The Journal of Psychohistory
A Publication of The Institute for Psychohistory
Volume 42, Number 1, Summer 2014

Floyd W. Rudmin • Cognitive History and the Neurotic Regulation of Historical Beliefs: The Case of Canadians Encountering War Plan RED (1904–1939) .................................................. 2

Mark Cronlund Anderson • The Suckling and the Rebel: Growing Up Imperial in Anglo North America ............................................................. 28

Robert H. Simmons • The Emergence of Psychogenic Mode #7: Emotionally Literate (An Addition to deMause’s Psychogenic Theory of History) ........................................................................... 44

Martin Klüners • Freud as a Philosopher of History ........................ 55

Kenneth Alan Adams • “A German Generation” and Psychohistory ... 72

Letter to the Editor ............................................................................. 84

Howard Stein • Response to Letter ................................................... 85

Book Review

Henry Lawton • The Body Never Lies: The Lingering Effects of Cruel Parenting, by Alice Miller, trans. Andrew Jenkiris ...................... 86
Cognitive History and the Neurotic Regulation of Historical Beliefs: The Case of Canadians Encountering War Plan RED (1904–1939)

ABSTRACT
Cognitive history is the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of beliefs about history. Historical beliefs are the product of normal processes of social cognition (e.g., primacy effects, stereotyping, halo effects, misattribution) and normal processes of neurotic regulation of anxiety (e.g., repression, introjection, rationalization). History is grounded a) on empirical artifacts such as texts or archeological remnants, b) on social constructive forces such as culture, ideology, and pedagogy, and c) on cognitive and psychodynamic processes of perception, emotion, and memory. The present study examines the archived responses of Canadian journalists, historians and politicians to their encounter with historical evidence of U.S. preparations to invade, occupy and annex Canada, as articulated in War Plan RED (1904–1939). This study shows the regularity with which Canadians have repressed, ridiculed, or rationalized journalistic and scholarly reports of U.S. military planning. Thus, the standard “good-neighbour” narrative of U.S.-Canadian historical relations is incomplete and incorrect, to a degree unknown, until cognitive and neurotic mechanisms of misperception and repression are understood enough to allow historical facts to be freely sought and evaluated.

History is a very psychological discipline, and it is remarkable that there has been relatively little interdisciplinary collaboration between history and psychology (Runyan, 1988). To be sure, historical explanations of the causes of past events usually include inferences about the motivations and the decision processes of the individuals involved, as described, for example, by Collingwood (1994). Furthermore, two subfields of history have psychological aspects: 1) the “mentalité” tradition of ethnohistory (e.g., Burke, 1997; Harkin, 2010; Lloyd, 1989) and 2) the conceptualization of history as collective “social memory” (e.g. Fentress & Wickman, 1992; Thelen, 1989). When psychological methods have been used more overtly and formally in history, the focus has been on explaining the psychological development of important individuals or groups of individuals. This is called “psychohistory” if inferences are based on psychodynamic interpretations (e.g., Albin, Delvin & Heeger, 1986; de Mause, 1975; 1982; Stannard, 1980) and “historiometry” if inferences are based on statistical studies of multiple cases (Simonton, 1999; Woods, 1911).

The role of psychology in history is not remote, not limited to faraway peoples or to dead personalities from the past. Historical beliefs are psychologically active in the heads of all of us who are alive today. Beliefs about history seem to influence our thinking and our behavior, especially political behavior. Thus, many governments find it important to control school history curricula and textbooks. History is psychologically intimate to us. We identify ourselves by history. We possess and are possessed by history. When we say, “I am an American,” “I am a German,” “I am a Jew”, we attach national histories to our personal biographies (Liu & László, 2007). It is predictable that national history and personal memory might become confused in our cognitive processes. Because historical beliefs are bound to psychology, they are bound by psychology and thus relatively resistant to new information (Rudmin, 1996a).

Historical beliefs are powerful motivators and play a central role in our psychological readiness for war. All over the world, from Rwanda to Israel to Bosnia to Armenia, Chechnya, Iraq, India, Indonesia, people will risk death and dare the destruction of their own communities in order to assert their historical beliefs (Horrock, 1993; Koring, 1993; Rudmin 1996b). Yet, historical beliefs have rarely been the focus of systematic study.

There is need for the development of a sub-field called “cognitive history,” to be defined as the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of historical beliefs (Rudmin, 1993; 1995). Austrian psychologist, Fritz Heider, one of the founders of cognitive social psychology, was perhaps the first to suggest this:

One should write history as a development of beliefs (not in the narrow religious sense), as a description of the succession and changes in the world pictures, the world images. The changes in cognitive maps, the life spaces. (Heider, 1989, p. 42)
The focus should be on the contents and the internal structure of historical beliefs and on their dynamics, meaning their acquisition, disposition, and interaction with motivations, emotions, and other beliefs and behaviors. As cognitive phenomena, beliefs are held by individuals, but often collectively within national groups, within ethnic and religious minorities, and within specialist communities such as historians. Thus, beliefs can be studied at both the individual and the group levels.

Beliefs, of course, are difficult to study since they are essentially private, internal, phenomena. Beliefs cannot be directly observed. They must be inferred from behaviors and self-reports. When our beliefs are widely shared, they are doubly difficult to observe since we tend to be unaware of our beliefs without some contrasting points of external reference. Historical beliefs stand out dramatically as beliefs, and thus potential misbeliefs, when neighboring nations endorse contrary histories, as with the well-known example of Canadian schools teaching that the United States lost the War of 1812 and U.S. schools teaching that the United States won (Baily, 1968). Historical beliefs also stand out dramatically when new information is systematically ignored, tabooed, or otherwise repressed, indicating that there is incompatibility with established historical beliefs or that the implications of the beliefs cause intolerable anxiety.

