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The European Crisis: Implications for Human Security

Alan Hunter¹

Abstract

This paper reviews security research in Europe, especially that funded at a European level. Security research is discussed in relation to political developments in Europe, demonstrating a move towards technology and surveillance. In theory, this paper need address non-military forms of security only, because spending of EU research funds on weapons Research and Development is forbidden. Of course, many European national governments and also NATO do invest heavily in weapons research. However, one of the observations made in this paper is that in the current climate EU funds are often diverted to military technology, although using a variety of disguises. The paper provides a review of recent political developments before moving to the current major security initiatives.

1. Two decades of Self-Promotion, 1989 to 2008

Several European countries – France, Spain, Italy, Greece – regularly rate among the top tourist destinations of the world. For two decades, any foreign visitor must have been impressed by the rapid growth of infrastructure, the clean, prosperous cities and countryside, the vibrant sectors for education, health and welfare.

This apparent affluence was mirrored by the confidence, or arrogance, of the European elite and their spokespersons. Books appeared with titles such as *Why Europe will run the 21st Century* (Leonard, 2005); and *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (Rifkin, 2004).

Western Europe had been nurtured by the Marshall Plan, protected by NATO, and given an identity by opposition to the Soviet Bloc. The collapse of the Soviet system in 1989 was followed by the enlargement of the EU between 2004 and 2007 by the inclusion of a dozen new countries. This expansion appeared to be full vindication of the EU itself and of European democracy and capitalism in general. Stock markets were booming, unemployment low. Large numbers of immigrants appeared to be integrated, or on the way. Various crises in the Balkans, where a ‘stabilisation and association process’ was initiated in 1999, were handled with some success.

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Among the perceived threats of the period, the Balkan conflicts, immediately adjacent to the EU, were treated as the most urgent, and also the potential for protracted violent conflicts in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Following 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, Islamic terrorism was high on the threat agenda also.

However, there was considerable interest both among member states, and in the EU itself, in other aspects of security such as human security, peacebuilding, and humanitarian intervention. Poverty and under-development in parts of the developing world, particularly in Africa, were perceived on the one hand as human and moral tragedies; and also as potential threats to international stability and prosperity. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty stated that one of the main EU's aims is to promote peace, which was recognized as an important goal in the relations of the EU with the wider world.

Since 2001, the EU had actively implemented 'Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention' programmes in a number of countries, as far apart as Bolivia, Palestine, and Timor-Leste. In 2011, the EU published a major *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, reporting on outcomes of its actions, in which it had invested around \$8 billion euros between 2001 and 2010².

Meanwhile several EU member states also undertook similar work. Another overview of the theory and practice of peacebuilding from a European perspective is the document *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding* (Smith, 2004), sometimes known as the 'Utstein Report' using the name of the town in Norway where the foreign and development ministries of four nations (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK) analysed their peacebuilding experience. Meanwhile, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (known as the The Barcelona Report) was prepared by the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities in 2004. Finally, *From War to the Rule of Law: Peacebuilding after Violent Conflict* (Voorhoeve 2007, Amsterdam University Press) provides a model typology of successful 'peacebuilding'; unfortunately one that is rarely if ever seen in practice. A few lines from US philosopher John Rawls are cited at the outset, which after Iraq and Afghanistan read curiously like a nineteenth century apologist for empire: "The long-term goal of relatively well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened societies and outlaw states into the Society of well-ordered Peoples." *The Law of Peoples*, (Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 116)

These documents give an excellent indication of the European trend to 'humanitarian intervention' in the period, with its liberal, optimistic aspiration and perhaps total lack of foresight

² See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol1_en.pdf.

about Europe's own future. To give a short flavour the *Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (Glasius and Kaldor eds, pp.330-32) gives 'three main reasons why the European Union should adopt a human security concept'. First, the morality of our common humanity. While people suffer in places like East Timor or Sierra Leone, Europeans should provide humanitarian assistance. Second, there are legal obligations under the UN Charter (and later under R2P doctrine) to protect human rights worldwide especially in the worst cases. Third, enlightened self-interest: 'Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity...Dealing with terrorism and organised crime only be devising more robust punitive and intelligence measures within our own borders...can never be more than fire-fighting'.

