THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN REDISTRIBUTIONAL POLICY DISCOURSE: EVIDENCE FROM LIVING WAGE CAMPAIGNS IN CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO

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ABSTRACT: The existing urban politics literature is insufficient in explaining why redistributational policymaking flourishes in some contexts and not in others. This article attempts to move beyond the structure versus agency dichotomy and uses a close comparison of the living wage movements in Chicago and San Francisco, not only to argue that “history matters,” but to illustrate how historical narratives are actively (re)constructed by social actors to further their agenda(s). Although each city started with similar campaigns to enact basic “contractor-only” forms of living wage laws, by the end of a 10-year period the resulting level of change in San Francisco stood in stark contrast to Chicago, where advocates failed to extend the living wage to “big box” retailers. Using a brief history of economic restructuring and an empirical assessment of the business climate valence of each city’s political regime, this article finds that economic and political factors jointly structure the depth and pace of policy change by setting the terms of debate within redistributational policy discourses. This joint determination occurs because “problem frames” are path-dependent and because inherited political structures, such as the availability of binding referendum, allocate agenda-setting power and opportunities to challenge entrenched interests.

The rapid spread of the Occupy Wall Street movement from a localized protest in New York City’s Zuccotti Park to over 300 cities in three months sparked a host of commentary among pundits, academics, and political elites, resuscitating a long-missing national dialogue over the issue of income inequality (Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Weir, Wolman, & Swansstrom, 2005). Federal policy intervention into the labor market has been largely absent, but the past 20 years has witnessed a resurgence of redistributational interventions at the local scale that specifically aim to regulate the labor market in order to raise wages and improve standards for low-skilled workers, and ultimately address inequality. Whereas the movement to pass living wage laws is the most prominent and well-studied example (see Luce, 2004; Martin, 2001; Pollin & Luce, 1998; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Lester, 2011), local labor market interventions also include grassroots campaigns for community benefits agreements (CBAs) and the nascent “regional equity” movement (Bollens, 2002; Pastor, Benner, & Matsuoka, 2009). Although such policies vary significantly from place to place in their coverage and impact, they are unambiguously redistributive, and therefore represent a challenge to the dominant form of urban economic policy making, which tends to focus on entrepreneurial strategies that attract mobile capital.1 However, pursuing redistributational focused labor market interventions at the local—as opposed to state or national—scale raises some hard questions for policymakers. First, how deep an impact can cities have on the problems of working poverty and wage inequality? Second, why are far reaching labor market interventions undertaken by some cities, while efforts in some places fail, or stall after an initial foray?

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While the extent and capacity of local governments to engage in redistributional policymaking has been studied for decades (Peterson, 1981; Rast, 1999; Savitch & Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993), the dominant models offered in the urban politics literature still lack the explanatory nuance to assess why policies such as the living wage are enacted in some contexts and not others. This article builds upon the recent attention given to historical analyses in urban politics (see Rast, 2012) and offers a hypothesis that synthesizes the dominant explanatory factors—economic strength and political structure—in determining the redistributional scope available to urban policy makers. Specifically, this article uses a close comparison of the living wage movements in Chicago and San Francisco to argue not only that “history matters,” but to illustrate how historical narratives are actively (re)constructed by social actors to further their agenda(s). Although each city started with similar campaigns to enact basic “contractor-only” forms of living wage laws, by the end of a 10-year period the resulting level of change in San Francisco—which eventually included the nation’s highest minimum wage, paid sick leave, and universal health access for all workers—stood in stark contrast to Chicago, where the Mayor vetoed the extension of the living wage to thousands of workers at “big-box” retailers. Using the urban politics literature as a theoretical touchstone, this article seeks to understand why the pace of labor market regulatory intervention was so much faster in San Francisco. Using a brief history of economic restructuring and political change in each city, this article finds that economic and political factors jointly structure the depth and pace of policy change by setting the terms of debate within redistributional policy discourse. This joint determination occurs because “problem frames” are path-dependent and because inherited political structures, such as the availability of binding referenda, allocate agenda-setting power and opportunities to challenge entrenched interests. Ultimately, the arguments used by contemporary social actors—be they living wage advocates, politicians, or organized business opponents—are conscribed by history, in that they must be offered within a discursive context that is itself inherited from previous rounds of economic and political struggle.

This hypothesis is tested directly through a qualitative examination of the discourse around each city’s living wage campaign. Specifically, this comparison illustrates that historical precedent is the necessary “catalytic” ingredient that helps explain why, when a given city’s economic position improves, we do not see an automatic turn towards redistributive policies. For example, places like Phoenix or Raleigh-Durham, which experienced rapid economic growth in recent decades, have not seen a political shift towards addressing inequality. Similarly, as the Chicago case shows, the path dependence of specific “problem frames” explains why powerful political regimes cannot easily shift course towards redistributitional interventions.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the dominant explanations of local redistributive policymaking from the urban politics literature and explains how an emphasis on history can add explanatory power to the current theoretical landscape. This section also presents the research methods and argues that making comparison over time across two cases can illustrate the catalytic role of history. The following section provides an overview of the economic and political context in Chicago and San Francisco and draws key distinctions in how actors framed key economic development problems in the recent past, and the relative pacing of citywide political debates over redistributive issues (i.e., how many times and to what degree policies were considered that would have a potentially negative impact on the city’s “business climate”). Another section traces the living wage campaigns in each city and explains how history helped shape the relative outcomes through an analysis of the public arguments, coalition building, and strategic choices of campaign advocates. The final section concludes and sharpens the argument by highlighting examples from other cities.

EXPLAINING LOCAL REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR HISTORY

The urban politics literature attempts to explain how local governments make decisions, and in particular how much leeway elected officials have in pursuing a policy agenda that is redistributive
in nature versus one that favors economic development and wealth creation, especially given the
dominance of capital in local decision making (Cox, 1997; MacLeod & Jones, 2011).

However, some scholarship does attempt to describe the boundaries of redistributive action for
local governments. In this line of analysis the key difference turns on which variable—economic
competitiveness or political will—is more important in determining the scope of influence cities
have over the outcomes of economic development. One can roughly characterize this debate as
occurring between those who emphasize structural variables, particularly economic, versus those
who argue that certain political coalitions can exercise considerable agency over policy directions.
On the structural side, political economists such as Harvey (1989) and Logan and Molotch (1987)
argue that the nature of contemporary capitalist economic development puts severe pressure on local
governments to promote growth-oriented development schemes. Based on these works, we derive
the idea that the degree to which a given city can pursue a redistributive agenda depends on its
extant level of wealth or its competitiveness as an attractive location for mobile capital and middle
class residents. In this view, strong living wage laws, which are fundamentally redistributive in their
nature, would be easier to enact in so-called “strong-market” cities that can afford to place demands
on businesses.

However, some scholars argue that in privileging economic competitiveness as an explanatory and
largely exogenous variable, the structural side of the urban politics literature is overly determined.
On the agency side, scholars such as Stone (1989) argue that urban political regimes, while perhaps
naturally skewed to favor a pro-growth agenda, are not purely bound by an economic logic. Rather,
political consensus and the ability to form a governing coalition determine the local policy agenda.
Since obtaining the support of the public is a necessary condition for political consensus, in some
cases progressive urban regimes can emerge and successfully change the course of development
policy (Clavel, 1986; Ferman, 1996). A key aspect of this view is that the shape and orientation of
urban regimes depends on the political values of residents. For example, DeLeon (1992) characterized
San Francisco’s populace as “post-materialist” given the large number of white-collar workers and
its racial and ethnic diversity.

Joel Rast (1999) makes perhaps the strongest argument for local agency through his study of
Chicago’s redevelopment policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Rast argues that city leaders chose to
encourage growth in business services and corporate headquarters downtown instead of attempting
to maintain the city’s viable base of neighborhood industrial jobs. Under Rast’s argument a group
of elites including the Mayor, downtown landowners, and city planners made this choice through a
series of land use decisions and zoning changes.

By turning its focus solely on the internal coalition politics of specific regimes, urban regime theory
yields too much in the way of cross-cutting comparative explanatory power. Savitch and Kantor (2002)
seek a fruitful middle ground in the structure versus agency debate within urban politics. They claim
that even cities that face significant economic challenges have latitude to influence how the resulting
benefits of economic activity are shared among citizens. They identify two main factors—driving
and steering variables—that jointly determine the social or market orientation of urban redistributive
policy.

Market forces and intergovernmental support are driving variables in that they provide the re-
sources, such as jobs and investment, for urban development. Specifically, market conditions are
the “circumstances or forces that make cities more or less appealing to private capital” (Savitch &
Kantor, 2002, p. 43). This variable captures a city’s competitive advantage due to its location or the
presence of a strong agglomeration of firms in a certain industry (e.g., information technology firms in
Silicon Valley). Following their logic, we might simply measure market forces on a two-dimensional
scale only, such as strong to weak or high-growth to low-growth, and ignore the real influence of
historical industrial changes on a city’s current competitive advantage and also how policy makers
frame economic development problems.

