AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY EVALUATION - PART 2: REVIEWING THE OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APF AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR AFRICAN EFFORTS TO MANAGE CONFLICTS ON THE CONTINENT

Final Report

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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>African Union Mission in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU Los</td>
<td>African Union Liaison Offices</td>
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<td>AWG</td>
<td>Africa Working Group (COAFR in French)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market of East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CPPB</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace-building</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Directorate General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRIGCOM</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECPDM</td>
<td>European Center for Development Policy Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>E&amp;M</td>
<td>Evaluation and Monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLO</td>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
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<td>EQs</td>
<td>Evaluation Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Force Multinationale en Centrafrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarter</td>
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<td>IFs</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IL</td>
<td>Intervention Logic</td>
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<td>ISG</td>
<td>Inter-Services Group</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Judgement Criteria</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>JFA</td>
<td>Joint Financing Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAES</td>
<td>Mission d'Assistance Electorale aux Comoros</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>North Africa Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NIPs</td>
<td>National Indicative Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC (AU)</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC (EU)</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (COPS in French)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Department</td>
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<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIPv</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMsv</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION AIMS, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This is the Final Report of “Part 2 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the overall implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent”. This evaluation was commissioned by the European Commission (DEVCO, Unit D4) and conducted between October 2012 and September 2013. The objectives of the evaluation were to provide an overall independent assessment of APF implementation and its results, and to make recommendations to inform the design of the next phase of the APF currently being developed under the 11th EDF (2014-20). The temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period 2004-2013.

In line with the overall EuropeAid evaluation methodology approach, the evaluation included an inception phase, a desk phase involving a review of key documentation and interviews in Brussels, field work, and a synthesis phase. The fieldwork commenced with the holding of a Lesson Learning Seminar in Addis Ababa and was conducted in seven countries where APF-supported projects or peacekeeping missions were underway. The focus was on two PSOs (AMISOM and MICOPAX), five Capacity Building case studies (the AU Peace and Security Department and four regional organisations, namely EASFCOM, ECCAS, ECOWAS and NARC), and two ERM-financed activities (the AU High-Level Implementation Panel in Sudan and AU/SADC support for the Madagascar mediation initiative).

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF APF PERFORMANCE

The APF has been a game changer in terms of making possible a growing number of African-led responses to political crises on the continent. Since 2004, the APF has funded a number of major PSOs, including AMISOM in Somalia and AFISMA in Mali, which have been authorised and executed by the AU and regional organisations. By providing the resources for these bodies to act, the APF has enabled collective African security actions anchored in the nascent Peace and Security Council’s political role which has enabled it to be tested and put into action. In addition, it has provided extensive support for operationalisation of APSA which might otherwise not have occurred due to African resource constraints and variable commitment by African states to the APSA project.

These APF-supported actions have had a direct and positive impact on the lives of millions of Africans affected by political crisis and confirm the continuing need for and relevance of this instrument. These actions have also given the EU an important role in addressing conflict on the continent, with the enhanced political credibility and influence this brings, and have enabled it to add value in important ways to the peace and security actions of European Member States. Significantly, the core principles of Africa-EU partnership, African ownership, and African solidarity which underpin the APF have marked a departure from past interventionist policies by European countries. In particular, the APF’s development orientation has sent a message to African partners that the security of its nations and peoples should not be held hostage to the foreign policy priorities of outside powers.

The APF has been a highly innovative instrument, not least by enabling the use of EU development cooperation funds to address peace and security/military issues. It has
demonstrated the flexibility to evolve in the face of changing circumstances and needs. In response to African partners’ concerns, the APF broadened its scope in 2007 to more fully encompass conflict prevention activities. Development of the ERM two years later has facilitated increased mediation efforts to manage political crises. These positive developments have nonetheless also led to growing expectations about what can be achieved through the APF and the level of resources it can provide, which may not be realistic under the circumstances.

From its inception, the APF has faced a serious dilemma which has not been easy to overcome: it is a financial instrument which is meant to support the delivery of security by African organisations, but can only achieve this objective effectively under certain conditions which are not fully within its control. First, the APF’s African partners need to have the capacity to plan and execute PSOs and other relevant activities and to manage the funding provided by the APF. Second, the EC/EEAS must allocate sufficient human resources to effectively manage APF activities and monitor the use of APF funding, tasks which require a presence both in Brussels and in Africa. Third, because needs always outstrip available resources, it is essential that the APF partners develop a well-prioritised strategic plan for maximising the impact of APF funding.

The effectiveness of APF support over the evaluation period has been blunted because the institutional base of the AU/RECs/RMs is weak. In recognition that this would be an issue, the APF designers gave it the dual mandate to combine short-term support to PSOs with longer-term capacity building with a view to operationalising APSA. It was never anticipated that the APF would address these objectives single-handedly – the APF is just one instrument within a collective international effort. At the EU level, other tools such as the IfS, regional programmes, and CSDP have also contributed to this effort. Nevertheless, it is the APF which has led EU efforts to enhance capacity in the peace and security arena, recording some notable achievements in the AU PSD, certain RECs/RMs and AMISOM, and particularly in the area of financial management. This has been necessary because other EU capacity building instruments either have not been engaged in peace and security or because they have not engaged at a continental level.

For a number of reasons, however, the implementing environment has not been conducive to solid, long-term capacity building using APF resources. These reasons include the pressing need for short-term AU responses to armed conflict, the lack of adequate complementarity between EU and non-EU funding sources, and AU and EU human resource constraints. There has been strong consensus between African and EU partners on the need to tackle major crises, as a consequence of which facilitating rapid troop deployments has not surprisingly taken precedence over building the capacities required to deliver PSOs effectively and strengthen APSA. The latter two tasks have complex political and institutional dimensions, requiring active engagement by African Member States and a scale of support which is outside the scope of the APF alone.

A similar picture is apparent on the financing side where the early ambition of making long-term financial stability a feature of the APF has not been achieved. Despite the fact that 765 million euros were spent over 2004-2012, in practice political sensitivities around APF funding on the EU side have lengthened an already bureaucratic decision-making process. This has slowed disbursement, often leaving PSOs stretched for resources, particularly at the end of an EDF cycle. Furthermore, although it was never envisaged that the EU would cover all APF financing needs, other expected international contributions have not materialised and parallel contributions by African states have been fewer than expected. This has not only made it difficult for the African states to fulfil a meaningful role as “partner”, but has also weakened their ownership of the APF.
Despite these challenges, the APF has been and will remain for the foreseeable future the most important EU instrument to shape and support African responses to violent conflict on the continent. But the long-term objective of enabling African-led solutions to the continent’s crises is still “work-in-progress” as illustrated by the challenges of setting up the AFISMA operation in Mali. Although the task of institution building is not complete, the AU and regional organisations are under pressure to take on new tasks related to counter-terrorism and security sector reform, among others, which they remain ill-equipped to deliver. This highlights the critical need to carefully align the strategic security outcomes which European countries desire with the needs, priorities and capabilities of African partners. For the APF, this requires serious prioritization.

This evaluation echoes a key conclusion of the 2006 Mid-Term review which is that the big picture issue for the APF should really be about building up the capacity of APSA. Notwithstanding the fact that 90% of APF funds are spent on PSOs, this is not fundamentally an issue of funding per se, nor an issue exclusively for the APF. Rather it is about ensuring that this broader APF strategic orientation is adequately catered for by a clear, focused and long-term capacity building agenda. This must clearly identify the APF’s comparative advantage and where it should focus its funding, be adequately supported by African Member States in terms of both financing and priority setting, and be appropriately matched by the EU with other tools that complement the APF’s strengths.

**CONCLUSIONS**

**Conclusion 1 on Partnership and ownership:** The Africa-EU partnership has evolved and matured significantly since 2004, though African ownership of the APF has been weakened by the limited financial contributions of African states and variable political commitment to the APSA project. There has been significant common ground between the EU and Africa regarding the need for the APF and its relevance to the current political and security context. Nevertheless, the question of African ownership of the APF impacts directly on the success of the long-term strategy for operationalising APSA as well as efforts to develop viable exit strategies for PSO support. Addressing these issues will require a political approach that goes well beyond the APF, but it has a crucial role to play in setting the agenda for change.

**Conclusion 2 on Strategic orientation:** The APF’s strategic orientation has broadened since 2004 from a focus on PSOs to more fully encompass wider APSA development, though this has spread the APF very thin in terms of financing and human capacities and increased pressure on it to achieve more with fewer resources. The broadening of the APF’s mandate has enabled the instrument to better mirror the ‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ nature of the APSA, particularly its conflict prevention dimensions; but it has also blunted the APF’s strategic focus as it has been pushed to support a widening range of activities with neither the financial nor human resources to do so effectively. Thus, a clearer strategic approach to operationalising APSA is required. While the EU's African partners should lead on this task of strategic planning and prioritisation, increased EU support could have significant benefits.

**Conclusion 3 on Institutional development.** The APF has contributed to improvements in selected functions within AU PSD and the peace and security departments of the RECs/RMs, particularly around financial management, but these improvements have often been undermined by wider institutional constraints which are not within the APF’s mandate to address. Effective peace and security activities must be backed by effective institutions. Despite significant progress thus far, particularly at the AU, additional institutional strengthening is required for African partners to use APF money efficiently. More needs to be done by the EU, using its own instruments and through partnerships with other development
actors, to strengthen core strategic planning, finance and human resource capacities within the AU/RECs/RMs, which will enhance the effectiveness of peace and security functions.

**Conclusion 4 on Programme management.** There are a number of critical EU decision-making functions associated with managing the APF that need to be carried out in Brussels, but APF experiences demonstrate a need for increased programme-level monitoring of and technical support for APF activities. A degree of devolution could in certain contexts increase APF responsiveness to local needs by enhancing communication on APF matters both between Brussels and EU Delegations, but also between the EU and the AU/RECs/RMs. Long-term capacity building of the kind APF is engaged in is politically-sensitive, complex “hands-on” business which can benefit from the constant monitoring, mentoring and local knowledge that can only be provided by experts on the ground. But devolution is not a panacea and there are various constraints, including the shortage of EU staff with peace and security backgrounds in Delegations, which would need to be taken into account in determining how best to improve programme-level support for APF activities.

**Conclusion 5 on Sustainability and Impact.** APF-supported gains, both in the area of security and institutional development, rest on precarious foundations due to a lack of adequate, complementary institutional investments by other actors and weak political commitment to the APSA project by African states. Discussions about alternative sources of funding and efforts to increase African Member States’ contributions to the AU and RECs/RMs have not yet borne fruit. Because the APF has not been mandated to finance the development of core institutional capacity, the result has been shorter-term fixes to improve the management and oversight of APF-financed programmes alone. While this has facilitated some vital security actions by the AU/RECs/RMs, it has left some organisations without the core capacities required to effectively manage PSOs or critical elements of APSA.

**Conclusion 6 on Synergies between EU instruments.** The APF is the principal EU instrument for addressing peace and security issues in Africa but has not had the impact it might otherwise have had due to weak complementarity between the APF and the EU’s other financing and political tools, including the RIPs. While there have been examples of joint planning between the APF and different EU instruments, this has not occurred in a systematic manner or been informed by an overall strategic or ‘comprehensive’ plan for EU engagement in support of peace and security organisations in Africa. As a consequence, potential synergies among the various tools have not been maximised. Recent high-profile crises such as Somalia and Mali illustrate some of the benefits of coordination and efforts to develop a ‘comprehensive approach’ integrating the EU’s multiple tools. But there is more scope for complementarity, particularly between the APF and RIPs.

**Conclusion 7 on Innovation and Value Added:** The APF has been an innovative and dynamic instrument which has evolved in response to changing circumstances and needs and which has enabled the EU to provide value added in important ways to European Member States’ peace and security initiatives in Africa. The APF has made possible the practical application of the security and development nexus by using a development cooperation instrument to promote peace and security objectives. Lesson learning conducted in response to the early challenges of supporting PSOs has given rise to innovations such as the ERM which have increased APF flexibility and responsiveness. These innovations have made it possible for the EU to provide significant added value to European Member State peace and security efforts by pooling funds to support PSOs, supporting continental-wide initiatives, and using its convening power to engage Member States in strategic planning discussions. This, in turn, has also had benefits for the AU/RECs/RMs as transaction costs have been reduced by only dealing with one donor, though there is scope for the EU to take greater advantage of the political leverage this value added affords to engage in dialogue with APF partners around addressing the broader constraints to APSA implementation.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Team has made 20 recommendations, clustered around five themes, which are intended to point the EU towards actions required to address the challenges highlighted in the conclusions. The core recommendations include the following:

Deepening the Africa-EU partnership

- The EU should engage more frequently with the Member States of the AU and the RECs/RMs at both policy and political levels to provide the foundation for a regular dialogue on how to consolidate recent APF gains over the medium to longer-term.

Sharpening the APF’s strategic focus

- In planning for the next phase of APF development under the 11th EDF, the EU should work with the AU/REC/RMs to sharpen the APF’s strategic orientation with reference to both the component areas/activities it is best placed to concentrate on and those areas where other actors are better placed to provide support. The basis for this strategic reflection should be an explicit recognition that the APF cannot effectively support all areas across the spectrum of African conflict response or APSA development which it is increasingly being drawn into, including conflict prevention.

Stream-lining EU/APF decision-making

- The EU should modify the provision on financial decision-making in the APF Three-Year Action Programme which stipulates that every action requires a separate decision, in view of speeding up the approval process for contracts which are not of strategic importance, such as renewal of support to a given PSO.

Strengthening APF capacity building

- The APF partners (EU/AU/REC/RMs) should adopt a more tailored approach to capacity building in the area of peace and security that is based on a thorough needs assessment of partner institutions in the area of peace and security and informed by an overall strategic plan for institutional development.

- To support the implementation of these long-term peace and security capacity building strategies, the EU should work to strengthen APF alignment with other EU and non-EU funders (such as the RlPs, the €30 million AU Support Programme, the African Development Bank, bilateral donors, etc.) in order to strengthen critical core institutional capacities, consulting on a priority basis with these funders to develop a strategy for providing the requisite assistance.

Enhancing EU programme support

- In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the EU should explore options to further decentralise aspects of APF programme management which relate to day-to-day programme management, including monitoring of AU and REC/RM APF-funded activities, on-the-spot coordination of EU affairs relating to the APF, and technical support/guidance for the AU and RECs/RMs.

- Recognising the constraints posed on the Commission AFP unit, due to its small size, in terms of its ability to effectively manage and monitor the APF and conduct strategic planning, and the potentially harmful consequences of that on attainment of overall APF objectives, DEVCO should ensure that Commission APF ambitions are matched by an appropriately-sized and skilled APF management team.
1 INTRODUCTION

This is the Final Report of “Part 2 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the overall implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent”. This evaluation was commissioned by the European Commission (DEVCO, Unit D4) under Framework Contract Com 2011 – Lot 1 in response to Request for Offer No 2012/300303.

The APF has thus far undergone several formal evaluation and monitoring exercises, including an external Mid-term evaluation in 2005-2006, a Lessons Learned exercise in 2007, and “Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation” which preceded this and was completed in 2011 (by IBF International Consulting). The latter focused on the APF sources of funding and procedures.

Part 2 of the APF evaluation was conducted between October 2012 and September 2013. It was carried out by IBF International Consulting in collaboration with ADE (Belgium). The team consisted of five experts including two members of ADE and three independent consultants.

1.1 Overall objectives and scope of the evaluation

This evaluation covers the activities undertaken under the three main APF components: Peace Support Operations (PSOs), capacity building (CB), and Early Response Mechanism (ERM).

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- First, to provide an overall independent assessment of the implementation of the APF and its results, notably in terms of relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency. The 3Cs (Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence) as well as EU value-added were also covered, and special attention was paid to the question of African ownership; and
- Second, to make practical suggestions and recommendations, drawing upon key lessons identified from implementation of the APF to date, that can inform the design of the next phase of the APF that is currently being developed under the 11th EDF (2014-20).

The temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period 2004-2013\(^{1}\). The funding source for the APF during this period is the 9th EDF (2004-2007) and the 10th EDF (2008-2013).

The EU is the beneficiary of this evaluation and the recommendations which emerge from it are intended primarily for the EU (including its Member States). It is hoped that the AU and the RECs/RMs will also benefit from this evaluation.

\(^{1}\) The financial figures included in this report are accurate until the end of 2012.
1.2 Structure of report

This report is structured as follows:

- **Executive Summary**: this provides an overview of the key evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- **Section 1: Introduction**: this briefly outlines the aims and scope of the evaluation, and how the report is structured.
- **Section 2: African Peace Facility background**: this provides background information on the APF, including the organisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, how the APF is structured, the EU policy context, and financial information.
- **Section 3: Methodology**: this chapter details the methodological approach adopted for this study, including the tools and sources of information that were used.
- **Section 4: Answers to Evaluation Questions**: this chapter presents the answers to the eight Evaluation Questions (EQs) which framed the assessment.
- **Section 5: Conclusions**.
- **Section 6: Recommendations**.

This report also includes the following annexes:

- **Annex 1**: Terms of Reference (ToR)
- **Annex 2**: African Peace Facility financial overview
- **Annex 3**: Data collection grids (Desk phase)
- **Annex 4**: Summary notes (Field phase)
- **Annex 5**: List of persons met
- **Annex 6**: Bibliography
- **Annex 7**: Addis Ababa Seminar Report

1.3 How to read this report

The evaluation findings and analysis contained in this report are presented on four ‘levels’ of detail to facilitate reading:

- The Executive Summary provides an overall picture of the evaluation findings, including the main conclusions and recommendations;
- Each of the eight evaluation questions includes a box summarising the main findings, followed by a more detailed discussion of the findings;
- Each conclusion and recommendation is summed up in a very brief statement, followed by the full conclusion and recommendation;
- The information which was used to answer the evaluation questions is compiled in the Annexes: the Data Collection Grids contain the data collected during the desk phase, and the Summary Notes contain the field work findings.
2. **AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY BACKGROUND**

### 2.1 The African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture

The **African Union** (AU) was established in 2002 with a broad political mandate in the area of conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building in Africa. It established, in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the **African Peace and Security Architecture** (APSA) as a structural and long-term response to African peace and security challenges.

The APSA is made up of several components and structures:

- The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the central decision-making body;
- Eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with a mandate in peace and security which form the pillars of the overall security architecture: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the South African Development Community (SADC);
- Two Regional Mechanisms (RMs): Eastern Africa Stand-by Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North Africa Regional Capability (NARC);
- The 'Panel of the Wise' with a mandate in conflict prevention and resolution;
- The African Standby Force (ASF);
- The African Peace Fund with a mandate to promote the work of the AU Commission’s (AUC) Peace and Security Department (PSD); and
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) with the role of supporting PSC decision-making and guiding deployment of African Standby Forces (ASF).

### 2.2 The European Union policy context

The EU made peace and security one of the main pillars of its **Strategy for Africa** (2005) and committed to further enhancing its support to Africa in this area. To this end, an **EU Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts** was put forward in 2006. Moreover, the **Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)**, adopted in 2007, defined peace and security as one of the eight areas for a specific EU-Africa partnership (the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership). This partnership includes as a key objective full APSA implementation. The intent of the EU-Africa partnership is to support "African solutions for African problems".

### 2.3 The African Peace Facility

Starting in 2003, the EU took an initial step to strengthen the financial capacity of the African institutions to foster peace and security on the continent. In response to a request made by the African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003\(^2\), the APF was created. The Cotonou Agreement (Article 11) forms the overall legal framework within which the APF is based.

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\(^2\) Decision 2003/3 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa.
2.3.1 Strategic orientations

The APF, based on the principle of African ownership, supports the AU and the regional African organisations which have a mandate to promote peace and security. Initially developed in response to a request by African leaders, the APF has evolved into the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership. This partnership consists of three inter-linked priorities, namely:

- Priority No. 1: to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security;
- Priority No. 2: to operationalise the APSA; and
- Priority No. 3: to support African-led Peace Support Operations in Africa.

2.3.2 Funding

At the time the APF was established in 2003, the EU treaties and thus, budget, strictly precluded any financing of operational expenditure having ‘military or defence implications’. As the EDF is not part of the general EU budget and is therefore subject to different rules, it was agreed that the APF would be funded through the EDF. The APF has been part of the intra-ACP envelopes of EDF9 and EDF10.

In line with regulations, APF funds can be used to finance costs incurred by African countries that are deploying their peace-keeping forces under the banner of the AU or a REC/RM in another African country (cost of transporting troops, soldiers' living expenses, development of capabilities, etc.), but not to cover military operations or arms expenditure.

2.3.3 Beneficiaries

The APF’s direct beneficiaries are the AU, African regional organisations (RECs/RMs) with a mandate in Peace and Security, and relevant institutions within or related to the APSA. Under EDF9, only the AU and the RECs/RMs (as pillars of the APSA) could be direct beneficiaries of the APF. Under EDF10, the scope of beneficiaries has been broadened to include other organizations, such as training centres, provided that they are formally linked to the APSA. These new beneficiaries can request funding from the APF, though only through the AU or RECs.

2.3.4 Geographic scope

The effective functioning of APSA relies on contributions from all African regions and, to that extent, the APF needs to be pan-African in nature, with the full involvement of all African countries. Because the APSA extends well beyond the geographic scope of the EDF, complementary efforts are required from non-ACP African countries/regions in the spirit of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and in respect of the principle of African solidarity. These countries may provide targeted and self-funded contributions to the APF from their own resources, within joint co-financing arrangements, provided for in the 10th EDF Implementing Regulation.

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3 For a list of the eligible and non-eligible expenditures, see the “Three-Year Action Programme for the African Peace Facility, 2011-13 (10th EDF)”, p. 12.
2.3.5 APF budget

More than €1.1 billion have been allocated to the APF since its inception. Of this, €932m have been contracted and €764.98m have been spent over the period 2004-2012 (see annex 2 and figure 1).

- Under EDF9, the APF received an initial allocation of €250m in 2004. This was replenished five times (once in 2006 and four times in 2007) for a total amount of €189.2m, raising the total EDF9 envelope to €439.2m.
- It should be noted that the EDF9 envelope has been supplemented with a €7.7m contribution from the South Africa Heading of the EU Budget (which is not included in the amounts presented in the figure).
- Under EDF10, the APF envelope consisted of two allocations of €300m (€300m for the 3-year Action Programme 2008-2010 and €300m for the 3-year Action Programme 2011-2013). Belgium also made a Voluntary Contribution to MICOPAX of €600,000. Two additional replenishments of €100m and €115m were respectively finalized early 2013 and mid-2013.

Figure 1 – African Peace Facility financial overview under EDF9 and EDF10 (in €m)

Over the period 2004-2012, annual contracts and payments averaged between €70m and €90m. In 2008, allocations and outlays dropped due to the shift from EDF9 to EDF10. Peaks in contracts and payments occurred in 2007, 2011 and 2012 (€116.5m, €147.4m and €210.3m respectively). In 2007, AMIS contracts were valued at €76.5m and AMISOM contracts at €15m, while €20m were contracted for capacity building. In 2011 and 2012, AMISOM contracts represented the lion’s share of total contracts. They were valued at €115.9m in 2011 (nearly 80% of all 2011 contracts) and at €164.4m in 2012 (nearly 78% of all 2012 contracts).

During the first six months of 2013, this financing trend has continued. AMISOM contracts have continued to represent the bulk of total funds contracted, though the establishment of AFISMA in early 2013 has also absorbed a significant portion of APF resources. All together, €68.5 m was contracted for AMISOM, €50m for AFISMA, and €6.3m for MICOPAX.
Figure 2 – Evolution of contracted amounts and payments, 2004-2012 (in €m)

Figure 3 presents the breakdown of APF contracted amounts by type of activity between 2004 and 2012. The bulk of the APF envelope was allocated to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (88.5% of the contracted amounts). Capacity building (CB) activities received €92m (9.9% of total contracts) and Early Response Mechanism (ERM) activities €15m (1.6% of total contracts). AMIS in Sudan and AMISOM in Somalia received 86.57% of the contracted amounts devoted to PSOs. Central African Republic benefited from two successive operations: FOMUC and then MICOPAX. The mandate of the operation was extended under MICOPAX and the beneficiary organisation changed from CEMAC to ECCAS.

Figure 3 – APF contracted amounts per type of activity, 2004-2012 (in €m and %)
2.3.6 Decision-making process

Part 1 of the APF Evaluation provided a detailed description of APF decision-making procedures, which is summarised below and shown in Figure 4. Each intervention to be financed by the APF has to be specifically requested by the AU or by a sub-regional organisation (with the endorsement of the AU).

For PSOs and actions related to the operationalisation of the APSA and Africa-EU dialogue, the EEAS/European Commission circulates an Information Note on the intervention envisaged to EU Member States upon receipt of the request from the AU or the African regional organization, endorsed by the AU for the second one. On the basis of this Note, the EEAS/Commission consults/informs the relevant Council preparatory working groups and seeks the approval of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the “political appropriateness” of the intervention requested. An allocation for funding is then adopted by a European Commission decision, on the basis of a description of the intervention which includes a detailed budget\(^4\). This process typically takes about three months.

