
**Introduction: Occupied and Occupiers—The Israeli Case**

Daniel Bar-Tal and Izhak Schnell

We begin our introduction with two quotations that reveal much about the nature of the occupation and the relationship between the occupied and the occupiers.

In a speech that attempted to explain the rationale of his “disengagement plan,” the former Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, said that he had reached the conclusion that “it is impossible to hold 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation” and that “the occupation cannot last indefinitely” (Likud party meeting at the Knesset, May 25, 2003). About five years later, Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, said to soldiers serving in the occupied territories of the West Bank:

> We have to understand that a very large population of Palestinians lives here and we need to find the smartest and boldest mechanism so that before it happens [the withdrawal from the territories], we still achieve maximal security. But we shall not create such breaches with them that will darken the continuation of our life for the coming generations ... take for example a 50-year-old man who lives here—a man who has spent most of his life—40 years of it from age 10—under the control of the Israeli soldier. This soldier justifiably holds a gun. But this is the narrative of this man. Take those who were made to undress at the checkpoints because there may have been terrorists among them. Take those who stand for hours at the checkpoints because a vehicle packed with explosives might go through that checkpoint. It could be a boiling pot that can explode and cause terrible burns and could be something else—that depends only on your understanding and your ability to act with wisdom and boldness. (Haaretz, 2008, p. 3)

These two quotations indicate the realization of two Israeli Prime Ministers, both of whom are political hawks, of the problems that necessarily occur in interactions between occupier and occupied and their serious repercussions. Both quotations focus on the negative effects of the occupation on the occupied population, but the subtext also indicates that the speakers are aware of the negative effects on the occupying society. This is as far as they went. In this
This book focuses on protracted occupation, which is viewed as both attention-grabbing and puzzling in the twenty-first century—an era in which long-term occupation has become exceptional and rare. The analysis begins with a viewpoint suggesting that occupation, by its very nature, usually acquires negative connotations because it is usually carried out coercively, against the will of the occupied population (Edelstein, 2008). In the discussion of occupation, therefore, the focus is frequently on the occupied society, because it bears the very heavy tangible and intangible burdens of the occupation. There is a growing literature on this issue (e.g., Bornstein, 2008; Carlton, 1992; Edelstein, 2003; Playfair, 1992). We are also obliged to analyze the relatively neglected effects of the occupation on the occupying society, effects that are not always explicit or easily observed.

There are two major reasons for this neglect. First, those who study occupations tend to focus on those who are regarded as the primary victims of the occupation—the occupied society. The occupied society, which suffers the major physical and mental costs of the occupation, tries to bring attention to itself to obtain material and moral support and end its own suffering. In turn, the international community, which in the postcolonial era has become more sensitive to oppression and the violation of human rights, focuses on those cases in which occupation still persists, attempting to help the occupied and end the subjugation (Arangio-Ruiz, 1979). Second, the occupying society tries to hide and minimize the costs of the occupation and to focus instead on its justification and legitimation (cf. Jost & Major, 2001). In addition, analysis of the costs requires a critical self-examination, which is very painful and seldom done (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, in press). Analysis of the effects on the occupying society is thus rare, even though it can provide important information on the political, sociological, psychological, legal, cultural, and educational processes in that society, all of which are aspects of the prolonged occupation. These processes have an imprinting and lasting effect on the occupying society, even if that society is not aware of them, ignores them, and/or tries to deny and hide them. We thus believe that it is important to shed light on these processes and to relocate them to the center of academic debate and future research, as well as in public discourse.

This book focuses on a particular case of prolonged occupation—that of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel following the Six Day War in 1967. The causes of this war and its particular context have been well presented in various books, and we shall not rehash them here (e.g., see Lesch, 2008; Morris, 2001; Oren, 2003; Segal, 2007). We shall also ignore the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, because these are presented in detail elsewhere (e.g., see Ben-Yehuda & Sandler, 2002; Caplan, 2009; Dowty, 2005; Morris, 2001; Tessler, 1994; Wasserstein, 2002). Of importance for us is the fact that since 1967 Israel has been occupying Palestinian territories, and the Palestinian population has been living for over four decades under this occupation. In the summer of 2005, Israel withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements on the West Bank; otherwise, it continues to control many aspects of life in Gaza.

As noted above, we will not address the effects of the occupation on Palestinian society because so many publications have been written from this perspective (e.g., Abu-Harthieh, 1993; Aruri, 1989; Gordon, 2008; Khalidi, 1997; Makdisi, 2008). Rather, we will focus on what has been omitted from an interactive analysis of the context of occupation: the effects of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the State of Israel and its entire society.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE OCCUPIER AND THE OCCUPIED**

The fundamental assumption guiding this book is that a prolonged occupation as a military-political-societal-economic-cultural system, which includes both the occupied and occupying societies, has interactive features that influence both societies. Memmi (1990), in his seminal book on colonialism, noted that the colonizers, too, are affected by the system of colonialism. We seek to apply and extend this insight to the situation of occupation and suggest that occupiers are greatly influenced by the system of occupation, focusing on the Israeli occupation. This analysis applies to all those cases in which the occupation is prolonged and unacceptable to the occupied society. These are two necessary conditions for the unfolding of the deleterious effects of occupation that will be described.

We believe that an occupation cannot operate separately from the occupying society, which cannot seal itself off from the occupation and its effects. This connection becomes especially pronounced when the occupier not only penetrates the space of the occupied territory but also settles in these spaces, which are perceived as a continuation of the homeland territory, as in the Israeli case. Following the occupation by the military forces, the boundaries expand, albeit mainly for the occupiers; a continuous process of interaction between occupiers and occupied begins. Although the occupying force believes that it can control the occupied society and its territory, in reality it begins to lose its grip, and processes gradually evolve in the occupied society that exceed the control of the occupying force. These processes first of all touch upon every aspect of the collective life of the occupied society, including
political, economic, cultural, and security aspects. Moreover, these processes also affect the occupying society, because once the occupation begins, a multifaceted and continuous interaction between occupier and occupied occurs, usually starting with resistance to the occupation (see Bar-Tal, in press).