Savitch and Kantor (2002) refer to popular control and local culture as steering variables which
determine the policy orientation of urban regimes with regard to redistributive policies. “Popular
control” is the degree to which citizens exert control over the decision making process to “express
their preferences and hold elites accountable.” Savitch and Kantor argue that “cities with strong
popular control systems exercise greater influence over capital investment and influence the course of ED [economic development] decisions” (2002, p. 45).

Local culture is the collective set of “norms and values that create a disposition toward the development agenda” and drives popular choice on development options: “Is it jobs and construction? Or is it historic preservation and green space?” (Savitch & Kantor, 2002, p. 45). DeLeon (1992) characterizes local culture across various cities on a materialist/post-materialist spectrum. In this spectrum, voters in cities with high levels of unemployment and a large blue-collar workforce tend to favor policies that bring the material benefits of development (e.g., jobs). Alternatively, voters in wealthier localities with a more professional and highly-skilled occupational base favor other non-material development outcomes ahead of jobs and are more likely to pressure or place demands on local businesses.

These variables together determine whether policy outcomes at the urban scale are market oriented or socially oriented by structuring the bargaining position that city actors have vis-à-vis the private sector. As a city’s economic health improves and growth becomes more robust, one should expect—all else equal—to see a shift towards socially oriented policies (Savitch & Kantor, 2002). Yet, as the cases of Chicago and San Francisco indicate, the process of switching from one policy orientation to another is hardly a smooth one. We see then that the Savitch and Kantor model ignores one critical factor: the path-dependent nature of both economic restructuring and popular control mechanisms. It is this article’s contention that including a historical approach can help explain the “stickiness” of redistributive policy making.

As Rast (2012) points out, although there is broad interest in historical explanation across the social sciences—led by the work of Pierson (2000), Thelen (2004), and others—the “historical turn” has yet to make a significant impact on the dominant theories of urban politics. Broadly speaking, proponents of historical analysis argue that events or institutional arrangements in the past can have a significant causal influence on existing social outcomes through a variety of mechanisms, including path dependence, policy feedback, and sequencing. Stone’s (1989) analysis of Atlanta describes a single case of regime development and resilience over time implicitly using a historical approach. Yet, history itself is not an explanatory variable in his model. Similarly, the literature on institutional change—and particularly within labor markets—is implicitly (and at times explicitly) historical in nature in that it seeks to understand the development and maintenance of certain norms and practices in certain contexts over time (Hanson & Pratt, 1995; McCall, 2001; Peck, 1996; Thelen, 2004). Within the urban politics literature, however, there have been relatively few empirical analyses that explicitly investigate the role of history. Some attempts have been made to argue for increased attention to historical context in understanding contemporary urban development.

This article presents an advance on this nascent historical turn in the urban politics literature by offering a theory of not just why, but how history matters in redistributive policy debates. To build this argument, this article relies heavily on two theoretical constructs in the social sciences—problem frames and policy discourse. The term problem frame is used here in the context of economic development to refer to the process by which policymakers and social actors react to the challenges presented to them by changes in the external economic environment (i.e., real economic restructuring, plant closings, etc.). As Weir (1992) describes, economic problems are framed through the political process, and a given diagnosis—based on a particular ideology—can dominate policymaking until an alternative frame is offered by an organized and politically successful coalition. This term is key to understanding how history leaves its imprint on the driving variables offered by Savitch and Kantor in explaining redistributive outcomes. Specifically, this article contends that public debates about how to respond to economic change—which may span across political regimes—have a path-dependent effect on future rounds of progressive policies. Thus, there is a set frame in which actors see the “problems” that economic development policy must address and define which constituencies have a “moral” claim to benefit from city intervention.

Finally, this article uses the term policy discourse broadly, and builds on work that suggests that the ideas or arguments put forward by political agents can have an independent, but not necessarily uniquely causal, impact on the policy making process (see Campbell, 2001). Specifically, the term discourse as used here includes the various arguments, campaign tactics, and actions put forth by
actors who either propose or oppose redistributional policies such as a living wage. As described below, the spaces and opportunities to engage in public discourse over the living wage are vastly different in each case. The definition includes the full spectrum of political action and strategic choices available to actors to engage with counter-arguments and attempt to challenge or reframe existing problems (see Weir, 1992). Ultimately, this article argues that the patterns and structure of each city’s economic development discourse, including which arenas are available for public debate, the degree of “competition” with other policy discourses, and the pace and timing of decision-making periods, determine the process of institutional change in cities. It is in this sense that the steering variables that Savitch and Kantor (2002) highlight can have a historical or vestigial effect on policy outcomes.

A Note on Research Design

Before turning to the analysis below, it is important to note how the hypothesis proposed here—broadly, that history matters—can be tested from a two-case comparison. It may be tempting for the casual observer to simply conclude that San Francisco passed so many progressive labor laws because it was (a) wealthier or (b) much more liberal politically. While these observations may be largely the case, neither is sufficient to explain the opposing outcomes or the divergent pace at which change occurred. As will be shown below, because this article follows the campaigns in each city over time we are able to observe and investigate the factors that lead to the relative “stickiness” of problem frames. Specifically, this comparison shows that, even as Chicago’s economy improved, an older problem frame—that the City must incentivize businesses to locate within the city limits—proved resilient to a new progressive challenge. Likewise, while San Francisco’s populace has always been far to the left of mainstream, a careful analysis of the arguments, tactics, and tools used by living wage advocates over time shows how a hard-fought legislative success can create a powerful path-dependent imprint on future campaigns. In particular, the new problem frame offered around the living wage issue became replicable over multiple campaigns and complimented a broader, parallel political discourse around escalating housing costs and land-use policies.

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR LIVING WAGE DEBATES IN CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO

The contemporary economic and political landscapes that living wage advocates in Chicago and San Francisco worked within were sharply different. It is a major claim of this article that historical differences in the way economic problems were framed and in how public decision making occurred in each city shaped the ultimate pace and depth of labor market interventions in each city. This section presents a cursory economic and political history of each city to demarcate the key differences that help explain the differential outcomes.

Economic Context: Divergent Histories and Contrasting Challenges

Chicago and San Francisco are both older urban centers at the heart of bifurcated regional economies, where low-wage work proliferates amidst growing high-technology industries. Yet, the trajectory of their growth patterns over time has been quite different. Each successive round of industrial development created a “generational” or “layered” effect on the regional political economy in general, and the labor market institutions in particular (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Massey, 1978, 1998). Chicago was in many ways the archetypical “Fordist” city for much of the twentieth century, with its massive manufacturing sector dominated by large plants that employed thousands of workers. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the city underwent dramatic economic changes with massive job losses in goods-producing sectors and growth in service-sector employment. Chicago’s restructuring during this period took on a pronounced spatial and, given Chicago’s hypersegregation, racial pattern. Job losses were concentrated on the far south, south, and west sides—which were home to
the largest concentrations of African Americans—while growth was concentrated in and around the Loop. Alternatively, San Francisco made the transition to the post-industrial era much earlier than Chicago and, by the 1990s, was a service-dominated economy with a highly skilled workforce and a diverse population. Although the city lost many large corporate headquarters during the 1980s and 1990s, it remained attractive for investors as it became a sought-after residential location for highly paid workers from Silicon Valley, which by now had surpassed San Francisco as the true economic engine of the Bay Area.

In both cities, the bifurcated economies resulted in a rise in income inequality. However, poverty in Chicago is more concentrated and more consistently located. Large swaths of the south and west sides have highly concentrated poverty, where more than 40% of households have incomes below the poverty level (Lester, 2009). Chicago’s pattern of concentrated poverty is consistent with the high rates of job loss and, critically for the discussion below, widespread property abandonment and neglect. San Francisco, by contrast, has lower overall poverty that is also highly dispersed, with the exception of the isolated Bayview/Hunter’s Point neighborhood in the city’s southeast corner.

In terms of contemporary economic problems, Chicago’s neighborhoods still reel from the effects of severe deindustrialization and the associated urban ills of disinvestment, abandonment, and joblessness, despite the recent economic success of its central area. Relative to Chicago, San Francisco does not have large swaths of neighborhoods devastated by abandonment and concentrated poverty. Instead, San Francisco faces severe pressure to intensify land use and build additional office, commercial, and residential space. Unlike Chicago, San Francisco never faced the challenge of widespread property abandonment (Castells, 1983, p. 101). As the city’s economy continued to attract a highly educated and well-compensated workforce, housing costs rose rapidly and sparked gentrification across the city. Given San Francisco’s limited size and location on the end of a peninsula, average housing prices in San Francisco have always been above average, and the pace of housing price growth accelerated rapidly beginning in the late 1990s.

Despite clear differences in the economic challenges that each city faced, these economic variables alone are not enough to explain the difference in the pace and extent of labor market interventions. The orientation of a city’s economic policy depends not only on the raw inputs of economic change but also on the political response to such problems. As described below, the political structure and governance styles of each city were critical in framing economic problems and shaping the mechanisms through which alternative frames can be offered.