An accelerated procedure was approved in 2008 for APF interventions requiring an urgent response. In these cases, the Commission requests the Council to do its utmost to ensure that the PSC gives its approval on political appropriateness rapidly\(^5\).

For APF interventions financed under the ERM, the decision-making process aims at enabling a quicker reaction to requests for assistance (+/- 10 days).

\(^5\) Source: EC, APF Annual Report, 2010
2.3.7 Aid modalities

Part 1 of the APF Evaluation provided a detailed discussion of APF aid modalities, which is summarised below.

APF funding is delivered through the following aid modalities:

- Contribution agreements under the system of joint management which require that the institution (in this case international organisations) receiving the funds offers guarantees equivalent to internationally-accepted standards relating to accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures (the so called “4-pillars” requirements). As discussed under EQ8, a derogation to this rule was adopted for the AU: contribution agreements were signed with the regional organisation including safeguarding measures in the Special Conditions since it had not yet passed the “4-pillars” assessment;
- Grant contracts under the centralised management of DEVCO; and
- Framework Contracts (in the past) and a Service contract (since 2012) used for the implementation of the Technical Assistance (TA).

General EDF regulations and internal control requirements are applicable to AU/RECs in the context of the APF framework.
3. METHODOLOGY

This section presents: (i) the overall methodological approach adopted for this evaluation, and its different phases; (ii) the data gathering tools and sources of information used; and (iii) the data gathering challenges faced and the limitations of the assessment.

3.1 Structured evaluation approach

In line with the overall EuropeAid evaluation methodology approach, the evaluation was structured in four phases as summarised in Figure 5: an inception phase, a desk phase involving a review of key documentation and interviews in Brussels, consultations and field work in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and six other countries where APF-supported projects or peace-keeping missions were underway, and a synthesis phase.

Figure 5 – Evaluation process

The figure also indicates the activities that were undertaken during the different phases, the Inter-Services Group (ISG) meetings in Brussels and the on-the-spot Debriefing meetings conducted with Commission services in the field (D), and the various deliverables (draft and final versions) produced at the different stages of the evaluation. Each phase started upon approval of the deliverable of the previous phase.

The evaluation built upon the first part of the APF evaluation which was completed in 2011. This was an externally-commissioned policy-oriented review focusing specifically on APF sources of funding and procedures. In addition, the evaluation drew upon the Mid-term evaluation of the APF (completed in 2006), internal reviews of the APF (primarily the annual reports published by the Commission since 2009), and the 2007 lesson learning exercise conducted in Djibouti.
3.1.1 Intervention Logic

The intervention logic of the African Peace Facility describes in a schematic manner the hierarchy of objectives pursued by the Commission with regard to the APF. It served as the basis for formulating a set of eight EQs (see section 3.1.2) that allowed for more in-depth analysis of crucial aspects of the Commission’s support through targeted data collection (see section 3.1.2).

The intervention logic is exclusively based on the official documents made available to the Evaluation Team, in particular: 1) the APF Financing Proposal, March 2004 (EDF9); 2) the Three-Year Action Programme for the African Peace Facility, 2008-2010 (EDF10); and 3) the Three-Year Action Programme for the African Peace Facility, 2011-2013 (EDF10).

The intervention logic is presented in the form of an expected impacts diagram which summarises, across five columns, the hierarchy of objectives, spanning from planned EU political engagement and assistance activities to the expected outputs of these activities, the broader results to which they will contribute, the intermediate impact this will have on African ownership and capabilities in the area of peace and security as well as political stability, and the expected global impact on peace, security and development more generally on the continent. The figure below also highlights the level at which the evaluation questions are pitched within the intervention logic.
Part 2 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the overall implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent

Figure 6 – Intervention Logic of the APF

**EU inputs**
- Political Dialogue
- Financial Assistance
- Technical Assistance
- Complementary EC activities (under NIPs and RIPs, US, CSDP missions, EU MS actions and international donors operations)

**Activities**
- Areas of focus:
  - APSA
    - Development of P&S policy
    - Planning of P&S activities
    - Financial management
    - HR management
    - Management of finances for PSOs
    - Strengthening of linkages between AU and RECs/RMs
  - PSOs
    - Training of military, police and civilian personnel for PSOs
    - Payment of allowances (PSOs)
  - Mediation
    - Financing of mediation activities

**Outputs**
- Joint EU-Africa and AU-REC/RM consultations, knowledge sharing and assessment missions conducted
- AUC and REC/RM organisation and human capacities strengthened
- APSA structures reinforced:
  - AU P&S Council
  - Panel of Wise
  - Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
  - African Standby Force
  - AU Peace Fund
- Cross-cutting agendas (SSR, CT, etc.) developed
- African capacity to deploy PSOs reinforced
- Mediation initiatives supported
- EU ability to disburse funds more rapidly enhanced (ERM)
- EU ability to deploy experts more rapidly enhanced (APF TA Service Contract “APF Expert Pool”)
- APF is more flexible and responsive to African needs

**Results**
- Dialogue and cooperation on the challenges to African P&S is enhanced
- African ownership and solidarity in the area of P&S is enhanced
- APSA architecture is operationalised and is functioning effectively
- Predictable and sustainable funding for African-led PSOs is available
- Peace and security in Africa is improved, providing the necessary conditions for development

**Intermediate Impacts**
- Incidence, duration and intensity of violent conflict in Africa is reduced

**Global Impacts**
### The set of Evaluation Questions

The EQs aim at addressing the key issues with respect to the implementation of the APF and its results. They are derived from the intervention logic. Table 1 lists the eight questions.

#### Table 1 - Overview of the Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQ</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ1</td>
<td>Relevance of the APF</td>
<td>To what extent has the design of the APF been in line with the EU's international commitments and objectives, the AU and REC/RM's policies and activities, the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, and current thinking on conflict prevention and peace-building?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ2</td>
<td>Consistency of Implementation</td>
<td>To what extent has the implementation of APF activities been consistent with the APF design and its underlying principles (African ownership, Africa-EU partnership, and African solidarity), and has the APF evolved in response to changes in the African context and priorities?</td>
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<td>EQ3</td>
<td>Dialogue and Cooperation</td>
<td>To what extent has dialogue and cooperation among the principal African and EU APF stakeholders with respect to understanding and addressing the challenges to peace and security in Africa been enhanced?</td>
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<td>EQ4</td>
<td>Operationalising APSA</td>
<td>To what extent has the APSA been operationalised at regional and continental levels, and are the key structures for conflict prevention and peace-building functioning effectively?</td>
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<td>EQ5</td>
<td>Predictable and Sustainable Funding</td>
<td>To what extent has EU support for the APF helped to achieve more predictable and sustainable funding for African-led peace support operations and mediation activities, including the ability to disburse funds rapidly?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ6</td>
<td>Impact on Peace and Security</td>
<td>To what extent has the APF contributed to strengthening the resolve and ability of the AU, the REC/RMs, and member states to work together to reduce violent conflict in Africa, and has this joint effort enhanced conditions for development?</td>
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<td>EQ7</td>
<td>Coordination and Complementarity, and Value-Added</td>
<td>To what extent has EU support for the APF been provided in a coordinated and complementary manner with respect to both EU actors’ roles (Commission, Council, EEAS and Member States) and other donors’ support, and what has been the EU’s added value?</td>
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<td>EQ8</td>
<td>Efficiency of Implementation</td>
<td>To what extent have the availability of funding, human resource capacities and the regulatory/administrative framework of the APF both at the EU and the AU/REC levels contributed to, or hindered achievement of, the intended results?</td>
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The set of EQs allows coverage of the different evaluation criteria, while making sure that the evaluation has a clear focus, through a set of precise and well-defined questions. Table 2 shows the linkages between the evaluation questions and the evaluation criteria to be tackled by this evaluation.
Table 2 - Coverage of Evaluation criteria by the EQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC evaluation criteria</th>
<th>EQ1 Relevance of APF</th>
<th>EQ2 Consistency of Implementation</th>
<th>EQ3 Dialogue and Cooperation</th>
<th>EQ4 Operationalising APSA</th>
<th>EQ5 Predictable and Sustainable Funding</th>
<th>EQ6 Impact on P&amp;S</th>
<th>EQ7 Coordination &amp; Complementarity and Value Added</th>
<th>EQ8 Efficiency of Implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Sustainability</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
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<td>Issues</td>
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<td>Coordination and Complementarity</td>
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<td>EU Value Added</td>
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<td>African Ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting Issues</td>
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3.2 Evaluation tools

Once the structuring stage was completed, information was collected by the evaluation team through the use of specific evaluation tools as represented below:

**Figure 7 – Evaluation tools**

- General level desk study (25 general-level documents)
- Activity-level desk study (available documentation for 7 APF-funded activities)
- Financial overview of APF funding
- Interviews with representatives from AU, REC/RM, EU (Commission, EEAS, EUD), EU MS, UN, other donors and Civil society (208 persons met)
- 9 case studies:
  - CB: AU PSD, ECCAS, ECOWAS, EASFCOM, NARC
  - PSOs: AMISOM, MICOPAX
  - ERM: AU HIP, Madagascar AU/SADC
Data gathering and analysis was carried out at three levels covering the Evaluation Questions and their related Judgment Criteria and Indicators (see Annex 3). The evaluation tools used consisted of the following:

- **General-level Desk Study:** the evaluators screened general-level documents relating to EU conflict prevention strategy and policy, and the APF;

- **Activity-level Desk Study:** the evaluators conducted an in-depth documentary study of project documentation relating to a selection of seven APF-funded interventions drawn from the three APF components:
  - For PSOs, in addition to looking at AMISOM and MICOPAX, the review covered FOMUC (the precursor of MICOPAX), AMIS, AMISEC and MAES).
  - For Capacity-building, narrative and financial reports of all activities financed under the four major capacity-building contracts were analysed during the desk review.
  - For the ERM, narrative and financial reports of all activities financed under the ERM contract were analysed during the desk review.

- **Interviews in Headquarters:** semi-structured interviews were undertaken at EU Headquarters in Brussels with key stakeholders including EU policy and programme officials. In addition, interviews were conducted with the London-based auditors used by the APF as well as key member state interlocutors and EU officials involved in the start up of the APF who were posted outside Brussels or retired.

- **Case studies:** the nine case studies selected on the basis of specific criteria and agreed with the ISG were as follows:
  - **Capacity Building:**
    - AU PSD: covered through two visits to Addis Ababa
    - ECCAS: covered through visits to Addis Ababa and Libreville
    - ECOWAS: covered through visits to Addis Ababa and Abuja
    - EASFCOM: covered through visits to Addis Ababa and Nairobi
    - NARC: covered through a visit to Tripoli
  - **PSOs:**
    - AMISOM was covered through visits to Brussels, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Mogadishu;
    - MICOPAX was covered through visits to Brussels and Libreville. The initial visit planned to Bangui CAR was cancelled for security reasons.
  - **ERM:**
    - AU HIP was covered through a visit to Addis Ababa to coincide with the talks taking place between the two Sudans in April 2013. This enabled the team to meet with all key AU HIP stakeholders.
    - SADC/AU support for the Madagascar Mediation Initiative was covered through a visit to Gaborone, where SADC is located, and telephone interviews with relevant interlocutors in Madagascar and Addis Ababa.

Each case study involved analysis of relevant documentation and semi-structured interviews with representatives, as relevant, from the AU, REGs/RMs, EU Delegations, EU Member States, the United Nations, and other donors and civil society groups. On completion of each case study, the evaluators prepared a Summary Note (see annex 4) which presents the key evaluation findings by Evaluation Question.
- **Financial overview of APF funding**: a financial analysis of the activities financed by the APF is provided in section 2.3.5 (see also annex 2 for more detailed data).

### 3.3 Data gathering challenges

The Evaluation Team faced a number of specific challenges in gathering data:

- First, gaining access to documentation and interlocutors with relevant experience from the early years of the APF’s existence, particularly 2004-2007, proved difficult. Interviews with a number of key EU and AU staff knowledgeable about this period of the APF have helped to fill this information gap;

- Second, the documentary information provided for each of the three APF components examined was often descriptive rather than analytical, and there were relatively few monitoring reports and end-of-activity evaluations to consult;

- Third, the ERM-financed activities were generally more politically-sensitive and hence not amenable to the same level of scrutiny as other APF-financed activities for which there existed more programme documentation including financial reports and audits. As a consequence, the data-gathering process for the ERM relied heavily on interviews with key actors involved in these interventions;

- Fourth, as noted above, the security situation in both CAR and Somalia restricted on the ground access to the PSOs being examined. In the case of MICOPAX, telephone interviews were conducted with a number of EU officials based in Bangui and extensive information was gathered through interviews conducted in Libreville at the HQ of ECCAS which is mandated to manage MICOPAX. In the case of AMISOM, a short visit was made to Mogadishu where interviews were conducted. Additional interviews were conducted in Nairobi and Addis where key programme management staff was based.
4. **ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

4.1 **EQ 1 on Relevance of the APF**

To what extent has the design of the APF been in line with the EU’s international commitments and objectives, the AU and REC/RM’s policies and activities, the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, and current thinking on conflict prevention and peace-building?

This question addresses the issue of **relevance**.

It first examines whether the design of the APF reflects the priorities for EU foreign policy as laid out in key policy documents including the European Security Strategy (2003).

Second, it assesses the degree to which the APF has been effectively aligned with AU and REC/RM policy objectives and priorities, particularly in relation to capacity development, deployment of PSOs, and mediation-related activities.

Third, the EQ examines the extent to which the APF, as it has evolved over time, has come to reflect the key principles, objectives and priorities outlined in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in 2007 and the two EDF10 Action Plans covering 2008-10 and 2011-13.

Finally, it verifies to what extent the APF’s design has reflected current thinking on conflict prevention and peace-building. This has been an increasing EU emphasis since the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention (COM(2001)211) which called for conflict prevention to be mainstreamed into all elements of EU development programming and policy-making.

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**EQ 1 on Relevance - Answer Summary Box**

Overall, the evaluation findings point to a general alignment of the APF with EU commitments, African priorities, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, and current thinking on conflict prevention. The context within which the APF operates has nonetheless evolved over the past nine years, creating new pressures on it to adapt accordingly.

The APF’s initial design was consistent with EU commitments at the time, and overall it has been implemented in line with EU peace and security priorities as they have developed over the APF’s lifespan. The APF has also generally been in line with AU and REC/RM objectives in relation to tackling conflict and operationalising APSA. But shifts in the priorities of the AU and RECs/RMs have complicated development of a shared strategic vision to move APSA forward, and the APF’s continental and regional focus has made it more difficult to adequately reflect AU Member States priorities in its programme activities.

The evolving Africa-EU Partnership has also influenced the APF: from 2007 the APF was embedded in the JAES and its scope was broadened to more formally encompass Africa-EU dialogue on peace and security issues and support for APSA. This has contributed to increased Africa-EU collaboration in defining strategic APF priorities as reflected in the Three-Year Action Programmes, though these are broad and provided limited guidance on the selection and implementation of APF activities.

In line with current conflict prevention thinking, the APF’s focus has been significantly broadened in recent years (i.e. the creation of the ERM in 2009). While there was a strong view among beneficiaries that the APF needed to do more in this area, supporting PSOs remained a key priority for both African and EU stakeholders and other EU instruments do exist to support conflict prevention activities. The APF has experimented with novel approaches to addressing conflict, such as the AU HIP, that appear to fit well with African realities and have had some positive effects.
JC1.1 & JC7.2 Alignment of the APF with the EU’s international commitments and objectives in the area of peace and security

The establishment of the APF in 2004 was in line with EU commitments at the time, and its overall objectives and implementation have remained aligned with EU priorities in the area of peace and security as they have evolved over the APF’s lifespan. The APF was established in response to a request made by the African Union to the ACP Committee of Ambassadors. Its legal basis is provided for by Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement “Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution”. The 2004 Project Outline for the APF refers to its alignment to the Cotonou Agreement when defining the APF’s objectives. Moreover, the APF design documentation places the APF’s overall objectives within the broader context of the EU’s recognition of the security-development nexus, and in line with the 2003 European Security Strategy. Finally, both Three-Year Action Programmes for the APF covering 2008-2010 and 2011-2013 refer to the principles and objectives expressed across a range of key EU policy documents governing its actions in the area of peace and security, including the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ of 2005, the ‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’ of 2006, and the EU Council ‘Conclusions on "Security and Development”’ of November 2007. It is worth noting that in its ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ in 2005, the EU committed to further enhance its overall support to Africa at all stages of the conflict cycle and to strengthen the APF with substantial, long-term, flexible and sustainable funding.

The design and implementation of APF-funded activities reviewed during the course of this evaluation have been consistent with EU policy commitments in the area of peace and security. This suggests that these commitments have informed the design of these activities, though there is not always explicit reference to the relevant EU policy documents (e.g. AMISOM, MICOPAX and ERM-financed activities).

JC 1.2 Alignment of the APF with AU and REC/RM objectives in the area of peace and security

The original design of the APF was closely aligned with AU and REC/RM objectives in the area of peace and security. The design took specific account of the need to support the AU and sub-regional organisations in promoting peace and security in Africa. The APF’s overall objectives are defined as supporting “in particular the AU and sub-regional organisations in tackling conflicts”, and “stimulating […] the continental architecture under the authority of the AU” whilst its project purpose includes supporting “the continental peace and security policy” and increasing “the capacity of the AU and sub-regional African organizations in the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations”. Moreover, the AU request to establish the APF was made within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which envisaged, from the outset, a conflict prevention and management role for RMs.

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7 Ibid above
APF-funded activities have been targeted at both regional and continental levels and have been aligned with African peace and security objectives. APF-funded capacity-building activities examined during the field work have had as their primary aim to strengthen the capacity of the AU, RECs and RMIs to develop and implement peace and security policies and operations and, more broadly, to support operationalisation of APSA by financing ‘APSA roadmap’ priorities. Support to African-led PSOs and activities (primarily mediation) financed through the ERM has enabled timely funding for crisis response.

But there has never been a complete match in priorities between the AU, RECs and RMIs, making difficult the development of a fully-shared strategic vision to move APSA forward. The AU, RECs and RMIs do have certain priorities in common in the area of peace and security though, over time – as APSA has been operationalised – differences have emerged in some areas. For instance, some SADC representatives believe that the general design of APSA and the ASF does not adequately reflect regional specificities. Another example is the creation of AFISMA to address the Mali crisis, which underscored that there can be differences in views about whether the AU or the relevant regional organisation should lead a PSO in a particular region. These differences reflect the fact that not only do circumstances and needs differ from region to region, but RECs and RMIs (and their constituent regional member states) are not willing to cede full powers to the AU to intervene in sensitive, sovereign areas such as peace and security.

Moreover, because the primary beneficiaries of the APF are – by design – the AU and regional organisations, this has made it more difficult for the APF to cater for the priorities of AU Member States in programme activities. As a consequence, Member States have not always fully embraced the peace and security agendas of their regional organisations. This problem was compounded by insufficient communication between the AU and regional organisations in the framework of the Africa-EU partnership which has made it more difficult to increase convergence in African peace and security priorities at the continental, regional and national levels.

JC 1.3 Alignment of the APF with the Strategic Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa-EU partnership

As noted under JC1.1 above, the APF was initially designed in 2004, at which time the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) did not exist. The development of the JAES influenced the design of the APF under EDF 10: it embedded the APF in a strategic framework and broadened its scope to more formally encompass Africa-EU dialogue on peace and security issues and support for APSA. The key priorities of the Peace and Security Partnership became the objectives of the APF under EDF 10.

- The need for the APF to take into account the evolving context of the African-European Partnership - in particular the 2005 EU strategy for Africa and the preparation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy - was specifically highlighted by the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Djibouti Lessons Learned Seminar (November 2007). In December 2007, the relationship between the EU and Africa was taken to a higher strategic level with the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in Lisbon. The JAES aims at providing a coherent and comprehensive framework for joint initiatives in eight priority areas or thematic Partnerships. The Partnership on Peace and Security consists of three priority actions, namely: 1) “Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 2) Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture; and 3) Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations.”

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Part 2 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the overall implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent

The APF Three-Year Action Programmes for the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2013 explicitly inscribe the APF within the Peace and Security Partnership of the JAES, with the objective of the APF being “to provide a response to all three priorities of the Partnership, with a financial focus on priority actions n°2 and 3.” Additionally, the APF became the major financing tool to support the implementation of the JAES under EDF 10, as explicitly mentioned in the two EDF 10 APF Three-Year Action Programmes. All APF-funded activities fall under one or more of the three JAES pillars.

The notion of partnership which underpins the JAES has shaped the design and implementation of the APF in various ways. The design process under EDF10, for instance, was jointly conducted by EU and African partners. Notably, the recommendations which emerged from the joint EU-Africa Djibouti Lessons Learned seminar guided the European Commission in the preparation of the APF strategy under EDF10. The 2013 Lessons Learned Seminar in Addis Ababa illustrated the continuing partnership in practice, though the seminar highlighted the need for increased AU-EU collaboration in defining APF priorities and selecting the activities to be financed.

Although the APF has been closely aligned with the Partnership on Peace and Security of the JAES, its three priority actions are broad and have provided limited strategic direction for development of the APF strategy and the selection of activities. The two EDF10 Three-Year Action Programmes consist of essentially the same activities, and few criteria are provided to guide prioritisation between them. The Action Programmes do not provide a detailed strategic review of the African peace and security context as a basis for justifying the spending priorities which have been agreed. The balance of spending between components, which has been weighted towards PSOs from the outset of the APF, reflects the continuing emphasis of African and EU partners on short-term responses to managing violent conflict on the continent.

Although the APF has broadened its scope under the 10th EDF to more fully encompass conflict prevention and peace-building activities, this has still not been translated in practice into a significant re-allocation of spending between components or among component activities in the second EDF10 Three-Year Action Programme. The one exception stems from the decision to establish the ERM in 2009. The ERM provides a new window to fund activities requiring a rapid disbursement of funds, and thus far these activities have primarily been oriented towards the area of mediation. The budget for this funding window could be considered low in view of the huge needs in the area of mediation and preventive diplomacy on the African continent, but thus far it has been sufficient to cover the 15 proposals for funding that have been approved by the EU and AU.

JC1.4 Conformity of the APF to current international thinking on conflict prevention and peace-building

Efforts have been made at the EU policy level to ensure that the APF conforms to current international thinking on conflict prevention and peace-building. EU policy documents serving as a framework for the design of the APF explicitly spell out the need for holistic approaches to address conflict in Africa. The ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ (2005), for instance, aims to “give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent.” The JAES, p.4, also points to the need for “holistic approaches to security” “addressing the root causes of conflict”.

In keeping with this emphasis on broader responses to insecurity, the APF has come under pressure over time to formally broaden its scope to more fully encompass

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conflict prevention and stabilisation activities, including mediation on the one hand, and post-conflict reconstruction on the other. While it has done so, many interlocutors have nonetheless argued that conflict prevention has remained insufficiently addressed despite the fact that there exist other EU and international instruments which address conflict prevention.

Under EDF 9, the APF design documentation did not explicitly mention cross-cutting issues such as dedicated support to women and children caught up in armed conflicts, though this was envisaged under EDF 10. Similarly, the need to adopt a comprehensive and continental approach to address conflicts, including the regional and transboundary dimensions, was explicitly mentioned in the two EDF 10 Three-Year Action Programmes. The creation of the ERM in 2009 responded to a recommendation from the 2007 Lessons Learned Seminar on the need for a rapidly-disbursed source of funding for prevention activities.

Despite these changes, there was a strong feeling among APF beneficiaries, highlighted during the 2013 Lessons Learned Seminar, that insufficient attention was being provided to conflict prevention, resulting in an over-reliance on possibly unsustainable PSOs. There was also a perception among some seminar participants that there was a disconnect between African and donor peace and security agendas with the Africans supporting conflict prevention, and donors pushing for activities such as counter-terrorism and maritime security which are closely aligned with donor country strategic interests. While counter-terrorism and maritime security also respond to African countries’ needs, the concern expressed was that these shorter-term agendas are distracting attention and resources from longer-term prevention work. There was also a view that there has been an over-emphasis on the military aspects of APSA training, specifically PSO and ASF-related, at the expense of training that would enhance early response and prevention.

More generally, there was consensus among APF beneficiaries that the issue of weak governance, identified as a root cause of African conflicts, has not been sufficiently tackled by the AU and African member states and that there was still too much emphasis on tackling the consequences of conflicts. While there are therefore calls for the APF to “do more”, the APF is currently the only EU instrument that is capable of funding African-led PSOs while there exist a range of other instruments that deal with various aspects of conflict prevention, including mediation (for instance, the RIPs), and post-conflict reconstruction. (See EQ7 for a discussion of division of labour among the tools available to address these issues.)

While APF-funded activities have on the whole, as noted above, focused on short-term responses to armed conflict, there has been an increasing attempt over time to adopt approaches that are more sensitive to conflict prevention and peace-building and to experiment with more novel approaches to addressing conflict.

- For instance, the development of African conflict early warning systems, which has involved strengthening regional early warning systems and the linkages among them and the continental system based in Addis (CEWS), has bolstered African conflict prevention capacity. There is still a long way to go, not least at a political level, to ensure that this system works effectively, but the foundations of the system are now in place.

