

KANTIAN MADNESS: BLIND INTUITIONS, ESSENTIALLY ROGUE OBJECTS, NOMOLOGICAL DEVIANCE, AND CATEGORIAL ANARCHY

Robert Hanna

Independent philosopher/Visiting Research Professor PUC-PR Brazil

Though this be madness, yet there is method in't.

—W. Shakespeare¹

1. Introduction

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that “appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding” (A90/B122) and also that “intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123). This opens up the real possibility of what Kant calls “blind intuitions” (A71/B75), that is, empirical or a priori intuitions that represent objects without involving either empirical or a priori (categorical) concepts, and also, as this text clearly states, the real possibility of what I call *essentially rogue objects*, that is, objectively real objects, veridically represented by empirical or a priori intuitions, that *necessarily* fall outside the scope of either empirical or categorical concepts:

Appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accordance with the conditions of its unity.... [and] in the succession of appearances nothing would present itself that would yield a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this [categorical] concept would be entirely empty, nugatory, and without cognitive significance (*ohne Bedeutung*). Appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition, since intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. (A90–91/B122–123; my underlining)

In short, such objects are *nomologically deviant* and *categorially anarchic*. This means not only (i) that the activities and basic causal powers of essentially rogue objects are necessarily underdetermined by any and all Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic laws that fall under the “dynamical” principles, the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought (A160–2/B199–202, A176–235/B218–87), together with all the physical facts about the past, but also (ii) that essentially rogue objects are essentially non-categorical, in that they are necessarily underdetermined by any and all of the categories, and also (iii) that essentially rogue objects have special, anti-mechanistic, categorially normative properties related to causal self-determination, with direct implications for Kant’s moral philosophy.

Correspondingly, the three-part purpose of this paper is, first, to spell out the basic issues at stake in the contemporary debate about Kant’s conceptualism vs. Kant’s non-conceptualism, second, to identify, compare, and contrast five different kinds of essentially rogue objects described by Kant in his Critical and post-Critical periods, and third, to explore the

¹ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act 2, scene 3, line 206.

systematic significance and two profound implications of their nomological deviance and categorial anarchy for Kant's metaphysics of transcendental idealism, or TI, and for his Critical philosophy more generally.

The systematic significance of the nomological deviance and categorial anarchy of rogue objects is that, as contemporary Kantians, we should *affirm*, and not *reject*, what I have called *the Gap in the B-Deduction*,² and, perhaps surprisingly and even shockingly for traditional Kantians, therefore also affirm, and not reject, the *unsoundness* of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories (hereafter TD), in the B- or 1787 edition of the *First Critique*. Following on from that, the first profound implication is the logical independence of a sound argument for TI *from sensibility*, which was already in place by 1772,³ from another, unsound argument for TI *from the understanding*, which Kant did not finally figure out until 1787, when he built it into the B Deduction. And the second profound implication is a metaphysical opening for a (*liberally, because transcendently idealistic*) *naturalised Kantian theory of freedom*, grounded on his anti-mechanistic philosophy of biology in the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* and on several other important ideas in his post-Critical philosophy.⁴

2. Kant's TI, Kant's Cognitive Dualism, and the Debate about Kant's Conceptualism vs. Kant's Non-Conceptualism

Kant's TI says that the essential forms or structures of the manifestly real world necessarily conform to the a priori forms or structures of the innately specified cognitive capacities or powers of rational human animals, whose basic or proper objects are always spatiotemporal sensory appearances or phenomena, and never non-spatiotemporal, non-sensory, mind-independent things in themselves or noumena. TI also says that the converse classical rationalist or empiricist thesis—i.e., that the rational human mind conforms to its cognitive objects—is not the case.⁵ In other words, the core of Kant's TI is *The Conformity Thesis*. The Conformity Thesis is also variously known as 'Kant's Copernican hypothesis', 'Kant's Copernican revolution', and 'Kant's Copernican turn'. In view of what I called Kant's argument for TI *from sensibility*, The Conformity Thesis, in turn, presupposes Kant's fundamental thesis that the cognitive capacities or powers of rational human animals are *inherently dual, or two-sided*, including:

1. our finite embodied animal capacity for *sensibility* (*Sinnlichkeit*), which is receptively responsive to given actual individuals and their individuality in space and time, via *intuitions* (*Anschauungen*), whether these are delivered to us by sense perception of the external world (outer sense) or by our own subjectively experiential or phenomenally conscious lives (inner sense), and is not always self-consciously (apperceptively) accessible to us, and
2. our discursive intellectual and rational capacity for *understanding* (*Verstand*) which is spontaneously responsive to reasons, judgements, and logic, via *concepts* (*Begriffe*), and is always, at least in principle, self-consciously (apperceptively) accessible to us.

Just to give this fundamental thesis a name, let us call it *Kant's cognitive dualism*.

Now one of the best-known and most widely-quoted texts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is this pithy slogan: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are

² See Hanna (2011b) and also Hanna (2013b).

³ See Hanna (2016c).

⁴ See Hanna (2006a), Hanna (2006b), ch. 8, Hanna (2006c), Hanna (2009), Hanna (2014), Hanna (2016a) and Hanna (2016b), chs 2–3.

⁵ See, e.g., Hanna (2001), ch. 2, and Hanna (2006b), ch. 6.

blind” (A51/B76). That slogan encapsulates what I have called the togetherness principle.⁶ The ‘togetherness’ here is the necessary cognitive complementarity and semantic interdependence of intuitions and concepts, when placed against the backdrop of Kant’s cognitive dualism of the faculties of sensibility and understanding:

Intuition and concepts [...] constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without [intensional] content (*Inhalt*) are empty (*leer*), intuitions without concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise. (A50–1/B74–6)

What does the togetherness principle mean? The famous texts just quoted have led many readers and interpreters of Kant to deny the cognitive and semantic independence of intuitions: intuitions without concepts either simply do not exist or else are wholly meaningless (i.e., neither objectively valid nor rationally intelligible) even if they do exist.⁷ Let us call this the anti-intuitionist interpretation. The anti-intuitionist interpretation, in turn, appears to be supported by at least one other text:

The understanding cognizes everything only through concepts; consequently, however far it goes in its divisions [of lower concepts] it never cognizes through mere intuition but always yet again through lower concepts. (A656/B684)

Superficially, this text can be read as saying that all cognition is conceptualised via the understanding, all the way down, even where “mere intuition” might threaten to count as genuine cognition. But another, equally plausible, and ultimately deeper reading of this text is that it is emphasising how the human understanding is discursive, not intuitive, and as such cannot cognise except through concepts, which does not at all imply that there could not be other, essentially different, kinds of genuine cognition, e.g., “mere intuition”.

