Active Society in Formation: Environmentalism, Labor, and the Underworld in China

ABSTRACT: This Special Report highlights mutual penetration between the Chinese state and society by exploring the environmental movement, labor politics, and the underworld in that country. Guobin Yang of the University of Hawaii, Manoa, points out a growing tendency in China to organize collective action through legitimate channels while encouraging learning, cooperation, participation and dialogue—and shows how the environmental movement reflects this trend. Ching Kwan Lee of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, argues that the conventional rubrics of "class struggle" and the politics of "citizenship" cannot fully capture the complexity of Chinese labor politics. Chinese workers follow the strategy of applying mass pressure within the existing hierarchical power structure, rather than challenging it from the outside. Ming Xia of the College of Staten Island, City University of New York, notes that the infiltration of organized criminal groups into the state, or the so-called “red-black collusion,” has become a common phenomenon in China. This Special Report suggests that China will not soon create an independent civil society and move toward democratic governance.

Introduction

Gang Lin

After two decades of economic reform and openness, Chinese society is becoming more pluralistic. Whether civil society has emerged in China is debatable, but most China watchers agree that Chinese society deals more actively with the state than two decades ago. What has been the effect on Chinese society of two decades of reform? What new issues face China’s leadership? Three 2003-2004 Woodrow Wilson Center fellows, Guobin Yang of the University of Hawaii, Manoa, Ching Kwan Lee of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and Ming Xia of the College of Staten Island, City University of New York, contributed papers on, respectively, China’s environmental, labor, and organized crime issues, to this Special Report. Elizabeth Perry of Harvard University offered comments on the three papers when they were presented at a May 18 seminar co-hosted by the Center’s Asia Program and China Environment Forum.

In the first essay, Guobin Yang argues that the environmental movement in China aims to influence consumer behavior, business practices, and government policies without directly challenging state power. Yang points out four features of a grassroots public campaign to stop the building of 13 dams on the Nu River in southwestern China. The campaign benefited from the involvement of 1) environmental groups; 2) a moderate repertoire of collective action, such as public forums, study tours, photo exhibits, petition letters, and collective signatures; 3) close ties with international organizations; and 4) a leading role by media professionals.

According to Yang, this grassroots campaign marks the incipient rise of a new social movement in China. While earlier social movements often directly targeted the government, the
environmental movement does not challenge state power—and even seeks support from central government agencies. Unlike earlier social movements that sought explicit political change, the environmental movement aims to raise public consciousness and solve specific problems. Activists consciously try to effect gradual political change through practicing—not preaching—democratic values, such as citizen participation, self-responsibility, and reasoned debate. Relying on media and international support, the environmental movement reflects a larger trend within China of building organizational bases for collective action through legitimate channels. Yang concludes that the environmental movement’s rise demonstrates the expansion of space for political participation and the growing differentiation of multiple spheres in Chinese society.

Ching Kwan Lee’s essay sheds lights on several features of Chinese labor politics that distinguish them from the unionism that is familiar in liberal democratic societies. According to Lee, the rampant nonpayment of pensions and wages has prompted rebellion and unrest among migrant workers in global factories, and unemployed and retired workers of state industries. However, worker protests have seldom extended beyond the workplace. Lee calls this lack of lateral organization “cellular activism.” Aggrieved workers usually begin collective action by approaching factory managers or local government departments. If the problem is not resolved, they escalate action by blocking roads or carrying their complaints to higher levels of government. Their strategy is to apply mass pressure within the existing hierarchical power structure, not to challenge it from the outside.

Lee argues that conventional rubrics of “class struggle” or the politics of “citizenship” do not fully capture the complexity of Chinese labor politics. Rather, Chinese workers make claims as “weak and deprived groups” or unprivileged masses. Although many workers are impoverished, retired and unemployed workers still own workplace apartment units, and migrant workers are entitled to land allocation in their home villages. Thus, Chinese workers’ cellular activism is predicated not on horizontal social solidarity or the idea of a juridical, rights-bearing, individual subject, but on the moral and economic entitlements of the subordinate masses in a hierarchical political community led by central state authority. As “disadvantaged masses,” workers want more, not less, state intervention and regulation to restrain the market. The political aspiration of ordinary Chinese workers, as their activism indicates, is for more protection—rather than autonomy—from the state.

Ming Xia, in his essay, explores the dark side of Chinese society—organized crime. According to Xia, organized criminal groups differ from other criminal groups in that they operate under cover of business and seek political protection. Organized criminal groups employ some or all of the following methods to acquire or maintain power: developing connections with family members of officials, buying off and corrupting officials directly, influencing cadre appointment and elections, embedding themselves in local government agencies, and infiltrating local regimes and forming “gang rule.” The sizeable number of organized crime cases released by the government is only the tip of the iceberg, Xia contends. In other words, the infiltration of organized criminal groups into the state, or “red-black collusion,” has become common in China.

Why has organized crime returned to China? According to Xia, the state has failed to address the structural cause of crime—lack of democratic mechanisms. Meanwhile, there are not enough societal groups serving as “watchdogs” of the state. Even though the Chinese central government still enjoys fairly unchallenged legitimacy and has destroyed organized criminal groups through sporadic campaigns, it fails to prevent them from reemerging. A regime that is serious about containing rampant organi-
ized crime, Xia maintains, must first acquire democratic legitimacy through free elections. Unfortunately, the Chinese state has effectively damaged Chinese society’s “immune system” against the disease of organized crime, and has continued to lose its capacity. The United States should encourage the Chinese government to forcefully fight organized crime while inducing it to embrace democratic governance.