- Similarly, in recognition that current thinking might not always been consistent with the realities of the African context, the APF also used a novel approach to support mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan. The AU HIP has been process-oriented, has adopted “out-of-the box” thinking, and has drawn upon a global network of experts to experiment with a new approach to peace-making. This approach has been distinct from approaches used in other contexts which have tended to be more prescriptive and sensitive to time limitations.
4.2 EQ 2 on Consistency of Implementation

To what extent has the implementation of APF activities been consistent with the APF design and its underlying principles (African ownership, Africa-EU partnership, and African solidarity), and has the APF evolved in response to changes in the African context and priorities?

This question relates to the evaluation criteria of relevance and sustainability.

It addresses the issue of relevance at the level of APF implementation and examines the extent to which this has been consistent with the overall design, including the work plan and the needs of the key APF beneficiaries - the AU and the RECs/RMs. It also assesses whether the overall resources provided for the APF have been sufficient in relation to programming needs, and takes a view on the sustainability of the instrument.

Recognising that the APF has evolved over time, this EQ also examines whether this evolution has been responsive to changes in both the context and AU and REC/RM priorities. In particular, it assesses how decisions to modify the APF have been made and whether they have been informed by a lesson learning process involving key stakeholders.

The EQ then assesses how effectively the principles of African ownership, African solidarity and the EU-African partnership have been addressed during APF implementation.

**EQ 2 on Consistency of Implementation - Summary of Answer**

APF-supported activities have been consistent with overall programme design and underlying APF principles, though implementation has faced a range of challenges resulting in variable progress in attaining objectives. The APF has nonetheless adapted in a number of important ways to improve its implementation and performance since 2004.

APF implementation has been constrained by weaknesses in beneficiary institutions as well as the limitations in human resource capacity of both the AU and the EU. While programme support has improved over time, the APF is essentially a financial instrument and the tasks of disbursing, managing and accounting for how APF funds are used take up a significant amount of programme management time.

Resourcing levels for the APF have never been sufficient to meet all needs on the ground, particularly in relation to PSOs, and were never intended to do so. In the area of capacity building (such as the APSA support programme) the picture has been more mixed: while the needs are immense, a number of regional organizations have experienced problems in effectively spending available resources.

The APF has evolved significantly since its creation in 2004, on the one hand broadening its focus to encompass new activities and on the other incorporating new mechanisms to improve implementation. This evolution has been driven by lessons identified from past experience, though there is scope for a more systematic approach to lesson learning.

There has been extensive and regular political dialogue between the EU and African stakeholders since the APF's inception to ensure that it responded well to African needs. This has strengthened the Africa-EU partnership and has also given African institutions an enhanced role in management of the APF, but has not been accompanied by sufficient EU monitoring of APF-funded activities at the programme level or technical support for the implementing organisations.
JC 2.1 Consistency of APF implementation with the programme’s objectives and the needs of the target beneficiaries

APF activities have been in line with programme objectives and beneficiaries’ needs, though implementation has faced various challenges stemming from weaknesses in beneficiary institutions and limitations in AU and the EU human resource capacities. While programme support has improved over time, the tasks of disbursing, managing and accounting for how APF funds are used take up a significant amount of programme management time.

The general objective of the APF (which was broadened under the 10th EDF) is “to contribute to peace, stability and security in Africa through targeted support to African efforts at the continental and regional level in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace-building”. The three specific objectives around which APF activities have been organized are: i) to enhance cooperation and dialogue on challenges to peace and security; ii) operationalise APSA; and iii) achieve more sustainable and predictable funding for PSOs.

Consistent with the APF’s focus on African-led peace and security efforts, the priority action areas and needs have been jointly identified by African member states and the EU. Key programming and policy documents were produced in collaboration with the AU and the RECs/RMs. The original Project Outline developed under the 9th EDF and the two Three-Year Action Programmes under the 10th EDF were the outcome of high-level political dialogues between the EU and the AU. Each plan was based on peace and security priorities and recommendations developed jointly by the EU and its African partners.

In addition, in 2010, an APSA Assessment Study was produced by the AUC in conjunction with the RECs, RMs and the European Union, and itself informed the 2011 APSA Roadmap which spells out the priorities for development of APSA. APF support for 2011-13, notably the €40m APSA Support Programme was aligned with the 2011 APSA Roadmap. Monitoring of ERM activities (of which 14 have been financed during 2010-12, 13 of which were mediation-related) has been limited, but AU narrative reports indicate that these activities have been consistent both with ERM objectives and APF objectives as a whole.

While spending under all three components has reflected overall APF objectives and beneficiaries’ needs, the development of programming – and programme support – has been slow to cater for the deep-seated institutional weaknesses within the AU and the RECs/RMs which constrain efforts to deliver peace and security services. This was not for lack of recognition at the APF’s outset of the AU’s and the RECs/RMs’ institutional weaknesses and the need to bolster programme management capacity, for instance by establishing PMUs in both the AU and certain RECs/RMs. But in practice, these PMUs – where they have been established – have also faced challenges in working effectively (see EQ 8 for further discussion of this).

In the meantime, extensive funding has been provided for activities which the relevant institutions have not always been adequately capacitated to deliver. This problem was noted early on: programme documentation for the €20 million AUC/REC Capacity Building programme (2007-10) identifies a “slow and significantly varying implementation rate of the capacity building programmes” as an important constraint on the ability of African organisations to benefit from APF CB support. Both of the two 10th EDF Three-Year Action Programmes indicate that weak institutional capacity remains an important constraint on


African peace and security activities. The same problems were reported at the outset of the 2011-13 APSA programme. The relative weakness of the APSA has in turn hampered African efforts to respond effectively to conflicts and security problems.

As noted above, the issue has not been lack of recognition of the huge institutional challenges facing the AU and RECs/RMs, but rather the immense scale of the capacity building challenge at hand and the limited impact which APF resources can have. The APF only contributes roughly 10% of the overall donor support being provided for APSA development. The fact that APF programme management is largely centralized in Brussels, combined with the relatively small size of the Brussels-based APF team and the immense pressures to disburse large sums of money has limited the practical support that can be provided for monitoring, evaluation and technical advice on the ground.

JC2.2 Adequacy of APF financial resources in relation to the programming objectives and needs on the ground (in addition, see JCs 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3)

Resourcing levels for the APF have never been sufficient to meet all needs on the ground, particularly in relation to PSOs, but they were never intended to do so. In areas which relate to longer-term capacity building (such as the APSA support programme) the picture has been more mixed: while the needs are immense, a number of regional organizations have experienced problems in effectively spending available resources. The financial challenges facing the APF have therefore not simply been about having sufficient funds in absolute terms, but also the ability of beneficiaries to obtain these funds in a timely manner and to ‘absorb’ them effectively.

APF spending priorities since 2004 have been consistent with the priorities identified in the original Project Outline for the APF and the two 10th EDF Three-year Action Programmes. These in turn have reflected the priorities identified in the Partnership on Peace and Security in the 1st and 2nd Joint EU-Africa Strategy, and this was confirmed also by the 2011 APSA Roadmap. In practice, though, the funding requirements for PSOs in particular have been significantly higher than what was first anticipated in 2004.

PSOs have absorbed approximately 90% of APF funding since 2004. Concerns about how to sustain this level of spending, if not to increase it, as well as to ensure that this does not squeeze out funding for the Capacity Building and ERM components were identified as a concern early on by the 2006 Mid-Term review. This has been a persistent theme in JCC meetings, the APSA Assessment, and interviews with stakeholders.

Even though the APF has provided an important share of PSO funding, including a significant portion of funding for AMIS, approximately 1/3 of funds for AMISOM, and 40-50% of MICOPAX funds, there have remained funding constraints for all operations. The 2010 APSA Assessment Study reported that both AMIS and AMISOM nevertheless “encountered serious financial and logistics shortfalls which seriously limited their ability to implement their mandates.” The situation remained the same in early 2013, both in Somalia and CAR where changes in the security situation since 2012 (improvement in Somalia, and degradation in CAR) have increased the demand on the PSOs and the pressure on resources.

Because it was never envisaged that the EU would be the sole contributor to the APF, institutional arrangements have been put into place to facilitate direct contributions by African


states. In practice, supplementary contributions from African states have been very limited and this is a significant concern regarding the long-term sustainability of APF-financed peace and security activities and institutional capacities within the AU and RECs/RMs (see EQ 5).

Views among APF stakeholders differ on how best APF resources should be allocated among the three components, but there is broad consensus on the importance of continued (and even increased) funding both for PSOs and the APF more generally given pressing, immediate security challenges on the ground. Activities funded under the ERM (which have been most in support of mediation) have been a good case in point – while the €17M earmarked for the ERM under the two 10th EDF Action Plans, out of which €15M has been contracted, have not been fully used up, there is considerable potential (and need) for increased funding of activities through this mechanism. This is consistent with the broadening of the APF to encompass conflict prevention activities and the critical need for Africa to find ways to more effectively manage its political crises so that they do not become violent.

JC2.3 Responsiveness of the APF to the context in which it has been implemented and the changing needs and priorities of the AU and RECs/RMs

The APF instrument has evolved significantly since its creation in 2004, on the one hand broadening its focus to encompass new activities and on the other incorporating new mechanisms to improve the efficiency of implementation. This evolution has been driven in large part by lessons identified from past experience, though there is scope for a more systematic approach to lesson learning.

Key policy and programming documents underscore the importance of evaluating progress and lesson learning within the APF and make provisions for this to be integrated into the programme cycle. The original Project Outline and the two Three Year Action Programmes under the 10th EDF make reference to the importance of lesson learning, noting that “joint “lessons learned” exercises on APF implementation should be held systematically”. A financial allocation was made for audit, monitoring, evaluation technical assistance and lessons learned activities (7m euro during the 2004-06 and 2007-10 periods respectively and 6m euro during 2011-13). This is in line with the requirements of art 12(f) of the 10th EDF Implementing Regulation which require periodic reviews of APF performance. The Description of the Action for the ERM provides for a review one year after implementation began and for audit missions to be organised by the Commission financial services.

In practice, there has been willingness on the part of the EU, the AU and REC/RMs to refine the APF strategy in various ways and develop new tools in view of enhancing the efficiency of the instrument and increasing its flexibility. In 2007, a two-day Lessons Learned workshop was held in Djibouti bringing together key APF stakeholders and which gave rise to a series of recommendations and lessons to inform the next phase of APF development:

- The scope of AFP activities was formally broadened to include upstream conflict prevention and downstream reconstruction and peace-building activities.
- The Early Response Mechanism (ERM) approved in 2009 is a response to the drawn-out approval process required to disburse funding for activities which by their nature required rapid action. The new ERM endowed the AU and the RECs with a source of immediately available funds for the first stages of these activities.

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The new APF Technical Assistance Service Contract initiated in 2010-11 is a response to problems faced by former AIDCO/C6 in recruiting external technical assistants. The new approach enables the recruitment of experts with a better professional profile, without formal budgetary limitations, and in a quick and flexible manner.

The APSA Support Programme identified problems with earlier APF funded capacity building activities. In order to improve implementation, an implementation manual was developed and other actions specified to improve performance.

Two significant Aide Memoires produced in 2009 and 2011 respectively took stock of the status of AU-EU cooperation and proposed measures to address challenges (particularly in terms of financial management) confronting the APF, and improve this cooperation.

While there has been significant reflection to learn from experiences, most APF programmes do not incorporate adequate structures and procedures to allow for systematic monitoring and external evaluations and reviews have been inconsistent. There have been no clear guidelines either within the EU or African institutions for lesson learning, and it has not occurred in a systematic manner.

Three long-term experts (one covering Capacity Building programmes, one AMISOM and one MICOPAX) are in place with dual roles to provide technical assistance and monitor activities. They provide one form of “on-the-spot monitoring” which is valuable, but are not always on the ground where activities occur and would ideally be supplemented, where possible, by support from an EU Delegation. One key reason is that fulfilling an advisory role, which is enhanced by having a very close relationship with the organisation (AU, REC or RM) in question, may not sit comfortably with also having to monitor it and report back on problems to the EU.

The initial APF Project Outline (2004) indicates that ‘Evaluations will be conducted on each Peace Support Operation funded. The capacity building component…will be subject to a mid-term review and a final evaluation after completion of this component.’ However, only financial audits were carried out on AMIS, MAES and AMISEC – no formal evaluations.19

MICOPAX (since it evolved from FOMUC in 2008) has been evaluated three times by a joint AU-EU mission. There has also been constant monitoring at the administrative and financial level. The last joint evaluation in 2012 notes that previous recommendations in relation to programme management have not been applied.

AMISOM, like MICOPAX, has been subject to regular auditing (essentially financial in nature) and has been internally reviewed several times by the AU itself. In addition, the UN/AU have conducted several comprehensive reviews of AMISOM though these reviews are not publicly available.

An institutional memory of APF activities has existed within the Commission APF Unit, the AU and REC/RMs, but the quality and accessibility of these databases appeared to vary tremendously. Guidelines for capturing, storing and sharing data between relevant APF stakeholders did not exist. In particular, there has been a relatively weak base of programme documentation relating to the monitoring and assessment of APF activities, and reporting back to the EU by African stakeholders on programme performance.

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JC2.4 Delivery of EU support in a manner which has reinforced African ownership and solidarity, and the EU-African partnership

There has been extensive and regular political dialogue between the EU and African stakeholders from the inception of the APF to ensure that it responded well to African needs. This has strengthened both the Africa-EU partnership and given African institutions an enhanced role in management of the APF, but has not been accompanied by adequate EU monitoring of or programme support for APF activities.

The notion that African peace and security need to be addressed through African-owned and led initiatives in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution is a central theme in both EU and APF policy documents. The original Project Outline and the first two Three-Year Action Programmes were based on peace and security priorities developed jointly by the EU and its African partners as reflected in the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Joint AU-EU APF management procedures, including the annual Joint Coordinating Committee meetings and the holding of periodic APSA Steering Committee meetings, have provided a framework for regular policy and political dialogue.

Various programming mechanisms developed by the APF support enhanced African ownership, including the JFA on Support to the Employment of AUC Personnel Working in PSD which gives the AUC full responsibility for managing recruitment; the implementation procedures of the APSA Support Programme which ensure activities are implemented under the direct responsibility of the units concerned at AUC and RECs/RMs respectively; and the JFA for Support to AU LOs which applies AU rules and regulations covering financial management, employment regulation and recruitment.

The Mid-term review (2006) did note “differences in understanding between the EU and the AU actors, of what partnership implies in practice and what each ‘owes’ the other. Information flows, financial reporting, APF management and degrees of involvement in consultation and decision making are key points of divergence”. The findings from this evaluation confirm, however, that there has been significant convergence in these key areas in recent years.

Despite the evident strengths of the joint Africa-EU partnership, this has not automatically translated into equal input into decision-making or agreement on priorities. The 2010 APSA Assessment Study reports that “questions have been asked about the extent to which the high reliance on partner support undermines the principle of ownership.” The 2011-13 Action Plan itself notes that “the political dialogue has intensified significantly, but more could be done…to reach common positions and to implement common approaches to challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally.”

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4.3 EQ 3 on Dialogue and Cooperation

To what extent has dialogue and cooperation among the principal African and EU APF stakeholders with respect to understanding and addressing the challenges to peace and security in Africa been enhanced?

This question relates to the evaluation criteria of **effectiveness** and **sustainability**.

It addresses the sustainability and effectiveness of the APF actions undertaken in support of the first Priority Action outlined in the JAES. This relates to efforts to enhance dialogue and cooperation on challenges to peace and security at two levels: first, between the EU and its key African partners at the level of both the AU and the REC/RMs; and second, between the key APF African stakeholders.

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**EQ 3 on Dialogue and Cooperation - Answer Summary Box**

The APF has significantly enhanced dialogue and cooperation on peace and security issues between African and EU partners and between the AU and the RECs/RMs. Much of this interaction revolves around improving financial management, however. The APF has not benefitted sufficiently from wider policy discussions on how to achieve more effective joint responses to crisis situations.

Dialogue between African and EU stakeholders has increased over the lifetime of the APF as a consequence of regular consultations both at political and working levels. EU/AU dialogue and cooperation which the APF has facilitated around addressing the Somali crisis has made a particularly important contribution to strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership.

At the level of the AU and the RECs/RMs, dialogue and cooperation around addressing peace and security issues have been facilitated by the decision to channel APF funds to the RECs through the African Union. This has contributed to enhanced cooperation and consultations between these bodies though there has remained a lack of consensus on the principle of subsidiarity and the specific roles and responsibilities of each actor in responding to crisis situations. This has constrained the AU and the RECs/RMs in their attempts to develop joint responses to specific crises and conflict situations.

The urgent need to develop exit strategies for APF-funded PSOs has become accepted by EU and African partners. However, there has been a cautious approach in defining options for exit strategies. This may be explained by the complex and rapidly evolving political context where these PSOs have been deployed, and the fact that foreign policy considerations of African and European member states are key in determining what is possible.

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**JC 3.1 Contribution of APF actions to enhancing dialogue and cooperation on peace and security issues between African and EU stakeholders**

Dialogue between African and EU stakeholders has increased and become more structured over the lifetime of the APF as a consequence of regular consultations both at political and working levels. The establishment of the APF instrument has led to the holding of regular meetings and the creation of an APF Joint Coordination Committee (JCC). Since the first meeting of the JCC in 2005, there have been eight annual meetings co-chaired by the AU Commission and relevant EU Directorate-Generals. The JCC has served as a forum for assessing progress and challenges with regard to APF implementation. While there have been a number of joint AU/EU evaluations and assessments missions, thus far these have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis.
After the embedding of the APF instrument in the broader Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Joint Consultative Meetings between the Political and Security Committee of the EU and the Peace and Security Council of the AU were organised to address the need to strengthen political dialogue. Six of these meetings have been organised since 2008, taking place alternatively in Brussels and Addis Ababa, and have been a convening base for senior political level actors in Africa and Europe. In addition, there have been regular video teleconferencing sessions between the Chairs of the AU and EU Peace and Security Councils as well as the convening of regular EU-Africa summits at which a broad range of development and security issues have been discussed.

Consultations and meetings on the situation in Somalia as well as on the role of AMISOM have made a significant contribution to the increased dialogue and cooperation between African and EU Stakeholders. 91% of APF funds have been allocated to PSOs over the evaluation period\(^\text{21}\). This support has triggered increased consultations and cooperation between EU stakeholders (especially the Commission) and African partners. The AMISOM mission in Somalia illustrates this trend:

- African and EU stakeholders have come together more regularly to discuss issues relating to Somalia and AMISOM. Monthly African Union Partners’ Group (AUPG) meetings in Addis and Somalia, donor meetings in Nairobi as well as coordination meetings in Brussels have brought together APF stakeholders (including other partners e.g. UN) to discuss political, operational and financial management issues.
- A working group on the AMISOM operation has brought AMISOM partners and the AU together in monthly meetings in Addis.
- In addition, a number of lessons learned workshops on Somalia have provided forums for interaction and collaboration between APF stakeholders alongside others.
- One forum, which has systematised such interaction and collaboration is the Joint Security Committee (JSC) established under the Djibouti agreement, which has harmonized the work of the Government of Somalia and the international community in support of Somalia’s national security institutions. Membership of the JSC is drawn from AMISOM, the UN Political Office for Somalia and other international actors including the EU, IGAD and the League of Arab States.

Originally a “stand-alone” instrument, the APF was embedded in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in December 2007. Dialogue between the APF stakeholders has nonetheless continued to take place largely at a technical level, dominated by issues of financial management, as a result of which there has been less opportunity to engage with the complex political and policy challenges that shape and constrain joint responses to crisis situations in Africa. Although the JCC meetings do engage with some of these broader political issues which impact on APF activities, these issues tend to be addressed in other fora. In the work undertaken by the EUSR for the Horn, APF stakeholders have been engaged in these discussions, though this is not always the case.

The heavy emphasis placed on technical discussions, particularly around financial issues, can in part be explained by the initial experience of AMIS. Weak AU control over the disbursement, accounting and reporting of field personnel allowances resulted in a high rate of ineligible expenditures\(^\text{22}\), raising concerns within the EU. Accordingly, the Commission has since placed great emphasis on financial management issues, though this has to an extent

\(^{21}\) In terms of amounts contracted.

\(^{22}\) According to the final AMIS auditing report, balance of ineligible funds vis-à-vis the EU amounted to more than 5.5 million euros.
squeezed out discussion on key policy issues relating to APSA implementation and to peace and security out of the dialogue.

That said, there has been a trend of increased APF support for dialogue at higher political levels with the strengthening of the Partnership between the EU and Africa. Relevant examples of this include the support given to the AU High Level Implementation Panel under the Chairmanship of former President Mbeki and the Joint Security Committees which have brought together representatives from AMISOM, the UN Political Office for Somalia and other international partners.

**JC 3.2 Contribution of APF actions to enhancing dialogue and cooperation on peace and security issues between the AU and RECs/RMs**

Dialogue and cooperation between the AU and RECs/RMs in the field of peace and security has improved over the evaluation period and the APF has made a significant contribution to this trend. In 2008, the AU and all of the RECs/RMs (with the exception of the Arab Maghreb Union) signed a Memorandum of Understanding reaffirming their commitment to the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent and recognizing the need for closer collaboration between the AU and RECs/RMs to address conflict prevention, management and resolution. The AU PSD staff member charged with overseeing implementation of this MoU has been funded by the APF through the JFA salary scheme. Furthermore, the APF has contributed to enhancing dialogue and cooperation between the AU and the regional organisations in five key ways:

- **First,** by channelling the funds for the APSA support programme that were destined for the RECs/RMs through the AU. This has facilitated efforts by the AU and the RECs/RMs to speak to each other and to work together. The APSA support programme has placed particular emphasis on developing procedures to guide the collaboration between the AU and the RECs/RMs, and this has had positive effects. An Implementation Agreement was signed between the AU and the RECs/RMs and a Programme Manual was drafted to guide their collaboration. This *modus operandi* has also generated tensions on occasion, particularly between the AU and RECs/RMs that have not been performing so well. But these tensions have not necessarily been counter-productive as they have resulted in a closer engagement between the parties in order to resolve problems (see EQ6 for further information on this point).

- **Second,** by funding the establishment of RECs/RMs Liaison Offices at the AUC, and the AU Liaison Offices in RECs. Even though the performance of these Liaison Offices has been variable, overall they have been key to facilitating dialogue between the AU and the RECs/RMs. This was notably true for the AU Liaison Officers based in francophone regional organisations.

- **Third,** by funding the establishment of AU Liaison Offices in countries affected by or emerging from crisis and conflict. These offices have not only provided a means for the AU to monitor the situation on the ground, but have also played a representational and public diplomacy role to enhance the visibility of the AU in these countries.

- **Fourth,** by funding interventions designed to increase dialogue and practical cooperation between the AU and the RECs/RMs. This was the case, for example, of capacity building activities with a continent-wide focus such as those which involve Early Warning and the African Standby Force – both of which are key to operationalising APSA.

- **Fifth,** through the funding of PSOs which has strengthened partnerships between RECs and the AU, especially when these were AU-led. The involvement of Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti in joint AMISOM operations has favoured cooperation between these IGAD countries and also with the AU in addressing pressing security challenges in the Horn. APF support to AFISMA, which is jointly AU-ECOWAS led, has also facilitated
cooperation between the two bodies though there was an initial period of tension between the two organisations over leadership of the operation. Close cooperation between the AU and RECs is thus not always the norm, further illustrated by the MICOPAX operation in CAR which ECCAS has taken the lead in managing.

But this increased dialogue and cooperation has had limitations and, as a consequence, attempts to develop joint responses by the AU and RECs to specific crisis and conflict situations have often encountered obstacles. Despite commitments by the AU and the RECs/RMs to contribute to full APSA operationalisation, APSA development has remained at an embryonic stage. There has been limited coordination – even information sharing – between APSA components (for further information, see EQ4 on the operationalisation of APSA). Furthermore, the divides between regional and continental levels have only slowly begun to be bridged, notably with the strengthening of linkages between the PSC-like structures, where they have existed or been established in the regional organisations, and their AU counterpart.

These limitations stem partly from constraints in time and resources, but the real challenge has been a political one which is well illustrated by the discussion on subsidiarity. While the RECs/RMs have appeared to recognize and accept the principle of subsidiarity in their relationship with the AU, there has been less clarity on its application in practical terms. The reality is that establishment of some of the regional organisations predates that of the AU, and a number have been actively involved in managing crises in their regions for some time. In addition, their constituent states have fought to keep a tight control over peace and security issues in their regions, as illustrated by the political crises in Mali, CAR and Madagascar.

The slow pace of APSA operationalisation and the lack of consensus between the AU and RECs/RMs on the practical implications of the subsidiarity principle are factors that have constrained development of joint AU/regional responses to specific crises and conflict situations over the evaluation period. For example, there were strong differences of views between SADC and the AU on who should lead in mediating a solution to the political crisis in Madagascar. Similarly, ECOWAS felt aggrieved by the decision that the AFISMA mission, which was taking place in its back-yard, should be jointly led with the AU. More recently, the AU and ECCAS have had diverging views with respect to how to respond to the unconstitutional change of government in CAR in early 2013.