In any case, the anti-intuitionist reading cannot be a correct interpretation of the famous texts at A50–1/B74–6, because of what Kant says in these texts:⁸

Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding. (A89/B122; my underlining)

Appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. (A90/B122; my underlining)

The manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of the understanding and independently from it. (B145; my underlining)

⁶ See, e.g., Hanna (2005) and Hanna (2013c), supplement 1. Henry Allison also calls this “the discursivity thesis” in Allison (2004). In 2005, I called it “the togetherness thesis”, because I did not want to imply my acceptance of Allison’s *epistemic* approach to Kant’s transcendental idealism, which, since the early 2000s I have been arguing against (as well as arguing equally against a classical metaphysical noumenal-realist approach, now currently in vogue again, in the prop wash of Analytic metaphysics), in favour of a *cognitive-semantic* approach. See, e.g., Hanna (2001), esp. the Introduction and chs 1–2.

⁷ See, e.g., Sellars (1963), Sellars (1968), McDowell (1994) and Abela (2002).

⁸ To be sure, this interpretive claim has been challenged by Kantian conceptualists. See, e.g., Heidemann (ed.) (2012). For some replies to the challenges, see, e.g., Hanna (2011a) and Hanna (2015), ch. 2.

In order to interpret these three texts correctly, we need to remember Kant’s initial definition of the notion of an appearance or *Erscheinung*: “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*” (A20/B34). Now ‘determination’ for Kant is conceptual specification, hence an “undetermined object” is a conceptually unspecified or unconceptualised object. In this way, even though intuitions without concepts are “blind” and do not include conceptual specification, they are still fully objectively valid cognitions under the objectively valid a priori spatiotemporal forms of intuition, as Kant points out explicitly at A89/B122:

[S]ince an object can appear to us only by means of [...] pure forms of sensibility, i.e., be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are thus pure intuitions that contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective validity.

This point about the cognitive independence of both empirical and a priori intuition from both empirical and pure concepts is also captured in the well-known “progression” (*Stufenleiter*) of representations text at 319–20/B376–7, which isolates intuitions as distinct type of cognition in direct contrast to concepts.

In other words, both empirical and pure intuitions are essentially non-conceptual cognitions, that is, rational human cognitions that are (i) objectively valid over and above empirical or pure concepts, and also (ii) objectively valid without requiring either empirical or pure concepts.

What do I mean by this? For Kant, what comes before the mind in cognition is a conscious “representation” or *Vorstellung*, and every conscious representation has a “content” (*Inbegriff*) (Br, 11:314) or “material” (*das Materiale*) (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24:40). Otherwise put, conscious representational content is conscious, intentional information about objects, which, in turn, can be either conceptual, intuitional, or imaginational. In the case of the conscious representational content of concepts, *Inhalt* is ‘intension’, that is, logically ordered sets of descriptive attributes, which collectively necessarily determine *Umfang* or ‘comprehension’, the cross-possible-worlds extensions of those intensions, that is, all the actual and possible objects falling under those descriptive attributes.⁹ So conceptual representational content is *descriptive information*. In the case of intuitions, conscious representational content is directly referential, sensible, thought-independent, singular, object-dependent, spatiotemporal *demonstrative information*.¹⁰ And in the case of imagination, conscious representational content is directly referential, sensible, thought-independent, singular, *non-object-dependent*, spatiotemporal *pictorial or schematic information*.¹¹

Objective validity is the empirical meaningfulness of any conscious representational content.¹² Now focusing on the case of intuitional content, empirical or pure concepts are neither sufficient nor necessary for empirically meaningful, objectively valid intuitions. Sufficiency would mean that fixing the objectively valid representational contents of all relevant concepts would necessarily fix the objectively valid representational content of any intuition, and necessity would mean that fixing the objectively valid representational content of at least some concepts is required for the determination of the objectively valid representational content of every intuition. I call the thesis that empirical or pure concepts are not sufficient for the determination of the objectively valid representational content of intuitions, the *independence* of intuitions from concepts, and I call the thesis that intuitional, or essentially non-conceptual, cognitions and contents can also exist and be objectively valid in the total absence of concepts and conceptual capacities alike, hence the thesis that that em-

⁹ See Hanna (2001), Sections 1.4 and 3.1.

¹⁰ See Hanna (2001), Sections 1.4, 4.2, and 4.3.

¹¹ See, e.g., Hanna (2001:36–41).

¹² For a detailed analysis of objective validity, see Hanna (2001), Section 2.2.

pirical or pure concepts are not necessary for the determination of the objectively valid representational content of intuitions, the *autonomy* of intuitions from concepts.

It is important to note in this connection that the argument for the necessary underdetermination of empirically meaningful intuitional representations by concepts (= *the NCC independence thesis*, according to which concepts are not sufficient for objectively valid intuitions) does not itself entail the existence of empirically meaningful intuitional representations without any concepts at all (= *the NCC autonomy thesis*, according to which concepts are not necessary for objectively valid intuitions). As I have argued elsewhere, my favoured argument for the NCC independence thesis is an updated version of Kant's famous 'incongruent counterparts' argument, which I call *the Two Hands Argument*;¹³ and the strongest argument for the NCC autonomy thesis appeals to the actual existence of non-human animal cognition and/or non-rational human cognition (e.g., human infant cognition),¹⁴ together with the plausible assumption that rational human animals like us share essentially the same faculty of sensibility with non-human animals and non-rational human animals alike.

The conjunction of the NCC independence thesis and the NCC autonomy thesis then entails the actual (and really possible) existence of objectively valid intuitional representational contents *that are not only necessarily underdetermined by, but also lack, any associated concepts whatsoever, whether empirical or pure*. These objectively valid intuitional representational contents are therefore *essentially non-conceptual contents*.¹⁵

For convenience, let us call these essentially non-conceptual contents, *super-non-conceptual contents*, or super-NCCs. To the extent that rational human animals really do share essentially the same faculty of sensibility with non-human animals and non-rational human animals alike, then rational human animals are capable of super-NCCs too.

In this way, Kant is committed, on the one hand, to the togetherness principle, and *also* on the other hand, to the NCC-independence and NCC-autonomy of intuitions, as well as to the actual and really possible existence of super-NCCs. But now we are in an apparent dilemma. How then can these two apparently contradictory sets of commitments be reconciled?

The answer is that what Kant is actually saying in the famous texts at A50-1/B74-6 is that intuitions and concepts are cognitively complementary and semantically interdependent *for the specific purpose of constituting objectively valid judgements*. This in turn corresponds directly to a special, narrower sense of 'cognition' (*Erkenntnis*) that Kant highlights in the B-edition of the *First Critique*, which means the same as objectively valid judgement (Bxxxvi, Bxxvi n.), as opposed to the wider definition of 'cognition' (*Erkenntnis*) that he had used in the A- or 1781 edition, which means the same as *conscious objective representation* (A320/B376-7). But from this it does not follow that there cannot be 'empty' concepts or 'blind' intuitions outside the special context of objectively valid judgements. 'Empty concept' for Kant does not mean either *bogus concept* or *wholly meaningless concept*: rather it means *concept that is not empirically meaningful or objectively valid*, and for Kant there can be very different sorts of concepts that are not objectively valid, including rationally intelligible concepts of noumenal objects or noumenal subjects, which are meaningful, or informative, only in a *thin* sense that implies at least bare logically self-consistent conceivability, although not in a *thick* sense that also implies empirical meaningfulness.

