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Angry expressions induce extensive processing of persuasive appeals

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Abstract

Persuasive appeals sometimes include expressions of anger in an attempt to influence message recipients’ thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. The current research investigated how angry expressions change the way in which a persuasive appeal is considered. In five experiments, participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals attributed to sources expressing anger, indicating careful processing of those appeals. However, participants reported equally favorable attitudes towards appeals attributed to sources expressing other emotions, indicating a lack of careful processing. Angry expressions induced extensive processing even in those not dispositionally inclined to do so, and also influenced attitudes towards issues related to, but not specifically addressed in, the appeal. Mediation and causal-chain analyses indicate that extensive processing was induced by the threat signaled by angry expressions.
Imagine you are on a jury that must decide the guilt or innocence of a person charged with murder. The life-or-death decision facing you depends not only upon the facts presented in the case, but also upon the interpersonal dynamics that transpire among you and your fellow jurors during deliberations. Such was the situation depicted in the film *12 Angry Men*. For example, Juror 10 argues angrily that the defendant's ethnicity and socioeconomic status are sufficient evidence of his guilt. This blatantly racist claim offends the other jurors who collectively turn their backs to him. In contrast, Juror 8 rises to anger in order to draw attention to inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case that had been overlooked by the inept public defender, which sets in motion a cascade of attitude change among his fellow jurors that ultimately produces a verdict of not guilty.

Juror 10’s arguments apparently lacked merit and were rejected, whereas Juror 8’s arguments were apparently well-founded and won over his fellow jurors. However, as the saying goes, sometimes it is not just what you say, but also how you say it. Perhaps the ultimate outcome of these deliberations was not due to the content of the arguments alone, but also was influenced by the angry manner in which the arguments were delivered. Did expressing anger make Juror 10’s weak arguments even less persuasive, but make Juror 8’s strong arguments even more persuasive? More broadly, does the source of a persuasive appeal’s simultaneous expression of anger influence the way in which that appeal is considered?

Angry expressions signal important information about the angry person’s inner states. According to Van Kleef’s (2009) emotions as social information (EASI) model, emotion expressions provide information about how the source of the emotion regards a situation which, in turn, can activate inferential processes in the perceiver. Specific emotions arise in response to
appraisals of specific situations (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991), so emotion expressions provide relatively precise information about the source of the emotion’s intentions (Fridlund, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), inner states (Ekman, 1993), and orientation toward others (Hess, Bliary, & Kleck, 2000; Knutson, 1996). Inferential processes have been shown to influence perceiver’s judgments and behaviors across a variety of domains. Angry negotiators receive larger concessions than do those expressing other emotions (Van Kleef, De Drew, & Manstead, 2004). In the workplace, managers who strategically feign anger induce greater compliance among subordinates (Fitness, 2000; Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005). Team members high in information-processing motivation infer from their leader’s anger that their performance is unsatisfactory and, subsequently, increase their engagement and work harder to improve their performance (Van Kleef, Anastasopoulou, & Nijstad, 2010; Van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Damen, 2009). However, expressing anger can decrease compliance when anger is seen as inappropriate, such as when making a request for help (Van Doorn, Van Kleef, & Van der Pligt, 2015). Similarly, work groups that contain an angry confederate exhibit poorer cooperation than groups with a happy confederate (Barsade, 2002). Thus, expressions of anger can influence judgments and behaviors across a host of domains, sometimes facilitating and sometimes impeding the expresser’s intended outcome.

Given that expressed emotion can have consequences for negotiation, leadership, and compliance, we propose that the inferential processes activated by angry expressions also influence how a persuasive appeal is considered. When people receive persuasive appeals, they consider them in two main ways (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; for a review, see Smith & DeCoste, 2000). Decades of research have demonstrated that people can engage in a relatively fast, effortless, and superficial style of information processing that requires few
cognitive resources. This *non-analytic* information processing is often driven by heuristic cues.\(^1\) Heuristics are quick and efficient decision strategies that operate, in part, by prioritizing some information over other information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). For example, the status of the source of a persuasive appeal can act as a heuristic for expertise: A doctor might be more persuasive than a layperson, even if both make identical appeals. Thus, heuristic-driven attitude change can happen independently of the content of a persuasive appeal itself. Consequently, non-analytic processing is often characterized by impoverished analysis of the information such that non-analytic processors are typically unable to distinguish between strong, compelling persuasive arguments and weak, specious arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983).

In contrast, people can engage in *analytic* information processing, a slower, more effortful, and more extensive scrutiny of information. Analytic processing is characterized by effortful, deliberate, and systematic consideration and evaluation of information. Because analytic processors attend to the content of an appeal, their judgments are sensitive to variations in information quality. Thus, an individual processing analytically will be more persuaded by strong, compelling arguments than by weak, specious arguments. However, in order to engage in this more taxing analytic processing style, persuasive appeal recipients need both the ability and the motivation to do so (Cacioppo et al., 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).

If angry expressions influence how a persuasive appeal is considered, do they act as heuristics, induce analytic processing, or both? Although no previous research (to our knowledge) has examined the relation between emotion expressions and processing, there have been numerous demonstrations that the personal and subjective experience of felt emotions can determine whether or not people engage in analytic or non-analytic processing. Some research has shown that people experiencing anger are more likely to base judgments on heuristics than
people experiencing other emotions (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). These findings are often interpreted as anger reflecting physiological or motivational states, such as high arousal or high certainty, that reduce the ability or motivation to process analytically (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Walley & Weiden, 1973). In contrast, other theoretical perspectives view the negative internal states associated with anger as conducive to analytic processing (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1994). For example, negative affect may signal that something is wrong in the environment and, consequently, motivate careful scrutiny. That the personal experience of anger can both increase reliance on heuristics and also induce analytic processing is consistent with the idea of multiple roles articulated in the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993): the same cue might serve as a heuristic when processing is constrained to be low, but induce careful processing in less constrained circumstances.

Although previous research has demonstrated that people experiencing anger can engage in both analytic and non-analytic processing, there are reasons why these findings might not directly translate into predictions about how emotion expressions influence processing. For example, an angry expression signals information about the inner state of the source of the persuasive appeal, rather than the inner state of the person receiving the appeal. It is unknown whether such information about the source’s inner state has effects on judgments similar to the effects a target’s inner state might have. Similarly, inner states are hard to fake, whereas emotion expressions can be feigned strategically. Thus, it is uncertain whether perceivers will assign the same legitimacy to a source’s anger as they would to their own. Thus, it remains an open question whether and how angry expressions will influence how a persuasive appeal is considered.
We conducted three experiments to assess the basic effect of angry expressions on analytic and non-analytic processing. Moreover, we began by constraining processing to be low by presenting participants with persuasive appeals of little relevance to them. If angry expressions influence processing in a similar manner as other source cues (e.g., Petty et al., 1993), then they should be used as heuristics under such low-processing conditions and participants will report more (or less) favorable attitudes towards appeals attributed to angry relative to other sources, regardless of appeal quality. However, it is also possible that angry expressions influence judgments differently than do other source cues and, thus, induce analytic processing. If so, then participants should report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals attributed to angry sources but, because processing is otherwise constrained to be low, report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals attributed to sources expressing other emotions. Again, these outcomes are not mutually exclusive: participants could simultaneously use angry expressions as heuristics and also process the persuasive appeal analytically. The first three experiments were designed to assess all of these possibilities.

**Experiments 1-3: Assessment of the anger expression-processing effect**

The purpose of Experiments 1-3 was to investigate how angry expressions influence the processing of a persuasive appeal. To test our competing hypotheses regarding the ways in which angry expressions might influence processing, participants read an appeal consisting of strong, compelling statements or weak, specious statements attributed to a source who was pictured expressing anger or other emotions. Because of the similar design of these three experiments, we report them together.

**Participants and Design**
All participants in Experiments 1-3 were undergraduates at the University of California, Davis (UCD) who participated for partial course credit. In Experiment 1, 233 participants (150 women, three did not report, $M_{age}=19.85$, $SD_{age}=2.69$) were randomly assigned to a 5 (Emotion Expression: anger, disgust, fear, sadness, or neutral) $\times$ 2 (Appeal Quality: strong or weak) $\times$ 2 (Emotion Source Sex: female or male) between-subjects design. In Experiment 2, 216 participants (155 women, three did not report, $M_{age}=19.55$, $SD_{age}=1.43$) were randomly assigned to a 3 (Emotion Expression: anger, fear, or neutral) $\times$ 2 (Appeal Quality: strong or weak) $\times$ 2 (Emotion Source Sex: female or male) between-subjects design. In Experiment 3, 229 participants (185 women, two did not report, $M_{age}=19.82$, $SD_{age}=2.59$) were randomly assigned to a 3 (Emotion Expression: angry, happy, or neutral) $\times$ 2 (Appeal Quality: strong or weak) between-subjects design.

**Procedure**

Participants in all three experiments were told that their goal was to become familiar with an unknown person by seeing the person’s picture and reading the person’s opinion on a specific proposal. They first read some brief background information about the proposal, and then were presented with a persuasive appeal regarding the proposal accompanied by a digital image of a person to whom the appeal was attributed.

**Manipulation of emotion expression.** In Experiment 1, the appeal was randomly attributed to a male or female source expressing anger, disgust, fear, sadness, or a neutral expression using pictures from the UCD Set of Emotional Expressions photoset (UCDSEE: Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). In Experiment 2, the appeal was randomly attributed to a male or female source expressing anger, fear, or a neutral expression using pictures from Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces photo set (KDEF: Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). In Experiment
3, the appeal was attributed to a male source expressing anger, happiness, or a neutral expression (Lundqvist et al., 1998). All pictures can be found in the Online Supplement.

**Manipulation of argument quality.** Participants were told that a proposal was under consideration at a distant university, and that the person whose picture accompanied the appeal was a member of that community who expressed his or her opinion on the proposal. The persuasive appeals contained either strong, compelling statements or weak, specious statements. The complete text of all of the appeals can be found in the Online Supplement.

