This paper examines certain ways that national museums in Australia and New Zealand seek to portray the social identity of the nation in a world in which the idea of the nation-state has faltered. It particularly focuses on the newly constructed National Museum of Australia, comparing it with another new Australasian national museum, the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, as well as with older national museums. This paper argues that the postcolonial historiographies of Australia and New Zealand have become institutionalised and inscribed in their museums' architecture, their location within civic spaces, and in the fragmentary narratives they present.

Key Words: Australia, New Zealand, postcolonialism, museums, nation-state

In July 2003, the Australian Government published a review of the National Museum of Australia (NMA), which had opened two years earlier in the nation’s capital, Canberra. The Review’s brief was to establish whether or not the new Museum had achieved the aims set out in its founding legislation, the National Museum of Australia Act 1980. As Graeme Davison’s submission to the Review outlines, the establishment of a national museum in Australia in the present time is a complex and problematic undertaking:

Rather than suppressing difference by imposing a single authorial voice, or brokering an institutional consensus, the NMA might better begin with the assumption that the imagined community we call the nation is by its very nature plural and in flux. In practice the degree of difference should not be exaggerated, there are many topics of high interest on which there is a substantial consensus of opinion. A
As Davison’s submission suggests, the concept of a national museum of Australia is all the more problematic given the threat to the authority of the nation-state that increasing globalisation poses today. That is, the very idea of the nation-state over the last 250 years; it is particularly embedded within European culture. In Europe, the very earliest national museums, such as the Dresden Museum (1744), the British Museum (1753) and the Vatican Museum (1784), appeared in the mid-to-late 18th century. These were not national museums as we conceive of them now; the British Museum, for instance, was formed largely from the mass of curiosities of the private collection of Sir Hans Sloane. It was not until the opening of the Louvre as a museum in 1793, that national museums were predicated on more emphatically nationalistic grounds. In the new French Republic, Jean Marie Roland, Minister for the Interior, comprehended the important potential for museums in the popular production of nationhood:

As I conceive it, it [the Louvre] should attract and impress foreigners [. . .] It should be open to everyone. This will be a national monument. There will not be a single individual who does not have the right to enjoy it. It will have such an influence on the mind, it will elevate the soul, it will so excite the heart that it will be one of the most powerful ways of proclaiming the illustriousness of the French Republic. (qtd. in Pearce 100)

Unlike museums that preceded it, the Louvre was conceived as having important symbolic civic functions beyond the scholarly needs of the privileged classes. For Roland, the Republic’s new museum was to play a vital aspirational role for the citizens of France. Moreover, it would demonstrate the status of the nation-state by displaying its nationalised material wealth and its history as part of a coherent and cumulative narrative.

During Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperial expansion, the national museum proclaimed the illustriousness of France more specifically by displaying material it had looted from other nations and cultures; indeed, many of the treasures in the Louvre today were accumulated during the Napoleonic Wars. Of course, Napoleon understood the imperial symbolic value of collecting material culture during his conquests, as the large collection of ancient Egyptian artifacts in the Louvre attests. The British also realized this very quickly with the defeat of Napoleon’s forces in Egypt in 1801 when the Rosetta Stone, amongst other Egyptian artifacts, was handed over by the French to the British; this led to its acquisition by the British Museum in 1802. While on the face of it, national museums like the Louvre and the British Museum were concerned with universal collecting (comprehensively accumulating material from all cultures for scientific purposes), their collections represented the potency of the nation-state by demonstrating the extent of their colonial and trade influences. Realistically, a national museum could only amass an expansive universal collection if it possessed the military force and political influence to practically acquire the objects. Throughout the 19th century in Europe, national museums developed stronger civic, pedagogical and fiduciary obligations, but these also further served to assert national identity and imperial power. To this day, the British Museum’s stated functions as an educational institution and a guardian

national museum might then expect to play host to several interpretations of the nation’s past, stirringly patriotic as well as critical, educationally demanding as well as entertaining. (Carroll et al 8)

As Davison’s submission suggests, the concept of a national museum of Australia is all the more problematic given the threat to the authority of the nation-state that increasing globalisation poses today. That is, the very idea of the nation-state over the last 250 years; it is particularly embedded within European nation-forming, nation-consolidating and empire-building discourses of the 19th century. During that time, national museums played an increasingly vital role in the pedagogical functions of the nation-state as a central pillar of emerging ideas about participatory democracy (Chakrabarty 5). Architecturally, they served as highly visible physical monuments that reified national of the

difficult to conceive. Furthermore, Australia’s own postcolonial conditions make lost its imaginary force and the function of a national museum is increasingly the telling of a coherent museographic national story particularly problematic.