From the beginning, an occupied society is not a passive entity. Instead, it develops forms of action in response to the developing situation, to which the occupying society believes it has the responsibility to react. Some of these forms of action may be explicit; others are not always easily detectable. That is, the occupying force, which is usually not familiar with the culture and customs of the occupied society, finds it difficult to perceive some of these actions and/or attribute the correct meaning to them. In any event, such actions have an effect on the occupying force in the occupied territories and subsequently on the occupying society as a whole. These effects may not appear overnight, but they will gradually penetrate the occupying society and change its nature.

Focusing here on only one example that reflects the cycles of resistance and oppression, we suggest that signs of resistance lead the occupying forces to exert greater control over the occupied society. The occupying society may redirect security forces and resources to the new mission, construct narratives to rationalize the new situation, develop new diplomacy to justify the struggle against resistance, and so on (e.g., see Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Rosler, & Raviv, 2010; Jost, Kay, & Thorsideitir, 2009). These moves slowly lead to changes in the occupying society, changes that are not always observable at first; as the resistance gains strength, however, they become salient. The occupier’s reactions, in turn, provoke counterreactions by members of the occupied society, with both sides entering into an intensive, ongoing, mutual interaction, including vicious cycles of violence that quickly extend into other domains (see also Bar-Tal, 2011). Such violent exchanges are only one example of the complex mutual interactions between the occupied and the occupiers that become a natural and inherent part of the occupation.

Prolonged occupation requires many different activities by both societies in many different domains, such as providing the services needed for daily life; establishing a legal system; opening schools, clinics, and hospitals; providing religious services; developing a system of surveillance and control; and so on. The occupying society initiates well-planned and unplanned series of acts in various areas, beginning with the military but also the legal, political, economic, and more—and these, in turn, trigger new processes that lead to intended or unintended consequences. Moreover, these effects do not stop at the border but influence the occupying society as well, particularly in the case of Israel, where spatial continuity between the homeland and the occupied territories exists and the occupied territory is settled as part of the homeland.

Under such conditions, boundaries become blurred and interactive processes permeate the two territories, initiating long-term changes in every aspect of the occupying society's life. New goals, interests, needs, trends, and developments appear at all levels of the society. New dogmas arise to justify the continuing occupation; new interest groups emerge; new norms, language, and moral standards develop to support the occupation; economic investments are made; the desire arises to seize resources, exploiting the occupied territories and their populations; a new political culture evolves to maintain the occupation; new security needs and new military strategies are developed; new trade markets appear; and groups emerge that object to the occupation and carry out a political struggle against it, reflecting the evolving socio-political polarization, and so on. These processes are well demonstrated in this book.

An analysis of the mutual influences, however, does not depend only on the formal and informal policies and the derivative actions of both societies. The individuals who make up the occupying military and civil forces that are stationed in the occupied territories and enforce the occupation are part of the larger occupying society, and they think and act in a particular way when they are in the occupied territories. They accumulate information, experiences, and political views as well as needs and aspirations. Later, they return to their original milieu with a new behavioral and ideological repertoire that affects their lives. This new repertoire becomes a new motivating force in their thoughts, feelings, and actions. In this respect, the norms, codes of behavior, morals, and practices that develop in the treatment of the occupied population and the occupied territories do not stop at the border. They permeate, even unwittingly, the occupying society and leave their mark on its system of beliefs, values, and patterns of behaviors (Bar-Tal & Halperin, in press).

It is important to remember that the occupied society frequently carries its resistance into the home territory of the occupying forces. It makes every effort to harm the occupying society and strike the most sensitive targets. These acts of violence, including terror, often have a profound effect on the occupying society in many areas of its personal and collective life. Finally, in many cases, members of the occupying society may have contact, either direct or indirect, with members of the occupied society in contexts such as workplaces, personal meetings, and media representations. These contacts eventually affect the occupying society.

These dynamics greatly intensify when the occupying society decides to annex de facto the occupied territories and when it decides to settle in them, bringing new populations that require ideological justification, security and defense, material resources, a legal system, and so on. In these cases, the occupying society tries to differentiate its treatment of the occupied and the
occupiers (i.e., the settlers). These decisions greatly accelerate the effects of lasting occupation on the occupying society and eventually produce deep changes that are very difficult to reverse. The occupying society has to adapt to accommodate, contain, deal with, and live with the evolving context of prolonged occupation. But not all the effects are intended; many are unintended and undesirable. Nevertheless, they become part of the dynamic processes of societal change in the occupying society.

Our main contention is that due to the problematic nature of an occupation—especially a prolonged occupation in which members of the occupying society settle in the occupied territories—it generally leads to violence, oppression, exploitation, domination, and discrimination. The costs on the occupying society thus override the benefits. We go even further in suggesting that an occupying society, when it violates the fundamental principles of justice, morality, and human rights, is condemned to deterioration, degeneration, and decline—at least in regard to its democratic, humane, and moral qualities, which leads to a corresponding political degeneration. We believe that the above analysis is general and can be applied to various societies that carry out lasting occupations to which the occupied resist. We elaborate on this issue in the concluding chapter. In the meantime, we focus on Israeli society, which is the subject of our book.

From the beginning of the occupation Israeli society has been greatly affected by the occupation, not only because of its prolonged nature with all of the implications, including ongoing violence, but especially because the State of Israel has carried out an extensive Jewish settlement of the occupied territories. The objective of this book is to delineate the continuing effects of the Israeli occupation on various aspects of life in Israeli society. Before describing these effects, however, we summarize the legal considerations regarding the nature of occupation in general and prolonged occupation in particular. We then describe the implications of the prolonged occupation before considering the nature of the Israeli occupation. This is followed by a brief outline of the physical costs of the occupation to Palestinian society as well to Israeli society. Finally, we discuss the structure of the book and its constituent chapters.

