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Triangulating human political conditions and reorienting political development in China

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ABSTRACT

A revisit to the debate on human nature leads us to multiple cultures upon which anarchy has been constructed and fictionalized. By highlighting the importance of social capital in human society, this paper argues that a Lockean conception of anarchy, instead of a Hobbesian one, offers a better option for achieving a liberal democracy in the cyclic and triadic model of anarchy-autocracy-democracy.

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I. Introduction

The complexities of polities and their mutual mutation have been the persistent challenge to political scientists since Aristotle founded the discipline of comparative politics. More than two thousand years ago, facing 158 (some say 170) different constitutions, Aristotle created a simple 3 by 2 classification based upon two criteria: Who (one, a few or many) governs and for whom (selfish or public interest) and provided a static model for six types of polities. He also devoted a big part of his Politics to the preservation and change (both within and in-between) of regimes, leaving us a rich legacy for studying the issues of political development and decay, political order and chaos. Today, as we think about these issues, the most prominent intellectual lineage has run from Samuel Huntington to Francis Fukuyama. It is worthwhile raising such a question: To what extent have Aristotle’s ideas impacted these two scholars? In the following discussion I will point out that Thomas Hobbes and his Leviathan have been the more logical fountain for them, then, I will raise and try to provide an answer to the following question: How have Aristotle and Hobbes provided two different traditions for framing the question of political development and how have these two traditions impacted upon our formulation of solutions to political disorder?

In this paper, I will formulate the following arguments: First, in the long history of discussing regime changes, disorder, chaos and anarchy have been a major concern, but Thomas Hobbes contributed most to create a theory of the state of nature, and upon it, the discourse of anarchy, which has defined the parameters of discussion on
political development. Second, although the Hobbesian version of anarchy has been the hegemonic idea in defining Western political thought (both liberalism in political theory and realism in IR theory), many research findings have revealed its inconsistency both with historical development and the recent scientific theories. A reconstruction of the theory on anarchy is needed by basing its premises upon a theoretical lineage from Aristotle to Locke, Kant, and Rawls. Third, based upon different cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian), we can assess and critique the political development theory of Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama, and offer an alternative solution to the problem of political decay both in the developed and developing countries. Fourth, looking through a new dynamic model of anarchy-autocracy-democracy, we can see clearly that the entrenched anarchy discourse (on ‘luan’) in China has exaggerated the apocalyptic nature of anarchy, undermined the possibility of reconstructing a political order along democratic legitimacy, and unfortunately, created a self-fulfilling prophecy of anarchy-autocracy predicament.

In the context of reading Francis Fukuyama, especially his *The Origins of Political Order* (2011) and *Political Order and Political Decay* (2015), this paper consists of the following four parts: Firstly, combing through history of political thought, I will contest that Hobbes based a problematic discourse of anarchy upon a shaky concept of the state of nature, although this fiction has inspired a long list of pessimistic, egoistic theories on aggression and conflict, in collective they further conditioned and constrained people’s understanding of political development. Secondly, in challenging the binary and linear model of autocracy-democracy, I will build a triadic and cyclic model of anarchy-autocracy-democracy to analyze human political conditions, in particular, I will highlight the various theoretical traditions of anarchy and their different impact upon regime transition. Thirdly, by applying a transition game theory, I will demonstrate that in a game of cooperation and conflict, the ongoing political conflict in China, with increasing likelihood, might end up with the sub-optimal equilibrium, namely anarchy, for both the ruling elites and the citizens. Finally, I will elaborate on what my analytical model could mean for our reflecting upon and reorienting the future course of political development in China.

II. The controversial human nature and the discourse of anarchy

In 1943, when the modern democratic state was at a time of crisis and under tremendous pressure from other competing ideologies and systems (Both from Left and Right), the Oxford Professor A. D. Lindsay published his *The Modern Democratic State*, in which he defined it as ‘a type of state which came into existence in the nineteenth century in Western Europe, America, and the British Dominions, largely as the effect of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution on the absolutist nation state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.’ According to Lindsay, the operative ideals of democratic state were shaped by two important contributions in Western civilization: Graeco-Roman civilization (e.g. Constitutionalism) and Christianity (e.g. human equality). Therefore, it is illustrative for us to use Aristotle and Hobbes, two giants of these two traditions, to shed light upon the continuity, rupture, synthesis, and corruption of political thinking on the Western constitutional development.
One specific contribution from Greek thought and practice is the conception of citizenship. For Aristotle, a state is made up of its citizens; a citizen is one who shares in the activity of politics or citizenship. The peculiar activity of politics is direction or ruling of the common life. Politics means conscious control of common life. That is what ruling, properly conceived, is. A citizen is one who rules and is ruled in turn.\(^4\) In his discourse that ‘man is by nature a political animal,’ Aristotle believes, anyone who has no state is ‘either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman.’\(^5\) Clearly for him, if the nature is more defined by essence and ‘telos’ (end), the political animal thesis has presumed the prior existence of social animal stage (\textit{homo sociologus}) and the transcendence of biological animal stage, in other words, the ‘non-co-operator’ was excluded from the state. Since ‘the whole must be prior to the part,’ ‘the state is prior to the individual.’ In the very beginning of \textit{Politics}, Aristotle defines the social and progressive nature of the state: ‘[E]very state is an association, and every association is formed with a view to some good purpose.’ Most importantly, Aristotle argues, ‘the virtue of justice is a feature of a state.’\(^6\)