**Political Contrasts: Structure, Style, and Business Climate Valence**

The political context of each city can be understood by means of three variables: regime stability, style of governance, and what this article terms *business climate valence*. Chicago and San Francisco differ markedly across these three dimensions. Chicago’s urban regimes, dominated by the Daley political family, have tended to be more stable than those in San Francisco, which have vacillated between progressive and pro-growth governing regimes since the mid-1970s. The overall method of policymaking or style of governance includes the degree to which citizens and organized activists can participate and control the policy agenda. With the exception of Harold Washington’s progressive interregnum (1983–1987), economic development policymaking in Chicago is elite-driven and takes place outside of public scrutiny (Bennett, 2006). Alternatively, agenda-setting power is much more democratic in San Francisco as citizens’ groups, business associations, labor unions, and individual activists can use the city’s ballot initiative process to advance their particular interests.

However, it is the business climate valence that is the critical difference between the political context of Chicago and San Francisco. *Business climate valence* is defined here as the orientation of economic development and land use policies towards either subsidizing businesses (i.e., projecting a positive business climate) or placing demands or additional taxes on them (negative). Using two primary sources—thirty years of ballot initiatives in San Francisco and all of Mayor Richard M. Daley’s ordinances since 1998—this section illustrates the difference between the cities’ business climate valence of economic development policy.
Each political regime in San Francisco has lacked long-term stability and the political support to execute its preferred development agenda and, since the mid-70s, the city has demonstrated a highly contentious style of governance. This is evidenced by the ability of small constituent groups to use the ballot initiative process to force slow-growth policies onto the development agenda. Thus, San Francisco has considered a host of legislation that has placed demands on businesses, ranging from development limits in Proposition M (passed in 1986, which greatly curtailed downtown commercial development) to labor market regulations such as the living wage.

Figure 1 illustrates the city’s business climate valence, categorizing the valence and the volume of all business-related ballot initiatives since 1980. San Franciscans voted more often on ordinances that placed restrictions on business than those that directly subsidized them, which set a more negative valence than positive. In addition, the mayor’s particular agenda or reputation on business development did not actually influence the volume of anti-business measures on the ballot.

This indicates that progressives can place anti-development measures before the public even when out of power. Fights over the local business climate and land use have thus defined San Francisco’s recent political history and established a slow-growth track record. The successful passage of ballot initiatives and other legislation that has a direct negative impact on the perceived business climate of the city indicates that San Francisco has a well-established pattern of open public debate about economic development policies, with different groups stepping forward to present alternative problem frames (e.g., Proposition M backers’ contention that downtown growth was harming neighborhood quality of life). The fact that progressive actors in San Francisco have a track record of taking on business interests and pursuing their agenda proved to be critical in the campaign to pass a living wage.

If San Francisco epitomizes the case of a fractious urban governance structure, Chicago epitomizes the city of strong central governance. Mayor Richard J. Daley, who made Chicago synonymous with the Daley “machine” and the “city that works,” led a pro-growth regime that created one of the most stable city governments in postwar U.S. history. As both mayor and Democratic Party chairman, positions he held simultaneously until his death in 1976, Daley dominated party and civic affairs and notoriously solidified control over the City Council and his electoral rivals through a comprehensive patronage system. The mayor and his network of political elites (the machine) drove policymaking
decisions through the ward organization system. Independent neighborhood organizations were locked out of power if they opposed the decisions, ensuring little public resistance to the machine. Daley’s economic policies were pro-growth, with a sharp bias towards downtown: “Neighborhoods were shortchanged as capital resources were targeted almost exclusively toward the downtown area” (Ferman, 1996, p. 36).

However, this style of governance changed with the election of Harold Washington, a U.S. Representative from Chicago’s south side and the city’s first African American mayor. Known for building coalitions among Chicago’s various ethnic groups, Washington promised to end a system that pitted downtown against the neighborhoods (Mier & Moe, 1991). He brought community organizations into the policymaking process and proposed an alternative economic development agenda that sought to link downtown growth with jobs-based economic development in Chicago’s neighborhoods in order to stem the tide of industrial job loss (Mier & Moe, 1991).

Richard M. Daley, the eldest son of former mayor Richard J. Daley, returned the pro-growth agenda to City Hall with his election as mayor in 1989. In his six terms, Daley exhibited shades of his father’s style of governance, an “elite inclusion” as opposed to Washington’s “grassroots inclusion” (Bennett, 2006). While he relied almost exclusively on a small group of advisors, his administration included representatives from almost all the city’s diverse ethnic, religious, and minority groups. In Daley’s regime, budgets or other major pieces of local legislation were only brought to council when sufficient support was secured through back channels, which had the effect of dampening public debate on economic development policy. Thus, Daley was able to retain firm control over the agenda within City Hall.

In order to compare Chicago’s business climate valence to that of San Francisco, all of Mayor Richard M. Daley’s proposed ordinances between 1998 and 2003 were categorized according to whether an ordinance placed a new tax or regulation on local businesses (i.e., a negative valence) or subsidized business or land development (positive valence). As Table 1 indicates, redevelopment agreements, legislation related to tax increment financing (TIF), targeted economic development subsidies to specific firms, and other economic development policies constituted 28% of total legislative activity. This figure would be nearly 50% if one included land transactions originating with the City selling or giving away tax delinquent or abandoned properties. Of all of the 1,752 ordinances

| TABLE 1 |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Ordinances</th>
<th>Share of Ordinances</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land purchase or sale</td>
<td>390</td>
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<tr>
<td>City business/services</td>
<td>311</td>
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<td><strong>Redevelopment agreements</strong></td>
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<td><strong>12.79</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic development—TIF-related</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>9.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
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<td>5.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic development—targeted</td>
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<td>Tax increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open space/environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police/parking/quality of life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban design/zoning</td>
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Note: List of all ordinances introduced for passage by the City Council by Richard M. Daley gathered from the mayor’s section of the official City of Chicago website (www.cityofchicago.org). Ordinances were assigned to topical categories by the author. Economic development–related categories appear in bold type.
analyzed, none had an explicitly negative business climate valence like San Francisco’s Proposition M. Thus, the policy orientation of Chicago’s governing regime under Mayor Richard M. Daley tends towards offering subsidies and inducement to businesses. From this analysis we can conclude that the dominant problem frame for economic development in Chicago was the need to promote job growth, particularly in neighborhoods outside the prosperous Loop.

Daley’s power, cemented by his control over a docile City Council, well-funded business community support, and his ability to deflect criticism from potential challengers, allowed the Mayor’s office to control nearly all citywide policy debates over economic development. Critically, the most widely used economic development tool, TIF, requires relatively little public oversight and, once created, siphons off revenue from the City’s general fund and other taxing authorities. Thus, with over 160 TIF districts and over $500 million in annual increment available, economic development decisions in Chicago are largely made outside of public view (Joravsky & Dumke, 2009). Arguably, there had been no public debate in Chicago around redistributive issues on a citywide basis until the living wage debates that began in the mid-1990s.

The critical difference between Chicago and San Francisco is in the way the two sets of economic and political variables that Savitch and Kantor (2002) have described interact to structure the discourse around economic development policy. This discourse influences the degree to which each city could intervene in the economy, make demands on mobile capital, or expand its regulatory bounds into territory usually held by higher levels of government. With this understanding of the contextual differences between Chicago and San Francisco, the next section illustrates how these historically conscribed factors shaped the local debates, and ultimately the outcomes, over the living wage.

**TRACING THE REDISTRIBUTIVE DISCOURSES OF LIVING WAGE CAMPAIGNS**

The labor movement in both Chicago and San Francisco underwent a progressive turn during the 1990s, with service-sector union locals and community-based organizations becoming voices for economic justice for residents of low-income neighborhoods. Over the course of the decade, these progressive activists would coalesce around the issue of living wage regulation to varying degrees of success. The initial “contractor-only” living wage laws were passed in both cities, but varied in their original intent and in the overall number of workers covered, and in each case advocates made compromises with living wage opponents to ensure the law’s final passage. Ultimately this analysis will show that previous rounds of economic policy debates, and efforts to support redistributional policies—whether successful or not—gave current actors the inherited vocabulary with which to frame their arguments.

**Chicago: The Resilience of the Business Climate Discourse**

Starting in the early 1980s, unions and grassroots organizations in Chicago began pursuing progressive social movement tactics, led in particular by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). The Chicago chapter of ACORN and Local 880 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) both grew from the national ACORN organization and became instrumental in the living wage campaign. The idea to start a living wage campaign in Chicago emerged shortly after Baltimore passed the nation’s first living wage law in 1994 with a wage floor of $6.10 per hour. In response, ACORN built a similar coalition in Chicago beginning in 1995. ACORN reached out first to the most progressive members of Chicago’s labor movement, who represented workers most likely to be affected by a living wage ordinance, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) Local 1 and SEIU Local 880. ACORN also sought out the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, an organization with an established history of advocacy that represented homeless day laborers, a key constituency often hired by city contractors to clean up after major city events such as the “Taste of Chicago.” At their first meeting, the newly created Chicago Jobs and Living Wage Coalition (CJLWC) made a critical decision to limit the coalition to only those organizations that had a demonstrated base and could commit a minimum amount
of $1,000 or deliver a busload of volunteers to an event. This ensured that the resulting coalition had the financial resources and organizational wherewithal to advance an aggressive and tightly-knit campaign. Ultimately, the coalition consisted of 60 membership organizations and clergy members who represented some 250,000 Chicagoans. Critically, however, the members of the coalition were by no means close allies of the Daley administration, and none had the experience of organizing a citywide campaign on an issue that opposed the mayor.