Zealand also recently opened a new national museum- the Museum of New respects, are the postcolonial conditions of New Zealand. Like Australia, New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa- in Wellington in 1998. This paper, focusing mainly on Australia, will consider the ways in which two recently-opened Australasian national museums represent a renegotiated idea of the national museum as it is historically figured in the West, one which attempts to reconcile the traditional celebratory functions of national museums with their own contentious histories. In both instances, a narratives these museums present but also in the architecture of their new buildings and their reconfigured function within civic space.

In today’s world, museums are an international and seemingly universal phenomenon. Yet the ‘museum idea’ has a relatively short history, situated firmly within European culture. In Europe, the very earliest national museums, such as the Dresden Museum (1744), the British Museum (1753) and the Vatican Museum (1784), appeared in the mid-to-late 18th century. These were not national museums as we conceive of them now; the British Museum, for instance, was formed largely from the mass of curiosities of the private collection
of mankind’s material culture, remain the ideological justification by which it retains artifacts looted from non-Western cultures, such as those taken from Benin during a punitive Navy mission in 1897.

Britain’s Australasian colonies in the 19th century also adopted what Benedict Anderson calls “this form of political museumizing” (183). Both Australia and New Zealand had established colonial museums from the mid 19th century, based on similar principles to those of European national museums, prior to their recently-founded institutions. The Colonial Museum of New South Wales was established in Sydney in 1827 (changing its name to the Australian Museum in 1836), and New Zealand’s Colonial Museum was established in 1865 in Wellington. This museumizing ideology is most apparent in the functions of these colonial museums within civic architecture. Both Sydney’s Australian Museum and Wellington’s Dominion Museum inherited the neoclassical architecture that characterizes the British Museum. Throughout the Western world, museums in the mid 19th century were regarded as institutions of authority and knowledge, and their classical architecture was designed to reflect this. Indeed, classicism signified ‘civilization’ in its narrowest sense. The very first completed gallery of the Australian Museum, the Lewis Wing, was a modest two-storey building, which opened to the public in 1857. James Barnet, the building’s Clerk of Work, however, envisioned a more grandiose, British Museum-like neoclassical edifice, facing Sydney’s Hyde Park. He also planned to include a large flight of steps leading up from the Park to the Museum’s entrance and a dome on the roof (Australian Museum Online np). Although the steps and dome never eventuated, Barnet’s plans illustrate the importance that was placed on housing the Museum in an ostentatious neoclassical building. As with Barnet’s grand visions for the Australian Museum, New Zealand’s Colonial Museum in Wellington was intended to lie at the top of a large set of steps, at the end of a tree-lined boulevard. It too was originally housed in a modest building where it remained until 1936, when it was relocated to a hilltop at the centre of Wellington. The new building was an imposing neoclassical edifice, with a façade so austere that the British Museum’s architecture seems comparatively welcoming. In the visioning of these colonial museums as public spaces, both museums were understood as cornerstone civic institutions, highly visible in a pseudo-Haussmanized ordered cityscape.

In terms of collections, however, the museumizing ideology takes a different form in these colonial museums from European national museums. While Europe’s national museums demonstrated the power of the nation-state by representing a multitude of non-European cultures that were, to varying degrees, under their influence, Australasian colonial museums demonstrated the power of the colony by representing European culture’s conquest over ‘exotic’ local flora and fauna. When Australia and New Zealand achieved nationhood in the 20th century (Britain’s Australian colonies were federated in 1901 and Westminster granted New Zealand independent dominion status in 1907 and full independence took effect in 1947), the collections of their former colonial museums remained comparatively local in scope. They did not transform into universal collections characteristic of the British Museum.