Although Aristotle did not deny the opposition of body and mind, ruler and the ruled, freeman and slave, rational and irrational, good and evil, just and unjust, civilized and savage as well as the argument that nature can fall short (nature achieves her ends only ‘for the most part’;) it had to wait for the emergence of Christianity to create the concepts of ‘original sin,’ ‘sinners’ and ‘the inherent wickedness of man.’\(^7\) It is Hobbes, the founder of modern liberalism and also ‘the first totalitarian philosopher,’ systematically constructed the state of nature based upon the idea of sinful human nature from St. Paul.\(^8\) In Romans I: 28 of \textit{The Holy Bible}, Paul explained God’s wrath against the godless and wicked mankind: ‘They have become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity. They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice.’\(^9\) Understandably, from Hobbes, who did not find home in an Aristotelian atmosphere at Oxford and ‘continually attacked the doctrines of Aristotle,’ but was influenced by Puritanism, ‘[h]is individuals are atoms; that is, (i) they are all alike in power; (ii) no one has authority which others acknowledge; (iii) each individual being connected with no real ties to anyone else only looks after his own interest.’\(^10\) To be fair to Hobbes, he really does not deny the desirability of benevolence, ‘although the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.’\(^11\) Based upon his construction of the state of nature and the horror of anarchy, Hobbes united Puritanism (e.g. sinner and original sin), reason, individualism, absolutism and peace in his \textit{Leviathan}. We can say that the myth of absolute power entrusted in the hands of the sovereign is necessitated and justified by the myth of Hobbesian anarchy.

It is interesting to notice, from the Christian view of crooked human nature, to Social Darwinism and Malthusianism, to Freudian psychoanalysis, and finally to realpolitik realism and neo-liberalism in the late 20th century, a huge number of key concepts were created, such as ‘innate depravity,’ ‘theory of natural selection,’ ‘survival of the fittest,’ ‘aggression and death instinct,’ ‘anarchic world,’ ‘shock doctrine,’ and many others. As a continuous intellectual stream, they have effectively and timely provided theoretical justifications to a series of social-economic-political practices and systems: absolutism, slavery, racism, poverty and inequality under industrialism, brutal
competition under capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, two world wars, Holocaust, the Cold War and the MAD strategy, ‘structural adjustment program,’ ‘the Washington Consensus,’ ‘gangster capitalism,’ global elitism and plutocracy, etc.\textsuperscript{12} Under the motto, ‘\textit{Homo homini lupus}’ (Latin: ‘Man is a wolf to other man’), for the past 500 years, the most powerful rulers and strongest conquerors tend to be the wolves that herd all other men as if they are sheep under the name of law and order.\textsuperscript{13} Crooked human nature and anarchy have become expedient theoretical constructs; the ‘discourse of danger’ has provided the raison d’\textsuperscript{etre} for the art of ruling, especially under those brutal regimes in the developing countries or the emergency rule in democratically elected regimes.\textsuperscript{14}

Anarchy, commonly defined as ‘the absence of centralized authority,’ is a socially constructed myth in political discourse. Illustrated amply by Alexander Wendt in the context of international politics, anarchy does not have only a single logic, but several. Wendt has identified three different cultures: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Wendt writes,

I propose that at the core of each kind of anarchy is just one subject position: in Hobbesian culture, it is ‘enemy,’ in Lockean ‘rival,’ and Kantian ‘friends.’ Each involves a distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence, which can be realized in multiple ways at the micro-level. The posture of enemies is one of threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence toward each other; that of rivals is one of competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other; and that of friends is one of allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats. (Wendt, Social Theory, 257–8)

Respectively, these three cultures define different Self-Other relationships: enmity, rivalry, and friendship; highlight different incentives: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy; demonstrate different logics: ‘Kill or to be killed’ (‘War of all against all’), ‘Live and let live,’ and ‘Pluralistic security communities’/‘collective security.’

In international relations, numerous scholars have confirmed that Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ does not hold true when checked in terms of historical development.\textsuperscript{15} In more anthropological, psychological, neurological and cultural studies, Hobbes’ solitary, nasty brute view of man and the aggressive human nature have been refuted; instead, sociability, cooperation and goodness are the dominant features of human culture.\textsuperscript{16} For example, the social thinker Jeremy Rifkin has argued, ‘A radical new view of human nature has been slowly emerging and gaining momentum, with revolutionary implications for the way we understand and organize our economic, social and environmental relations in the centuries to come. We have discovered Homo empathicus.’\textsuperscript{17} He has also cited the 1996 discovery of ‘mirror neutrons’ or popularly called ‘empathy neurons’ that ‘allow humans—and other animals—to grasp the minds of others.’\textsuperscript{18} The Cambridge developmental psychopathologist Simon Baron-Cohen has also found that the empathy spectrum is influenced by genetic, hormonal, neural and environmental factors. His team has found ‘four genes associated with empathy’ and one of the ‘social-emotional behavior’ genes was related to hormone oxytocin, which has several popular names: ‘love hormone,’ ‘trust hormone’ and ‘attachment hormone.’\textsuperscript{19}

Despite of all these new developments in helping us understand the nature of human nature, as Rifkin has said, ‘Our philosophical and political thinking has been
woefully slow to catch up.\textsuperscript{20} James Coleman also notes, this is a ‘broadly perpetrated fiction’ created by Hobbes and his followers, ‘[t]hat philosophical position continues to the present.’\textsuperscript{21} For example, Samuel Huntington, Coleman’s colleague at Harvard, was one of the most vocal Hobbesian thinkers from a passing era of ethno-centric patriotism and state-centric realism, who wrote the following words:

Hence, the likelihood of general or lasting peace among ethnic groups, states, or nations is remote. As human experience shows, the end of a hot or cold war creates the conditions for another. ‘A part of being human,’ as a committee of psychiatrists put it, ‘has always been the search for an enemy to embody temporarily or permanently disavowed aspects of our selves.’ Late-twentieth-century distinctiveness theory, social identity theory, sociobiology, and attribution theory all lend support to the conclusion that the root of hate, rivalry, the need for enemies, personal and group violence, and war are ineluctably located in human psychology and the human conditions. (Huntington, \textit{Who Are We?}, 26–27)

