

Alternatives to liberal constitutionalism: popular, political, deliberative

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Liberal constitutionalism is traditionally associated with limitations to majoritarian power. Put in J.S. Mill's wording, "the people ... may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power". Constitutions are, under this view, the foremost example of such precautions.

Yet, as powerful as this conception has been in shaping scholarship, constitutional practices and institutional arrangements, it has met with opposition from sundry perspectives, under different labels. Some speak of *popular*, others of *political* constitutionalism. Moreover, recent developments in democratic theory show an increasing interest in *deliberative* constitutionalism. Finally, we are currently witnessing the rise of *illiberal* or *populist* forms of constitutionalism. It is presently not clear, however, if scholars championing these alternatives are talking with each other or past each other.

With this in the background, this workshop seeks to answer some of the following questions: what are the differences, if any, among these alternatives to traditional accounts of constitutionalism? Are they conceptual in nature, or normative? Do they endorse different principles? To the extent that they do, are they compatible to each other? How? Do they justify different institutional arrangements? If so, which?

We welcome abstracts of papers answering these and other related questions.

Procedure:

1. Abstracts of up to 300 words and a CV should be submitted to **both** convenors by **February 15th, 2019**.

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2. Full versions of accepted papers should be submitted to the convenors by **May 31st, 2019**.