The CJLWC drafted an ordinance, introduced to the city council in May 1996, which mandated a wage floor of $7.57 per hour, or $3.35 more than the federal minimum wage rate. The proposed ordinance would have covered some workers at firms with 10 or more employees that held a city contract of at least $5,000. It also would cover workers at private firms that received “business assistance” from the city—a loan or direct subsidy of $50,000 or more—including firms located in TIF districts (Garza, 1996, p. 1). Supporters estimated that the proposed ordinance would have affected 10,000 low-wage workers, a very far-reaching ordinance compared to other cities.

The “business assistance” clause turned out to be the most controversial aspect, as it challenged the Daley administration’s preferred method of economic development, namely TIF. Coalition members defended the ordinance with an easily communicated moral claim: local governments should not be subsidizing poverty wages; $7.57 per hour, they claimed, was the minimum wage that a single full-time worker needed to earn an annual income above the federal poverty line, or $15,000 per year. Since new welfare-reform legislation required recipients to find work within 5 years, the CJLWC argued that if government is “ending welfare as we know it,” it also has a responsibility to encourage low-income residents to find jobs that would support their families.

The Mayor ignored CJLWC’s claim and opposed the ordinance stating it would present unjustifiable projected costs to taxpayers:

> There isn’t anyone in America who doesn’t believe in the living wage. But who is going to pay for the living wage? The taxpayers will have to come up with X amount of money. I’m going to put on their taxes that they have to come up with this money or do you start laying people off?

When the mayor and the City Council ignored the call for a living wage and let the draft languish in the finance committee, the CJLWC pursued tactics aimed at shaming the mayor and his allies and pointing out glaring points of hypocrisy in the city’s governance structure. For example, at the 1996 Democratic National Convention at Chicago’s United Center, which Mayor Daley viewed as a chance to show off Chicago’s economic success to a global audience, CJLWC sued for access to picket the mayor during the opening celebrations at Navy Pier and organized “tours of shame” that took visiting delegates to the homes of low-wage workers. Throughout the convention, the Teamsters displayed a large banner on their building adjacent to the United Center that read “Mayor Daley why won’t you support a living wage?” The CJWLC attempted to make the point that Chicago would spend millions of tax dollars on beautification projects and infrastructure improvements for outsiders yet would not increase the wages of its lowest-paid residents. Yet, this discourse did not occur within City Hall, and living wage advocates struggled to raise the issue to the level of citywide debate.

Despite CJLWC’s efforts, the living wage ordinance was mired in a committee chaired by Chicago’s longest-serving alderman, Edward Burke, which prompted the CJLWC to shift to strategic efforts against the council. By July 1997, the CJLWC was determined to force the ordinance out of committee with organized protests at Alderman Burke’s home and citywide. After two years of waiting, living wage supporters on the City Council made an unorthodox parliamentary move to vote the ordinance out of committee with a full vote of the council. Aldermen would have to choose to honor their public support for the living wage or acquiesce to the mayor. Despite 36 aldermen having supported the principles of a living wage in 1995, only 17 voted in favor of the ordinance (Garza, 1996, p. 1).

After this loss, many observers considered the living wage campaign a failure. However, the CJLWC had learned critical lessons in fighting the machine and its pro-business allies and were strengthened going into the next election cycle in 1999. When in the summer of 1998, the City Council moved to raise their annual salaries from $75,000 to $85,000 per year, Alderman Munoz—the initial sponsor of the living wage ordinance—seized on this opportunity to claim that “the City
Council has no business considering a raise if it won’t pass a living wage first.” The CJLWC attended every council meeting from March through June 1998, charging the council: “if you vote yourselves a raise, we get a raise too.”10

The mayor finally agreed to negotiate and, minutes before the July 1998 meeting, sent a modified draft of the ordinance to Munoz. It was a “job-title” living wage in that it specified a rate of $7.60 per hour for specific categories of workers: custodial, clerical, home and health care, security guards, parking attendants, day laborers, cashiers, and elevator operators. Critically, the final ordinance did not cover firms that received business assistance, which greatly reduced the total number of workers covered by the law (to under 1,000). The coalition eagerly accepted this offer and the City Council voted 49–0 in favor of the ordinance.11 The timing of the compromise—in the midst of election season for the aldermen—yielded some political cover for the aldermen and the mayor on the pay raise issue. They acknowledged that there was support at the grassroots level in Chicago for a living wage. The CJLWC concluded that the machine was not invincible, but the only way to win concessions would be to bring a direct electoral challenge. Thus, the CJLWC would choose the spring before the next election to begin its next push to strengthen the living wage law and to address the wages of workers in “big box” stores.

Chicago’s progressive labor coalition succeeded in permanently associating in the public mind the increases in the living wage to increases in salaries of elected officials. Initially, this “institutional fix” politically benefited both Mayor Daley and his progressive opponents, but the narrow discourse on governance issues and the attempts to shame elected officials came at the expense of a wider debate about the City’s economic development agenda.

The Failed Big Box Campaign

When Wal-Mart announced plans to open its first store in Chicago in 2003, the campaign to further expand the living wage took a critical turn; the campaign to halt Wal-Mart’s expansion in Chicago became the catalyst for the Big-Box Living Wage ordinance.12 The big box ordinance would have expanded the living wage for tens of thousands of workers employed at large retailers throughout the city, but the debate around it revealed the underlying conflict around the city’s “business climate.” Aldermen were seeking to attract jobs and redevelop neglected portions of their wards, but progressive community groups and unions directly challenged local aldermanic control of land use and the assumption that protecting the city’s “business climate” meant exempting business from labor standards.

For unions and labor advocates, Wal-Mart epitomized the worst aspects of the contemporary labor market and had become the top target of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) and SEIU. Wal-Mart offers low wages and meager benefits and resists unionization. As the nation’s highest grossing retailer and largest private employer, Wal-Mart had saturated the suburban and exurban portions of the United States and had begun to move into urban areas. When Wal-Mart announced plans to open stores on the west (37th Ward) and south sides (21st Ward), Emma Mitts, the 37th Ward alderman, argued that Wal-Mart would bring needed jobs and shopping opportunities to an area that lacked businesses of any kind. According to Jorge Ramirez, Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Chicago Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO), the economic distress on the west side made it hard for aldermen to oppose their colleague: Wal-Mart was contemplating two locations at this time. Both neighborhoods had a majority African American population. But, one of the areas, on the west side, was blighted. It was a tough area of town and had been neglected by the business community and by the city. If you look at the streets it was obvious. So, that was a much tougher fight.13

The approval of the west side store served as a wake-up call for the labor movement in Chicago; the Chicago Federation of Labor became more involved and ACORN took on a leading role. ACORN claimed that the wage differences at big box stores were a spatial economic justice issue. Noting that a Costco store on the north side paid higher wages and offered health care, ACORN argued that “if they do that [pay living wages] on the North Side, they can do that on the South and West Sides too.”14
In 2004 ACORN’s National Living Wage Resource Center and the Brennan Center for Justice had drafted a new living wage ordinance that required any retailer with over 90,000 square feet who had at least $1 billion in annual sales (nationally) to pay at least $10 per hour and contribute $3 per hour for health insurance. ACORN then convinced UFCW and other members of the initial anti–Wal-Mart group to form the Big-Box Living Wage Coalition (BBLWC) to be run out of the Grassroots Collaborative. By late 2004, BBLWC had gathered additional coalition partners and, brandishing the Big-Box Living Wage Ordinance draft, had built consensus against zoning approval for the south side Wal-Mart. With each monthly vote, the margin against zoning approval got wider as the BBLWC mobilized at least 100 volunteers to attend each Council meeting. Finally, the developer relented and sent a letter to each alderman stating that Wal-Mart would not be a part of the proposed retail development.

However, the BBLWC decided to wait a full year to propose the ordinance, timing it to coincide with another proposed increase in aldermanic pay. While they waited, the BBLWC grew to include a total of 35 organizations, including community-organizing and faith-based community groups and additional labor organizations, and collected the signatures of 10,000 residents on postcards indicating their support for the Big-Box Living Wage law. The BBLWC also discreetly met with aldermen about the living wage and ultimately gained the support of 33 co-sponsors.

The BBLWC wanted to demonstrate to elected officials the popularity of the living wage issue and that rescinding their support would cost them re-election. Thus, in late 2005, ACORN and SEIU gathered signatures to put a non-binding referendum on the big box ordinance on the March 2006 ballot in several wards, including the 35th. Eighty-four percent of voters in the 35th Ward supported the ordinance. In March of 2006, a slightly revised version of the ordinance was introduced to the Finance Committee, where it was held (by statute) for 60 days before coming up for hearings in April and May. Then, BBLWC commissioned a citywide poll of 500 registered voters, releasing the results just before the final council vote in July of 2006. The results of this poll indicated that 84% of Chicagoans supported the ordinance, with solid majorities throughout the north, south and west Sides, and 90% of African American voters supported it.