Occupation: The Legal View

Most current definitions of the term "occupation" are found in the field of international law (e.g., Carlton, 1992). We learn from them that occupation is the temporary control of a territory by another state that claims no right to permanent sovereign control over that territory. An occupying power must intend at the onset of the occupation to vacate the occupied territory and return its control to the indigenous population. A precise date for the return need not be specified, but the occupying power's intention must be clear about terminating this situation. This view is well reflected in the definition proposed by the international legal scholar Byal Benvenisti, who defined occupation as "effective control of a certain power (be it one or several states or an international organization), over a territory which is not under the formal sovereignty of that entity, without the volition of the actual sovereigns of that territory" (Benvenisti, 1993, p. 4). Edelstein (2004) adds that occupation refers to temporary control of a territory by a state that does not claim the right to permanent sovereignty over that territory. This distinguishes occupation from colonialism or annexation, in which the occupant does not necessarily intend to vacate the territory in the future (see Lustick, 1993).

This definition shows that international law considers occupation to be a formal procedure that has implications for the relationship between the occupying force and the occupied population. The main characteristic of occupation, according to these definitions, is its temporary nature. Hence, the occupant is forbidden to take actions that would introduce permanent changes to the occupied territory (see Benvenisti, 1993; Playfair, 1989, 1992; Roberts, 1985, 1990). In addition, legal definitions reveal that occupation is usually seen as a potential (unplanned) by-product of military activities, which result in the conquering party ruling a territory that is recognized as belonging to the defeated party. Such a situation is usually regarded as "belligerent" or "military" occupation (McCarthy, 2005; Rivkin & Bartram, 2003).

However, the history of the last two centuries has demonstrated that occupation can also be the long-term outcome of a threat to use force made by a party, either because of the status quo or a formal agreement, including a peace agreement (e.g., the German occupation of Bosnia in 1939 and of Denmark in 1940). These options have shifted the emphasis from studying occupation as the result of a war-like act to attempting to understand occupation and its mechanisms.

Roberts (1985) distinguishes among 17 types of military occupation that vary in terms of the circumstances in which they occur, the degree of consent of the occupied to the action, the identity of the occupying entity, and the previous status of the occupied territory. The aspect most relevant to the present discussion is the duration of the occupation, which may reflect its essence as well as the goals of the occupant. If the occupation is perceived—by both occupier and occupied—as temporary from the outset, intended to protect the military interests of the occupier and to prevent the occupied territory from becoming a source of instability, then both the occupier and the occupied will likely strive to end it as quickly as possible (Edelstein, 2004).

Roberts (1990) argued that "prolonged occupation" must be regarded as a category that is entirely distinct from temporary military occupation. He
defined the former as lasting for more than five years and continuing even when military hostilities have subsided or ceased. In addition, prolonged occupation raises legal questions concerning the aims of the occupier, who may intend to change the status of the occupied territory. This situation usually has very clear implications for both the occupied and the occupying societies.

In any event, it is important to note that since the early twentieth century, the international community has attempted to regulate and control the behavior of occupying powers. The first important convention concerning moral codes in occupied territories was the Hague Convention of 1907, which stated that concerning "[a] territory that has in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, this authority will take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country" (Article 43, Hague Regulations, 1907). The Hague Regulations also forbid the occupying state from introducing permanent changes into the occupied territory unless these changes emanate from military needs, in the narrow sense, or are intended to benefit the local population. Later, in 1949, the Geneva Conventions were drafted. They have achieved universal acceptance, with amended protocols reinforcing the codification of moral principles regarding occupation. The Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 49) prohibits the occupying state from transferring civilians from its own territory to the occupied territory. Thus, the occupying power should be seen as a trustee of the occupied territory and is responsible for protecting the territory and ensuring the rights of the occupied population (Playfair, 1992).

Another key document setting out the basis for moral principles regarding war and occupation is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference in 1998 and to which 104 countries were signatories as of the beginning of 2007. According to the Rome Statute, grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are considered to be war crimes, and they can be judged and punished by the International Criminal Court.

**Implications of the Occupation**

The implications of the occupation are reflected in three different perspectives: those of the occupied society, the international community, and the occupying society (cf. Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

**The Occupied Society**

From the viewpoint of the occupied society, occupation in most cases is an oppressive experience. Very few societies accept occupation willingly. (We do recognize that there are such cases—sometimes by part of the population, such as Turkish Cypriots, who welcomed Turkey's invasion of the eastern part of Cyprus.) Resistance can be manifested in political action, civil disobedience, and other forms of peaceful protest. In many cases, however, resistance may also involve violent acts, such as attacks against the occupying military forces as well as the occupying civilian population. The occupier naturally attempts to prevent the resistance and punish its initiators. Preventive measures take the form of surveillance, forced collaboration, imposed curfews, and the restriction and prevention of free movement by means of roadblocks and checkpoints, as well as extensive arrests, expulsions, and even killings (Bornstein, 2008). If the preventive measures are also designed to punish the resisting occupied groups, this can lead to other harsh measures, such as imprisonment without trial, torture, deportation of individuals, and/or mass forced transfers, destruction of property, and the use of excessive force against the civilian population, including collective punishments, which can lead to mass killings and even ethnic cleansing.

During prolonged occupations, the occupying power often takes various direct actions that serve its ideological, political-economic, military, and social interests (Gordon, 2008). These may include confiscation of land, settlement by civilians from the occupying state in the occupied territory, use of natural and economic resources of the occupied land, economic exploitation of the occupied population, institutionalized discrimination against the occupied population, and more. In addition, the occupying force may strive to maintain its superiority and domination by exercising continuous control and surveillance over the local population. To accomplish this, the occupier may seek to control the occupied population's political, social, economic, educational, health, and other systems, and their migration and movement. It may also try to prevent their social, economic, and cultural development. These actions cause humiliation to the occupied population both as a collective and as individuals. On the collective level, in addition to the physical harm resulting from the continuous oppression, these acts often greatly damage the societal infrastructure, causing demographic changes, destroying the economic foundations, and damaging the cultural heritage (Aruri, 1983). On the individual level, members of the society living under prolonged occupation, with its vicious circle of coercion, resistance, and violence, not only suffer physically but may also suffer from complex chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, as well as a pessimistic personal and national vision of the future (Lavi & Solomon, 2005).