A national history is the biography of the nation. Just as we hold beliefs and misbeliefs about persons we know, so too, do we hold beliefs and misbeliefs about the nations we know. Beliefs about national history seem to follow the cognitive forms and dynamics that shape our perceptions of persons. We often speak about nations as though they were individual personalities, as in, "The United States did such and such," or "America thought that..." or "Washington hoped to...". Heider has noted that interpersonal psychology underlies our perceptions of nations: "Nations are in some ways like persons, and it is common to apply to them the person-concept which we have developed in the commerce with individuals" (Heider, 1989, p. 36).

Thus, it might be hypothesized that the normal psychological processes of perception and misperception that operate when we think about individual people also operate when we think about nations. A remembered national history is a socially constructed memory of a nation's behavior. Our cognitive schemas, whether of persons or of nations, are built from beliefs and are routinely wrong, maybe for similar reasons (Heider, 1958).

There is a vast social psychology literature on person perception. Polish psychologist, Gustav Ichheiser, is the pioneer on topics of misperception in interpersonal relations, and his phenomenological analyses might have easiest application to cognitive history (Rudmin, Trinpop, Kyl & Boski, 1987; Ichheiser, 1949; 1970). Many of his mechanisms of misbelief in interpersonal relations have become standard theories in social psychology, and four of these may help explain misbeliefs in national history:

1) We tend to attribute greater reality to visible events than to invisible events. Ichheiser wrote: "the raw material of social perception, that is, the data which serve as a basis of those interpretations and misinterpretations shaping the image of personality, belong altogether to the collectively perceivable world" (Ichheiser, 1949, p. 14). This tendency, however, readiness us to miss or to misinterpret important events because they are not immediately perceptible. Ichheiser noted this to be a problem in our understanding of history:

The point we wish to make is that in the world of common sense in which, after all, we are emotionally at home, it is the visible aspects of social relations which impress us as 'social reality.' Coercion, for instance, is usually recognized as coercion by those not directly involved (by the 'neutral spectators') only when it takes the visible form of outright violence... Historical experience shows it to be possible for long period of time to conceal, or even to deny, the existence of such social realities. (Ichheiser, 1949, p. 16).

Thus, outright war is historically visible and undoubtedly real. But preparation for war is much less visible and therefore more easily dismissed as unreal, even though the latter is often more effective as a coercive force in international relations.

2) Our mental images of different people, and of different nations, are cognitive schemas constructed for their helpfulness in organizing perception and memory and in communicating among people who share those schemas. They are first created from early experience and from social norms. Once structured, cognitive schemas are like projections of the mind onto the world, or like mental templates. They feel like reality, but are in fact fabrications. Schemas ready us for misperception by focusing us on information that fits the schema or image or frame and by causing us to ignore or discount information that does not fit (Ichheiser, 1949; Wineburg, 1991).

3) Cognitive schemas as misrepresentations ready us for more misperception by over-estimating the unity and the consistency of a person or a
nation across different situations in the history of the person or the
nation. Schemas are relatively static impositions on dynamic reality and
create the appearance of consistency over time (Brewer & Nakamura,
1984; Rumelhart, 1984). Again, we tend to ignore or to misinterpret
information that has become dissonant with prior, established schemas.

Once the image of another person [or nation], shaped by primary mecha-

nisms of one kind or another, is fixed in our minds, we tend either to over-
look all factors in the other person which do not fit into our preconceived
scheme; or, else, we misinterpret all unexpectedly emerging factors in order
to preserve our preformed misconceptions. (Ichheiser, 1949, p. 28)

Forty years earlier, American psychologist and philosopher, William
James, had written something similar:

The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the
older truths...Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is
the first principle—in most cases the only principle; for by far the most
usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a
serious rearrangement of our preconception is to ignore them altogether, or
to abuse those who bear witness to them. (James, 1907, pp. 61-62)

4) We tend to behave “in fact” quite differently from how we think we
would behave “in principle”. Our abstract, rational understanding of the
psychological processes behind our beliefs may not describe our actual
belief processes. Ichheiser wrote:

The views, or interpretations, ‘in principle’ are those we hold, or perform,
about social facts and issues in a generalized, so to speak, ‘philosophical’
way, that is, as long as we are not faced by any necessity for doing some-
thing about those facts and issues. (Ichheiser 1949, pp. 22-23)

We misunderstand our own belief processes, and these misunderstand-
ings may stand as rationalizations. Thus, our actual belief behaviors are
more telling than are our own explanations of our beliefs. We may know
that historical beliefs should be based on careful judgments of evidence,
and believe that our own beliefs are, but still be quite unaware that par-
ticular beliefs are, in fact, the results of routine cognitive processes that
are prone to error.

METHOD
This study is a first attempt to examine belief behaviors about history, in
situ, as the beliefs were expressed in history. More specifically, this is a
study of apparent beliefs in the improbability of hostile behavior by the
United States towards Canada, even in the face of contrary evidence. It is
important to understand that U.S. military actions and policies are not the
focus of this study. They are merely the events to which Canadians could
have reactions. It is the reactions, or the lack of them, that are the focus
of this study. This paper is not a military history; it is a cognitive history.

The method employed here is based on historical texts. Mentions of
events of U.S. hostile behavior were identified in secondary sources such as
Richard Preston’s 1977 book, The Defence of the Undefended Border, or in vari-
ous journalistic reports found via the New York Times Index. Primary
sources were then examined where possible and cross-comparisons made
with other secondary sources in order to document further information on
the events and to discover reactions to those events. The hypothesis to be
confirmed or disconfirmed is that Canadians have not used these events as
opportunities to re-evaluate their beliefs about Canada-U.S. relations.

There are two methodological problems with this project. First, be-
because Canadian newspapers did not begin indexing themselves until
the late 1970s, there is no ready way to locate earlier news reports, editor-
ial columns, or letters-to-the-editor. One must go to the microfilm and
search newspapers, day-by-day, page-by-page, or one must rely on sec-
ondary sources. Neither of these approaches is a reliable way to make an
exhaustive search.

