

SHAN AMAN-RANA

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

Placement Officer: Professor Mark Schankerman +44 (0)20 7955 7518 m.schankerman@lse.ac.uk
Placement Assistant: Mr John Curtis +44 (0)20 7955 7545 j.curtis@lse.ac.uk

OFFICE ADDRESS, TELEPHONE & E-MAIL:

Department of Economics
London School of Economics & Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 7403578556
s.aman-rana@lse.ac.uk

GENDER: Female

CITIZENSHIP: Pakistani

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2013-2014 MRes in Economics, London School of Economics
2010-2011 MSc. Economics, London School of Economics (Distinction)
2002-2003 MSc. Economics, Lahore School of Economics (CGPA 4.0/4.0-Distinction)
2000-2002 M.B.A. in Finance, Lahore School of Economics (CGPA 3.94/4.0- Distinction)

DOCTORAL STUDIES:

PhD Economics, London School of Economics

DATES: 2014 - present

THESIS TITLE: "Essays in Development Economics"

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: July 2019

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Prof. Oriana Bandiera
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7955-7519
Fax (44-20) 7831-1840

Prof. Tim Besley
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
t.besley@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7955-6702
Fax (44-20) 7831-1840

Prof. Robin Burgess
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
r.burgess@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7955-6676

Prof. Gerard Padro I Miquel
Department of Economics and Political Science
Yale University
115 Prospect Street
Rosenkranz Hall, Room 335
New Haven
CT 06520
gerard.padro@yale.edu
Tel. (203) 432-5011

Prof. Maitreesh Ghatak
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
m.ghatak@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7852-3568

DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Development Economics
Secondary Fields: Organizational Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2015-2018	Micro and Macro for Public Policy	Master of Public Administration, School of Public Policy, LSE
2013-2018	Empirical Methods for Public Policy	Executive Master of Public Administration (EMPA), School of Public Policy, LSE
2013-2018	Economic Policy Analysis	Executive Master of Public Administration (EMPA), School of Public Policy, LSE
2013-2014	Political Science & Public Policy	Executive Master of Public Administration (EMPA), School of Public Policy, LSE
2012-2013	Economics of Developing Countries	Undergraduate Tripos Part IIB, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge
2011-2012	Development Economics	Undergraduate Tripos Part I, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge
2002-2004	Microeconomics	Masters level, Department of Economics, Lahore School of Economics

TEACHING AWARDS

2016	LSE Best Class Teacher Award
2016	Nominated for LSE Students' Union Student-led Most Inspirational Teacher Award
2012-2013	Best Teaching Fellow in the Economics Tripos, University of Cambridge

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2017 Research Assistant for Prof. Oriana Bandiera, London School of Economics
2005- Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) civil servant, Government of Pakistan
2004 Research Associate, WWF-Pakistan

LANGUAGES

Urdu (native), English (fluent), French and Punjabi (basic)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2018 Research Grant (5,000 GBP), STICERD
2014 Research Grant (20,000 GBP), International Growth Centre (IGC)
2014 PhD Field Research Grant (5000 USD), Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), Pakistan
2014 Research Grant (140,000 USD), United States Institute of Peace (with Dr. Jacob Shapiro, Dr. Ali Cheema and Mr. Zulfiqar Hameed)
2013-2018 Economics Department Award, Full Scholarship, PhD Economics, LSE
2013 Centre for Development Studies, Research Fund, University of Cambridge
2013 Offered Visiting Student Research Collaborator (VSRC), Princeton University, Department of Politics, under Dr. Jacob N. Shapiro
2013 Offered Visiting Graduate Student, University of California San Diego (UCSD), Economics Department under Prof. Eli Berman
2012-2013 Research Fund, Murray Edwards College, University of Cambridge
2011-2013 Cambridge Commonwealth Trust- HEC Pakistan, Full PhD Scholarship
2009-2011 Master's Award, Full Scholarship, MSc. Economics, London School of Economics
2007 Best in Academics, Civil Service of Pakistan
2007 Best Research Paper, Civil Service of Pakistan
2006 President of Pakistan Gold Medal, Best Probationary Officer, Civil Services of Pakistan
2006 Best in Academics, Civil Service of Pakistan
2003 Gold Medal, MSc. Economics, Lahore School of Economics
2003 Silver Medal, Dean's Honor List, Lahore School of Economics
2002 Gold Medal, M.B.A. Program, Lahore School of Economics
2002 Silver Medal, M.B.A. Program, Lahore School of Economics
2002 Full Scholarship, MSc. Economics, Lahore School of Economics