In Experiment 1, participants read strong or weak appeals opposing a proposal to create a swimsuit calendar featuring student athletes at the University of Miami (adapted from Debono & Harnish, 1988). Each appeal began with the stem “I feel extremely angry (disgusted, afraid, sad).” followed by the body of the appeal. The neutral condition included no stem. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants read strong or weak appeals supporting a proposal to implement comprehensive exams for college seniors at the University of Miami (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). In Experiment 2, each appeal began with the stem, “I'm angry (afraid, aware) that…” followed by the body of the appeal. In Experiment 3, each appeal began with the stem “I’m angry (happy) about this.” The neutral condition included no stem. The appeal in Experiment 3 also specified that the proposal would not take effect until the Fall of 2024, over 10 years into the future. We set the proposals to take place at distant universities in order to minimize their relevance to our participants and, thus, constrain processing to be low (e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). We additionally specified that the proposal in Experiment 3 would take effect 10 years in the future in order to decrease the relevance even further (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988).
We varied characteristics of the persuasive appeals across experiments to ensure that any processing effects found were not due to idiosyncrasies of specific messages. Importantly, the appeals used in Experiment 1 opposed the proposal under consideration, whereas the appeals used in Experiments 2 and 3 supported the proposal under consideration, effectively ruling framing effects out as a possible explanation (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Additionally, agreement with the appeals used in Experiments 2 and 3 represents support for a proposal (i.e., the implementation of comprehensive exams) that is counterattitudinal in a college population (Claypool, Mackie, Garcia-Marques, McIntosh, & Udal, 2004).

**Attitude Index.** After reading the appeal, participants responded to a series of questions assessing their agreement with the appeal. In Experiment 1, these included “How much do you support the proposal to create a swimsuit calendar featuring student athletes?” (1=not at all, 7=very strongly) and 7-point semantic differential scales (bad/good, negative/positive, and foolish/wise) completing the stem “The proposal for a swimsuit calendar featuring University of Miami student athletes is”. All items were averaged into an attitude index (α=0.94) that was reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated increased agreement with the persuasive appeal. In Experiments 2 and 3 items included “Should comprehensive exams be implemented?” (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) and 7-point semantic differential scales (bad/good, negative/positive, foolish/wise, and harmful/beneficial) completing the stem “Comprehensive exams are:” All items were averaged into an attitude index (Experiment 2 α=0.93; Experiment 3 α=0.93) such that higher values indicated increased support for comprehensive exams. The Attitude Index is interpreted as evidence of processing: participants processing analytically are expected to report more favorable attitudes toward strong than weak appeals, and participants
processing non-analytically are expected to report more (or less) favorable attitudes toward appeals regardless of argument quality.  

Finally, all participants completed demographics.

**Results and Discussion**

**Attitude Index.** The mean level of agreement with strong and weak persuasive appeals for each of the emotion expressions is presented in Table 1. For Experiment 1, the attitude index was subjected to a 5 (emotion expression) \( \times \) 2 (appeal quality) between-subjects ANOVA. The main effect of appeal quality on agreement was not significant, \( F(1,233)=0.50, p=.48, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2<0.01 \), nor was the main effect of emotion expression, \( F(4,233)=1.19, p=.32, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.02 \). The interaction between appeal quality and emotion expression was also not significant, \( F(4,233)=1.88, p=.12, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.03 \). The sex of the participant, the sex of the source of the emotional appeal, and the interaction between participant and source sex did not moderate the relation between emotion expressions and agreement, all \( p\text{s}>.38 \), and thus were not included as factors in subsequent analyses.

For Experiment 2, three participants did not complete the attitude measures, and two participants were removed from the analysis for producing scores more than three SD from the mean on the attitude index. All subsequent analyses include the remaining 211 participants. The attitude index was subjected to a 3 (emotion expression) \( \times \) 2 (appeal quality) \( \times \) 2 (source sex) \( \times \) 2 (participant sex) between-subjects ANOVA. A main effect of appeal quality revealed that strong appeals were evaluated more favorably (\( M=4.80, SD=1.02 \)) than weak appeals (\( M=4.22, SD=1.14 \)), \( F(1, 211)=8.42, p=.004, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.04 \). There was no main effect of emotion nor did source emotion interact with appeal quality, \( F\text{s}<1.70 \). None of the sex of the participant, the sex of the source of the emotional appeal, nor any interactions between participant and source sex
moderated the relation between emotion expressions and agreement, $F$s < 1.90 and, thus, were not included as factors in subsequent analyses.

For Experiment 3, the attitude index was subjected to a 3 (emotion expression) X 2 (appeal quality) between-subjects ANOVA. There was no main effect of either appeal quality, $F(1,229)=2.05$, $p=.15$, $\eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.01$, or emotion, $F(2, 229)=1.47$, $p=.23$, $\eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.01$, and the interaction between appeal quality and emotion expression was not significant, $F(2,229)=1.52$, $p=.22$, $\eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.01$. Even though the same stimuli were used in Experiments 2 and 3, the null effect of argument quality in Experiment 3 is perhaps unsurprising, given that we deliberately decreased the relevance of the appeal in order to further decrease default processing.

In order to test our specific predictions, we conducted a series of follow-up analyses. Across all three experiments, analysis of the simple main effects of emotion expressions collapsed across appeal quality conditions revealed that participants did not report any more (or less) favorable attitudes towards appeals paired with angry expressions than appeals paired with any other emotion expression: Experiment 1, all $t$s < 1.11; Experiment 2, all $t$s < 0.68; Experiment 3, all $t$s < 1.68. This pattern of results suggests that none of the emotion expressions was used as a heuristic.

Analysis of the simple main effects of emotion expression within levels of appeal quality revealed that participants across all three experiments who saw angry expressions reported more favorable attitudes toward the persuasive appeal after reading strong appeals than weak appeals: Experiment 1, $t(46)=2.36$, $p=.02$, $d=0.70$; Experiment 2, $t(68)=4.20$, $p<.001$, $d=1.02$; Experiment 3, $t(74)=2.32$, $p=.02$, $d=0.54$. In Experiment 2, participants who saw neutral expressions reported marginally more favorable attitudes toward comprehensive exams after reading strong appeals than weak appeals, $t(69)=1.77$, $p=.08$, $d=0.43$. However, in Experiments 1 and 3, participants
who saw neutral expressions reported equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals, all $ts<0.23$. Similarly, across all three experiments, participants reported equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals attributed to disgusted, fearful, happy, or sad sources, all $ts<0.82$. This pattern of results suggest that angry expressions elicited analytic processing of the persuasive appeals, in that participants’ responses indicate that they were sensitive to the quality of the arguments, but other emotion expressions did not.

**Meta-analyses of Experiments 1, 2, and 3: the anger expression-processing effect**

Across all three experiments, participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals accompanied by angry expressions. However, none of the omnibus analyses reached conventional levels of significance and, thus, these effects should be interpreted cautiously. Cell sizes in these experiments exceeded the best practice of 20 per group recommended by Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn (2011) at the time we began this line of research (average $Ns=23.3, 36$, and $38.17$, respectively). Given the consistent pattern of results, but no significant appeal quality $\times$ emotion expression interactions, one possibility is that these experiments all lacked sufficient statistical power to detect reliable effects despite sample sizes that exceeded norms for the field. Thus, to determine the reliability of the effect of angry expressions on how persuasive appeals are considered, we meta-analyzed the effect of angry expressions relative to other expressions using the metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010).

We estimated the size of the difference between the effect of angry and other expressions (i.e., disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) on responses to strong versus weak appeals. For Experiment 1, we compared the effect of angry expressions against disgust, fear, and sadness expressions with a contrast, assigning weights of 3 and -3 to strong and weak appeals paired with angry expressions, respectively, weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with
disgust, fear, and sadness expressions, respectively, and zeroes to neutral expressions, $F(1, 223) = 3.46, p = .06, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2 = 0.02$. For Experiment 2, we compared the effect of angry expressions against fear expressions with a contrast, assigning weights of 1 and -1 to strong and weak appeals paired with angry expressions, respectively, weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with fear expressions, respectively, and zeroes to neutral expressions, $F(1, 205) = 4.89, p = .03, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2 = 0.02$. For Experiment 3, we compared the effect of angry expressions against happy expressions with a contrast, assigning weights of 1 and -1 to strong and weak appeals paired with angry expressions, respectively, weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with happy expressions, respectively, and zeroes to neutral expressions, $F(1, 223) = 2.46, p = .11, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2 = 0.01$. Meta-analyzing these three effects revealed a significant summary effect, $Z = -2.25, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.11, -0.08], SE = 0.26, p = .02$. A more conservative meta-analytic test which includes neutral expressions along with disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness in the three contrasts against anger resulted in an identical pattern of results, $Z = -2.27, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.90, -0.14], SE = 0.45, p = .02$. Thus, these results indicate a reliable effect of angry expressions inducing analytic processing of persuasive appeals.

This meta-analysis also allowed us to test two possible mechanisms underlying the anger expression-processing effect. The first mechanism was the valence of the emotion expressed by the person to whom the persuasive appeal was attributed. According to Schwarz’ (1990) model of emotions as information, the experience of negative emotion such as anger indicates that something is wrong and processing resources must be engaged to deal effectively with the situation. Conversely, the experience of positive emotion indicates that all is well and effortful processing is unnecessary. If this perspective can be extended from experienced emotions to emotion expressions, then the expression of a negative emotion might signal to the perceiver that
the source of the emotion regards something to be wrong. Thus, a negative emotion expression accompanying a persuasive appeal might induce the perceiver to scrutinize the content of the appeal in order to understand and potentially resolve the situation. Conversely, a positive emotion expression accompanying a persuasive appeal might signal that all is well and reduce effortful scrutiny of the appeal. The meta-analysis revealed no evidence that the valence of the emotion expressed by the appeal source reliably influenced analytic processing (see the Online Supplement for more details).