**The International Community**

Occupation in general is not acceptable in the normative code of today's world. If it takes place, the occupying state must provide convincing reasons...
to justify such an extreme and unacceptable act, especially if the state wishes to be part of the democratic international community. The contemporary liberal discourse, with its emphasis on equality and personal and collective civil and human rights (such as the right to self-determination), significantly influences moral positions on occupation (Howe, 2002). Occupation contradicts the principles of self-determination, collective rights, political independence, and territorial integrity that have gained worldwide acceptance as basic moral principles concerning states and other collectives. Occupation violates those moral principles that constitute the basis of universal human rights, such as the dignity of human life, equality, and the right of the individual and the collective to freedom and independence (Rosier, Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, & Raviv, 2009). All of these principles are firmly anchored in various international declarations, agreements, and conventions. An example can be found in the first Geneva protocol (1977), which applies to situations in which nations fight for their right to self-determination against "colonial domination, foreign occupation and ... racist regimes," all of which are treated as equivalents (see Roberts, 1985). Occupation also violates internationally protected human rights as listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), subsequently developed in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Thus, it is not surprising that both the international community and public opinion have condemned prolonged occupation. Occupation in itself, and especially prolonged occupation, is criticized in international forums, and the occupying states and societies are condemned (see Roberts, 1990). Moreover, in many societies in which notions of human and collective rights are of concern, public opinion and the mass media express their opposition to occupying states and societies. Finally, the occupying states and societies are under close watch and subjected to criticism by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned about human rights, by intellectual and cultural elites with progressive and liberal views, and by the public in many states in general.

The Occupying Society

We suggest that over the last few decades, when at least the well-established democracies have been guided by the liberal values and norms that have developed since the end of World War II, occupation in general and prolonged occupation in particular have become almost totally unacceptable. Occupation has thus acquired a deeply negative meaning, and every occupying society must necessarily confront this (Halperin et al., 2010). The need to view one’s own group positively, including its perception as moral, is based on the well-established finding that members of a society draw their personal self-esteem from the esteem of the groups to which they belong (Tajfel, 1978, 1981). All this adds to the social, cultural, political, and (sometimes) financial cost that prolonged occupation inflicts on the occupying society. We also need to add the cost of the human loss and destruction that usually accompany an occupation, in part because of the violent resistance of the occupied population.

It is clear that in the current international climate, in order for an occupation to persist, the occupying society must be driven by deep and significant motives to attempt it and even more seriously to maintain it. The longer the occupation continues, the more it confronts occupants with difficulties relating to their own morality and legitimacy in their relationship both with the occupied population and with the international community. Members of such a society must thus construct a convincing rationale for the act of occupation or else deny its existence (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Neta-Zehngut, in press).

Many different rationales are given for occupation (Bar-Tal, in press). Sometimes the occupiers believe that the occupation serves an important superordinate (sometimes international) goal, and that occupation is necessary to prevent a higher-level disaster or to achieve another highly valued goal (e.g., the occupation of Iraq by the United States). In other cases, the occupiers believe that the occupation is necessary to achieve existential goals, without which they believe their society cannot survive (e.g., the occupation of Manchuria by Japan). Sometimes the occupiers believe that it is necessary to punish the occupied nation for its wrongdoing (e.g., the occupation of Afghanistan by the United States). In yet other situations, occupying societies may refuse to accept their action as an occupation and define it instead as a "liberation" (e.g., the occupation of certain regions of Georgia by the Russians, the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, or the occupation of Tibet by China). In all cases, the occupants try to provide, even if only superficially, a normal life to the occupied society, and in most cases the occupying society forces openly declare the occupation to be temporary. In very few cases of prolonged occupation, the occupying states make an effort to create fully normal conditions that do not resemble an occupation; even in Tibet the Tibetans officially enjoy the same civil rights as the Chinese population.

We turn now to a discussion of one of the few prolonged cases of occupation today: the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory.

THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION

While many countries were moving to end colonialism and occupation, Israel paradoxically moved in the opposite direction. Most analysts of Israeli policy following the 1967 war, when the territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip,
and the Golan Heights were seized, believe that the prolonged occupation, rather than being the result of a well-considered decision-making process, is the product of an inability to decide or a "decision not to decide" (Gazit, 1999). An alternative view, described by Pedatzur (1996) and others, maintains that the prolonged occupation is an accurate reflection of Israel's aims and interests (Segev, 2007; Zertal & Eldar, 2007).

A meeting between Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan that took place about six weeks after the end of the 1967 war is highly illuminating (see Segev, 2007). The original protocol referred to one of the topics on the agenda of the meeting as "occurrences in the occupied territories." A few days later, an "invisible hand" amended the protocol in writing and replaced the term "occupied territories" with the term "liberated territories"—which had acquired more favorable sociopolitical connotations even at this early stage. Already in the historical decision by the Israeli government on June 19, 1967, in which it was decided by one vote to exchange the Golan Heights and Sinai for peace and, if possible, to unite Jerusalem and incorporate the Gaza Strip into Israel, the ministers could not reach an agreement with regard to the West Bank. Many of them hoped to create an autonomous Palestinian entity adjoining the State of Israel (Oren, 2003). There are also several accounts of how the Israeli political and military leadership decided that the new lines of defense that were established with the conquest of the territories during the 1967 war would become defensive borders (see the chapters by Pedatzur and Magal et al., this volume).