However, the First World War significantly shifted the ways in which Australia and New Zealand defined their nationhood for the following five decades. A combined military force, known as the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) was sent to the War, and suffered heavy losses on April 25, 1915, fighting alongside British and French troops at Gallipoli in Turkey. This battle is regarded as the critical defining event of Australian and New Zealand nationhood, creating the ANZAC mythology. Gallipoli enabled these new nations to define themselves in relation to a military adversary. When memorials dedicated to ANZAC troops were erected in Sydney and Wellington, they were placed adjacent to the former colonial museums. Sydney’s ANZAC Memorial, opened in 1936, is located in a section of parkland across the road from the Australian Museum; New Zealand’s Dominion Museum was opened in 1936 on a site shared with the National War Memorial, dedicated four years earlier.

So the museums of these fledgling postcolonial nations only addressed the social character of nationhood obliquely through this geographical association with war memorials. The quasi-natural link between national identity, heritage and war, inherent in the ANZAC mythology, was further reinforced in Australia with the opening of the Australian War Museum in Melbourne in 1923. This museum later became the Australian War Memorial Museum in Canberra, after the Memorial’s completion in 1941. Indeed, until the opening of the National Museum of Australia in 2001, the Australian War Memorial Museum remained the only national museum in Australia primarily concerned with Australian social history. Of course, a war memorial museum is constrained by the parameters of its topic and its specific civic functions: to portray a nation’s unity in times of war. So, understandably, the Australian War Memorial Museum is not concerned with representing a more holistic and problematic vision of Australia, with its internal conflicts and fissures.

Even before Australia became a federated nation there was a perceived need for a national museum. In 1887, Sir Henry Parkes, Australia’s ‘Father of Federation,’ proposed the construction of a ‘National Palace’ in Sydney’s
Centennial Park. His vision was deeply embedded in the ideas of participatory democracy that framed the function of national museums in Europe at that time; the ‘National Palace’ was to be a building “for the education of the souls of citizenship.” It was to include a repository for historical manuscripts, an art gallery and a mausoleum for eminent public figures (Martin 370). Parke’s vision was never realized, but following Federation the creation of a national museum was believed to be all the more important for Australian national identity (Woodward 93-96). It was not until 1974, however, that the Australian Government, under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, recognized the need for a national collection and a national museum. The Committee of Inquiry on Museums and National Collections was established and produced a report in 1975 called “Museums in Australia,” otherwise known as the “Pigott Report” (Pigott). The Report recommended:

that a Museum of Australia be established in Canberra [...]. The new national museum should not attempt to imitate or duplicate those fields in which the older Australian museums are strong, but should concentrate on three main themes or galleries: Aboriginal man in Australia; European man in Australia; and the Australian Environment and its interaction with the two-named themes. (4)

Consequently, the Federal Parliament passed the Museum of Australia Act in 1980, following which a National Historical Collection was established.1

By the closing decades of the 20th century, however, it had become increasingly difficult to imagine a museum of the kind that Parke once envisioned. Perceptions of Australian identity shifted over the century. In the present day, postcolonial critical perspectives problematize any straightforward singular representations of Australian history, and conceptions of a coherent national identity such as that envisioned by Hansonism in the late 1990s seem little more than monocultural racially-motivated jingoism.2 For most of the 20th century popular perceptions of Australian national identity were enshrined in the ANZAC mythology and tales of white pioneers and bushrangers which emphasized Australia’s primarily British settler heritage. It is only in recent decades that the history of European settlement of Australia has been characterized as more fragmented, heterogeneous and problematic.

Australia was declared terra nullius, uninhabited land, when it was colonized by the British, and its history in race relations has been a troubled one, often reflecting adversely on the white settler. During the colonial period, indigenous people were subjugated to the point of genocide as, for example, under the Tasmanian martial law passed in 1828 which allowed settlers to shoot Aborigines on sight. The indigenous populations were effectively emancipated by referendum in 1967. Nevertheless, Australia’s governments continued into the 1970s the now-infamous eugenics practice of removing ‘half-caste’ children from Aboriginal parents, creating a Stolen Generation of indigenous people, dispossessed of their familial and cultural heritage. And even the absurd principle of terra nullius was overturned in Australia’s High Court only as recently as 1992. Indeed, the recent race riot in Sydney in February 2004 is a reminder that celebrations of Australia’s harmonious society, like those at the Opening Ceremony of the Sydney 2000 Olympics, belie its chequered past and continuing conflicts (Dick 5). Furthermore, the settler culture in Australia has become increasingly heterogeneous in the latter half of the last century. Australia remains fundamentally Western, Christian, and Anglophone. It has a Westminster system of democracy, but its cultural fabric is now fairly diverse; multiculturalism is institutionalized under the auspices of the Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio.

Globally the notion of the nation-state as a concretized political entity has faltered during the course of the 20th century (Hobsbawm 1990 & 1992; Thomas 211-19). As international economic alliances bond by common commercial interests have become increasingly dominant, the concept of nation has begun to separate from the traditional, concrete symbols of state and has shifted to the more fluid and ambiguous realm of the imagination (Appadurai 8). In Europe, where the very notion of the nation-state originated, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has further eroded the symbolism of territorial boundaries and national currencies. Group identity in the contemporary world has shifted from the arbitrary designation of nationality to different foundations. Social commonalities that transcend national boundaries like sexuality, gender, class, culture, religion and ethnicity, provide new structures of group identification. So, the world is a very different place from that of 1793, when the Louvre was founded to help consolidate the French nation-state. National museums, once potent symbols of the nation-state, no longer possess the same social, spiritual and political value.

At the beginning of the 21st century, then, how does a National Museum of Australia reconcile the traditional functions of a national museum with Australia’s problematic identity? How can such a museum celebrate its nation’s history when it is marred with exploitation and genocide? How can a national museum portray the identity of a society which is emphatically fragmentary, in a world in which the imagined potency of the nation-state has faltered?

In the 1990s the idea of a national museum in the European tradition lost the support of the Australian Government. The then Prime Minister, Paul
Keating, was acutely aware that the idea of the nation-state was waning as international economic alliances became more influential in national self-definition. Keating emphasized Australia's place within the economic communities of South East Asian and Pacific Rim over and above its historical links with Britain. His geopolitical re-figuring of Australia had a direct bearing which outright rejected the idea of a central national museum in the 19th-century sense. Keating conceived the National Museum of Australia as devoid of visual symbolism, a dispersed and decentralized organization without a museum building. Instead, the Museum would be a bureaucracy that would organize traveling exhibitions drawn from the National Collection and produce educational, information and multimedia resources. When the current Prime Minister, John Howard, defeated Keating in the 1996 Federal Election, the idea of a more traditional national museum on a permanent site was revived. Compared with Keating, Howard is a conservative and a traditionalist. His political and emotional investment in traditional European symbols of nationhood is epitomised by his strident opposition to Australian republicanism. In fact, Howard conceived of the national museum as the symbolic centerpiece in the 2001 celebrations of the Centenary of Australian Federation.

Immediately, the new Howard Government initiated the construction of a permanent national museum, and the National Museum of Australia was opened at its present site in 2001. Despite Howard's conservatism, the realization of the Museum adhered to the spirit of the recommendations for the Museum that were made in the 1975 Pigott Report which had been initiated by the relatively leftist Whitlam government. In the Report, Geoffrey Blainey and John Mulvaney recognized that Australia could not be accurately portrayed without including its contradictions and ruptures. "The museum, where appropriate, should display controversial issues. In our view, too many museums concentrate on certainty and dogma, thereby forsaking the function of stimulating legitimate doubt and thoughtful discussion." (73)

