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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10	SOUTHERN DIVISION	
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12		<b>Case No.: SACV 16-02277-CJC(DFMx)</b>
13	CHROMADEX, INC.,	
14	DI . 4.66	
15	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS
16	V.	) DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS ) AND MOTION TO STRIKE
17	ELYSIUM HEALTH, INC.,	}
18	Defendant.	
19	Defendant.	
20		}
21	ELYSIUM HEALTH, INC.,	}
22		}
23	Counter Claimant,	}
24	v.	}
25	CHROMADEX, INC.,	}
26 27		}
28	Counter Defendant.	}
40		<i>)</i>
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Case 8:16-cv-02277-CJC-DFM Document 73 Filed 11/28/17 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:1439

### I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff ChromaDex, Inc. ("ChromaDex"), filed this action against Defendant Elysium Health, Inc. ("Elysium") on December 29, 2016. (*See generally* Dkt. 1 [hereinafter "Compl."].) Elysium counterclaims against ChromaDex, and filed its operative Second Amended Counterclaim on October 11, 2017. (Dkt. 65 [Second Amended Counterclaim, hereinafter "SACC"].) ChromaDex now moves to dismiss Elysium's fourth and fifth amended counterclaims and to strike patent misuse allegations related to the fifth amended counterclaim. (Dkt. 67 [hereinafter "Mot."].) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.<sup>1</sup>

### II. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is discussed at length in the Court's May 10, 2017, Order granting in substantial part Defendant's motion to dismiss claims and granting in part Plaintiff's motion to dismiss counterclaims. (*See* Dkt. 44 [hereinafter "May 10 Order"].) Relevant to this particular motion are the following facts.

ChromaDex is a corporation that develops patented ingredients for use in dietary supplements, food, beverages, skin care, and pharmaceuticals. (Dkt. 48 [Third Amended Complaint, hereinafter "TAC"]  $\P$  9.) Elysium is a corporation that sells a dietary supplement named "Basis." (Id.  $\P$  2.) ChromaDex alleges that it is "Elysium's sole authorized United States supplies of the two fundamental ingredients" in Basis. (Id.) These two ingredients are NIAGEN®, a health ingredient that is comprised of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for December 4, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.

nicotinamide riboside ("NR"), and pTeroPure®, a health ingredient made of pterostilbene. (*Id.*)

ChromaDex and Elysium allegedly entered into various contracts under which ChromaDex sold and Elysium bought NIAGEN and pTeroPure. (*Id.* ¶ 16.) One of the contracts was a Trademark License and Royalty Agreement ("TLRA"), dated February 3, 2014. (*Id.*)

When ChromaDex first filed this lawsuit in December 2016, ChromaDex alleged that Elysium was required to pay royalties under the TLRA based on Elysium's "net sales of product containing NIAGEN NR." (Compl. ¶ 76.) ChromaDex claimed that Elysium failed to pay the required royalties and brought a cause of action for breach of the TLRA. (*Id.* ¶¶ 96–100.)

On January 25, 2017, Elysium filed counterclaims against ChromaDex. (Dkt. 11 [Counterclaim, hereinafter "CC"].) One of the counterclaims was for declaratory judgment of patent misuse. (*Id.* ¶¶ 119–123.) Elysium claimed that ChromaDex's "tying of access to its patent rights to a royalty-bearing trademark license impermissibly broadens the scope of those patent rights, with anticompetitive effect." (*Id.* ¶ 121.)

ChromaDex sought to dismiss Elysium's counterclaim for declaratory judgment of patent misuse, arguing that a patent misuse claim can only be brought as an equitable defense to a patent infringement action. (Dkt. 34.) The Court rejected ChromaDex's argument, and ruled that "[a] case or controversy exists here because ChromaDex seeks to enforce the royalty requirement in the parties' Agreement." (May 10 Order at 17.)

ChromaDex then filed the operative Third Amended Complaint on June 7, 2017. (Dkt. 48 ["TAC"].) In its TAC, ChromaDex removed its cause of action for contract

damages under the TLRA. (*See generally* TAC.) Further, ChromaDex included the following statements to renounce any rights to collect royalties under the TLRA:

[T]o eliminate an issue from this litigation, to conserve the parties' and the Court's resources and to streamline this action, and without prejudice to ChromaDex's arguments and contentions, ChromaDex restates that it has already terminated the Trademark License and Royalty Agreement on February 2, 2017 and further, hereby unequivocally renounces any rights to collect, charge, or obtain royalties under the Trademark License and Royalty Agreement with Elysium.

[...]

ChromaDex likewise hereby unequivocally renounces any rights to charge, obtain, or collect royalties on sales of non-trademark bearing NIAGEN from customers other than Elysium, or to require the use of its trademarks under any agreement. ChromaDex represents to the Court that it is immediately terminating all such trademark license agreements. These terminations are made for the purpose of purging any and all allegations of patent misuse.