Similarly, 'blind intuition' for Kant does not mean either *bogus intuition* or *wholly meaningless intuition*: rather it means *concept-autonomously and concept-independently empirically meaningful or objectively valid intuition, i.e., an essentially non-conceptual cognition*. Blind intuitions, which are sensible and empirically meaningful/objectively valid, must be sharply distinguished from 'intellectual intuitions', i.e., the sort of directly referential, *non-sensible, wholly concept-deter-*

¹³ See, e.g., Hanna (2008), and Hanna (2011a).

¹⁴ See, e.g., McLear (2011).

¹⁵ For a fully-detailed, step-by-step argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual contents, encompassing both empirical and also pure intuitions in the Kantian sense, see Hanna (2015), ch. 2.

mined, singular, object-dependent, *non*-spatiotemporal cognitions that only a non-empirical, noumenal, infinite, omniscient being, e.g., God, could have (B72), for whom ‘thinking makes it really so’. Intellectual intuitions are strictly empirically meaningless or not-objectively-valid, and altogether ‘empty’ intuitions for human, finite, sensible cognisers like us, for whom real objects must be independently ‘given’ to the spatiotemporally-constrained faculty of sensibility; and in this way, as ‘empty intuitions’, intellectual intuitions constitute the cognitive-semantic correlate of ‘empty concepts’. So blind intuitions are *not* empty intuitions.

Therefore, despite its being true for Kant, according to the togetherness principle, that intuitions and concepts must be combined with one another in order to generate objectively valid judgements, nevertheless intuitions, or essentially non-conceptual cognitions, can also occur both autonomously from and independently of concepts and still remain empirically meaningful or objectively valid. But the very idea that according to Kant, in rational human cognition and in non-rational human or non-human animal cognition alike there exist objectively valid intuitions that are essentially autonomous from and independent of concepts, has generated a vigorous debate in recent and contemporary Kant-interpretation, with far-reaching implications for interpreting Kant’s TI and the Transcendental Deduction. This is the debate about *Kant’s conceptualism* vs. *Kant’s non-conceptualism*.¹⁶

Unfortunately, even quite apart from their Kantian incarnations, conceptualism and non-conceptualism are defined in non-trivially different ways by different contemporary philosophers of mind.¹⁷ But for the present purposes of my discussion, *conceptualism*, as such, is the two-part thesis

(C1) that all rational human objectively valid representational content is strictly determined by conceptual capacities alone, and

(C2) that non-rational human or non-human animals are not capable of objectively valid representation.

By contrast, *non-conceptualism*, as such, is the three-part thesis

(NC1) that not all rational human objectively valid representational content is determined by conceptual capacities alone,

(NC2) that at least some rational human objectively valid representational contents are both autonomous from and independent of conceptual content and also strictly determined by non-conceptual capacities alone, and

(NC3) that at least some and perhaps most non-rational human or non-human animals are capable of objectively valid representation.

Kant’s conceptualism, in turn, is taken to follow directly from the togetherness principle; and, in addition to asserting both (C1) and (C2), it adds either

(KC1) that the rational human understanding and its innate conceptual capacities not only strictly determine all objectively valid representational content, especially including all objectively valid judgements, but also strictly determine the faculty of sensibility itself and all the intuitions yielded by it (*strong Kantian conceptualism*),¹⁸ or else

¹⁶ See, e.g., McLear (2014) and Schulting (2016).

¹⁷ See, e.g., Bermúdez and Cahen (2012) and Van Cleve (2012).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Sellars (1963), Sellars (1968), McDowell (1994), and Abela (2002).

(KC2) that the rational human understanding and its innate conceptual capacities strictly determine all objectively valid representational content, especially including all objectively valid judgements, as well as all intuitions, although the faculty of sensibility independently provides a necessary condition for objectively valid representation, and some empirical concepts or conceptual activities occur outside the context of fully explicit judgements or self-consciously articulated propositions (*weak Kantian conceptualism*).¹⁹

The most important difference between strong Kantian conceptualism and weak Kantian conceptualism is that whereas the weak variety at least minimally preserves Kant's cognitive dualism of faculties, and also some sort of semi-independent *cognitive role* for intuitions (even though it still rejects the thesis that intuitions have an essentially different kind of *empirically meaningful or objectively valid representational content* from concepts), the strong variety does not countenance any of these concessions to non-conceptualism, and thereby, in effect, strong Kantian conceptualism explanatorily reduces the faculty of sensibility to the faculty of understanding.

In any case, by contrast to either weak or strong Kantian conceptualism, Kant's non-conceptualism is taken to follow from the four texts cited above, together with various other texts and background argumentation; and in addition to asserting (NC1), (NC2), and (NC3), it also adds either

(KNC1) that the human or non-human capacity for sensibility generates empirical intuitions and a priori intuitions that autonomously and independently provide objectively valid representational contents (*weak Kantian non-conceptualism*),²⁰ or else

(KNC2) that the human or non-human capacity for sensibility not only generates empirical intuitions and a priori intuitions that autonomously and independently provide objectively valid representational contents, but *also*, by means of these autonomous and independent, essentially non-conceptual cognitions, the faculty of sensibility contributes directly to the justification of epistemic and practical beliefs, by virtue of inherently normative and proto-rational factors that it builds into the essentially non-conceptual content of intuitions (*strong Kantian non-conceptualism*).²¹

The most important difference between weak Kantian non-conceptualism and strong Kantian non-conceptualism is that whereas the weak variety does not directly address the classical Sellarsian worry, known as The Myth of the Given, that nothing can count as conscious objective representational content unless it occurs within the essentially conceptual domain of "the space of reasons",²² and only thereby can contribute directly to the justification of epistemic and practical beliefs, the strong version of Kantian non-conceptualism explicitly asserts that autonomously and independently objectively valid, essentially non-conceptual intuitions can contribute directly to the justification of epistemic and practical beliefs *without* having to enter the essentially conceptual domain of "the space of reasons". Or in other words, strong Kantian non-conceptualism explicitly deflects and trumps The Myth of the Given.

As several recent Kant-commentators have correctly noted, not only do Kantian conceptualism and Kantian non-conceptualism stake out strikingly different positions on how cor-

¹⁹ See, e.g., Wenzel (2005), Ginsborg (2006), Ginsborg (2008), McDowell (2009), Grüne (2009), Bowman (2011), Land (2011), Bauer (2012), Griffith (2012), Williams (2012), McDowell (2013), Pippin (2013) and Golob (2014).

²⁰ See, e.g., Rohs (2001), Allais (2009), McLear (2015) and Onof and Schulting (2015).

²¹ See, e.g., Hanna (2008), Hanna (2011a), Hanna and Chadha (2011), Laiho (2012) and Tolley (2013).