With regard to political development, Huntington made it clear: ‘The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.’\textsuperscript{22} With such a normative preference for order and state, since both authoritarian and democratic systems can maintain order and deliver effective authority to the citizens, they are better options than statelessness, which is equivalent to disorder and savagery. From Samuel Huntington to Francis Fukuyama, the primary concern in their research is political order, which is one issue of political sociology, namely to create a government, provide the authority, and a state to monopolize the use of violence.\textsuperscript{23} But one problem is that an order without legitimacy can become the exact source of political decay and anarchy. This is where Fukuyama starts to diverge from Huntington. The divergence of these two scholars with a master-apprentice relationship is vividly embodied in the difference of major arguments and their premises in \textit{Who Are We?} and \textit{Trust}, which I will revisit in the following discussion.

Based upon the successful solution to the Hobbesian dilemma, namely the order, the second order question for Huntington and Fukuyama is under the dichotomy of authoritarianism and democracy, how accountability, which is ensured by both the competitive electoral procedures and rule of law, distinguishes the latter from the former; and how an authoritarian system can evolve into democracy. The third order question is then how a democracy can consolidate itself into a liberal democracy and maintain energy to expand substantive democracy. Referring to Huntington and Fukuyama’s ideas, we can contemplate on that among order and liberty, which one is more primary? Is liberty a logical result of order, or vice versa? If liberty is constructed upon the foundation of order, does the order have to come exclusively from the state authority? If liberal democracy is the highest stage of good political order, namely, the endpoint of history, standing from the perspective of a stable autocracy, what is the chance that democratization may get order lost without achieving democracy, ultimately wiping out liberty?\textsuperscript{24} Conservatives’ pro-status quo bent reveals in its fixation upon anarchy. But, does anarchy come as a result of liberty or despotism?\textsuperscript{25} Then, if inferring from Hobbes, the state is an ‘artificial man,’ ‘man-made man,’ if both autocracy and democracy are created by human choices, then, isn’t ‘Anarchy is what people
III. Anarchy, autocracy and democracy: a three-dimensional cyclic politics

Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy with the ‘competition for political leadership.’ He said, ‘The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’ If ‘rule with consent from the people’ is the hallmark of democracy, then, ‘rule by imposition,’ either through violence or inheritance, is the signature of autocracy, which can be called as ‘dictatorship,’ ‘authoritarianism’ or tyranny. Only during the last a quarter century has autocracy as the dominant mode of political governance given way to the democratic mode worldwide. By the 1990s, 60% of nations had become electoral democracies. By 2008, democracy versus authoritarian states reached a 70 to 30% ratio. The latest 2016 Freedom House index, with a report title of ‘Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure,’ reveals that 40% of world population lives under free countries (44%), 24% partly free countries (30%), and 36% (China accounts for 19% of the world total population) under not free ones (26%). This reminds us that the dynamic mutation among free, partly free and unfree countries will persist.

Strictly speaking, political order and political governance can have only two binary alternatives between autocracy and democracy, because in addition to the mutual transformation between them, their collapse can have a common third scenario, namely anarchy. Of course, the meaning of anarchy is not uncontroversial. The most common understanding in political science on anarchy can be found in textbooks, such as what is said by Douglas van Belle: ‘Unlike the concepts of security and power, the definition of anarchy is not something that political scientists argue about. However, in this case, it is the common usage of the term—equating anarchy with rioting werewolves run amok—that is likely to create confusion.’ He continues, ‘When political scientists speak of anarchy, they are referring not to chaos but to an absence of any kind of overarching authority or hierarchy.’ It either can be presented in the negative light, e.g. in the Hobbesian tradition as the state of nature where ‘war of all against all’ is ongoing, the ‘anarchy of loneliness, violence, disorganization, and ineffectiveness’; or it can be put in the positive light, which has a utopian bent (moral individuals free from coercive state power to cooperate), or a libertarian bent. If we stick to the Hobbesian definition of anarchy, we can see that anarchy is both anti-state and therefore anti-political; anarchy is an antithesis to political order and an absence of governance. The state of nature does not reflect the nature of the state. This tradition makes it likely to be slighted in contemporary political discourse on political order and governance. In a dichotomy of authoritarian and democratic regimes, a binary and linear progress toward democracy has been idealized as the natural or imperative process for human political governance or ‘a clear directionality to the process of political development.’

But even in comparison to both democracy and autocracy, anarchy can be an equilibrium, too, with order at micro-levels offered from non-state actors such as family, community, and social networks and at macro-levels by religions, and the global
governance without government. For anarchists, voluntary associations can provide public services and maintain public order. Even for libertarians, the spontaneous market order can justify a minimal state, for liberals civil society can emerge as the third realm to compensate both the state failure and market failure. Fukuyama, with a conspicuous aversion to institutional disorder and decay, still acknowledges the biological and socio-psychological foundation to politics. He argues, ‘Human beings never existed in a personal state.’ Here we can see his deviation from Huntington: ‘Natural sociability is built around two principles, kin selection and reciprocal altruism’ and ‘[h]uman beings have an innate propensity for creating and following norms and rules.’