**JC 3.3 Development of an ‘exit strategy’ for African PSOs funded under the APF**

Although the need for exit strategies has become widely accepted, there has been a cautious approach in defining and agreeing strategies for PSOs funded by the APF. This can in part be explained by the complexity and fluidity of the political contexts in which PSOs have been deployed. There has been growing awareness in recent years on the critical need to develop exit strategies for APF-funded PSOs. When the APF was initially designed, there was an assumption - both in African and European thinking - that the UN would take over these PSOs, if required, once they were up and running. The experience of the past ten years, particularly in relation to AMISOM, has led to recognition by APF stakeholders that a UN re-hatting is far from a straightforward process. Despite growing attention to this issue by APF stakeholders, there has been mixed success in developing exit strategies for APF-funded PSOs as illustrated by the cases of AMIS, AMISOM, MICOPAX and, more recently, AFISMA.

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23 Such as the COMESA Committee on Peace and Security, the ECCAS Council for Peace and Security (COPAX), ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, or the Peace Council recently established by CEN-SAD.
- AMIS was the first of two (with AFISMA being the other) APF-funded PSOs to be transmuted into a UN operation (UNAMID). The transition faced obstacles, and AMIS’ mandate had to be extended twice, in 2006 and 2007, before the mission could be re-hatted. Even though the UN Peace and Security Council had authorised a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, it had to pass a second resolution removing the use of sanctions and creating a “hybrid” AU/UN operation before it could be deployed.

- In the case of AMISOM, the shifting political and security situation on the ground has turned the exit strategy into a “moving target”. When AMISOM was established in 2006, it has the limited objective of regaining control over Somali territory. But this goal then changed to installing a stable government to prevent a relapse of armed conflict. This gave rise to a more ambitious state-building agenda, involving training of the Somali security forces and the rebuilding of state institutions, tasks which would normally correspond well with the mandate for UN PSOs. However, there has been a lack of agreement among EU Member States on whether the UN should step in. Conditions on the ground in early 2013, with Al Shabab continuing to pose a serious threat, have also militated against a change in the status of the mission.

- MICOPAX is the only PSO that has been managed by a REC, namely ECCAS. Despite the stabilising effect of the MICOPAX in the areas where it had been deployed, ECCAS member states decided in 2011 that there was diminishing utility in maintaining the mission and opted to withdraw their troops from CAR within two years. The view of the joint AU/EU monitoring missions which assessed MICOPAX in 2011 and 2012 was that the exit plan - which was to replace MICOPAX units with CAR army units - was not feasible given political and security realities. In the event, this proved true. Armed rebels attacked government forces in late 2012 and, despite a January 2013 peace agreement, seized power in March following a break-down in negotiations. ECCAS Heads of States revised the MICOPAX mandate to allow for the continuation of the mission with the support of a Chadian interposition force.

- AFISMA illustrates yet another scenario. The French intervention in Northern Mali in early 2013, in support of Malian security forces, helped to restore the security situation in Mali and stabilise the government’s control of the country. However, this left largely unresolved a wider, regional threat posed by extremist and terrorist elements seeking shelter in the northern part of Mali and in neighbouring countries, which was also of particular concern to European countries. In this context, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the re-hatting of AFISMA to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which assumed operation on 1 July 2013.

APF experiences to date suggest that there are no templates for developing exit strategies and that context very much determines what is possible. Moreover, development of an exit strategy for a PSO is a highly political undertaking. There is a limited amount which the APF itself, which is essentially a financial instrument, can do to create the conditions for exit strategies to emerge. Ultimately, the four cases above illustrate that foreign policy considerations of both African and European member states in particular, but also of the EU and other UN members, were central in making exits for AMIS and AFISMA possible.
4.4 EQ 4 on Operationalising APSA

To what extent has the African Peace and Security Architecture been operationalised at regional and continental levels, and are the key structures for managing conflict and peace-building functioning effectively?

This question relates to the evaluation criterion of **effectiveness**.

The EQ examines APF actions undertaken in support of the second and third Priority Actions of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, at three levels:

- First, as they relate to strengthening the core capacities of the relevant departments within the AU and the RECs/RMs which are responsible for peace and security;
- Second, as they relate to operationalising APSA, including the strengthening of its core structures and mechanisms and emerging cross-cutting and thematic agendas;
- Third, with regard to the preparation, deployment and conduct of African peace support operations.

In particular, this question assesses the key results of these APF-supported activities with respect to these two Priority Actions, including any unintended ones, and compares these to the intended results.

**EQ 4 on Operationalising APSA - Answer Summary Box**

*Although the APF has only provided a small percentage of overall international support for APSA, it has contributed significantly to enhancing AU PSD’s capacity, particularly in the area of financial management. Development of the capacity of the RECs/RMs and of the key APSA conflict prevention structures has been more uneven with significant achievements registered in some areas, while others are still work-in-progress.*

Since 2004, the APF has provided significant support aimed at strengthening core capacities for financial, programme and human resource management as well as the development of technical expertise on peace and security matters in APSA institutions. While AU PSD has benefited most from these capacity building programmes, particularly in the area of financial management, the record of institutional capacity building has been more mixed among the RECs/RMs. Serious APF capacity building support began only under EDF10 and progress has been slow and uneven.

Progress in relation to the core APSA structures has been uneven across the structures and between APSA’s continental and regional levels. APF funding has been key to unlocking the political potential of the AU PSC, enabling it authorise important collective security actions in response to crisis. The various parts of the APSA machinery, including the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and the Africa Standby Forces have all benefitted from technical enhancements made possible by APF funding, though variable political commitment by African Member States to using these instruments has slowed institutional development.

The APF has progressively contributed, since 2004, to enhancing the effectiveness of African-led PSOs through support for financial management, in particular. This support has produced valuable lessons which have been applied to subsequent PSOs, though the recent experience of AFISMA confirms that despite efforts to strengthen PSO planning in the AU and the RECs/RMs planning remains hobbled by wider institutional weaknesses.*
JC 4.1 The APF’s contribution to the strengthening of core institutional capacities in the AU PSD and in RECs/RMs

Since 2004, the APF has provided significant support aimed at strengthening core capacities for financial, programme and human resource management as well as the development of technical expertise on peace and security matters in both the AU and RECs/RMs. The initial focus of APF capacity building support was the AU. There have been four capacity contribution agreements with the AU under the EDF9 and EDF10. The first, a €6 million contribution agreement, focussed exclusively on the AU PSD. The subsequent capacity building programmes (for €7.5 million, €20 million and the €40 million APSA Support Programme) have provided assistance to the AU and RECs/RMs. The focus was on strengthening: 1) PSD capacity to implement elements of the Peace and Security Protocol; 2) AU/REC/RM planning capacity for PSOs and the African Standby Force; 3) AU/REC/RM financial and administrative capacity; and 4) critical P&S infrastructure.

The APF also financed a study to identify the long-term P&S needs of the AU and the RECs/RMs which was being updated as this evaluation was conducted. A Training Centres Programme was inaugurated in 2012 to provide a range of training needs for the ASF. Collectively, these programmes have enabled the PSD and RECs/RMs to hire staff, develop some systems and procedures, undertake training, and purchase equipment necessary to operationalise APSA. The APF has also helped improve communication between the AU and the RECs/RMs through the financing of Liaison Offices.

The AU PSD has benefited most from these capacity building programmes. Significant progress has been achieved in all areas, particularly financial management. Nonetheless the AUC has faced a range of serious institutional challenges which have slowed APSA operationalisation over the timeframe of the APF. Overall, APF funding, along with similar support from other donors, has enabled the AUC to become a serious player in the P&S arena by allowing the PSD to hire staff and strengthen certain critical functions such as financial management and PSO-related planning. P&S programme management has received some limited support (including long-term technical assistance and various institutional reviews) but has remained in need of strengthening. The accent on financial management grew out of the need to ensure that APF finances were well-managed following problems encountered in managing AMIS finances. (Specific activities undertaken by the APF and the EU more generally to build the PSD’s capacity to manage P&S finances are discussed in the Box on the next page)

The progress recorded to date has been tempered by several important institutional challenges. First, AUC staff recruitment has been constrained by the Maputo structure, which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through the regular AU budget. This, in turn, has limited the sustainability, predictability and flexibility of investments by the APF and other donors in APSA. Second, the AUC has provided the PSD with inadequate support in terms of financial management, human resources, and administration. While the APF and other donors have been able to assist PSD in building up adequate capacity to manage P&S finances, at least in the short term, weaknesses in other core functions, particularly human resource management, have created significant problems for APF-financed activities in terms of their ability to hire staff with the appropriate experience and expertise in a timely fashion. Because systems for personnel reviews have also been weak, the PSD may not have used its available human resources to maximum effectiveness. The Evaluation Team found no evidence of a comprehensive capacity building plan for P&S functions of the AUC.
When the EU first provided APF funding to the AU for the AMIS, it was generally assumed that the AU had adequate capacity to manage PSO financing, although the initial CB programme from 2004 included a modest amount of support for the AU PSD’s finance division (5 posts). Audit results and a four-pillar assessment (accounting, external audit, internal controls and procurement) quickly uncovered significant gaps in the AU’s financial management capacity, in part due to the heavy demands of managing financing large PSOs (APF support for AMISOM having begun in 2007) but largely to a lack of systems, procedures and staff. This led, among other things, to multi–million Euro recovery orders for ineligible expenditures on AMIS.

The AU was not in a position to finance these ineligible expenditures and waiving them was a politically sensitive issue for the EU. It was clear to both sides that the capacity of the AU to manage PSO finances had to improve and together they took a number of steps designed to improve the financial management capacity of the AU.

While capacity development remains a work in progress, the success achieved to date is due to several factors: 1) Commitment of the AUC to strengthening its ability to manage APF funding; 2) Willingness of the EU (and other donors) to finance a significant number of positions in the PSD Finance Division (PSDF); 3) Use of audit reports and the four-pillar assessment as learning tools by the PSDF; 4) Technical assistance, both long and short term, financed by the APF that has been instrumental in assisting PSDF in finding solutions to financial management problems, such as ineligible expenditures; 5) Increasingly active role of the EU Delegation to the AU in working with the AU PSD to monitor APF financed activities on a day to day basis; 6) Two Aides Memoire between the AU and EU (2009 and 2011) that served both as a mechanism for strengthening AUC financial management in the area of P&S and as a vehicle for dialogue between on a range of issues relating to APSA operationalisation.

By the time this evaluation began in late 2012, the AUC had made significant strides in strengthening financial management and providing support to the REC/RMs in financial management. AU PSD was very close to passing the four-pillar assessment, new procedures had been implemented to reduce ineligible PSO expenditures, an APSA Support Programme implementation manual had been produced, training for REC/RM financial and programme managers was taking place, REC/RMs were being monitored and PSDF was providing support to ECOWAS for AFISMA financial management.

Efforts to further strengthen AU financial management capacity are essential for a number of reasons. First, AU resources for P&S are constrained and all available resources need to be used as efficiently and effectively as possible. Second, AU P&S activities are heavily dependent on external sources of funding. Donors want to know that their support is used in an effective and accountable manner. Third, the AU signs contribution agreements with the EU also on behalf of the RECs/RMs. It is hence both responsible vis-a-vis the EU for monitoring the activities of the REC/RMs and solely accountable for the management of EU/APF funds by RECs/RMs. This involves providing technical support to RECs/RMs on implementing APSA and Training Centre allocations as well as sanctioning RECs/RMs if resources are mismanaged. To carry out these functions, the AU itself needs adequate and appropriate human, financial and technical capacity within its own financial management system.

The record of institutional capacity building has been more mixed among the RECs/RMs. Serious APF capacity building support began only under EDF10 and progress has been uneven. Each REC/RM has its own capacity building trajectory and the operationalisation of APSA has taken different forms for each organisation, although there have been some common trends. A good deal of the capacity building support received by RECs/RMs has been to enable them to carry out activities related to operationalising APSA (see JC4.2 below.) Relatively little of this capacity building support has involved strengthening core institutional capacity for financial or programme management, human resources and the like, and many of the RECs/RMs have had serious deficits in these areas.

Where capacity development has occurred, it has been primarily in the area of financial management and primarily focussed on the ability of the REC/RM or, in a few cases, the training institution to manage APF finances. Some of this capacity development has been provided by the AU through the APSA Support Programme. The RECs/RMs that already had
a good level of financial management capacity have, unsurprisingly, been able to make the best use of this support, underscoring the importance of having a strong institutional foundation to maximise the effective use of APF resources. EASF, for example, has been reasonably successful at absorbing APF funding because of its strong ability to manage finances. In contrast, the AU suspended APSA Support Programme funding to ECCAS in late 2012 because of problems with its financial management system.

The RECs/RMs have not generally received the sort of support from regional EU Delegations that the AU has received from the EU Delegation in Addis, though one exception is ECOWAS which has benefitted from support to mount and manage the AFISMA operation. To a large extent, this reflects the fact that the mandates are different: the EU Delegation to the AU has a very specific mandate to support AU capacity building. As part of this task, the Delegation has been helping to manage the two JFA’s, with full management to be devolved to the EU Delegation to the AU by 2014. As discussed in EQ5, RECs/RMs, and in some cases training institutions, have experienced difficulties in accessing APF funding – partly as a consequence of capacity limitations - and this has reduced the predictability and effective use of APF funding.

The RECs/RMs themselves have faced a number of institutional challenges that have impeded operationalisation of APSA. First, P&S, including APSA, has been embedded in the work of the RECs/RMs to varying degrees ranging from it being an integral part of SADC’s work to a much less central part of the work of EAC and COMESA. Second, RECs/RMs have had varying capacities to generate their own resources, with many of them experiencing difficulties in finding resources for activities mandated by their Member States. Third, some RECs/RMs have taken administrative decisions that have constrained their ability to absorb donor funding. ECOWAS, for example, has frozen hiring of new staff until a previous irregularity in staff recruitment has been resolved.

Overall, the results of APF efforts to enhance the capacity of both the AUC and RECs/RMs in the area of peace and security have been mixed, and there have been a number of unintended consequences. In considering the APF’s track record of support for building core AU/REC/RM institutional capacities in the area of P&S, three points stand out. First, AU PSD capacity (which has been the core APF priority under the first Capacity Building programme of the 9th EDF) has been significantly increased, though in some ways to a greater degree than rest of AUC. There was a concern expressed on various occasions during the evaluation that this has enhanced the political profile and clout of the PSD at the expense of the Department of Political Affairs and skewed the AUC’s approach to crisis management. Second, progress has been much slower at the REC/RM level and has often been constrained by wider institutional problems which have not been adequately anticipated by the APF or strategically addressed as part of a wider donor strategy for capacity building (including the EU/APF itself). Third, as a consequence, the different pillars of APSA have developed at a very uneven pace, making it more difficult to harmonise, streamline and implement P&S actions at a continental level.

JC 4.2 The APF’s contribution to the reinforcement of the core APSA structures and the emergence of new cross-cutting and thematic agendas.

The APF has made an important contribution – along with other donors – to reinforcing the core APSA structures, but progress has been uneven across the APSA as seen most notably with regard to the linkages between the various structures and between APSA’s continental and regional levels. APSA’s underlying rationale is that its constituent parts will systematically work together to enable the AU to undertake structural conflict prevention and, where this fails, to manage escalating conflicts so that they do not develop into larger crises. Article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the Union recognises that in certain instances these objectives must be pursued through military intervention/use of force, particularly where other options fail. APF funding has assisted the AU and RECs/RMs in
developing certain ASPA structures, the main ones being: 1) AU Peace and Security Council; 2) Continental Early Warning System; 3) Panel of the Wise; and 4) African Standby Force.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) confers the political authority of AU Member States on the work of APSA components. Its role is to authorise and oversee AU peace and security processes and activities. The PSC has benefited from APF support through the AUC PSC Secretariat. APF funding has been crucial in unlocking the PSC’s political potential and allowing the AU to undertake real collective political and security actions in response to crisis. Within the first few years of its establishment, the PSC had “become an internationally recognised and accepted element” of the APSA. This level of activism has not been so evident in recent years, which has resulted in waning enthusiasm among African Member States for the operationalisation of APSA.

Of all the APSA components, early warning most reflects the necessity of connecting activities/operations at continental and regional levels. The recognition that robust early warning at the regional level will enhance overall conflict prevention has underscored the role of RECs as the building blocks of APSA. At the continental level, CEWS has developed considerably with APF providing salary support for CEWS and EW activities including quarterly coordination meetings, which have contributed to strengthening intra-component linkages. Similar progress has been made by ECOWAS, IGAD and to a certain extent SADC, where APF support has been less steady. In the RECs where EW has been well developed, there has been consistent process of data collection and analysis and a degree of collaboration with CEWS, including, for example, through a software licensing agreement and increased expertise and analytical skills among CEWS and RECs EW staff.

Despite this progress, several factors have slowed its operationalisation. First has been the uneven and slow development of the EWS within RECs. While CEWS, ECOWARN and CEWARN have made tangible progress, particularly with data collection and reporting, other RECs are yet to do this effectively. Initially ECCAS made good progress in EW, but resources were reallocated by ECCAS management and capacity has diminished in recent years. Second has been the lack of consensus about what the concept of early warning entails. The AU and some RECs have opted for an open source approach while others (e.g. SADC) have opted for a closed state-centric system, akin to intelligence gathering. This has made it difficult to harmonise EW across the continent. Third, even where there has been evidence of effective data collection, analysis and reporting, there has been no clear and convincing evidence that this has consistently influenced decision-makers and informed their actions in conflict situations.

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) has been APSA’s institutionalised support for its EW and conflict prevention work but the effectiveness of the AU PoW and similar REC structures has been called into question in several ways. First, while a number of RECs have also created similar structures, there is limited synergy between them and the AU PoW given the absence of institutionalised linkages. This has been true even where the REC has been operational for longer than the PoW and it activities have been partly supported by APF as with the ECOWAS Panel of Elders. Second, there has not been clarity about what stage of conflict AU PoW is supposed to be engaged in. Third, while ad hoc mediation has been undertaken by the AU, for example the AU HIP in Sudan and AU/SADC in Madagascar, this has occurred outside the PoW framework and their lessons have not been integrated into PoW or, by implication, APSA. Thus, opportunities have been lost to ground ongoing PoW-related activities in APSA, notwithstanding that those activities were not funded with PoW in mind.

APF has provided limited but tangible support to the development of the African Standby Force. This has helped establish mission planning cells to prepare military, police and civilian personnel for future possible deployments. Activities supported have included rostering, planning and coordination, administration, logistics and training. The training, including curriculum development, has often been done in partnership with training institutions and centres of excellence. The military component has uniformly been more developed than the civilian component largely because ASF was originally envisaged as playing a largely military role from the start. Police and civilian components were added later. Civilian tasks have sometimes been performed by military personnel or police as an interim arrangement (e.g. EASF, ECOWAS).

The contribution of ASF development to APSA operationalisation so far has been severely limited. The systematic linkage between ASF development and peace operations, which are to form part of the focus of ASF when it becomes operational, has evolved gradually. The first operational deployment of an ASF element in an ongoing peace support operation was in 2011 when EASF sent 14 staff to AMISOM. In 2013, some staff from the mission planning cell at ECOWAS were deployed to Mali as part of AFISMA’s planning cell.

Another factor behind the slow development of ASF has been that the concept of a standby force has moved significantly away from what was initially envisaged as standby brigades organised by region, in which national armed forces earmark troops to be deployed rapidly when the need arises. The joint exercises undertaken through the AMANI programme have had the added value of bringing together personnel across many countries although there has been no guarantee that the same personnel would be available for deployment or future training. Even under the current seemingly modified arrangement in which troops and other personnel have been pledged by Member States, the regional brigades have developed at an uneven pace and this has made ASF operationalisation more challenging.

Overall, there has been limited coordination and coherence between the APSA components, and this has impeded APSA operationalisation. This has been due to the uneven development of the individual APSA components, particularly at the level of the RECs/RMs, and to the lack of coordination and synergy between and among the different APSA components. Vertical coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs in the operationalisation of APSA has increased significantly in some areas (CEWS and ASF) but has not been apparent in other areas (PoW). Coordination between the different APSA components has also been limited due to the uneven pace of development of these structures within RECs/RMs.

As a result of the efforts made in the AMIS and AMISOM operations, and the Sudan peace process, the AU PSC has become an important element of the continental security arrangements. This has in turn given the PSC a certain amount of influence beyond Africa. However, questions were raised by various interlocutors consulted during the evaluation about the political commitment of AU Member States to the APSA project. Political engagement by the PSC has often been weak following its decisions to authorise AU actions in response to crisis. Furthermore, the PSC’s failure to urge African states to approve new posts for the PSC Secretariat, whose current professional staff are funded by partner support, may also call into question its commitment to APSA.

Ongoing AU peace operations and peace processes have revealed other emerging cross-cutting concerns, including, for example the need for stabilisation activities (e.g. in Somalia) and greater focus on security governance and reform. APSA has not demonstrated sufficient flexibility in responding to a number of these challenges. APF support toward addressing some of these cross-cutting issues has been evident, for example, in the regional programmes to support maritime security in the Horn of Africa and specifically those offering protection to AMISOM shipments e.g. EUCAP NESTOR and EU NAVFOR Atalanta operations. Some APF support has also been given to AMISOM for quick impact initiatives in
areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. Thus far, however, these cross-cutting issues have not been adequately addressed by APSA.

While the APSA Support Programme has been informed by the APSA Road Map, which outlines African priorities, the APF and APSA decision-makers have not taken a sufficiently strategic approach to dealing with APSA. There does not appear to be sufficient prioritisation of APSA activities so as to deliver specific strategic objectives. A selection of activities has been funded without clear strategic outcomes. It is not yet clear to what extent existing APSA structures can “learn” the lessons identified from early experiences of responding to conflicts including, for instance, AMISOM and AU-HIP.

JC 4.3 Effectiveness of African-led peace support operations financed through the APF

APF funding has progressively contributed, since 2004, to enhancing the effectiveness of African-led PSOs through support for PSO planning and deployment and financial management. This support has produced valuable lessons which the APF has applied to subsequent PSOs including, most recently, AFISMA. Early APF-funded PSOs demonstrated the need for robust long-term planning capacity to ensure rapid and flexible action for deployment. The operations in Darfur and CAR demonstrated how a lack of defined guidelines could be a major challenge. The AMIS mission underscored the need for “strong strategic leadership” as well as efficient financial management to ensure coherence and effectiveness in implementation. The FOMUC and AMIS operations also demonstrated the need to support the process of planning for PSOs with adequate staff capacity and the deployment of “double-headed” administrations at both field level and the planning unit in PSD. AMIS also showed that the absence of logistic procedures and structures such as Pre-deployment Logistics Plan (PDLP) invariably diminished the effectiveness and efficiency of PSOs. The absence of continent-wide or regional logistics depots as was seen in Darfur and Somalia initially, led to serious financial and logistics constraints for the PSOs. Progress has been made in these areas over time with the creation of capacity in AUC and some RECS where Mission Planning Cells have been established, although largely as part of ASF planning.

AMISOM represents the single most important indicator of an effective African-led PSO, although MICOPAX has also been judged to be a more limited success. AMISOM has achieved significant successes not least due to its success in driving Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and several major Somali towns. However, sustainability has remained a challenge given that Al-Shabaab has remained at large in areas just outside of the major towns. Since AMISOM has not deployed sufficient troops to control the rest of the country, there has continued to be a threat of renewed violence. The asymmetric nature of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab has raised larger questions as has the issue of a lack of obvious exit strategy for the APF – the UN has not been considered an ideal alternative due in part to the fact that a relapse of hostilities remains a real possibility; and a handover from AMISOM to Somali forces is difficult to achieve in the absence of adequately trained security forces.

MICOPAX has also been judged to be effective in terms of providing security and stability to its rather limited mission area. But in comparison to AMISOM, this was a mission of about 400 military personnel and 150 civilian police who were deployed in specific areas. While MICOPAX is considered to have been effective in stabilising and securing the areas where it was deployed, the mission was not in a position to challenge Seleka when it decided to oust former president Bozize in early 2013, partly because of its size and partly because of the politics of the sub-region. Additionally, MICOPAX has been managed by ECCAS, a very weak REC which has made sustainability even more difficult to achieve.
4.5 EQ 5 on Predictable and Sustainable Funding

To what extent has EU support for the APF helped to achieve more predictable and sustainable funding for African-led peace support operations and mediation activities, including the ability to disburse funds rapidly?

This question relates to the evaluation criterion of **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **sustainability**.

It addresses the financial sustainability and effectiveness of APF activities undertaken in support of the third JAES Priority Action. It examines whether the financing provided for PSOs and Capacity Building has been timely and adequate given needs on the ground. It also examines the degree to which the ERM has effectively responded to the need for rapidly disbursed funding and whether in practice this mechanism has worked effectively.

This question also assesses issues of sustainability relating to the financing, results and impact of APF-financed activities: 1) the extent to which these operations are likely to be maintained over time, and 2) the likelihood of increased burden-sharing by African countries.