Second, an exhaustive search is necessary to support a claim that
something was not happening, in the present study, that Canadians were
not reacting to reported events of U.S. hostile behavior. The epistemologi-
cal problem is that confirming such a claim requires searching all possible
places of evidence and finding none. In practice, this cannot be done.
Such claims must always stand as “not yet rejected”. However, if it is dif-
ficult to confirm a claim that nothing happened, it is relatively easy to
reject such a claim.

For example, Grenville (1979, p. 23) has claimed that by the 1890s,
the U.S. no longer had a policy of holding Canada as a hostage against
British military actions: “the 19th century plan of ‘hostage’ Canada
passed away”. This was asserted without reference citations since there is
no evidence that can be displayed to prove an absence. However, in this
case, there are several positive instances of contrary evidence. In 1904,
General Tasker Bliss, the founding Director of the U.S. War College, was
directed by the Joint Board that the preparations of war plans by the
Army and Navy War Colleges must be coordinated for approval by the
Joint Board and by the Secretaries of War and Navy. In response, Bliss
prepared a major policy paper setting out guidelines for future military
planning. Here he referred to hostage-Canada as an important part of U.S. military planning: "Only in the case of a war with England would we have any chance of reimbursing ourselves by more desirable property nearer home to replace that which we should have lost further away" (Bliss, 1904, p. 7).

An even more telling rejection of Grenville's belief appears in War Plan RED, which was approved by the U.S. Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy in 1930. Here it was declared in three different places that Canada serves as a hostage:

From the standpoint of BLUE [United States] it would appear to be advantageous for CRIMSON [Canada] to be allied with RED [Great Britain]. In this case BLUE would be free to employ her greatly superior manpower in overrunning CRIMSON and holding that Dominion to offset such losses as BLUE might suffer elsewhere. CRIMSON neutrality would be of little military advantage to BLUE. (Joint Board, 1934, p. 7)

The conquest of CRIMSON would probably be held by BLUE more than sufficient to offset probable losses elsewhere. (Joint Board, 1934, p. 26)

...the occupation of CRIMSON territory would secure to BLUE a counterbalance against possible territorial losses elsewhere. (Joint Board, 1934, p. 57)

Clearly, it is a misbelief for Grenville to have asserted in 1979 that the U.S. had ceased conceiving Canada to be a military hostage, an especially curious misbelief considering that War Plan RED had been declassified in 1974, had been a Reuter's news wire story in 1975 (Lovell, 1975), and had been the focus of Preston's book in 1977.

1910 MILITARY MANOEUVRES

Richard Preston's 1977 book, The Defence of the Undeferred Border is the foremost source of information on U.S. military planning against Canada. Preston, a Canadian then teaching at Canada's Royal Military College, discovered evidence of military planning along the "undeferred border" by searching the card index of the U.S. Army's War College library and by searching contemporary military trade journals. In a 1910 issue of the United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette, he found a disclaimer that the headline "Canadian Army Crushed," appearing in the New York City newspaper, The Sun, was just a news reporter's joke, that the military manoeuvres it referred to were not directed at Canada (Common Sense vs. Peace Fustian, 1910). These manoeuvres had taken place at Pine Camp, the present site of Fort Drum, in Upstate New York, near the Canadian border. In fact, The Sun had been routinely and matter-of-factly reporting that these manoeuvres were practicing for war with Canada (Brisk Work at Pine Camp, 1910; War Puzzle Solved Too Soon, 1910). The headline in question was a quotation from the field report of a Capt. Paul M. Malone of the 27th Infantry (Canadian Army is Crushed, 1910). No joke.

An examination of the newspapers of the nearby Canadian cities of Montreal and Kingston for the week immediately following the headline found no mention of the incident. Preston (1977, p. 196) himself accepted the disclaimer and wrote into history that the Gazette had "...learned that the word 'Canada' had not appeared in the operational orders for the manoeuvres and that a newspaper correspondent had been trying to be 'funny' and had 'made a mess of it'."

Preston's readiness to accept the U.S. military's disclaimer of hostile behavior also seems to have prevented him from seeking further evidence about the event and from linking it to his other discoveries. He might have wondered, for example, if maneuvers practicing for war with Canada were related to the policy plans he was finding. More specifically, were the same officers involved in both activities? In fact, the first military manoeuvres ever held at Pine Camp were in 1908, and they, too, had been reported in newspapers as practicing for war with Canada (Forces Cross from Kingston to Clayton, 1908). Several of the officers participating in those manoeuvres subsequently prepared plans for the invasion of Canada and do appear in Preston's book (1977, pp. 188, 191): Capt. Alexander Dade of the 13th Cavalry compiled geographic information on Canada, emphasized the strategic importance of the St. Lawrence canals, and recommended that they be quickly seized if war seemed imminent; Maj. David Baker, Jr. of the 11th Infantry prepared plans for concentrated attacks on Montreal and Quebec City; Maj. William Hay of the 10th Cavalry co-authored the most detailed and sophisticated invasion plans to date, calling for U.S. forces to cross the St. Lawrence River at Cornwall. These officers were all listed in the Army's souvenir pamphlet for the 1908 manoeuvres at Pine Camp (U.S. Army, 1908). Therefore, yes, U.S. military officers planning for war with Canada were also practicing for war with Canada, and Preston might have discovered this had he not been predisposed to accept the U.S. Army's dismissal of the news report.

Confirmation that military manoeuvres and strategic planning were coordinated might have led Preston to look for more concrete preparations for war against Canada, for example, base construction. In fact, the 1908 manoeuvres had been held on leased land, which in 1909 was pur-
chased by the U.S. Army for the creation of a new military base on the Canadian border near Canada's national capitol, despite evidence that the price was too high and that the site was unsuitable for military manoeuvres (Oppose Pine Plains as Manoeuvre Site, 1908).