This Special Report highlights both positive and negative aspects of Chinese society in the reform era. While Chinese society has become more active in dealing with the state, it is difficult to overemphasize the degree to which the state dominates politics. As Elizabeth Perry pointed out correctly at the May 18 seminar, the impact of China’s old political campaigns on current social movements is visible in terms of state-society cooperation. She also highlighted the multiple identities of Chinese workers as members of the working class, “disenfranchised masses,” and ordinary citizens, reflecting both socialist legacies and the reform era’s trademarks. This Special Report demonstrates the mutual penetration between the state and society, which not only characterizes China’s environmental movement and labor politics, but also colors its underworld in the form of “red-black collusion.” Despite two decades of reform, China is a long way from independent civil society and democratic governance.
This essay starts with a brief story of the recent grassroots campaign to stop dam-building on the Nu River, or literally the “River of Anger.” It then argues that campaigns like the Nu River case mark an important new development in Chinese political life, indicating the rise of a new kind of social movement in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Public Campaign to Protect the Nu River

According to a China Daily report on April 29, 2004, China’s State Council recently halted a hydropower project being planned on the Nu River. The decision came after months of intense public debates. China’s Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly cited “a high level of social concern” as an important reason for suspending the proposed project. This high level of social concern was expressed through a series of public actions and discussions.

The proposed project on the Nu River was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission on August 14, 2003. The core components of the project are 13 dams on the middle and lower reaches of the river. The project aroused immediate controversy. In September and October 2003, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) organized two forums to discuss the environmental implications of the project. The first was held in Beijing, with the predominant voice harshly critical of the project. The second forum was held in Kunming, Yunnan, at which local scientists and government officials vehemently defended the project. SEPA officials were on the opposing side, but the controversy seemed irresolvable between the parties directly involved. The public campaign played an important role in tipping the balance in favor of the project’s opponents.

The campaign demonstrated several notable features. The first was that environmental groups played an important role in mobilizing public opposition to the project and raising public awareness. The China Environmental Culture Promotion Society organized one of the earliest influential public actions. At its second membership congress on October 25, 2003, held right after the Kunming forum, the organization issued a public petition to protect the Nu River, signed by 62 scientists, journalists, writers, artists, and environmentalists. In December 2003, the Green Volunteer League in Chongqing City mobilized 10,000 college students to sign a petition letter to oppose the Nu River project. In January 2004, five research and environmental organizations, including Friends of Nature and the Yunnan-based Green Watershed, organized a forum in Beijing to discuss the economic, social and ecological impact of hydropower projects, again directing its criticisms at the Nu River project. In February, about 20 journalists, environmentalists and researchers from Beijing and Yunnan conducted a study tour along the Nu River, and returned to Beijing to put on a photo exhibit.

The second feature of the campaign was a moderate repertoire of collective action, such as public forums, study tours, photo exhibits, petition letters,

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collective signatures, and the use of websites and e-mail. For instance, according to activists in the campaign, the website on the Nu River (www.nujiang.ngo.cn) set up by the Institute for Environment and Development in Beijing, played an important role in disseminating information. Overall, the new repertoire was constructive, not disruptive, and was oriented to promoting public awareness, dialogue, participation, and information dissemination.

A third feature of the campaign was its international connection. There was direct funding for organized activities from external sources. For example, the forum co-organized by Friends of Nature and several other organizations in January 2004 was sponsored by Oxfam, Hong Kong. Furthermore, in making their arguments, Chinese environmentalists made frequent references to the international community. They cited the importance of maintaining good relations with neighboring countries downstream of the Nu River. They warned that the river is part of the Three Parallel Rivers, which had just recently been listed as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on July 3, 2003. They also worked to directly mobilize international support. From March 26–29, 2004, some environmentalists organized a photo exhibit on the Nu River at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Fifth Global Civil Society Forum (GCSF) held in South Korea.

A final feature of the campaign was that media professionals played a leading role. The two most active media environmentalists are from the Central People’s Radio Station and China Youth Daily. Both were signatories to the petition letter of October 25, 2003. One was the main organizer of the study tour of the Nu River in February 2004 and the photo exhibit in Beijing. The other was the first person to expose the Dujiangyan case in the media. She was equally active in the Nu River campaign. Besides publishing many news reports about the debates surrounding the Nu River project, she ran a special section in the “Green Net” of China Youth Daily to cover the debates.

All these activities played a pivotal role in creating a high level of social concern, and are examples of a whole series of environmental campaigns that have happened in China during the past decade, as shown in the table. What to make of these campaigns?

### Selected Environmental Campaigns in China, 1995-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Protecting the golden monkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Boycotting disposable chopsticks</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Promoting campus recycling</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Guarding the wild geese in Purple Bamboo Park, Beijing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>Protecting the Tibetan antelope</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Earth Day publicity campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Protecting the Tibetan antelope (website campaign)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Boycotting “wild tortoise” medicinal products</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-03</td>
<td>Protecting the Jiangwan wetlands in Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Protesting the building of an entertainment complex near the suburban Beijing wetlands (Internet campaign)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Fighting severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Protecting the Dujiangyan Dam in Sichuan province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>Stopping proposed dam-building on the Nu River</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### The Rise of a New Social Movement in China?

What these campaigns indicate is the incipient rise of a new social movement in China. This trend has some important features atypical of social movements in the history of the PRC, and both resembles and differs from environmental movements in Western societies. To explore these new features, let me briefly discuss the movement's targets/goals, resources, repertoire of collective action, and organizational characteristics.

First, the targets and goals of the environmental movement differ from social movements in the ear-
lier history of the PRC. While earlier social movements (e.g., the 1978 Democracy Wall and the 1989 student movement) often directly challenged state authority, the environmental movement no longer clearly or mainly targets the state. Its targets include business practices and consumer behavior, as well as government policies. Because the central government follows a national policy of environmental protection and sustainable development, the environmental movement often seeks support from central government agencies, such as the SEPA, in order to achieve its goals. This was the case in the Nu River campaign.

The goals of the environmental movement are also somewhat different from earlier social movements that sought explicit political change. The environmental movement does not directly challenge political power. It aims to raise environmental consciousness, promote cultural change, and solve environmental problems. For example, the mission of Friends of Nature is “to promote environmental protection and sustainable development in China by raising environmental awareness and initiating a ‘green culture’ among the public.”