Finally, there are profound discrepancies between Israel's formal legal position and the stance in forums of international law (Benvenisti, 1993; Roberts, 1985). Since June 1967 the Israeli government has in general maintained in all international forums that the territories do not constitute occupied territories and, therefore, that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable to this case. This argument has been based on the supposition that the territories had never been under either Jordanian (in the West Bank) or Egyptian (in Gaza) sovereignty. Thus, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) cannot be seen as an occupier that has usurped the territories from their legal owners (Freyfogel, 1989; Roberts, 1985). Israel has preferred to regard the territories as being "under dispute," which, it was believed, provided room to maneuver in future negotiations. This position has been rejected by many scholars as well as by many states and international organizations. In reality the territories were not annexed; therefore, legally, the Palestinians in the West Bank are not citizens of Israel and they are not allowed to exercise the rights that a sovereign representative government should provide (see the chapter by

Nonetheless, some ambivalence has slipped into Israeli policy making, because in practice it has complied with some of the laws pertaining to an occupying force (Roberts, 1990). Shortly after the end of the 1967 war, then Attorney General Meir Shamgar decided that the Israeli military administration of the territories would obey the rule of international law, "of its own good will," in any case that concerned the treatment of Palestinians in the territories and would even agree to be subjected to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of Israel. In September 1967, the legal counsel to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Justice Theodor Meron, issued a legal opinion (classified as top secret) that Jewish settlement in the occupied territories would constitute a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Gorenberg, 2006). However, as the years went by and the influence of this legal viewpoint on Israel's conduct in the territories weakened, many previously self-imposed restrictions were ignored, Jewish settlements prospered, and violations of Palestinian human rights increased dramatically (Ben-Naftali, Gross, & Michaeli, 2006; Gordon, 2008).

Over time, the Israeli leaders, the political elites, and Israeli society in general have developed a national ideology that provides well-based arguments for remaining in the occupied territories. The foundations of this ideology, which lie in Zionism and Judaism, served well the initial return of Jews to their homeland and eventually the establishment of the State of Israel. The 1967 war, with the occupation of new territories and with its unintended results, led to a reconstruction of the ideology, which aimed at presenting a new view of the emergent situation. Basically, this ideology reformulated the "ethos of conflict" that had dominated Jewish society prior to the 1967 war (see Bar-Tal, 2007). In principle, it provided a system of organized societal beliefs to justify continuing to hold the occupied territories for various reasons—including religious, historical, national, and security-based reasons. Moreover, these beliefs served as the epistemic basis for the extensive Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. In general, they provide ideological justification for continuing the occupation and its accompanying actions, as well as facilitating the construction of a positive collective self-image of the occupying group and the delegitimization of the occupied nation (Halperin et al., 2010; Jost & Major, 2001; Levy, 2006; Kelman, 2001).

In contrast to the dominant view in Israel, it is our contention that both societies are paying a heavy cost for the prolonged occupation. These costs are incomparable, however, because the costs to the occupied society are not only higher, but are also of a different, harsher quality. Because this book focuses on the costs to the occupying society, we shall just briefly mention some of the tangible costs to Palestinian society of the continuing occupation up to 2010.
These costs are directly related to the serious violations of Palestinians' human rights. We leave out of this description an analysis of the societal, political, economic, cultural, and environmental costs, for these are presented in depth elsewhere (Abu-Harthieh, 1993; Aruri, 1989; Gordon, 2008; Khalidi, 1997; Makdisi, 2008; Ophir, Givoni, & Hanafi, 2009).

**Costs of the Occupation to Palestinian Society**

In order to evaluate the extent of the damage done to the Palestinian people, we should note that in 1967, after the war, there were about 600,000 Palestinians residing in the West Bank and about 355,000 in the Gaza Strip (http://israeli-palestinian.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=0005364&chart=5). As of 2010, according to the World Factbook of the CIA, there are 2,514,845 Palestinians residing in the West Bank and an additional 209,000 in East Jerusalem in an area of 5,860 km². There are currently about 1,600,200 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in an area of 360 km² (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html). In addition, in 2010 there were about 313,000 Jewish Israeli settlers in the West Bank and more than 197,000 living in East Jerusalem, annexed by Israel (http://www.cbs.gov.il).

We were unable to obtain any systematic and reliable information concerning the effects of the Israeli occupation on Palestinian society since June 1967. Rather, there are various reports that provide a partial description of the various costs, and we refer to some of them.

The first twenty years after the Six Day War constituted a relatively quiet period in the occupied territories, with economic progress and some broadening of individual liberties as compared with the era of Jordanian rule that had preceded it. This period was even viewed by liberal Israeli Jews as a "benign occupation." Israel invested in developing a more sophisticated form of agriculture, and several colleges were opened. Close to 100,000 registered Palestinian workers and 70,000 unregistered workers commuted to Israel as manual workers, and their standards of living rose. Moreover, as a result of the development during the 1970s and the open border policy, a negative migration balance was replaced by a positive one, and the Palestinian population began to grow rapidly. Finally, with the occupation, the three Palestinian communities in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel were reconnected after nineteen years of separation. The ensuing communication among them contributed to the crystallization of a Palestinian national identity (see Gazit, 2003; Portugal, 2006).

This picture dramatically changed in the late 1970s, however, when the Israeli governments began to alter their policies regarding the occupied territories. For example, an extensive and heavily subsidized Jewish settlement was initiated there, with the aim of disrupting Palestinian territorial continuity in order to implement the ideology of a "Greater Israel" (Gorenberg, 2006; Zertal & Eldar, 2007). Parallel to this development, during the 1980s the occupied Palestinians moved from an attitude of sumud (steadfastness) to one of intifada (eliminate occupation) or rebellion, leading to massive attempts by Israel to contain it through various means of control, oppression, and collective punishment. In the following discussion of the effects of the occupation on the occupied Palestinian society, we begin with a description of the Jewish settlement.