According to French sociologist Louis Dumont, there are ‘two mutually opposed configurations’ of individual. In traditional societies, ‘the stress is placed on society as a whole, as collective Man; the ideal derives from the organization of society with respect to its ends (and no with respect to individual happiness); it is above all a matter of order, of hierarchy; each particular man in his place must contribute to the global order, and justice consists in ensuring that the proportions between social functions are adapted to the whole.’ From the eighteenth century to the age of romanticism and beyond, an individualistic tendency, the ‘ideal of the autonomy of each person’ became ‘established, generalized and popularized.’ In modern society, under the ideal of human individual, ‘This individual is quasi-sacred, absolute; there is nothing over and above his legitimate demands; his rights are limited only by the identical rights of other individuals. He is a monad, in short, and every human group is made up of monads of this kind. Common sense finds no problem about the harmony between these monads.’ The contrasts between traditional and modern societies are obvious: When society is taken as a whole (‘holism’), ‘Homo Major’ is used to designate ‘man as a collective being, man as society.’ Under the individual (individualism), ‘Homo Minor’ is for man as individual. Historically speaking, socially hierarchical values are at the first order. Referring to Talcott Parsons, Dumont discusses ‘the universal rationale of hierarchy’ and argues: ‘In other words, man does not only think, he acts. He has not only ideas, but values. To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy, and a certain consensus of values, a certain hierarchy of ideas, things and people, is indispensable to social life.’ In contrast, ‘individual consciousness has its source in social training,’ the twin values of liberty and equality are artificial. Given hierarchy as the universal rationale, Homo hierarchicus is, in contrast to Homo aequalis, a modern Western antithesis; ‘Homo hierarchicus can help Homo aequalis to complete the consciousness he has for himself.’

Bringing the discussion to the Chinese context, given the absence of democracy as an alternative both in terms of idea and practice in China, a Confucian dichotomy of authoritarianism and anarchy has dominated the elitist thinking in China as well as many of its surrounding countries. The current Chinese leaders have tried to legitimate its rule and deter any opposition by reiterating a forewarning: the collapse of the communist rule would only cause chaos. This Chinese-style anarchic bogeyman, namely ‘Chaos’ (luan) forms the ideational foundation to its developmental dictatorship. The political scientist Fei-ling Wang has just finished a comprehensive study on the two historical patterns of development in China: the grand unity and order under the Qin-Han Polity (also extended to Tang Dynasty, Yuan-Ming, Qing, and the Communist Regime since Mao) and the divided periods (from the Spring-Autumn and Warring states, to Southern Song, the late Qing and Nationalist regime before the Japanese invasion).
In the official historiography, the unity under Tianxia (‘All under heaven’) system has always been glorified, in contrast, the multi-centric and competitive historical periods condemned. But Wang has found that the Qin-Han states underperformed for their people (of course good for the rulers and officials), and contrary to our common belief, the socio-economic and cultural developments tended to make big progress as the central empire state was absent. Therefore, we can say, anarchy, like autocracy and democracy, is also socially constructed. Anarchy has been created as a myth, a fiction, a frightening bogeyman, more often by the ruling group with vested interest, to scare people away from dreaming and pursuing democracy and to justify the extant predatory or kleptocratic governance. Bertrand Russell once said, ‘Anarchism is a game at which the police can beat you.’

Classic political philosophers (Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Montesquieu) have rich discussions on the change from anarchy (or ‘the state of nature’) to autocracy (or ‘Leviathan’), and vice versa. Although Aristotle did develop a more sophisticated model for anarchy, autocracy and democracy and the transition among them; the modern version of mutual transposition started to emerge in The Federalist Papers. During the third wave of democratization, not only scholars and politicians had been enthusiastic for assisting, promoting, designing, crafting, and even willing for democracy; but also they had been optimistic, even excessively zealous about catapulting states from anarchy directly into democracy. After the end of Cold War, the rapidly increasing failed states in the transitional societies brought back a discussion on the anarchic form of governance, which made Aristotle, Hobbes and James Madison contemporary. But looking closely at the newly failed states, they are not merely confined to the dichotomy of authoritarianism and anarchy; many states are in a category of ‘democratic anarchy,’ or of ‘illiberal democracy,’ which the conventional perspective (such as The Freedom Index) misses. Thus, an integrated, triangular framework is needed to address the challenging issue of changing governance and its internal dynamics.

Inspired by Gordon Tullock’s binary model between autocracy and democracy, my three-dimensional model (maybe it is what Tullock anticipated, ‘a hypersurface in a multidimensional space’) includes the following parts: Anarchy, Autocracy and Democracy (see Figure 1).

1. I assume there are three modes of governance for managing human political affairs: anarchy, autocracy, and democracy, which all three can be regarded as equilibriums. To combine ‘The Freedom Index’ (constructed as Y axis; Polity Index can be used too) and ‘The Failed States Index’ (X axis; The Governance Index can be applied too), we can produce a coordinate with four fields: democratic order (Norway leads the group), autocratic order (Singapore, Libya and several Gulf monarchies are conspicuous examples), democratic anarchy (e.g. Cape Verde, Angola, and Iraq), and anarchy (Somalia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo lead the pack).

2. All states can be viewed as a ball placed in one of the three equilibriums in my triangular model: either in an anarchic bottom, or an autocratic valley, or a democratic valley. Democratic transition, democratic consolidation, and democratic rollback (It may go back to autocracy or into anarchy) can be understood as a dynamic cyclic process.
3. Although they are three equilibriums, anarchy, autocracy, and democracy are at different levels of value hierarchy. They also require different quantity of force and energy to elevate the ball from one valley into another and sustain it in equilibrium. Since anarchy often results in the failure of collective action at the national level, autocracy is often created by collective movement under a ‘great hero’ (or a ‘great unifier’ such as Qinshi Huangdi in China, Charlemagne in France, Tito in Yugoslavia and Putin in today’s Russia), but only democracy requires the collaboration between a visionary democratic leadership and strong popular support. R. B. Bernstein wrote in his editor’s note to *The Federalist*: ‘Every previous republic, however, had collapsed into anarchy or tyranny. The precondition for a successful republic, therefore, was to maintain the people’s virtue—their willingness to sacrifice special interests in the service of public interest.’

