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***The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China.* SONNY SHIU-HING LO. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. xvii + 253 pp. £95.00; \$160.00. ISBN 978-0-415-61956-1**

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though replete with interesting statistics, reads more like a Chinese Communist Party report than a scholarly analysis. Particularly troubling is the conclusion, which notes among other similar points, that “Han people in Xinjiang are used to tolerating imbalanced and different policies between them and the ethnic minority people... [but now] Han people strive for equal treatment” (p. 96). Needed citations are also missing in the chapter. Linda Wang’s interesting chapter on cultural tourism in Naxi and Mo-so areas insightfully concludes that “tourists are almost encouraged to misconstrue the meaning of the surviving Mo-so cultural tradition in the absence of proper social contextualization” (p. 121).

The final section is titled “Relations, confrontation, and solution.” The first two chapters deal with religious issues. Jieli Li and Lei Ji’s chapter on Hui Muslims concludes that Han–Hui positive relations disprove claims that Muslim communities are inherently problematic to a non-Islamic society. The tone of this essay seems similar to Zhou and Li’s chapter, and seems quick to blame the Uyghur for being “unwilling and reluctant to answer the government-initiated campaign for “Opening up the West”... which is supposed to benefit them directly” (p. 164). Absent from the analysis as to why the Uyghur people are more resistant to the state than the Hui is any mention of Party policy culpability. By contrast, Xiaobing Li’s examination of current policy in Tibet concludes that “key issues causing the religious riots include limited political participation, unequal economic opportunities, inequitable development and inadequate protection of Tibetan people...” (p. 190). Qiang Fang seeks to explain the escalating violence in Xinjiang and Tibet since the late 1980s. Though his chapter compiles a useful and fairly detailed summary of CCP minority policy since 1921, he is wrong to claim that no others have ever done so (p. 200). He need only consult the work of Pittman Potter among others to find the “linear and comprehensive analysis of the CCP’s law and policies toward minorities” he seeks (p. 200). The final chapter by Guangqiu Xu provides a useful, though not necessarily new, overview of US policy toward Tibet.

The book contains a number of factual errors (that “Xinjiang is the only province in the country where the ethnic population outnumbers the Han Chinese,” p. 11 for example) and could use another round of careful editing, but overall will be useful for undergraduates, graduates, and scholars interested in a wide variety of contemporary issues placed in historical context.

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*The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China*

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*The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China* is an informative survey of organized crime in Greater China (the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) in the 21st century. The booming economies in the region, mainly driven by a rising China, are associated with the increasing incidence of organized crime activities. The politics is chosen by author Sonny Lo to help us understand causes and solutions of organized crime in Greater China. The significance of this research is clear, given the

deepening integration of this region and its intensifying impact, for better or worse, upon the world.

In addition to an introduction and a conclusion, the book consists of nine chapters. Noticing the neglect of “the intertwined relationships between state capacity, state autonomy and state legitimacy,” Lo develops a central argument in the book: “[I]f a nexus between crime and politics is forged, the state capacity for crime control is destined to be curbed and limited. The separation between crime groups and political elites on the one hand, and the clear dichotomy between criminal elements and political institutions on the other, can protect and enhance state capacity in controlling general and organized crime” (p. 2). Chapter one offers a historical review of various states dealing with organized crime, especially the triads (it seems to me too arbitrary to apply this concept to organized crime in China, or to equate triads to *heishenhui*), under different forms of political regimes (communist, nationalist and finally colonial). Chapter two gives a sketch of organized crime activities and the responses from the authorities of China, Hong Kong and Macau in the 21st century. Chapter three covers the fourth territory of Greater China, namely Taiwan, where *heidao* and *heijin* have been a stigma on its liberal democracy. Chapters four to seven cover four issues as case studies: terrorism, prostitution, casino/gambling, narcotics/drug trafficking, and how authorities try to gain the upper hand over these. Chapters eight and nine examine the cross-border law-enforcement cooperation within Greater China and with the larger global community.