ChromaDex is further refunding and/or crediting any and all past royalties paid by all customers pursuant to all "royalty-bearing trademark licenses." ChromaDex represents to the Court that it will provide a credit to Elysium for all past royalties against the damages owed by Elysium in this case, including for the failure to pay for product purchased.

These voluntary and proactive actions by ChromaDex are not an admission of any wrongdoing or acts of patent misuse, but instead are intended to prophylactically and completely eliminate issues in this and any other dispute related to ChromaDex's patents by purging any and all allegedly unlawful conduct with respect to all allegations by Elysium of patent misuse. In particular, these voluntary acts are made to dissipate any and all alleged effects of any alleged patent misuse in the market. These voluntary steps taken by ChromaDex are intended to moot Elysium's allegation and counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that ChromaDex has misused any of its patents. Such counterclaim should be promptly voluntarily dismissed by Elysium, or dismissed *sua sponte* by the Court based on the unequivocal terminations and renouncements made herein.

 $\| (TAC \P 62-65.) \|$ 

Notwithstanding these representations made by ChromaDex in its TAC, Elysium has maintained its counterclaim for declaratory judgment of patent misuse. (*See generally* TAC.) Elysium has also added a counterclaim for restitution for unjust enrichment, seeking repayment of royalties that it paid under the TLRA, plus interest and attorneys' fees. (*Id.* ¶¶ 144–150.) ChromaDex now moves under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) to dismiss the counterclaims for patent misuse and unjust enrichment. (*See generally* Mot.) ChromaDex also moves to strike Elysium's allegations of patent misuse as immaterial to the unjust enrichment counterclaim. (*Id.*)

### III. DISCUSSION

## A. Declaratory Judgment of Patent Misuse

ChromaDex claims the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction over Elysium's fourth counterclaim for declaratory judgment of patent misuse because there is no controversy regarding patent infringement. (Mot. at 11.) "Jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action must be present at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." *Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.*, 540 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). A declaratory judgment action is available where "the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." *MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.*, 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).

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The question here is whether there remains a substantial controversy between the parties to warrant a declaratory judgment. ChromaDex claims that no controversy remains, since it renounced certain rights in the TAC. Namely, ChromaDex makes the following three representations: (1) ChromaDex "unequivocally renounces any rights to collect, charge, or obtain royalties under the [TLRA]"; (2) ChromaDex "unequivocally renounces any rights to charge, obtain, or collect royalties on sales of non-trademark bearing NIAGEN from customers other than Elysium, or to require the use of its trademarks under any agreement"; and (3) Chromadex is "refunding and/or crediting any and all past royalties paid by all customers pursuant to all 'royalty-bearing trademark licenses," and "will provide a credit to Elysium for all past royalties against the damages owed by Elysium in this case." (TAC ¶¶ 62–64.)

In short, ChromaDex has provided a covenant not to collect past-due royalty payments from Elysium and other customers under the TLRA. Elysium argues that this is not sufficient to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction because ChromaDex has not granted Elysium a covenant not to sue for patent infringement. (Dkt. 71 [Opposition, hereinafter "Opp."] at 9–10.) Elysium alleges that "ChromaDex has continued to tout its patent rights to its investors and the public, has stated that it intends to defend its patent rights in the context of describing Elysium's continued sale of Basis containing NR, has accused Elysium of obtaining supply of NR from another source, and has accused Elysium of 'copying' NR." (SACC ¶ 141.) Because ChromaDex has "impliedly threatened Elysium with patent litigation," (*id.*), Elysium alleges that only an irrevocable covenant not to sue for patent infringement would eliminate the "substantial controversy" between the parties, (*id.* ¶¶ 142–143).

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Applying the Supreme Court's "totality of the circumstances test" in *MedImmune*, a district court determining whether a covenant not to sue eliminates a justiciable case or controversy in a declaratory judgment action "should especially consider, in addition to other factors: (1) the language of the covenant, (2) whether the covenant covers future, as well as past, activity and products, and (3) evidence of intention or lack of intention, on the part of the party asserting jurisdiction, to engage in new activity or to develop new potentially infringing products that arguably are not covered by the covenant." *Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC*, 663 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2011), *aff'd*, 568 U.S. 85 (2013).

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The totality of the circumstances here show that there remains a substantial controversy for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Elysium's declaratory judgment counterclaim. First, there remains a threat of future litigation over ChromaDex's NR patents. Nike, Inc., 663 F.3d at 96 ("[T]he threat of future litigation remains relevant in determining whether an actual controversy exists."). ChromaDex has affirmatively protected its patents against Elysium, by requiring Elysium to pay royalties on sales of its products containing NR, and then by initiating a lawsuit against Elysium for those royalties. ChromaDex has decided to drop its cause of action for royalty payments, but only after Elysium's patent misuse counterclaim survived ChromaDex's motion to dismiss. Furthermore, when ChromaDex decided to drop its cause of action, the language in its covenant was carefully prescribed to eliminate only the threat of a lawsuit for past royalty payments. The covenant does not enjoin ChromaDex from any future action that it might take against Elysium for any future sales of Basis, which ChromaDex acknowledges contains NR and is Elysium's only product.<sup>2</sup> The totality of these circumstances, including the narrow language of the covenant, indicates that an actual controversy between the parties remains. See e.g., Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Any of Elysium's future sales of Basis will contain NR, whether the NR is obtained from ChromaDex or another company. Such future sales could form the basis of a patent infringement lawsuit between the parties.

