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July 8, 2010

The World Bank Board of Executive Directors 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433

Dear World Bank Executive Director:

I am writing to request your intervention in the case of Mr. Yonas Biru, a former World Bank staff member who was terminated on June 17, 2009 after making protected disclosures about data fabrication involving China, India and 21 African countries and racial discrimination in the World Bank's International Comparison Program (ICP). Specifically, Mr. Biru would like the Board of Directors to direct the Bank to engage in binding external arbitration, based on consensus selection of arbitrators and shared costs in order to resolve his pending termination case.

Mr. Biru believes that external arbitration is necessary at this stage, given the World Bank Administrative Tribunal's prior handling of his racial discrimination and retaliation complaints. In reviewing these previous claims, the Tribunal violated Mr. Biru's due process rights<sup>2</sup> and failed to hold the Bank accountable for systematic and significant misrepresentations of fact, as outlined in brief below.

### **Racial Discrimination Complaint**

Mr. Biru joined the Bank's Development Economics Data Group (DECDG) in 1993 as a consultant. In 1999, he received a term appointment as a senior economist (grade GG)<sup>3</sup> and in 2001 he was appointed team leader for the ICP.<sup>4</sup> Prior to making his disclosures, Mr. Biru received outstanding performance reviews for seven years and had the second highest evaluation ratings compared to DECDG staff at the same level.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mr. Biru submitted a detailed report about the data fabrication to the Bank's Chief Ethics Officer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For example, Mr. Biru was denied timely access to critical documents that the Bank submitted to the Tribunal as supporting evidence. A portion of the documents were eventually released to Mr. Biru after the Tribunal's hearings, denying him the opportunity to cross examine the Bank's witnesses about information contained in those documents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Mr. Biru holds a Ph.D in economics from George Mason University.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The ICP is a worldwide statistical partnership designed to collect comparative price data and compile detailed expenditure values of countries' gross domestic products (GDP), and to estimate purchasing power parities (PPP) of the world's currencies.

In February 2007, Mr. Biru filed a racial discrimination complaint with the Bank's Appeals Committee, in which he alleged that his supervisors denied him equal access to promotions and career development opportunities because of his race and national origin (he is a black Afro-descendant from Ethiopia). During his career at the Bank, Mr. Biru was repeatedly promised promotions, only to be denied them later. After resurrecting the ICP project as team leader (which was failing when he inherited it) and turning it into "the world's largest statistical program," Mr. Biru was told by his director that the project had become "too big" and too "high profile" for him and a new global manager was hired whose Terms of Reference were nearly identical to his own. This manager, who is white, was not hired through the Bank's normal HR procedures. Moreover, the manager confessed that the reason that Mr. Biru was not promoted, despite his excellent work, was because "Europeans are not used to seeing a black man in a position of power."

It should be noted that there is a virtual absence of black professionals in the department where Mr. Biru worked. In 1995, during a departmental reorganization led by the Director of DECDG (one of the chief discriminators and retaliators in Mr. Biru's case), 60% of black staff members in the department were asked to leave. The chart below compares this redundancy rate to other groups. Similarly, none of the seven black staff members who worked at DECDG under the same director between 1996 and 2009 was ever promoted. Over the same period, the Director promoted 17 non-black staff members by at least one pay grade, as shown below:

Table 1: Nationality of staff and consultants declared redundant in DECDG in 1995 and staff promoted in DECDG between 1996 and 2009<sup>5</sup>

Race/Origin	Percentage	Percentage Promoted
of Staff members	declared	in DECDG Between
	redundant in	1996 and 2009
	DECDG 1995	
Black	60%	0%
Asia	22%	30%
CIS and East Europe	17%	50%
Iran	0%	50%
White Western	0%	50%
Europe		
White North America	0%	60%

At the time that Mr. Biru submitted his racial discrimination claim, he was the only black staff member in DECDG at grade GG, a senior professional level. There was no black person at GF. Having reviewed the above, as well as evidence specific to Mr. Biru's case, the Tribunal concluded: "Considering the record, the Tribunal does not see any pattern of prejudice" in the department.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This chart excludes North Africa, the Middle East and South America because of insufficient data (less than 2 staff members from each region). Western Europe includes the UK. Iran is shown because the director is Iranian. Also, absolute numbers are not included as they are different for different time periods.

Last year, our organization, the Government Accountability Project (GAP),<sup>6</sup> released a report that supports Mr. Biru's racial discrimination claim. Our investigation found that Bank studies uniformly show that Sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and black American staff members are disadvantaged, relative to other staff, when they pursue careers at the Bank. For example, as of 2003, the latest year for which statistics were available,<sup>7</sup> black World Bank employees were 36.3% less likely to hold a managerial grade relative to equally qualified non-black employees.

# **Appeals Committee**

In 2008, The Appeals Committee issued its decision in Mr. Biru's case, in which it found "no business reason" to explain some of the actions taken by Mr. Biru's line supervisor. This caused the Committee to question whether Mr. Biru's supervisor "harbored personal animosity toward the Appellant." The Committee also found that Mr. Biru's managers "poorly managed the work environment on the ICP Team" and "placed the Appellant in a difficult situation."

The Committee, however, rejected Mr. Biru's racial discrimination case. In doing so, it stated that it "recognized that the Appellant, as a tenured, talented and hard-working staff member, grew dissatisfied over the years when his significant contributions to the ICP program went without as much public recognition as he believed was appropriate ... the Panel found that as much as the Appellant may have earned the opportunity to perform the ICP/GM [Global Manager] functions, he was not *entitled* to have the function assigned to him at any particular time." (*original emphasis*)

Regarding Mr. Biru's claim that the Bank retaliated against him after he filed his discrimination complaint, the Panel ruled that it "could not conclude that the Appellant's managers retaliated against him. At the same time, the Panel was not convinced that they did not retaliate against him." (original emphasis) The Panel strongly recommended that "the Bank take immediate measures" to provide Mr. Biru "with a healthy work environment" and "immediately enter into binding mediation." The Bank failed to follow any of these recommendations.

In its decision, the Panel stated that because "the burden of proof to establish retaliation rests with the Appellant, the Panel therefore could not conclude that the Appellant's managers retaliated against him." It should be noted that this onerous burden of proof standard on a complainant favors the institution and is inconsistent with international

<sup>6</sup> GAP is a U.S. nonprofit public interest group that promotes accountability by protecting whistleblowers, advancing occupational free speech, and empowering citizen activists. GAP's report is available at <a href="http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/RDWB.pdf">http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/RDWB.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The fact that these studies are not publicly available, that apparently more recent analyses do not exist, and that the Bank does not make available the racial/ethnic profile of its staff raises serious questions about the Bank's oft-stated commitment to "diversity."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ms. Shaida Badiee – Mr. Biru's director and one of the chief retaliators in his case – was one of the chairs of the Appeals Committee before and during the pendency of Mr. Biru's case.

discrimination jurisprudence<sup>9</sup> and with the Bank's whistleblower protection policy, which was passed several months after the Panel issued its decision. World Bank Staff Rule 8.02 states that "where a staff member has made a prima facie case of retaliation for an activity protected by this Rule (i.e., by showing that the staff member reported suspected misconduct under this Rule and has a reasonable belief that such report was a contributing factor in a subsequent adverse employment action), the burden of proof shall shift to Management to show – by clear and convincing evidence – that the same employment action would have been taken absent the staff member's protected activity." (emphasis added, para. 3.01)

If this burden shifting framework had applied in Mr. Biru's case, the burden would have shifted to Management to show that they had legitimate, non-retaliatory business reasons for the actions taken, which he alleges included: 1) refusing to provide him with meaningful terms of reference (TOR); 2) undermining his authority with his staff including denying him access to data and data processing software; 3) excluding him from important projects; 4) humiliating him in front of his colleagues; 5) sabotaging the tasks he was managing and 6) falsely assigning credit for his work to a different employee. <sup>10</sup> Management did not meet the hurdle to refute Mr. Biru's evidence and therefore should not have prevailed in this case.

According to Mr. Biru's sources, the Committee wrote a confidential letter to the Vice President of HR in which they said that they didn't rule in Mr. Biru's favor because they didn't want to set a "precedent." In this letter, which the Bank has failed to release, the Committee reportedly recommended that the VP take immediate administrative action on Mr. Biru's behalf. The Bank never denied the existence or content of this memo, but refused to release it claiming that it had "no relevance" to the case before the Tribunal. <sup>11</sup>

### The World Bank Administrative Tribunal

The World Bank Administrative Tribunal (AT) was originally scheduled to review Mr. Biru's case in June 2009. However, the Bank refused to release critical information that the Tribunal needed for its deliberation, which forced the AT to postpone the hearing. Mr. Biru was informed of this postponement two weeks after his manager recommended his termination in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities (described below) and a week before his termination memo was issued. The Tribunal application was finally heard in October 2009, and its ruling was not issued until March 2010. The Tribunal normally issues its decisions within four to six weeks after the hearing. No explanation

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In the US and EU, circumstantial evidence of discrimination is enough to shift the burden of proof to the employer. In the burden shifting framework, fairness obliges the institution to present evidence to establish that its decision was legitimate and that it was not a pretext, once the complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For example, the Bank falsely credited the former Global Manager for guiding methodological innovations and their implementation in all regions of the world. All the consultants who took part in ICP methodological development and implementation submitted written testimonials confirming that it was Mr. Biru who managed and guided their assignments and that the former Global Manager had nothing to do with their work.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Mr. Biru would appreciate any help that you can provide in obtaining this memo.

was given for the inordinate delay in releasing Mr. Biru's decision. In the meantime, Mr. Biru had been terminated.

GAP's evaluation of racial discrimination at the World Bank found that in the past 12 years the Tribunal has reviewed 21 cases of racial discrimination (not including Mr. Biru's), but failed to substantiate a single case. That record stands despite internal Bank studies that have repeatedly found racial discrimination to be prevalent within the institution. Given this record, it is not surprising that the AT failed to find racial discrimination in Mr. Biru's case.

In order to dismiss the racial discrimination charge, the Tribunal made three inexplicable judgments. First, it stated that the ultimate decision in the appointment of the ICP Global Manager position rested with the ICP Executive Board, which consisted of members from other Intergovernmental Organizations, rather than with his director. But the director's testimony before the Tribunal directly contradicted this, as she admitted that she only *consulted* with the Board and that all staffing decisions were ultimately hers, not the Board's. Furthermore, one of the Bank's HR managers and two Board members testified before the Tribunal confirming (i) the Board has no authority to appoint the Global Manager and (ii) the responsibility squarely rests with the Bank.

Second, in October 2006, the Global Manager (Mr. Vogel) retired, but was retained as a short term consultant. Contrary to normal Bank practice whereby consultants play a support role, Mr. Vogel was allowed to keep his title as Global Manager. However, since Bank rules would not allow him to perform managerial duties, Mr. Biru managed the day-to-day coordination of the program, supervised staff and administered the ICP trust fund. There was no business reason to maintain Mr. Vogel as Global Manager when he was not managing anything. Mr. Biru established this with numerous supporting documents. However, the Tribunal paid no attention to any of the documents, nor to the testimonies of Bank officials who established at the Appeals hearing that as a consultant, Mr. Vogel was not allowed to manage fund or staff.

Third, the Tribunal failed to make the Bank accountable for giving starkly conflicting testimonies and for submitting scores of false statements during the course of the proceedings. Several substantive and material examples are described below:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In its ruling, the AT stated that "the Tribunal concludes that it is not in dispute that the Applicant made an important contribution to the ICP. His good performance has been acknowledged by the Bank in his OPES. But performance alone does not entitle a staff member to a particular title or promotion." (para. 73) <sup>13</sup> In an internal email exchange that Mr. Biru was copied on by mistake, the Tribunal questioned the credibility of this supervisor, while ultimately relying on her as credible witness to rule against Mr. Biru. This email was sent by the Executive Secretary of the Tribunal, who is supposed to administer the Tribunal's proceedings, to three judges residing over Mr. Biru's case. The email, which was recalled, included a set of questions that the Secretary and another lawyer in his office drafted. This email showed that the Tribunal Secretary – who is appointed by the Bank's president – is involved in reviewing documents, analyzing arguments advanced by the Bank and Applicants, and preparing drafts for the judges. The involvement of Bank employed lawyers in the analysis and drafting of opinions and questions puts into question the independence of the Tribunal's decision-making process, which, according to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, is supposed to function independently of the management of the Bank Group.