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**Overall, the evaluation findings confirm that the APF has been instrumental to the increasing ability of the AU and, to a lesser extent, RECs/RMs to address critical peace and security challenges in Africa. The sustainability of this outcome is, however, in jeopardy due to the difficulty in finding alternative sources of funding and weak institutional capacity on the part of African institutions.**

The APF has provided the AU/RECs/RMs with adequate, timely and relevant financial support to operate viable PSOs. It has provided adequate capacity building support to assist the AU and, to a lesser extent, the RECs/RMs to address critical P&S challenges. It has also enabled the rapid funding of critical activities requiring immediate action through the ERM, primarily for mediation and for AUC-led activities. The ERM’s flexibility, rapid disbursement and light procedures have made it a good fit for mediation support, but its short duration and limit on repeat grants have been limiting factors in this regard. The EU has, however, shown flexibility in interpreting ERM regulations.

The six-year timeframe of the APF has provided a measure of predictability which has enabled some multi-year expenditures for capacity building. However, the bulk of the funding has been allocated to PSOs for periods of six to 12 months at a time. The AU/RECs/RMs have also experienced difficulties in accessing and managing APF funding due to bureaucratic inefficiencies on both the EU and African sides, reducing its predictability. These problems have had less of an impact on the ERM because of its relatively light procedures.

The APF has prioritised short-term capacity building (mainly salary support programmes) rather than longer-term capacity building of systems and processes to support P&S activities. Additionally capacity building funding has at times not been used as efficiently as possible due to lack of information about APF and its procedures, structural blockages in AU/RECs/RMs (including core institutional capacity), requirements for counterpart funds and problems in reporting on expenditures. Some improvement has been registered but problems have persisted.

Inadequate African funding for P&S, weakness of core institutional capacities (such as programme management, human resources and financial management) in AU/RECs/RMs, and weak collaboration with other EU-supported P&S programmes have undermined the sustainability of many APF investments, although sustainability has been partly influenced by factors beyond the immediate control of the APF.
JC 5.1 Extent to which the APF has provided the AU and the RECs/RMs with adequate, timely and relevant financial support to operate viable African PSOs

Although supporting African-led PSOs has proven more costly than originally anticipated, APF funding has provided significant, reasonably predictable and relevant support for African-led PSOs.

APF funding has been critical to the establishment and operation of PSOs such as AMIS, AMISOM, MICOPAX and AFISMA. By December 2012, the APF had committed €411.4 m to AMISOM (an estimated 30% of AMISOM’s budget) and €68.7 m to MICOPAX (between 40 and 50% of MICOPAX’s budget). AMIS, AMISOM, MICOPAX and AFISMA have all been able to combine the APF’s non-lethal support with logistics material, and military equipment and training from sources such as the UN, the USA and EU MS, in addition to support provided by the troop contributing countries (TCCs) themselves.

Importantly, the APF has enabled AMISOM to reinforce its troops (more than doubling numbers between 2007 and 2012) and expand the geographic scope of its operations when the situation on the ground required a swift response. The APF has also assisted MICOPAX in adjusting to the changing political landscape in CAR by continuing to provide funding for the restructured mission following the Seleka takeover in March 2013. In early 2013, however, AMISOM was once again facing the challenge of reinforcing its troops in order to continue to contain Al-Shabaab at the same time as the APF was facing rising demand for PSO support and the need to mobilise additional APF resources.

The six-year timeframe of the APF under EDF10 has provided a measure of predictability. AMISOM has received funding since March 2007 and MICOPAX since July 2008 (with the APF having funded its predecessor, FOMUC, since late 2004). However, most PSOs have had Contribution Agreements (CA) or Operating Grants that have had to be renewed every 6-12 months.

Notwithstanding the importance of APF support, all of these PSOs have experienced difficulties in accessing and managing APF funding which has ultimately reduced the predictability of this funding. These difficulties have been partly overcome, but the need to replenish the APF in 2013 and the transition from EDF10 to EDF11 in 2014 have put additional constraints on the predictability of APF funding for PSOs.

Interviewees in Brussels and in the field identified a number of problems all along the chain of requesting, administering and accounting for APF PSO funding that have affected most if not all PSOs. These problems have stemmed from inefficiencies in the bureaucratic processes of all the key actors (EU, AUC, RECs, TCCs). EU processes for approving CAs and grants have been lengthy and complex and EU regulations governing the management of CAs and grants have typically been more rigorous than those of other international partners (e.g. the UN). The AUC, RECs and TCCs have experienced a lack of capacity to manage APF financing and insufficient understanding and/or disregard of EU rules and regulations. Differences between EU regulations and national and/or UN regulations have also created problems, for example by requiring more documentation (such as verifiable signatures of individual soldiers) to ensure the eligibility of funding. As a result, the AUC and RECs have at times had to pre-finance the missions and have generated ineligible expenditures that have had to be reimbursed to the EU. This in turn has exacerbated the cash flow problems facing these organisations because of policy decisions taken by AU/REC/RM Member States that exceed the ability and/or willingness of the Member States to finance.

These difficulties have been partly overcome owing to EC flexibility, capacity improvements in the AU PSD, and revised AU and TCC procedures. The EC has shown flexibility in a
number of ways, for example by not requiring the purchase of European material for MICOPAX in light of CAR’s status as a fragile state. The EC has also helped build the capacity of the AU PSD’s Finance Division, the AMISOM finance office in Nairobi and a new finance unit in ECOWAS to support APF PSO-related financing. The AU has developed a procedure for matching PSO troops with their signatures and most AMISOM TCCs have agreed to ensure that soldiers’ allowances are deposited into bank accounts, which has greatly reduced the problem of ineligible expenditures due to unverifiable signatures.

Nonetheless, pre-financing requirements for AMISOM were increased in 2013 by the decision of EU Member States to move to two-month CAs. There have also been concerns that the transition from EDF10 to EDF11 in 2014 may create a funding gap. While there has been considerable discussion about the need for AU/REC Member States to shoulder more of the financial burden, the expectation among many African stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation was that the international community, in one form or another, would need to continue to support AMISOM and other PSOs into the foreseeable future.

JC 5.2 Extent to which the ERM has provided the AU and REC/RMs with adequate, timely and flexible funds to support initiatives requiring immediate action.

The ERM has enabled the rapid funding of critical activities requiring immediate action, primarily in the area of mediation and primarily for AUC-led activities.

Of the 14 ERM activities approved between 2010 and January 2013, 13 were in support of mediation and 11 were led by the AU (one jointly with SADC). The predominance of AU-led ERM activities has in part reflected an inadequate understanding among RECs/RMs of what the ERM offers, how to apply for funds, and/or a lack of staff to lead the process of accessing and managing ERM grants. (See also EQ8 for a discussion of the impact of inadequate AU/REC/RM programme management capacity.) ERM funding was shown to catalyse support from other donors. The mechanism appeared to work most efficiently for AU applications for funding. Although the ERM was judged to be quite fast disbursing compared with other sources of mediation funding, delays have still occurred – for instance, in the case of the AU HIP’s 2013 application to the ERM - because of clarifications requested by Brussels before approval could be given. Because applications for funding have needed to pass first through the AU, this is an additional factor that may have slowed down approval processes in certain cases. Both IGAD and SADC reported delays in the processing of their applications and, in the latter case, a significant delay in disbursement in funding by the AU after the application had been approved by the EU.

While the ERM has been one of the few instruments available for funding mediation that was highly flexible, disbursed quickly, and had light procedures, its short duration (generally 6-8 months) and the stipulation that ERM funding would be provided only once for any given activity has meant that the ERM has not been fully suited to funding mediation. However, the EU has shown flexibility in interpreting ERM regulations.

When the ERM was created in 2009, it was not anticipated that it would be used almost exclusively to support mediation efforts. However, according to AU officials engaged in the AU HIP mediation effort, the ERM has been one of the few sources of funding that has combined three important attributes: speed, flexibility and light application/reporting procedures. In order to obtain EC approval to establish the ERM, it was necessary to agree that ERM grants would be very short-term and, in principle, non-renewable. The spirit of the ERM is to cover the first stage of activities, covering the ‘gap’ until more appropriate longer-term funding instruments can step in. From a practical perspective, however, these two conditions have greatly reduced its suitability for mediation support. In recognition of this fact, EU officials have shown flexibility, approving multiple ERM grants for the LRA and AU HIP.
mediation efforts. In the latter case interviewees explained that the ERM support was extremely helpful in sustaining the peace process and avoiding a slide into an emergency situation.

**JC 5.3 Extent to which the APF has provided the AU and the RECs/RMs with adequate, timely and relevant financial support for capacity building.**

**Overall, the APF has been instrumental to the increasing ability of the AU and, to a lesser extent, RECs/RMs to address critical peace and security challenges in Africa.**

The support provided by the APF through its various capacity building programmes to the AUC and RECs/RMs has been adequate to help them acquire critical capacity to plan and manage PSOs and develop key elements of the APSA. Again the six-year timeframe of the APF under EDF10 offered a measure of predictability. Importantly it has allowed AU PSD staff to have contracts that last for more than one year. The 44-month timeframe of the APSA Support Programme has opened the door for multi-year activities, as well, although most activities have had one-year timeframes, consistent with the annual APSA work-plans.

The AU PSD has benefitted most from capacity building support, primarily in the area of financial management. By early 2013, the PSD’s capacity to manage APF finances was widely recognised as significantly improved. Interviewees generally agreed that the AU PSD has made good progress in financial management, a finding confirmed by audit reports. Additionally, finance officials from both Addis and the Nairobi-based AMISOM finance unit were providing technical support to ECOWAS as it built up its capacity to manage AFISMA finances. At the same time, by supporting some 80 PSD staff, the APF has also contributed to increased capacity throughout the department. Numerous interlocutors commented: “Without the APF, there would be no PSD.” The APSA components that have benefitted most from APF funding have been CEWS and the African Standby Force, both at the continental and the regional levels. APF funding has enabled critical staff to be hired both in Addis and in the RECs/RMs, roadmaps to be developed and systems to be established and strengthened. Progress has not, however, been uniform across all RECs/RMs due to differences in institutional capacity and Member State political commitment.

**As with PSOs, recipients of APF capacity building support have experienced difficulties in accessing and managing APF funding which has reduced the predictability of this funding, in particular the timeliness of its delivery.**

The recipients of capacity building support have reported the same problems with requesting, administering and accounting for APF funding as recipients of PSO support and the causes and outcomes have been by and large the same. There have been several reasons why RECs/RMs in particular have found it difficult to access available funding: 1) information about the availability of funds and procedures for accessing them have not been adequately communicated by those within the organisation who are responsible for APF programme management (short-term expert pool and ECCAS early warning unit); 2) the organisation has had structural constraints (ECOWAS limitations on hiring limited absorptive capacity; weakness of human resource management in AU and ECCAS); 3) funding has been tied to the requirement for counterpart funding and RECs/RMs with severe cash flow problems have experienced difficulties in meeting this requirement (ECCAS APSA Support Programme); 4) RECs/RMs have failed to report adequately leading to late disbursements or even suspension of funding (ECCAS); and 5) the way in which the capacity building programmes have been structured, with the AU having the responsibility for managing funds allocated to the RECs/RMs and the RECs/RMs having responsibility for managing funds allocated to training centres, has added additional layers of complexity. (On the ability of the AU to provide the necessary support to RECs/RMs, see EQ8.)
Lastly, the APF has prioritised short-term capacity building (enabling African institutions to temporarily acquire the capacity to engage in certain peace and security activities) over longer-term institutional capacity building (developing systems and processes).

The APF has helped to increase the capacity of some institutions to meet P&S challenges, largely through salary support programmes. They have paid the salaries of key P&S staff in the AU PSD and RECs/RMs because AU/REC/RM Member State contributions to organisational budgets have not been adequate to meet the needs engendered by ambitious P&S agendas. Although having key staff in place is essential to meet P&S challenges, the ability of the AU/RECS/RMs to deliver peace and security objectives also rests on core systems of administration, strategic planning, human resources and programme and financial management, and these have by and large been weak.

The APF has been aware of these critical gaps, but not enough attention has been given to filling them. While the APF’s mandate is not to engage in broad institutional development, it has in fact contributed to that outcome through its efforts to strengthen the capacity of the AU/RECs/RMs to manage APF funding, which could benefit the entire institution. However, the APF has not explored the viability of creating P&S cells within existing finance departments rather than creating capacity solely within P&S departments. The PSD Finance department has therefore benefitted from a special status. That said, at the time this report was written, the AUC appeared to be in the process of integrating the PSD finance division into the AUC directorate for programming, budgeting, finance and accounting.

Furthermore, the APF has not generally worked with other funders to ensure that broader institutional development programmes – for example in the areas of human resource management, strategic planning or programme management – were put in place. There is, however, growing recognition that continuing institutional capacity gaps of this nature are detrimental to APF-funded activities. The APF was given the opportunity by the EU Delegation in Nigeria to feed into development of the latest RIP that was agreed with ECOWAS that is explicitly seeking to address some of these institutional gaps.

JC5.4 Extent to which APF financed-interventions, particularly peace support operations, and the results and impact achieved are likely to be maintained over time.

The lack of adequate P&S financing from African sources and the weakness of core institutional capacities in the AU/RECs/RMs have rendered many APF capacity building investments unsustainable in the short to medium-term in the absence of continued APF or other external support.

The extreme dependence on external funding, of which the EU has provided a significant share, has probably been the most serious challenge facing the sustainability of APF-funded activities. This situation has derived at least in part from limited African political commitment. AU/REC/RM Member States have either given their organisations mandates that cannot be met with agreed levels of Member State contributions or they have failed to provide those contributions in a timely fashion. Some RECs/RMs have had significant problems with arrears. The AU and some of the RECs/RMs have begun to look for ways of increasing African inputs into P&S activities. However, at best, mobilising significant new resources would take time and it was unclear at the time this evaluation was carried out how effective any new initiatives would be.

The weakness of core institutional capacities has meant that the AU/RECs/RMs have not yet been able to provide the support that P&S activities have required. The APF has provided some support in the areas of financial management and, to a lesser extent, programme management but if APF funding were to be withdrawn, the core financial and programme
management capacities of the AU and many RECs/RMs would be unable to provide the necessary support. In other areas, the evaluation team has not seen evidence that the APF has engaged to the extent possible, for example by seeking out synergies with other donors to strengthen broad institutional capacity.

In the case of human resources, this has meant serious delays in hiring critical staff, staff retention problems and poor staff oversight, all of which have negatively affected the sustainability of APF investments. There was some evidence that the AU was planning to strengthen organisation-wide systems which would provide the basis on which APF-supported activities could be sustained once technical assistance provided through the APF (programme and financial management) came to an end. Additionally the African Development Bank’s five-year programme to promote regional integration in Central Africa by building ECCAS’ institutional, human and operational capacity should help build the systems necessary to better manage its peace and security activities. The benefits of such efforts would not, however, be felt for some years to come.

**Sustainability of the results and impact achieved to date through APF investments in PSOs and mediation has been influenced by factors beyond the immediate control of the APF.**

The sustainability of the current level of stability in Somalia which had been achieved due to effective and successful AMISOM operations could not be assured for several reasons. First, due to the continuing threat from Al-Shabaab; and second, due to AMISOM’s incapacity to recover more territory without an increase in troops, accompanied by greater capacity among Somali national forces. Furthermore, while the United Nations had agreed to assume responsibility for AMISOM and AFISMA, there are no plans at present for AMISOM to be rehatted as a UN operation.

The failure of ECCAS Member States to pay their agreed portion of the MICOPAX budget has placed the sustainability of that mission in doubt. What is more, the changed political environment in CAR has affected MICOPAX’s plan to withdraw from CAR at the end of 2013.

**The nascent trend in recent years towards enhanced collaboration between the APF and other EU-supported security and justice programmes is likely to increase the sustainability of APF investments**

When it was established in 2004, there was recognition that the APF’s support for the AU and RECs/RMs should be complementary to the Commission’s wider support for conflict prevention in Africa. However, the RIPv only began to support peace and security work during EDF10. Although, for example, the most recent RIPv agreed with ECOWAS and SADC have mediation-related components, interviews conducted for this evaluation have suggested that the level of coordination between RIPv funding for peace and security and the APF has not yet achieved an optimal level. (See EQ7 for more details on collaboration between the APF and the RIPv). Some interviewees suggested that if responsibility for day-to-day programme management of some APF-financed activities were devolved to the regional EU Delegations, this could strengthen overall coherence of EU programming in the area of peace and security provided that Delegation staff have the requisite skills and backgrounds to manage these portfolios effectively.
4.6 EQ 6 on Impact on Peace & Security

To what extent has the APF contributed to strengthening the resolve and ability of the AU, the REC/RMs and member states to work together to reduce violent conflict in Africa, and has this effort enhanced peace and security?

This question relates to the evaluation criterion of impact.

It first assesses the impact of APF-supported activities in terms of increased African ownership and solidarity in the area of peace and security and the reduction of violent conflict across Africa.

The question then examines the extent to which the APF has contributed to enhancing the ability and commitment of the AU, RECs/RMs and African Member States to collaborate in reducing violent conflict in Africa.

Finally, it examines whether APF-supported activities have had unintended impacts on the political and security context, and the extent to which these impacts have influenced the achievement of the APF’s overall objectives.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>EQ 6 on Impact on Peace and Security - Answer Summary Box</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall, the APF has made a direct and substantive contribution – alongside other donors – to enhancing African nations’ resolve and ability to collaborate in addressing violent conflict through political and military means. The slow pace of efforts to operationalise APSA has nevertheless hampered African-led planning and crisis response. In addition, the modalities for disbursing APF resources and strengthening peace and security capabilities have had some unintended consequences which may hamper development of sustainable, long-term African security capabilities.</td>
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<td>The APF has been instrumental in enabling the APSA and unlocking the potential of the AU and its nascent Peace and Security Council to undertake collective political and security actions in response to major political crises and conflicts on the continent. In addition, the APF has contributed directly to enhancing peace and security in Africa through its support for PSOs and ERM-financed mediation initiatives and, indirectly, through its support for operationalisation of APSA. The slow pace of the latter, however, has to varying extents compromised the effectiveness African initiatives to address political crises and violent conflicts at national, regional and continental levels.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Although the APF has been instrumental in strengthening the ability of African states to collaborate in addressing violent conflict, this has come at the expense of a heavy reliance of the key security institutions, notably the PSD in the AUC, and equivalent departments within the RECs/RMs, on EU resources. This has underscored the importance of ensuring that the APF is embedded within a wider EU/international strategy for supporting peace and security in Africa, which gives due attention to questions of sustainability and creating institutional capabilities that reflect local realities, including resource constraints.</td>
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<td>The EU’s decision to channel most APF funds intended for the RECs/RMs through the AU has also had an unintended consequence of exacerbating tensions between the continental and regional organisations. But this has also obliged them to work together to overcome differences and has been key to narrowing the divides between them over the evaluation period. More generally, the heavy donor investment over the past decade in building up the AU’s capacity in the area of peace and security has also likely had the unintended consequence of marginalising the role of the AU Department of Political Affairs in addressing Africa’s security problems.</td>
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JC 6.1 How the APF has contributed to the ability and commitment of the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States to collaborate in reducing violent conflict in Africa

The APF has been instrumental in enabling the APSA and unlocking the potential of the AU and its nascent Peace and Security Council to undertake collective political and security actions in response to major political crises and conflicts on the continent.

Following the establishment of the AU in 2002, the EU committed to a general programme of support to revitalise its institutional structures. This involved the creation of a Peace and Security Council that gave the AU the competencies and capacities required to address Africa’s peace and security challenges. This built on a stated desire of African nations, including at the Maputo Summit in 2003, to find solutions to their own problems. The APF was conceived on the basis that making available a pot of funds for the AU, with the PSC authorised to determine how and when these funds would be used, would give it the confidence and resolve to undertake real collective action to respond to crisis.

APF funding has made an important contribution to putting into action the PSC’s political potential. This has made possible an important political break-through for African nations, moving them away from the unilateral interventions of the past in response to conflict, which were often contentious, and offering a basis to build upon in terms of operationalising the wider APSA.

To that end, APF funding has facilitated consensus-building around how to address violent conflicts at both regional and continental levels, primarily through its support for the AU PSD and related peace and security structures, and the APSA. In both areas, there have been numerous other international actors, including the UN, who have supported these processes, making contributions which have often directly complemented the support provided through the APF. Collectively, this international support has provided an enabling framework in which African states have committed themselves to providing troops to address political problems in a range of countries including the Comoros, Sudan, Somalia, CAR and, most recently, Mali, with the relative confidence that the financing and logistical support required to make these missions a success would be forthcoming.

Nevertheless, African Member States have reacted in a generally cautious manner to the recent empowerment of the AU PSC. While there is growing consensus on the need and rationale for collective regional or continental responses to crisis, there has been variable African commitment to responding to AU requests for assistance. This reflects not only concerns about the ‘cost’ of deploying forces, but political sensitivities and differences among Member States within regional organisations, for instance, about how to deal with conflicts in one of their states.

It also reflects persisting, deep-rooted differences between the AU and certain regional organisations, due to the unresolved question of subsidiarity, about who should lead in response to a political crisis. This has been readily apparent in relation to the recent Mali and Madagascar crises, where there were tensions between the AU and ECOWAS and SADC respectively, about who should lead.
JC 6.2 How the APF has contributed to enhancing peace and security in crisis-affected regions in Africa

First, a word on measuring impact: there are a number of factors which make it challenging to assess the impact of APF-funded activities in the area of peace and security in Africa. APF programme interventions – whether in support of PSOs or longer-term APSA operationalisation – have generally not included a detailed monitoring and evaluation framework to measure results though there was reference in the case of MICOPAX to field visits and joint AU-EU evaluations that would serve this purpose. There has been virtually no use of baseline data and precise indicators that the evaluation team was able to detect to measure interventions’ long-term impact in terms of institutional development and impact. Evaluation reports generated by APF projects, including PSOs such as AMISOM, were largely of an auditing nature, focusing on finances, or consisted of descriptive reviews of interventions which have rarely attempted to assess impact and achievements, though there is a more general AU and UN body of PSO reviews which highlight the important contributions made by the APF.

The narrative reports produced thus far for the ERM by the AU have generally been very brief, of variable quality, and provide little detail on either how APF funds were used or the achievements. This reflects in part the extreme political sensitivity of many ERM activities and, hence, an understandable reluctance to divulge details on what actually occurred. But it was also a consequence of inadequate investment in the programme management capacity required within the AU to ensure that reporting was conducting in an effective and timely manner.

The APF has contributed directly to enhancing peace and security in Africa through its support for PSOs and ERM-financed mediation initiatives and, indirectly, through its support for operationalisation of APSA. The slow pace of the latter, however, has rendered less effective than they might otherwise be the case African initiatives to address political crises and violent conflicts at national, regional and continental levels.

The APF, through its facilitation of planning for troop deployments in conflict zones or countries facing political crisis and its payment of allowances for peace-keepers, has made a very direct and substantial contribution to enhancing peace and security in crisis-affected regions. The APF is by no means the only international actor supporting African peace and security efforts, but at the level of PSOs its role has been instrumental, going back ten years and covering operations in the Comoros, Sudan (Darfur), CAR, Somalia and, most recently, Mali. This is largely the case because the payment of peace-keepers’ allowances, without which TCC’s would not have consented to deploy troops, have been covered by the APF.

The contribution of AMISOM to peace and security in Somalia has been a measured success. At the time this report was written, this contribution had only recently been achieved due to a number of important military gains against Al-Shabaab. It was by no means certain how complete victory over the Islamist group, which continued to control significant amounts of territory outside the capital, Mogadishu, would be achieved. Nevertheless, as the AU itself has noted: “AMISOM has proved to be crucial for the survival of the Somali Transitional Institutions/the new Federal Institutions after the end of the transition in Somalia in September 2012 by helping create the minimum security pre-conditions for continuing the peace process and providing humanitarian assistance to the Somalis”.

In view of this progress, AMISOM is now being tasked with a broader goal of making possible effective and legitimate administration in these liberated areas in order to prevent the re-emergence of Al-Shabaab. Although AMISOM has a critical role to play in non-military activities, the civilian component of the mission has had limited interaction with Somali authorities. Overall the lack of a clear and unified political strategy has made it more difficult for AMISOM to support the restoration of civil authority – and this illustrates the limitations of the relatively narrow, military responses which APF funding for AMISOM has made possible.

Since its inception in 2008, MICOPAX has contributed to stabilising and making secure the five regions where it was deployed in CAR, but considering the small scale of the operation it has not been in a position to enhance peace and security at the national level. Furthermore, all reports (from ECCAS, EU and AU) over the evaluation period have emphasized the instable security situation and even the negative trend in some regions, underscoring the fragility of gains. This was made apparent in March 2013 when the Seleka rebel forces overthrew the government and took power, with MICOPAX peace-keepers neither militarily capable nor politically mandated to confront the rebels.

APF support for operationalisation of APSA has had a limited direct impact on efforts to address political crises in Africa. This reflects on the one hand the fact that APSA and the associated capacity building support programmes funded through the APF and other donors have only been around for around a decade. In addition, APF support for APSA only constitutes 10% of overall international support. It is thus crucial to match expectations with timeframe – as noted elsewhere in this report, institution building is a generational undertaking. On the other hand, APF contributions to operationalise APSA have largely been focused on putting into place the building blocks of the African crisis response machinery: the human resource capacities, financing, strategies, policies and tools.