Since opening in 2001, the National Museum of Australia has indeed been a multivalent institution, representing multiple positions. The narratives it presents are dynamic and contestable, conveying stories that are sometimes conflicting. Despite being constructed by the conservative Howard Government, the Museum is sometimes politically dissident. For example, the collection includes the Hong Hai, a Vietnamese refugee boat that landed near Darwin in 1978, carrying 38 refugees. In the political climate of contemporary Australia, where the Howard Government's strong stance on 'border protection' was a central issue in its re-election in 2001, the display of the Hong Hai's wheel in the Horizons gallery can be interpreted as drawing a contrast between Australia's acceptance of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s and its more recent dehumanizing treatment of asylum-seekers. It is also a good example of the kinds of object that the Museum displays which challenge the traditional functions of national museums, actually celebrating a breach of territorial boundaries and emphasizing multiculturalism. The Museum's First Australians Gallery, which records the social history of indigenous Australians from before European settlement to the present, provides further examples of the Museum's dissident narratives. For example, one display addresses the protests by indigenous people at the Bicentenary of Australia celebrations in 1988. It also acknowledges the history of exploitation of the indigenous people with exhibits such as Batman's Deed of Purchase from 1835, which exchanged about 600,000 acres of Aboriginal land for a small supply of foodstuffs, clothing, knives and other European objects. Unlike the Colonial Museum of the 19th century, Australia's natural environment is seen as complexly interrelated with its social life, and this too can raise shameful episodes in the nation's history. The thylacine, also known as the Tasmanian tiger, was hunted into extinction in 1936. The Museum displays a carcass of one of the last thylacines, killed and skinned in 1930, interpreting this slaughter in terms of the extremely negative impact of European settlement on many native species.

Likewise, the exhibits of Te Papa Tongarewa in New Zealand also address the internal ruptures in New Zealand's national identity. Like Australia, New Zealand's history is marked with conflict between the colonizers and indigenous populations although the character of this conflict differs significantly. Unlike Australia, New Zealand was never declared to be terra nullius. Instead the Treaty of Waitangi is central to its problematic identity just as the principle of terra nullius is central to colonization and conflict in Australia. The Treaty was signed in 1840 by representatives of British settlers and the Maori people. It ostensibly grants sovereignty of New Zealand to the British Crown; in return the Maori people were promised protection, law and order, equal rights to those of British citizens and the right to own tribal lands. Two versions of the Treaty were drafted: one in English and one in the indigenous language. As James Gore notes, contention arises from these two versions, primarily over the interpretation of the term "sovereignty." "Sovereignty" in the English text reads as "kawanatanga" in the Maori translation. "Kawanatanga," however, more accurately translates as "governance," quite a different concept from sovereignty (57). This contention over the interpretation of the Treaty remains a major point of conflict to this day (Kawhau).

Te Papa's long-term exhibit about the Treaty of Waitangi, Signs of a
Nation, does not ignore this problematic fissure in New Zealander identity. Like Batman's Deed at the National Museum of Australia, Signs of a Nation reflects the colonizers' exploitation of the indigenous people. The actual tattered Treaty document is kept in the Constitution Room at Archives New Zealand, but Te Papa reproduces it in a large glass facsimile. Didactic text panels that accompany the reproduction actually focus on the 'kawanatanga'/sovereignty' central to both New Zealand's identity and its colonial and postcolonial conflicts.

The architecture of these new museums and their relationships to their civic landscapes further articulate a profound shift in attitudes. While the Louvre was conceived as a 'national monument' the National Museum of Australia's site is deliberately anti-monumental, according to Michael Keniger of the Museum's Design Integrity Panel (National Museum of Australia np). Thus, the design of the new museum attempts to articulate Australia's heterogeneous identity. The building and site itself are fragmented, asymmetrical, decentered, and dispersed. It was no longer appropriate for a national museum at the end of the 20th century to echo the classicism of the British Museum's architecture. Instead, the Museum building is multivalent, making fragmented visual reference to sources as diverse as Soviet art, with Lissitsky's Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge, 1919, and Daniel Libeskind's architectural design of the Jewish Museum, Berlin. The reference to Libeskind's Jewish Museum further emphasizes rupture and fragmentation in Australia's history. Libeskind's design for the Jewish Museum is a fragmented Star of David that looks like a lightening bolt and represents the genocide of the Holocaust. This motif is incorporated into the section of National Museum of Australia where the First Australians Gallery is housed, which strongly suggests a point of commonality between genocide in the Holocaust and colonial attempts to extinguish the indigenous population of Australia.