Table 2: Examples of Conflicting Statements Made by Bank Managers in Mr. Biru's Case

ISSUE	Sworn Statements or Signed Submissions by Senior HR and DECDG Officials		
	Appeals Hearing (November 8, 2007)	Tribunal Hearing (October 5, 2009)	
Who appoints the Global Manager for ICP, The Bank or the external ICP Executive Board?	The Board - "Filling the ICP Global Manager function is exclusively within the authority of the external ICP Executive Board."  ~Ms. Badiee and Mr. Belkindas (Respondent's written submission to Appeals Panel, Sept. 21, 2007)	The Bank - Filling the ICP Global Manager is exclusively the prerogative of the Bank. "The role of the ICP Board is limited to providing input, but its recommendations have no relevance with the impugned administrative decisions."  ~ Ms. Badiee and Mr. Belkindas (Respondent's Post-hearing briefs submitted to the AT Nov. 3, 2009)	
	The Board – "As far as the Global Manager function is concerned, who should perform the function, for how long and in what format, is the decision of the Board" "The decision to appoint Global manager lied with the Executive Board."  ~Badiee and Belkindas (Appeals Hearing Transcript p. 40 and 43)	The Bank – With respect to the Global Manager decision, "any consultation with the Board regarding staffing or functions or anything to do with the World Bank, either World Bank budget or World Bank staff of World Bank offices and so on, were input to me. And I was the decision-maker."  ~Badiee (Tribunal transcript p. 257)	
	The Board – I proposed to the Board for Yonas to become Global Manager, at the February 2007 meeting, but the Board wanted to continue with Fred. "I'm sorry, it broke my heart, the result, too. But, you know, and I wish the result was different."  ~ Badiee's sworn testimony (Appeals Transcript, p. 61)	The Bank – At the Tribunal hearing the Bank's counsel asked Ms. Badiee: "So you had taken an independent decision [independent of the Board]So it's not quite accurate when, in responding to this question of promise and promises and assurances, when you say, 'Well, I kept my promise. My promise was to submit your name and I did submit your name." Ms. Badiee replied her promise was to "Consult with the Board." The bank's counsel continued: "[you] consulted with the Board, but not to get at your decision" She responded: "Exactly." ~ Tribunal Transcript p. 258	
<b>OPE Assessments:</b> In 6 years the lowest rating Mr. Biru received in (i) program management, (ii)	Valid OPE- "Every OPE that you see that [Yonas] has in the records is written or signed by me. So, I'm one	Not Valid OPE- We "regret" giving him high ratings. His OPEs were "overinflated" and "had the	