The ERM was originally envisaged as a mechanism to endow the AU and RECs/RMs with a source of immediately available funds for the “first stage” of actions aimed at preventing, managing or resolving political crises. This has been based on the assumption that follow-up funding would be provided from other sources to support continued mediation to resolve crises, on the understanding that ERM-funded initiatives are generally restricted to one six-month intervention. In practice, few of the 14 ERM-funded initiatives to date, of which 13 have focused on mediation, appear to have directly resolved the underlying political crises they were intended to address. But they have provided a basis for establishing critical infrastructure (offices, equipment, vehicles, etc.) and building trust and confidence among disputing parties which have served as a basis for subsequent political initiatives.

The lack of follow-up financing for mediation initiatives jump-started by an initial ERM grant, or delays in the initial disbursement of funding by the AU have been problematic, suggesting that there are a number of adjustments required in how the ERM is managed which should be considered by the APF.

JC 6.3 Unintended impacts of APF actions on the political and security context in Africa, and how this has affected achievement of overall APF objectives

Although the APF has been instrumental in strengthening the resolve and ability of African states to collaborate in addressing violent conflict, and with some significant results, this has come at the expense of a heavy reliance of the key security institutions, notably the PSD in the AUC, and equivalent departments within the RECs/RMs, on EU resources. This dependency on the APF is problematic from the point of view of the sustainability of not only the peace and security capacities created within the AU and regional organisations, but also recent peace and security gains as outlined above. But
there is also a more perverse consequence of this funding imbalance between the EU and African states, and the resultant creation of African dependency on external resources to address conflicts. This is, in all likelihood, a reduction in incentives for African states to make the difficult political choices required to channel more of their own resources to the AU and regional organisations. The case of AFISMA, where significant resources were mobilised from the African side suggests, however, that there is much potential for change.

The EU’s decision to channel most APF funds intended for the RECs/RMs through the AU has had an unintended consequence of creating or exacerbating tensions between the continental and regional organisations. But this has in effect also obliged them to work together to overcome their differences which, in the long-term, has been vital to narrowing the divides between them over the evaluation period. There was a clear and understandable logic to use the AU as a conduit for APF funds. First, the AU was the lead African institution in the area of peace and security, consistent with the letter and the spirit of APSA. Second the sensitivity of funding peace and security activities (e.g. SADC, which is reluctant to take funds directly from donors for certain activities in this area), could be circumvented by having the AU disburse funds to the RECs/RMs. Third, channelling funds through the AU and giving it the responsibility of monitoring how these funds were used by RECs/RMs in effect obliged the continental and the regional bodies to learn how to work together. This has been key to operationalising APSA.

Nevertheless, relations between the AU and regional organisations have historically been difficult. Differences and tensions between the two, particularly over the question of roles and responsibilities in dealing with security problems, have sometimes been exacerbated by the perception that AU is in the “driving seat” by virtue of the fact that to get access to APF resources the RECs/RMs must request these from the AU. Delays on the part of the AU in approving work plans and ERM proposals, or in disbursing resources, have further exacerbated relations in some cases, which the AU has nonetheless by and large succeeded in managing.

Drawing on experiences from previous PSOs, notably AMIS and AMISOM, the APF made a decision in early 2013 to make the establishment of a special finance unit directly within the ECOWAS Political Affairs and Peace and Security (PAPS) department a condition for channelling APF funding for AFISMA through the regional organisation. This decision was made due to concerns about the capacity of ECOWAS’ Finance Department to handle the AFISMA funding efficiently. This short-term fix has been key to standing up the AFISMA operation rapidly, but may have some potentially negative longer-term consequences which need to be monitored and mitigated. By effectively by-passing the main finance unit within ECOWAS - experience from other donor-supported programme management units suggests - this may indirectly compromise efforts to strengthen core financial management capacity within ECOWAS. This is likely to be the case unless efforts are made to migrate the capacity developed with the specialised finance unit back into ECOWAS’ main Finance Department at an appropriate time.

More generally, the heavy investment over the past decade by donors in building up the AU’s capacity in the area of peace and security has also likely had the unintended consequence of marginalising the role of the AU Department of Political Affairs in addressing Africa’s security problems. This is not just a question of the DPA being under-resourced and under-staffed, but the growing prominence of PSD within the AU has also given it certain autonomy within the continental body that, in the view of many observers, may complicate efforts to find political rather than military solutions to Africa’s crises. This is of particular concern as recognition grows that the only viable long-term solutions to Africa’s security problems involve addressing their developmental and governance roots and that the security response – though vital – is not sufficient in itself.
4.7 EQ 7 on Coordination and Complementarity and EU Value Added

To what extent has the EU’s support for the APF been provided in a coordinated and complementary manner with respect to both EU actors’ roles (Commission, Council, EEAS and Member States) and other donors’ support, and what has been the EU’s added value?

This question relates to coordination and complementarity issues in relation to EU support for the APF as well as EU value added.

It focuses on two levels of coordination and complementarity: a) within the Commission and b) within the EU, i.e. between the Commission, the EEAS, and EU Member States. This distinction is important since the APF requires an integrated approach involving a large number of actors, notably to achieve synergies between the APF and other relevant EU instruments for security and development, such as the CSDP.

This question also covers the EU’s added value in providing support for the APF, notably in relation to the principle of subsidiarity (e.g. the EU’s experience in regional integration, mandate for drawing Member States together to support a greater effort, etc.).

**EQ 7 on Relevance – Summary of Findings**

The evaluation findings point to various improvements in the coordination of APF-related issues among EU actors but there is a need for greater coherence within EU MS, clearer division of work between EEAS and the Commission, better links between Brussels and EU Delegations to strengthen complementarity, and closer collaboration with other international actors. There is nonetheless clear indication in a number of areas of the EU’s value-added to European peace and security efforts in Africa through the APF with potential for this to be enhanced further, particularly in the political sphere.

Intra-EU coordination became more complex in January 2011 when the EEAS became operational. APF-related coordination between the EEAS and the Commission has steadily improved, but the January 2013 division of work lacked adequate detail on key issues such as sequencing and tasks. Gaps in coordination and communication between Brussels and EU Delegations have sometimes reduced the effectiveness of APF financing. EU Member States have effectively coordinated decisions about APF funding in Brussels, and efforts have been made to strengthen EU Member States coordination in the field. There has been some collaboration between the APF and EU Member States on specific activities such as AMIS, MICOPAX, AFISMA, AU HIP, and two Joint Financing Arrangements for the AUC. But Member States have not always followed coherent approaches to APF-related issues.

The EU has sought to develop a comprehensive approach to complex crises such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, applying the APF in Somalia and in Mali. Here and elsewhere collaboration among EU tools and funding instruments has had mixed results.

APF-financed activities have been coordinated with those of other P&S donors, notably through the AU Partners Group in Addis and with the UN and bilateral donors on mediation and PSOs.

The APF has enabled the EU to add value to European peace and security efforts in Africa in several important respects: first, through the pooling of funds which enables the EU to do more than individual member states could do; second, by supporting peace and security initiatives at both the regional and continental levels, and over an extended period of time. This has also had benefits for the AU/RECs/RMs as transaction costs have been reduced by only dealing with one donor, though the EU has not always taken full advantage of the political leverage afforded by this value added.
JC 7.1 Extent to which the design, implementation and monitoring of the APF has been effectively coordinated within the EU (Commission/Council/EEAS and Member States)

Coordination between the EEAS and the Commission on issues pertaining to the APF has improved over the evaluation period.

When the EEAS became operational in January 2011, it added a new layer of coordination to the APF. Interviews conducted for this evaluation have confirmed that since then close working relations have developed between EEAS and the Commission’s APF unit. Intra-EU collaboration has also become stronger, particularly on politically high-profile issues such as Somalia and Mali. For example, EU officials reported that the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn of Africa had improved coordination in Brussels between EEAS and DEVCO. In 2011, the EUSR created a Somali Working Group which brought together some 30 people at HQ level, many of whom had reportedly never met each other, but who continued to work together and exchange information.

In January 2013, with a view to ensuring greater coordination and consistency in EU foreign policy as called for by the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS and DEVCO agreed a division of work for the APF. While this was seen as an important step forward, some EU officials suggested that more refinement was required in terms of sequencing of EEAS and DEVCO actions.

Gaps in coordination and communication between Brussels and EU Delegations in Africa have generally reduced the effectiveness of APF financing, though decentralisation of a number of key responsibilities to the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis has had a positive effect.

Many EU Delegation officials stated that they were prepared to engage more fully in APF-related activities, but that the lines of authority have not always been clear and that they were not adequately tasked by Brussels. Several Delegations reported not being routinely asked to provide input on issues relating to APF activities. Information-sharing between Brussels and EU Delegations on centralised instruments such as the APF and the IfS was reportedly weak. This appeared to have affected the ability of Delegations to lead in on-the-spot coordination of the implementation of all EU assistance in order to increase synergy and EU visibility.

From the perspective of Brussels, officials responsible for the APF have stated that EU Delegations could be more involved if they wished but that most EU Delegations have not been appropriately staffed for engaging in P&S issues. Although they have programme management and regional integration capacity, most regional EU Delegations have not had P&S advisers and, in some cases, very small political sections. The one exception has been the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa which has had a strong political section and a military adviser. The Commission APF Unit has sought to make up for these capacity gaps by conducting regular briefings in the field and inviting Delegations to participate in JCC and JSC meetings.

Responsibility for the two JFAs (AUC salaries and AU Liaison offices to conflict affected countries) is currently in the process of being devolved to the EU Delegation to the AU. The decision to do this was taken because these joint programmes have relied on regular coordination with donors in order to be implemented efficiently, especially as the EU has been the lead donor for the JFA Salaries and assumed the lead for JFA LOs in 2013. In addition, the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis has indeed contributed to identifying areas of need in relation to the ERM, most recently in regard to the third grant awarded to the AU HIP. Nevertheless, even though this Delegation has been more engaged with the Commission’s APF unit, questions about tasking have persisted. At a minimum there has been a
communications gap between Brussels and EU Delegations on the capacity of the Delegations to engage more fully in helping to manage APF-related activities.

The fact that the APF is managed in a very transparent way vis-à-vis EU Members States (vote on political appropriateness for all programmes and APF annual reports) has nevertheless facilitated coherence of assistance. In Central Africa, for instance, the EU has agreed with the French Ministry of Defence to create a financial and administrative support cell within MICOPAX. There was no indication that the involvement of other regional EU Delegations in APF management matters has yet occurred on a systematic basis.

**EU Member States have effectively coordinated their decisions on APF financing in Brussels and efforts have been made to strengthen coordination among EU Member States in the field, leading to collaboration between the APF and EU Member States in supporting a number of specific activities. However EU Member States do not always follow coherent approaches to APF-related activities.**

Interviews with MS suggested that the consensus orientation of the Africa Working Party (COAFR) of the Council’s Political and Security Committee has promoted coordination among EU Member States in Brussels on issues relating to the APF since 2004. APF funding decisions have been taken within the context of agreement among the Member States on EU policy toward a specific country. The fact that consensus has been reached in Council configurations has strongly influenced decisions in the EDF Committee, where decisions have been taken by qualified majority, not consensus. Member States representatives reported that it was extremely rare that a Member State would block a decision in the EDF Committee after consensus was reached in the Council formations. However, EU officials report that obtaining consensus can be a lengthy process. Furthermore, interviewees noted that EU Member States have not always been internally consistent, with positions taken by Member States in Brussels not being reflected in the field (and vice versa) and positions adopted by individual Member States in other fora, for example the UN, contradicting positions adopted in Brussels.

In the field, the Head of the EU Delegation to the AU has acted as the EU Special Representative to the AU and as such has had a mandate to coordinate EU and EU Member States’ actions. In an effort to improve EU coordination at the political level, there have been monthly meetings of political advisers and heads of missions. One difficulty at this level has been the EU Delegation’s need for a mandate from the PSC to address new crises.

There has also been coordination between APF-financed activities and activities supported by EU Member States. The APF and France have supported MICOPAX in CAR with financing and technical assistance and the APF has provided critical early funding for AFISMA to help consolidate the gains achieved by France in Mali since January 2013. The APF has contributed to two Joint Financing Arrangements to support the AU, which also received important support from EU Member States: the JFA for AUC Salaries in Peace and Security and the JFA for AU Liaison Offices in Conflict-Affected Countries. The EU Delegation to the AU has coordinated JFA Salaries and sought to obtain consensus among JFA partners, including EU Member States. The EU Delegation to the AU was also tasked in 2013 with coordinating the JFA for AU LOs. JFA partners had quite different approaches to the JFAs – with some preferring greater oversight of the AU’s use of these resources than others – but consensus was reached on a new JFA in the first half of 2013. With regard to the AU HIP mediation, there was ad hoc coordination between the EU, the UK and (non-EU member) Norway. The objective was to maintain a low profile in order not to divide the parties. There was also complementary financial support to the AU HIP from these three actors.
The EU’s record on using multiple EU tools in a complementary fashion to address P&S issues has been weak, but the EU is seeking to strengthen coherence as illustrated by the case of Somalia.

It has long been argued that a key EU added value in international security was the capacity to draw on a wide range of instruments and capabilities – diplomacy, development assistance, humanitarian support and security assistance – particularly in crisis environments such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. Attention has been given in recent years to developing such a “comprehensive approach” but at the time this evaluation was conducted, there was no formal agreement on the scope of the concept or how best to implement it. Nonetheless, EU officials interviewed for the evaluation have pointed to the EU’s efforts to collaborate in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia, and in the Sahel region, particularly in Mali. The APF has been one of the instruments used in both of these cases.

EU officials have noted that despite agreement in principle in Brussels among different EU actors about coordinating activities, it has proven very difficult in practice to ensure that concrete programmes are mutually supportive and do not conflict with each other. That said, EU officials have also suggested that important lessons were learned from the experience in Somalia and applied to collaboration in Mali. Events in Mali were unfolding at the time this evaluation was conducted, and only APF support to AMISOM was included as a formal case study.

With regard to Somalia, interviews with key EU, AMISOM and AU stakeholders indicated that there was scope for increased complementarity. APF support to AMISOM began in 2007. It was only in November 2011 that the Council approved a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and began to combine its political tools (EUSR for the Horn, political dialogue on democratisation and rule of law), its development portfolio (including the IFS), its security sector support (AMISOM and SSR programmes), and its humanitarian assistance in Somalia. It also created CSDP missions focused on maritime capacity building (ATALANTA and NESTOR) and on the training of the Somali security forces (EU Training Mission).

EU stakeholders have stressed that the coherence of the EU engagement at the political level has improved but has not yet sufficiently percolated to the technical level, partly due to the lack of dedicated human resources. The interaction between the CSDP missions and AMISOM has generally been ad hoc and piece-meal, in part because it is not in the mandates of either organisation. In addition, AMISOM is not engaged in all areas where the EU is, for instance the maritime sector. That said, various coordination fora do exist which are attended by EUTM, the EU delegation and AMISOM itself, including the Somali Military Technical Working Group and its Training Sub-Committee and the AMISOM Force Commanders Weekly Brief. The challenges of coordination are compounded by the fact that different actors work in different ‘sectors’, itself reflecting the prevailing security situation.

In both West and Central Africa there was some degree of collaboration between the APF and peace and security programmes supported through the RIPs. EU Delegations in Abuja and Libreville both reported a division of labour between the RIPs and the APF. In West Africa the APF was consulted on the development of the RIP; in Central Africa the division of labour occurred after the RIP programme (PAPS II) was designed. Similarly although the countries benefitting from the IFS-supported Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) programme were a subset of ECOWAS and ECCAS members, CRIMGO was not consulted with PAPS II in Libreville or, apparently, the APF prior to CRIMGO’s creation in early 2013. In East Africa, a former IGAD official reported a similar lack of coherence among the different EU funding instruments, the RIPs and the APF. There was also lack of clarity in East Africa about the relationship between the EU Programme to promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE), announced in May 2013, and existing EU P&S instruments.
JC 7.3 Coherence of the APF with other international peace and security policies and instruments in Africa, including those of the UN and other countries

The APF has coordinated its support for African P&S initiatives with other international actors. The EU has played an important role in the establishment and functioning of the AU Partner’s Group (AUPG), a network of donor countries accredited to the AU (including Brazil, India and China). It has chaired the AUPG’s P&S subgroup since 2009, a role facilitated by its status as major donor. Because of the diversity of this group, actual coordination has been difficult. For example, the P&S subgroup has yet to accept the APSA Roadmap as the main instrument for donor coordination.

The APF has collaborated with the UN and the United States and other bilaterals (UK) on support to AMISOM in order to provide an appropriate mix of lethal and non-lethal support. Interlocutors have argued that the complementarity between the APF and UN support has been key in sustaining AMISOM. The APF’s bridging financing for AFISMA enabled a peace support operation to be set up prior to the UN assuming responsibility for peace operations in July 2013.

Six of the activities financed through the ERM referred to coordination and cooperation with other stakeholders. Of these four referred specifically to the UN.

The APF has played an important role in establishing and managing joint financing arrangements to strengthen APSA implementation. As indicated above, APF financing has been channelled through two JFAs for the AUC that included both EU and non-EU partners in order to harmonise international support. The EU played a pivotal role in managing the first JFA Salaries and in negotiating the second JFA Salaries. The EU Delegation to the AU was also named coordinator for the second JFA for AU LOs in 2013.

JC 7.4 EU added value through its support for the APF

The APF has enabled the EU to add value to European peace and security efforts in Africa in several important respects: as a major funder, as a multilateral organisation, and in its support for joint funding arrangements. However the EU has not always taken full advantage of the political leverage afforded by this value-added.

The EU has been one of the major donors to the AUC, AMISOM and MICOPAX and provided a substantial share of the international support to AMISOM. Much of this support has been provided through the APF. The ability to deliver this assistance over a period of years has been recognised by many interlocutors as a value-added of the EU. By pooling funds, the EU has been able to do much more than individual European Member States could do. In addition, this critical mass of funding and the network of EU delegations across Africa has also made it easier for it to support peace and security initiatives at the regional and continental level.

At the same time, some EU officials and independent observers have suggested that the EU’s status as a major donor has not been translated into political leverage. In the case of the AUC, the EU has continued to be seen as a development actor, not a political actor, and the willingness of the AUC to engage with the EU Delegation on a political level has reportedly been limited. Similarly major donor status does not appear to have given the EU political leverage in dialogues with Central African governments. In Somalia, while the EU was one of the largest donors, there was a lack of strategic discussion between the EU and African counter-parts which prevented it from using its political leverage to the full.

There was evidence from the AU High-Level International Panel overseeing mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan that the EU, as a multilateral institution, could deliver
support that better fitted to African interests and ideals than bilateral governments that have tended to impose their own agendas. With regard to MICOPAX, it was suggested that the added value of the EU was its geographic presence - namely its network of regional delegations. This made possible an exchange of information between the Delegations in Central Africa at critical junctures (such as during the late 2012/early 2013 crisis in CAR) and enabled the EEAS to deliver messages simultaneously to regional actors in Libreville, N’Djamena, Brazzaville and Yaoundé. More generally, the EU’s ability to draw on political, economic/financial, humanitarian and security policies, tools and instruments has been considered a potential value added and the EU has sought to strengthen the coordination and complementarity of these policies, tools and instruments in recent years. The APF has been one of the instruments deployed in the two areas where efforts to develop a comprehensive approach have occurred, namely Somalia and Mali.

Lastly, as discussed above, the EU Delegation to the AU has played a leadership role in the African Union Partner Group (AUPG) and has played an important role in harmonising donor contributions to the AUC through the two JFAs.
To what extent have the availability of funding, human resource capacities and the regulatory/administrative framework of the EU and the AU/RECs/RMs contributed to, or hindered achievement of, APF objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner?

This question relates to the evaluation criterion of efficiency.

It analyses the degree to which the mix and sequencing of financing for the APF, human resource capacities, aid delivery methods and the regulatory/administrative framework have enabled the APF to achieve its expected results in a cost-effective and timely manner. It examines these issues in relation to the EU, the AU and RECs/RMs.

Issues related to the nature and quality of policy dialogue between EU and African stakeholders aimed at improving APF implementation are dealt with under EQ 3. The issue of coordination between different EU financing instruments is addressed under EQ7.

**EQ 8 on Efficiency of Implementation – Summary of Findings**

Although constraints stemming from financing, human resource capacities and administrative frameworks within the EU, the AU and the RECs/RMs have been apparent during the period under review, each of these institutions have sought to improve efficiency of implementation which has resulted in improvements in overall APF performance.

The APF has been funded by the EDF, a source of funding which has given more “latitude” to the instrument in terms of the activities it could fund, but which has meant a lengthy process of approval of funding decisions.\(^{26}\) The EU has sought to address the issue of timeliness by increasing the flexibility of its financial management, especially in the case of PSOs, and by creating the ERM which has opened a new window of rapid funding for mediation activities, in particular. There has been a consistent focus by the EU on taking advantage of its institutional set-up and capacities to improve APF efficiency.

Starting from a relatively low base, the administrative and management capacities of the AU PSD have improved significantly over the lifetime of the APF, particularly in the area of financial management. Measures taken in the past three years, notably the use of an APF expert pool have contributed to addressing these challenges and there have been concrete improvements. Nevertheless, significant institutional challenges affecting the timely and cost-effective implementation of APF activities remain which impact upon planning and management processes. These relate primarily to management, budgetary issues and staff recruitment.

The performance of the RECs/RMs with respect to the implementation of APF-funded activities has varied significantly reflecting their different levels of institutional development and operating contexts; while a number have improved their capacity, others still face significant challenges in managing APF activities and resources. The efficiency of APF funding has been heavily dependent on other human and financial capacities being in place which the APF has had little control over. But there have been some encouraging developments as the AU PSD’s own capacity to monitor and support the RECs/RMs has been reinforced in recent years.

\(^{26}\) This statement does not imply that another source of funding such as the general EU Budget would have been faster; it only states that EDF procedures have been cumbersome.
JC 8.1 Extent to which the EU's regulatory/administrative set-up and capacities have enhanced the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of its support for the APF.

The EU's procedural and financial systems are cumbersome and this has generally hampered its ability to respond efficiently to AU requests for financial assistance.

Commission, EEAS and Council officials interviewed concurred that the processes involved in the approval and disbursement of APF funding have been slow. This view was also shared by African partners, including the Finance Division within AU PSD. These problems are not specific to the APF, however, and stem from the complex bureaucratic and political procedures that need to be followed within the EU system to approve and disburse funding. This is particularly the case of the European Development Fund (EDF), from which the APF is financed. Though it does have a particularly lengthy approval process, it has also given the APF more “latitude” in terms of the activities it can support because a limited portion of EDF funds can be used to fund “non-DACable” activities.

The Commission’s use of Contribution Agreements and Grant Agreements to finance APF activities, which is standard for EDF programmes, has nonetheless also caused delays. One key reason is that these agreements are complex and the beneficiary organisations have had difficulties understanding the procedures involved in each agreement and how to comply with the financial management and reporting requirements. Grant Agreements effectively imply that African partners use European procedures, which has made compliance more challenging. This has often led to delays in disbursements. Furthermore, as the same procedures apply regardless of the size (i.e. the amount) of the contract, the process is slow for even very small financial agreements. There is clear indication, nonetheless, that understanding of and compliance with the terms of these agreements has improved significantly over time.

In addition to these administrative challenges, the sensitivity of peace and security activities in Africa for European Member States has further complicated approval procedures. Indeed, prior to any Commission decision on EDF funding, the Commission has had to submit a note for approval to the PSC on “political appropriateness”. The whole process has taken on average between 2-3 months for each contract. Thus, the process has applied not only to the global decision on the Three-Year Action Programmes (2008-2010 and 2011-2013), but also to each individual funding proposal under each of these programmes.

Over the evaluation period, the Commission has nevertheless sought ways to simplify the procedures which its African partners need to follow and to be more flexible in its own approval and disbursement processes. This was particularly the case with regard to funding for PSOs and mediation activities, where major delays can have serious political consequences.

The Commission has demonstrated flexibility in a number of ways when applying financial regulations:

- First, by signing Contribution Agreements with the AU despite the fact that it had not passed the four-pillar assessment certifying that its financial procedures and systems

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27 This evaluation did not assess whether another source of funding such as the general EU Budget would have been more rapid and better suited to the APF. Issues around alternative sources of funding were examined in Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation (2011).

28 The Commission typically uses grant agreements when implementing organisations do not comply with internationally-accepted financial management standards, i.e. compliance with the so-called “four pillars” of financial management (internal control, accounting, auditing, and procurement).
were of an appropriate standard to satisfactorily manage EU funds. The decision to do this was driven by the urgency to channel funding to the AU so that it would have the means to undertake important security actions and be seen to be doing so in an autonomous fashion. Ultimately, this decision was a political gesture to encourage the AU to step up to its responsibilities, including strengthening its institutional processes. But there is no evidence that this contributed to a swifter or more efficient implementation of APF activities; rather it resulted in a situation where the AU was being given relatively large amounts of funds which it was not, initially, adequately capacitated to handle.