The forces arrayed against the Big-Box Living Wage Ordinance were comprised of three distinct sets of actors who each offered a different critique of the ordinance. The first set consisted of members of the business community: the Illinois Retail Merchants Association (IRMA), the Chamber of Commerce, and the companies directly impacted by the ordinance, such as Target, Lowe’s, and Wal-Mart. David Vite of IRMA testified that the ordinance sent a negative signal about the “business climate.” He claimed that the ordinance illegally discriminated against big box retailers. Within the pro-business group, the large national retailers Wal-Mart and Target put significant money to work against the big box living wage. In particular, Wal-Mart spent heavily on a public relations campaign to boost its image within the African American community, using prominent African American leaders and clergy members such as Andrew Young, a civil rights veteran and former Mayor of Atlanta, to argue that working at Wal-Mart was a good entry point into the labor market. Pro-business actors clearly articulated that the ordinance would negatively affect the city’s business climate and result in job losses in the areas of the city that needed them the most. Although Wal-Mart did not convince all African American leaders and elected officials, “they were able to . . . drive a wedge in some communities and divide community groups before they realized what happened.”

Several African American aldermen from the south and west sides of the city also opposed the big box ordinance. Of the 14 aldermen who cast their votes against the big box living wage, 9 were African American. They highlighted the level of economic distress in their wards and emphasized that their residents were desperate for employment. They further portrayed the big box ordinance advocates and unions as outsiders without connection to the economic reality of their wards, charging that the big box ordinance proponents were racist for trying to hold up development on the south and west sides but not on the (predominantly white) north side or in the suburbs. Several aldermen, upset by the involvement of unions in blocking big box development, insinuated that the unions’ historical racism was continuing:
If I put a Wal-Mart in my area today, I wouldn’t lose one job because there’s nobody in them smaller stores hiring my people anyway. . . . This ordinance is going to kill Chicago. That is what it’s going to do. I don’t see no [sic] union officials. Every time they send somebody to talk to me . . . I told them to send me some black folks. You want to come out and meet us? . . . Send me some black folks. Where is the black folks in the union?22

The use of labor unions’ historical legacy of racial divisions—which were more of an issue with industrial and construction trades unions in earlier decades, rather than the service sector unions pushing for the living wage—highlights again the role history plays in contemporary policy debates. Specifically, history is used here as an active rhetorical tool by actors pursuing their own interests in a contemporary discourse, even when that history is not explicitly relevant.

A third opponent of the ordinance was the mayor himself. Daley publicly supported Wal-Mart’s plans in 2004,23 but then refused to take a public position on the big box ordinance and did not actively lobby the City Council to oppose the ordinance between December 2004 and June of 2006.24 Once the ordinance was voted out of the Finance Committee, Daley argued that if it passed Wal-Mart would ring the city with stores and siphon off needed sales tax revenues and jobs. However, he was embroiled in unrelated scandals at the time and the arguments failed to gain traction. One alderman described Daley’s efforts to pressure aldermen as “too little, too late.”25

The vote on the big box ordinance in the City Council occurred on July 26, after an unprecedented 3 hours of floor debate. The final version of the ordinance would affect any retailer with more than 90,000 square feet (up from 75,000) of space and over $1 billion in annual sales nationwide. The required wage rate of $10 per hour and the $3 per hour for health care would phase in over 3 years instead of occurring at once. Unlike the initial living wage campaign, where negotiations with the mayor ensured a unanimous vote from the council and the mayor, the outcome here was uncertain. The Big-Box Living Wage Ordinance passed by a vote of 35–14, surprising both sides with a veto-proof majority.26

However, Mayor Daley was determined to veto the ordinance. Daley went public with his opposition, essentially calling the ordinance a racial issue. He compared the ordinance to “redlining” and suggested that it would “deprive impoverished African-American communities of jobs, places to shop and revenues.”27 Alderman Toni Preckwinkle (4th) described the strategy:

[T]he Mayor’s people decided this was a wedge issue that they were going to use in the black community. . . . They bought the black media, and found community organizations to come and campaign against the living wage and imply that black aldermen that supported the living wage ordinance were anti-jobs and anti-development in their neighborhood. . . . They were afraid that Jesse Jackson Jr. was going to run [for mayor] and if he had solid black support, he would be a real challenge to them. . . . They concentrated their efforts around the big-box ordinance in a way that divided the black community, and who benefitted from that? Him.28

Daley also needed two aldermen to switch their votes. As discussed previously, Daley has had a strong grip on the council during his tenure; by 2006 he had appointed 19 of the 50 sitting council members and could maintain control over individual aldermen because he “has an extraordinary amount of power and an extraordinary amount of carrots and sticks.”29 Daley exerted his influence. On September 13, 2006, he vetoed the big box living wage ordinance and, three days later, three aldermen switched their votes to sustain the veto.30 The political clout, financial resources, and racial justice claim exercised by the living wage opponents trumped the arguments and tactics of the BBLWC.

It is here that we can observe the constraints that history placed on the struggle to extend the living wage to private sector workers in the retail industry. First, by its very nature, the ordinance ran counter to the accepted practice of subsidizing businesses that open shop in the city. In particular, Chicago’s economic development problem frame became so entrenched because nearly all of the City’s policy tools—especially the wide use of TIF—were aimed at subsidizing rather than adding costs to businesses. This created a system of incentives for policy makers, including aldermen, to continue down the same path. Second, as elections were the only mechanism for holding aldermen
accountable and changing the terms of debates, living wage advocates had to wait 4 years before introducing new legislation. Four-year intervals resulted in an exceedingly slow pace of discourse. Also, Chicago’s uneven pattern of economic restructuring has resulted in a high degree of poverty and property abandonment on the south and west sides. As this economic development pattern was heavily influenced by historical racial discrimination, opponents of the big box living wage ordinance could portray supporters as “outsiders” (i.e., not black) and prevent the progressive labor coalition from forming a more complete alliance within the African American community.31

San Francisco: Active Debates and Rapid Change

In San Francisco, the growth of service unions and progressive community alliances in the 1990s combined to push for local business regulation, which resulted in two ordinances that set precedents for the city’s regulation of labor standards.32 The passage of these two laws, regulating union recognition and domestic partner benefits, demonstrated that the living wage movement would find a friendly ear at City Hall. By the time San Francisco’s progressive labor coalition proposed a living wage campaign in 1998, both Oakland and San Jose, as well as cities in other states, already had living wage laws on the books. The living wage got its initial push in 1998 when the Bay Area Organizing Committee (BAOC), the San Francisco Labor Council (SFLC), and several local unions began to focus on legislation that would specifically benefit their membership. The BAOC is an Industrial Areas Foundation affiliate comprised of 35 member institutions, including Christian, Muslim, and Jewish congregations, labor unions, and ethnic organizations.33 SEIU and HERE Local 2, along with several other smaller unions, were interested in organizing government and city health care workers, including at San Francisco International Airport. SFLC took the lead and began drafting legislation that would cover approximately 30,000 workers.34

The second push came from an ad hoc set of community and individual social activists with distinct ideological goals, but who similarly looked to the living wage as a vehicle to build power and organize (for full discussion see Lester, 2009). This group moved quickly to draft their own living wage legislation, basing their language on Oakland’s ordinance and setting the wage rate based on the California Budget Project’s (CBP) calculated cost of maintaining a basic level of consumption in San Francisco. This draft was ambitious in that it featured a high wage rate—$14.50 per hour compared to $7.60 in Chicago and $8.00 in Oakland—and mandated health care coverage for workers employed by city contractors.

Initially, the two groups were working independently but came together thanks to a $100,000 gift from Rob McKay, heir of the Taco Bell family fortune.35 To create a united coalition, McKay tapped two experienced organizers, Ken Jacobs and Karl Kramer, who convened key leaders of both factions and formed a “steering committee where half the votes were from labor and the other half was non-labor.” 36 The newly formed group—the San Francisco Living Wage Coalition (SFLWC)—focused on a multifaceted lobbying and communication strategy. It primarily hinged on workers telling their stories of having difficulty meeting basic needs on minimum wage (then $5.75 per hour) in a city with rapidly escalating rents.37 To put pressure on the supervisors, the SFLWC also organized a number of public demonstrations throughout the city during 1999, used phone banking to directly connect voters to individual supervisors, and canvassed door-to-door in each supervisor’s district.

The key groups lined up against the living wage proposal were the Committee on Jobs (a business lobbying group formed by the 40 largest corporations in the city), the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Golden Gate Restaurant Association (GGRA), and the Human Services Network, a group formed by various non-profit service providers who hold large city contracts and employ several thousand workers. While this business-led coalition never made the claim that raising wages would kill jobs, they proved a powerful adversary that succeeded in pressuring Mayor Brown and the Board of Supervisors to delay action on the living wage by creating a Living Wage Task Force to study the issue and ultimately water down the initial proposed legislation. As Karl Kramer, Co-Director of the SFLWC, describes it:
Our main opposition was the Committee on Jobs—which is the political apparatus of the 40 largest corporations in the city. They are a heavy funder of electoral campaigns and have the funds to influence elections. The primary motivation in forming the Committee on Jobs was to lessen the political pressure on making downtown corporations pay their fair share of taxes. So, they pushed the idea of contracting out city services. Thus, they helped set up, and continue to have a great deal of influence over, the Human Service Network, first to oppose union organizing in non-profit agencies and later the living wage.\(^\text{38}\)

Within the official minutes of the Living Wage Task Force—a bi-partisan group formed by the Board of Supervisors in 1999 to study the issue—most of the comments centered on the projected cost of $210 million to the City. With living wage laws in effect in Oakland, San Jose, and Los Angeles, opponents of the living wage saw the writing on the wall. Mayor Willie Brown and members of the business community were alarmed at the prospect of a $14.50 per hour wage rate. The consensus on the Task Force was to enact a law that was more limited in scope and set a wage level starting at $7.50 per hour and rising to $9.00 over 3 years.\(^\text{39}\) Supervisor Ammiano then introduced a revised ordinance in May of 1999 with a wage rate of $11 per hour that covered approximately 35,000 workers, including all city contractors (for-profit and non-profit) and businesses that held leases on City-owned land.

A critical juncture in the negotiation process was Mayor Willie Brown’s 1999 reelection campaign and Ammiano’s political challenge. The top campaign issues were the displacement of low-income residents and small businesses during the dot-com boom and the living wage. Brown distanced himself from Ammiano’s ordinance and said he would back any legislation that the Living Wage Task Force recommended. Although Brown won handily (57.8% to 39.2%), Ammiano’s campaign had forced a run-off election and had demonstrated an unexpectedly strong progressive challenge.

After the election, Mayor Brown convened a negotiation between the SFLWC, the Committee on Jobs (a business-led lobbying group), and the Human Services Network (representing non-profits that opposed the law). In early 2000, the SFLWC had gathered enough signatures to put Ammiano’s living wage ordinance on the November 2000 ballot. Brown wanted to maintain control over the Board and did not want his hand-picked supervisors running against the ordinance during their first district-based elections.\(^\text{40}\) Recognizing the strength of progressive challengers and his compromised political capital with unions and businesses, Brown brokered a compromise that avoided the ballot initiative. This compromise consisted of three laws that collectively formed the strongest living wage legislation in the nation, affecting approximately 30,000 low-paid workers.\(^\text{41}\)

**Beyond the Living Wage**

After these successes, the progressive labor coalition in San Francisco moved quickly to expand upon the initial living wage legislation with a series of additional labor regulations that resulted in wage increases, paid sick leave, and health care access for low-wage workers. Between 2000 and 2006, San Francisco experienced a political transition away from Mayor Brown’s pro-development regime towards a progressive regime that pursued a host of policies that challenged the business climate. However, ongoing economic restructuring—epitomized by the dot-com boom and bust—exacerbated income inequality and fueled progressives’ attempts to slow development, halt the displacement of renters, and raise wages for low-wage workers. The strategic differences between loosely affiliated advocate groups increased the pace of change. These political and economic factors shaped three individual campaigns for living wage expansion in San Francisco that ultimately extended the living wage concept to produce the nation’s most comprehensive local labor regulation. Whereas it took four years in Chicago to merely increase the living wage rate for city contractors, members of San Francisco’s progressive labor coalition won these significant extensions of both wages and benefits in six years. Rather than falling under a single well-organized coalition, a distinct set of actors coalesced around each piece of legislation—the Citywide Minimum Wage (2003), Paid Sick Leave (2006),\(^\text{42}\) and the Healthcare Security Ordinance (2006).
Citywide Minimum Wage: Proposition L

Just two years after San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors passed the initial living wage legislation, individual activists and community-based organizations put legislation on the November 2003 ballot that set a minimum wage for everyone employed in San Francisco. Two individuals—Supervisor Matt Gonzalez, the first Green Party member to be elected to a city council in a major city, and Barry Hermanson—were critical in passing the citywide minimum wage. The first groups to join them in the San Francisco Minimum Wage Coalition (SFMWC) were established community organizations with a tradition of social activism (e.g., the Chinese Progressive Association, the Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition, and ACORN). Established labor organizations did not participate to the same degree as they had in supporting the initial living wage ordinance.

The timing of the minimum wage campaign during the aftermath of the dot-com bust in 2003 helps undermine the claim that economic strength alone determines redistributive debates. As Matt Gonzalez described it:

[In 2002] there was a budgetary recession, and there was concern about taking a measure like that to the Board of Supervisors, because we thought the [ordinance] would be kind of watered down in terms of some of the provisions we wanted in it. I was adamant that I wanted a cost of living adjustment . . . and then there was the question of whether or not it should have a tip credit . . . for restaurant waiters.43

Despite the economic downturn, the SFMWC argued that full-time minimum wage workers could still not earn enough to afford to live in San Francisco. This dovetailed with the living wage argument that was still fresh in the minds of the public.44 With strong public support and without the political resources of SEIU 790 or the Labor Council, the SFMWC decided to put the minimum wage ordinance on the ballot rather than pursue a legislative strategy through the supervisors, which would necessitate winning eight votes to overturn a potential veto by Mayor Brown. While Gonzalez was the public face of support for the minimum wage at City Hall, Hermanson provided the strategic and financial support necessary to get the ordinance on the ballot, making a $100,000 donation to the campaign and paying for a poll of San Francisco voters that indicated that the $8.50 rate had the support of 61% of likely voters.45 Hermanson also provided funds to study the impact of raising the minimum wage. This research proved critical in the campaign. Gonzalez, who chaired the Land Use and Economic Development Committee, held a series of hearings where the research on the impact of the measure was presented and debated. The SFMWC gathered over 10,000 signatures, enough to get Proposition L on the November 2003 ballot.

The minimum wage became immediately popular among voters and deterred opposition. The Golden Gate Restaurant Association (GGRA) was one of the only public opponents, focusing on the potential for Proposition L to create job losses at restaurants. But unlike what had occurred during the earlier debates over the living wage, no organization came forward to argue that a higher minimum wage might negatively impact the city’s business climate or prevent economic development in poor neighborhoods:

What happened on the minimum wage really was that everyone did polls and it polled off the charts. Unlike the living wage, the business community looked at this from the start and figured fighting this was just a losing proposition. The campaign was a good campaign. . . . But unlike the living wage, it wasn’t a knock down fight. It was, however, also a great get-out-the-vote effort for Matt Gonzalez’s [mayoral bid].46

Gonzalez’s candidacy brought large numbers of the city’s progressives to the polls, resulting in one of the closest mayoral races in recent history and the easy passage of Proposition L with 60% of voters. Due to annual indexing, the minimum wage in San Francisco is now $9.79 per hour, the highest in the nation. The fact that the broader business community retreated from mounting an organized and well-financed opposition to the minimum wage is indicative of the path-dependent impact of the initial living wage battle in 2000. In addition, San Francisco’s business community is
pragmatic and chose to save their financial and political capital for other issues, particularly those over land use and growth regulation.

**Paid Sick Leave and the Health Care Security Ordinance**

In the mid-2000s San Francisco’s progressives exercised considerable power despite not having an ally in the Mayor’s office. This period was particularly fruitful for the diverse group of living wage and labor advocates who, despite their splintered organizational structure, successfully passed two key pieces of legislation. The first of these, the Paid Sick Leave ordinance, which was passed through a ballot initiative in 2006, guaranteed all private sector workers up to 72 hours of paid leave. The campaign for this ordinance was run by an innovative start-up organization called Young Workers United (YWU) that had ties to organized labor but maintained its own staff. During the Paid Sick Leave campaign, other labor advocates simultaneously pushed for health care security, another innovative piece of labor market regulation that functions like universal health care.

The SFLC formed a coalition comprised largely of labor unions and community organizations with a significant base that could be mobilized quickly. Many of the critical organizations had been part of the initial living wage campaign, including SEIU Local 790, HERE Local 2, Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU) Local 3, YWU, and BAOC. This coalition worked closely with Supervisor Tom Ammiano to draft legislation that Ammiano introduced to the Board of Supervisors in December 2005. The drafted legislation mandated that all employers in the city spend a minimum dollar amount per worker per hour on health insurance or pay an equivalent amount to the City’s Department of Public Health.

As the health care coalition gathered support in early 2008, Mayor Gavin Newsom asked the Board of Supervisors to delay their vote. Although he stated his support for the law, he convened a Universal Health Care Council (UHCC) consisting of business leaders, labor advocates, and health experts to negotiate the draft with the Board. Supervisor Ammiano and the SFLC negotiated a 100-day deadline for the UHCC so that, should negotiations between the Board and UHCC break down, the coalition could still gather signatures to qualify the ordinance for the November 2006 ballot.

The UHCC eventually recommended extending and consolidating the City’s current charity health care services provided by an existing network of county hospitals and non-profit clinics into a new program called Healthy San Francisco available to all uninsured residents, but left the method of financing up to the Board of Supervisors. The program was billed as universal health access, rather than insurance, as individuals participating in the program would pay a nominal fee (based on a sliding scale). To pay for the estimated $200 million cost of the program, Supervisor Ammiano introduced a revised ordinance in June that required private companies with 20 or more workers to spend $1.06–$1.60 an hour per employee on health care services. The Board of Supervisors unanimously passed the ordinance, and Mayor Newsom subsequently signed it into law on August 7, 2006. The Health Care Security Ordinance was the nation’s first “pay-or-play” mandate on businesses and established a norm that cities can significantly alter the behavior of a large number of employers (Jacobs, 2009).

The campaign to provide universal health care in San Francisco moved quickly—from its initial proposal in December 2005 to passage within 8 months—for two reasons. First, the coalition that formed around health care included a core of the most powerful and active labor unions in the city and community partners that had a high level of resources and a track record of running successful citywide campaigns. Second, by 2006 it was clear to all stakeholders in the process—including labor, elected officials, and business associations—that the political winds had shifted sharply to the left and it would be better to be on the winning side of the issue. This is epitomized in Mayor Newsom’s effort to “jump in front of the health care issue”; by forming the UHCC, he essentially ensured a unanimous vote, thereby granting him the status of the first mayor in America to enact a form of universal health care. Here again we can see how the negotiations over the previous living wage ordinance had a path-dependent impact on this issue, considering that many of the arguments over the law’s impact on businesses fell on deaf ears.
THE DETERMINING ROLE OF HISTORY IN THE “VOCABULARY” OF REDISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGE

Based on the comparisons above, we can see how historical patterns of economic restructuring as well as the unique political traditions of each city jointly conscribed the discourse and ultimate outcomes of redistributional policy debates. Specifically, the key differences between Chicago and San Francisco were the discursive pacing of debate and the “stickiness” of particular problem frames. To summarize, Chicago’s rigid political structure only responded to outside agitators prior to elections. Thus, for approximately two years, Mayor Daley could ignore the living wage issue, which tied up the original ordinance in committee with only one public hearing. Living wage advocates in Chicago could only effectively move their agenda every 4 years. By contrast, in San Francisco there were more venues for public debate and direct negotiation with opponents of the living wage, and the ability of advocates to use the ballot initiative broadened agenda-setting power. In San Francisco, the fractious progressive labor coalition that clung together as the San Francisco Living Wage Coalition dissolved into separate subgroups. Rather than halting the process of change, this disaggregation of progressive actors actually increased the pace of change, as the various actors led campaigns for separate pieces of labor regulation using different venues. The level of financial support as well as experience in citywide legislative and ballot fights enabled different combinations of actors to secure additional wage and benefit guarantees for low-wage workers. Unlike in Chicago, the political context in San Francisco was shifting during this period (2000–2006) towards progressive control over the Board of Supervisors that ushered in a host of new debates over the economic direction of the city. The groups of activists had learned from the living wage campaign to work closely with the supervisors, sticking to the center of decision making. Finally, whereas business groups such as the Committee on Jobs strongly opposed the first living wage law in 2000, opposition to the citywide minimum wage and the universal health access program was significantly lower. Ultimately, San Francisco’s historical experience with considering a wide range of legislation that had a potentially negative impact on the local business climate gave living wage advocates a significant advantage. Essentially, the “business climate” argument had been tested time and again through votes of the Board of Supervisors and the public directly, a fact that prepared the rhetorical grounds for living wage proposals. Further, once living wage advocates succeeding in passing the first living wage in 2000, they essentially created a new “problem frame” that had its own path-dependent effects on future legislation.

Conversely, the struggle to pass the big box living wage ordinance in Chicago required proponents to articulate an entirely new set of arguments in an arena that brought them into conflict with opponents with superior resources. As a result, the discourse around the big box legislation directly challenged Chicago’s dominant form of economic development practice as well as its established mode of governance, where the city subsidized neighborhood development and aldermen controlled land use decisions within their own wards. The arguments against the big box ordinance drew on historical racial divides within the city, highlighting the past exclusionary nature of Chicago’s unions and splintering support for the living wage within the African American community. Lastly, Mayor Daley’s veto and his historically demonstrated electoral power, which enabled him to flip three aldermen, demonstrated the resilience of Chicago’s centralized political structure.

The second major factor that explains the changes in each city is found in the different patterns of economic restructuring, which in turn structure debate by defining the “problems” that city policy—and labor market interventions in particular—ought to address. Once framed in a given way, “problems” created a path-dependent imprint on the ongoing living wage debate; living wage advocates and opponents inevitably articulated their arguments in terms of the city’s problem frames. For San Francisco, beginning in the late 1970s the critical economic challenge has been pressure to alter existing land uses to accommodate corporate headquarters and, later, high-tech startups and their accompanying high-income workers. This growth pressure in San Francisco has led to significant displacement. Labor advocates thus reasonably linked arguments for the living wage and minimum wage explicitly to the rapidly rising cost of living in the city. The switch to district elections for the Board of Supervisors in 2000 and the slow-growth and rent control legislation and ballot initiatives
are evidence of the progressive backlash.\textsuperscript{53} The living wage movement in San Francisco can be seen as part of the ongoing fight over land use and displacement.\textsuperscript{54} During the period when the living wage, citywide minimum wage, paid sick leave, and Healthy San Francisco were debated and passed, San Franciscans were also considering 15 initiatives regarding rent control, condominium conversion laws, or large-scale land use plans.\textsuperscript{55}

The key economic development problem in Chicago over the past three decades has been the widespread joblessness and property abandonment in neighborhoods on the south and west sides of the city. During the first living wage debate, living wage advocates decided to back down from their original proposal, which would have required any business that received any form of city subsidy to pay the living wage, because they knew they could not successfully challenge the City’s economic development policy (neighborhood development and TIFs) without challenging the accepted “frame” for Chicago’s economic problems. During the Wal-Mart debates, the argument differed from the initial living wage arguments, in that aldermen could not be “shamed” into passing it. Progressives asked aldermen to fundamentally alter an existing practice of allowing zoning variances in each other’s wards, which challenged accepted practice in economic development. When living wage advocates introduced the big box living wage ordinance, they now had to contend with the argument that raising wage standards would halt development in the most distressed areas of the city.

Despite the economic and political differences between Chicago and San Francisco, the preceding analysis shows clearly that one cannot simply argue that either economic strength or political structure alone is the determining factor in the scope of redistributive policy making. Making comparisons across time and cases casts doubt on arguments based on economic determinism. In the case of Chicago, the big box living wage was turned down at a time when the broader city economy was booming, with gentrification taking place in many neighborhoods throughout the city and property values increasing rapidly. In San Francisco, the dot-com bust failed to slow the pace of labor regulation. New York City offers another example. While similarly geographically constrained and economically successful as San Francisco, the pace of labor market interventions has been much slower in New York, as Mayor Bloomberg has successfully resisted and watered down a business assistance living wage law. On the structure side, other cities in California, such as Oakland and San Jose, have access to the ballot initiative but have not moved as far or as fast as San Francisco. Thus, there is a missing variable in the current explanatory models in urban politics.

Ultimately, the process of passing living wage legislation at the local scale is highly sensitive to the distinctive and historically contingent patterns of discourse around redistributive issues. The key takeaway for readers of the urban politics literature is that, rather than one factor trumping another, economic and political variables jointly influence the depth and pace of institutional change in urban labor markets. In addition, we also see that history plays a critical role in how economic problems are framed and, to varying degrees, reframed. Rather than playing a passive, deterministic role in redistributitional debates, however, this article illustrates that history plays an active and contingent role by providing actors with the “vocabulary” with which to present their arguments. Political actors in San Francisco have proposed and enacted a host of policies aimed at slowing down development in order to promote noneconomic goals such as neighborhood stability, design standards, and open space, which place constraints on local businesses and developers. As a result the “business climate” argument was largely discredited by the time actors proposed the living wage, giving labor advocates the rhetorical space to reframe economic problems in a citywide forum. In contrast, policy makers in Chicago have tended to take the opposite stance with regard to economic development, with the dominant paradigm of offering a wide variety of financial incentives, such as TIF, to entice businesses to locate within the city. With precious few opportunities to challenge this paradigm, living wage advocates in Chicago could not dislodge the existing problem frame and replace it with a new one. Through this detailed case comparison, we can see that historically inherited factors play a crucial role in explaining the differential process of change and illustrate why economic factors and contemporary political preferences cannot alone determine the scope of redistributional interventions at the local scale.
ENDNOTES

1 In addition, scholars from the regulationist approach also argue that the local policy agenda is dominated by a broad policy shift towards “neoliberalism,” which seeks to remove or restructure regulations on business interests (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002) and results in an economic development agenda that seeks to promote an image of growth over equity and delegitimizes local redistributive claims. While not explicitly reviewed here, this literature, by focusing on the “roll out” of neoliberal policies at the local scale, tends to de-emphasize emerging regulatory responses, such as the living wage movement, that work in the opposite direction.

2 The process of categorization included the following. The author built a database of all initiatives from information in the San Francisco Public Library’s Ballot Initiative Database (http://sfpl.lib.ca.us/librarylocations/main/gic/ballotsrch.htm) and categorized all measures from 1980 through 2007 based on the general intent of the proposed law as evident in the description field. The goal in building the categories was to examine the degree to which San Francisco’s voters and elected officials proposed policy changes that taxed businesses or changed zoning laws or other regulations such that development was curtailed over time (negative valence). Measures which directly subsidized or supported redevelopment efforts with public funds or loosened development regulations were coded as positive. Based on this analysis, since 1980 the voters considered 492 initiatives, 72 of which were considered to directly impact the city’s business climate as they considered policies related to tax increases, land-use, labor market interventions, or rent-control. Of these 72 initiatives, 45 were coded as having a potential negative effect while 27 were considered positive. A full copy of the database with the author’s subjective categorization is available upon request.