Eyewear, Inc., 556 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that a controversy persisted even though the plaintiff had delivered a covenant not to sue because the covenant only covered prior sales of the allegedly infringing product and did not extend to future sales or marketing). Accordingly, ChromaDex's motion to dismiss Elysium's fourth counterclaim is DENIED.

## **B.** Restitution for Unjust Enrichment

In its fifth counterclaim, which is styled as restitution for unjust enrichment, Elysium seeks restitution of royalties it paid under the TLRA, plus interest and attorneys' fees. (SACC ¶ 150.) ChromaDex claims that Elysium lacks standing to bring such a claim because ChromaDex has agreed to credit Elysium for all past royalties, with interest, against the damages Elysium is found to owe in this case. (Mot. at 16–18.) In its reply brief in support of its motion, ChromaDex even offers to deposit the royalties and interests it owes with the Court. (Dkt. 72 [Reply] at 13.) On the other hand, Elysium asserts that a "credit" to Elysium is not sufficient to eliminate standing because "there may never be a damages award judgment for ChromaDex at the conclusion of this case. In that event, there will be nothing against which to apply a 'credit.'" (Opp. at 13.)

The Court agrees with Elysium that ChromaDex's offer of a credit, and even its offer to deposit money with the Court, does not moot Elysium's claim for restitution. "Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit case law, a claim becomes moot when a plaintiff *actually receives* complete relief on that claim, not merely when that relief is offered or tendered." *Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 819 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction persisted where plaintiff was offered funds deposited in an escrow account, but had not yet received any relief on his claims.)

Elysium has not actually received the payments it seeks under its restitution counterclaim, so the claim is not moot.<sup>3</sup>

ChromaDex further argues that even if Elysium's counterclaim for restitution is not moot, it must be dismissed because unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action under California law. The Court disagrees. "While California case law appears unsettled on the availability of such a cause of action, this Circuit has construed the common law to allow an unjust enrichment cause of action through quasi-contract." *ESG Capital Partners, LP v. Stratos*, 828 F.3d 1023, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). "Under California law, the elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) receipt of a benefit; and (2) unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another." *Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 582

F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

Elysium alleges that it paid royalties to ChromaDex, and that ChromaDex unlawfully retained these payments because requiring the royalty payments constituted patent misuse. These allegations are sufficient to show that ChromaDex received and unjustly retained the royalty payments. *See ESG Capital Partners, LP*, 828 F.3d at 1039. Should ChromaDex be found to have unlawfully required royalty payments, Elysium would be able to recover restitution based on the theory of unjust enrichment.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, ChromaDex's motion to dismiss Elysium's fifth counterclaim is DENIED.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> ChromaDex suggests that Elysium's restitution counterclaim may be mooted once ChromaDex deposits money with the Court and unconditionally relinquishes its entire interest in the deposited funds. (Mot. at 13.) But the Court is not persuaded that such conduct would moot Elysium's counterclaim. The Ninth Circuit has stated that under the common law doctrine of tender, there may have been occasions when such a deposit would constitute an actual payment, but "common law tender exists principally as a means of limiting damages or costs rather than mooting claims." *Chen*, 819 F.3d at 1146.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> District courts have dismissed unjust enrichment claims where the sole remedy available to the plaintiff would be available under the plaintiff's other claims. *Baggett*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. That reasoning does not apply here, because none of Elysium's other counterclaims allow for a recovery of money damages for patent misuse.

### C. Motion to Strike

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court may strike "from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The essential function of a Rule 12(f) motion is to "avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." *Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co.*, 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, motions to strike are typically viewed with disfavor because they are often used for purposes of delay, and because of the strong judicial policy favoring resolution on the merits. *RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broadcasting Co.*, 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In reviewing a motion to strike, the court must view the pleadings under attack in the light most favorable to the pleader. *Lazar v. Trans Union LLC*, 195 F.R.D. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal. 2000). "If there is any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the court should deny the motion." *Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc.*, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

ChromaDex moves to strike the allegations of patent misuse in Elysium's fifth counterclaim as immaterial. (Mot. at 19.) ChromaDex argues that whether ChromaDex engaged in patent misuse is immaterial because ChromaDex has renounced its right to collect any of the royalty payments. (*Id.*) ChromaDex's argument is based on the presumption that Elysium's patent misuse counterclaim is moot. Because the Court has found that Elysium maintains standing to pursue its counterclaims for declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment based on ChromaDex's patent misuse, ChromaDex's motion to strike is DENIED.

# IV. CONCLUSION

DATED:

November 28, 2017

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Defendant's fourth and fifth counterclaims is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion to strike allegations of patent misuse in Defendant's fifth counterclaim is also DENIED.

CORMAC J. CARNEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE