PATRIOTISM
IN THE LIVES OF
INDIVIDUALS
AND NATIONS

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CHAPTER TWELVE

The Monopolization of Patriotism

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INTRODUCTION

Patriotism is not a modern phenomenon. It probably has its beginning in prehistoric times when individuals organized in groups (e.g., tribes, clans), settled in a specific territory (e.g., region, country), and developed an attachment to both land and group. Defined as an attachment of group members toward their group and the country in which they reside, patriotism can be found in every ethnographic group that lives in a particular geographical space. This attachment, which is associated with positive evaluation and emotion, is expressed by beliefs connoting contents of belonging, love, loyalty, pride, and care toward the group and land (see Bar-Tal, 1993).

Groups cherish patriotism, impart it to the young generation, and try to maintain it in their collective ideology. All the political, social, educational, and cultural institutions are mobilized to inculcate and glorify patriotism. Patriots are the society’s most revered heroes, and patriotism is viewed as a core value in the societal ethos. Nevertheless, patriotism is also often viewed with ambiguity and suspicion. During our century voices have appeared that blamed patriotic zeal for causing some of mankind’s worst evils (e.g., Holmes, 1925; Nathanson, 1993; Snyder, 1976; Waldenstein, 1917).

The present chapter, while attempting to differentiate between what it defines as “genuine” patriotism and its bastard offsprings (see also Saub’s chapter), will focus on one of its distorted manifestations, which occurs when patriotism is monopolized. Specifically, this chapter will first present a conception of universal, genuine patriotism; then it will describe the negative phenomenon of the monopolization of patriotism; third, it will elucidate the severe consequences of this phenomenon; and finally, the chapter will provide a conclusion to the previously presented conception.

FUNDAMENTAL PATRIOTISM

While the nature of patriotic feelings and beliefs has probably remained the same throughout the centuries, the objects of patriotism have changed. The societal and political systems, to which individuals as group members feel belonging and allegiance, have gone through remarkable changes. Human beings organized their lives on their territories as tribes, polis, kingdoms, princedoms, and independent cities, to name just a few examples—and developed patriotism.

In the last centuries when the dominant societal-political unit became that of the nation and state, patriotism has become ever more closely related to this system (Seton-Watson, 1977; see also the chapters by Kashfi and Ben-Amos in this book). Individuals’ social identity reflects their belonging to a nation and their citizenship in a state. On this basis develops an attachment, which is most often directed toward the nation and state. It should, however, be noted that not all nations have a state, and some are still struggling to achieve it (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians). Also, states may include several nations and ethnic groups that try to achieve unity (a new sense of nationhood) and a correspondingly unified sense of patriotism (e.g., Switzerland, Nigeria, India).

The new era of nations and states brought with it nationalism, considered a phenomenon similar to patriotism. Nationalism is defined as the self-recognition of a group as a nation that either aspires to a state or has one state and views it as the fulfillment of its self-determination. Nationalism considers a state as indispensable for the political, social, cultural, and economic functioning of the people (Kohn, 1955; Norbu, 1992; Smith, 1971; Snyder, 1954). (See also the chapters by Worchel and Coutant and by Kelman, which elaborate on the differences between patriotism and nationalism.)

Patriotism, in contrast to nationalism, does not dictate the nature of the group’s political organization. However, in periods of rising nationalism, patriotism has often been recruited for the welfare of nation and state. The present paper thus will focus on patriotism in the framework of nation and state.

Fundamentality of Patriotism

The fact that individuals tend to have a sense of national identity and an attachment to their nation indicates the fundamental role of patriotism in
their social-psychological makeup. Self national identity is a sign of belonging—a necessary condition for patriotism. But love and care, as expressed in attachment, provide patriotism with its special meaning. Love is the affection that group members feel toward their nation and the country in which the nation resides. Patriots not only have a sense of belonging to the nation, but also love its heritage, the culture, the people, and the landscape of the country with its flora and fauna. Patriots do not want to be members of another nation or live in other countries. Even when, as a result of special circumstances, they are compelled to leave their country, they always wish to return. Moreover, patriots care for their nation and country. Patriots are interested in the well-being of the nation and country and often are willing to make sacrifices for its sake.

The above indicates that patriotism has cognitive, emotional, and behavioral implications. The cognitive element is reflected in the existence of a wide array of beliefs that express patriotism (e.g., "I love my nation" or "I am devoted to my state"). The emotional component is most clearly expressed in the positive affect that patriots have toward their nation and state. The behavioral aspect of patriotism derives from the other two elements: here the cognitions and feelings are translated into action. Patriots are expected to act on behalf of their nation and state.

Still, although the patriotic sentiment is universal, individuals differ in the degree of their attachment to nation and state, and thus in the level of their patriotism. The level of individuals' patriotism depends, among other factors, on their level of identification with the nation and state, their internalization of patriotic values, and their perception of the needs of the state and nation. Moreover, it should be noted that there are also differences among nations. Not all nations emphasize the value of patriotism equally.

The above conception outlines a fundamental patriotism in its positive and genuine form. Without minimal patriotism a nation or state may disintegrate, as it cannot exist without its members having some sense of belonging, love, and care. Patriotism thus is fundamentally functional for nations and states.

In addition, patriotism contributes to national cohesiveness by giving expression to people's desire to be part of the nation. It also motivates nation members to act on behalf of the group by providing the explanation and justification for giving up personal comfort so as to contribute time, effort, or money for the benefit of their nation. This form of patriotism can be so forceful as to cause individuals to go to extremes such as sacrificing their lives for their nation and country. Conditions of emergency, especially wars and disasters, require mobilization of nation members for the welfare and security of the nation and the country. These are the times when patriots demonstrate their patriotism through actions, in addition to the feelings and beliefs that are its basic psychological substrate.

**Positive and Negative Types of Patriotism**

In spite of the above-described fundamentality and functionality of patriotism, it is often presented as a source of evil. After World War I, for instance, patriotism was seen as one of the causes of a tragedy in which millions of people lost their lives (Holmes, 1925; Waldenstein, 1917). Subsequently, Nazism and fascism, with their terrible consequences, anchored their ideology in patriotism, and this served as additional evidence of patriotism's potentially destructive effects.

Patriotism indeed has two faces—one fundamental and positive, which was described in the first part of the chapter, a patriotism that genuinely reflects group members' attachment toward their nation and state. The other aspect is the distorted-negative one. This is not a necessary corollary of the former, but may appear in nations under certain circumstances.

This negative patriotism can be classified into at least two types: one is often called chauvinism or jingoism and is reflected in blind and fervent acceptance of one's own group, on the one hand, and complete rejection of out-groups, on the other hand (see the chapter by Gozman). This type of negative patriotism usually has negative consequences for out-groups since it may lead to conflicts, violence, and even wars between nations. The other negative type of patriotism emerges when a group, or groups, in a nation limit the definition of patriotism by adding onto it alien elements such as ideology, goals, values, norms, policies, or leadership support that exclude those nation members who do not share these elements from the patriotic camp. That is, it takes place in situations when a particular ideology, goal, policies, or other elements are considered by a group or groups as the only desirable condition for the nation and state, and are viewed as a necessary way to express patriotism. In these cases, only those group members who accept the added elements are considered patriots, while other group members who are attached to the nation and country but do not embrace the additional beliefs are labeled nonpatriots. I call this phenomenon the
monopolization of patriotism, and it is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

**MONOPOLIZATION OF PATRIOTISM**

As was said above, in its fundamental form, patriotism refers to attachment as reflected in a sense of belonging, love, and care for the nation and state. It has a discriminatory element since it differentiates between in-group members and out-groups by drawing a boundary between nations that are members and those who are not, on the assumption that almost all the former have a sense of belonging and patriotic feelings toward their nation and the state in which they reside. Indeed, it is fairly hard to imagine a nation member who will declare a lack of at least minimal attachment to his/her nation and state. In this, patriotism allows both the differentiation from out-groups, and the inclusion of all the nation members, new and old, with different ethnic origins, races, ideologies, values, or religious persuasions, within the same boundaries, that is, those of their state.

Nevertheless, in its negative form, patriotism may become a mechanism of exclusion also for the in-group members. This happens with the monopolization of patriotism. Of special significance are those cases when the subgroup that monopolizes patriotism also governs the nation. Such a group may have the power to oblige the definition of patriotism, to legalize and even enforce it. The extreme cases of monopolization of patriotism are found in totalitarian systems. But monopolization of patriotism may equally occur in democratic systems, and a group does not have to be in power to monopolize patriotism. Various groups, some in opposition to the governing group, may support a particular idea and consider it essential to being a patriot. Monopolization of patriotism thus demands unquestioning loyalty not only to the nation and state, but also unquestionable support of the particular idea. It originates in a group and has an influence on the individuals (i.e., particularly ideology, values, policy, or support of a leadership and regime). This conception complements Staub's view of blind patriotism, which focuses on individuals' unquestioning loyalty to a particular state and nation (see Staub's chapter).

**Examples of the Monopolization of Patriotism**

The monopolization of patriotism is most saliently exemplified by totalitarian regimes because it is one of the explicit foundations of totalitarianism. The totalitarian regime defines the boundaries of patriotism, harnessing it for the complete support of the dominant ideology, practiced policies, and governing leadership. In totalitarian regimes only those group members who support the ideology, policies, and leadership are considered patriots. Any opposition to them is viewed as nonpatriotic at best, and often as treason. Patriotism serves totalitarian regimes as one of their most important legitimizations: the dominant ideology, the policies, and actions are always presented as benefiting the nation and the state, and as a reflection of true patriotism.

Naziism in the totalitarian German of 1933–1945 considered patriotism to be part of its ideology. In this view the National Socialist movement embodied the German nation: Naziism reflected the real meaning of Germany, and only Nazis were viewed as German patriots. The Nazi version of patriotism required an acceptance of Nazi ideology and support of the Nazi regime. The declaration that "The National Socialist Movement has become the Reich, the German State" (in Baynes, 1969, p. 198) made at the annual gathering of the Nazi party in Nuremberg on September 2, 1933, is an example of this view. On June 17, 1934, Hitler again identified Germany with the National Socialist movement, when he said:

> The fate of the community of the German people is bound with the existence of this Movement, and the fate of the German Reich is dependent on the strengthening of the community of the German people. (Baynes, 1969, pp. 231–32)

The implication was that only supporters of Nazism were patriots, and Hitler clearly stated on March 1, 1933, that:

> He who raises himself against this life of the nation will meet our resolution and on this resolution he will be dashed in pieces whoever he be. (Baynes, 1969, p. 233)

A similar monopolization of patriotism can be observed during the 1922–1943 totalitarian fascist regime of Mussolini in Italy. The only true patriots were considered those who supported fascist ideology, which was the only legitimate one. In the official credo of fascism, Mussolini (1935) identified devotion to the state with support for fascist ideas.

According to Mussolini's fascist doctrine the state stands above the individual

> . . . and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State . . . Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual. . . . The fascist conception of the state is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, fascism is totalitarian and the Fascist State—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of people. (Mussolini, in Halperin, 1964, pp. 146–47)
In such an ideology patriotism is viewed through a very narrow prism. The fascist state defines the permissible values and beliefs and requires that citizens accept them if they want to be considered patriots. Mussolini (Halperin, 1964) specified a long list of values and ideas that are alien to Fascist doctrine and therefore can neither flourish in the state nor be held by Italian patriots. According to Mussolini, fascism is opposed to classical liberalism which arose as a reaction to absolutism and exhausted its historical function when the State became the expression of the conscience and will of the people. . . . (Halperin, 1964, p. 146)

Fascism also opposes Socialism to which unity within the State (which amalgamates classes into a single economic and ethical reality) is unknown and which sees in history nothing but the class struggle. Fascism is likewise opposed to trade-unionism as a class weapon. . . . (Halperin, 1964, p. 147)

Fascism also opposes democracy "which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of the largest number" (Halperin, 1964, p. 147).

Monopolization of patriotism also took place in the Soviet Union, whose totalitarian regime defined only supporters of the communist ideology as patriots. Since the October 1917 Revolution the Soviet Communist Party had supported traditional Marxist internationalism, but in the 1930s Stalin began to create a new Soviet patriotism by yoking patriotic devotion to the Soviet state to support for Bolshevik ideology (Rigby, 1966). An example of this can be seen in a speech Stalin made in 1930:

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in the hands of the working class, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our Socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system in the economy. (Stalin, 1966, p. 48)

The monopolization of patriotism is directly expressed in formal Soviet publications about patriotism, for instance, in the writings of Matyushkin, one of the communist ideologists:

Soviet patriotism constitutes the fusion of the progressive national traditions of the peoples with the common vital interests of all the toilers of the USSR. This marvelous fusion was created by the Party of Bolsheviks. The Party of Lenin and Stalin is the inspire and teacher of Soviet patriotism, the founder of the new patriotic traditions of the working people of the USSR. (Barghoorn, 1956, p. 9)

Another formal definition which appeared in 1949 stated that patriotism is

Boundless love of the Soviet people for the Socialist motherland, the unity of all the fraternal peoples around the Party of Lenin, and Stalin and the Soviet government. (Barghoorn, 1956, p. 9)

The monopolization of patriotism continued in the Soviet Union until its collapse. During the time of Mikhail Gorbachev, it appeared in the approved program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 1, 1986:

The Party will continue to work tirelessly so that in every Soviet citizen feeling of love for the country of the October Revolution where he was born and grew up, and pride for the historic accomplishments of the world's first socialist state are combined with feeling of loyalty to proletarian socialist internationalism, of class solidarity with the working people of the fraternal countries, with all who are fighting against imperialism, and for the social progress and peace. (White, 1989, p. 87)

Japan, beginning with the Meiji Restoration Period (when Emperor Meiji restored Japan's sovereign power in 1868) until its surrender at the end of World War II, offers another example of the monopolization of patriotism (Wilson, 1992). Part of the restoration process was to revive the Shinto religion and make the emperor a god who had descended from heaven. Shintoism gave a religious basis to the ensuing nationalism. State Shintoism was placed under a government department, Shinto shrines were installed in every school, and Shinto rituals were incorporated in school programs (Ishida, 1983).

The essential element in Shintoism was patriotism. Shintoism was an extraordinary instrument for creating a mass loyalty to the imperial institution and to the emperor in particular. Thus, a patriot in Japan was considered a person who accepted the principles of Shintoism and especially the cult of the emperor. Since the emperor and the state were considered to be one and the same thing, and the emperor was worshipped as the head of state, Japanese monopolization of patriotism evolved easily and with great intensity and strength (Sunoo, 1975).

Peron, the dictator governing Argentina between 1946 and 1955, used monopolized patriotism to strengthen his regime. He frequently used patriotic themes in his speeches, identifying real Argentinean patriots as supporters of his "revolution," doctrine, movement, and leadership. He presented himself as superpatriot, national patron, and the embodiment of the Argentinean nation (Alexander, 1951; Baily, 1967; Blanksten, 1953). This view can be found in Peron's speeches, as the following excerpts illustrate. In a speech
given on January 11, 1949, he identified the Peronist movement with the Argentinean nation, and its objectives as the true expression of patriotism.

The Peronist movement is not a political party; it does not represent any political group. It is a national movement; this has been its basic idea. We are not, I repeat, a political party; we are a movement and as such we do not represent sectarian or party interests; we represent only the national interests. That is our aim. Our objective, pure and simple, is that which should be the objective of all nations that are striving for the happiness of their sons and for the greatness of their Homeland. (Peronist Doctrine, 1952, p. 186)

On July 25, 1949, Peron said:

The Peronist Doctrine supports the truths, the naked truth, the absolute truth, such as is maintained by men of goodwill and of an honest heart. That is Peronism. That is why we have so often repeated: "One only doctrine, the Peronist Doctrine; one only flag, that of the country; and one only greatness, that of the flag and the Homeland." (Peronist Doctrine, 1952, pp. 164-65)

And in May 1951, Peron declared:

The choice is between Peronism and anti-Peronism, between Brodenist confabulation and the national sovereignty... between the Homeland and treason. (Peronist Doctrine, 1952, p. 114)

Patriotism is not only monopolized by totalitarian regimes. In democratic countries, too, a party, an organization, or leader(s) may monopolize patriotism. It may be done by the opposition or by the governing party or leaders. In the latter case the consequences may be more severe since being in power implies a capability to enforce the government definition of patriotism.

In certain respects U.S. patriotism shows signs of monopolization. Americans often view a patriot as one who accepts American, capitalist values. Berger (1977), referring to this tendency, pointed out that American patriotism is characterized by a peculiar linkage with a highly articulate political ideology, and it is assumed that every American will not only love his country but owe allegiance to its official ideology. (P. 126)

As a result, he noted, "This of course, has led to the peculiar notion of 'un-American' beliefs" (p. 126). According to Berger, a person could be labeled "un-American," for example, if he/she believed in socialist ideas (see also the chapter of Andrews).

For a short period of time, between 1950 and 1954, the monopolization of patriotism in the United States reached a climax. In those years Senator Joseph McCarthy led a campaign which was directed against Americans whom he thought supported or sympathized with communist ideas. He argued that such Americans could not be patriots, and were really spies and traitors (Griffith, 1987; Oshinsky, 1983). In his initial accusation on February 9, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator McCarthy said:

While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of two hundred and five that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department. (Rovere, 1959, pp. 101-02)

Very few Soviet spies were actually caught in the United States, but this campaign was directed toward those Americans whose only "crime" was that they either had or were perceived to have left leanings and liberal opinions, which Senator McCarthy and his supporters negated. In this case, the political group around Senator McCarthy monopolized patriotism by claiming that American patriots could not hold certain ideological beliefs (Harper, 1969).

In Israel the monopolization of patriotism has been going on for a couple of decades. The conquest of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights by Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967 has resulted in a long-standing controversy among Israelis with regard to the country's future boundaries. Some Israelis have claimed that these boundaries should be extended to include large portions of the occupied territories, especially the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, as a realization of a Jewish right to return to their ancient homeland and in order to secure the existence of the state. In contrast, a significant segment of the Israeli society does not accept this idea of a Greater Israel (Eretz Israel Hashlamona) and believes that the Jews' right to a homeland has been met by the establishment of the Jewish State (Avineri, 1986; Elam, 1984; Horowitz & Lissak, 1990; Shapira, 1992).

This controversy has marked Israel's attitude regarding the self-determination of the Palestinian people, the appointment of their representatives, and various proposed solutions to the Middle East conflict. It polarized Israeli society to doves and hawks. While the so-called "doves" advocate giving up the occupied territories in return for peace and oppose the policy whereby Jews settle on these territories, "hawks" take an uncompromising stand in dealing with Arabs; support the notion of a Greater Israel, which
implies holding the territories and advocate the Jewish settlement of them (Arian, Talmud, & Hermann, 1988; Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994).

Often the controversy is debated in terms of the goals and essence of the Jewish national movement—Zionism and patriotism. Hawks argue that agreements involving the return of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights in exchange for peace violate the objectives of Zionism and therefore should be seen as anti-nationalistic (anti-Zionist) and nonpatriotic. A campaign that operates on the basis of the monopolization of patriotism has been waged against individuals, political parties, and extraparliamentary organizations that have advocated concessions of “land for peace.”

When the hawkish party Likud headed the coalition and its leader served as prime minister, this campaign was directed against those who oppose its hawkish policy, which advocated the settlement of the occupied territories and refusal to relinquish them even in return for peace. For example, on December 22, 1991, Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir said at the meeting of the Likud Secretariat:

Everywhere in the world, the opposition is part of the democratic system, but we are different from the rest of the world. We have groups and parties which support peace at all cost, are ready to relinquish the last piece of national interest for what they call peace... They collaborate with the most extreme among our enemies, who advocate a Palestinian state, plot to rob us of Jerusalem, approve armed terror against Israel. This is an unusual phenomenon on the international political map, and it requires unity in the Likud Party to strengthen the solidarity of the national camp. (*Haaretz*, December 23, 1991)

Since 1992, when Labor won the elections, the campaign has been directed against its coalition government. This government entered into negotiations with neighboring Arab states and Palestinians, accepting the principle of “land for peace.” Ariel Sharon, one of the leaders of the Likud Party, said on March 31, 1994: “I have no doubt that Jews in the country and the world feel that the government of Israel has lost its Jewish and Zionist direction” (*Haaretz*, April 1, 1994).

The proponents of negotiation with the PLO and a peaceful resolution of the conflict on the basis of Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories have been labeled nonpatriots, traitors, non-Zionists (or anti-Zionists), or non-nationalists or anti-nationalists. Itzhak Shamir, no longer prime minister, but still a central Likud figure, had the following to say about the Israeli government and the PLO: “The agreement with PLO is a bad and anti-Zionist agreement and therefore we will not honor it” (Yom Shishi, January 14, 1994).

Moshe Peled, a Knesset member and one of the leaders of the hawkish party Tzomet, said: “The decisions of the government are national treason. The government has finally lost its legitimacy” (*Ma’ariv*, August 30, 1993).

And Geula Cohen, a leading hawk, wrote on September 23, 1993: “This is no longer a mistake. This amounts to treason, even if unintended. The treason of the left in Eretz Israel, betraying Jewish history and Zionism...” (Cohen, September 23, 1993).

Elyakim Haetzni, another leading hawk, went as far as saying that “we are under a regime of military occupation by a foreign government” and added that he was waiting for the day when “the government will be put on trial for treason” (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, September 23, 1994).

**CONSEQUENCES OF MONOPOLIZING PATRIOTISM**

The label *nonpatriot* has affective and behavioral implications because all nations hold patriotism as a fundamental requirement in their group’s existence (see Bar-Tal, 1993), and because probably almost all group members like to consider themselves patriots. The identification of a person or a subgroup as nonpatriotic is in essence an exclusion from a nation itself. Being a nonpatriot implies that a person is not attached to the nation and state, that he/she does not feel belonging, does not love it, and does not care about it. Members of a nation typically desire to be considered patriots and do not call themselves nonpatriots even in times of hardship, when they oppose the political-social system, or disagree with its policies. The categorization of group members as nonpatriots has important consequences for members of a society. The first consequence of monopolizing patriotism is the delegitimization of those who are branded as nonpatriots. Furthermore, the monopolization of patriotism may lead to their scapegoating, blaming them for the nation’s real and imagined misfortunes. It may also create pressure to conform, since members wish to avoid the negative connotation of the label. Finally, monopolization of patriotism is deeply related to totalitarianism and may lead to it. All these consequences will now be discussed at length.

**Delegitimization and Exclusion**

The monopolization of patriotism leads to the delegitimization of those who do not agree with its narrowed scope. Delegitimization is defined as the categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values. (Bar-Tal, 1989, p. 170)

The label nonpatriot is in itself delegitimizing, indicating that the person does not belong to, does not love, and does not care for his or her own...
nation. Moreover, the label nonpatriot is often used as a synonym for "traitor," implying that "nonpatriots" may harm their own group or act as agents of another hostile group.

In addition to excommunication and rejection, delegitimization also has other behavioral implications for the delegitimized group (Bar-Tal, 1990). It indicates that the delegitimized group deserves punishment. Labels such as "nonpatriot" or "traitor" put individuals and groups in a category of people that should be treated negatively, sometimes even to the extreme of being jailed or executed. Nonpatriots and traitors are considered a threat not only to the basic values and norms, but also to the welfare of the group and even to its existence. The group thus feels an obligation to avert the presumed danger constituted by nonpatriots and traitors, by hurting and punishing them, in order to protect itself. It should be clarified, though, that the monopolization of patriotism is not the only cause of delegitimization, and--on the other hand--delegitimization does not necessarily lead to the oppression of nonpatriots. Oppression of an opposition may occur as a result of numerous political, social, psychological, and economic factors that are not elaborated in this chapter. Nevertheless, the monopolization of patriotism often serves oppressors with a justification for oppression, and even for the elimination of the opposition.

The following several examples illustrate how delegitimization can result from the monopolization of patriotism. In these examples, those who disagree with a particular ideology, ideas, or policy, or oppose a specific leadership and maintain their own beliefs, are delegitimized by labels such as "traitors," "enemies," "conspirators," "spies," and so on. In some cases the delegitimization was accompanied by oppression of the delegitimized individuals and groups.

During the celebration of the third anniversary of his rise to power, Hitler referred in the following way to the opposition:

They are the enemies of our people in our own land; we know them from the time of the Great War, from the time of the melancholy revolts of the year 1918; we know them from the time of our worst collapse. They alone it is who not only do not wish to find the way to us, but who will never be able to find it in the future and then we ourselves renounce. (Baynes, 1969, p. 230)

More than a year after becoming chancellor, Hitler, in a speech delivered to the Reichstag on July 13, 1934, delegitimized opposition groups on the basis of his view of patriotism:

... there is the small body of those international disintegrators of a people who are apostles of the Weltanschauung of Communism alike on the political and economic spheres systematically incite the peoples, break up established order and endeavor to produce chaos. We see evidence for the activity of these international conspirators all about us. Up and down the countries, the flames of revolt run over the peoples. ... Even in Germany some single tools and criminals of this type still again and again seek to exercise their destructive activity. ... The proof of their capacity and of the effect of their supremacy has by concrete examples already become so clear to the German people that the overwhelming majority even of the German working-classes has recognized the true character of these Jewish international benefactors of mankind and is no longer seduced by them. The National Socialist State in its domestic life will exterminate and annihilate even these last remnants of this poisoning and stupefication of the people, if necessary at the cost of another Hundred Years War. (Baynes, 1969, p. 299)

Peron, the dictator of Argentina, used to delegitimize his opponents as nonpatriots. In order to defeat political forces that opposed his regime, he turned political issues into issues of national loyalty by defining them as a matter of national welfare. He labeled the opposition to his policy as un-Argentine and treacherous (Baily, 1967), and he identified its leaders as agents of foreign countries. An example of the way he delegitimized any opposition can be found in Peron's speech of May 1, 1951. He said:

The lewd propaganda which they carry on contributes to enhance the excellence of our ideals and when they emerge from the filthy mud which is the habitual field of their activities and aim at anything higher, they have now no other resource than to agree with us and confirm our doctrine. This is not perhaps the most effective of the Peronist victories, but to oblige even the enemies of the people and of the Nation to cloak their treacherous intentions under the Judicial phraseology of political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice, is undeniably a victory because thus one more of our ambitions has been fulfilled, and that is that no one, no matter what political group he may belong to, may be able to deny his conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Nation. (Peronist Doctrine, 1952, pp. 174-75)

In the United States, McCarthy's monopolization of patriotism led to the delegitimization of many Americans who had, or seemed to have, liberal leanings, as well as of the few who believed in Communism. A long list of individuals, organizations, and institutions were labeled "nonpatriotic," "un-American," "traitors," "spies in the service of foreign interests," and "Communist agents."

Senator Joseph McCarthy initiated a U.S. Senate investigation committee (chaired by Senator Tydings) and himself chaired another one that investigated dozens of U.S. citizens accused of being Communist agents (Latham, 1969; Revere, 1959). McCarthy's Permanent Investigation
Subcommittee conducted 455 preliminary inquiries and 157 investigations between 1953 and 1954. Seventeen of these investigations reached the stage of public hearings, and these were mostly conducted by McCarthy himself (Griffith, 1987). The declared purpose was to "expose" communists, but he also was looking for individuals, especially government employees, who were not "dedicated to the American way of life."

The implications of McCarthy's campaign were far-reaching. The witch-hunt against "communist spies" penetrated into all layers of American society, touching individuals, organizations, and institutions. The delegitimization was directed against many thousands of Americans, especially civil servants, trade unionists, school teachers, university professors, industrial workers, lawyers, journalists, military personnel, writers, and actors. In McCarthy's view, "If you find that a person joins and sponsors or is affiliated with a number of Communist fronts, then you can assume that he's either so naive that he should be removed from his job or that he is loyal to the Communist cause" (McCarthy, 1977, p. 54). In this vein, blacklists were prepared and the consequences of the accusations were severe: people were deprived of passports, fired from jobs, placed under surveillance, interrogated, and isolated by their communities (Cauta, 1978; Griffith, 1987).

**Scapegoating**

When patriotism is monopolized, those who are considered nonpatriots or traitors are often turned into scapegoats because of their disagreement with the dominant goals or ideology, policy, and/or leadership. Scapegoating, defined as unjustly blaming other people for one's own misfortune (Allport, 1958), may arouse animosity, which, subsequently, may result in legal persecution, forcible discrimination, or outright violence.

"Nonpatriots" or "traitors" are the natural candidates for scapegoating. By virtue of their labeling, they are considered not to care for their nation, so it is not difficult to accuse them of being responsible for the nation's difficulties, failures, and hardships. The "nonpatriot" or "traitor" then is said to be "stabbing the nation in the back."

Hitler not only delegitimized "nonpatriots" but also used them as scapegoats. After the Reichstag was set on fire, he referred to Communists and Socialists as the enemies of the state who were responsible for the fire. He said:

By the decrees issued legally we have appointed tribunals which shall try legally enemies of the State and deal with them legally in a way which will put an end to the conspiracies. (Baynes, 1969, p. 235)

Scapegoating the opposition to the National Socialist Movement indeed was a favorite theme of Hitler and other Nazi leaders. All the difficulties, failures, and misfortunes of Germany, including the loss of World War I, economic hardship, the disintegration of German society, and so on, were blamed on the opposition. In his first speech as German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, Hitler said:

The National Government wishes to work and it will work. It did not ruin the German nation for fourteen years, but now it will lead the nation back to health. . . . The Marxist parties and their lackeys have had fourteen years to show what they can do. The result is a heap of ruins. (deRoussy de Sales, 1941, pp. 146-47).

In the McCarthyite U.S., the so-called nonpatriots, agents, and spies were blamed for many of the problems the country faced in that period. For example, the fall of China into Communist hands in 1949, the explosion of the first Soviet nuclear bomb in 1949, and the invasion by North Korean troops of South Korea in 1950, marking the beginning of the Korean War, served as a fertile background for the development of a "red scare." The prevailing assumption was that these failures, but especially the Soviet accession to nuclear power, could not have happened without the help of Americans who served the Communist cause. Few spies indeed were caught, but McCarthy and his followers referred to the penetration of thousands of them into every important U.S. institution, including the Defense Department, State Department, and the military.

The following excerpt from McCarthy's statement of March 30, 1950, illustrates the extent of the scapegoating:

it was not Chinese democracy under Mao that conquered China, as Acheson, Lattimore, Jessup and Hanson contend. Soviet Russia conquered China and an important ally of the conquerors was this small left-wing element in our Department of State. (Harper, 1969, p. 133)

Thousands of loyal Americans thus paid a severe personal price for their views, which were branded as un-American and nonpatriotic.

**Conformity**

When patriotism is monopolized, especially by a group in power, members of the nation may be ready to conform in order not to be considered nonpatriots. Those group members who have differing beliefs regarding the desired goals, values, policies, or ideology may prefer to hide them. They will tend not to express their beliefs and attitudes in order to avoid the label
“nonpatriot,” which is in itself a sanction. The more extreme labels such as "traitor," "enemy," or "foreign agent" evoke more severe sanctions in the form of punishments.

In addition, when the monopolizing group is in power it may enforce conformity not only by sanctions, but also by widespread indoctrination. It may impart the limiting definition of patriotism through various agents of socialization such as the mass media or schools. The pressure for conformity is especially effective when the regime has control over the socialization and communication institutions, on the one hand, and has the power to sanction dissenters, on the other.

Peron, who, as we saw earlier, monopolized patriotism, also pressed for conformity. On January 11, 1949, he said:

Personal ideas serve the cause of individualism and we want to put an end to this individualism in the country, we want all Argentines to think as they will, but we want Argentina, as a whole, to have only one idea. We want Peronists to think as they please but the Peronist party must have a single prevalent idea: that of the majority. (Peronist Doctrine, p. 172)

And on July 25, 1949, he stated:

When everybody knows our doctrine there is no doubt that all Argentines will be Peronists because that doctrine has been created to put and end to the evils which constituted a scourge for the Argentinean people. (Peronist Doctring, p. 165)

Another example of the conformity extorted by the monopolization of patriotism can be found in Japan during the restoration era until the end of World War II. During the prewar years there had been a tremendous pressure for conformity based on loyalty and patriotism (Ishida, 1983). As Japan encountered mounting hostility in the world and as its sense of isolation increased, the government's appeals for patriotic sacrifice grew more insistent. Not only the schools and the media, but also village-level government was pressed into service to convey the message of loyalty to the emperor, patriotism, and the need for even greater sacrifice (Smith, 1983). Ideological indoctrination to this effect was spread by all the channels of communication, and it likened the emperor's relation with the people to that between father and son (Fukutake, 1989).

The Japanese people were to suppress their own individuality and always behave in accordance with the overruling requirements of the nation. Patriotism was expressed through obedience to the Great Imperial Will and the most sincere reverence for the emperor. In this narrow and limiting definition, patriotism became a religion of sorts in prewar Japan. Patriotic values were actively imparted in Japanese schools. The Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 had introduced moral education in all Japanese primary schools and was used as a means of patriotic indoctrination. In fact, Japan is an example of a case where indoctrination and the pressure to conform were relatively successful, since opposition to the leading ideology, policy, and leadership was minimal.

In contrast, in the United States during McCarthyism, in spite of the tremendous pressure to conform to the "patriotic" line dictated by the campaign, there were forces who opposed and politically fought this line. Still the McCarthy era will be remembered as a period of conformism and obedience. Individuals, organizations, and institutions conformed to the spirit of McCarthy's patriotism and acted in accordance with its requirements. Aside from the many Americans who did not dare to express their own opinions or oppose McCarthyism, there were also numerous cases of unwilling collaboration with the witch-hunting (Causse, 1978; Griffith, 1987).

**Totalitarianism**

The monopolization of patriotism may be seen both as one of the reflections of totalitarianism and as one of its antecedents. In other words, totalitarian regimes, which arise as a result of various economic, political, cultural, and psychological conditions, are characterized also by the monopolization of patriotism. Once a group in power begins to monopolize patriotism and enforce the monopolization, totalitarianism begins.

Two of the five characteristics of totalitarianism proposed by Aron (1969) apply directly to the monopolization of patriotism:

1. The totalitarian phenomenon occurs in a regime which gives one party the monopoly of political activity.
2. The monopolistic party is animated as armed with an ideology on which it confers absolute authority and which consequently becomes the official truth of the state. (P. 193)

What this suggests is that in totalitarian regimes the one official party and ideology are presented as expressing the will of the nation (Curtis, 1979). Only their support reflects real patriotism.

Totalitarian regimes limit the definition of patriotism by specifying a glorified ideology, values, policy, and leadership, as was shown in the previously provided examples of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Communist Soviet Union (Radel, 1975). The monopolization of patriotism offers such totalitarian regimes legitimization and justification for oppressing any opposition.

Grodzins (1956) pointed out:
In democratic states it is easy to maintain loyalty because the meaning of national loyalty is ambiguous. But the ambiguities are drastically reduced with totalitarianism. There is no way by which individuals can openly justify action contrary to the government by appealing to the national cultural complex, national ideals, or the sacred fatherland. The rulers make full use of these concepts in their effort to promote patriotic endeavor; and many individuals and groups are able to serve a hated leader by convincing themselves that they really serve the fatherland. But no opposition can be based upon unproved definitions of the nation. If individuals or groups distinguish the nation demanding loyalty from the totalitarian government in power the distinctions cannot be made public. Those who make them are traitors. (p. 75)

It is thus not surprising that in totalitarian regimes all those who oppose the regime are subjected to persecution and oppression. In the case of Italy, the fascist regime limited and eventually eliminated all the opposition, in the name of the nation’s welfare. In a speech given on January 3, 1925, before the Chamber of Deputies, Mussolini openly expressed his intentions of suppressing the opposition and then went on to explain that

... what I am planning to do is not the result of personal caprice, or a lust to govern or an ignoble passion, but solely the expression of boundless and mighty love for the fatherland. (Halperin, 1964, p. 113)

About three years after the march on Rome, on December 24, 1925, the fascist government obtained the right to dismiss the civil and military officials “who do not furnish full guarantees as to their loyal fulfillment of duty or show lack of sympathy towards the general political direction of the government.” In his famous address to the chamber on May 26, 1927, Mussolini declared that there is no place for antifascists in Italy. Moreover, it was made a legal offense (Article 166) to be an antifascist, and offenders were put on the same level as criminals. Opposition to fascist ideology and leadership was considered harmful to Italy and therefore socially dangerous. Opponents were deported, jailed, and even murdered (Halperin, 1964; Tannenbaum, 1972).

In the name of love for the fatherland Mussolini dissolved organizations that were “subversive” to the nation and state. Seized newspapers, jailed opponents of the Fascist Party, and outlawed antifascist parties. By a royal decree on September 2, 1928, the Fascist Party assumed total power in Italy, and Mussolini was raised to the pinnacle of his authority as Il Duce—the leader of fascism. (Delzell, 1961; Gregor, 1979; Halperin, 1964; Tannenbaum, 1972).

Within a very short time of his ascendance to power, on July 10, 1933, Hitler monopolized patriotism legally by abolishing all political parties on the grounds that

The Party has now become the State... there is no longer any authority emanating from any one part of the Reich, but only that based on the idea of the German nation as a whole (Baynes, 1969, p. 265)

From the moment Hitler took the office of Chancellor, all forms of repression against the “enemies of the nation” were permitted, a situation that lasted until the end of the Nazi regime. Measures ranged from short terms of imprisonment or physical assault on individuals to mass extermination of whole groups that opposed Nazism. Terror against the opposition became a principal means of control (Frei, 1993; Hildebrand, 1991).

Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the totalitarian monopolization of patriotism had severe consequences for those who expressed opposition or even dared to criticize the dominant ideology, policies, or leadership. They were accused of being conspirators, spies, and foreign agents; they were jailed, exiled and, during the Stalin era, often executed (Armstrong, 1961; Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; d’Encausse, 1981). No formal opposition was allowed. Even within the Communist Party, any implicit or indirect opposition to Stalin’s policy was interpreted as harmful to the Soviet Union and might well result in death. Moreover, from time to time during Stalin’s totalitarian regime, purges were carried out, frequently on the basis of suspicion only, in which many of the Soviet citizens were executed (Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; d’Encausse, 1981; McClosky & Turner, 1960; Moore, 1966). Monopolization of patriotism served as a justification to eliminate not only the opposition, but also many loyal supporters of the ideology, “real patriots,” whom the paranoid Stalinist leadership perceived as threats to the regime (Armstrong, 1961; Brzezinski, 1957; Levitsky, 1972).

But the monopolization of patriotism does not occur exclusively in totalitarian countries. If it is practiced by a party and/or leader in power, it may lead to totalitarianism. Thus Bell (1963), for example, described McCarthyism as “the forerunner of an American totalitarianism.” The monopolization of patriotism limits pluralism, freedom of ideas, and equality, which form the basis of democracy. And in doing so, it may be the first step toward totalitarianism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The present chapter analyzes the monopolization of patriotism. It first described the scope of this phenomenon and subsequently its consequences. The chapter proposes that the basic condition for patriotism is attachment to the nation and land reflected in a sense of belonging, love, and care. That is, a patriot is a person who experiences an attachment to his or her own nation and its land. On the basis of this approach a question can be asked.
Should every member of a nation who experiences attachment be considered a patriot, or are there behaviors that clash with our notion of patriotism? More specifically, can we consider, for example, William Joyce, "Lord Haw Haw," the British fascist who broadcast for the Germans during World War II, a British patriot? He believed that Great Britain was taking the wrong course and that instead of opposing Nazi Germany, it should close ranks with it, thus to bolster the West against the Soviet empire. The same question can be asked about other historical figures who collaborated with the enemy of their nation, for example, Vidkun Quisling in Norway or Andrei Vlasov in the Soviet Union, who collaborated with the German conquerors of their country (see more examples in Littlejohn, 1972).

The chapter argues against the monopolization of patriotism and outlines its negative consequences. What remains is the question of the limits of the definition of patriotism. To do full justice to this problem, the moral, social, and political aspects of loyalty and patriotism, which are the concern of philosophers, must be probed further. Nevertheless, I would venture some remarks. It is my opinion that the conception it has its limits. Patriots who feel they belong to their country and nation, and love it, do not collaborate with an enemy who tries to conquer their country or part of it or attempts to subjugate or harm members of their nation. In this view an intentional collaborationist behavior with the enemy that causes harm to one's own people and country is considered nonpatriotic.

But there is one qualification here. If the leaders and the regime massively violate basic human rights, then collaboration with whoever tries to stop this violation is not considered nonpatriotic. The attempt to stop genocide, massive atrocities, or massive oppression by collaboration with an enemy, whose main objective is to bring an end to these offenses, does not prevent a person from being a patriot. A different case is when the enemy itself massively violates human rights. Then, collaboration does not help to prevent the harm and therefore cannot be considered patriotic. According to this view, Willy Brandt, the later German Chancellor who collaborated with the Allied Forces during World War II against Nazi Germany, is considered a patriot (see also the chapters by Staub and Andrews).

The presented qualification implies that patriotism cannot exist separately from other human obligations. Patriotism derives from the sense of belonging to a nation and the development of self-social identity, on which basis individuals acquire a set of commitments toward the nation. But, in addition to this, members of a nation should also be committed to moral values that serve as safeguards against the violations of basic human rights and thus assure that nations do not commit major offenses against humanity. In cases where such offenses take place, it is a basic human duty to stop them. Such moral commitment can serve to put a halt to dangerous versions of patriotism. It should be stressed, therefore, that patriotism, however

respectable an attribute it is considered to be, cannot exist in isolation from general human and moral concerns (see also the chapters by Staub and Nathanson). Members of a nation not only have obligations toward their own nation but also, and just as pressingly, toward humanity. It is a challenge for every nation and state to inculcate patriotism together with a commitment to moral values and human rights. In this vein, Giuseppe Massini, who is considered one of the heroes and symbols of Italian patriotism, rightly suggested, "God has given you your country as cradle, and humanity as mother; you cannot rightly love your brethren of the cradle if you love not the common mother."

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In the midst of the Second World War, Albert Camus was moved to write a series of letters to his German friend, Rene Leynaud, in which he explained what he perceived to be the fundamental difference between their worldviews. He begins the first of these letters by recalling a conversation between them.

You said to me “The greatness of my country is beyond price. Anything is good that contributes to its greatness. . . . ‘No’, I told you, ‘I cannot believe that everything must be subordinated to a single end . . . I should like to be able to love my country and still love justice. I don’t want any greatness for it, particularly a greatness born of blood and falsehood. I want to keep it alive by keeping justice alive.” You retorted: “Well, you don’t love your country.” . . . No, I didn’t love my country, if pointing out what is unjust in what we love amounts to not loving, if insisting that what we love should measure up to the finest image we have of her amounts to not loving. (Camus 1960: 3-4)

For Camus, the only greatness worth having is that which is built on a fundamental respect for the integrity of justice. A “greatness” that is blind or indifferent to the supremacy of this principle, a “greatness” that is “beyond price,” can only be hollow. The context in which Camus makes his case, the Second World War, is perhaps the most pronounced moral tale of the twentieth century. Here are the forces of good and evil, the resistance fighters (of which Camus was a part) against the unconsolable nazi. Can one