1915 MILITARY MANOEUVRES
The present study used the New York Times Index to seek for other U.S. military manoeuvres that Preston's methods of search might have missed. This led to the 1915 summer manoeuvres at Plattsburgh, New York, near the border south of Montreal (Recruits Defeat the Red Invasion, 1915). According to the news reports, the war game enacted a Blue army invading a foreign country defended by Red, causing Red to counter-invade Blue, but with Blue forces prevailing in a final battle fought right on the Canadian border. Local newspaper reports did not disguise the fact that Red represented military forces defending Canada: “The Blue army today won a decisive victory over the Reds after a desperate struggle in which the Reds were driven from their entrenched position and compelled to fall back to the Canadian line” (Blue Win Signal Victory, 1915, p. 3).

An examination of the Montreal Star and the Montreal Gazette found no account of these military manoeuvres a mere 40 miles south of the city. This was another unnoticed public event of U.S. hostile behavior, unnoticed in its day and unnoticed in subsequent history, because it is incompatible with the presumptions of trust and good-will visibly evident in U.S. and Canada being allies in WWI and WWII.

Again, Preston might himself have sought and found evidence of the 1915 manoeuvres. But he apparently had made a prior decision that no inferences follow from the war plans he was discovering. These plans include: 1) in 1913, a document entitled, Invasion of Canada (Canadian War Plan), which proposed a staging area in Molra, New York, a little to the west of the 1915 manoeuvres site; 2) in 1914, a Military Geography of Eastern Canada and a Study of an Invasion Plan by United States Forces; 3) in 1915, an invasion plan by Brig.-Gen. M. M. Macomb approved by the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff; and 4) in 1916, an invasion map showing U.S. troops crossing from northern New York to capture Ottawa and Montreal (Preston, 1977, pp. 191, 192, 271, 272). The discovery that the U.S. planned war on Canada, even as Canada was very visibly fighting with the Allies in Europe in WWI, cannot overcome the set schema or image of the U.S. as a friend and ally with Canada in WWI. Rather than new facts causing new hypotheses and a search for further facts, the science of history here falters and is halted. History seen with a blind-eye is bound by the psychology of misbeliefs.

Despite beliefs about how military allies should behave, the United States revived in 1919 its programs of military planning for war with Canada. Care had been taken to keep such preparations from Canadian awareness. For example, in 1928, the four decade old practice of "Hunting and Fishing Leave" was discontinued as a cover for military espionage in Canada, and in 1929, U.S. officers were ordered "not to cross the border during the Quebec reconnaissance" because it might attract unwanted attention (Preston, 1977, p. 23). Nevertheless, continuing signs of war preparations were there to be seen, public, and obvious.

1935 BORDER AIR BASE TESTIMONY
In 1935, the U.S. Government Printing Office, by mistake, published the full transcripts of secret testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee by the most senior U.S. officers responsible for strategic planning: Brig.-Gen. C. Kilbourne, Head of the War Plans Division, Gen. E.M. Andrews, Commander of the Army Air Force, Col. W. Krueger, Assistant Chief of Staff serving the Joint Board, and Capt. H.L. George, from the Air Corps Practice School. These officers argued that three new air bases were needed for surprise attacks against Canada. The new bases on the east and west coasts were to be described as coastal defence bases, and the one in the Great Lakes region was to be camouflaged as a civilian airport but "capable of dominating the industrial heart of Canada" (Air Defense Bases, 1935, p. 61.)

The transcripts were published at the end of April 1935, and made headline news for several days (Air Base Provided Near Canada Line, 1935; Roosevelt Scores House Committee on Border Air Base, 1935). U.S. President Roosevelt denied any military planning against Canada and spoke of "permanent peace", "generations of friendship", and the "disarmament of our three thousand miles of common boundary". Roosevelt claimed that the military officers involved had been presenting personal opinions, not national policy. Despite the President's denials, however, these base recommendations were consistent with War Plan RED, which was national military policy at that time, approved by the U.S. Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy. Two weeks after Roosevelt's statement, his Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approved amendments to War Plan RED making military offensives against Vancouver and Winnipeg a higher priority, and two months after Roosevelt's statement, he recommended General Kilbourne for promotion (Butler, 1935; Gets Army Promotion, 1935).
For the present thesis, Canadian responses were more revealing than were the revelations of the testimony. Hume Wrong, senior diplomat at the Canadian Legation, asked the U.S. State Department for copies of the transcripts but emphasized to the press "that he had asked for no documents or data considered secret or confidential" (Canada Asks Data on Air Base Proposal, 1935). From Ottawa, the official response was that the Canadian government "had been disposed from the first not to take the matter seriously except for its possible effect on Canadian public opinion" (Action Pleases Canada, 1935). Prime Minister George Perley affirmed Canadian beliefs that the U.S. is a predictable personality with a disposition for good-will: "No one in Canada believed the Government of the United States had any intentions of departing from the attitude which has been officially termed 'the policy of good neighbors'" (McSwain Explains Canada Incident, 1935, p. 8).

*The Toronto Globe* headlined its report, "U.S. Disavows Airport Yarn," even though it confirmed for its readers that the appropriations bill would be passed and the air bases built (U.S. Disavows Airport Yarn, 1935). The *New York Times* quoted one Canadian editorial as saying that it was all "foolish publicity given to an irritating topic" and quoted another that "Canadians by and large did not take the episode seriously and were inclined rather to laugh heartily at the absurdity of the whole affair" (MacCormac, 1935).

The House approved the air base bill on June 6, 1935 (Air Corps Stations Approved, 1935), and shortly afterwards there appeared reports that the U.S. War Department was examining the prospect of building a new air base directly south of Montreal (Studies Big Air Base, 1935). When the Canadian government was questioned about this in Parliament, the response was that U.S. air bases are a U.S. domestic affair (Canada Unruffled, 1935). Given the certified veracity of the sources of information that the U.S. was engaged in hostile preparations, given the continuing evidence of military preparations along the border, it is indeed difficult to interpret the Canadian response as anything other than blind eye behavior based on an unwillingness to disrupt orthodox beliefs in American goodwill, compounded by anxiety arising from thoughts of the U.S. preparing to attack Canada.

**1935 MILITARY MANOEUVRES**

In August, 1935, the United States held the largest peacetime military manoeuvres in its history, near the border south of Ottawa, at Pine Camp, the same site as the 1908 and 1910 manoeuvres practicing invasion of Canada (Army to Mass 60,000, 1935; Rudmin, 1993). Five divisions, 36,000 troops, were rushed to the border. Another 15,000 troops were called to a site in Pennsylvania as a back-up reserve force for those at the border (Baldwin, 1935a; 1935b). The war game script was a replay of the 1915 manoeuvres, calling for a Blue motorized invasion "across a feigned international boundary defended by a Red army", with the Red defenders holding the invading Blue forces back, until Blue reinforcements arrive and Red loses "out-numbered and out-gunned," this according to the Army's souvenir pamphlet (Baldwin, 1935c; Briot, 1935a; Souvenir of the First Army Manoeuvres, 1935, p. 2). As in 1915, the U.S. military presumed that it was the aggressor and Canada the defender. After these manoeuvres, the War Department purchased enough land to double the size of Pine Camp (History of Fort Drum, 1988).

U.S. military preparations on the Canadian border were there to be seen, well reported for weeks in the *New York Times* and in the local *Watertown Daily Times*. But evidently, they could not be seen, not by Canadians. If the newspaper in Kingston, the nearest Canadian city to these activities, is a fair indication of Canadian reactions, then there were no reactions.

**WAR PLAN RED**

The 1935 air base incident, the 1935 manoeuvres, and the 1935 border base expansion were unseen hints that the U.S. had an active plan for war with Canada. In fact, during the 1920s and 1930s, as well documented by Preston, the U.S. military developed extensive and detailed planning for the invasion and conquest of Canada. A 1924 draft stated:

Blue [U.S.] intentions are to hold in perpetuity all Crimson [Canadian] and Red [British] territories gained. The policy will be to prepare the provinces and territories of Crimson and Red to become states and territories of the Blue Union upon the declaration of peace. The Dominion government of Canada will be abolished..... (Preston, 1977, p. 221)

A final draft of these plans was approved by the U.S. Secretaries of War and Navy on May 10, 1930. *War Plan RED* was ostensibly for war with Great Britain. However, the military operations for the U.S. Army are focussed exclusively on the conquest of Canada. In the 94 page, single-spaced, legal-size text, only one British city is once mentioned, Portsmouth. But every Canadian province and every Canadian city is present in the text, even communities as small as Sherbrooke, Farnham, Prince Rupert, Trenton, Trois-Riviere, Moosejaw, and Sioux Lookout.
(Joint Board, 1934, pp. 4, 5, 17). The Theatre of Operations for the U.S. Army in War Plan RED (Joint Board, 1934, pp. 80, 84) was defined to be "All CRIMSON territory," and the Army's mission, in bold type, was "ULTIMATELY TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON". Curiously, the word "Canada" is never used in the document. Possibly the avoidance of the name of the target of attack facilitates war planning by repressing the fact that the attack is against a friend and good neighbor.

War Plan RED was not a document in a drawer. For reasons still unknown, preparations for war with Canada accelerated dramatically in late 1934 and 1935:

October 17: Roosevelt’s Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approved amendments to War Plan RED authorizing the destruction of Halifax, Montreal, and Quebec City by "immediate air operations on as large a scale as practicable" (Carpeneder & Kueger, 1934; Joint Board, 1934, p. 82).

October 17: Roosevelt’s Cabinet officers also approved amendments that directed the U.S. Army, in bold letters, TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE, INCLUDING THE USE OF TOXIC AGENTS, FROM THE INCEPTION OF HOSTILITIES, IS AUTHORIZED..." (Joint Board, 1934, p. 85).

January 19: War Department announces that Pine Camp on the border south of Ottawa will be doubled in size (May Enlarge Pine Camp, 1935).

February 4: Brig.-Gen. Kilbourne orders a secret reconnaissance mission into the Labrador and Hudson Bay regions to look for hidden Canadian sea plane bases (Kilbourne, 1935).

February 11-13: Congress holds hearings on funding for new air bases, including three for surprise attacks on Canada (Air Defense Bases, 1935).

February 20: War Department announces that it will hold the largest peace-time manoeuvres in U.S history at Pine Camp (Plans Army Manoeuvre, 1935).

March 6: Gen. Douglas MacArthur recommends that War Plan RED be amended "to initiate, when the situation permits, offensive operations to secure the Winnipeg and Vancouver Areas" (MacArthur, 1935).

April 28: Secret military testimony to the House Committee on Military Affairs is mistakenly published by government printing office, revealing plans for three new air bases for surprise attacks on Canada (Air Base Provided Near Canada Line, 1935).

April 30: U.S. Under Secretary of State gives a speech praising the demilitarization of the Canadian border (Canadian Treaty, 1935).

May 1: President Roosevelt lies that the U.S. has no plans for war against Canada (Roosevelt Scores House Committee on Border Air Base, 1935).

May 9: Roosevelt’s Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approve Gen. MacArthur’s amendments for offensive operations against Winnipeg and Vancouver (Butler, 1935).

June 6: House approves the bill to build new air bases on the Canadian border (Air Corps Stations Approved, 1935).

June 9: U.S. Army reports it is examining Maine, New Hampshire, and Northern New York for sites for new air bases (Studies Big Air Base, 1935).

June 29: U.S. Army announces additional soldiers for military bases, including Madison Barracks and Plattsburgh Barracks near the Canadian border (299 Men to be Added at Post, 1935).

July 24: President Roosevelt recommends Gen. Kilbourne for promotion (Gets Army Promotion, 1935).

August 9: Equipment and troops begin arriving at Pine Camp near the border south of Ottawa for the largest peace-time manoeuvres in U.S. history (Air Unit at Pine Camp, 1935).

August 10: President Roosevelt signs into law the air base appropriations bill (Roosevelt to Sign Army Air Base Bill, 1935).

August 27: Military manoeuvres finish at Pine Camp (Brior, 1935b).


October 5: Carl Walther Strom is posted as vice-consul to Vancouver, to continue espionage during WWII and the Cold War (Blum, 1986, p. 149; Shawcross, 1979, pp. 53-54; U.S. State Dept., 1944, p. 209).


November 11: Canada and U.S. agree to free-trade treaty as an "Instrument for peace" (Canada and U.S. Agree, 1933; Baldwin, 1954; Martin, 1982).

December 1: U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Norman Armour, gives a speech praising the demilitarization of the Canadian border (Undefended Frontier, 1935).

December 18: Major C. H. Jones and Lt.-Col. H. W. Crawford, from the G2 intelligence division of the War College, submit their report on road, rail, and sea routes to target cities in Canada (Jones & Crawford, 1935).
This listing raises a number of historical questions. For example, were the activities of the President, the Army, and the State Department coordinated or independent? Where these events registering in the Canadian government or military, and to what extent? What was the extent and nature of U.S. espionage in Canada prior to WWII? Of course, such questions cannot be answered until they are raised, and they cannot be raised until the phenomena at issue can be seen. Sight precedes insight.

REACTIONS TO U.S. WAR PLANS
In its day, War Plan RED was “among the most sensitive and closely held papers on earth”, to quote from a former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Army (Holt, 1988, p. 48). War Plan RED was declassified in February 1974, and this was reported in the summer issue of the Canadian Defence Quarterly by Richard Preston (1974). This first scholarly record of War Plan RED has been cited only once in the Social Science Citation Index.

In 1975, War Plan RED was publicized in a Reuters news-wire story by Graham Lovell, writing from Washington, DC. Canadian newspapers not reporting the existence of War Plan RED included the Ottawa Citizen, the Toronto Star, the Regina Leader-Post, the Kingston Whig-Standard, and the Charottetown Guardian. Newspapers from cities named as primary targets in the Reuters report and shown dramatically on an accompanying invasion map also did not carry the report or even acknowledge its coverage elsewhere: La Presse in Montreal, Le Droit in Ottawa, the Vancouver Sun, the Winnipeg Free Press, and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald. On the U.S. side, the New York Times and the Washington Post did not report it. Thus, avoidance was the typical journalistic response to War Plan RED.

The news-wire story and subsequent abridgments misrepresented War Plan RED by claiming it was initiated in 1929 as a result of the Great Depression and by suggesting that Canada “was to be invaded by the United States as a defensive measure,” as a “pre-emptive foray into Canada to protect ourselves” (Lovell, 1975, p. A14). In fact, War Plan RED dates from 1904 (Bliss, 1904) and presumes that the U.S. will initiate the war and will attack Canada even should Canada declare neutrality and present no threat to the U.S.A. Lovell’s (1975, p. A14) report mentioned a memorandum “suggesting that an officer be sent on a secret mission to the Hudson Bay area” to look for hidden Canadian air bases. The report lined up comments from several current U.S. military officers that this would have been a silly waste of time. But despite the news report’s readiness to find the idea ridiculous, archived documents show that the mission had in fact been ordered (Kilbourne, 1935).

In 1977, two years after the news-wire report, Richard Preston published Defence of the Undefended Border, again bringing U.S. war planning to public awareness, this time set in historical context with five decades of U.S. military espionage and invasion planning. Though discovering evidence of continuous U.S. military designs against Canada from 1867 to 1939, Preston was very much an apologist. As an historian, he displays his discoveries, but he seems embarrassed by the implications of those discoveries. Thus, Preston presents excuses for U.S. actions where possible and often looks away from concrete logistical or political extensions of U.S. invasion planning. The book sold approximately 800 copies before going out of print. In its first decade, it appeared in the Social Sciences Citation Index only four times, all brief book reviews.

The first citation was A. E. Campbell’s (1978, pp. 398-399) review of the book, dismissing it as unimportant because military staff “must have something to do” and they “therefore prepare for any eventuality they can foresee, probable or improbable”. Campbell wrote despite the fact that War Plan RED was a policy document approved at the Cabinet level and despite the fact that the U.S. military had not prepared plans for all contingencies. For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. had no plans for war with its last two battlefield enemies, Spain and Germany, or with Italy, even though all three nations were increasingly in the news for their military activity and fascism.

Desmond Morton (1978, pp. 1371-1374) presented another dismissive review, repeating the unsubstantiated suprise that the plans were only idle activity “for underemployed staff officers” and “represented the efforts of peacetime armed forces to find meaning for their existence”. Such arguments overlook Cabinet-level authorization for the use of poison gas against Canadians, overlook base construction and large scale manoeuvres, overlook active espionage in Canada. Morton also surmised that the U.S. military thought it “more discreet to plan for war with friends rather than with potential enemies.”

N. F. Dreisberger’s (1979, p. 345) review of Preston’s book was another that tried to dismiss historical facts that did not fit orthodox beliefs. Again, there is the false argument that “American planning for the invasion of Canada was mostly an academic exercise”. Again, Dreisberger stated that it was the very friendship between the U.S. and Canada that caused the U.S. military to plan for war on Canada. He was apparently willing to write this conclusion into history, without mentioning Cabinet level authorization for the immediate first use of poison gas and for the strategic bombing of Canada’s cities. To quote from War Plan RED:
"...large parts of CRIMSON territory will become theatres of military operations with consequent suffering to the population and widespread destruction and devastation of the country..." (Joint Board, 1934, p. 6). This certainly is not consistent with the image of a "good neighbor".