The second mechanism we tested was the certainty associated with the emotion expressed by the appeal source. Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated that participants experiencing relatively low-certainty emotions (e.g., fear) processed persuasive appeals more carefully than participants experiencing relatively high-certainty emotions (e.g., anger). The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion proposes that analytic processing is triggered when one’s actual level of confidence in a judgment falls below one’s desired level of confidence (the sufficiency threshold; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). If this perspective can be extended from experienced emotions to emotion expressions, then the expression of a high-certainty emotion paired with a persuasive appeal might decrease the perceiver’s confidence gap and reduce scrutiny of the appeal. Conversely, a low-certainty emotion expression paired with a persuasive appeal might increase the perceiver’s confidence gap and induce the perceiver to scrutinize the content of the appeal. However, given that anger is associated with high certainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), this mechanism predicts the opposite of what we found in Experiments 1-3, and the meta-analysis produced no evidence that certainty of expressed emotion influenced analytic processing (see the Online Supplement for more details).

**Experiment 4**
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated that angry expressions reliably induced analytic processing of persuasive appeals, compared with disgusted, fearful, happy, sad, or neutral expressions. In addition, various conditions in those experiments allowed us to eliminate emotion expression valence and certainty as explanations of this effect. However, angry expressions differ in other ways from other emotion expressions. For example, anger also signals threat (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Perhaps the threat signaled by angry expressions induces perceivers to carefully scrutinize the contents of the appeal made by angry sources. Thus, the main purpose of Experiment 4 was to test perceptions of threat as the mechanism by which angry expressions influence how a persuasive appeal is considered.

Experiment 4 also allowed us to confirm the power of the effect of angry expressions to induce processing. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, angry expressions induced college students to analytically process persuasive appeals, even when the appeal is of low relevance. However, college students differ from the general population in several important ways: they have been pre-selected for their above average cognitive proclivities but, at the same time, are more easily influenced than older adults because they have less crystalized social attitudes (Sears, 1986). In Experiment 4, we collected data from an adult sample with greater cognitive variability than the college student samples used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Dispositional tendencies to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors were measured using the Need for Cognition scale (NFC: Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). People who are high in NFC chronically pay attention to appeal quality and, therefore, generally report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak arguments. Conversely, people who are low in NFC do not typically pay as much attention to appeal quality and, therefore, report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak arguments (Cacioppo et al., 1983). The power of the effect of angry expressions to trigger
extensive processing will be obvious if it induces such processing even among people with low NFC. We thus anticipated that, in response to an appeal attributed to a source expressing fear, high NFC participants would report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals but low NFC participants would not. In contrast, if angry expressions override even low NFC participants’ predisposition to superficially consider an appeal, our key prediction was that participants who evaluated persuasive appeals attributed to a source expressing anger would report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, regardless of NFC.

**Participants and Design**

Participants were 207 U.S. residents (106 women; $M_{age}$=39.50, $SD_{age}$=14.70) recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.50. Participants were randomly assigned to a $2$ (Emotion Expression: anger or fear) X $2$ (Appeal Quality: strong or weak) between-subjects design. Thus, the average number of observations per cell was 51.75, almost double the average sample size used in Experiments 1-3.

**Materials and Procedure**

**Need for cognition.** First, all participants read an introduction screen which stated that they would be completing a series of unrelated tasks which had been bundled together. Next, all participants completed the NFC scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which was averaged into a composite score ($\alpha$=0.94).

**Threat index.** Participants were told that the purpose of the next task was to investigate what information people can glean from just a photograph. Then they viewed one of the male faces from Experiment 2 expressing either anger or fear (Lundqvist et al., 1998), which they evaluated on three items measuring cognitive appraisals of threat: “How dangerous is this person?”, “How threatening is this person?”, and “How menacing is this person?” Responses
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were made on 7-point scales (1=not at all, 7=very much). These items were averaged into a threat index (α=0.95).

**Manipulation of appeal quality.** Next, in an ostensibly unrelated task, participants were told that their goal was to become familiar with an unknown person by seeing the person’s picture and reading the person’s opinion on a specific proposal. Participants were presented with a strong or weak persuasive appeal in favor of a tax increase to improve highways (Weisbuch, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2003). The appeals started with “I am angry (scared)…” followed by the body of the appeal. The appeal was presented with and attributed to the same digital image of a male source expressing anger or fear that participants had viewed previously in the threat evaluation task. The complete text of the persuasive appeals can be found in the Online Supplement.

**Attitude index.** After reading the appeal, participants responded to a series of questions assessing their agreement with the appeal. These included, “Taxes to help repair highways should be increased.” (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) and 7-point semantic differential scales (bad/good, negative/positive, foolish/wise, and harmful/beneficial) completing the stem “A tax increase to help repair highways is”. All items were averaged into an attitude index (α=0.96). Finally, participants completed demographics.

**Results and Discussion**

Using Cook’s Distance and 4/(N-k-1) as a criterion, we first removed 14 multivariate outliers on the attitude index, eight on the threat appraisal index, and four participants who failed an attention check screening question. All subsequent analyses include the remaining 181 participants.
**Anger expression inducing analytic processing.** A significant 3-way interaction among emotion expression, appeal quality, and NFC emerged on the attitude index, $b=0.39$, $p=.004$ (Figure 1). Participants who saw a fearful source showed the typical 2-way interaction between appeal quality and NFC, $b=0.73$, $p < .001$. Specifically, low NFC participants reported equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals, $b=-0.23$, $p=.26$, but high NFC participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, $b=0.89$, $p < .001$, indicating that fearful expressions neither induced extensive processing among low NFC participants nor inhibited extensive processing among high NFC participants. In contrast, and consistent with predictions, responses from participants who saw an angry source revealed only a marginal main effect of appeal quality, $b=0.27$, $p =.08$, with no appeal quality by NFC interaction, $p =.74$. Both low and high NFC participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, which suggests that angry expressions induced low NFC participants to extensively process the appeal.

**Perceptions of threat.** In order to test whether perceptions of threat induced analytic processing, we first confirmed that angry sources ($M=5.34$, $SD=1.15$) were appraised as more threatening than fearful sources ($M=2.88$, $SD=1.32$), $t(179)=13.35$, $p<.001$, $d=1.98$. Next, we regressed the attitude index on threat appraisal, appeal quality, and NFC, and a significant 3-way interaction emerged, $b=-0.16$, $p=.03$ (Figure 2). Regardless of emotion expression, participants who appraised the source as non-threatening (-1SD) showed the typical 2-way interaction between appeal quality and NFC, $b=0.61$, $p=.001$. Specifically, low NFC participants reported equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals, $b=-0.08$, $p=.70$, but high NFC participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, $b=0.87$, $p<.001$. These results show that expressions that were appraised as non-threatening did not induce
extensive processing among low NFC participants nor did they inhibit extensive processing among high NFC participants. In contrast, for participants who appraised the source as threatening (+1SD) there was only a main effect of appeal quality, $b=0.24$, $p=.05$, with no appeal quality by NFC interaction, $p=.76$. Both low and high NFC participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, suggesting that threatening expressions induced low NFC participants to extensively process the appeal.\(^5\)

**Mediation by threat.** Following the recommendations of Rucker and colleagues (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011), we tested the indirect effect which consisted of 1) the emotion expression effect on threat appraisals and 2) the interaction of threat appraisals, appeal quality, and NFC on attitudes. This indirect effect was significant, $Z=2.14$, $p=.03$, consistent with the idea that threat appraisals mediated the interactive effect of expression, appeal quality, and NFC on recipients’ attitudes.

**Experiment 5**

Experiment 4 suggested that threat is the mechanism by which angry expressions induce extensive processing of persuasive appeals. However, traditional mediation analyses are not the only way, nor always the best way, to demonstrate causality. An alternate method to establish causation is to manipulate the proposed psychological process in order to demonstrate the proposed causal chain (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Based on the accumulated evidence, we propose a causal chain in which (A) angry expressions (B) signal threat which, in turn, (C) induces extensive processing of persuasive appeals. Experiments 1-4 demonstrated that (A) angry expressions (C) induce extensive processing. Experiment 4 also demonstrated that (A) angry expressions are perceived as (B) more threatening than other emotion expressions (i.e.,
fear). The remaining piece of this causal chain is to manipulate the proposed mechanism (i.e., threat) in order to demonstrate that (B) threat (C) induces extensive processing.

One way in which the threat conveyed by an angry expression can be manipulated is through gaze direction (Dimberg & Öhman, 1983; Lundqvist, Esteves, & Öhman, 1999). An angry expression has different functional significance when it is directed at the perceiver versus when it is directed away from the perceiver. For example, a direct angry gaze can signal that the source of the emotion has encountered a surmountable obstacle (Scherer, 2000), whereas an averted gaze can indicate appeasement or submission (Argyle & Cook, 1976). Thus, participants in Experiment 5 evaluated strong or weak persuasive appeals from angry sources pictured either looking directly at them or off to the side. Threat should only be conveyed by the direct angry gaze, which we expected to induce participants to extensively process the persuasive appeal. However, averted angry gaze should not convey threat, which we expected to not induce extensive processing.

Experiment 4 demonstrated the strength of the influence of angry expressions by inducing extensive processing in people who are not predisposed to do so. One final purpose of Experiment 5 was to further probe the strength of angry expressions inducing processing by measuring the influence of angry expressions on attitudes of higher relevance to participants. In Experiments 1-4, we measured attitudes towards proposals of relatively low relevance to participants, taking place in the distant future, at a distant location, or at an unspecified location. Because the default response to low relevance information is non-analytic processing (Petty et al., 1981), Experiments 1-4 have demonstrated that angry expressions induce careful processing and subsequent attitude change when the personal stakes are somewhat low. It remains unclear whether angry expressions can similarly influence processing and attitudes towards topics of
higher relevance. However, it is not sufficient to simply have participants evaluate a highly-relevant appeal because the default response to such information should be to process carefully, regardless of what emotion expression accompanies it. Instead, in Experiment 5, we had participants read an appeal advocating comprehensive exams at a distant university 10 years in the future (i.e., low relevance) but then measured their attitudes towards comprehensive exams at their own university (i.e., high relevance). If angry expressions can influence highly-relevant attitudes in the same way that they influenced attitudes towards less relevant information, then we expected participants to report more favorable attitudes towards comprehensive exams at their own university after reading a strong versus weak appeal accompanied by a direct angry gaze, but report equally favorable attitudes towards comprehensive exams at their own university after reading strong and weak appeals accompanied by an averted angry gaze.