**Jewish Settlement**

The United Nations report notes that Israel built, and continues to expand, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Dugard, 2006). According to B'Tselem, Israel has expropriated 50% of all West Bank territories, mostly by declaring and registering these lands as state lands (B'Tselem, Taking control of the land in the West Bank, 2010) and building Jewish settlements on them (B'Tselem, 1997a). Moreover, according to a report by the Israeli Civil Administration, over one-third of all West Bank settlements have for decades been constructed on private Palestinian lands expropriated for "security needs" via temporary military injunctions (Rapoport, 2008). By March 2010, there were over 120 settlements in the territories (excluding East Jerusalem) and about 100 outposts, officially unrecognized by the authorities, containing 283 permanent homes and 1,865 caravans (Arieli, 2010).

**Land Expropriation**

According to B'Tselem, the procedure by which the State of Israel declares lands to be state lands circumvents the land registration process that is anchored in Jordanian law and international law. Two-thirds of all West Bank lands have thus not been appropriately registered, and their ownership derives from long-term possession (B'Tselem, 1997a). East Jerusalem is just one area in which this procedure has been utilized. Following the 1967 war, Israel annexed to the municipality over 70 km² of land bordering on West Jerusalem, which was part of the State of Israel. About 24 km² of the annexed area, most of which is privately owned by Arabs, was later expropriated by the state. By the end of 2001, 46,978 housing units had been constructed on the lands expropriated in East Jerusalem for the city's Jewish population, while not a single one had been built for Palestinians, who constitute about 33% of the city's residents (B'Tselem, Renovation of residency in East Jerusalem, 2010).
Casualties
At present, there are no sources of reliable and comprehensive data on the total number of Palestinians killed throughout the period of occupation. It is especially difficult to obtain information regarding the first two decades of the occupation. Nonetheless, various organizations do provide partial data on the later periods.

According to data compiled by the B'Tselem, between 1989 and 2009 Israeli security forces killed 7,398 Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories, including at least 1,537 minors (Yahav, 2009). Various collections of data relate to the decisive moments in the occupation, such as the first and second intifadas (the two Palestinian uprisings). Thus, for example, from December 1987, when the first intifada started, to the end of December 1993, 997 Palestinians were killed by the Israeli army (IDF) and 15,839 were injured by the IDF (B'Tselem, 1994). Subsequently, according to information provided by Amnesty International, between 2000 and 2005, and during and following the second intifada, over 3,200 Palestinians were killed by the Israeli forces, including 600 children and over 150 women (Amnesty International, 2005). To these statistics we must add the number of Palestinians who were injured, which probably involves many thousands, but we were unable to find reliable data.

Imprisonment
An estimated 700,000 Palestinians were imprisoned in Israel between 1967 and 2007 (Dugard, 2008), and many thousands of others were tried by the Israeli military courts. Between 1990 and 2006, over 150,000 Palestinians were tried in the military courts (Yesh Din, 2007). At the end of February 2010, 6,759 Palestinians were being held by the Israeli security forces, including 297 minors (B'Tselem, Detainees and prisoners, 2010).

Some of the detainees are held by means of administrative detention, which is carried out by an administrative order alone, with no judicial ruling, indictment, or trial. A person detained in this way does not know why he or she has been detained or on what charges. Nor is the individual given an opportunity to question witnesses or challenge the truth of the accusations in any way. Between December 1987 and December 1997, over 18,000 administrative detention orders were issued against residents of the occupied territories (B'Tselem, 1998). According to the Israel Prison Service, of 548 administrative detainees held by the army in January 2009, 42 had been held for over two consecutive years and 23 for over two and a half years (B'Tselem, 2008).

Various interrogation and torture methods are used against some of the detainees. According to Physicians for Human Rights, 1,000-1,500 Palestinians are interrogated by the Shin Bet (security service) annually, and 85% of them are subjected to methods that fall under the definition of torture (Physicians for Human Rights, 2000). According to B'Tselem (1996); approximately 23,000 Palestinians were interrogated by the Shin Bet between 1987 and 1994. The 1987 Landau Commission, which was headed by Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, was appointed to examine the interrogation methods of the General Security Service (GSS). It exposed a widespread practice of torture and cover-up. The commission outlawed torture but also noted that "the exertion of a moderate degree of physical pressure cannot be avoided." Nevertheless, a 1994 State Comptroller's Report (released in summary form in February 2000) found that the GSS interrogation methods continued to violate the law, the Landau Commission guidelines, and the internal guidelines formulated by the service itself.

House Demolitions
The demolition of Palestinian houses is carried out for various reasons: as a form of punishment, in response to the failure to obtain a building permit, due to military needs, to make way for the separation barrier, and to facilitate the detention of wanted individuals (Dugard, 2006). House demolitions may be carried out completely, partially, or by sealing off the property. According to the Israel Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), Israel demolished over 24,100 Palestinian houses between 1967 and April 7, 2009, leaving 70,000 Palestinians homeless (ICAHD, Campaign against house demolitions, 2010).

Movement Restrictions
Upon occupying the territories in 1967, Israel declared the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be restricted territories, with all movement into or out of them requiring permits. Roadblocks and curfews are special means of restricting the movement of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Some of the roadblocks are permanent; others are movable. As of late August 2009, the IDF regularly maintained 60 West Bank roadblocks; 28 of these were continuously manned, some 24 hours a day and others only during daylight or other hours. Thirty-nine additional roadblocks—all permanent and continuously manned—constitute the entrance checkpoints between the West Bank and the State of Israel. Additionally, the IDF operates movable roadblocks and physical obstructions such as earth mounds (B'Tselem website, Movement Restrictions). According to reports by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), in April 2010 there were 504 movement obstacles (65 checkpoints, 22 partial checkpoints, 117 road
gates, 68 roadblocks, 168 earth mounds, 10 trenches, 44 road barriers, and 20 earthen walls). Two years earlier, there were 607 movement obstacles.