Dreiziger (1979, p. 345) was worried that Preston's book might lead people to question their beliefs about the United States' attitude towards Canada, as would be reasonable whenever new information becomes available:

It is a well-crafted piece of scholarship researched with great thoroughness. Nevertheless, its publication in an age of anti-American feelings might have undesirable consequences. The book might be misconstrued, or passages might be taken from it out of context and used to bolster the myth that Uncle Sam has, and always had, designs on Canada.

Dreiziger's rhetoric here is worth examining: "myth" is used to derogate hypotheses without providing the necessary historical evidence that they are unfounded, and "Uncle Sam" is used to further derogate hypotheses by posing them as cartoons. Personifying the United States also invokes all of the psychology of person perception, including unified and consistent personality, even though there is no reason to dismiss U.S. military behavior because it is inconsistent with U.S. public opinion or with the pronouncements of some U.S. politicians.

In 1980, R. W. Winks from Yale University prepared a brief review of Preston's book for a military journal, complimenting the research as well done. These four reviews comprise the first decade of scholarly reaction to Preston's book documenting U.S. plans for war on Canada. In psychological terms, one might say that evidence of such planning is repressed from public consciousness. For Americans, War Plan RED affronts their self-image and must therefore be unseen or explained away. For Canadians, War Plan RED causes anxiety and must therefore be unseen or explained away.

War Plan RED and Defence of the Undefended Border have also been discussed, or avoided, in monographs that do not enter the Citation Index. A sample of books from the FC 240s Library of Congress section shows dismissal to dominate. For example, Charles Stacey (1981, pp. 155-157) in his book, Canada and the Age of Conflict, dismisses War Plan RED: "This is a good point at which to mention a matter that has lately received more attention than it deserves: the obscure existence on both sides of the border of 'war plans' implying the possibility of hostilities between the United States and Canada." The use of "obscure" and the use of quota-

tion marks around "war plans" are both rhetorical devices to dismiss without evidence. Stacey wrote that "it is amusing" to read the section of the 1924 draft of War Plan RED declaring that the Canadian government will be abolished and the provinces and territories annexed to the United States. He then wrote into history that "all this activity was highly theoretical", not mentioning the 1935 air base appropriations and the 1935 manoeuvres. Historical beliefs precluded a search for evidence of concrete military activity. Air bases are concrete. Stacey also wrote into history that all this activity was "almost completely divorced from American national policy", not mentioning that the plans and such amendments as use of poison gas and bombing civilian cities were approved at the Cabinet level, not mentioning that President Roosevelt had chosen to issue public lies in order to cover up the plans.

Stacey concluded his history of U.S. plans for war against Canada by refuting some of Preston's (1977, p. 219) earlier quotation of R. S. Cline (1951, pp. 34-35) who wrote that the 1930's war plans were "simply outlines of missions", "meaningless", merely "abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed military planning, providing useful training for the officers who drew them up". Cline was the first to dismiss War Plan RED, setting the template for following historians, doing this in 1951, two decades before the documents were declassified. How could Cline write about War Plan RED two decades before it was declassified? Who was Cline? In 1943, he had been Chief of Current Intelligence for the OSS, and in 1949, joined the CIA to become Chief of the Estimates Staff (Montague, 1992, p. 138; U.S. State Dept., 1973, p. 68; Who's Who in America, 1985, p. 606). In 1951, when he published his much quoted claims, he had just become the CIA's liaison officer with British intelligence.

Desmond Morton (1981, p. 94) in his book, Canada and War, reiterated his earlier dismissal, saying the 1930s war preparations "were really little more than staff exercises and a framework for war games and militia exercises". Thus, the first block of historical commentary on War Plan RED—Cline, Preston, Campbell, Morton, Dreiziger and Stacey—strongly set the norm and mental template that War Plan RED should not be thought about, or researched, or used as a basis for rethinking historical beliefs.

That taboo seems to have been effectively set. For example, Thompson and Randall (1994, p. 100) in their history, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, quoted the section from the 1924 invasion plan that Stacey had found amusing and then wrote into history, without citation,
that "Not even the soldiers, however, took these plans very seriously". When asked at a conference if there were diary or interview evidence for that claim, Thompson admitted the statement was based on surmise not evidence. The transcripts of officers testifying to the 1935 House hearings showed them to be serious. Gen. Douglas MacArthur commanded the U.S. Army in the early 1930s, and he is famous for being serious.

More recent historical commentary seems to be also controlled by Cline's 1951 template. For example, Young's (2005, p. 100) review of Ross's (2002) book on war plans states, "one of the rationales for war planning was as an academic exercise used to train mid-level officers to think about strategic planning." Reiss (2010, p. 73) stated that the "war plans were also useful training exercises for officers and for their adaptability to the changing international situation." As James and Ichheiser predicted, an early established belief or image is very difficult to dislodge.