This does not mean that the environmental movement has no political intentions or consequences. Activists are engaged in policy advocacy (if only gingerly), and are aware that their actions and organizations represent new political developments in Chinese life. Their approach represents what may be called “an environmental path to political change.” This approach has two dimensions. First, the movement revolves around environmental issues. For this reason, not only does it fail to pose direct threats to political power, but it enjoys political legitimacy because, as mentioned above, sustainable development is a national policy. Second, it has the feature of exemplariness. By this I mean that activists in the environmental movement consciously try to effect gradual political change through practicing—not preaching—democratic values, such as citizen participation, self-responsibility, and reasoned debates. From a global perspective, this is not entirely surprising—exemplary behavior is often associated with environmental and other “new social movements” around the world. Yet this development has particular significance in China. While scholars have often emphasized the importance of democratizing the Chinese political system as a whole, it is equally important to stress that democratic practices at the grassroots level may serve as a strong social force for gradual democratic change.

Second, the environmental movement has new types of resources. A social movement depends on resources to achieve its goals. Three types of new resources are crucial to the emerging environment movement, namely, mass media, the Internet, and direct support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Media support of the movement is evident in the extensive coverage of environmental organizations, and in the direct participation by media professionals as organizers or members. A significant number of influential organizations are led by journalists or former journalists, such as the Green Camp and Green Earth Volunteers. Earlier I mentioned that two journalists played important roles in the Nu River campaign. For the past ten years or so, these two journalists have been co-organizers of an environmental group in Beijing. They are both journalists and environmental activists.

The alliance between the media and environmental groups reflects complex relations among different institutional fields in China. Environmental NGOs and the media are influenced by the changing political system. They share structurally similar positions and strive for more autonomy. Such structural homology explains why environmental NGOs have found a close ally in the media.

The rise of the environmental movement in China coincided with the development of the Internet. Friends of Nature was founded in 1994, the same year that China was connected to the Internet. There were about 10,000 Internet users in China in 1994. This number had jumped to 620,000 by October 1997 and 2.1 million by December 1998. With the rapid development of the Internet, the number of environmental groups also increased quickly. Available sources indicate that in the two years from 1998 to 1999, more than 50 environ-
mental groups were founded (about 30 of which were college student environmental associations, and 20 were non-student organizations).

Among the whole range of Internet services, website, BBS (bulletin board system) and e-mail are most popular with Chinese environmentalists. In a survey of website presence of environmental NGOs conducted in March 2004, I found that of the 74 organizations surveyed, 40 (or 54 percent) have a website. All but one of the 40 websites list the organization’s e-mail. Twenty-four (or 60 percent) of these websites have a BBS.

The Internet represents a new resource for Chinese environmental NGOs. It facilitates communication and information sharing, and may be used to organize activities and recruit members and volunteers. For some informal groups, the Internet makes up for lack of resources and helps to overcome some political constraints. While the restrictive regulations create barriers to registering an NGO, unregistered groups can claim their existence and operate through websites, e-mail, and online forums. The Internet provides an effective way of mobilizing volunteers in different physical locations. Bulletin boards are sources of information and spaces for discussion and community-building.

Although the presence of international NGOs (INGOs) in China is relatively recent, their influence on Chinese environmental groups is visible. For Chinese environmental NGOs, INGOs are sources for funding, expertise, and prestige. For example, they provide expertise by running workshops, seminars, and lectures. INGO funding of Chinese environmental NGOs is also quite significant. The Center of Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK) in Kunming, for example, received most of its 2002 project funding (U.S. $203,000) from INGOs. Influential international environmental NGOs have become household names in China’s environmental circles.

The third feature of the environmental movement is a moderate repertoire of collective action. The typical repertoire of collective action in PRC history includes mass demonstrations, rallies, and the posting of big-character wall posters. These methods were used in a variety of movements, from the state-supported Red Guard Movement to the more spontaneous Democracy Wall Movement and the 1989 student movement. This repertoire is essential-

ly confrontational and provocative, aimed at galvanizing public support and embarrassing and provoking authorities. It was often successful in short-term massive mobilization, but less successful in maintaining long-term organizational strength.

Because of the peculiar history of social movements in the PRC, observers tend to see only spectacular protest events such as demonstrations on the Tiananmen Square. Yet not all social movements involve dramatic confrontational action. Whereas earlier environmental movements in Western societies often took disruptive forms, contemporary movements have begun to adopt more cooperative and less confrontational strategies. This is an important finding in Russell Dalton’s classic study of environmental movements in Western Europe, The Green Rainbow.

Similar to some contemporary worldwide environmental movements, the emerging environmental movement in China avoids confrontational methods and adopts approaches that encourage learning, cooperation, participation, and dialogue. In the case of the Nu River campaign, for example, the main ways of acting were petition letters, collective signature, media debates, public forums (workshops, conferences, etc.), investigative field trips, photography exhibits, and the use of websites. Closer to institutionalized than non-institutionalized politics, this repertoire aims more at publicity and participation than at protest and disruption.

Finally, but most importantly, the emerging environmental movement in China is building an organizational base. With the exception of state-organized campaigns, earlier popular movements in China (such as the student movement in 1989) involved at most ephemeral organizations. The environmental movement, however, consists of formal and informal organizations that operate on a routine basis. Tacking to the global discourse, they prefer to be called NGOs, although the nature of these organizations is open to debate. What is clear is that these organizations are diverse in form, size, and degree of autonomy from government control. Of the various types of organizations, two are particularly active in the movement. The first is college student environmental associations. There were only a few of them in 1994. Now there are about 200. The second is non-student organizations. There were less than 10 of them in 1994, but more than 70 now.
Scholars of the environmental movement in the United States and Britain have noted a tendency in the movement to create professional organizations. Many scholars are critical of the institutionalization of the environmental movement in the West, arguing that institutionalization weakens the critical thrust of the movement. In China, the environmental movement is much more routinized than previous social movements. This does not mean that the environmental organizations have become as institutionalized as many such organizations in Western societies. Even the most fully developed organizations, such as Friends of Nature, retain important characteristics of social movement organizations, such as an emphasis on value-guided commitment, volunteerism, and non-hierarchical relationships both within and between organizations. More importantly, it does not mean that in the Chinese political context, institutionalization is necessarily a bad thing. Quite the contrary, in view of the lack of institutionalized social-movement organizations in the history of the PRC, the institutionalization of environmental organizations may prove to be the most important new development in contemporary political life in China.