Since anarchy is a state at a lower level of organizational development that requires little collective action and organized efforts at the national level. We can hypothesize that the height of Mound 2 > Mound 3 > Mound 1, which means that it is harder for a country to move from equilibrium 1 (autocracy) to equilibrium 2 (democracy) than the other way around; for those two equilibriums, it is also easier for them to slide into anarchy than to move to each other. In the Figure 1, Equilibrium 1 is deeper than Equilibrium 2, which is to indicate that autocracy actually is a more stable equilibrium than democracy. That the history of autocracy so far has occupied 90% of human political history proves the point. As for democracy, it has been fragile and suffered either setback or retrenchment in many countries, which its deepening (democratic consolidation) can create a more stable condition, namely a deeper valley for the ball of democracy.

According to Tullock, ‘despotism is in essence the equilibrium state of human society.’ If we take this observation as a base for our observation, we can treat autocracy as the perfect hierarchy for the Homo Hierarchicus; the loss of central control from the national state can lead the country to anarchy, which is for Homo homini lupus. The social and political movement or revolution under autocracy would bring the authority to be accountable to the people and under the constraints of rule of law (a system of mutual guarantees under constitutionalism). Although democracy is regarded by
some scholars as a market mode of governance in comparison to the hierarchy and network, certainly democracy cannot completely rid itself of hierarchy, but a modified one, namely, the edge of hierarchy has been softened by vertical and horizontal accountabilities. In this sense, Fukuyama uses ‘democratic hierarchies,’ Dahl uses ‘polyarchy’ to indicate democracy cannot be a single form of authority, but ‘a multiplicity of forms.’ For the perspective of ideal, not political reality, we can argue that democracy is for Homo aequalis, at least in political and moral sense.

In the 3-D model of anarchy-autocracy-democracy, the three modes of governance are pure models, therefore, they are presented as mutually exclusive categories. However, if we look deeper into each category, we can say that each of three is actually made of the three ingredients of all, the differences only lie in the fact that one factor can establish its dominant position over the other two, but a dynamic change can always start with a quantitative change and then accumulate into a qualitative breakthrough, a paradigmatic shift, and a regime change.

To relate this 3-D model to our previous discussion on the three cultures of anarchy, we can assume anarchy either in the Hobbesian tradition or the Lockean/Kantian one. The major difference of them is the absence/presence of social capital. According to James Coleman, ‘I will conceive of these social-structural resources as a capital asset for the individual that is as social capital. Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. . . .Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons.’ Robert Putnam gives a more vernacular definition: ‘[S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.”’ In the Hobbesian state of nature, human beings are solitary, in a ‘war of all against all.’ But in Lockean culture of anarchy, although the state of nature is assumed, it is with the mind initially as a ‘blank tablet’ (tabula rasa); sinful tendencies of mankind do exist, but given their natural capabilities and good education, human nature is malleable for improvement. Most importantly, to end anarchy, human beings can exercise their agency and mutual trust to create a social contract in order to stipulate people’s obligations and rights, in particular, the relationship between the ruling and the ruled is contractual with reciprocal obligations as the base of legitimacy. In contrast to Hobbes, whose Leviathan is also based upon a social contract between the sovereign and the people, it is more an imposition from a historical hero upon the ruled with a performance-based legitimacy, namely, the continual provision of security. This difference was manifest in the debate of making American constitution; The Federalist Papers demonstrates this point. At that critical juncture, history had made it clear that the choice of Hobbesian approach would inevitably lead to a despotic direction. To choose Lockean tradition as the bedrock for American constitution would bring the sovereign under the rule of law, not above the law; such constitutionalism would insert the concept of accountability into the bond connecting the ruling and the ruled; thus the American democracy was made possible. This intentional and successful elevation of American system from a Hobbesian one to a Lockean one is reflected in Madison’s classic comments: ‘But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. ... In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself.\textsuperscript{51} To illustrate this connection between the Founding
Fathers and Locke, we can add here that Jefferson once praised Locke’s work as being
‘perfect as far as it goes,’ and then he added, ‘Descending from theory to practice,
there is no better book than the Federalist.’\textsuperscript{52}

To summarize, given the institutional choice-set of governance, human beings can
face a cyclic triad of anarchy, autocracy and democracy. Since anarchy can have differ-
ent traditions, in this paper I juxtapose the Hobbesian tradition with the Aristotlian-
Lockean-Kantian-Wilsonian tradition.\textsuperscript{53} People, especially legislators and rulers, can
consciously choose either of them from the anarchy-hierarchy continuum, construct
two different versions of anarchy, in order to value or devalue, validate or invalidate
democracy vis-à-vis autocracy.\textsuperscript{54} Specifically speaking, under the Hobbesian culture,
anarchy is fictionalized and problematized as an abyss, an institutional black hole,
which has to be avoided at any cost. Under such a political calculus, to vigorously dis-
turb an autocracy can either throw it into a ‘failed state’ or a ‘democratic anarchy’
(both in anarchy category), the democracy is a distant third possibility. Naturally, inertia
becomes a virtue under autocracy, status quo turns into a purpose for governing,
human progress and political evolution are blocked for the possible association of dem-
ocracy with anarchy. Inevitably, fear, hatred, lies, and violence feature prominently in
the repertoire of statecraft.

But the Hobbesian solution is not the only anchorage we have to fasten our ferry
boat of ideas for regime transition. Mohandas Gandhi called upon peoples of the whole
world with the following teaching, ‘Have no fear. He who fears, hates; he who hates,
kills. Break your sword and throw it away. So fear shall not touch you.’\textsuperscript{55} Realistically
this is an impossible height for most of us to climb, not because of our crooked human
nature, but the twisted nature of political logic in the current countries and the world.
However, we can scale back to the Kantian tradition, in which we can believe and prac-
tice the principle of ‘democratic peace’; or we can secure the Lockean tradition to
defend liberty, pluralism, toleration, and human happiness.\textsuperscript{56} If we think in the Lockean
tradition, my triadic model can be modified to treat anarchy not as an abyss, but as a
self-contained valley which has the capability to generate new movements to push the
ball either into autocracy or democracy. This potential and capacity arise from the fact
that although under an anarchy the central state authority is lost, human ties, the fam-
ily, community, civil society, and the society as a whole can survive and rebuild. In
other words, the trust, social capital, organizational resources and culture can step in to
sustain historic progress. Such optimism once blinked in Huntington’s writing, espe-
cially The Third Wave (1991), where he relaxed himself as the U.S.-USSR hostility dimin-
ished and democracy generated its rising third wave globally. But it did not last very
long. The Clash of Civilizations (1996) and ‘the challenges to American identity’ (the sub-
title for Who Are We?) led him to a new enemy (‘the rest’ opposed to ‘the West’) and
back to a life of ‘an anguished, frantic, over-burdened academic confronted with the
agonies, frustrations, and incredible time demands involved in producing serious scholar-
ly works.’\textsuperscript{57} Meanwhile, Fukuyama was attracted by the valence of trust and later he
argued: ‘The study of how order arises, not as the result of a top-down mandate by
hierarchical authority, whether political or religious, but as the result of self-organization on the part of decentralized individuals, is one of the most interesting and important intellectual developments of our time. This separates himself from Huntington, with an intellectual gap between the Lockean culture and Hobbesian one. This important difference will be acknowledged in the later part of the paper as I discuss the governance crisis in China.

In addition to the triadic model, if we realize that the ingredients of anarchy, autocracy and democracy actually exist within each three states of human political conditions, then, we can cultivate, substantiate, or suppress different parts of them to create an optimal composition and equilibrium, which is the liberal democracy Fukuyama has designated as the endpoint of history. This competing process for preponderance is the tug of war between democratization and reaction. Regarding political decay in the U.S., Fukuyama puts his finger correctly on the failure of social aspect; furthermore, one cause is that the autocratic factor has been raising its head in the form of plutocracy, oligarchy and security state, trying to shift the ground of U.S. democracy away from the Lockean tradition to the Hobbesian one.

The hypotheses above can have many inferences about the probability that a state will move under different situations, and it helps us develop different strategies and priorities for democratic transition. Now we turn to the case of China.

IV. China in the triadic framework

Regarding the nature of Chinese communist party-state, a grand debate has been going on for the past decade or so. The Chinese official tone has been set by its top leader Xi Jinping who has made it clear: ‘To strengthen our cultural soft power, we should disseminate the values of modern China. Modern Chinese values are also those of socialism with Chinese characteristics, representing advanced Chinese culture. China has blazed a successful socialist path featuring Chinese characteristics. Facts prove that our path and system, theoretical and social, are successful.’ Understandably, there have been several aggressive theoretical efforts to discredit ‘Western democracy;’ lump all democracies, old and new, under this category in a contrast to the ‘Chinese democracy;’ dub the Chinese system as the ‘good governance’ in contrast to the ‘bad governance’ ranging from U.S. to India, EU to Iraq, and Japan to Taiwan; completely reject the dichotomy between democracy and autocracy; promote the superiority of ‘China model’ to Western liberalism, and predict its ultimate triumph over the ‘hypocritical electoral democracy’ in the West. John and Doris Naisbitt, the husband, once the best-seller writer in U.S., and his wife now both based in China, made the point even more explicit that justification for governing is not election but accomplishment of leaders: ‘The party has changed from an arbitrary top-down autocracy to a functioning one-party leadership with strong bottom-up participation, a vertically organized democratic society with increasing transparency in making and executing decisions.’

A large number of scholars and commentators would not endorse the above statements, but still believe that China is a ‘resilient authoritarianism,’ ‘popular authoritarianism’ and ‘propaganda state,’ ‘the perfect dictatorship,’ ‘a dictatorship under the Party,’ a ‘Leninist Party-state,’ a ‘totalistic state,’ a communist empire, a ‘fascist police state,’ totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism or late-totalitarianism, a ‘Communist oligarchy’ and
so on. In a research project to monitor the longitudinal political development in China, the political scientist Li Fan and his associates based in Beijing published three ‘Chinese Democratization Index 2.0’ reports from 2009 to 2013, which recorded a systemic setback for China’s pursuit of democracy (see Table 1). The authors have observed four patterns: All scores are low and below the passing grade; there were downward spirals; the year 2011 witnessed a low point for democratic development due to the suppression of citizen rights in an election year; and the election category had scored lowest, indicating the official resistance to meaningful elections even at the grassroots level. The data have not been available since 2013, when Xi Jinping completed his accession to power, because the whole project was stopped. The clampdown on the democratization index project and other ensuing political developments do not offer any reason for a better score card.

Although the Chinese propagandists have somewhat succeeded in ‘marketing dictatorship,’ Wilhelm Hofmeister has made it clear, ‘Democracy is democracy, also in its different forms of concretization. Obviously, there exist other forms of government that are not democratic, and although these governments may try to present their regimes as a democracy, one cannot sell people a ship for a car.’ The massive marketing of a ship for a car and the controversy over whether a ship is a car expose the diametrically opposed views among the Chinese and between the Chinese and Westerners. It also reveals the deep division and intensive conflict over China’s democratization, both in theory and practice.

If we follow the common criteria for democracy and autocracy, we can safely say that China is still an autocracy. Since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the economic miracle in the following two decades, the creation of a ubiquitous stability-maintenance regime and the successful removal of liberal opinion leaders and the atomization of the entire society have created a political gridlock in the 21st century China: democratization process has been stalled, autocratic status quo has been facing rising tide of resistances, revolution and collapse have both increased their probability. If we put China in our triadic model, how will different dynamic forces play out? Here we can apply a simple rational choice model, the transition game, to enlighten us on the strategies and outcomes of China’s political conflict.

Suppose there are two major players in the Chinese politics: the ruling establishment and the citizens. Here we can confidently assume the current Xi Jinping regime as the ‘Hardliner Ruling Elite’ and they can pursue the following policy options in a preference ordering: status quo > narrow dictatorship > anarchy > democracy. As for the citizens, the preference ordering can be a little bit more complicated, which depends on citizens perceiving anarchy either in the Hobbesian light or Lockean one. Under the Hobbesian culture, their preference ordering can be the following: democracy > status quo > narrow dictatorship > anarchy (see Figure 2); but under the Lockean culture, the
preference ordering can change into: democracy > anarchy > status quo > narrow dictatorship (see Figure 3). Here are the outcomes into payoffs in two different scenarios (Table 2):

In the Transition Game Model 1 of the Hobbesian Culture (see Figure 2), the hardliner ruling elite must convince the citizens, (1) they are willing to escalate repression and have the credibility to be a fierce disciplinarian (the Tiananmen crackdown played such a role of grand advertisement to the people); (2) there is no way for the citizens to organize successful rebellion (the stability-maintenance regime or the ‘control cartel’ with peer policing, informants, ‘brainwashing,’ the blacklist of sensitive words, the Great Fire Wall, kidnapping and ‘evaporation’ are part and parcel of the deterrence); (3) if the hardliner ruling elite loses control and the regime collapse, the whole country will fall into anarchy (‘luan,’ as Deng Xiaoping put it, ‘Stability prevails over everything.’); (4) finally, ‘democracy’ or ‘Western democracy’ is poison, its only effect in China would be ‘chaos’ like warlordism and the Cultural Revolution. In 2011, the NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo declared ‘Five Nos’: No multiparty system for power rotation, no pluralism in the ruling principle, no separation of three powers and bicameralism, no federalism, and no privatization in China. He warned, ‘If we waver, the state could
The CCP’s exorbitant ruling privilege engraved in the state Constitution is built upon this historical inevitability and necessity of the party ‘to counterbalance the fissiparous tendencies’ of a heterogeneous society: ‘The CCP defends against the possibility of anarchy.’

If all these four points are registered with the Chinese people, then status quo will be the dominant strategy and optimal outcome, even for the people. If we trace all these four points in a reverse order, actually we can find: (1) the belief that democracy is a desirable universal value and political system is deepening among more Chinese and many are willing to fight for it; (2) the imagination of the collapse of a communist totalitarian system has become less terrifying, at least the aftermath never be worse than the system itself, as indicated by all former totalitarian systems (fascism, Nazism and Stalinism); and some think it can be a new beginning; (3) more and more people are gaining the hope and efficacy that their rebellions can result in tangible victory (So many high-profile democrats and activists have risked their freedom to fight for democracy); (4) the system has been losing its resources, resolve and capacity to crackdown if another national movement occurs.

According to Clarke, Golder and Golder, under a complete information game, the transition game would not happen. Miscalculation (more from the hardliner ruling elite such as overconfidence) and irrationality (more from the citizens such as martyrdom and ‘mob psychology’) often make transition possible. The current Chinese system, like the old Soviet apparatus, has suffered the problem of ‘a significant loss and distortion of information.’ For example, the statistics has turned from the art of the state into the magic and the monopoly of Baidu as the search engine orchestrated the expulsion of Google from the Chinese market. Also, if people under all autocracies have preference falsification more or less, we can expect that China as a humongous complex system will surprise us in many ways. However, one thing is becoming clearer: For many Chinese, anarchy maybe unwelcome, but it may be a better option than the status quo especially if it has to be maintained with rising costs. In addition

Figure 3. Transition game model 2: Lockean culture.
to the egregious administrative discretion of the control cartel that makes anarchy less repulsive, there are several other positive factors present: (1) Instead of embracing the trinity of Party-state-country propagated by the official ideology, more people have started to differentiate them and realized that China as a country and society has survived from two dozens of cyclic dynastic changes. (2) Although the gentry had been lost permanently as the backbone of local governance and self-government after 1949, some traditional organizations have been revitalized and new institutions created. The most significant have been the religious networks from Buddhism, Daoism, Qigong societies, to Islam, Catholicism and Christianity. Contemporary NGOs, the rights movements, online activist groups, opposition party movements, charities, groups of lawyers, and the private entrepreneurs with increasing resources are expanding fast to reduce Chinese dependency upon the state. (3) The mainland Chinese have become more aware of and have started to seek assistance from the organizational resources overseas, which include a semi-autonomous and politically active Hong Kong, a stable liberal democratic Taiwan, a functioning Tibetan Central Administration in India, a vast network of Chinese democracy movements over the world. Even the victims of forced evacuation have become a fixture of protest in front of the UN buildings, Chinese embassies and general consulates, and the White House. Ironically, the Chinese official Hobbesian anarchy discourse started with three major sources: Marx’s claim of Hobbes the ‘father of us all!’ Mao’s fascination of egoism, social Darwinism, and death instinct; and a deep-seated Confucian obsession of chaos. Now chickens have come home to roost: the Mao fans of Red Guard generation (who smashed Confucianism and turned Chinese society upside down) and their new recruits have stirred up the old spirits of Mao: ‘How do we change China? The country must be destroyed and then re-formed. . . .When the old universe is destroyed, a new universe will be formed. Isn’t better?’