²² See, e.g., Sellars (1963), McDowell (1994), McDowell (1998) and McDowell (2009).

rectly to interpret Kant's theory of cognition in general and his theory of judgement in particular, they also define strikingly different ways of reading the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a whole. In short, and to put it bluntly, what is at issue here is nothing less than the entire Kantian ball of wax.

So which approach is correct? Currently, and perhaps not too surprisingly, the correct answer to that question remains deeply controversial. What does seem very clear is that if there is to be a resolution to the debate, or at any rate some further fruitful philosophical progress in it, then this will almost certainly come from a fuller appreciation and critical evaluation of how Kantian conceptualism and Kantian non-conceptualism, whether in their strong or weak versions, precisely and differentially affect interpretations of Kant's TI and TD. So in the next section, I want to explore, specifically, how strong Kantian non-conceptualism affects how we should think about TD.

3. Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in TD

An essential feature of Kant's TI, in view of his cognitive dualism, is that TI comes in two logically distinct phases:

1. TI for sensibility/intuitions, and
2. TI for understanding/concepts.

The two phases were also historically distinct. The basic argument for TI with respect to sensibility/intuitions was already in place by the time of the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, and is carried over almost without revision into the Transcendental Aesthetic (hereafter TAe). But it took Kant until 1781 to work out even the initial version of the basic argument for TI with respect to understanding/concepts, i.e., to work out TD; and then it took him another six years, until 1787, to revise and update TD, and get into a format that he regarded as definitive and finalised.

Why did it take Kant so long (i.e., $11 + 6 = 17$ years) to work out, revise, update, and finalise the basic argument for TI with respect to understanding/concepts? The three-part answer, I think, is this:

1. TAe, at least implicitly, in relation to Kant's breakthrough proto-Critical essay, *Directions in Space* (GUGR 2:377–83) establishes the cognitive independence and autonomy of both empirical and a priori intuition from both empirical and pure concepts, and from conceptualisation more generally,²³

hence,

2. the original cognitive-semantic argument that Kant supplies in TAe for the a priori necessity and empirical meaningfulness/objective validity of pure intuition, i.e., the unified formal representations of space and time, *cannot* be soundly used, in and of itself, to show the a priori necessity and objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., the categories,

therefore,

3. another, logically distinct argument-strategy must be found in order to demonstrate the a priori necessity and empirical meaningfulness/objective validity of the categories, and, correspondingly, there is a *prima facie* serious difficulty for Kant about how to demonstrate this.

²³ See Hanna (2016c).

In any case, what all of this entails is that

1. although the a priori necessity and empirical meaningfulness/objective validity of the forms of intuition can be proved directly by means of the inconceivability of empirical intuitions without the pure formal representations of space and time immanently contained within them and presupposed by them, the same argument for a priori necessity and objective validity will *not* work for pure concepts or categories,

therefore

2. there must be a logically distinct argument for the a priori necessity and empirical meaningfulness/objective validity of pure concepts or categories that effectively rules out the possibility of what I shall call *rogue* objects, i.e., unconceptualised objects, i.e., empirically and/or a priori intuited objects that do not fall under the pure concepts or categories.

This logically distinct argument, again, is TD, which *purports* to show that all and only the objects of human sensory intuition necessarily fall under and presuppose the pure concepts of the understanding or categories. This, in turn, is manifestly clear, e.g., in the titles of § 20 and § 24 in the B-Deduction: “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness” (B143) and “On the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general” (B150).

Now given Kant’s TI, the difference between

1. undetermined or unconceptualised objects of empirical intuition, i.e., appearances,

and

2. determined or conceptualised-and-empirically-judged empirical objects, i.e., *determined or conceptualised-and-empirically-judged appearances*

is of crucial importance for natural science and natural scientific knowledge. This is because *only* type-(2) objects are inherently available to natural science, and only the latter will count as *material or physical objects* in the Newtonian sense. Kant’s term-of-art for such objects is *objects of experience* (A93/B126). Correspondingly, whether in its “subjective” or “objective” version, what the A- or 1781 edition version of TD, the A-Deduction, actually shows is that necessarily, for all objects of rational human cognition, *if* any object of empirical intuition is *also* to be a determined/conceptualised material object in the Newtonian natural scientific sense—if any object of empirical intuition is also to be an object of experience—*then* the categories are a priori required for the empirical determination/conceptualisation of those very objects, i.e., the objects of experience, by means of the a priori synthesis of transcendental imagination, under the original synthetic unity of apperception, via the sub-syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition (A95–130).

But, unfortunately for Kant, in light of the meaning of the necessary conditional that captures the actual conclusion of the A-Deduction, the A-Deduction does *not* thereby show that *all* objects of empirical intuition *must* be synthetically determined/conceptualised, and therefore does not thereby show that all objects of empirical intuition must fall under the pure concepts or categories and be objects of experience. For there could still be *some* objects of empirical intuition, or appearances, that *as yet are not so determined/conceptualised* or even *cannot be so determined/conceptualised*, and thereby fall outside the ontological and epistemic scope of Newtonian natural science.

For clarity's sake, I shall call those objects of empirical intuition, or appearances, that are as yet not determined/conceptualised but still *can in principle* be determined/conceptualised, *accidentally rogue objects*, and I shall call those objects of empirical intuition, or appearances, if any exist, that are as yet not determined/conceptualised but also *cannot even in principle* be determined/conceptualised, *essentially rogue objects*. Unless it can be shown by Kant

1. that all the accidentally rogue objects of empirical intuition really do fall under the pure concepts or Categories, and also
2. that there really are no such things as essentially rogue objects of empirical intuition,

then

3. the A Deduction has a logical gap in it, namely, The Gap, and thereby is unsound.

In the B-edition of the *Critique*, and correspondingly in the B-Deduction, Kant takes three steps to close The Gap. The first step is to define an essentially narrower conception of *Erkenntnis* that rules out empty concepts as 'cognitions' in the strict sense of that term, and also thereby guarantees, by stipulation, that all cognitions in the narrow sense are objectively valid empirical judgements, or *judgements of experience* (Bxxvi n.). The second step is to deploy a strong version of TI which entails the *identity* thesis that

$\square(\forall x)(x \text{ is an experience of an object} = x \text{ is an object of experience})$

or at the very least, entails the *necessary equivalence* thesis that

$\square(\forall x)(x \text{ is an experience of an object if and only if } x \text{ is an object of experience}).$

In other words, for Kant, all the experiences of objects, in the form of objectively valid judgements of experience, are either necessarily identical to or necessarily equivalent with all the objects of experience. This experience of objects/objects of experience necessary identity or necessary equivalence thesis is clearly implied by the crucial last sentence of the crucial section § 26, which says that "since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience [i.e., of all experiences of objects], and are thus valid *a priori* of all objects of experience" (B161). But this thesis is also explicitly stated in Kant's philosophical correspondence:

You put the matter quite precisely when you say: "The content (*Inbegriff*) of a representation is itself the object; and the activity of the mind whereby the content of a representation is represented is what is meant by "referring to the object".' (Br 11:314)

Now the first two steps, together with the togetherness thesis, directly entail

1. that 'blind' intuitions are not cognitions (*in the narrow sense of 'cognition'*),

and also

2. that objects of 'blind' intuition are not really objects (*of experience*).

Notice that if the crucial qualifications in parenthesis are left out or overlooked, then it can easily seem that Kant is just a conceptualist, full stop, and not in fact a strong non-conceptualist who is also a deeply conflicted conceptualist. But that is entirely the result of a su-

perfunctory reading of the text, although of course grist for the hermeneutic mills of those who (falsely) believe that Kant is a conceptualist, full stop, e.g., as Gunther writes:

In his slogan, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”, Kant sums up the doctrine of conceptualism.²⁴

But of course, in point of fact, since Kant’s cognitive semantics and metaphysics are the historical-philosophical source of both conceptualism and non-conceptualism alike,²⁵ in that sense he *is a deeply conflicted conceptualist* who is desperately trying to close The Gap in TD that has been opened up by his own *strong non-conceptualism*. So more than a definitional sleight-of-hand is needed to solve the problem.

The third step is explicitly to construe the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, a.k.a ‘figurative synthesis’, a.k.a *synthesis speciosa*, a.k.a ‘the productive imagination’, as the mere ‘effect’ of understanding on sensibility, presupposing the original synthetic unity of apperception, and therefore also presupposing the categories:

Since in us a certain form of sensible intuition *a priori* is fundamental, which rests on the receptivity of the capacity for representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given representations in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think *a priori* synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of *sensible intuition*, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects that can be given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable of intuition *a priori*. This *synthesis* of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, can be called *figurative (synthesis speciosa)* [...]. Yet the figurative synthesis, if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., this transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories, must be called [...] the *transcendental synthesis of the imagination*. *Imagination* is the faculty for representing an object even *without its presence* in intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which it alone can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to *sensibility*; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, *in accordance with the categories*, must be the transcendental synthesis of the *imagination*, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, it is distinct from the intellectual synthesis without any imagination merely through the understanding. Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the *productive* imagination. (B151–2)

The same line of argument was present in the A-Deduction, but not nearly as clearly and explicitly. In any case, this long-winded text clearly and explicitly means that necessarily, for all objects of rational human cognition, for every object of empirical intuition to which the transcendental imagination possibly applies, that is, for every object of empirical intuition that is able to be cognitively processed by means of the figurative synthesis or *synthesis speciosa* or productive synthesis of the imagination, that is, for every object of empirical intuition that we can determinately and uniquely locate in the total space and time of material

²⁴ Gunther (2003:1).

²⁵ See, e.g., Hanna (2005), Hanna (2008) and Hanna (2011a).

natural-scientific objects, via the original synthetic unity of apperception, then it does indeed fall under the categories and is also an object of experience. This line of argument does not quite line up with Kant's thesis that "since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination [...] belongs to *sensibility*" (B151). Nevertheless, if we accept that line of argument, and finesse that text, it suffices to show that necessarily, *all the accidentally rogue objects do indeed fall under the categories*.

Unfortunately for Kant, however, the three steps do not suffice to show that there are no such things as essentially rogue objects. Such objects would be objects of empirical intuition and/or a priori intuition, represented by super-NCCs, that are somehow or another inherently engaged in *nomological deviance and categorial anarchy*. What kinds of inherently nomologically deviant, categorially anarchic objects are we talking about here? In fact, in various places, Kant explicitly allows for at least *five* different kinds of essentially rogue objects:

1. *Incongruent counterparts like my own right and left hands* are objects of outer sense/spatial intuition that cannot be uniquely individuated by empirical concepts and/or schematised pure concepts, or by judgements of experience, and are nomologically deviant with respect to Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic laws (see *Directions of Space, Prolegomena, and What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself In Thinking*).²⁶
2. *Arbitrarily-chosen sequences of successive states in inner sense or phenomenal consciousness, including sensory states, desires, and affects, that is, the temporal stream of consciousness*, are non-mathematisable objects in inner sense or phenomenal consciousness that cannot be uniquely individuated by empirical and/or schematised pure concepts, or by empirical apperceptions = judgements of experience of the form 'I think X' (see the second Analogy of Experience, so-called 'judgements of perception' in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, and the Introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*).
3. The *empirical affinity* of the laws of nature does not automatically follow from the *transcendental affinity* of the laws. This entails the possibility of essential rogueness, nomological deviance, and categorial anarchy in a causal sense = *causal perversity or non-determinism, in the sense of self-determining causal activity via transcendental freedom* (see Section III of the A-Deduction, § 13 of TD, the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*).
4. *Non-inert and non-mechanical, dynamically vitalistic, spontaneous, events, processes, or objects, and all naturally purposive or self-organising objects of empirical intuition, i.e., living organisms—including plants (e.g., blades of grass), animals, and my own living conscious feeling body and its non-self-consciously conscious vital or intentional movements* (see esp. KU, 5:278, where mind is explicitly identified with life)—cannot be uniquely individuated by empirical concepts and/or schematised pure concepts, or by judgements of experience, since these all presuppose that their objects are made of inert and mechanical matter.

²⁶ Incongruent counterparts do indeed preserve causal laws of nature in equilibrium or near-equilibrium thermodynamic systems, hence in classical Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic dynamic systems, under the operation of mirror-reflection, which contemporary physicists sometimes call 'P' (a.k.a enantiomorphy). But incongruent counterparts that are also parts of living organisms, which are *far-from-equilibrium* thermodynamic systems, do *not* have their activities or basic causal powers entailed or otherwise necessitated by Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature under enantiomorphy. The most obvious case of this is the reversal of the arrow of time (see, e.g., Prigogine 1997). Now of course, Kant was not aware of contemporary non-equilibrium thermodynamics. But he had a deep intuitive grasp of the role of spatiotemporal asymmetry in complex thermodynamic systems from the investigations leading up to his *Directions in Space* essay, and a similarly deep intuitive grasp of the basics of non-equilibrium thermodynamics from his pre-Critical studies of weather and winds.

And finally,

5. The *operations of the power of artistic genius and its Ideas of imagination*, i.e., creative human mind, by means of which “nature gives the rule to art” and in turn “gives the rule to nature” (KU, 5:308) cannot be uniquely individuated by empirical concepts and/or schematised pure concepts, or by judgements of experience.

The bottom line, however, is that the B-Deduction soundly shows that *the categories are necessary a priori conditions of the possibility of all and only objects of experience*. But, given the concept-independence and concept-autonomy of super-NCCs and the fivefold possibility of nomologically deviant, categorically anarchic, essentially rogue objects of empirical and/or a priori intuition, then the B-Deduction does not suffice to show that the Categories *must* apply to *all possible objects of the senses or all possible objects of empirical intuition*. Now as we saw above, that is the stated goal of the B-Deduction in §§ 23–4. So the B-Deduction fails, and, as a consequence, TD in both versions thereby fails.