Deportations, Revocations of Residency, and Family Reunifications

According to data compiled by B'Tselem (1993), over 1,000 Palestinians were deported from the territories between 1967 and 1987. From December 1987 to the end of 1992, 481 Palestinian residents of the territories were deported as a form of punishment (B'Tselem, 1998). Of special interest is the revocation of residency and family separation in East Jerusalem after its annexation. Following a census taken by Israel, 66,000 Palestinians who were found in their residences during the census lost their right to obtain Israeli identity cards. Their family members had to request family reunification and Israeli identity cards on their behalf (B'Tselem, 1997b). Between 1984 and 1993 only a few hundred of these permits were issued (B'Tselem, 1999b).

This review of the costs does not take into account the humiliation, cruel treatment, psychological violence, and trauma, which exist on a very large scale and are a continuous part of daily life for much of the occupied Palestinian population (see Hobfoll, Hall, & Canneti, 2012; Panamaki, Komproe, Qouta, Elmasri, & de Jong, 2005). In the context of the occupation, some Palestinians have continuously carried out violent acts of various types, including terrorist attacks that have led to severe losses for the Israeli-Jewish population. In order to see the full picture of the relationship between the occupied and the occupiers, we next provide information on the costs to Israeli-Jewish society.

The Costs to Israeli-Jewish Society

Just as there is a paucity of data regarding harm to the Palestinians, there are no reliable data on the harm caused to Israelis as a result of Palestinian terrorism throughout the years of occupation. The Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) states that no reliable, comprehensive database exists on the victims of suicide attacks (IICC, 2006). Nonetheless, some data are available for different periods.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 987 people were killed in Israel in Palestinian terrorist attacks between 1967 and 1999 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). More specifically, between 1990 and 1999, 344 people were killed in such attacks (Shin Bet Security Service, 2010). According to B'Tselem, between 1989 and 2009 Palestinians killed 1,483 Israelis, including 139 minors; 468 of those killed were security personnel and 995 were civilians (Yahav, 2009). Data provided by B'Tselem, the Yesha Settlements Council, the Shuvi organization, the Organization of Families Victims, the IDF, and Haaretz reveal that 230 Israelis were killed in the Gaza Strip between 1967 and 2005 (Regular & Gottlieb, 2005).

Reports by the Shin Bet and the IICC provide detailed information on Palestinian terrorism in the twenty-first century. According to Shin bet data, between September 29, 2000, and December 31, 2009, 1,178 people were killed as a result of Palestinian terrorism, including 790 Israeli civilians, 328 security personnel, and 60 foreign nationals. In total, 146 suicide attacks took place in this period (Shin Bet (Security Service), 2010). According to IICC data, 24,247 attacks were carried out between September 28, 2000, and February 8, 2005; 0.54% of these were suicide attacks that were responsible for 49% of all Israeli fatalities (502 killed). Also in this period, 3,528 long-range fire incidents took place, comprising 3,096 mortar attacks and 432 rocket attacks (IICC, 2005).

One of the most common attack methods in the region in the last decade has been rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. This began in 2001 and has gradually become one of the central threats posed by Palestinians. In total, 2,383 rockets and 2,543 mortars landed in the western Negev between 2001 and 2007 (as of the end of November 2007), with the town of Sderot, a prime target, absorbing 45% of all rockets landing in residential areas. As a result of this rocket fire, 10 civilians were killed and 10 others (including 8 civilians) died as a result of mortar shelling. These experiences and previous ones clearly have caused severe psychological damage, expressed as posttraumatic stress disorder and other effects (e.g., see Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; IICC, 2007).

THE BOOK

This book elaborates on the effects that an occupation has on the occupying society in different spheres of public life. It begins with a description of the nature of occupation as perceived from different angles.

The first chapter, by David Kretzmer, describes the way laws have been used and, in effect, misused as a system of control, discrimination, and exploitation of the occupied territories and their Palestinian residents. Thus, in establishing settlements and exploiting the resources in the occupied territories for the good of Israel and Israeli Jews, formal legal norms have been ignored. However, in justifying restrictions on the rights and liberties of the Palestinian residents, the formal norms of belligerent occupation have been cited time and again. Kretzmer calls this situation "legal hypocrisy," because the territories themselves are not regarded by Israel as occupied, their Palestinian residents are, however, subjected to the laws of occupation.

The chapter by Marcelo Dascal examines the nature of the relationship between morality and occupation. It considers the possibility that the
relationship is bidirectional. Dascal presents an open-ended, innovative, eclectic, and multidisciplinary approach that could pave the way for progress in resolving a conflict that has been described as "an ostensibly intractable ethno-national conflict." (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 761).

The next chapter, by Izhaq Schnell, explores how the State of Israel has related with duplicity to the occupied territories. On the one hand, it has preserved their legal status as occupied territories; on the other hand, it has used wide variety of practices designed to include the territories within an area that is identified with the Jewish nation. In effect, the state and the settlers developed many practices that were intended to annex the land to the national territory. These included rebuilding the territories through their Judaization and reconstructing the territories' awareness of the nation in a way that incorporates them into the Israeli homeland, all in contradiction to the recognized status of the territories as occupied.

The chapter by Tamir Magal, Neta Oren, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Eran Halperin explains how the psychological legitimization of the occupation emerged. They do this by describing the various ideological orientations regarding the status of the occupied territories and the perceptions of the Palestinian nation that have prevailed among Israeli Jews from 1967 to the present. It focuses on the platforms of the political parties, the beliefs of the leaders, and public opinion (cf. Kelman, 2001). Views of the territories as being liberated because they are part of the Jewish homeland and belong exclusively to Jews, and claims that these territories are of supreme importance for securing the future existence of the State of Israel, have shaped the determination of borders, the removal of settlements, and the division of Jerusalem, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state. This ideology was a marginal one before the 1967 war, but with the conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it has become a dominant view among many Jewish-Israeli leaders and citizens.