- Second, by allowing ‘retro-active’ funding in the case of PSOs such as AMISOM and MICOPAX so that expenditures pre-financed by the AU or ECCAS can be reimbursed with APF funds. This measure has helped to ensure the regularity and timeliness of payments for food and troop allowances which was difficult to achieve given the short nature of contracts, and the lengthy approval process for follow-on contracts.

- Third, by adopting several derogations to usual contractual procedures, for instance in relation to procurement, as a consequence of the crisis situation in the CAR.

Development of the Early Response Mechanism is another example of how the EU has sought to adapt its procedures to needs on the ground. In 2009, it became clear that there were gaps in funding for certain important activities, including mediation activities, fact-finding missions for future PSOs, and the establishment of planning cells for PSOs, each of which typically required a rapid approval and disbursement of funding. The ERM made it possible for the AU to disburse funds for these activities, on the written approval of the Commission, within a period of ten days. To date, the ERM has mainly been used to fund mediation efforts. In fact, in trying to improve the timeliness of its support, the EU has developed a tool that is particularly well-suited to the unpredictability of mediation needs given its rapid disbursement capability and its light procedures (simplified budget, for example).

In practice, however, disbursements of ERM funds by the AU have often taken longer than anticipated and, in some cases, significantly so, due to bureaucratic and political constraints. In addition, while the ERM has improved the reactivity of the APF to situations requiring rapid response, it is limited in terms of what it can fund, and for how long. Overall, the funds allocated to the ERM constitute only a small portion of overall APF funding (approximately 2% of committed funds under EDF 10). While this has been sufficient thus far to meet the formal requests for assistance made to the AU/EU, needs are clearly greater. APF beneficiaries, particularly the RECs/RMs, have not yet been able to take full advantage of what the ERM offers due to capacity constraints.

The Lisbon Treaty has necessitated certain adjustments in APF management namely by clarifying the division-of-labour between DEVCO and the EEAS, though the full impact of these changes on how APF assistance is delivered is still not clear.

Before the creation of the EEAS in December 2010, different DGs worked together on the programming and implementation of the APF. With the entry into force of Lisbon, responsibilities were more formally split between the Commission and the EEAS. A two-page document was drafted in January 2013 to formalise this division of labour, with the operational unit “Africa-EU Partnership, Peace Facility” in the Commission’s DG DEVCO charged with implementation, and its sister unit in the EEAS “Pan-African affairs” tasked with leading on political orientation and the interface with EU Member States.

However, the new working relationship is still very much work in progress by mid-2013. The division of tasks and the sequencing of decision-making processes remain vague, with the document stating for example that both services be informed or that certain issues be “addressed jointly”. In practice, this can lead to confusion regarding at what point an EU Delegation should begin to engage in terms of implementing a decision, or who the
appropriate interlocutor (EEAS or DEVCO) would be for African partners, in certain situations.

Notwithstanding the division-of-labour between the EEAS and Commission on APF matters, the day-to-day responsibilities for managing the APF have largely been shouldered by the Commission APF unit which is a relatively small team.

Previous EQs have identified two sets of issues that have impacted negatively on the efficiency of APF implementation, namely the centralised nature of APF management (see EQ 7), and the relatively limited engagement by the Commission APF Unit in on-the-ground monitoring of programme implementation (see EQ 2). This reflects a number of factors including the large amounts of money being disbursed through the APF and the heavily bureaucratic and political nature of the approval process, both of which have resulted in a disproportionate amount of staff time being spent on developing proposals and ‘accompanying’ them through each step of the approval process.

JC 8.2 Extent to which the administrative, planning and regulatory set-up within the AU has allowed for the timely and cost-effective implementation of APF activities.

Starting from a relatively low base, the administrative and management capacities of the AU PSD have improved significantly over the lifetime of the APF, particularly since 2010 and in the area of financial management. Nevertheless, institutional challenges affecting the timely and cost-effective implementation of APF activities remain which impact upon administrative, planning and management processes.

AU capacity building has been a target of the APF since its inception, particularly in view of the AU’s failure to pass the first four-pillar assessment it underwent. In 2007, the Djibouti Lessons Learned exercise identified the main constraints in the following areas (i) financial management; (ii) operational planning; (iii) long-term capacity building planning; (iv) and staffing and modernisation of human resources management. With APF support, efforts have been made to tackle these constraints by hiring staff through the programme budget, by deploying technical assistance through framework contracts, and by setting up an APF expert pool in 2010.

Additionally there have been changes in procedures prompted by EU oversight of AUC financial management processes and procedures. Following the signing of two Aide Memoires on AUC Financial Management and EC Cooperation in 2009 and 2011, concrete measures to strengthen capacity were undertaken. AU PSD Finance Division still falls short in terms of attaining international financial management standards, but key indications of progress include the following:

- the decreasing number of ineligible expenditures in the different APF projects, especially PSOs (AMISOM).
- the Programme Management Team (PMT) has developed its capacity as a service-providing team, assisting PSD staff access APF resources and report more effectively in line with EU regulations;
- efforts have been made to strengthen personnel management by linking the AU PSD work-plan with goals of individual AU staff members and providing enhanced career incentives for them;
- AU PSD is playing a more active role in overseeing implementation of APSA support programme activities by the RECs/RMs, notably by reviewing work-plans, conducting periodic monitoring missions, controlling expenditures, and advising on various aspects of programme management.
• As AU PSD has built up its own staff capacity, this has put it in a position to second staff to other institutions – the most recent case in point being the integrated management team established to support AFISMA which is based both in Abuja and Bamako.

• Finally, the AU PSD is increasingly exercising its authority and showing a willingness to sanction regional beneficiaries of APF funds who are not complying with APF regulations – the case in point here being the decision taken in 2012 by the AU to suspend disbursement of funds to ECCAS.

Despite these positive developments, significant challenges have persisted and have affected the timely and cost-effective implementation of APF activities:

• First, there has continued to be a disconnect between the AU’s ambitious mandate in the area of peace and security and its available budget. The APF was never intended to meet all needs, though as the scope and scale of AU peace and security activities have grown, expectations about what the APF can contribute have also increased.

• Second, collaboration and information sharing between AU PSD and AU Directorate for Strategic Planning has remained inadequate even though peace and security have been included in AU strategic planning for the period 2014-2017. Collaboration between the different AU PSD divisions has also been insufficient;

• Third, staff recruitment in PSD has been hampered both by the lack of a clear human resource policy and strategy for the department that links available posts with specific skills and expertise, and inefficiencies within the Directorate of Administration and Human Resources which greatly lengthen recruitment processes;

• Fourth, the problems of human resource planning and staff recruitment identified above have resulted in a relatively weak tier of middle management staff in PSD which has made it more difficult for senior managers to delegate tasks and thereby to improve the efficiency of project management and implementation.

JC 8.3 Extent to which the administrative, planning and regulatory set-up within the RECs/RMs has allowed for the timely and cost-effective implementation of APF activities.

The performance of the RECs/RMs with respect to the implementation of APF-funded activities has varied significantly reflecting their different levels of institutional development and operating contexts; while a number have improved their capacity, others still face significant challenges in managing APF activities and resources.

The nine regional organisations that signed the 2008 MoU with the AU on peace and security have faced different institutional challenges. While a number are quite well established, others such as NARC have only more recently begun operations. Each REC/RM has had varying support from its member states, reflecting political and economic realities. Work in the area of peace and security, which has been relatively new for all of them, has in certain cases been sensitive for Member States. Some organisations, like ECOWAS, were not originally established to manage assistance programmes, which has constrained their effectiveness in this area. As a consequence, the picture of REC/RM capacity in the area of peace and security more generally, and with regard to managing APF resources and activities specifically, over the period examined by this evaluation, is very mixed – some have performed well, others very poorly.

All of the RECs/RMs have received assistance under the various APF capacity building programmes under EDF10, including the current APSA support programme. But each
organisation’s ability to benefit from this APF assistance has been affected by three inter-related sets of factors:

- **First,** most of the RECs/RMs, to one degree or another, face wider institutional challenges in developing core capacities which constrain work in the area of peace and security. These challenges include, among others, weaknesses in strategic planning, financial and human resource management, programme management, etc. and have contributed to an unclear division-of-labour between the different departments.

- **Second,** efforts to overcome these institutional challenges have been constrained by different factors, including management problems and inadequate funding. Most RECs/RMs have been primarily reliant on the contributions of their Member States to function, but the latter have not always been willing or able to provide the required funding, or have not done so in a timely manner for both political and economic reasons. In the case of SADC and ECCAS, for instance, Member States have traditionally kept tight control over peace and security-related matters, curtailing the autonomy of their regional organisations in this area. In the case of NARC, the recent political instability and uncertainty engendered by the Arab Spring prevented Defence Ministers convening for their annual meeting in 2012 at which the budget would normally have been approved, allowing funding to be disbursed.

As a consequence, with funding for core staff positions in many RECs/RMs limited, they have been covered through a combination of staff seconded staff from regional Member States or staff financed by donors, including the APF. This has implied different types of recruitment processes and contracts with different conditions making it difficult to obtain a cohesive workforce. With regard to the APF specifically, cash flow problems experienced in a number of RECs that were visited during this evaluation, including both SADC and ECOWAS, resulted in a situation where funds were not on hand to hire key staff, which has delayed APF activities.

- **Third,** the problem of a cohesive workforce has been further compounded by weak human resource management. As a result, departments/units have been understaffed or not staffed at all, such as the mediation unit in ECOWAS. Available staff have not always been sufficiently qualified because the skills required for the posts in question have not been carefully assessed. In addition, recruitment processes have frequently been slow for different reasons and key posts have remained unfilled, sometimes for years, because Member States have failed to nominate candidates. As an example, ECCAS went for two years without a Head of Administration and Budget Department and the Early Warning unit, MARAC, was also without a head for several years, for the same reason.

These broader institutional constraints have been beyond the mandate of the APF to address, but they have nonetheless affected APF activities in the peace and security areas directly. As a consequence, the APF has sought to enhance capacity within the relevant units responsible for activities in various ways.

**APF-funded efforts to build the capacity of RECs/RMs under the APSA Support programme have had mixed results, but there have been some encouraging developments as the AU PSD’s own capacity to monitor and support the RECs/RMs has been reinforced in recent years.**

APF capacity building in RECs/RMs has faced several broad constraints. First, it has financed primarily short-term capacity building, providing salary support to enable RECs/RMs to hire staff so that certain critical peace and security functions such as managing PSOs or developing CEWS and the ASF could be carried out. These capacity enhancements have in many cases been “temporary fixes” which have not addressed deeper constraints to institution building and there have been serious questions about sustainability.
Second, under the APSA Support Programme, the primary actor responsible for oversight and support of REC/RM capacity building has been the AU whose programme management unit has itself been in the process of building its capacity. This has limited its ability to systematically monitor what RECs/RMs are doing, and to provide advice and support accordingly. Financial management has been the key area where the AU PMT has a mandate to support the RECs/RMs. As the AU PSD’s capacity has grown in recent years, it has played a stronger role in assisting the RECs/RMs to comply with the EUs stringent funding rules and procedures.
5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter presents the Evaluation Team’s overall assessment of the APF’s performance during the period under review, and its key conclusions. These conclusions are based on the findings and analysis presented in Chapter 4: “Answers to the Evaluation Questions”.

5.1 Overall assessment of APF Performance

The APF has been a game changer in terms of making possible a growing number of African-led responses to political crises on the continent. Since 2004, the APF has funded a number of major PSOs, including AMISOM in Somalia and AFISMA in Mali, which have been authorised and executed by the AU and regional organisations. By providing the resources for these bodies to act, the APF has enabled collective African security actions anchored in the nascent Peace and Security Council’s political role which has enabled it to be tested and put into action. In addition, it has provided extensive support for operationalisation of APSA which might otherwise not have occurred due to African resource constraints and variable commitment by African states to the APSA project.

These APF-supported actions have had a direct and positive impact on the lives of millions of Africans affected by political crisis and confirm the continuing need for and relevance of this instrument. These actions have also given the EU an important role in addressing conflict on the continent, with the enhanced political credibility and influence this brings, and have enabled it to add value in important ways to the peace and security actions of European Member States. Significantly, the core principles of Africa-EU partnership, African ownership, and African solidarity which underpin the APF have marked a departure from past interventionist policies by European countries. In particular, the APF’s development orientation has sent a message to African partners that the security of its nations and peoples should not be held hostage to the foreign policy priorities of outside powers.

The APF has been a highly innovative instrument, not least by enabling the use of EU development cooperation funds to address peace and security/military issues. It has demonstrated the flexibility to evolve in the face of changing circumstances and needs. In response to African partners’ concerns, the APF broadened its scope in 2007 to more fully encompass conflict prevention activities. Development of the ERM two years later has facilitated increased mediation efforts to manage political crises. These positive developments have nonetheless also led to growing expectations about what can be achieved through the APF and the level of resources it can provide, which may not be realistic under the circumstances.

From its inception, the APF has faced a serious dilemma which has not been easy to overcome: it is a financial instrument which is meant to support the delivery of security by African organisations, but can only achieve this objective effectively under certain conditions which are not fully within its control. First, the APF’s African partners need to have the capacity to plan and execute PSOs and other relevant activities and to manage the funding provided by the APF. Second, the EC/EEAS must allocate sufficient human resources to effectively manage APF activities and monitor the use of APF funding, tasks which require a presence both in Brussels and in Africa. Third, because needs always outstrip available resources, it is essential that the APF partners develop a well-prioritised strategic plan for maximising the impact of APF funding.

The effectiveness of APF support over the evaluation period has been blunted because the institutional base of the AU/RECs/RMs is weak. In recognition that this would be an issue, the APF designers gave it the dual mandate to combine short-term support to PSOs with longer-term capacity building with a view to operationalising APSA. It was never anticipated
that the APF would address these objectives single-handedly – the APF is just one instrument within a collective international effort. At the EU level, other tools such as the Ifs, regional programmes, and CSDP have also contributed to this effort. Nevertheless, it is the APF which has led EU efforts to enhance capacity in the peace and security arena, recording some notable achievements in the AU PSD, certain RECs/RMs and AMISOM, and particularly in the area of financial management. This has been necessary because other EU capacity building instruments either have not been engaged in peace and security or because they have not engaged at a continental level.

For a number of reasons, however, the implementing environment has not been conducive to solid, long-term capacity building using APF resources. These reasons include the pressing need for short-term AU responses to armed conflict, the lack of adequate complementarity between EU and non-EU funding sources, and AU and EU human resource constraints. There has been strong consensus between African and EU partners on the need to tackle major crises, as a consequence of which facilitating rapid troop deployments has not surprisingly taken precedence over building the capacities required to deliver PSOs effectively and strengthen APSA. The latter two tasks have complex political and institutional dimensions, requiring active engagement by African Member States and a scale of support which is outside the scope of the APF alone.

A similar picture is apparent on the financing side where the early ambition of making long-term financial stability a feature of the APF has not been achieved. Despite the fact that 765 million euros were spent over 2004-2012, in practice political sensitivities around APF funding on the EU side have lengthened an already bureaucratic decision-making process. This has slowed disbursement, often leaving PSOs stretched for resources, particularly at the end of an EDF cycle. Furthermore, although it was never envisaged that the EU would cover all APF financing needs, other expected international contributions have not materialised and parallel contributions by African states have been fewer than expected. This has not only made it difficult for the African states to fulfil a meaningful role as “partner”, but has also weakened their ownership of the APF.

Despite these challenges, the APF has been and will remain for the foreseeable future the most important EU instrument to shape and support African responses to violent conflict on the continent. But the long-term objective of enabling African-led solutions to the continent’s crises is still “work-in-progress” as illustrated by the challenges of setting up the AFISMA operation in Mali. Although the task of institution building is not complete, the AU and regional organisations are under pressure to take on new tasks related to counter-terrorism and security sector reform, among others, which they remain ill-equipped to deliver. This highlights the critical need to carefully align the strategic security outcomes which European countries desire with the needs, priorities and capabilities of African partners. For the APF, this requires serious prioritization.

This evaluation echoes a key conclusion of the 2006 Mid-Term review which is that the big picture issue for the APF should really be about building up the capacity of APSA. Notwithstanding the fact that 90% of APF funds are spent on PSOs, this is not fundamentally an issue of funding per se, nor an issue exclusively for the APF. Rather it is about ensuring that this broader APF strategic orientation is adequately catered for by a clear, focused and long-term capacity building agenda. This must clearly identify the APF’s comparative advantage and where it should focus its funding, be adequately supported by African Member States in terms of both financing and priority setting, and be appropriately matched by the EU with other tools that complement the APF’s strengths.

These issues are examined further in the Evaluation Conclusions which follow.
5.2 Conclusions

Conclusion 1: Partnership and ownership

The Africa-EU partnership has evolved and matured significantly since 2004, though African ownership of the APF has been weakened by the limited financial contributions of African states and variable political commitment to the APSA project.

The Africa-EU partnership has matured significantly since 2004 as evidenced by the quality and frequency of the dialogue. There has been significant common ground between the EU and Africa regarding the need for the APF and its relevance to the current political and security context. Conceptually, the AU was seen from the outset as a fully-fledged partner with a responsibility to cover some of the costs. By placing APF funds at the disposal of the P&S Council, this has given it the authority to undertake real action in pursuit of African interests. The establishment of a genuine partnership was therefore also the basis for Africans to own the APF, including both its strategy and activities, and to exercise meaningful leadership in response to Africa’s peace and security challenges.

Although the APF was designed to be financed by both African and international resources, it has de facto become an EU-funded instrument which has had a damaging effect on African ownership of the APF. Furthermore, with a number of key leadership changes since 2004, some of the initial support for the APF among African states has dissipated. African states’ inability or reluctance to contribute a larger share of the APF budget has diminished the P&S Council’s authority. While it has authorised a range of African peace and security actions, its political engagement around these processes has often been weak. This has reduced the PSC’s scrutiny and interest in how the AUC manages these resources, leaving the AUC financially accountable (to the EU) but not politically accountable for the actions it manages.

The question of African ownership of the APF impacts directly on the success of the long-term strategy for operationalising APSA as well as efforts to develop viable exit strategies for PSO support. The former will require increased engagement on peace and security issues by AU member states, through the PSC, in the form of agenda and priority setting for the APF and APSA initiatives. The latter is dependent on enhancing resource mobilisation from African states. Addressing these issues will require a political approach that goes well beyond the APF, but it has a crucial role to play in highlighting what is at stake in terms of developing robust and sustainable African peace and security capabilities, setting the agenda for change, and influencing both African and EU partners to address the key issues.

Conclusion 2: Strategic orientation

The APF’s strategic orientation has broadened since 2004 from a focus on PSOs to more fully encompass wider APSA development, though this has spread the APF very thin in terms of financing and human capacities and increased pressure on it to achieve more with fewer resources.

APSA was conceived as the back-bone of African responses to political crisis. The designers’ intention was that core capabilities would be evolved across the conflict response spectrum enabling the AU i) to forestall the eruption of violence through mediation and other preventive activities, ii) to manage, contain and eventually quell violence - where it does erupt - through PSOs, and iii) to prevent a relapse of violence through reconstruction and peace-building activities. Each of these APSA capabilities was seen as vital to enabling...
Africa to respond in a comprehensive and integrated manner to conflict, though in practice these capabilities have developed at varying speeds.

The APF was established to address a very specific barrier to collective African responses to conflict through PSOs which was the lack of funds, without which the AU could not undertake real action. Recognising that institutional development would also be key to achieving effective PSOs and operationalising APSA, the APF was also given a wider capacity building mandate. Over time, in response to new political and security dynamics, pressures have grown on the APF to provide more support for development of other APSA capabilities, in particular its missing conflict prevention and peace-building dimensions. While the bulk of the €765 million spent since 2004 has financed PSOs, capacity building has increasingly taken up a greater proportion of APF attention and human resources.

This broadening of the APF’s mandate has enabled the instrument to better mirror the ‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ nature of the APSA that it is seeking to support. But it has also to a certain extent blunted the APF's strategic focus as it has been pushed to support a widening range of activities with neither the financial nor human resources to do so effectively. Faced with Africa’s immense security challenges and APSA’s weaknesses, APF resources fall short of what is required to effectively meet all needs. Notwithstanding the real successes achieved, the APF has been spread too thin, and has not been adequately complemented by other funding sources. Thus, a clear strategic approach to operationalising APSA and decisions on what elements of this strategic approach APF is best suited to supporting are urgently required.

In question here is not the focus on short-term support to African-led PSOs. This has been a priority for both Africa and the EU since the APF’s inception and the APF remains the only EU (and international) instrument that can do this. Neither is it the focus on supporting the operationalisation of APSA, which provides an essential platform for developing effective short and long-term African responses to conflict. The two key questions, rather, are: first, which aspects of capacity building are most necessary to effectively support PSOs?; and, second, where does the APF have a comparative advantage in supporting longer-term APSA development in relation to other EU instruments and donors which may be better suited to addressing certain capabilities?

During the period under review, externally-funded capacity development processes, including the APF, have focused on building technical capabilities within the AU and RECs/RMs which are not adequately supported by an enabling political and institutional framework. The assumption has been that the longer-term institutional development processes - widely accepted by all as essential - will eventually emerge as African “political will” crystallises and more resources become available on the back of economic growth and efficiency gains within African governments. While this may very well occur over the long-term, thus far (and this problem will remain for the foreseeable future) political, financial and institutional deficits have directly constrained African responses to conflict to an extent that has not been adequately recognised or factored into APF strategic planning.

As a consequence, the use of APF resources within the PSO and Capacity Building components, in particular, has not been adequately prioritised. The AU and the RECs/RMs have had their own strategic plans (with annual work-plans), and roadmaps (with their own annual work-plans) have been developed to guide both APSA and APF-financed activities such as the APSA Support Programme, the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System. However, there has by and large not been a sufficiently strategic approach to priority setting taking into account overall limitations in APF resources, differing regional needs, and inputs from other funding partners.
The linkage between priority APSA outcomes and specific policy objectives, on the one hand, and activities and resource allocation, on the other hand, has been far from evident. In many cases funding has determined priorities rather than the good practice approach of priorities leading resource allocation. This has led to a situation in which it has been difficult to say that the APF has financed the highest priority APSA needs or that APF resources have been used as appropriately and effectively as possible. The APF has not adopted a systematic, long-term approach either to assessing peace and security needs within its partner organisations, the RECs/RMs in particular, or supporting the development of PSO capacity and capabilities for conflict prevention and peace-building. While it is the responsibility of the AUC and the RECs/RMs to lead on these tasks of strategic planning and prioritisation, these are areas where increased EU support could have significant benefits.

Conclusion 3: Institutional development

| APF has contributed to improvements in selected functions within AU PSD and the peace and security departments of the RECs/RMs, particularly around financial management, but these improvements have often been undermined by wider institutional constraints which are not within the APF’s mandate to address. |

Effective PSOs must be backed by effective institutions. When the APF was first established, it was generally assumed that the AU and regional organisations had the requisite administrative, planning and financial management capacity to plan and manage PSOs. In consequence, facilitating rapid troop deployments took precedence over building the capabilities to deliver PSOs effectively and strengthen the wider African peace and security architecture. However it became evident that significant institutional strengthening was required for the organisations to use APF money effectively and efficiently – this was a key lesson from AMIS that has been taken on board by the teams supporting both AMISOM and AFISMA, with positive effects.

Nevertheless, from the outset, APF capacity building has faced two broad constraints. First, it has financed primarily short-term capacity building, providing salary support to enable African institutions to hire staff so that certain critical peace and security functions such managing PSOs or developing CEWS and the ASF could be carried out. While this capacity has enabled the AU and, to a lesser extent, the REC/RMs to engage more effectively in the area of P&S, these have been “temporary fixes” which have not addressed deeper constraints to institution building and there have been serious questions about sustainability (see Conclusion 5).

Second, the AU and some of the REC/RMs have confronted fundamental institutional weaknesses in areas such as administration, human resources, and programme and financial management which have undermined APF efforts in the area of peace and security. However, strengthening core institutional capacities of the AU/REC/RMs was not within the APF’s mandate and there appears not to have been an adequate understanding of how these gaps would impact on APF’s own activities and objectives or the need to engage with other actors that could complement APF activities.

As a consequence, the EU has not done enough to develop partnerships with regional programmes, or encourage other actors such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank to undertake institutional strengthening programmes. Rather than creating capacity solely within Peace and Security departments, which has been the APF focus, it might then have been possible to support the development of core functions such as strategic planning, finance or human resources with the AU/RECs/RMs instead of duplicating these functions in Peace and Security departments.
Financial management within the AUC’s Peace and Security Department is one area where the APF has given serious attention to institutional capacity development – that is, the creation of systems and processes and ensuring that staff have the capacity to effectively operate those systems and processes. This focus was understandable given the lessons learned from AMIS about financial management, but again the lack of adequate attention to wider programme management constraints within AU PSD has reduced the effectiveness of APF investments.

Equally problematic, considerably less attention has been given to the RECs/RMs, some of which have faced significant capacity shortfalls in financial management, planning and administration. This has in turn affected their capacity to undertake peace and security tasks. Part of the problem may have stemmed from the fact that the AU has primarily been responsible for delivering the APSA Support and Training Centres Programmes, including monitoring and oversight, at a time when its own capacity was relatively weak. As the AU PSD’s capacity has grown in recent years, it has played a stronger role in assisting the RECs/RMs to comply with the EUs stringent funding rules and procedures.