Kant at least implicitly recognises that TD is unsound, which is why he includes the appendix on the regulative use of the Ideas of pure reason in the *First Critique* (A642–68/B670–96). Kant argues there that we must scientifically investigate nature as if we could cognise it according to pure rational principles of the “*homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms*” (A658/B686), that is, the systematic unity of nature, which is a merely regulative or “hypothetical” use of reason, by means of which this “systematic unity (as a mere idea) is only a *projected unity*” (A647/B675). Nevertheless, this projected systematic unity is itself a necessary presupposition of the coherent use of the understanding (A651/B679), and “without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible” (A654/B682). So this is Kant’s proposed solution to the empirical affinity problem.

Correspondingly, in the first Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, and in the Analytic of the Beautiful, the “principle of purposiveness” is a necessary presupposition of the experience of the beautiful, which in turn is the essentially non-conceptual awareness of the apparent conformity of nature to our cognitive faculties: we experience the beautiful as if nature were designed to conform to our cognitive faculties. That is, the experience of the beautiful gives us positive subjective evidence that there are no objects that are essentially at odds with the natural mechanistic laws generated and recognised by our cognitive faculties.

Also in the *Third Critique*, teleological judgements about natural purposes and living organisms are a necessary supplement to classical Newtonian mechanistic physics, since

it is quite certain that we can never come to know the organized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature, let alone explain them; and indeed this is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans even to make such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings. (KU, 5:400)

But in the *Third Critique*, it is also made perfectly explicit that even though it is subjectively necessary for us to judge nature with respect to its beauty and artistic creativity and organismic life/purposiveness in order to effect a systematic cognitive transition *from nature to freedom*, by postulating their unity in a single “supersensible substrate”, i.e., God, who can grasp the teleological unity of freedom and nature via an “intuitive understanding” that “goes from the *synthetically universal* (of the intuition of the whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts” (KU, 5:406–7), nevertheless these are all at most *regulative* and not *constitutive* judgements. For example, hylozoism, or the thesis that living matter ex-

ists, is a strictly noumenal, inherently contradictory (since physical matter under Newtonian presuppositions is defined as essentially inert), and unknowable thesis (KU,5:394–5).

Finally, in the unfinished Transition from the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to the physics project contained in the *Opus postumum*, Kant argues in the so-called Aether Deduction that an a priori *material* condition of the possibility of experience is an actual material correlate of the supersensible substrate, i.e., the dynamic aether, as the unified totality of attractive and repulsive forces, as *the dual causal source of inert matter (natural mechanisms) and also natural purposes (living organisms) alike* (OP, 21:206–33). This is basically a modified Spinozistic move, because it in effect construes physical nature, a unified totality of attractive and repulsive forces, as *God’s externalisation*, hence as *deus sive natura*.

But even if the Aether Deduction *were* sound, and even if it were appended to the B-Deduction, their conjunction is still *not* sufficient to capture the essentially rogue, nomologically deviant, and categorially anarchic objects of intuition represented by super-NCCs—e.g., incongruent counterparts like my right and left hands, the stream of phenomenal consciousness, causal perversity or non-determinism via causally self-determining transcendental freedom, organismic life, and/or creative human mind—and bring them safely under empirical concepts and/or schematised categories, or judgements of experience. So The Gap remains essentially unclosed at the very limits of Kant’s transcendental idealism, like Kierkegaard’s abyss of 70,000 fathoms, providing, from one interpretive point of view, a counsel of deep sceptical despair (*The Gap That Will Not Close*), but also, from another interpretive point of view, as I shall argue in the next section, also a breathtaking new possibility for interpreting Kant’s TI—the possibility of *systematically affirming nomological deviance and categorial anarchy*.

4. The TD Modus Ponens/Modus Tollens Dilemma, Affirming Nomological Deviance and Categorial Anarchy, and Why We are *Phenoumena*

By ‘nomological deviance’, as contextually defined, I mean this:

X is nomologically deviant if and only if X’s activities and basic causal powers *are minimally consistent with, but not entailed or otherwise necessitated by*, the general Newtonian, deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature, together with all the settled physical facts about the past.

In other words, X’s nomological deviance involves *no inconsistency with, or violation of* any general Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature, but instead X’s activities and basic causal powers are merely *necessarily underdetermined* by these laws. The notion of nomological deviance is formulated so as to capture Kant’s deep modal insight in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, that something’s activities can be in conformity with a law, but also not necessarily determined by that law (GMS, 4:397–8). It is also crucial to see that nomological deviance in this sense is *not* the “lawlessness” that is ascribed to transcendental freedom by the Antithesis of the Third Antinomy (A447/B475).

Otherwise put, in modal terms, nomological deviance is the *external negation* of a law-statement L (i.e., “Not necessarily L”), not the *internal negation* of that law-statement (i.e., “Necessarily not L”), which is lawlessness. The Kantian distinction between nomological deviance and lawlessness is in fact one of the fundamental keys to a philosophically adequate solution of the free will problem.²⁷

Granting all that, the real possibility of The Gap That Will Not Close due to the essentially non-conceptual, intuitional representability of nomologically deviant, categorially anarchic, essentially rogue objects, leads directly to a fundamental meta-problem in contem-

²⁷ See, e.g., Hanna (2016a).

porary Kant-interpretation that can be called the TD *modus ponens/modus tollens dilemma*,²⁸ which unfolds like this:

The strong Kantian non-conceptualist argues that

1. if strong Kantian non-conceptualism is true, then some autonomously and independently objectively valid intuitions exist (i.e., some super-NCCs exist),
2. if autonomously and independently objectively valid intuitions (super-NCCs) exist, then there is a serious gap in TD, in the sense that the cognitive scope of the sensibility thereby actually exceeds, or at the very least threatens to exceed, the cognitive scope of the understanding and its pure concepts or categories,

and

3. if there is a serious gap in TD, then TD is unsound,

but

4. strong Kantian non-conceptualism is true,

and finally

5. therefore, TD is unsound.

But the Kantian conceptualist argues that

- 1*. if TD is sound, then there is no gap in TD,
- 2*. if there is no gap in TD, then no autonomously and independently objectively valid intuitions exist (i.e., no super-NCCs exist),
- 3*. if no autonomously and independently objectively valid intuitions (super-NCCs) exist, then strong Kantian non-conceptualism must be false,

but

- 4*. TD is sound,

and finally

- 5*. therefore, strong Kantian non-conceptualism is false.

In other words, the strong Kantian non-conceptualist's *modus ponens* argument is the Kantian conceptualist's *modus tollens* argument, and there appears to be no principled way to resolve the dilemma.