**Participants and Design**

Participants were 166 UCD undergraduates (129 women, 2 did not report, $M_{age}=19.75$, $SD_{age}=2.41$) who participated for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Angry Gaze: averted or direct) X 2 (Appeal Quality: strong or weak) between-subjects design, with an average of more than 40 participants per cell.

**Materials and Procedure**

First, all participants read that they would be completing a series of unrelated tasks for different experiments. Next, participants were shown a digital image of a male expressing anger (Lundqvist et al., 1998). The same male was pictured in both conditions, either at half left profile or directly facing the participant (see Online Supplement). Participants were asked: “What emotion is this person displaying?” with the following answer choices: sadness, anger, disgust, fear, I’m not sure. Because an averted gaze is potentially a non-normative expression, the “I’m
not sure” option was included to ensure that participants were able to correctly identify anger in both the direct and averted faces.

Participants then read the persuasive appeals from Experiment 3 advocating the implementation of comprehensive exams for graduating seniors at the University of Missouri in 2024. In contrast to previous experiments, the appeals included no verbal expression of emotion. The appeal was presented with and attributed to the same picture of the male as previously seen in the emotion identification task expressing either direct or averted anger. The image was positioned to the left of the appeal, as it had been for all previous experiments. Because of the positioning, the source with the averted gaze appeared to be looking away from the appeal.

After reading the appeal, participants responded to two items assessing their attitudes towards the implementation of comprehensive exams for graduating seniors at the University of California, Davis. These items varied in relevance to participants. The first read: “I want comprehensive exams to be implemented at UC Davis in 10 years.” and the second read: “I want comprehensive exams to be implemented at UC Davis now.” (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Next, participants responded to a behavioral intention item gauging their support for comprehensive exams: “I would sign a petition in favor of implementing comprehensive exams at UC Davis.” (yes/no). Finally, participants completed demographics.

Results and Discussion

Five participants were first removed from the analysis for failing an attention check screening question. Fifty-six participants were also removed for failing to correctly identify the angry expression. All subsequent analyses include the remaining 104 participants.

Mean levels of support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at UC Davis in 10 years is presented in Table 2. A 2 (gaze direction) X 2 (appeal quality) between-subjects
ANOVA revealed a main effect of appeal quality, $F(1,103)=16.13, p>.001, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.14$, which was qualified by the gaze direction by appeal quality interaction, $F(1,103)=4.69, p=.03, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.05$. Participants who saw an averted angry gaze reported equal (lack of) support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at their university in 10 years after evaluating strong and weak appeals, $t(52)=1.23, p=.22, d=0.34$. In contrast, participants who saw a direct angry gaze reported the greatest support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at their university in 10 years after evaluating strong appeals and the least support after evaluating weak appeals, $t(47)=4.82, p<.001, d=1.41$.

The same pattern of results emerged for mean levels of support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at UC Davis now. A 2 (gaze direction) × 2 (appeal quality) between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of appeal quality, $F(1,103)=6.14, p=.02, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.06$, which was qualified by the gaze direction by appeal quality interaction, $F(1,103)=3.89, p=.05, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.04$. Participants who saw an averted angry gaze reported equal (lack of) support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at their university now after evaluating strong and weak appeals, $t(52)=.33, p=.74, d=0.09$. In contrast, participants who saw a direct angry gaze reported the greatest support for comprehensive exams to be implemented at their university now after evaluating strong appeals and the least support after evaluating weak appeals, $t(47)=3.31, p=.003, d=0.97$.

Finally, a similar pattern of results emerged for participants’ reported willingness to sign a petition in favor of implementing comprehensive exams at UC Davis. In the averted angry gaze condition, 6 out of 26 participants who evaluated weak appeals reported that they would sign the petition and 6 out of 28 participants who evaluated strong appeals reported that they would sign the petition, $\chi^2(1, N=54)=0.02, p=.88$. However, in the direct gaze condition, 3 out of 28
participants who evaluated weak appeals reported that they would sign the petition but 9 out of 22 participants who evaluated strong appeals reported that they would sign the petition, $\chi^2(1, N=50)=6.16, p=.01$.

In Experiment 5, the threat conveyed by an angry expression was manipulated through gaze direction. Participants reported more favorable attitudes and behavioral intentions towards comprehensive exams at their own university after reading a strong than weak appeal accompanied by a direct angry gaze. In contrast, participants reported equally unfavorable attitudes and behavioral intentions towards comprehensive exams at their own university after reading strong and weak appeals accompanied by an averted angry gaze. A direct angry gaze signals threat but an averted angry gaze does not, so this pattern of results provides further evidence that the threat signaled by an angry expression induces analytic processing of persuasive appeals. Moreover, Experiment 5 demonstrates that the processing induced by threatening gazes can influence attitudes towards issues of relatively high relevance. Even though the persuasive appeals made no mention of implementing comprehensive exams at participants’ own university, direct but not averted angry gaze induced enough scrutiny of the appeals to apparently inform their attitudes towards a related issue that could realistically impact them. Thus, the influence of angry expressions on how persuasive information is considered does not appear to be limited to topics of low relevance. Taken together with the results of all previous experiments, Experiment 5 completes the causal chain and demonstrates that threat – either measured or manipulated – that is conveyed by an angry expression induces extensive processing of persuasive appeals.

**General Discussion**
We experience persuasive appeals every day, and these appeals are rarely made dispassionately. When a suspect argues for his innocence, a romantic partner claims her fidelity, or a politician courts supporters, their persuasion attempts are often accompanied by expressions of anger. The present research demonstrated that angry expressions lead to more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak arguments by signaling threat which induces extensive processing of a persuasive appeal. Moreover, angry expressions can override dispositional tendencies to process non-analytically, and the impact of angry expressions on processing can carry over to related issues beyond what is specifically advocated in the appeal (e.g., lateral attitude change; Glaser, Dickel, Liersch, Rees, Süssenbach, & Bohner, 2015).

Although emotion has been closely linked to persuasion throughout the centuries since Aristotle penned *Rhetoric*, scientific research has almost exclusively focused on the emotion experienced by the recipients of persuasive appeals. In the present research, threat was identified as the mechanism by which angry expressions induce analytic processing, even though appraisals of threat were made in the absence of any real threat to the perceiver. Moreover, despite the well-established role of experienced emotion in processing, we did not find any evidence of affective reactions in any of our experiments. After participants completed all the attitude indices, but before they completed demographics, they reported the extent to which they were currently experiencing a series of common emotions. These measures assessed the possibility that angry expressions influence processing by way of affective reactions, e.g., emotion contagion. Across all five experiments, we found no evidence that participants’ current emotional state was influenced by the emotion expressed by the message source. Participants who evaluated persuasive appeals from angry sources did not report feeling angrier (i.e., direct emotion contagion) than participants who evaluated appeals from sources expressing other
emotions. Neither did participants who evaluated appeals from angry sources report feeling more afraid (i.e., complementary emotion contagion) than participants who evaluated appeals from sources expressing other emotions. Consequently, the evidence points toward cognitive inferential processes, rather than affective processes, as the central mechanism in emotion expression-induced changes in information processing. See the Online Supplement for more details and analyses of participants’ self-reported emotions.

The present research also expands our understanding of the role of threat in persuasion. Threat has been previously identified as an important factor in the effectiveness of persuasive messages. However, such effects of threat on persuasion are often moderated by message framing. For example, threat can make a persuasive appeal more effective when that appeal is framed in terms of loss than when it is framed in terms of gains (Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin, & Salovey, 2006; Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Additionally, previous research has manifest threat through the content of the appeal (e.g., health or safety threats) of varying relevance to the perceiver. In the present research, the threat itself (i.e., the angry source) was unrelated to the content of the appeal and posed no realistic danger to the perceiver. Even under such minimally threatening conditions, it appears that cognitive appraisals of angry sources as threatening are sufficient to induce perceivers to carefully evaluate the merits of the source’s appeal.

This research also expands our understanding of angry expressions by separating threat from anger. To be sure, angry expressions are generally perceived to be more threatening than other emotions, as Experiment 4 demonstrates. However, as illustrated in Experiment 5, not all angry expressions are perceived as threatening. A direct angry gaze can signal dominance, whereas an averted gaze can signal submission (Argyle & Cook, 1976). Thus, it appears that expressing anger is not sufficient to induce analytic processing. In order to induce processing,
angry expressions must also signal threat, though it is not necessary for this threat to be directly relevant to the perceiver.

It is important to note that the effects of angry expressions on analytic processing demonstrated here are unlikely to be due to any idiosyncrasies of the ways in which anger was expressed in the present research. The emotion expressions depicted in Experiment 1 were composed based on a directed facial muscle action task without direct mention of any associated emotion, whereas the emotion expressions depicted in Experiments 2-5 were expressed in a more naturalistic manner. Additionally, the models in Experiment 1 came from the same student population as the participants, whereas the Swedish models in Experiments 2-5 were foreigners to our American-based participants. The verbal expression of emotion varied across studies, as well. In Experiment 1, the persuasive appeal began with an expression of emotion with no reference to the cause of the emotion, whereas in Experiments 2-4 the appeal explicitly stated that the emotion was related to the proposal under consideration, and Experiment 5 included no verbal expression of emotion at all. Moreover, the effects of angry expressions on analytic processing are unlikely to be due to any idiosyncrasies of the persuasive appeals used in the present research. Of the three different appeals used here, two were framed in favor of the proposal and one was framed in opposition to the proposal, and one of these proposals (i.e., to implement comprehensive exams for graduating college seniors) was counter-attitudinal to the participant population. Taken together, the effect of angry expressions on analytic processing appears to be a generalizable phenomenon.