Concluding Remarks

Where does the environmental movement fit into the overall landscape of political participation in China today? The movement studied here largely represents an urban phenomenon among a relatively well-educated segment of the population. Its relatively quiescent character does not reflect what is happening in rural areas, where there are more conflictual and even violent forms of environmental protest. Nor does it reflect other parts of the urban scene—the increasing frequency of demonstrations and strikes among workers and relocated citizens. Thus the environmental movement is only part of a much larger landscape. It is nevertheless an important part and does represent a larger trend. This is a trend of building organizational bases for collective action through legitimate channels. Many scholars have studied various forms of what Kevin O’Brien refers to as policy-based or rights-based resistance. Ching Kwan Lee, for example, has noted the increase in formally arbitrated labor disputes through institutional channels. Deborah Davis has studied homeowners as citizen-consumers. The list goes on. Together, these most recent studies show that Chinese citizens are more actively asserting their rights as citizens and making their voices heard through self-organized and legitimate channels. The rising environmental movement is a visible part of this new development.

How to explain the rise of such a new social movement in China? How will it develop in the future? The emergence of the movement benefits from important structural changes taking place in China. I have touched on two such structural changes in this essay—namely, globalization and technological change (especially the development of the Internet). Let me conclude by emphasizing a third structural factor, growing political pluralism. The rise of the environmental movement demonstrates the expansion of space for political participation and the growing differentiation of multiple spheres in Chinese society. But this structural change has its limits. As Harry Harding observed several years ago in an article published in the Journal of Democracy, the advance of pluralism in China is of a “halting” kind and has many difficulties and constraints. Thus, while increasing pluralism has facilitated environmental movement’s emergence, its “halting” character has been a constraining factor and will remain so. The diverse forms of environmental organizations certainly reflect adaptation to political opportunities and constraints. The action repertoire also partially reflects such organizational adaptation. Thus, while the environmental movement’s rise marks new political developments in Chinese society, the movement’s future will continue to depend on structural conditions as well as the agency of environmentalists.

ENDNOTES

2. This is not to deny that there are continuities between the repertoire of the environmental movement and that of earlier social movements, but my purpose in this essay is to highlight some new features. I would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Perry for reminding me about the continuities in the forms of popular protest and public campaigns in China.
As China becomes the workshop of the world, the conditions of Chinese workers have drawn the attention of the activist, policy and scholarly communities. Many accounts maintain that Chinese labor is politically weak and subordinated. Under a repressive Communist regime, workers are denied the rights of free association and collective bargaining. Migrant workers from the vast countryside suffer additional discrimination in an apartheid-like citizenship regime which deprives them of a range of welfare entitlements enjoyed by urbanites. Such depiction of Chinese workers is incomplete and fails to appreciate the specific kind of labor struggle that has taken place in China in the past two decades. In the following pages, I hope to shed light on several features of Chinese labor politics that follow a different mode and logic other than the unionism, social activism or electoral politics familiar to liberal democratic societies.

**China’s Non-payment Crisis**

Not getting paid, or what can be called the “non-payment crisis,” is the most explosive labor grievance. Workers would endure long hours of work, dangerous workplaces, the lack of rest days, or lack of independent unions, as long as they got paid. But what has prompted the most rebellious and persistent unrest among both migrant workers in global factories and retirees/laid-off workers from rustbelt state factories is a rampant problem of non-payment of pensions and wages. Nationwide, 14 million workers were owed wages in 2000 in the state and collective sectors. In the heart of China’s rustbelt in Liaoning, a quarter of retired workers were owed pensions, another quarter of employed workers were owed wages. Among migrant workers, 72 percent experienced wage arrears or non-payment according to official surveys. In Shenzhen, a major industrial export base in southern China, 70 percent of labor disputes are about wage arrears. Desperate migrant workers in Guangdong have resorted to staging suicide threats in an attempt to collect back wages. In the northeast, pensioners and laid-off workers blocked rail and road traffic and held mass demonstrations, trying to exert pressure on their enterprises and local governments to repay owed pensions and wages.

Non-payment is intriguing, because it happens even after a decade of serious efforts by the central government to establish a labor rule of law and a new safety net for the working population. The non-payment problem shows that these are not enforced. Poor enforcement of the law is caused by the court’s lack of institutional autonomy vis-a-vis the local government. Local governments are more interested in accumulation and profit-making than social justice and welfare provision. Labor regulations come up against local government resistance. Many local governments not only compete for investors, but are themselves business partners of investors. Therefore, courts are particularly susceptible to administrative interference in labor lawsuits.

But if the intended results of laws and state regulations do not materialize, they still have unintended consequences. Arguably, legal reforms have the effect
of encouraging popular unrest by providing a powerful rhetoric and legitimate grounds for workers to make claims for back wages and owed pensions—for example by citing the Bankruptcy Law or Labor Law. But workers are too well aware that the implementation of the law is erratic and flawed; they certainly do not see themselves as effective rights-bearing citizens. How do they see themselves as political actors? How do they get mobilized in practice?

**Cellular Activism**

Worker protests in the past decade and a half in both Liaoning and Guangdong have largely followed the pattern of workplace mobilization, i.e., protests are usually based in one single factory, or sub-groups within the same factory. I call this pattern “cellular activism” to emphasize its lack of lateral organization. Workers with grievances usually begin collective action by approaching management, whose inaction then prompts them to approach local government departments to inquire, lodge complaints, and request official intervention. Petitioning to the Letters and Visits Bureau is a time-honored, institutionalized and legitimate means of making demands and expressing popular discontent against the government. Officials handling these petitions usually direct workers to labor arbitration committees, or pressure state enterprises to redress workers' grievances. When repeated visits to the labor bureaus fail to deliver owed pensions, or when migrant workers are frustrated by the pro-employer decisions of labor arbitrators or judges, petitioners are prone to take their demands from the courtrooms to the streets.

Chinese Workers’ strategy has been to maximize public attention to their plight, publicize their grievance (“creating public opinion” as some put it), and damage the stable image of the city and its pro-investment climate. The logic of their action is that they could leverage the hierarchical relation in the local government bureaucracy: they disrupt to draw the attention of higher level officials who would then pressure subordinate officials directly responsible for their case or their firm to repay them wages and pensions. Usually, once local officials arrived on the scene and promised to expedite payment of wages or pensions, workers would dissipate. If no promise was made, they would escalate action by blocking larger roads or going to higher levels of government. “It’s like squeezing a tube of toothpaste: more pressure, more output,” concluded several worker representatives in Liaoning. In rare cases, like the spate of protests in Liaoyang in March 2002, prolonged official inaction toward individual cases would radicalize and spread worker activism from one to more factories, creating multi-day confrontations.