The remaining chapters elucidate the various effects that the occupation has had on the State of Israel and its society. The chapter by Yaron Ezrahi discusses the political effects of the occupation, describing its imprinting on the structure and political culture of the Israeli regime, which endangers the state's democratic character in the future. The chapter describes the destructive impact of the occupation on the Israeli political system, educational system, legal structure, and military, as well as on social perceptions of legitimate internal and external uses of force, norms and practices of the bureaucracy, the status of Israeli Arabs, the relationship between religion and politics, and the international legitimacy of Israel as a democracy.

The chapter by Reuven Pedatzur focuses on the effects that the occupation has had on the Israeli army. He argues that the army has naturally played a major role in the management of the occupied territories but that in fulfilling this role, it has been responsible for encouraging, initiating, realizing, and supporting Jewish settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This has produced legal acts, the legitimization of illegal acts, the political involvement of the army, and the disregard of violations of Palestinians' human rights. It has also weakened the military's ability to fight a conventional war, insofar as it has preoccupied itself with managing the resistance of the Palestinians and combating terrorism.

The chapter by Gideon Doron and Maoz Rosenthal concerns the policy of settling Jewish populations in the occupied territories. The authors believe that this policy was derived from the ability of radical right-wing parties to maneuver between the needs of their constituencies and strong ideological commitments.

The chapter by Muhammad Amara and Mohanad Mustafa describes the impact of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. It focuses on political discourse in the organization of the Palestinians and Arabs in Israel, and their relationship to the state, and how these have changed since the occupation. The main thesis of the chapter is that since the 1970s, a collective attitude has crystallized in which civil equality is sought alongside a solution to the national question.

The next part of the book addresses societal effects of the occupation. The chapter by Dan Caspi and Danny Rubinstein describes the ways in which the mass media have handled the occupation. It suggests that Israel has concentrated on building an "Information Wall" that separates Arab and Israeli societies, blocking information on what is happening in Palestinian society—and thus perpetuating mutually held stereotypes.

The chapter by Shir Hever describes the economic costs of the occupation to Israeli society. It concludes that funding the occupation has been the most expensive project undertaken by Israel since 1967. The financial outlay to maintain security forces in the occupied territories and to carry out the activities entailed by the occupation, together with the building and defense of Jewish settlements, is taking an ever-increasing toll on the State of Israel in a way that may undermine economic growth in the near future.

Hanna Herzig's chapter suggests that the prolonged conflict and the occupation have become a social mechanism that institutionalizes a narrow understanding of the concept of human security, excluding issues of personal and economic security. In particular, it replicates the gendered division of social roles and has contributed to a gendered hierarchy as well as discrimination and even violence against women.
The chapter by Charles Greenbaum and Yoel Elizur examines the effects of the occupation on moral thinking, mental health, and violence in Israeli society. It suggests that the occupation has exposed Israelis of all ages to trauma, leading to a variety of stress-related reactions, including increasingly violent behavior both within Israeli society and by Israeli soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories toward Palestinians.

The final part of the book explores the cultural effects of the occupation. The chapter by Edy Kaufman analyzes the impact of the occupation on the violation of human rights within Israel. It shows how the political culture that has developed ignores issues of human rights, with severe consequences for Israeli society.

The chapter by Dan Urian reveals how Israeli theater artists since the early 1980s have introduced into their works the problem of "divided reality" and the need for a critical examination of the Zionist ideology that created the State of Israel and subsequently enabled the policy of occupation.

The chapter by Nadir Tsur examines the link between prolonged occupation and the language of public discourse that has evolved in the State of Israel. It demonstrates the close relationship between the two and identifies how the use of language has been transformed from that of religious belief to a discourse of national rights, including discourse about security, including the language of conciliation and peace as well as separation and disengagement.

In the Conclusion, Izahk Schnell and Daniel Bar-Tal integrate the collective insights derived from the individual chapters of the book. Three major themes emerge: (1) the development of an Israeli national identification and its relationship to the emerging regime; (2) the life domains in which the occupation has brought about transformative, largely deleterious effects on the occupying society; and (3) the psychological and ideological mechanisms that have facilitated "ethnicization" in the occupied territories. Each of these themes is deeply deserving of political psychological analysis (e.g., Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003; see also Jost & Sidanius, 2004)—not only in the context of Israel, but around the world.

NOTES
1. Also of interest is a report by the Attorney General of Israel, Elyakim Rubinstein, who protested to the Prime Minister against use of the word "occupation" and argued that the official position of every Israeli government since 1967 has been that the territories are "under dispute" and not "occupied" (Zertal & Bidar, 2007).
2. We recognize that occupation, according to its legal definition, can be willingly viewed as congruent with other aspirations, goals, and needs. One example is the acceptance of Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots.
3. The information on costs to the Palestinians and Israelis was compiled with the assistance of Hadar Biran.
4. We are aware that the Israeli government, IDF, part of the media and various NGOs attempt to delegitimize sources that monitor the Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories. We have thus tried to use only those sources that we believe to be reliable.
5. An outpost ("a stronghold") refers to a community built within the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) that was constructed without the authorization of the Israeli government but very often with its help. Some of these are illegal because they are built on privately owned Palestinian land.
6. Additional detailed information indicates that from December 1987 to the end of February 1999, the Israeli security forces killed 1,472 Palestinians in the territories, 1,341 of whom were civilians and 18 of whom were members of the Palestinian security forces. 113 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians, mostly Jewish settlers. Of those killed, 302 were children under the age of 17 (B'Tselem 1999).
7. Between the end of September 2000 and the end of December 2008, the Israeli security forces killed 4,792 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 952 of whom were under the age of 18. At least 2,222 of those killed were not engaged in armed struggle at the time, and 233 were targets of assassination (B'Tselem website, fatalities).

REFERENCES


ICC (Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center). (2005, February 8). Summary of data on Palestinian terrorism during the present confrontation with Israel.


---

**Fundamentals of Occupation**