3 Initial evidence seems to indicate that this pattern has continued under Mayor Rahm Emanuel as evidenced by the low number of contested City Council votes. Mayor Daley averaged 4.7 divided votes per year over his 18 years in office, while Mayor Emmanuel faced just 6 divided votes in his first year (see http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-0606-city-council-one-year-gfc.eps-20120605,0,4291864.graphic) according to a Chicago Tribune analysis. A divided vote occurs when more than one alderman votes against the mayor.


5 This argument appeared numerous times on the editorial pages of the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times throughout the initial living wage campaign and in subsequent efforts to strengthen the law in 2002. See, for example, Richards, “City Council Plays Scrooge to the Hilt,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 1, 1997, p. 27, and Cannon, “Workers Deserve a Living Wage,” Letter to the Editor, Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1999, p. 14.


8 Interview with Madeline Talbott, Chicago ACORN. Ms. Talbott also explained that the coalition had to pay a security guard to watch the banner overnight after several attempts were made to remove it.

9 According to two interview subjects this particular procedure was seldom used because there were so few instances where there was any controversy in the first place, but also most alderman considered it “rude” to force legislation out of committee with a full vote of the council.

10 Interview with Madeline Talbott, Chicago ACORN.

11 Interview with Madeline Talbott, Chicago ACORN.

12 The first instance of a potential Wal-Mart store opening was actually in February of 2002, when they considered a site in the rapidly growing South Loop area. However, this development never moved forward. The west side Wal-Mart was the first planned store opening to go up for zoning approval with the City of Chicago. See Yue, “Wal-Mart Plans Move into Chicago—West Side Store Would Open in ’05,” Chicago Tribune, July 29, 2003.

13 Interview with Jorge Ramirez, Executive Secretary Treasurer, Chicago Federation of Labor AFL-CIO.

14 Ramirez (note 13).
The Brennan Center for Justice is housed at New York University’s School of Law. See http://www.brennancenter.org

This election was a primary for national and state level offices and did not include aldermanic races.

Internal opinion poll analysis, Grassroots Collaborative. These figures were also reported by Spielman, “Poll: Make ‘Big Boxes’ Toe Wage Line,” Chicago Sun-Times, June 21.

Vite, “Big Knocks on Big Boxes Just Cost Jobs,” Letter to the Editor, Chicago Tribune, June 6, 2006. Mr. Vite reiterated these points in a personal interview.

Interview with David Vite, IRMA.

Interview with Jorge Ramirez, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, CFL.

Specifically, those voting against included Aldermen Haithcock (2nd), Tillman (3rd), Hairston (5th), Beavers (9th), Troutman (20th), Brookins (21st), Carothers (29th), Austin (34th), and Mitts (37th).

Comments of Alderman William Beavers.

In advance of the zoning committee vote to allow Wal-Mart, Mayor Daley was quoted saying, “You have Wal-Marts in the suburban area and people drive from the city out there, and all the people who live there go to Wal-Mart. Why should they be allowed there if they are so bad? They are building all around the city, and why can’t we have one?” Washburn, “Why Can’t Wal-Mart Stores Be Allowed in City? Daley Asks,” Chicago Tribune, March 29, 2004.

This opinion was noted in interviews with Madeline Talbott, Ken Snyder, and Jorge Ramirez, and also reported in Spielman, “Aldermen Won’t Give In to Daley on Big Box Vote: Daley’s Lobbying Fails to Sway Support for Living Wage Ordinance,” Chicago Sun-Times, June 30, 2006.

Alderman ask to remain anonymous.


Interview with Alderman Toni Preckwinkle.

Interview with Ken Snyder.


The aftermath of the big box living wage debates may have introduced some measure of change, but the ultimate result remains ambiguous. In February 2007, voters elected Daley to his sixth term with 71% of the vote while seven anti–living wage ordinance aldermen were targeted by the unions and voted out of office. The mayor’s machine proved that it was resilient to outside pressure from living wage advocates, although Wal-Mart, Target, IRMA, and the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce had to heavily outspend the BBWLC to protect their “business climate.” The election of 2007 and labor’s newfound commitment to engage in aldermanic elections may prove to be a context-changing event. However, the members of the progressive labor coalition have not yet tested the new council as they could not effectively reintroduce the big-box living wage or other labor-related legislation until 2011.

These ordinances included the Equal Benefits Ordinance (1996)—which required any firm doing business with the city to extend family health benefits to domestic partners—and the Employer Signature Authorization Ordinance (also referred to as the “card check ordinance”) in 1997. The card check ordinance mandated that new hotels and restaurants located on property in which the City held a proprietary interest must recognize the union if a majority of workers signed union cards and, in exchange, the union would agree not to engage in any actions against covered hotels during arbitration. The legislation passed unanimously through the Board of Supervisors with Mayor Brown’s support.


Interview with Ken Jacobs.

36 Interview with Ken Jacobs.

37 Based on newspaper coverage of testimony from public hearings. Interview with Karl Kramer.

38 Interview with Karl Kramer.

39 Analysis of minutes of the Living Wage Task Force meetings May 27 through September 9, 1999. Available at the San Francisco Public Library’s Government Documents Library (5th Floor)

40 This analysis of Mayor Brown’s decision to compromise was echoed by each of the SFLWC co-directors, Ken Jacobs and Karl Kramer, as well as by Barry Hermanson, all of whom personally participated in negotiations sessions.

41 The first act passed in January 2000 was the Airport Commission’s Quality Standards Program, which established a permitting process for all vendors operating in secure areas that specified “minimum training and compensation standards” as well as paid time off (Jacobs, 2009, p. 7). The second law, the Health Care Accountability Ordinance (HCAO), required firms with city contracts or located on any city property to provide health insurance or pay $1.50 per hour per worker to the San Francisco Department of Public Health, the agency that provides health care to the uninsured. This became the nation’s first “pay or play” health care policy. The final law was a city minimum compensation ordinance (MCO) that mandated a wage rate of $9.00 per hour for workers at private companies and $8.00 for non-profits, covering workers at all city contractors and the airport. However, establishments located on other City-owned property are exempt. The wage rate was indexed for private firms.

42 Due to space constraints the details of this campaign are omitted here. For a full discussion see Lester (2009).

43 Interview with Matt Gonzalez.

44 Interview with Matt Gonzalez.

45 Interview with Barry Hermanson.

46 Interview with Ken Jacobs.

47 Specifically, the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (PSLO) allows any employee to accrue one hour of paid sick leave to care for themselves or a family member for every 30 hours worked. Employees at small businesses (less than 10 employees) can accrue up to 40 hours and all other employees can accrue up to 72 hours.

48 Interview with Ken Jacobs.

49 Paulson (2008, p.3).

50 The ten-member Universal Health Care Council chaired by Sandra Hernandez, executive director of the San Francisco Foundation, and Lloyd Dean, president and CEO of Catholic Healthcare West. Other members included: John Gressman of the San Francisco Community Clinic Consortium; Mark Laret of the University of California San Francisco Medical Center; Mike Alexander of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan; Jean Fraser of the San Francisco Health Plan; Steve Falk of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; Tim Paulson of the San Francisco Labor Council; Mitch Katz of the San Francisco Department of Public Health; and Lucien Wulsin of the Insure the Uninsured Project.

51 Although the Chamber of Commerce and the GGRA participated in the negotiation process and agreed to the creation of the Healthy San Francisco program, they strongly opposed employer-mandated spending and ultimately had pulled out of the UHCC in order to preserve the right to challenge the law in court.

52 Interview with Matt Gonzalez.

53 For example, Supervisor Chris Daly passed a measure in 2001 that would subject tenancy in common units (TICs) to the same limit (200 units per year) that condominium conversions face. The measure was meant to protect long-time renters from being displaced when their apartment buildings were sold. The measure was ultimately struck down in court.
These initiatives include Proposition J (Health Care) in 1998, Proposition L (Minimum Wage) in 2003, Proposition G (Health Plans for City Residents) in 2004, and Proposition F (Paid Sick Leave Ordinance) in 2006.

These initiatives included: Propositions E (Rent Control Exemption), G (Owner Move-In Eviction Limitations), K (Use and Control of Treasure Island), L (Presidio Land Use) in 1998; Proposition I (Octavia Boulevard Plan) in 1999; Propositions H (Landlord, Renter Costs), K (Office Development Controls), L (Office Development, Live Work Controls), and N (Controls on Rental Conversions) in 2000; Proposition D (Land Fill in San Francisco Bay) in 2001; Proposition R (Condominium Conversion with Certain Conditions) in 2002; Propositions B (Eviction Disclosure Ordinance) and H (Relocation Assistance for No Fault Tenant Removal) in 2006; and Propositions G (Mixed-Use Development Project for Candlestick Point and Hunters Point Shipyard) and F (Affordable Housing Requirement for the Candlestick Point and Hunters Point Shipyard Mixed-Use Development Project) in 2008.

REFERENCES


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