But in fact, there is a royal road out of the TD *modus ponens/modus tollens* dilemma that can be reached simply by seriously asking, and then seriously answering, a leading question about the five different kinds of essentially rogue objects, as follows.

Q: What do incongruent counterparts like my right and left hands, the stream of phenomenal consciousness, causal perversity or non-determinism via causally self-de-

²⁸ See, e.g. Hanna (2011b) and Grüne (2011).

termining transcendental freedom, organismic life including minded animal bodily life, and creative human mind all have in common, apart from their nomological deviance and categorial anarchy?

A: They are all individually necessary conditions of *embodied practical freedom*, or *embodied rational agency*.²⁹ All that needs to be added is *rational human personhood*, and then the 5+1 = 6 necessary conditions, namely:

1. (egocentrically-centered subjectivity in orientable and space and asymmetric time,
2. mechanistically and physicalistically irreducible and necessarily underdetermined phenomenal consciousness,
3. mechanistically and physicalistically irreducible and necessarily underdetermined, causally self-determining transcendental freedom, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition of practical freedom (A533-4/B561-2),
4. mechanistically and physicalistically irreducible and necessarily underdetermined organismic life, including minded animal bodily life,
5. mechanistically and physicalistically irreducible and necessarily underdetermined creative human mind, and
6. rational human personhood,

are also *jointly sufficient* for embodied practical freedom, or rational human agency.

Here are some crucial follow-up points about condition (3) in this list. Transcendental freedom is nomologically deviant *only with respect to Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature* (A533/B561). For, at the same time, transcendently free agents can freely *self-determine* themselves according to the Categorical Imperative or moral law, and both natural non-determinism and natural non-mechanism (hence nomological deviance with respect to Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature) are necessary conditions of such moral self-determination. Notoriously, transcendently free agents like us can *also* freely fail to obey the Categorical Imperative/moral law, and choose or act badly and wrongly; and the “human, all too human” capacity for doing this is what Kant calls “radical evil” in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (RGV, 6:18–33). Therefore, categorically normative laws are essentially different from natural causal laws, in that categorically normative laws both (i) require nomological deviance with respect to Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic causal laws of nature, and also (ii) presuppose transcendental freedom and its practical implications, so that the freedom to obey or disobey categorically normative laws, and moral responsibility for both free obedience and free disobedience alike, are constitutive conditions of their obtaining as laws.

Now back to the entire list of six conditions. In other words, if, instead of regarding the unsoundness of TD as a *problem*, we may simply undertake another Copernican revolution in our Kantian thinking and thereby *accept The Gap as a necessary, or built-in, feature of Kant’s TI*. Then the nomological deviance and categorial anarchy of essentially rogue objects provide for the real possibility of embodied practical freedom and embodied rational human agency, that is, they provide for the real possibility of embodied practical freedom and embodied rational human agency fully *inside* the natural world of appearances, and not *outside* it.

²⁹ See, e.g., Hanna (2006b, ch. 8).

So, in this way, we effectively and inherently *limit* the scope of TD to all and only empirically or categorially *conceptualisable* objects of sensibility, that is, to all and only *objects of experience*, or, to all and only *scientifically naturalisable, physicalistically explicable, naturally mechanised objects*, but also fully admit the real existence of super-NCCs and nomologically deviant, categorially anarchic objects, i.e., essentially rogue objects. In so doing, we thereby *liberate* Kant's TI from the ontological handcuffs of the Two-World substance dualism of essentially mutually exclusive classes of spatiotemporal phenomenal objects and of non-spatiotemporal noumenal objects, and fully embed the noumenal within the phenomenal *as the class of nomologically deviant, categorially anarchic, essentially rogue natural or apparent objects*, especially including ourselves as rational human persons.

As shocking as this terminological proposal may sound to traditional Kantian ears, let us call all and only such nomologically deviant, categorially anarchic, essentially rogue natural or apparent items *phenomena*. This neologism is intended to capture the full metaphysical significance of what I have also called 'negative noumena'.³⁰ Negative noumena are objects of any sort, including manifestly real empirical objects, *just insofar as* they have inherent non-empirical relational or non-relational properties. Or otherwise put, negative noumena are objects *qua* their inherent non-empirical relational or non-relational properties. For example, the non-empirical mathematical fact that John plus Paul plus George plus Ringo equals four Beatles, is a negatively noumenal relational property of The Fab Four: hence John, Paul, George, and Ringo are all negative noumena. So phenomena are 'phenomenal' in that they are apparent, objectively real, and fully belong to the manifestly real world, but also 'noumenal' in the strictly minimalist, negatively noumenal sense *that they have inherent non-empirical relational or non-relational properties and cannot be reduced to fundamentally physical, naturally mechanised facts about that world, that is, they cannot be explanatorily reduced to worldly facts that are fully explicable by means of the natural sciences*.

In other words, phenomena are nothing more and nothing less than *non-scientifically-naturalisable natural phenomena*. So incongruent counterparts like my right and left hands, the stream of phenomenal consciousness, causal perversity or non-determinism via causally self-determining transcendental freedom, organismic life including minded animal bodily life, and creative human mind, are all phenomena.

But even more shockingly, therefore, *you, I and the folks next door are all phenomena*. What I mean is that, precisely by virtue of our phenomenality, we not only fully belong to the manifestly real natural world of appearances, but also fully belong to this manifestly real natural world of appearances *just insofar as we are egocentrically centred in orientable space, embodied conscious rational human living organisms, and capable of non-deterministic transcendental and practical freedom*.

In this connection, moreover, it is crucial to see that our nomological deviance with respect to deterministic, mechanistic natural laws and our categorial anarchy are not only fully *consistent with* categorial normativity and our freely self-legislating the Categorical Imperative, i.e., the moral law: more than that, our nomological deviance and categorial anarchy, egocentrically centred at the embodied source of agency, are also *constitutively necessary* conditions of our freely self-legislating the Categorical Imperative/moral law, according to Kant's anti-mechanistic, source-incompatibilist conception of free agency.³¹

In this way, by taking strong Kantian non-conceptualism seriously, and, correspondingly, by accepting The Gap, by *recognising* the necessary, built-in, character of the unsoundness of TD, by *admitting* the existence of essentially rogue objects, i.e., phenomena, and by affirming their nomological deviance and categorial anarchy, we finally discover the essential condition *for completing Kant's metaphysics of TI and for adequately explaining the unity of nature and freedom*.

³⁰ See Hanna (2006b, pp. 194–8, and 425–33).

³¹ See, e.g., Hanna (2006b), ch. 8, Hanna (2006c), Hanna (2009), Hanna (2014), Hanna (2016a) and Hanna (2016b).

Now does that sound like Kantian madness to you? “Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.”