A confluence of factors produces this kind of cellular activism. First, it is the result of how worker interest is constituted and organized. Despite reforms, Chinese workers’ entitlements at work and after retirement continue to be closely tied to their work organizations. The availability of pensions, unemployment benefits, and industrial injury compensations still depends on the employing units’ ability and willingness to contribute to insurance funds, pooled at the city or county levels. Legal wage levels are set by city governments, and the factory as a legal entity is responsible for payment of wages and insurance benefits. Second, socialist societies are highly organized by the state, and these social organizations can be subverted for organizing oppositional activities. Both state owned enterprises and non-state factories share similar ecological and social features that can be conducive to workers’ collective action. Dormitories for migrant workers in export factories and residential quarters for state workers are geographically close to factories, forming self-contained, all encompassing communities where production and social reproduction activities take place. Such residences facilitate communication and the aggregation of interests. Third, workers’ cellular activism results from the divide between labor and the intellectual stratum. Students and intellectuals, who were the key instigators of the pro-democracy movement in the late 1980s, have been silenced and disillusioned, and many have become winners in the economic reform of the 1990s. The politically concerned members of the intellectual stratum have
shunned protests and found in constitutional and legal reform a more promising way to bring about social change.

Workers’ cellular activism arises from the locality- and work unit–based organization of interest, and the readily available organizational resources provided by encompassing communities centered at the workplace. Workers’ target is the official bureaucracy which they perceived as the only and real source of authority, capable of delivering results. Their strategy is to apply mass pressure within the existing hierarchical power structure, not to challenge it from the outside. The point here is that cellular resistance and hierarchical political imagination have material foundations in the present and in the concrete ways interests are constituted. It is not a less developed form of politics, nor an indication of traditional culture or conservative mentality.

**The Unprivileged Masses**

How is the political subjectivity that motivates and enables workers to engage in collective action? My fieldwork finds that although workers are aware of their common predicament as workers, and aspire to legal rights as citizens, they find the public identity of the “unprivileged masses” the most empowering and effective. The “masses,” as a political subject, has its origins in the Chinese Communist Revolution and Mao’s “mass line” ideology. More recently, it has reincarnated into another term, “ruoshi qunti,” or groups in weak and disadvantaged positions, who need the protection of government in the process of market reform. In banners and letters, workers identify themselves as the masses or ruoshi qunti. They invoke the law in protest and appeal to an all-powerful state in a hierarchical political community. And the central government, while cracking down on any sign of laterally organized dissent, has shown restraint towards cellular localized petitions and unrest. In the interest of social stability, the central government has made slow progress in meeting some of the most urgent livelihood needs of workers. Liaoning has become the testing ground for a new round of pension and unemployment insurance reform. Workers get some of their back wages and join a provincially administered pension scheme.

Some of the most blatant fees and treatments of migrants have been removed.

Workers largely look at the Communist regime as legitimate. Corruption that distorts law and justice may eventually erode such popular perception. But until now, the disadvantaged masses see the government as the only source of effective power which can answer their demands, and constrain the most adverse effects of the market. In my fieldwork, I found that although workers are impoverished, many retired and unemployed workers still own their workplace apartment unit, and migrant workers are entitled to land allocation in their home village. Unemployed workers and retirees who organized protests insist that “no one is starving.” Peasant workers admit that rural land produces enough for subsistence, although profit making is out of the question. These entitlements provide a floor of subsistence even in the worst circumstances, like wage and pension arrears that last for months and years.

To conclude, I argue that the mode and logic of worker activism in China deviate from what are conventionally conceptualized as class and citizenship struggles. Chinese workers’ cellular activism is predicated not on horizontal social solidarity or the idea of a juridical, rights-bearing, individual subject, but on the moral and economic entitlements of the subordinate masses in a hierarchical political community led by the central state authority.
As China has deepened its market economy, the crime rate has climbed for two decades—part of a global surge. Since the 1990s, organized crime has emerged as a serious threat to China’s further development. The proliferation of organized crime is illustrated by the sizeable number of cases released by the government to show its anti-crime efforts. For example, from 1992 to 1999, public security agencies nationwide destroyed more than a million criminal groups with 3.76 million members. During China’s “campaign of striking organized crime and eradicating evil forces” from April to December 2001, the courts adjudicated more than 300 cases of organized crime, and sentenced 12,000 members of organized criminal groups, which, are distinguished officially from ordinary criminal groups in that they operate under cover of business and seek political protection.

“Red-Black Collusion”

Organized crime has a tendency to encroach on the state. Since the mid 1980s, corrupt and parasitic organized criminal groups have clung to Chinese local governments like cancer cells. This cancer metastasized in the 1990s through a variety of criminal-political nexuses. According to incomplete statistics from the Supreme Procuratorate, from April 2001 to April 2003, China’s procuratorates prosecuted 557 state officials for implication in organized crime cases and for acting as “protective umbrellas” for gangsters. Analysts have warned of a convergence of organized criminal groups and state power agencies and of a Chinese Communist regime of “black gold.” As He Qinglian has phrased, “the black gold politics” have facilitated a “Sicilification” or “Sudanization” of China. She argues:

As such, corrupt officials are transforming organs of public power into channels through which they work as accomplices to organized criminals. The overall picture is a blurring line between the police and criminal gangs.¹

The infiltration of organized criminal groups into the communist regime, or the corruption of the latter by the former, is often referred to as “red-black collusion,” which takes four major forms. First, the black woos the red—that is, gangsters seek protection from state agents. Second, the red woos and serves the black, as officials patronize gangsters for political and material gains. Third, gangsters “bleach” themselves through entering mainstream society and sitting in powerful, legitimate organizations. Fourth, gangsters get hold of the entire government and rule society as a “gangland.” This paper intends to delineate the formation and depth of the criminal-political nexus in China. It will also offer some suggestions to the public policy community in China as well as in the United States.