In the “Conclusion” chapter, the author has several interesting and debatable arguments. First, the central government of PRC has the political will to control organized crime: “the crux of the problem is how to control the local governments” (p. 230). It seems that Lo agrees to the use of mass mobilization and campaigns by the central state as part of the remedy to control crime. Second, “the city-states of Hong Kong and Macao have been maintaining their relatively stronger capacity for controlling organized crime” (p. 232). The Hong Kong police force provides a “good model for the PRC counterparts to imitate” and the “Hongkongization” of the mainland police is encouraged. Third, the autonomy of the Taiwan state vis-à-vis criminal groups is comparatively limited, “mirroring the politics of Italy.” Fourth, the governments of the four places “have become more like national security states than ever before.”

Despite Lo’s meticulous data collection, his book lacks a tight theoretical framework and careful methodological design, and some weaknesses, in particular some unsubstantiated conclusions, ensue. Overall, the reading is slowed by the cumulative journalistic cases, in which data have not been aggregated in a systematic way for generalization and few theorizations can be accomplished. To some extent, the book resembles a commentary that lies between journalism and theoretical analysis. The rich data undoubtedly provide leads for further research in a more rigorous comparative research design. In Lo’s book, the central state of the PRC is assumed but not critically discussed. As more scandals involving the top brass of the communist government have been overwhelming the world, it is not easy for the readers to swallow this argument in the book: “The divergence between the capacity, autonomy and legitimacy of the central state and that of local states remain a hallmark of the difficulties of organized crime control in the PRC” (p. 232). In contrast to the easy writing-off of the central state as a problem in the PRC, the author easily lumps the central and local states in Taiwan together and leaves an impression that the PRC model at the central level has been working better. Because of this underestimation of the threat from the very top of the PRC leadership to capacity (due to corruption), autonomy (due to criminal-political nexus) and legitimacy (due to

repression and brutality), the author has not seen the looming danger of the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. With such an orientation, Lo presents the case of Islamic “terrorism” in Xinjiang uncritically. For these reasons, whether the emergence of a security state in the PRC, or the “stability-maintenance regime,” is a good thing for state-building and crime control can be debatable in the context of globalization and democratization.

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*Tigers without Teeth: The Pursuit of Justice in Contemporary China*

SCOTT WILSON

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xiii + 260 pp. \$75.00

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In February 2016, Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counselling and Service Centre was shut down by order of the authorities. Zhongze, a leading women’s legal aid centre founded after the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, was just one of the civil society organizations that became “sensitive” after the first drafting of China’s Foreign NGO Management Law in December 2014. This recent development triggered many questions regarding, for instance, the role of civil society organizations in China’s legal evolution and why the authoritarian state tolerates certain rights-advocacy NGOs and blocks others. For anyone interested in these issues, Wilson’s book, *Tigers without Teeth: The Pursuit of Justice in Contemporary China*, is a must-read.

Wilson argues that China’s civil society organizations contribute to rights-based litigations and their symbiotic growth speeds up China’s progress towards rule of law. To illustrate this process, Wilson focuses on two looming crises in China: environmental pollution and the HIV epidemic. Through a cogent analysis, Wilson shows that deficiencies in China’s legal and political systems worsened these two crises over the last two decades, but the intervention of civil society organizations assisted the victims of pollution and HIV in litigation and effectively dispersed their accumulating indignation.

Wilson notices that when it comes to individual litigations in these two fields, the Chinese courts’ responses vary towards pollution victims and HIV carriers. In general, environmental cases have a better chance of being taken to the court and are more successful in terms of court verdicts than HIV cases. Wilson delves into opportunity structure theory to explain this divergence. To be specific, the courts’ responses are hugely influenced by the two ministries responsible for environmental pollution and HIV – the ministry of environmental protection (MEP) and ministry of health (MOH). While the environmental lawsuits aid the MEP to monitor polluting industries and thus help the MEP to gain power, the HIV lawsuits cast light on the MOH’s mismanagement of blood-supply control and therefore diminish the MOH’s legitimacy. In a country where courts are far from independent, the practical concerns of ministries have a substantial impact on the way litigations are taken and handled.

In addition to this bureaucratic peculiarity, Wilson reveals another feature in current Chinese civil society, which is the underlying tension between GONGOs (governmental NGOs) and grassroots NGOs. In environmental lawsuits, for example,