Clearly the competitive race between liberals and Maoists to change China brings a mixed bag to Chinese political development; one thing is certain, it has shattered the dark magic power of Hobbesian anarchy in China. No matter from which model we look, either Hobbesian or Lockean, the anarchy scenario would become a dominant transition point in the future political development/underdevelopment. Unfortunately by default, anarchy might be the inevitable outcome. On this point, it is easier to comprehend under the Lockean culture, since anarchy will be the most stable equilibrium. However, even in the Hobbesian model, once the status quo is rejected by the citizens, then for the citizens, they have stepped upon a path of no return unless they reach the last and the highest pay-off: democracy. If the hardliner ruling elite keep intensifying their suppression on the civil society, overzealously enforcing ‘Seven No Mentions’ (e.g. universal values, freedom of press, civil society, citizen rights, fallacies of the CCP, power capitalists and independent judiciary), and aggressively squeezing the space for NGOs through passing new security law, anti-terror law, anti-spying law and tightened NGO regulations, then they are going to create a self-fulfilling prophecy that the collapse of the CCP, the organizational emperor, would leave China with no institutional infrastructure and social capital but into a Hobbesian abyss. If a communist party eventually eradicates community, a socialist state exterminates society; such alienation could disturb Karl Marx as a humanist. To prevent the worst from materializing, if that happens due to the failure of reciprocation between the ruling elites and citizens, then, to save us from the hell, social capital and trust can offer help. Therefore, they should
be nourished and cherished, not deliberately depleted. This is an important point Fukuyama has proved by partially rejecting the Hobbesian premise of his teacher.

V. Conclusion

Being fully aware that P. R. China, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Eritrea and Qatar are the only five countries never having conducted national elections since 1946, democrats all over the world would most likely agree that a democratic China could secure the liberal democracy as the endpoint of the history. In this paper, I have chosen the statelessness or anarchy as a focal point for our political discourse on political order and political chaos, autocracy and democracy, in particular, on the future course of Chinese political governance. My first finding is that anarchy, as a social and mental construct we have made, constrains our discussion on the dichotomous mutation between autocracy and democracy. If we examine anarchy as a theoretical fiction or a mental construct, we can find two intellectual lineages respectively running from Hobbes to Spencer, Freud and Huntington as well as from Aristotle to Locke, Kant, Wilson, and Wendt. The Hobbesian anarchy as an abyss provides a negative theoretical foundation for the creation and maintenance of absolutist state, an artificial bogeyman, the monster Leviathan. However, the Lockean tradition has offered the possibility to see a more benign anarchy which can generate social capital, facilitate cooperation through mutual contract, and elevate mankind to a more civilized state of democracy. The Lockean anarchy can help dispel the dark shadow of Hobbesian anarchy; enlighten the mankind to self-realize the complexity and potentiality of Homo Hierarchicus, Homo Empathicus and Homo Aequalis; therefore, we can escape the enchantment of the vicious triangle among anarchy, autocracy and democracy for a collective journey to reach liberal democracy, where the state can coexist with both rule of law and democratic accountability. Social capital, trust, human relationship, organizational assets, their creation or destruction done by ruling elite or citizens will make a crucial difference. This certainly applies to China.

Tocqueville once said, ‘The technique of association becomes the mother of every other technique; everyone studies and applies it.’ The art of association is the most challenging and difficult one in political life. But the Chinese, although lagging behind regarding civic and political associations, can make a stride if given a chance, because Lucian Pye also said highly about the Chinese ability to build relationships: ‘This primacy of personal relations is relevant for the building of political organizations, because the Chinese, by being so quick to attach significance and to give substantial form and structure to any set of human relationships in which they are involved, are uniquely capable of making any set of extended human contacts appear as a potential if not an actual organization.’

Notes

3. Lindsay, Modern Democratic State, 1.
4. Lindsay, Modern Democratic State, 55.
6. Ibid., 60–61.
7. Ibid., 66; Montagu, Biosocial Nature of Man, 17.
8. Lindsay, Modern Democratic State, 81; Montagu, Biosocial Nature of Man, 17.
10. Macpherson in Hobbes, Politics, 16; Strauss and Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy, 397; Lindsay, Modern Democratic State, 7.
12. Montagu, Biosocial Nature of Man; Gay, Cultivation of Hatred; Klein, Shock Doctrine; Woodiwiss, Gangster Capitalism; Reid-Henry, Political Origins of Inequality.
15. Ibid., 268 and note 65; Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace; Mandelbaum, Ideas that Conquered.
16. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory; Capra, Turning Point; Capra, Web of Life; Levine, A Mind at a Time; Derrida, Politics of Friendship; McLeod, Mindful Politics; Ekman, Emotional Awareness; Nussbaum, Political Emotions.
17. Rifkin, Empathic Civilization, 43.
18. Ibid., 83.
23. Ibid., 8
27. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 269.
28. Economic Intelligence Unit, The Economist.
31. Dahl, After the Revolution, 19; Kaplan, Coming Anarchy; Morris et al, Politics from Anarchy; Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia.
32. Fukuyama, Political Order, 548
34. Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, 9.
35. Ibid., 11, 4.
36. Ibid., 5, 20, 238.
37. Wang, China Order.
40. Dahl, After the Revolution; Kaplan, Coming Anarchy; Rotberg, When States Fail.
41. Tullock, Social Dilemma of Autocracy, 134–135.
42. Ibid; Przeworski, Democracy and Market; Gleick, Chaos; Gell-Mann and Tsallis, Nonextensive Entropy.
44. Tullock, Social Dilemma of Autocracy, 133.
45. Dahl, After the Revolution, 1–44.
46. Fukuyama, Great Disruption, 194–195; Dahl, After the Revolution, 49.
47. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, 302.
49. Wolterstorff in Audi, Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 600–602; Locke, Two Treatises of Government.
60. Xi, *Governance of China*, 179.
66. Clark et al., *Principles of Comparative Politics*.
68. Xia, *Dual Developmental State*, 54–57.
71. Clarke, Golder and Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics*.
73. Gorrie, *The China Crisis*.

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**Notes on contributor**

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