But these APF experiences confirm the very real limitations of a selective approach to capacity building within the peace and security area when core institutions are weak. The AU and the RECs/RMs understandably still believe they can benefit from APF support in these circumstances, and hence there continues to be a strong demand for APF support. But greater attention is required to how these “temporary fixes”, which in some cases have been vital in achieving key security objectives, will contribute to wider organisational strengthening so that the gains achieved through APF financing can be sustained. This is both an EU/APF and beneficiary responsibility.

**Conclusion 4: Programme management**

There are a number of critical EU decision-making functions associated with managing the APF that need to be carried out in Brussels, but APF experiences demonstrate a need for increased programme-level monitoring of and technical support for APF activities.

The APF is a centralised funding instrument and has largely been managed from Brussels by the Commission’s APF unit in coordination with the EEAS. In common with all EDF-funded programmes and in view of the need for EU MS to determine the political appropriateness of most APF financing decisions (apart from specific ERM-funded activities), this aspect of APF programme management has by necessity been conducted in Brussels. With regard to other day-to-day programme management activities, which include monitoring, coordination of EU APF-related affairs, and technical support, the small size of the APF management team in the Commission, combined with the challenges of effectively conducting these activities from a distance, have resulted in less emphasis being placed on them than would otherwise be desirable.

There were very different views between Brussels and the Delegations about their respective openness to collaboration on APF matters and what level of devolution of APF activities would be appropriate. It has been strongly suggested by many interlocutors (both EU and AU/REC/RM) that relevant EU Delegations should be tasked with more responsibility for day-to-day programme management, in line with their responsibility for on-the-spot coordination of EU affairs. The two JFAs for AUC Salaries and AU LOs, which are in the process of being devolved to the EU Delegation to the AU, will be the first test case. Given the multiple instances of lack of coordination between the APF and regionally-focused EU strategies or other EU instruments (e.g. DCI, IfS, CSDP), it will be important to assess whether this ‘model’ of devolution could have benefits in other APF areas.
That said, devolution is not a panacea and there were a range of constraints which the Evaluation Team took note of which would not be straight-forward to address. These include, for instance, the shortage of staff in Delegations with an appropriate peace and security/military background which limits their ability to engage constructively on APF matters. The serious staff constraints facing Delegations have, in certain cases, limited their responsiveness to requests from Brussels for inputs into APF matters or support in monitoring activities.

There are three main reasons, however, why a greater degree of devolution could make good sense in certain contexts in order to increase APF responsiveness to local needs. First, one apparent area of weakness in past years has been communications among the different EU actors on APF matters which has also impacted on communications with the AUC and RECs/RMs. While at Brussels level communication between the Commission and the EEAS is well established, there have been more challenges between Brussels and Delegations. Evidence from Addis Ababa nonetheless suggests that Heads of Delegations can enhance communication with African partners where they are given greater responsibility for on-the-spot monitoring of APF-funded programmes such as the JFA salary scheme.

Second, and more fundamentally, long-term capacity building of the kind APF is engaged in is – by its very nature – a politically sensitive, complex “hands-on” business. Financing is necessary, but where the aim is to institute new institutional processes or strengthen existing ones it needs to be accompanied by other inputs. Constant monitoring and mentoring, including leverage, may be required; for this to be effective, a nuanced understanding of beneficiaries’ needs, concerns and programme technicalities is required. Because the view from the ground will differ from that in Brussels, having more than one “voice” is important. In view of this the APF has attached long-term experts with a monitoring role to AMISOM, MICOPAX and AU PSD who work closely with the relevant Delegations, but they also require adequate support and there are limits to what Brussels can provide.

Third, the small Commission APF unit, even with the support it gets from its EEAS counterpart advisers, is already stretched thin. There is a risk that its capacity to engage in in-country monitoring and advising will be further reduced if it is affected by the anticipated staff cuts due to take place across the European Commission in the near future. While there are benefits to cross-regional comparisons and lesson learning which can be facilitated by a central unit, it makes good sense to determine which oversight/TA functions must be carried out in Brussels and which would benefit from greater local support.

**Conclusion 5: Sustainability and impact**

APF-supported gains, both in the area of security and institutional development, rest on precarious foundations due to a lack of adequate, complementary institutional investments by other actors and weak political commitment to the APSA project by African states.

The sustainability of APF support can be measured both in terms of the continuation of specific activities once APF financing has concluded (Continental Early Warning System, for example) and the maintenance of outcomes facilitated by APF financing (enhanced peace and security in Somalia, for example). The evidence collected in the course of this evaluation suggests that there are reasons for concern on both counts.

There has been weak political commitment to peace support operations and implementation of the APSA agenda on the part of some African governments. This has been reflected both in inadequate funding from AU/REC/RM member states and unwillingness on the part of these Member States to allow the organisations to develop the capacity to lead in the sensitive area of peace and security. The political backing required by the AU and the
regional bodies to become effective has often been lacking, as their Member States have been wary of strengthening continental or regional organisations with agendas they were unable to control.

In terms of financing, neither the AU nor the RECs/RMs have had adequate income from their own sources to meet the peace and security mandates approved by their policy organs. Most of the RECs/RMs have experienced serious arrears in annual contributions and while the AU’s arrears have mostly been cleared, the AU regular (Member State-financed) budget has been woefully inadequate to meet the tasks its Member States have asked it to carry out. Discussion about alternative sources of funding and efforts to increase Member States’ contributions have not yet borne fruit. Without continued external financing neither the AU nor the regional bodies would be in a position to maintain the capacity they have acquired through the APF.

As indicated earlier, inadequate African institutional capacity has called into question the sustainability of APF investments. In part this has been because AU/REC/RM regular budgets would not be able to assume responsibility for the staff hired under APF funding in the short term and the willingness of African governments to compensate for reductions in APF (and other external) funding has yet to be demonstrated. Serious weaknesses in institutional capacity, particularly in the area of staffing, have also created significant stumbling blocks for P&S programmes in certain organisations. The AU/REC/RMs have all too often been unable to recruit staff on the basis of experience and expertise due to Member State interference with hiring processes.

Because the APF was not mandated to finance the development of core institutional capacity, the result has been temporary fixes to improve the management and oversight of APF-financed programmes alone (technical assistance, requirements for hiring competent programme managers, and programme accountants). While this has solved a short-term problem, over the medium to longer-term, organisations with weak general administrative, financial, programme and finance management capacities will not be able to manage P&S or critical elements of APSA such as the ASF, the early warning system, or conflict prevention efforts. Addressing broader institutional reform is not within the APF’s remit per se, but the fact that it does affect the sustainability of APF investments should be of real concern to the EU.

The EU appears not to have taken adequate steps to encourage regional programmes and other relevant donor partners to support strengthening of the core administrative and managerial functions of RECs/RMs that are essential to maintain P&S gains. It is possible that more day-to-day engagement by the Commission APF team through the EU Delegations accredited to the AU and the REC/RMs could have facilitated collaboration of this nature and would not have required additional political or security advisers at the Delegations. In addition, Delegations are well-placed to have an overview of what programmes are being funded by different EU/donor instruments and to work on an appropriate division of labour. The EU does not appear to have used the potential political weight afforded by the APF to encourage other international partners to engage in this way.

There has been some coordination of APF support with other international actors, both multilateral and bilateral. However, there has been limited success in getting agreement from international actors to maintain these activities were APF funding to be significantly curtailed. The UN has assumed responsibility for AMIS and MINUSMA, the successor of AFISMA. No agreement has been reached on AMISOM and there have been no obvious candidates to substitute for APF support to MICOPAX. The APF has also been the largest contributor to the two JFAs for the AUC and it was not evident that there were alternatives to APF support. Some of these potential remedies (such as rehating AU PSOs) are, of course, beyond the ability of the APF to deliver and require input from the EU at policy and political levels.
In certain cases, it may be appropriate for the EU because of its added value (critical mass of funding, convening power among EU Member States, perceived political neutrality, etc.) to take the lead in ensuring that donors work within an agreed strategic approach. The case of the EU Delegation to the AU which supports management of the two JFA schemes is an example of how this works which could potentially be extended to other regions.

**Conclusion 6: Synergies between EU instruments**

The APF is the principal EU instrument for addressing peace and security issues in Africa but has not had the impact it might otherwise have had due to weak complementarity between the APF and the EU’s other financing and political tools, including the RIPs.

The EU disposes of a large number of political, development and security tools that it has used to support peace and security activities in Africa as well as broader political and institutional development processes. While there have been examples of coordination or joint planning between the APF and different instruments (including those of EU member states), this has neither occurred in a systematic manner nor been informed by an overall strategic or ‘comprehensive’ plan for EU engagement in support of peace and security organisations in Africa. As a consequence, the institutional pre-conditions necessary for APF funding to contribute effectively to these outcomes have often been missing and potential synergies among the various tools have not been maximised.

Politically high profile crises such as Somalia and Mali have benefited the most from coordination and efforts to develop a ‘comprehensive approach’ integrating the EU’s multiple tools (and this reflects lessons learned from other experiences), but even there gaps have been evident, notably at the technical level.

The problems have been most evident with regard to APF efforts to enhance the capacity of regional organisations in the area of peace and security. Many of the REC/RMs have not had adequate capacity to manage APF activities, to conduct strategic planning, and to meet basic reporting requirements. Capacity gaps that have affected the operation of APF-financed activities have been filled, to the extent possible, through the provision of technical assistance. However, some RECs have faced more fundamental institutional problems cutting across the organisation which the APF has had neither the mandate nor resources to address and which have required a broader, long-term process of institutional development to address. The RIPs have been mandated to address this need, and there have been discussions between the APF and certain RIPs, for instance in the ECOWAS case, aimed at fostering long-term capacity building as a means of promoting the sustainability of APF-financed activities. But there is more scope for complementarity between the APF and RIPs in this area.

Specifically with regard to peace and security issues, the weak complementarity between the APF and the RIPs stems from various factors. The RIPs only began to address P&S issues under EDF10 and some RIP programmes have not yet been launched. Improvements in communication on APF matters between the Commission’s APF unit in Brussels and EU Delegations in the last few years has resulted in more joint planning and coordination. Furthermore, because the Delegations only began to engage in peace and security issues during EDF10, their capacity, as discussed earlier, has been weak. While there have been some instances of duplication, the regional programmes may be better placed to undertake certain types of peace and security activities that are not military in nature and which are regional specific.

But it should also be noted that regional programmes have not required a peace and security mandate to engage in strengthening broader institutions and that the decision not to do so in...
certain cases, where quite clearly there was a need, may have stemmed from an under-appreciation of the core weaknesses of regional organisations. In the cases of both ECOWAS and ECCAS, this was made evident by the failure to pass their four-pillar assessments and generally low rates of implementation/eligibility for EU-funded projects. In the case of ECOWAS, this has resulted in the Abuja Delegation making capacity building a core focus of its support for ECOWAS under the current Conflict Prevention framework financed through the RIP. This will be of benefit to the APF-funded activities which have suffered from a weak project management culture within the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

Conclusion 7: Innovation and value added

The APF has been an innovative and dynamic instrument which has evolved in response to changing circumstances and needs and which has enabled the EU to provided value added in important ways to European Member States’ peace and security initiatives in Africa.

The APF has been a highly innovative instrument in three ways:

- first, by making possible the practical application of the security and development nexus by using a development cooperation instrument to promote peace and security objectives covered under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
- second, by making available to the AU a substantial pot of funds with which to finance African-led PSOs and support the operationalisation of APSA. This made possible a critical political break-through in the development of Africa’s P&S capacity by enabling the Peace and Security Council to take collective security action on behalf of African member states in response to a number of urgent political crises including those in the Comoros, Darfur and Somalia; and
- third, by making provisions for a parallel financial contribution from African countries, through a “slicing mechanism” used under EDF9, so that it would not be a purely EU funding instrument.

However, the APF’s experiences have exposed some of the limitations of these innovations. This was particularly apparent in the Darfur AMIS operation where, in the urgency to deploy a PSO, funding was provided without adequate pre-deployment planning and robust procedures to ensure satisfactory programme (particularly financial) management. The scale of problems faced, which became apparent following audits of AMIS finances, brought home the necessity for the APF to invest in a much more systematic manner in reinforcing institutional processes both at the AU and REC/RM levels.

An internal APF process of reflection (including the 2007 Djibouti Lessons Learned Seminar) gave rise to various innovations including the ERM and the APF TA service contracting mechanism which have increased the flexibility and responsiveness of the APF. In addition, two Aide Memoires (2009 and 2011) were key in framing and achieving EU and AU agreement on the key changes that needed to occur. This has subsequently informed capacity building efforts within the AU PSD, and later at the regional level, which have also influenced the design of the financial management structures of AMISOM and, most recently, AFISMA.

In recognition of the importance of lesson learning, this has been a key theme in the EDF10 Three-Year Action Programmes, with financial provision made for this. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the APF’s ability to innovate and adapt to changing circumstances and needs have been constrained by a number of factors including general limitations in institutional capacity both on the EU and African sides, not least of all in the area of
programme monitoring. This has limited the scope for structured and systematic joint EU-AU lesson learning processes.

The innovative nature of the APF has made it possible for the EU to add value to the peace and security efforts of European member states on the African continent in a number of important ways. First, by pooling funds it has been possible for the EU to achieve the critical mass of funding necessary to support various African PSOs over an extended period of time. Both the level of funding and its durability have been beyond what individual European member states could do. Second, the APF has made possible more coordinated and sustained support for regional and continental peace and security initiatives such as the APSA and its various component parts. This has been possible because the EU benefits from a network of Delegations across the continent and a range of funding instruments, notwithstanding the challenges identified in the previous conclusion with regard to creating synergies between these tools. Third, the EU as a supranational organisation enjoys convening power which it has used on occasion to encourage strategic coordination among its Member States with regard to certain APF activities.

These areas of added value have also had benefits for the AU/RECs/RMs as transaction costs for these organisations have been reduced by only having to deal with one European donor on APF-related issues. There is nonetheless scope for the EU to take greater advantage of these areas of added value, particularly by using the political leverage they offer in discussions with the AU and other African partners about addressing the political and structural constraints to APSA implementation.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Situating the recommendations

These recommendations are intended to point the EU towards actions required to address the challenges highlighted in the conclusions of this APF Evaluation.

The recommendations are directed primarily at the European Commission and the EEAS which are the main beneficiaries of this evaluation. Some recommendations also concern EU Member States and the Council of the European Union whose support is crucial to bringing about the required changes.

A number of recommendations, if accepted and implemented, will also impact on the APF’s beneficiaries (the AU and the RECs/RMs) and the EU’s relations with them. As already foreseen by the EU, its African partners will have the opportunity to review the final Evaluation Report and express their views on the findings.

The recommendations are intended to be actionable – that is to say, specific and practical. Some of the recommendations, however, may require changes which are not politically feasible now or which stretch the capacity of the Commission’s APF unit. Keeping in mind the APF’s core objective which is to strengthen African-led responses to the continent’s crises, and the scale of existing challenges in this regard, consideration should also be given to policy options which may offer future promise to make the APF a more effective instrument.

The recommendations are clustered around five themes:

A. Deepening the Africa-EU partnership
B. Sharpening the APF’s strategic focus
C. Stream-lining EU/APF decision-making
D. Strengthening APF capacity building
E. Enhancing EU programme support

6.2 Recommendations

A. Deepening the Africa-EU partnership

Recommendation 1: In view of reinforcing the Africa-EU partnership and giving African countries a greater stake in the development of APSA and the successful implementation of APF-funded activities, the EU (DEVCO/EEAS, Council of the European Union, EU Delegations and Member States) should engage more directly and frequently with the Member States of the AU and the RECs/RMs at both policy and political levels to provide the foundation for a regular dialogue on how to consolidate recent APF gains over the medium to longer-term. This could include, but not be limited to, placing the following issues on the agenda of regular JAES fora such as the annual Commission to Commission meetings and the 2014 EU-Africa Summit:

- the role of the AU/RECs/RMs in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, APSA operationalisation, and how Member States can support this more effectively;
- achieving the necessary political and financial support to enable the AU/RECs/RMs to more effectively address the challenges to P&S at a continental and regional level (first, by addressing political blockages to implementing existing funding decisions;
second, by exploring options for a rise in Member State contributions to the Peace Fund; third, by assessing options for increasing contributions from non-EU donors);

- engaging African publics in discussions of the role played by the AU/REC/RMs in promoting P&S on the continent.

**Recommendation 2:** The EU should explore options to jointly develop with the AU a plan for the latter to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key APSA components currently financed through the APF. As this will require a revision to the Maputo/post-Maputo staffing agreements among AU Member States, it will be important to engage them in this dialogue from the outset. This dialogue should begin as soon as feasible at senior EU/AU levels, with a view to migrating the first staff positions to AU financing within two years.

**Recommendation 3:** The EU, together with its African partners, should assess whether more efforts should be devoted to sensitisation in order to raise awareness of the APF/APSA among key stakeholders (including African Member States) and promote longer-term engagement in support of APSA.

### B: Sharpening the APF’s strategic focus

**Recommendation 4:** In planning for the next phase of APF development under the 11th EDF, the EU should work with the AU/REC/RMs to clarify and sharpen the strategic orientation of the APF with reference both to the component areas/activities it is best placed to concentrate on and those areas where other actors are better placed to provide support. The basis for this strategic reflection should be an explicit recognition that the APF cannot effectively support all areas across the spectrum of African conflict response or APSA development which it is increasingly being drawn into, including conflict prevention, stabilisation, resolution and reconstruction. The APF’s strategic orientation should consist of three elements: i) keeping APSA development as its ‘big picture’ issue, working with its African partners and other donors to ensure that a coherent strategic framework for its long-term development exists; ii) within that framework, focusing on activities where APF has a comparative advantage (funding PSOs, rapid response mediation activities, and aspects of APSA capacity building where a ‘continental’ approach is required); and iii) supporting AU efforts to identify other actors who are better placed to address the gaps.

**Recommendation 5:** Based on efforts to clarify and sharpen the APF’s strategic orientation and comparative advantages, the APF should jointly conduct with the AUC and the RECs/RMs a process for determining the strategic priorities of APF funding for the 2014-2017 period in order to identify the highest priority categories of activities to be funded by the APF. This should take account of the AUC’s 2014-17 Strategic Plan and similar REC/RM documents in the first instance. However the objective would be to identify a coherent subset of priorities that could be funded through the APF.

**Recommendation 6:** The EU should actively support current efforts within the AU to encourage cross-departmental thinking and strategies to achieve a more integrated response to addressing political conflict and deepening democracy – the so-called security-governance nexus – placing particular attention on addressing the ‘roots’ of Africa’s conflicts. This could involve, for example, strengthening links between APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).

**Recommendation 7:** In order to ensure that the EU is employing the most appropriate tools at its disposal EEAS/DEVCO should ensure that the APF is integrated into ‘comprehensive’ EU approaches to dealing with African conflict at the continental, regional and national levels and that the APF activities which the EU chooses to finance benefit from adequate and appropriate programme support both at Brussels and Delegation levels.
**Recommendation 8:** The EU should modify the provision on financial decision-making in the APF Three-Year Action Programme which stipulates that every action requires a separate decision, in view of speeding up the approval process for contracts which are not of strategic importance, such as renewal of support to a given PSO.

**Recommendation 9:** The EU should work with the AU to establish a clearer protocol for the ERM-approval process which provides for more consistent, rapid and constructive feedback to RECs/RMs on the status of their application and ultimately the decision taken by the EU on whether or not to fund it, and the reasons behind this. In addition, the EU should encourage the AU to continue to reinforce its own capacity to manage the ERM in view of i) improving the speed and efficiency of its response to requests from RECs/RMs; ii) encouraging RECs/RMs to take more advantage of available opportunities to use ERM funding; iii) achieving better quality reporting on initiatives that receive ERM funding.

**Recommendation 10:** The APF should examine the feasibility of providing support tailored to mediation processes, which generally unfold over a period of time and whose needs are difficult to foresee at the outset. Two options should be explored: i) amending the current ERM programme to allow for multiple grants to the same mediation process and lengthening the timeframe of the grant, or ii) creating a new window that would have the same flexibility, rapid response and simplified procedures as the ERM but allow multiple requests and longer timeframes for grants in recognition of the fact that mediation processes can often run for a period of years and may be seriously disrupted if there is a break in funding.

**D: Strengthening APF capacity building**

**Recommendation 11:** The APF partners (EU/AU/REC/RMs) should adopt a more tailored approach to capacity building in the area of peace and security that is based on a thorough needs assessment of partner institutions in the area of peace and security and informed by an overall strategic plan for institutional development, drawing on and updating earlier institutional (organisational/functional) and 4-pillar reviews as appropriate. This should lead to the development of long-term capacity building strategies that are linked to a realistic assessment of available financing and which assess how temporary capacity fixes in the area of peace and security can be migrated back to support the overall capacity of the AU/RECs/RMs. Given the wide range of donor partners engaged in supporting peace and security initiatives, where possible joint assessments and strategic planning should be undertaken.

**Recommendation 12:** To support the implementation of these long-term capacity building strategies, the EU should work to strengthen APF alignment with other EU and non-EU funders (such as the RIPv, the €30 million AU Support Programme, the African Development Bank, bilateral donors) in order to strengthen critical core institutional capacities, consulting on a priority basis with these funders to develop a strategy for providing the requisite assistance. APF needs to lobby to make this happen.

**Recommendation 13:** Additionally, the EU should explore the options for establishing i) a minimum threshold of institutional capacity that would have to be attained before APF funding could be accessed and ii) a graduated scale of institutional capacity that would enable APF beneficiaries to receive progressively larger amounts of APF financing and/or certain categories of APF financing. Beneficiaries would be assessed on their ability to undertake certain core functions such as financial management, human resource
management (including the ability to hire staff with the appropriate skill set in a timely fashion), programme management and strategic planning. Indicators for determining an appropriate, minimum level of functionality in these key areas could be drawn from existing institutional assessment tools, such as the 4-pillar review, and should ideally be determined in consultation among the APF partners. This would then provide a basis for developing a plan for improving these core capacities as well as a foundation for the effective use of APF resources. Some of the steps taken to strengthen these core institutional capacities might be supported through the APF – for example technical assistance provided through the APF’s expert pool, and short-term provision of programme managers and financial officers. Other activities would more appropriately be supported by other parts of the EU (appropriate political leverage from a variety of EU actors, on-the-spot monitoring of APF support by EU Delegations, RIPs, €30 million AU Support Programme and so on) through the strategic plan for institutional strengthening (Recommendation 3), or other donors.

**Recommendation 14:** Monitoring of APF-supported capacity building should incorporate ‘bench-marks’ to help clearly identify when and where capacity has been built, and a system should be established to more systematically track capacity built with APF support.

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**Recommendation 15:** In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the EU should explore options to further decentralise aspects of APF programme management (particularly relating to capacity building, both of APSA and PSO planning and financial management) which relate to day-to-day programme management, including monitoring of AU and REC/RM APF-funded activities, on-the-spot coordination of EU affairs relating to the APF, and technical support/guidance for the AU and RECs/RMs, including on issues relating to accessing/managing APF (including ERM) and other EU resources. These should either be devolved to the AU EUD in Addis or to relevant regional EUDs where appropriate political/security/military expertise exists, or an appropriate division of labour should be instituted between Brussels and the relevant EUD. One option would be to formally task the person in charge of a RIP in the area of peace and security in a regional Delegation to monitor APF programmes and support programming/evaluations at the Brussels level.

**Recommendation 16:** The Commission’s APF unit should work with the other APF partners to integrate an M&E element into capacity building programmes in order to provide mid-term corrections and to understand the long-term impact of APF investments. This would enable a more systematic and structured approach to lesson learning that is embedded within an overall M&E framework and closely aligned with programme management processes. This would allow the APF partners to more effectively learn from what works and does not work so well, and use this to improve programme management across all relevant partners.

**Recommendation 17:** In view of the fact that the APF is a EU-African instrument, with joint management responsibilities, the EU should assess options to ensure closer day-to-day contact between relevant EU and AU/REC/RM managers. Where advantageous, the EU should devolve greater responsibility for management of the political dimensions of the APF programme to the relevant EU Delegations/Heads responsible for relations with the AU and the RECs/RMs.

**Recommendation 18:** There should be greater recognition by the EU of the challenges the AU faces in fulfilling its own oversight and technical support role vis-à-vis the RECs/RMs and appropriate measures should be taken to strengthen AU capacity in this area as required by: i) ensuring that the EU monitors and provides consistent support and guidance for AU programme oversight/advisory activities at the REC/RM level, and ii) by decentralising this function to the relevant EUD.
**Recommendation 19:** Recognising the constraints posed on the Commission AFP unit, due to its small size, in terms of its ability to effectively manage and monitor the APF and conduct strategic planning, and the potentially harmful consequences of that on attainment of overall APF objectives, DEVCO should ensure that Commission APF ambitions are matched by an appropriately-sized and skilled APF management team.

**Recommendation 20:** The Commission APF Unit should review its policy on communications and information sharing with EUDs on APF issues, and adopt a more systematic approach to updating EUDs on relevant political, policy and programming issues.