The Museum's location in the civic landscape is also symbolically decentered. Canberra was literally invented as a capital city in the early 20th century and its city planning was purposely symbolic. The 'Parliamentary Triangle'—an equilateral triangle cornered by The Parliament House, the Department of Defence complex and Canberra's civic centre—symbolizes the cornerstones of participatory democracy, military power and the citizenry. Between each point run long boulevards, the grandest of which cuts symmetrically through the centre of the Triangle, running from the enormous flagpole on top of the new Parliament House to a point on the very opposite side of the triangle. At the end of that boulevard is the Australian War Memorial Museum. When the site was chosen for the National Museum, however, it was symbolically located outside the Parliamentary Triangle and not connected by any straight roads or clear lines of sight to Parliament or to the War Memorial.

Similarly, the architecture and new site of New Zealand's Te Papa makes an anti-monumental political statement. In the 1990s, the symbolism of the existing Museum was considered to be colonial and anachronistic. The Eurocentrism embodied in its stern neoclassical architecture no longer reflected the more postcolonial conditions of New Zealand. As the new museum's website explains: "The old National Museum at Buckle Street was a much-loved place. However, with changes in New Zealand society, and the evolution of new attitudes towards our history and our identity, it became clear that the Buckle Street site no longer served the wider community." (Te Papa Tongarewa np) So, when the New Zealand Government reconstituted the national museum in an Act of Parliament in 1992, the entire institution was overhauled and relocated to a new site with its new name (Te Papa translates to the more inclusive 'our place'). The architecture of Te Papa abandons the neoclassicism of the old building. Similar in some respects to the National Museum of Australia, the new Te Papa building is postmodern, asymmetrical and its forms are deliberately fragmented. While the old Museum had occupied a symbolically central position, on a hill in the centre of Wellington next to the War Memorial, the new Te Papa site is in an off-centre waterside location, next to the harbour.

Australia and New Zealand were still colonies at a time when the nation-state was in the ascendency in Europe, and yet their processes of nation formation throughout the 20th century actually coincide with the global decline of the idea of the nation-state. In their contemporary postcolonial contexts, the idea of creating a national museum is problematic, but certainly not impossible. It is no longer tenable, however, for these institutions to function as celebratory civic symbols in the same way as their earlier European counterparts. In their actual manifestations, these museums are able to negotiate their societal functions by refiguring the narratives they tell and their symbolism in the civic landscape. Consequently, both museums have been strongly criticized for their approaches (Wilson np; Windschuttle 11-19). For Australian historian Keith Windschuttle, the National Museum of Australia is a model of how not to run a national museum (11-19). Nevertheless, by showing the internal conflicts and contradictions, by representing ruptures and fragmentations in the national narratives, and opening historical discourses to contestation and debate, these museums continue to perform an important civic role—although their functions are far more complex and inclusive than the traditional model of a national museum allows. According to Timothy Ambrose and Crispin Paine:
Museums have a key task to play in providing an understanding of identity and a sense of belonging to a place or community. In the face of immense and often painful cultural change in many countries, museums provide a valuable sense of connection with the past and present, and serve as a springboard for the future. (3)

Postcolonial nations like Australia and New Zealand can only realistically connect with their colonial past when they acknowledge all of its facets, whether these are celebratory, shameful or unpalatable. Ironically, their fragmentary approaches to national identity and history are more socially unifying than any does not exist.

Notes

1 An online publication of the Act is available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/naa1980297/

2 Pauline Hanson was elected to Australia's federal House of Representatives as the independent member for Oxley in March 1996. Her maiden parliamentary speech in September 1996 warned that Australia was “in danger of being swamped by Asians” and condemned multiculturalism and “privileges” for Aborigines. Her speech gained support from the far right margins of politics and led her to establish the One Nation Party in 1997. Hanson's racist politics received much media attention, but the Party failed to gain any significant electoral foothold, at best winning a handful of seats in the Queensland parliament. In the 1998 federal election, One Nation won no seats and Hanson lost her own. She announced her 'retirement' from politics in 2002 and was jailed for electoral fraud in August 2003 but was released on appeal after serving 11 weeks in prison. For a succinct BBC News profile on "Hansonism" see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2010782.stm

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