It is also important to note that the outcome of Experiment 5 is not likely to be due to differences between direct and averted faces in engagement or relevance. The default response to relevant information is to process it more carefully than less relevant information (Petty et al.,
1981). In most cases, a person looking directly at you is more likely to engage with you and, thus, be more relevant to you than someone looking away. However, we designed this paradigm to be of low relevance, describing the proposals as taking place at a distant or unspecified location, and in the distant future. As Experiments 1-4 demonstrate, directly-gazing disgusted, fearful, happy, and sad sources did not induce analytic processing in this experimental paradigm. Thus, direct gaze in and of itself is not sufficient to induce analytic processing under these conditions. Consequently, it was not necessary for Experiment 5 to include other emotion expressions with direct and averted gaze. If these other emotion expressions do not induce analytic processing with direct gaze (i.e., Experiments 1-4), then a demonstration that they also do not induce analytic processing under even less relevant conditions (i.e., averted gaze) would not tell us anything about relevance as an alternative mechanism. Moreover, we measured the perceived relevance of several emotion expressions in Experiment 4 as an exploratory variable (see Footnote 4). However, participants’ perceptions of the relevance of the source did not vary by emotion expression. Of course, such null results should always be interpreted cautiously, and primarily serve as converging evidence for our broader point. Taken together, we do not believe that gaze direction as a proxy for engagement or relevance is a viable alternate explanation for why participants analytically process persuasive appeals in this paradigm.

To our initial surprise, we found no evidence that the valence or certainty of an angry expressions influenced processing. We focused on these dimensions of emotion expressions because they had been identified in prior research on experienced emotions and processing to influence responses to persuasive appeals (e.g., Petty & Briñol, 2015; Schwartz & Clore, 1983; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Of course, valence and certainty are not the only dimensions upon which emotions vary, and the present research allows us to rule out other dimensions as potential
mechanisms. For example, the effect of angry expressions on analytic processing cannot be due to the approach-orientation signaled by angry expressions because happiness is also an approach-oriented emotion but did not induce analytic processing. Similarly, the arousal of the emotion expression is not a viable explanation for these effects: anger, disgust, and happiness are all high-arousal emotions but only angry expressions induced analytic processing. Evaluative conditioning also cannot explain the effects of angry expressions on analytic processing. Evaluative conditioning is the process by which the valence of a neutral (conditioned) stimulus is changed through pairing with a valenced (unconditioned) stimulus (e.g., Razran, 1954; C. K. Staats & Staats, 1957; for a review, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). In the context of the present research, the angry expression would be the unconditioned stimulus and the persuasive appeal the conditioned stimulus. If angry expressions influenced attitudes through evaluative conditioning, we would expect that pairing an appeal with a negative angry expression will create a negative association with the topic of the appeal and, consequently, lead to more negative attitudes toward the appeal relative to the same appeal paired with a positive emotion expression (e.g., happiness), regardless of the quality of arguments presented about the topic. However, we found no such pattern across any of these experiments. Thus, extensive processing induced by the threat signaled by angry expressions, as demonstrated in the present research, represents a novel contribution to the persuasion literature.

Though this research makes important theoretical and practical contributions, it is limited in some ways. One limitation is that the emotions here were expressed in a relatively impoverished manner via a static image and a brief description of how the source of the appeal is feeling (e.g., “I’m angry that this proposal might not be implemented.”) Emotion can also be expressed through posture and vocal prosody (Van Kleef, van den Berg, & Heerdink, 2014),
which are more clearly conveyed via video or in-person interaction than static image or written word. Thus, emotions expressed under such dynamic conditions likely convey a wider array of information and may have different effects on processing. That said, discrete emotion expressions can be recognized at levels far above chance, regardless of the expressive channel through which they are conveyed (Hawk, Van Kleef, Fischer, & Van der Schalk, 2009). The present research demonstrates that even minimal information conveyed by emotion expressions can influence how a persuasive appeal is considered. Moreover, though the paradigm used in the present research – a picture with text – may lack richness of information, it does not necessarily lack external validity. Indeed, this presentation closely resembles the format in which news and advertisements are often presented, and was modeled after opinion editorials as they often appear in newspapers. Thus, the present research has clear implications for how people think about and respond to information as they regularly encounter it.

**Future Directions**

Though this research represents a novel contribution to our understanding of angry expressions and persuasion, many questions are left unanswered and represent interesting future directions for study. Of the five emotions used in the present research (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness), we found evidence of only angry expressions inducing extensive processing. It is possible that other emotion expressions might also induce extensive processing, and other conditions under which disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness might do so as well. Similarly, there are likely conditions under which emotion expressions inhibit processing. For example, as mentioned above, presenting emotion expressions in more dynamic formats such as video or in-person interaction may allow additional information to emerge along with the expressed emotion.
which, in turn, may influence the extent of processing. This represents an interesting direction for future research.

The present research demonstrates through both mediation analysis and causal chain design that the threat signaled by an angry expression induces analytic processing of persuasive appeals. Future research should investigate why threat induces careful processing of persuasive information. One possible mechanism is the well-known ability of angry faces to grab and hold attention (Hansen & Hansen, 1988). Recent research has demonstrated that this attention advantage generalizes to other signs of facial threat (e.g., low eyebrow ridge, which is associated with propensity for aggression), even in the absence of explicit displays of anger (Shasteen, Sasson, & Pinkham, 2015). However, this explanation requires that the message recipient’s attention first be directed to the source of the angry expression, and then disengage from the angry person in order to carefully attend to the content of the persuasive appeal. Though we are unaware of any research demonstrating that angry expressions can not only attract but also redirect attention in such a manner, this mechanism represents an interesting direction for future research.

It is perhaps surprising that angry expressions induced analytic processing under conditions that constrain processing, i.e., low relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 1993). From the multiple roles perspective of source cues, angry expressions should serve as a heuristic under such conditions. Instead, it appears that angry expressions signal information (i.e., threat) that increases the extent to which perceivers analytically process persuasive appeals. Analytic processing depends on both the ability and motivation to engage processing resources (Cacioppo et al., 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Given that it is unlikely that perceptions of threat increase processing ability, the present research suggests that threat can play an important
motivational role in analytic processing. Additional research is warranted to investigate the relationship between threatening source cues, such as angry expressions, and processing.

Another topic for further exploration is the importance of the relationship between the person expressing anger and the persuasive appeal. In the present research, the appeals were attributed to the people whose pictures appeared alongside and, thus, the two stimuli were directly related. It remains an open question whether we would see similar effects if the pictured person were unrelated to the appeal. Similarly, it is possible that any stimulus that signals threat, such as a picture of a gun or spider, would have similar effects on processing. However, previous research suggests that an emotion expression needs to be relevant to the information under consideration in order to influence judgments. Van Kleef et al. (2014) found that participants formed more favorable impressions of a proposal when a happy versus sad person was pictured alongside, but only when that person was described as relevant to the proposal. Whether extensive processing of persuasive appeals also depends on such a relationship between stimuli should be examined in future research.

The relationship between the perceiver and source of a persuasive appeal also represents an interesting future direction for research. To our knowledge, the influence of emotion expressions on analytic processing has never been examined in the intergroup domain. In related work, though, Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) demonstrated that the intergroup relationship between the perceiver and source of an emotion expression can interact to imply different adaptive meaning for different emotions. If this logic can be extended to persuasive appeals, it is possible that different adaptive meaning is attached to emotion expressions from ingroup versus outgroup members which consequently leads to differential processing of the appeal. For example, happiness expressed by an oppositional outgroup member may signal threat to the
perceiver and, consequently, induce effortful processing of relevant information. In contrast, happiness expressed by a fellow ingroup member may signal that all is well to the perceiver and that effortful processing is unnecessary. Future research should investigate this.

Though we have framed this research in terms of angry expressions inducing analytic processing, we make no claim that angry expressions influence only analytic processing. Though the strong / weak appeal paradigm we employed is generally regarded to detect systematic / analytic / system 2 processing (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 1981), it is likely that no judgment is process-pure (Sherman, Krieglmeyer, & Calanchini, 2014). Instead, most judgments reflect the influence of multiple processes which traditional persuasion paradigms, such as the ones used here, are ill-suited to detect. Research using process-dissociating mathematical models has successfully estimated the contribution of multiple processes across a host of domains, such as judgments and decision-making (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006), prejudice (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Payne, 2001), stereotyping (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012), and moral decision-making (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Future research should apply process-dissociation models to the questions of attitude formation and change addressed in the present research in order to more precisely determine which processes are influenced by angry expressions.

Conclusion

Across five studies, we demonstrated that angry expressions are meaningful interpersonal cognitive cues that can influence the degree to which persuasive information is scrutinized. Returning to our jurors from 12 Angry Men, the present research helps explain why expressing anger made Juror 8’s strong arguments even more convincing but hurt Juror 10’s already-weak case. These findings have potential implications across a variety of domains in which persuasion
attempts regularly include expressions of emotion. Fields like advertising, sales, marketing, and politics may clearly benefit from such knowledge to develop more persuasive campaigns. Conversely, these findings could be used to develop programs to resist the influence of such campaigns. Given that emotion and persuasion often go hand-in-hand in close relationships, this research could have clinical applications to family and couples counseling. Similarly, this research could be applied to other interpersonal domains, such as leadership and organizational behavior. Taken together, the present research can inform both theoretical models of emotion and attitude formation and change and a multitude of real-world persuasion techniques and strategies.
Footnotes

1. Throughout this paper, we primarily use the terms analytic and non-analytic to refer to the two types of processing described in many dual-process models of cognition. Rather than adopting the terminology of one specific model, we choose these terms for both their generality and neutrality.

2. By representing emotion expressions using different photo databases across Experiments 1-3, we can rule out the possibility that our results were driven by stimulus-specific idiosyncrasies. A more extensive discussion of this point can be found in the Online Supplement.

3. Though there are empirical precedents for relying on differential effects of weak and strong arguments on reported attitudes as evidence of analytic processing (see Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006), we also assessed message elaboration in Experiment 2 as an additional direct indicator of such processing. See the Online Supplement for further discussion and analysis of this point.