The Tip of an Iceberg

To throw light upon a topic of which a full picture may never be understood or reconstructed, this research will rely on the cases of organized crime exposed during recent anti-crime “strike-hard” campaigns—a total of 99 cases in 26 provinces.² The question is how much information we can infer from these cases, and to what extent they apply to

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the overall situation of the nation. My research has convinced me that the “iceberg theory” (whatever we have seen is merely the tip of an iceberg) and the “cockroach theory” (if you have seen one cockroach, you can expect to see more) are the most applicable to assessing the problem of organized crime and the criminal-political nexus.

The earliest cases involving red-black collusion were three criminal groups formed in 1983 and destroyed in 1990 in Haerbin, Heilongjiang. These groups used violence to get project contracts, take over entertainment businesses, and involve themselves in rackets (such as kidnapping, assault, murdering, robbery, gambling, and bribery), as well as create legitimate business enterprises under their control. Quickly, they amassed hundreds of thousands of yuan and recruited many followers. Out of the 47 arrested members of the three criminal groups, five were police officers. A total of 62 police officers colluded with these groups, five at the rank of section (keji) or division (chuji) head.

**The Pingyuan Case**

In 1992 the Pingyuan (a mountainous township located in Yunnan Province) case involved the first officially defined underworld society and the earliest illustration of how comprehensive mob rule could be established under the Chinese communist regime. A Chinese scholar commented that Pingyuan was “a state within a state, the little Sicily in China.”

Pingyuan was turned into a dark den of robbery, murder, extortion and blackmailing, a black market for trading stolen automobiles, a workshop for manufacturing pornography products, a center for drugs and prostitution, and a safe haven for criminals.

In Pingyuan, political and religious powers fell into the hands of organized criminals. The leaders of the Pingyuan township government, Party branch, and religious organizations became corrupt chiefs of organized criminal groups. Not only did they control the mosques and governments in the three villages in Pingyuan, but their influence reached other areas as well. Pingyuan was turned into a dark den of robbery, murder, extortion and blackmailing, a black market for trading stolen automobiles, a workshop for manufacturing pornography products, a center for drugs and prostitution, and a safe haven for criminals beyond the enforcement of the law and the reach of public security agencies.3

Several times, police officers were stopped from entering this gangland and were attacked (numerous officers were killed and wounded) for trying to enforce the law. Mobs ransacked local public security stations and government offices, looted crime files, and burned police patrol cars. In 1992, it took three months for the armed police to recapture Pingyuan, arresting 854 criminals and confiscating various materials, including 1,073 kilograms of drugs, 946 guns and rifles (among them five machine guns and 119 semi-automatic weapons), 40,000 bullet cartridges, 278 explosives (grenades and mines), 60 stolen automobiles, 34 motorcycles, and a sizeable amount of drugs, money and other valuables (10.47 million yuan, 2.5 kilograms of gold, and 14.4 kilograms of silver).

**The Liu Yong and Yuanhua Cases**

The Liu Yong case in Shenyang and the Yuanhua case in Xiamen have implicated the highest level of Chinese officials. The Liu Yong case has several prominent features. First, as a provincial capital, Shenyang enjoys more autonomy than ordinary cities, and its mayor enjoys the rank of vice-governor. Liu turned this city into his sphere of influence, and made the mayor and deputy mayor his men. Second, Liu’s influence went beyond the municipal administration to reach the municipal court, procuratorate, and the public security bureau. The entire municipal leadership came down along with Liu. Third, Liu was elected to the Shenyang Municipal People’s Congress, reaching the second highest political rank in the region of any gang leader (Cao Jie, another gangster in the same province, was a deputy to the Provincial People’s Congress). Fourth, under his control, Liu amassed a total of 700 million yuan, becoming the richest gangster to date. Fifth, Liu was first sentenced to death by the municipal intermediate
court, but the verdict was overthrown by the provincial high court, before being finally affirmed by a special tribunal created by the Supreme Court. Liu thus became the only person whose case was tried by a special tribunal of the Supreme Court since the trial of the Gang of Four two decades ago.

The 1999 Yuanhua smuggling case characterizes the “metastasis” of criminal-official collusion in Chinese society. It remains the biggest smuggling case in the history of Communist China, in terms of both the total value involved (53 billion yuan of merchandise and 30 billion yuan lost in tariffs) and the number of high-ranking officials (more than a thousand were removed and two dozens executed). Its ringleader, Lai Changxin (who is in Canada with a political asylum case pending), acted as an “elder brother” of the underworld society, and led activities in smuggling, gambling, money-laundering, and bribing. In his heyday, Lai acquired dozens of “red titles,” including memberships or standing committee memberships in five political consultative conferences at various levels, as well as a membership in Xiamen Municipal People’s Congress. He was even about to be recommended as a candidate for the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Lai captured members’ allegiance by providing them with expensive luxuries. Of Lai’s “captives,” 263 were later formally prosecuted. Many of them were high ranking—three were governors or ministers, 26 were bureau directors, and 86 were section directors or county heads. The entire leadership of the Xiamen municipal government and the Xiamen customs house were purged. According to Lai, the list even included some higher-ranking officials, such as the minister for public security, the Party secretary of Fujian, and the premier (Li Peng). Lai commented of his “captives”: “My men belong to three types. Those I buy off through money are not reliable. Friends are more trustworthy. Nevertheless, the best and most loyal are those people I have spent money getting promoted. Like the employees in my company, they are dependent upon me for their livelihoods. Certainly they have to work for me.” Indeed, Lai devoted a lot of time, money and energy to the promotion of his people to important positions in the government.

The Scope and Depth of Organized Crime

In addition to these benchmark cases, which define the parameters of the current criminal-political nexus, several findings can be generalized from the 99 cases publicized by the Chinese government.

Although my data is based on available information instead of random sampling, it does suggest a general picture of organized criminal groups. It identifies Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet as regions relatively immune from “red-black collusion,” and ranks Hunan (13 cases), Liaoning (nine cases), Heilongjiang (eight cases), Henan (six cases) and Guangxi (six cases) as the most infested provinces. These five provinces constitute 19 percent of the 26 provinces in the database, but account for 42 percent of the cases. In the second tier are provinces with five cases (Zhejiang and Jilin) or four cases (Fujian, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shanxi and Shaanxi).