partnership building and (iii)	of his big fans and, you know a big	unintended consequence of feeding
leading methodological studies	supporter of what he has achieved	into his megalomaniacal view of his
was "superior." In total he had 9	and, you know, what he has done."	performance and the resultant sense
"superior" and 8 "outstanding"		of entitlement to the Global Manager
ratings.	~Badiee (Appeal Transcript p. 57)	position."
		~ Badiee's and Belkindas' written submission to Tribunal (Nov. 3,'09)
Did the Bank follow Bank rules	No, the appointment did not go	Yes, Mr. Vogel was selected in 2002
	through the Bank's formal clearance	following "typical Bank recruitment
and guidelines in the recruitment	process and was not cleared by the	process." ~ Patricia Neil (HR),
of the former Global Manager?	relevant Sector Board. "With the	(Tribunal Transcript p. 57)
	understanding ICP Board is	(11tounai 11anscripi p. 57)
	selecting the Global Manager we	"Absolutely, AbsolutelyWe
	asked HR if we can circumvent the	followed Bank rules both in 2002 and
	Sector Board and they said fine"	2006.'"~ Badiee (Tribunal
	Sector Board and they said fine	Transcript p. 228)
	~ Belkindas (Appeals Transcript p.	Transcript p. 220)
	~ Beikinaus (Appeaus Transcripi p.   114)	
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Did Mr. Vogel face	Yes, At the February 2007 Board	No, Mr. Vogel did not face
administrative constraints to	meeting "[Ms. Badiee] explained	administrative constraints. "Since
undertake his Global Manager	that as a consultant Fred does not	Global Manager is functional title,
functions as a consultant?	have the same level of	and because Mr. Vogel continued to
	administrative discretion as he had	perform that <i>function</i> , he continued
	as a full-time staff member. He can	to use the Global Manager
	only work part time for up to 150	functional title" as a consultant.
	days per fiscal year, for example,	
	and he can not sign documents of a	~ Badiee and Belkindas (written
	legal or financial nature."	submission to the Tribunal, Emphasis
	D 114	added)
	~ Board Minutes issued on 07/20/07	
	Yes, "All the day-to-day	
	coordination of the ICP work and	
	the Global Office team was	
	basically taken over by Yonas"	
	when Mr. Vogel's status changed	
	from staff to consultant.	
	~ Badiee (see Appeals Transcript	
	page 38)	
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Despite this, the Tribunal concluded that Mr. Biru did not provide "any convincing reasons why the Tribunal should disregard the testimony of the Manager and the Director of DECDG." The Tribunal not only allowed instances of false testimony and written submissions to stand, but rendered them material by basing its judgment on them as if they constituted valid evidence. Material statements that were shown to be false were not stricken or rejected but instead became part of the record and the basis of the logic underlying the judgment. <sup>14</sup> In this case, the Tribunal also: (i) erroneously blamed Mr.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Upon request, Mr. Biru can provide additional examples of false information submitted by the Bank that was inappropriately accepted by the Tribunal. For example, the Bank falsely claimed (and the Tribunal

Biru for rejecting the Bank's alleged overtures to go to mediation, ignoring the written statement by the Mediation Office proving that the Bank was the party that refused mediation, (ii) wrongly blamed Mr. Biru for rejecting the Bank's overtures to reassign him elsewhere, even after the Bank's HR manager testified before the Tribunal that Mr. Biru was never presented with reassignment, and (iii) dismissed evidence submitted by Mr. Biru, such as an evaluation prepared by an expert witness on work place abuse, which explained the emotional and psychological toll that he suffered as a result of the Bank's failure to remedy the retaliation in his case.

## Whistleblowing

In March 2008 – well before the Tribunal reviewed Mr. Biru's racial discrimination claim – Mr. Biru sent an email to the Acting Senior Vice President in which he disclosed issues related to data manipulation in the ICP Global Report, which he believed put the credibility of the Bank at risk. Specifically, he maintained that the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GCFC) data for 21 countries in Africa were fabricated by another economist. In April he sent two additional emails to the Senior Vice President in which he explained his concerns in more depth. <sup>15</sup> In addition Mr. Biru maintained the same economist tried to falsify China's and India's ICP data using data fabrication software but his attempt was rejected by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In support of this allegation Mr. Biru submitted a written and signed testimony from the former manager of ICP-Asia at ADB.

Mr. Biru's manager subsequently issued a negative performance review (OPE) for him. That review included several statements that appeared to be made in retaliation for his whistleblowing, such as: "A number of e-mails were sent out from [the Applicant] to the team and wider audience accusing team members of fabricating data, which was very demoralizing for the team..." The people Mr. Biru copied on his email were the Ombudsman and the Bank's Chief Ethics Officer.

In December 2008, Mr. Biru sent an email to his manager and to the people involved in the data production in which he again questioned the published data. Two days later, he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), eventually leading to his termination. In this PIP he was primarily critiqued for communications that "singled out individuals or groups of individuals, impugning their professionalism, competence or integrity." The PIP also stated that it was "non-productive and disruptive to share with staff and/or external parties your claims against management." This comment was made

wrote in its decision) that Mr. Biru was hired in 1995 by the alleged discriminators in his case. In reality, Mr. Biru was recruited in 1993 as an ICP consultant. He was not recruited by the alleged discriminators – who were not even in the Department at that time – but by two other managers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> After Mr. Biru's OPE was issued, two eminent professors, both of whom were members of the ICP Technical Advisory Group, published an article echoing the same concerns that Mr. Biru raised. Mr. Martin Ravallion, the head of the Bank's poverty work, also validated Mr. Biru's data concerns. As a result, a section of the report had to be rewritten, data errors in a number of tables were corrected, and thousands of hard copies of the report were destroyed and new copies were printed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Because Mr. Biru had an appeal pending before the Tribunal, he was not allowed to contest his OPE rating to senior managers and HR.

in response to Mr. Biru's decision to ask a number of experts and regional agencies to send him written testimonials in support of his case.

The reasons ultimately used to terminate Mr. Biru clearly lacked merit. For example, some of the reasons given for his termination included:

- He prepared two papers on a topic that required complex data work and analysis, rather than one. Mr. Biru separated his report from the complex data analysis and produced two papers without requiring extra resources. The Bank used this as a reason to terminate him.
- He failed to meet the original December 31 deadline on a project completion report. Mr. Biru's managers ignored the fact that he had been granted an extension until January (which he met) to submit this report, because the consultant whose work and project were to be evaluated was not able to complete the project until January. In other words, Mr. Biru was expected to prepare a project completion report for a project that was not yet completed.
- He was instructed to produce a synthesis of six papers by March 2. At the same time, he was told that he would not receive the reports to be summarized until April 15. Mr. Biru asked for an extension of the March 2 deadline on the grounds that he could not prepare a synthesis of six papers six weeks before he was scheduled to receive the first drafts from the consultants. One reason cited for his termination was his failure to meet the impossible March 2 deadline despite the existence of a written document granting him an extension.

Mr. Biru believes that his termination represents a breach of legal, moral, and professional responsibility by the Bank, as well as a violation of the Bank's "zero tolerance" policy for racial discrimination.

#### **External Arbitration Request**

Mr. Biru can challenge his termination case through the Bank's justice system. However, he has lost all faith in that process and believes that pursuing a case through these channels will not lead to his reinstatement. This belief is supported by GAP's research, as we found that of the complainants who *successfully* challenged termination on due process or substantive grounds before the AT between 2000 and March 30, 2008, less than 15 percent were actually re-instated. The remaining 85 percent were dismissed from institutional employment despite prevailing.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> It should be noted that the failure of the Bank to reinstate a vindicated employee was just successfully challenged in a national tribunal. In June a Bangladesh District judge ruled that the termination of Ms. Ismet Zerin Khan, a former World Bank external affairs officer who was terminated in 2001, was "illegal, mala fide, arbitrary and that the Plaintiff is entitled to be reinstated in her post and get all arrear salaries and benefits." The Judge ruled that "the World Bank as an employer doesn't enjoy unfettered power regarding any suspension or dismissal of its employee and must follow rules contained in the Staff Manual of the bank." (emphasis added)

Mr. Biru believes that his case should be resolved through external arbitration, which can reduce some of the delay, expense, <sup>18</sup> inefficiency, and hostility associated with litigation. Labor-management arbitrations have been highly effective when the parties share costs and select the decision-maker by mutual consent through a "strike" process. It can provide an independent, fair resolution of whistleblower disputes, while circumventing the issue of whether Intergovernmental Organizations waive their immunity from national legal systems. As a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) best practice, it was adopted as a potential resolution measure by the African Development Bank in January, 2007. Moreover, the U.S. executive director to the World Bank is required by U.S. law to promote "access to independent adjudicative bodies, including external arbitration based on consensus selection and shared costs," for whistleblower cases. <sup>19</sup>

In addition to external arbitration in his termination case, Mr. Biru is also requesting an independent review of his racial discrimination claim. Mr. Biru is currently preparing a website that records in great detail the racial discrimination, retaliation, harassment and unjust termination that he experienced as a World Bank staff member. He is willing to present this evidence with independent, external reviewers, assuming that the Bank agrees to such an investigation.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. We look forward to a response at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Bea Edwards

**International Program Director** 

Bedwa Church

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> External arbitration could reduce expenses for Mr. Biru and the Bank. Mr. Biru spent more than US \$80,000 on his first Tribunal case. Regarding the Bank's expenses, a survey by the Center for Public Resources found that its 652 reporting companies saved on average more than US\$300,000 each by implementing such alternative dispute resolution programs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Sec. 1505 (a)(11) of the 2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which became Public Law 109-102 on November 14, 2005.