4. After the attitude index items and before the demographics, we also measured participants’ perceptions of the source’s intelligence, positivity, as well as the personal relevance of the source (e.g., “What this person has to say is relevant to me.”), the value of the source as a person (e.g., “This person deserves to be heard.”), and the informational value of the appeal (e.g., “How valuable is the information that was conveyed in these remarks?”). None of these exploratory perceptions varied as a function of emotion expression and appeal quality and are not discussed further.

5. It is also theoretically plausible to decompose these data by NFC, rather than by emotion expression or perceived threat. When doing so, there is a marginally significant interaction between emotion expression and argument quality for low NFC participants, $b=0.55$, $p=.06$. When arguments are attributed to an afraid source, low NFC participants report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals, as would be expected by default from such
participants. In contrast, when arguments are attributed to an angry source, low NFC participants report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals. This pattern of results is consistent with our characterization of angry expressions motivating analytic processing. There is also a significant interaction between emotion expression and argument quality for high NFC participants, $b=-0.67, p=.02$. When arguments are attributed to an afraid source, high NFC participants report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, as would be expected by default from such participants. In contrast, when arguments are attributed to an angry source, high NFC participants report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals. The pattern of results is similar, but weaker, when perceived threat rather than emotion expression is used in the analysis: Low NFC $b=0.08, p=.32$; High NFC $b=-0.17, p=.05$. We know of no theoretical perspective or precedent in the literature that would predict or explain why angry expressions would constrain the motivation (or ability) of high NFC participants to process analytically, and it warrants further study.

6. Misidentification did not vary by gaze direction, $p>.47$. That such a relatively large proportion of participants did not correctly identify the emotion expression in Experiment 4 is surprising, given that these stimuli are well-validated (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008). However, we included the recognition check in this experiment specifically because of the potential non-normativity of the averted angry gaze, so the decision to exclude the data of participants who failed to correctly identify the expression from the analyses was made a priori. Of course, the emotion being expressed needs to be correctly recognized in order for it to have predictable effects on processing. Indeed, it is a testament to the robustness of the phenomenon of angry expressions inducing extensive processing that it reliably emerged in Experiments 1-4, even though we did not screen out participants who failed to accurately recognize the emotion.
expressions. Had we checked for and excluded such participants, the likely outcome would have been to reduce noise in the data, ultimately strengthening the effect. Nevertheless, the pattern of results in Experiment 5 is largely the same if we retain participants who failed to correctly identify the angry expression in the analyses. Specifically, the effect of angry expressions on support for comprehensive exams at UC Davis 10 years in the future is marginal, $F(1, 159)=2.96$, $p=.09$, $\eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.02$; support for comprehensive exams at UC Davis is non-significant, $F(1, 159)=1.04$, $p=.31$, $\eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.01$; and willingness to sign a petition in favor of comprehensive exams remains significant: averted gaze $\chi^2(1, N=80)=0.57$, $p=.45$, direct gaze $\chi^2(1, N=80)=8.36$, $p=.004$.

7. Fear was conveyed in Experiment 2 with the stem “I’m afraid that…”, which has an alternate, colloquial meaning that does not indicate genuine fear. However, in Experiment 4 fear was conveyed with the stem “I’m scared that…”, which more clearly conveys fear, and this change had no discernable effect on the outcomes.
References


Figure 1. Mean attitude favorability as a function of emotion expression, appeal quality, and NFC, Experiment 4.
Figure 2. Mean attitude favorability as a function of threat appraisal, appeal quality, and NFC, Experiment 4.
Table 1

Attitude favorability, by emotion expression and appeal quality, Experiments 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disgust</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Sad</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>4.90 (1.58)</td>
<td>4.60 (1.35)</td>
<td>4.06 (1.25)</td>
<td>4.41 (1.36)</td>
<td>5.05 (1.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>3.91 (1.24)</td>
<td>4.59 (1.32)</td>
<td>4.23 (1.53)</td>
<td>4.53 (1.44)</td>
<td>4.44 (1.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>5.03 (0.95)</td>
<td>4.64 (0.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.69 (1.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>4.04 (1.02)</td>
<td>4.46 (1.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.16 (1.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>4.88 (1.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.35 (1.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.71 (1.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>4.26 (1.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.35 (1.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.65 (1.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* (Standard deviations)
Table 2

Attitude favorability, behavioral intentions, and correlations by emotion expression condition, Experiment 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Anger</th>
<th>Averted Anger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support in 10 years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>4.41 (1.44)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>2.63 (1.15)</td>
<td>3.04 (1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support now</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>3.55 (1.22)</td>
<td>2.71 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>2.33 (1.33)</td>
<td>2.58 (1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Would sign a petition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In 10 years</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
<td>0.82***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>-0.63***</td>
<td>-0.63***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: (Standard deviations) ***p<.001
Highlights

Angry expressions led to more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak arguments

Other expressions led to equally favorable attitudes towards strong & weak arguments

Angry expressions induced processing in people who do not normally process carefully

Threat signaled by angry expressions induced extensive processing of appeals
Online Supplement

**Using different photo databases**

We varied the stimuli across Experiments 1-3 to ensure that any effects of angry expressions on information processing were not due to idiosyncrasies of the specific pictures that were used to convey emotion expressions. The emotion expressions pictured in the UCDSEE photoset (Tracy et al., 2009) are displayed by students from the same university as our participants and were validated as recognizable at a rate significantly better than chance in the same population. The KDEF photoset (Lundqvist Flykt, & Öhman., 1998) portrays Swedish models and were validated using a Belgian participant pool (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008). Models depicted in the UCDSEE photoset posed their expressions based on a directed facial action task which guided expressers to voluntarily move certain facial muscles in order to produce facial configurations associated with different emotion expressions without direct mention of any associated emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991). Emotion expressions composed in this way do not suffer from many of the problems associated with emotion expressions developed without a standardized system, such as individual differences in the models’ or researchers’ intuitions about how various emotions should look (Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). However, such expression poses are based on prototypes of each emotion which might appear infrequently in daily life (Russell, 1994). Models in the KDEF photo set were asked to express each emotion in a way that felt natural to them, so the emotion expressions used in Experiments 2 and 3 were more naturalistic (Lundqvist et al., 1998). Consequently, any similarities in the patterns of results across Experiments 1-3 are not due to idiosyncrasies of the images used to convey emotion expressions but, rather, can be attributed to the emotions themselves.
Because the UCDSEE stimuli used in Experiment 1 portrayed models drawn from the same American university as our participants and were validated using the same undergraduate participant pool, but the KDEF stimuli used Experiment 2 portrayed Swedish models and were validated using a Belgian participant pool, we pretested the KDEF stimuli using our own participant pool in order to ensure that the emotions expressed could be accurately perceived by our participants. In a pretest sample, participants rated “To what extent does this person feel (angry, afraid, happy)” on a 7-point scale (1=not at all, 7=very much). All stimuli were rated significantly above the midpoint as expressing the intended emotion: Male anger, $M=5.25$, $SD=1.29$, $t(23)=4.73$, $p<.001$, $d=0.97$; female anger, $M=5.00$, $SD=1.51$, $t(22)=3.18$, $p=.004$, $d=0.66$; male fear, $M=4.62$, $SD=1.58$, $t(25)=1.99$, $p=.06$, $d=0.39$; female fear, $M=5.73$, $SD=1.54$, $t(25)=5.74$, $p<.001$, $d=1.12$; male happiness, $M=5.56$, $SD=1.34$, $t(26)=6.03$, $p<.001$, $d=1.16$; female happiness, $M=5.00$, $SD=1.66$, $t(27)=3.20$, $p=.004$, $d=0.60$. That male fear was perceived at a level only marginally above the midpoint is perhaps unsurprising, given that the expression of fear tends to be least well recognized across cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).
Message elaboration in Experiment 2

After participants in Experiment 2 read the persuasive appeal, but before they responded to the attitude index, they listed up to 10 thoughts (i.e., elaborations). Participants’ thoughts were later evaluated by two research assistants who were blind to hypothesis and condition. The research assistants rated whether each thought was relevant to the appeal, the source of the appeal, or something else. Agreement on the relevance of each thought was good (93.1%), and disagreements were resolved by the first author. The research assistants also rated the valence of each thought from negative to positive on a 7-point scale (-3=very negative, 0=neutral, 3= very positive). Agreement on the valence of each thought was good, $r=0.73$. An Elaboration Index was calculated by subtracting the number of negative thoughts (i.e., valence<0) from the number of positive thoughts (i.e., valence>0) and dividing by the total number of appeal-relevant thoughts. The Elaboration Index serves as additional evidence of processing: participants processing analytically are expected to report more favorable thoughts toward strong than weak arguments, and participants processing non-analytically are expected to report more (or less) favorable thoughts toward appeals regardless of argument quality.

The mean ratio of positive-to-negative appeal-relevant thoughts reported by participants in Experiment 2 in response to strong and weak persuasive appeals for each of the emotion expressions is presented in Table OS1. The elaboration index was subjected to a 3 (emotion expression) X 2 (appeal quality) between-subjects ANOVA. Although, overall, participants produced more negative than positive thoughts about the appeal (i.e., elaboration index scores<0), a main effect of appeal quality revealed that participants generated relatively more positive than negative appeal-relevant thoughts in response to strong appeals ($M=-0.20$, $SD=0.61$) than in response to weak appeals ($M=-0.55$, $SD=0.52$), $F(1,211)=20.09$, $p<.001$,
\( \eta_{\text{partial}}^2 = 0.09 \). However, neither the main effect of emotion expression nor the emotion expression by appeal quality interaction were significant, \( Fs < 1.82 \).

Analysis of the simple main effects of emotion expressions on thought elaborations revealed an identical pattern to the effect of emotion expressions on the attitude index. Collapsed across argument quality condition, participants generated equally (un)favorable thoughts in response to persuasive appeals paired with angry, fearful, and neutral expressions, all \( ts < 1.12 \). Analysis of the simple main effects of emotion expression within levels of appeal quality also revealed a similar pattern to the effects on the attitude index. Participants who saw angry expressions generated relatively more positive (less negative) appeal-relevant thoughts in response to strong appeals than in response to weak appeals, \( t(68) = 4.16, p < .001, d = 1.01 \). Similarly, participants who saw neutral expressions generated relatively more positive (less negative) appeal-relevant thoughts in response to strong appeals than in response to weak appeals, \( t(69) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 0.60 \). However, participants who saw fearful expressions reported equally negative appeal-relevant thoughts in response to strong and weak appeals, \( t(68) = 1.64, p = .22, d = 0.30 \).