**PRESUMPTION PREVENTS EVIDENCE**

The presumption that the U.S. military planned for all conceivable contingencies as an aspect of officer training, routinely leads to the inference that therefore none of the plans were of any consequence. In fact, this presumption is wrong, and the inference is false. First, there is simply no evidence in the U.S. military archives that plans were made for all contingencies. To the contrary, there is specific evidence in the archived record that only the most likely wars were studied. As explained by Brig.-Gen. Tasker Bliss (1904, p. 1), commander of the U.S. War College, to Admiral George Dewey and the Joint Board, concerning the war plans that should be "jointly studied and agreed upon" by the two services "primarily through the agency of their respective War Colleges":

For the specific purposes for which a General Staff is created, the order of relative importance of the war problems which it must study is determined by the order of their relative probability of occurrence in actual experience. It will have failed in its duty if a little war, which occurs tomorrow, finds it unprepared although at the same time it has carefully studied the conditions of a great war the probable occurrence of which is in the remote future. If we were guaranteed ample time for study, the question of probability of occurrence need cause us no delay for consideration. We would take up each possible theatre of war or combination of theatres, study them under all possible conditions, and thus be prepared for any possible emergency. As we have no such guarantee of sufficient time for a universal study, we have to endeavor to lift the veil of the future by the exercise of what Napoleon called 'the power of scientific imagination'; we have to make a scientific guess—

that is to say, a legitimate inference based upon known conditions and tendencies—as to what now seems most likely to happen first and in respect to which we need to be first prepared. (Bliss, 1904, pp. 2-3)

In other words, if the United States had only four approved war plans, and one of them was for the conquest of Canada, then that is what U.S. military staff predicted to be a likely action.

Two more presumptions that encourage dismissal of U.S. war planning are: 1) that the War Department was a Defense Department, and 2) that war plans were merely practice unrelated to any policies to actually attack a neighbor. Again, the archived evidence is contrary to these beliefs. Brig.-Gen. Bliss, in the same document, explained that U.S. wars would likely be aggression masked as defense:

I do not think that when the United States comes to fight it will be for the declared purpose of extension of trade, although that may be the real cause of war and its real object, concealed under an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine. (Bliss, 1904, p. 4)

After pages of reasoning and inference, Bliss identified Mexico as a country that would likely be attacked by the U.S.A: "That the intervention of the United States in Mexico may become necessary, with the least chance of any other foreign complication connected therewith" (Bliss, 1904, p. 20). Bliss recommended that the U.S. prepare for five contingencies, the fifth of these was for intervention in Mexico (Bliss, 1904, p. 21).

Here is one example of a so-called "abstract, theoretical exercise" written by a purported "icelö officer." But the so-called "theoretical, training exercise" would become national policy approved at the very highest political level, would develop into concrete operational plans, and would in fact cause a neighbor to suffer a U.S. invasion. The following information has been available from the U.S. National Archives in the same set of microfilm as War Plan RED. It could easily have been found by any historians seeking evidence for and against their beliefs that U.S. war plans were benign.

A Joint Board plan for military intervention in Mexico was approved by the Secretary of Navy on April 15, 1912, and counter-signed by U.S. President Taft on May 3, 1912 (Dewey, 1912). An amended version specifically recommending the "Seizure and temporary occupancy of Vera Cruz and Tampico by the naval forces of the United States" was approved on February 13, 1913, by Acting Secretary of the Navy Winthrop, with counter-signature by President Taft (Dewey, 1913).
One year later, in April 1914, as per the plan, U.S. naval forces seized and occupied first Tampico and then Vera Cruz. Dead in the streets were 126 Mexicans, and the standard encyclopaedia and textbook versions of these events would have us believe 1) that the Tampico invasion was a response to the failure of Mexican federal forces to apologize sufficiently for detaining some U.S. Marines who had landed in Tampico without permission, and 2) that the invasion of Vera Cruz was to prevent a German ship violating the Monroe Doctrine by delivering military supplies purchased by the Mexican government (Craw & Johnson, 1962; Gordon, 1971; Hofstadter, Miller & Aaron, 1967; Wade, Wilder & Wade, 1966). In fact, as the Dewey documents show, the invasions had been pre-planned and pre-authorized. The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was a prepared lie of the type anticipated by General Bliss in 1904. The cargo carried by the German ship was U.S. munitions that had been loaded in New York City (Grieb, 1969). There seems to have been no rationale for these invasions other than the mere moment of military planning; certainly no additional apologies were forthcoming from the Mexicans, the German ship did deliver its cargo, and the Americans withdrew.

This planning has been invisible, unseen and unheard in history. Nevertheless, this makes it clear that U.S. military planning for war against its neighbors is not merely defensive and not purely theoretical. It should be noted that the fourth of Brig.-Gen. Bliss's proposed war plans was "a study of the Canadian frontier, assume England as an intervening power under assumption a) alone, b) in coalition" (Bliss, 1904, p. 20). Given the additional evidence compiled by Preston, the origin of War Plan RED should be credited to Bliss in 1904, quite unrelated to the 1929 onset of the Great Depression or to the 1930s rise of militarism in Europe and Japan.

**THE PRESENT AND THE MISPERCEIVED PAST**

Historians of U.S.-Canada relations should not be tabooing topics because they are discomforting and should not be dismissing events because they are incompatible with some standard general image of the U.S. If historical facts feel funny, that is not a comment on the facts but on belief structures evaluating the facts. Historical explanations of the evidence of U.S. hostility should simultaneously be examining the evidence and the cognitive processes by which evidence is evaluated. There should not be a prior requirement that the U.S. military, politicians, and public be consistent with one another, nor that they be consistent over time. Unity and consistency are empirical questions, not a priori presumptions. Historical facts that do not fit fixed images, beliefs, and expectations of consistency should not be unseen, dismissed, or disparaged. Rather, those tendencies should alert us to the likelihood that our historical beliefs might be misbeliefs. Individually and collectively we may be deceiving ourselves about our history.

Floyd Rudmin is Professor of Social and Community Psychology at the University of Tromsø, Norway's Arctic University. He also teaches in the master's program on Peace and Conflict Transformation. His topics of study include: a) audiology, b) psychology of ownership, c) history of psychology biographies, d) acculturation psychology, e) peace studies, and f) psychohistory.

**REFERENCES**


Canadian Army is Crushed. (1910, Aug. 9). *The Sun* (New York), p. 3.


Dewey, G. Admiral. (1913, Feb. 13). Unpublished letter from the Joint Board to the Secretary of Navy, approved by the Acting Secretary of Navy and by President Taft.


