, despite the measure of progress that both society and some individuals have made in overcoming prejudice, the enduring challenge is to devise effective strategies for encouraging prejudice reduction among high prejudiced people.

References


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