But if we divide the 26 provinces horizontally, the cases are evenly distributed—11 northern provinces (42.3 percent of the 26 provinces) hold 42 cases, while 15 southern provinces (57.7 percent) claim 57 cases. Vertically, 10 coastal provinces (38.5 percent) contribute 37 cases, and 16 inland provinces (61.5 percent) contribute 62 cases. If we consider the household consumption (2001), the nine provinces whose indicators were above the national average claim 39 cases, the nine provinces at the bottom claim 31 cases, and the remaining eight provinces (30.8 percent) in between claim 29 cases. The correlation between household consumption and the number of cases from each province is insignificant. Thus, the problem of the criminal-political nexus is consistent throughout China, and economic development has no clear correlation with the rampancy of criminal-political connections.

How deep has organized crime reached the Chinese body politic? Five cases have involved officials at the ministerial or provincial level. The Lai Changxin group infiltrated the highest central bureaucracy and brought down a vice minister for public security, who also held a leading position in the Central Group for Anti-Smuggling Coordination. Nine cases implicated officials in the Ministry of Public Security and provincial public security bureaus, or leaders in the provincial govern-
ments. Thirty-nine cases involved officials at the municipal or prefectural level. Notably, in all provincial capitals and other big cities (such as Ningbo and Xiamen), municipal leaders rank equally to vice governors. The good news is that the majority of criminal-political collusion cases (62) occurred only at the county or urban district level. Judging from available cases, the central government and the 31 provincial governments are still relatively insulated from organized criminal groups. This may be explained by a taxation and budgetary allocation system that is skewed to favor the central and provincial governments, making them financially self-sufficient and less likely to participate in black gold politics.

Which part of the Chinese state is most vulnerable to infiltration by organized crime? Public security agencies are the most inherently susceptible (involved in 73 cases). Other government agencies were implicated in 44 cases. Thirty cases involved Party leaders; 21 cases the procuratorate; 17 cases members of the people’s congresses; seven cases members of the people’s political consultative conferences; and 12 cases officials working for courts.

Two officials from two procuratorates in Henan examined 83 government officials who provided “protective umbrellas” to organized criminal groups. They found that among the 83 suspects were 31 (37 percent) police officers, 23 (27 percent) officials working in the agencies of customs, taxation, industry and commerce, 11 (13 percent) leading cadres in the government, eight (9 percent) officials from other law-enforcement agencies, eight (9 percent) procurators, one court official, and one jail officer. The analysis accompanying this data lends support to my findings and confirms a popular perception: “The public security bureaus are rotten to their bones, the procuratorates to their flesh, and the courts to their skin.” My findings also indicate that the Party is as corrupted by organized criminal groups.

In terms of the formation of the criminal-political nexus, “red-black collusion” develops in the following order: organized criminal crime groups start by making connections (including buying-off and recruitment) with family members of officials. They then corrupt officials directly; influence cadre appointment and elections; infiltrate and control local government agencies; enter people’s congresses and people’s political consultative conferences; and become the de facto government, or the “second government.” Finally, they criminalize local regimes and form a gang rule. Among these methods, to bribe and corrupt officials is the most prevalent (88 out of 99 cases). Another effective way to capture the state is to make connections with family members of state officials (26 out of 99 cases). A dangerous trend is that organized criminal groups have developed increasingly sophisticated strategies to influence the state. Sixteen cases indicate that criminal groups have sought to influence the cadre appointment process and elections; 28 cases that they have infiltrated local government agencies to control them; 17 cases that their members have successfully entered people’s congresses or people’s political consultative conferences; six cases that organized criminal groups have become the de facto government, or the “second government”; and the final six cases that at the village and township levels, organized criminal groups have taken over or criminalized local regimes, and created a gangland.

**CAN THE CHINESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO SURVIVE?**

By borrowing Joel Migdal’s theory of disaggregating the state into four levels, we can make several observations. First, the Chinese state has lost many of its “trenches” to organized criminal groups—gang rule has driven out the legitimate state agencies. Second, the “dispersed field offices” of the Chinese state have been under the onslaught of organized criminal groups and many have lost soldiers and officers. Also, widespread corruption of government and Party officials at the county and municipal levels, as well as in the law enforcement system, has occurred. Third, state agencies at the ministerial or provincial level are relatively beyond the reach of organized criminal groups. Finally, the central Party-state is still maintaining relatively high authority and insulating itself from the attack of organized criminal groups. In addition to the budgetary and taxation system, the survival of the central government can be attributed to international scrutiny—particularly pressure from democratic forces in the U.S.-led Western countries. Local governments, unlike the central state, have faced less supervision. This asymmetry between the center and local governments may
explain why China still can launch numerous anti-
crime campaigns and round up a huge number of
organized criminal group members.

Even though the Chinese central government as
of now still enjoys fairly unchallenged legitimacy,
the situation could change quickly, for organized
criminal groups have been extremely “toxic” in their
effect on government. For example, the average life-
time of an organized criminal group is 5.9 years,
which is longer than a government term (five years).
Twelve groups survived more than 10 years, and one
lasted 13 years. Organized criminal groups have also
demonstrated their ability to “metastasize” both ver-
tically within the same department and horizontally
within the same region. In my data sample, only 40
were restricted to one single department. Groups
may cross different levels. For example, they may
infiltrate public security institutions at the municipal,
county, and township levels. The majority of
cases involved several bureaucratic systems. Seventy-
two cases were limited to one administrative level,
while another 27 cases involved state agencies at
several levels simultaneously.

Interestingly, organized criminal groups emerged
consistently over time, while the collapse of these
groups was clustered, due to government-sponsored
“strike-hard” campaigns. In other words, the
Chinese government may be able to destroy organ-
ized criminal groups through sporadic campaigns,
but it has failed to prevent their production. 1990s
statistics suggest that organized criminal groups
might have exploded even during the heyday of
anti-crime campaigns.