To assess whether appeal elaboration explained the influence of argument quality on the attitudes reported by participants who saw angry expressions, we tested this indirect effect following the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2008). Appeal quality was coded as weak = 0 strong = 1 and, using 5,000 bootstrapped samples from the original dataset, we constructed bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals estimating the indirect effect of appeal elaboration on participants’ attitudes towards the appeal. For participants who evaluated appeals attributed to angry sources, the indirect effect of appeal elaborations (\( M = 0.55, SE = 0.18 \)) was significantly different from zero, 95% CI [0.26, 0.98]. Thus, the relative favorability of appeal-
relevant thoughts reported by participants mediated the relationship between argument quality and attitudes toward persuasive appeals that were paired with angry expressions.

Because participants in Experiment 2 who saw neutral expressions also reported more positive appeal-relevant thoughts after reading strong than weak appeals, we conducted a similar analysis within the neutral expression condition. For these participants, the indirect effect of appeal elaborations ($M=0.46$, $SE=0.17$) was significantly different from zero, 95% CI [0.11, 0.77]. Thus, the relative favorability of appeal-relevant thoughts reported by participants also mediated the relationship between argument quality and attitudes toward persuasive appeals that were paired with neutral expressions.

Although the results of Experiment 2 seem to suggest that both angry and neutral expressions induce analytic processing, or that other emotion expressions (i.e., fear) inhibit analytic processing, neither of these conclusions seem to be warranted when considered along with the results of Experiment 3. Experiments 2 and 3 were nearly identical, including the same persuasive appeals and pictures of neutral and angry sources. However, in Experiment 3, the proposal under consideration was specified to take effect 10 years in the future and, hence, was less relevant to participants than the proposal in Experiment 2. Relevance is an established moderator of analytic processing (Petty et al., 1981): the default response to relevant information is to process it more carefully than less relevant information. When the relevance of the proposal was decreased in Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 2, participants reported more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals attributed to angry sources, but equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals attributed to neutral sources. Because decreasing the relevance of the persuasive appeal between Experiments 2 and 3 shut off the effect of neutral
expressions but did not change the effect of angry expressions, it is reasonable to conclude that angry but not neutral or other expressions induce analytic processing.

Table OS1

Elaboration index means by emotion expression, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.63)</td>
<td>-0.33 (0.58)</td>
<td>-0.23 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>-0.57 (0.44)</td>
<td>-0.55 (0.60)</td>
<td>-0.60 (0.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: (Standard deviations)*
Valence as the mechanism underlying the anger expression-processing effect

The meta-analysis of Studies 1-3 allowed us to test valence as a mechanism underlying the anger expression–processing effect, given that the valence of internally experienced emotions affects processing. According to Schwarz’ (1990) model of emotions as information, the experience of negative emotion such as anger indicates that something is wrong and processing resources must be engaged to deal effectively with the situation. Conversely, the experience of positive emotion indicates that all is well and effortful processing is unnecessary. If this perspective can be extended from experienced emotions to emotion expressions, then the expression of a negative emotion might signal to the perceiver that the source of the emotion regards something to be wrong. Thus, a negative emotion expression accompanying a persuasive appeal might induce the perceiver to scrutinize the content of the appeal in order to understand and potentially resolve the situation. Conversely, a positive emotion expression accompanying a persuasive appeal might signal that all is well and reduce effortful scrutiny of the appeal. From this perspective, we might expect recipients of persuasive appeals accompanied by negative emotion expressions to be more sensitive to variations in appeal quality and report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals, but recipients of persuasive appeals accompanied by relatively more positive emotion expressions to be less sensitive to variations in appeal quality and report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals.

In order to test valence as the mechanism by which angry expressions induce analytic processing, we estimated the size of the difference between the effect of negative and relatively more positive emotion expressions (i.e., happiness, neutral) on responses to strong versus weak appeals. For Experiment 1, we compared the effects of negative expressions against neutral expressions with a contrast, assigning weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with
angry, disgusted, fearful, and sadness expressions, respectively, and weights of 4 and -4 to strong and weak appeals paired with neutral expressions, \(F(1,223)=3.91, p=.05, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=.02\). For Experiment 2, we assigned weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with angry and fearful expressions, respectively, and weights of 2 and -2 to strong and weak appeals paired with neutral expressions, respectively, \(F(1, 205)=0.03, p=.87, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2<0.01\). For Experiment 3, we assigned weights of weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with angry expressions, respectively, weights of 1 and -1 to strong and weak appeals paired with happy expressions, respectively, and zeroes to neutral expressions, \(F(1, 223)=2.46, p=.12, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.01\). Meta-analyzing these three effects revealed a non-significant summary effect, \(Z=-0.63, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.44, 0.86], SE=0.33, p=.53\).

In the above analysis, we contrasted anger against happiness in Experiment 3 instead of the neutral expression, as we had done for Experiments 1 and 2. One of the purposes of Experiment 3 was to compare anger against a truly positive emotion (i.e., happiness), rather than the relatively more positive neutral expression. However, the results of the valence meta-analysis come out the same if we use a contrast estimate from Experiment 3 that compares angry expressions (weights of -2, 2) against combined happiness and neutral expressions (weights of 1, -1), \(Z=-0.01, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.88, 0.88], SE=0.45, p=.99\). Taken together, these results indicate that the valence of the emotion expression had no reliable effect of inducing analytic processing of persuasive appeals.
Certainty as the mechanism underlying the anger expression-processing effect

The meta-analysis of Studies 1-3 also allowed us to test certainty as a mechanism underlying the anger expression–processing effect, given that the certainty of internally experienced emotions affects processing. For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated that participants experiencing relatively low-certainty emotions (e.g., fear) processed persuasive appeals more carefully than participants experiencing relatively high-certainty emotions (e.g., anger). The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion proposes that analytic processing is related to the difference between a person's desired level of confidence (the sufficiency threshold) and actual level of confidence in a judgment (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Analytic processing occurs when a person's actual confidence in a judgment falls below the sufficiency threshold, and continues until this confidence gap is closed. If this perspective can be extended from experienced emotions to emotion expressions, then the expression of a high-certainty emotion paired with a persuasive appeal might decrease the perceiver’s confidence gap and reduce scrutiny of the appeal. Conversely, a low-certainty emotion expression paired with a persuasive appeal might increase the perceiver’s confidence gap and induce the perceiver to scrutinize the content of the appeal. From this perspective, we might expect recipients of persuasive appeals accompanied by high-certainty emotion expressions such as anger to be insensitive to variations in appeal quality and report equally favorable attitudes towards strong and weak appeals, but recipients of persuasive appeals accompanied by low-certainty emotion expressions such as fear to be sensitive to variations in appeal quality and report more favorable attitudes towards strong than weak appeals. In fact, this is the opposite of what we found in Experiments 1-3. Nevertheless, we meta-analyzed these three experiments in order to determine whether the certainty associated with an emotion expression reliably influenced processing. For Experiment
1, we compared the effects of certainty with a contrast, assigning weights of 1 and -1 to strong and weak appeals paired with high-certainty angry and disgusted expressions, respectively, weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with low-certainty fearful and sad expressions, respectively, and zeroes to neutral expressions, $F(1, 223) = 0.69, p = .41, \eta^2_{partial} < .01$. For Experiment 2, we assigned weights of -2 and 2 to strong and weak appeals paired with high-certainty angry expressions, weights of 2 and -2 to strong and weak appeals paired with low-certainty fear expressions, and zeroes to neutral expressions, $F(1, 205) = 4.89, p = .03, \eta^2_{partial} = 0.02$. For Experiment 3, we assigned weights of -1 and 1 to strong and weak appeals paired with high certainty angry and happy expressions, respectively, and weights of 2 and -2 to strong and weak appeals paired with the relatively less certain neutral expressions, respectively, $F(1, 223) = 0.56, p = .46, \eta^2_{partial} > 0.01$. Meta-analyzing these three effects revealed a non-significant summary effect, $Z = -0.56, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.50, 0.83], SE = 0.60, p = .58$. Thus, these results indicate that the certainty of the emotion expression had no reliable effect of inducing analytic processing of persuasive appeals.
Affective reactions as the mechanism underlying the anger expression-processing effect

The mechanisms tested in this manuscript (i.e., threat, valence, certainty) assume that emotion expressions induce inferential processes (Van Kleef, 2009). Specifically, we predict that the anger expressed by the source of the persuasive appeal conveys information (e.g., the source’s valence or certainty) to the perceiver which, in turn, influences how the perceiver considers the appeal. It is also possible that angry expressions influence how persuasive appeals are considered through affective reactions (Van Kleef, 2009). Affective reactions can include various forms of emotion contagion, such as mimicry (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), complementary emotions (e.g., Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), perspective taking (e.g., Hawk, Fischer, & Van Kleef, 2011), affect infusion (e.g., Forgas, 1995), affect priming (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1987), and mood maintenance (e.g., Schaller & Cialdini, 1988), among others. Such affective reactions to emotion expressions have been demonstrated to influence perceiver’s judgments and behaviors across a variety of domains, including negotiation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), leadership (Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005), product ratings (e.g., Howard & Gengler, 2001), voting (e.g., Mullen et al., 1986), and customer service (e.g., Pugh, 2001).

In the context of the present research, there are two main ways in which angry expressions might influence the extent of processing by way of affective reactions. The recipient of a persuasive appeal from an angry source might become angry herself through direct emotion contagion, and this newly-acquired feeling of anger might increase or decrease her reliance on analytic processing in the same way as would any other internally-experienced high-certainty or negative-valence emotion (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Alternately, an angry expression may induce fear in the perceiver as a complementary emotion (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996) and, because fear is a low-certainty and negative-valence emotion, the perceiver’s
newly-acquired feeling of fear may cause her to analytically process the appeal (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Thus, there are multiple ways in which angry expressions might change the appeal recipient’s own emotional experience and, consequently, influence how persuasive appeals are considered.