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

[Meritocracy in Bureaucracy? Evidence from Pakistan](#)

Abstract: Most bureaucracies today are rule-based. This is a result of a powerful intellectual tradition that argues that allowing discretion in decision making could lead to favoritism and collusion, with substantial costs to the organization. This paper studies one particular public sector bureaucracy, the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) in Punjab and presents novel evidence that when senior bureaucrats have discretion to promote juniors they do so meritocratically. I create a newly digitized civil servant-month panel data-set (1983-2013) which combines the universe of personnel records of PAS civil servants in Punjab, Pakistan with two key measures of merit of the junior (1) recruitment exam ranking that is publicly observable (2) historical tax collection by juniors that is private information of a particular set of seniors. I exploit two rules within the government to get exogenous variation in both the set of seniors and their power to promote juniors. First, results show that, in the long run, as the promotion power of seniors increase, high merit junior bureaucrats are more likely to be promoted than low merit ones. Second, with

increases in the promotion power of seniors they are more likely to pull high merit junior bureaucrats into their own team and promote them, while the effect reverses for low merit juniors. This suggests that self-interest of the person exercising discretion is one mechanism behind meritocracy. Third, as promotion power of senior increases, those juniors who are observationally good performers but not stars according to private information of the senior, have 3 times lower probability of being promoted than those who are top performers in both dimensions. A similar effect is seen for those that are observationally poor performers. This suggests that seniors can decipher not just hidden lemons from the star performers but also hidden gems from the bottom of the performance distribution. These results suggest that there is value from allowing discretion and have wider implications for how we think about the use of subjective judgement in organizations.

Other Papers:

Group size and use of skills diversity in production. Evidence from the lab and the field (with Brais Álvarez Pereira (EUI); Brais Álvarez Pereira's job market paper)

Abstract: This paper presents evidence on whether group size plays a role in determining how skills diversity affects performance of workers. We develop a theoretical framework that shows that having a diverse group-member increases performance of workers in a large group more than in a small one. We test this hypothesis in a lab in Guinea-Bissau with Nursing and Economics students. We find that the nurses with an economist colleague in a large group perform 4.3 times higher than those in a small group. We provide descriptive evidence in support of this result from a novel administrative data-set of tax collectors from Pakistan.

Charitable donations and violence: Evidence from Pakistan

Abstract: This paper suggests a new channel of violence: the charitable donations channel. I exploit the rules of religious donations coupled with variations in the international price of gold/silver to arrive at a source of exogenous variation for donations. Using district-year level data on average household donations and terrorist attacks in Pakistan for the years 2001-2013, I find that donations increase the probability of a terrorist attack by 79% and the number of terrorist attacks by 30. All the effect of donations appears to work through an increase in suicide attacks as a specific terrorism tactic. All other tactics appear unaffected.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

Incentive effects of automation in bureaucracies: Evidence from Pakistan

Do fast-tracked bureaucrats perform better?

Career incentives from a powerful work network: Evidence from Pakistan civil services

Better match through discretionary job allocation in bureaucracies? Evidence from Pakistan

Gender quota and performance of men: Evidence from Pakistan Civil Services

Can a 360 degree review incentivise performance of bureaucrats?

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Refereeing activity:

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Seminar and conferences:

- 2018 Institute of Fiscal Studies, Stanford and UC Berkeley: Fourth Development and Political Economics SF Bay Area conference, UC Berkeley, London School of Economics (Development, STICERD, Political Science and Political Economy seminars)
- 2017 18th World Congress of the International Economic Association (IEA), North American Summer Meeting, 32nd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA-ESEM), North Eastern Universities Development Conference (NEUDC) Tufts University, London School of Economics (Development, Labor, STICERD, Political Science and Political Economy seminars)

Conferences Convened:

- 2014 Institutions and their Discontents: Rethinking Economic Development in South Asia, University of Cambridge - Key Note speakers for the conference include Dr. Ha-Joon Chang (University of Cambridge) and Prof. Parnab Bardhan (UC, Berkley)

Affiliations

STICERD, Economic Organization and Public Policy Program (EOPP)
International Growth Centre (IGC), Researcher
Bissau Economics Lab (BELAB), Researcher