All these developments will soon generate seri-
ous concerns to decision-makers both in China and
the United States. However, remedial and preventive
actions can still tame this trend, if policy and opinion
makers in both countries realize their common
interest in nurturing effective and democratic gov-
ernance in China.

For the Chinese government, it is most important
to realize that the disorder within the state structure
and the inadequacy of state policy failed to prevent
the emergence of organized criminal groups. To
some degree, the criminal-political nexus can be
explained by a state-centric proposition: The state’s
failure has triggered the runaway multiplication of
organized crime in today’s China. Various factors
such as poverty, the gap between rich and poor,
migration, and unemployment have been identified
by sociologists, criminologists, economists, and histo-
rians as causes of organized crime. For me, such fac-
tors can only create a favorable environment and
increase the probability of organized crime, which
would not happen without state failure.

A government that does not acquire legitimacy through people’s consent and confirmation in free elections cannot separate itself from powerful organized criminal groups.

However, the Chinese leadership has failed to
understand or address the structural cause of organ-
ized crime. The Chinese political order has been
acquiescent to the resurgence and proliferation of
crime in general, and organized crime and the crim-
nal-political nexus in particular. Without funda-
mentally restructuring the basic political order
(through a democratization process to energize civil
society, empower the ordinary people, and put the
state under the democratic oversight), most efforts
to adjust criminal justice policies and purge the law
enforcement and judicial agencies of disloyal mem-
bers would be counterproductive. A government
that does not acquire legitimacy through people’s
consent and confirmation in free elections cannot
separate itself from powerful organized criminal
groups; in essence, both use violence without legiti-
macy. Therefore, for any regime that seriously wants
to contain rampant organized crime, the first step is
to acquire democratic legitimacy and to refrain from
gangster-type activity.

FAILURES OF THE CHINESE STATE

State failure in China is of two types: the loss or
weakening of state capacity in providing basic public
goods (law and order); and the loss or weakening of
the state control over its bureaucracy and its rent-
seeking behavior. State failures produce “ganglands”
in China’s periphery, where “the sky is high and the
emperor is far away.” They also create the criminal-
political nexus, which weakens state legitimacy and
capacity significantly. To compensate for this weak-
ness, the Chinese state has pursued a misguided poli-
On the one hand, the state has become paranoid about any challenge from democratic forces, and more resistant to the demand for democratization. On the other hand, some government agencies and their officials at the local levels have relied on organized criminal groups to enforce their policies and fulfill some basic state functions (thus “second governments,” “underground courts,” and “underground public security bureaus” abound in the Chinese countryside). The Chinese state thinks that organized crime is a lesser evil to the threat of the democracy movement, and is reluctant to develop a civil society that would contribute to a strong immune system to contain organized crime. The state therefore falls into a paradox. If it is not tough against organized criminal groups, the latter can become so brazen as to turn state agencies into targets and abuse government officials. But if the state decides to combat organized criminal groups, it risks an overstretch of its capacity.

The Chinese communist ruling elite has launched draconian anti-crime campaigns (“the tough law cures chaos” was the slogan of the 2000–2003 campaign), but failed to reverse the crime trend in China. A strike-hard campaign is often followed by revenge from organized criminal groups and an elevation of crime to a higher level. To some extent, the current strategy of the Chinese government can be likened to “fighting cancer head-on.” We all know that cancer cannot be completely cured, but only contained. Head-on attack would only cause a stronger reaction from cancer cells and facilitate their metastasis. The most effective way to contain cancer is to shore up anti-bodies and strengthening the immune system. The trouble with the Chinese state policy is that it has effectively and massively damaged the immune system in Chinese society against the cancer of organized crime and criminal-political collusion. With no help from a robust civil society, the government’s battle against organized crime is quixotic and leads to loss of its own capacity.

The danger for China is that state officials and ruling Party members may collectively lose concern for the public good and pursue their own selfish interests, even through a marriage with organized criminal groups. Disturbed by the problem of criminal groups, communist leader Jiang Zemin once asked rhetorically: “Leaving evil unchecked through top-level connections will lead to bigger disaster. How will the common people survive, as desperados run to do the bidding of gang chiefs?” We must warn the Chinese elite that its own long-term interest is not served through leaving gangsters at large and colluding with them. Many Chinese communist officials, so tough as to make ordinary Chinese shiver, have already been bullied and humiliated by gangsters.

**Recommendations to the U.S. Government**

U.S. decision-makers have to be on alert to the development of “black gold politics” in China as revealed during the 1990s, for the problem might worsen and metastasize to become more systematic. As the criminal-political nexus spreads to more areas and permeates important state organs at higher levels, it causes problems to the Chinese state: as the nature of the Communist state is gradually transformed, criminal states will emerge in more remote and rural areas, the state’s legitimacy will be further cast in doubt, and the central state will lose even more capacity to mobilize, penetrate and control society. The scenario of kleptocracy at the top and “mobocracy” (political control by criminal mobs) at the bottom may become reality for many Chinese people in the coming decade. This possible scenario certainly will not be in the best interest of the American people, either. Therefore, American policymakers should take into consideration the tensions that the Chinese government is facing and give attention to the maintenance of state capacity in China—a prerequisite for law and order. Meanwhile, the United States should try to wean off the Chinese government from autocratic repression and induce it to rely more on democratic governance. In this process, the Chinese central government should be encouraged to become a valuable and progressive vehicle for fighting against the criminalization of Chinese society at the local levels.

Finally, U.S. policy makers have to realize that a market economy may not create a situation of “all good things go together.” Many democrats in the West have advocated that democracy empowers people, the market economy enriches people, and a civil society insures people. The introduction of a market economy creates a sizeable middle class, the logic goes, which constitutes the backbone of civil
society and transforms the state into a democracy. However, in China, economic liberalization may create an underclass faster than a middle class, and the underworld society and organized crime may scuttle both economic marketization and political democratization. Because organized crime is not merely a social pathology, but a type of power, organized criminal groups can increasingly control wealth, build up solidarity, and secure social moorings. Therefore, the resurgence of the underworld is not transient and not restricted to China. It is a global challenge that requires public policies beyond the scope of criminal justice.

**ENDNOTES**


2. Only Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet were not included.


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