Indeed, it seems to me that the only possible reason for *resisting* the affirmation of categorical anarchy, at this point in the debate about Kant’s conceptualism vs. Kant’s non-conceptualism, would be a traditional, card-carrying-Kantian adherence to the soundness of TD, as formulated in the B-Deduction. Nevertheless, since a sound but restricted and weakened version of TD, which demonstrates that necessarily, the pure concepts or categories apply to all and only *the objects of experience*, is still available,³² even if the pure concepts or categories do not apply to *all actual and possible objects of the senses*, then I think that the philosophical pay-offs of recognising and affirming the unsoundness of TD, and correspondingly affirming the nomological deviance and categorical anarchy of essentially rogue objects, *massively outweigh* the traditional, card-carrying-Kantian satisfactions of holding onto the soundness of TD, at the cost of making it systematically impossible for a transcendental idealist metaphysics to unify nature and freedom, except by means of a super-strong conceptualist forcing-argument. That way *Hegel’s super-conceptualist madness lies*.³³

But for a true Kantian, and especially for a true contemporary Kantian, isn’t adequately explaining the unity of nature and freedom within a specifically Kantian transcendental idealist framework, thereby avoiding both the Scylla of scientific naturalism and physicalism on the one hand, and the Charybdis of Hegelian absolute idealism, on the other hand,³⁴ *really what it’s all about?*³⁵

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abela, P. (2002) *Kant’s Empirical Realism* (Oxford: Clarendon).

Allais, L. (2009) ‘Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47: 383–413.

Allison, H. (2004) *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Revised and Enlarged Edition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Bauer, N. (2012) ‘A Peculiar Intuition: Kant’s Conceptualist Account of Perception’, *Inquiry* 55: 215–237.

Bermúdez, J. and A. Cahen (2012) ‘Nonconceptual Mental Content’, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2012 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/content-nonconceptual/>.

Bowman, B. (2011) ‘A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19: 417–46.

Ginsborg, H. (2006) ‘Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience’, *European Journal of Philosophy* 14: 349–72.

³² See Hanna (2011b).

³³ See, e.g., Hanna (2013a) and Hanna (2013b).

³⁴ Of course, there are other important philosophical rocks and hard places to avoid as well, e.g., contemporary Analytic metaphysics. See e.g., Hanna (2016d).

³⁵ I am very grateful to John Callanan and Hemmo Laiho for their helpful critical comments on an earlier version of this essay. Of course, they are not in any way responsible for my Kantian madness.

- (2008) ‘Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?’, *Philosophical Studies* 137: 65–77.
- Golob, S. (2014) ‘Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception’, *European Journal of Philosophy* 22: 505–28.
- Griffith, A. (2012) ‘Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*’, *European Journal of Philosophy* 20: 193–222.
- Grüne, S. (2009) *Blinde Anschauung: Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie sinnlicher Synthesis* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann).
- (2011) ‘Is There a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction?’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19: 465–90.
- Gunther, Y. (2003) ‘Introduction’, in Y. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 1–19.
- Hanna, R. (2001) *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2005) ‘Kant and Nonconceptual Content’, *European Journal of Philosophy* 13: 247–90.
- (2006a) ‘Kant, Causation, and Freedom’, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 36: 281–306.
- (2006b) *Kant, Science, and Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2006c) ‘Reason, Freedom, and Kant: An Exchange’, co-author A.W. Moore, *Kantian Review* 11: 112–32.
- (2008) ‘Kantian Non-Conceptualism’, *Philosophical Studies* 137: 41–64.
- (2009) ‘Freedom, Teleology, and Rational Causation’, *Kant Yearbook* 1: 99–142.
- (2011a) ‘Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19: 323–98.
- (2011b) ‘Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19: 397–413.
- (2013a) ‘Forward to Idealism: On Eckart Förster’s The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy’, *Kantian Review* 18: 301–15.
- (2013b) ‘Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content’, *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 34: 1–32.
- (2013c) ‘Kant’s Theory of Judgment’, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/kant-judgment/>.
- (2014) ‘Kant’s Anti-Mechanism and Kantian Anti-Mechanism’, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science* 45. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848614000107>.

– (2015) *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

– (2016a) ‘Are you really free? Yes: a new argument for freedom’, *Oxford University Press Blog*, 6 February 2016. <http://blog.oup.com/2016/02/are-you-really-free/>.

– (2016b) *Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics* (unpublished MS, Winter 2016 version). https://www.academia.edu/22215580/Deep_Freedom_and_Real_Persons_A_Study_in_Metaphysics_Winter_2016_version_comments_welcomed_.

– (2016c) ‘Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism’, in D. Schulting (ed.), *Kantian Non-Conceptualism* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

– (2016d) ‘Kant, the Copernican Devolution, and Real Metaphysics’, in M. Altman (ed.), *The Palgrave Kant Handbook* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Hanna, R. and M. Chadha (2011) ‘Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge’, *European Journal of Philosophy* 19: 184–223.

Heidemann, D. (ed.) (2012) *Kant and Non-Conceptual Content* (London: Routledge).

Laiho, H. (2012) *Perception in Kant's Model of Experience* (Ph.D dissertation, Turku: University of Turku).

Land, T. (2011) ‘Kantian Conceptualism’, in G. Abel et al. (eds), *Rethinking Epistemology* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter), pp. 197–239.

McLear, C. (2011) ‘Kant on Animal Consciousness’, *Philosophers' Imprint*, 11:1–16.

– (2014) ‘The Kantian (Non-)Conceptualism Debate’, *Philosophy Compass* 9: 769–90.

– (2015) ‘Two Kinds of Unity in the *Critique of Pure Reason*’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 53: 79–110.

McDowell, J. (1994) *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

– (1998) ‘Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality’, *Journal of Philosophy* 95: 431–91.

– (2009) ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, in J. McDowell, *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 256–72.

– (2013) ‘The Myth of the Mind as Detached’, in J. Schear (ed.), *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate* (London: Routledge), pp. 41–58.

Onof, C. and D. Schulting (2015) ‘Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition: On the Note to B160 in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*’, *Philosophical Review* 124:1–58.

Pippin, R. (2013) ‘What is ‘Conceptual Activity’?’, in J. Schear (ed.), *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate* (London: Routledge), pp. 91–109.

Prigogine, I. (1997) *The End of Certainty* (New York: The Free Press).

Rohs, P. (2001) ‘Bezieht sich nach Kant die Anschauung unmittelbar auf Gegenstände?’, in R.-P. Horstmann et al. (eds) *Akten des 9. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Bd. II (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter), pp. 214–28.

Schulking, D. (ed.) (2016) *Kantian Nonconceptualism* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Sellars, W. (1963) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in W. Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (New York: Humanities Press), pp. 127–96.

— (1968) *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Tolley, C. (2013) ‘The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach’, *Kantian Review* 18: 107–36.

Van Cleve, J. (2012) ‘Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States’, *Philosophical Perspectives* 26: 411–30.

Wenzel, C. (2005) ‘Spielen nach Kant die Kategorien schon bei der Wahrnehmung eine Rolle?’, *Kant-Studien* 96: 407–26.

Williams, J. (2012) ‘How Conceptually-Guided are Kantian Intuitions?’, *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 29: 57–78.