To determine whether angry expressions accompanying persuasive appeals affect persuasion via affective reactions, we measured participants’ emotional states following exposure to the expressed emotions in all five experiments. After completing the attitude index, participants reported the extent to which they were currently experiencing a series of common emotions. Participants used a 7-point scale anchored by not at all and extremely. To ascertain whether participants’ own emotional state was influenced by the emotions expressed with the persuasive appeal, we calculated a series of affective response indices. Experiment 1: anger (angry, frustrated, $r=0.56$), disgust (disgusted, revolted, $r=0.47$), fear (afraid, scared, $r=0.77$), sadness (sad, down, $r=0.79$). Experiment 2: anger (angry, frustrated, $r=0.46$) and fear (afraid, scared, $r=0.73$). Experiment 3: anger (angry, frustrated, $r=0.59$), happiness (happy, cheerful, $r=0.71$), fear (afraid, scared, $r=0.70$). Experiment 4: anger (angry, frustrated, $r=0.74$), fear (afraid, scared, $r=0.79$). Experiment 5: anger (angry, frustrated, $r=0.62$), fear (afraid, scared, $r=0.86$).

Participants’ self-reported emotions are presented in Table OS2. In Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5, participants’ self-reported anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness did not vary by emotion expression condition, all $F$s<1.78. In Experiment 3, participants’ self-reported fear and happiness did not vary by emotion expression condition, $F$s<0.25. However, participants’ self-reported anger was marginally lower in the anger expression condition than in the happy or neutral conditions, $F(2,229)=2.73, p=.07, \eta_{\text{partial}}^2=0.02$. Given that participants who saw angry
expressions actually felt less angry, affective reactions are not a viable explanation for the observed processing effects.

In Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5, participants’ reported anger and reported frustration did not correlate strongly ($0.46 \leq r_s \leq 0.62$). To confirm that anger was not in fact being induced, we also analyzed participants’ self-reports of anger separately. In none of these experiments did self-reported anger vary by emotion expression condition: all $F_s<1.97$. These results confirm that experienced anger was not induced differentially in the anger expression condition, and thus cannot explain the findings.

One limitation of the way in which we tested affective reactions as the mechanism by which angry expressions influence processing is that it relied upon self-report measures of emotion. Consequently, we can only rule out subjective emotional experiences as a mechanism. Further research can investigate subtle changes in neural or physiological activity that may occur outside of participants’ awareness (Whalen et al., 1998).

Table OS2

Self-reported affect by emotion expression, Experiments 1-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disgust</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Happiness</th>
<th>Sadness</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.24 (1.50)</td>
<td>1.70 (1.19)</td>
<td>1.95 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.22 (1.48)</td>
<td>1.78 (0.96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>1.81 (1.19)</td>
<td>1.48 (0.82)</td>
<td>1.73 (1.05)</td>
<td>1.87 (1.26)</td>
<td>1.70 (0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>1.51 (1.06)</td>
<td>1.54 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.79 (1.16)</td>
<td>1.83 (1.45)</td>
<td>1.60 (1.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>2.04 (1.65)</td>
<td>1.89 (1.47)</td>
<td>2.04 (1.44)</td>
<td>2.26 (1.68)</td>
<td>1.59 (1.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.06 (1.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.36 (1.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.07 (1.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>1.82 (1.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.64 (0.99)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.94 (1.41)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exp. 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>1.65 (1.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.09 (1.42)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.13)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>1.68 (1.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.63 (1.09)</td>
<td>1.76 (1.06)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>4.25 (1.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.15 (1.43)</td>
<td>4.28 (1.31)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exp. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.15 (1.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.02 (1.37)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exp. 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>1.82 (1.49)</td>
<td>1.70 (1.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.39 (1.27)</td>
<td>2.54 (1.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>2.14 (1.79)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.57)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* (Standard deviations)
Online Supplement References


**Persuasive Appeals**

**Experiment 1**

Appeal Introduction:

We are conducting a study on the effects of first-hand vs. second-hand information. In conjunction with our collaborators in Florida, we asked students at the University of Miami to read about several ideas that may be proposed for their school in the future and give their opinion on these issues. Now, we would like you to read what they wrote and tell us what you think. You won’t be reading the proposals themselves, but rather what other people thought about those proposals. Regarding a proposal for a swimsuit calendar featuring University of Miami student athletes:

Strong Appeal:

“I feel extremely angry (afraid, sad, disgusted). A calendar like this promotes sexist attitudes and further reinforces the unhealthy stereotype that men and women should be judged by what's on the outside rather than what's on the inside. Objectifying student athletes like this sends the wrong appeal to prospective students and their families. It would tarnish the progressive and enlightened image of our university that we have worked for so long to build.”

Weak Appeal:

“I feel extremely angry (afraid, sad, disgusted). A calendar like this will put the focus on athletes rather than academics, which is why students are supposed to be at college in the first place. It's going to make parents think that the students here have nothing better to do than pose in their swimsuits. There are so many better ways to promote the university than this. Nobody uses paper calendars anymore anyway.”

**Experiment 2**

Appeal Introduction:
The Regents of the University of Missouri are considering the implementation of comprehensive exams. This means that all seniors would need to complete and pass a general exam that covers a number of subject areas before being allowed to graduate. Recently, the Regents held a campus meeting to solicit input from any interested parties. On the following screen you will read and evaluate a statement made by one person who attended this meeting and expressed their views on comprehensive exams.

Strong Appeal:

"I'm (angry that we’re having a conversation about this issue; afraid/ aware that comprehensive exams may not be implemented due to strong opposition). Data from the University of Virginia, where comprehensive exams were recently instituted, indicate that the average starting salary of graduates increased over $4000 over the two-year period in which the exams were begun. At comparable universities without comprehensive exams, salaries increased only $850 over the same period. As Saul Siegel, a vice-president of IBM put it in Business Week recently, 'We are much quicker to offer the large salaries and executive positions to these kids because by passing their area exam, they have proven to us that they have expertise in their area rather than being people who may or may not be dependable and reliable.' Also, an interesting and important feature of the comprehensive exam requirement is that it has led to a significant improvement in the quality of undergraduate teaching in the schools where it has been tried. Data from the Educational Testing Service confirm that teachers and courses at the schools with comprehensive exams were rated more positively by students after the exams than before. Another benefit is that universities with the exams attract larger and more well-known corporations to campus to recruit students for their open positions. The end result is that students
at schools with comprehensive exams have a 55% greater chance of landing a good job than students at schools without the exams."

Weak Appeal:

"I'm (angry that we’re having a conversation about this issue; afraid/ aware that comprehensive exams may not be implemented due to strong opposition). A member of the Board of Regents has stated publicly that his brother had to take a comprehensive exam while in college and now he is the manager of a large restaurant. He said that he realized the value of the exams since their father was a migrant worker who didn't even finish high school. He also indicated that the university has received several letters from parents in support of the exam. In fact, 4 of the 6 parents who wrote in thought that the exams were an excellent idea. Also, the prestigious National Accrediting Board of Higher Education seeks input from parents as well as students, faculty, and administrators when evaluating a university. Since most parents contribute financially to their child's education and also favor the exams, the university should institute them. This would show that the university is willing to listen to and follow the parents' wishes over those of students and faculty who may simply fear the work involved in comprehensive exams. Also, any university that adopted the exams could be at the forefront of a national trend. High school students tend to be impressed by universities that keep pace with current trends. Therefore, the enrollments of universities with the exams should increase."

Experiment 4

Appeal Introduction:

We are conducting a study on the effects of first-hand vs. second-hand information. We surveyed citizens for their opinions on several new proposals that are under consideration in state
legislatures across the country. On the following screen you will see a picture of one of these citizens, along with his or her opinion of a proposal to increase taxes to repair highways in the U.S. You won't be reading the proposal itself, but rather this person's reaction to the proposal.

Strong Appeal:

“I’m angry (scared) that this proposal might not be implemented. Tax rates should be increased to help repair our highways. There are several reasons for why this action should be taken. First, an increase in tax rates would directly benefit the taxpayers’ safety. The increase would be used to repair potholes in our highways. Highway potholes play a part in 38% of all highway traffic deaths every year in America. This tax initiative would also be used to repair other rough spots on our highways. Rough spots on the road (such as bumps and damaged shoulders) play a part in an additional twenty percent of all highway traffic deaths. Second, a widening of the highway would lower commuting time, reduce traffic accidents and reduce the amount of traffic on city streets by making the highway a more attractive option. These traffic and time reductions would benefit almost all car owners. The final reason for this tax rate hike is actually economic. That is, a tax rate hike to repair our highways at this time would save the taxpayers from an even larger tax rate hike which would be necessary in approximately seven years, according to the government.”

Weak Appeal:

“I’m angry (scared) that this proposal might not be implemented. Tax rates should be increased to help repair our highways. There are several reasons for why this action should be taken. First, a tax rate increase would help in the beautification of our highways and also make them more interesting. Considering that many of our current highways are somewhat unsightly and boring, this tax rate increase could repair some of our highways’ unattractiveness.”
Increasing tax rates would additionally reduce the number of hitchhikers by making our highways more attractive. That is, hitchhikers would stand out against this more attractive highway background, and as such, it would be easier for police to ticket these individuals.

Second, the construction crews working on the repair of our highways should increase the safety of untamed animals living in close proximity to highways. That is, the noise and commotion caused by these construction workers would deter deer and other animals from lurking near the highways and potentially getting injured. Finally, the government should be trusted and supported on issues related to the maintenance of our highways. The government has often done good things in the past to increase the efficiency and safety of our highways and should be trusted to do the same here.”
Emotion Stimuli

Experiment 1 emotion expression stimuli
Experiment 2 emotion expression stimuli
Experiment 3 additional emotion expression stimulus
Experiment 5 emotion expression stimuli