2. Emerging crisis, 2009-2012

We seem to be in a very different world now. In 2012 it is apparent that Europe is in a deep structural crisis. The elite arrogance is still there, but there is much more an atmosphere of deep anxiety, perhaps an understanding that a major crisis may be imminent.

There were warning signs. The great capitals of Paris and London saw some of the worst riots in the past fifty years, 2005 and 2007 in France, 2011 in London. In France in 2005, over 100 policemen were injured; some 10,000 cars destroyed and a state of emergency decreed for three months. In London, 3000 people were arrested, after riots had caused 5 deaths, £200 million of property damage, and immense damage to reputation. Various analyses have been made as to the causes of the riots, but most of them refer to youth alienation and unemployment, especially among immigrant youth.

However, the depth of the crisis began to manifest first in the financial sectors, following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. As governments were obliged to support crashing banks and other institutions, it became apparent that almost all European countries had massively over-borrowed. Especially Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (including local and national governments, and financial institutions) were overleveraging and had been hiding most of their debt during the prosperous times, a fact that came to light during the crisis.

In short, the prosperity apparent to visitors in the earlier decades proved to be built on borrowed money, and borrowed time. Little real capital had been invested to make Europe competitive with the new economies of Asia in particular. Rather, the EU itself and most national governments had invested in prestige projects, a housing boom, and unsustainable welfare and pension provisions. Perhaps European arrogance and sense of entitlement made the continent slow to adapt to a changing

world.

As the situation worsened it also became more apparent that the EU had for decades been riddled with corruption. "Opportunities for fraud are open and they are taken advantage of. The most elementary precautions are neither taken nor even contemplated. The reverse is the case. People such as myself, who attempt to bring openness and accountability to the system, are pursued, suspended and dismissed." (Marta Andreasen. Whistle-blower and ex Chief Accountant to the European Commission.) Indeed, journalists and others are routinely prevented from conducting investigations, and the EU itself has no effective fraud prevention mechanisms³.

There are many dimensions to the European crisis. Economically, Europe is failing to compete with other international economies, especially rising Asian ones. The lack of competitiveness arises from high wages, taxation and social costs, combined with lack of investment in new plant and technology: Europe thus fails to take advantage of its excellent infrastructure and human resource base. Struggling companies do not recruit new staff, so unemployment in 2012 reached disastrous levels. Because employees (often older people) have protected employment rights, youth unemployment was especially high, reaching more than 50% in Greece and Spain.

In addition, governance deficits have become apparent, with incompetence, waste and corruption. There are many shared systems within the EU, but no central government or effective central bank, which leads to protracted and indecisive negotiations before decisions can be made. Meanwhile, most European populations have come to expect long-term state support for the unemployed, good pensions, sickness benefits etc.: all worthy social goods, but perhaps unaffordable without relatively full employment. We therefore see an unrealistic 'super-state' and currency; lack of competitiveness; and failure to adapt to the contemporary business environment. The social impacts so far are mainly seen in very high unemployment and personal stress; but we can easily anticipate massive social unrest soon. Still, Europe remains a rich continent in many ways, and would perhaps recover its positions with greater flexibility, openness, creativity and dialogue to maximise potential of the knowledge economy, still Europe's advantage.

3. Implications for security research: EU research funding programmes (FP7 & Horizon 2020)

We have seen that security research to the mid-2000s contained an important element of

³ See among many other websites: <http://www.freebritain.org.uk/FAQRetrieve.aspx?ID=45752&Q>

'human security', with a focus in part on humanitarian work in poorer countries, aid and development, and attempts to address the allegedly underlying causes of issues such as terrorism and illegal migration.

What are likely to be the guidelines and implications for security research in the new crisis era? Fortunately, we have a certain amount of information recently from EU sources that allow us to start answering this question. The answers may be rather depressing, but at least allow us to see how policy is shifting in the new Europe.

The EU provides much documentation about its research programmes. They are currently organised in the 'FP7 research framework', which is about to be replaced by Horizon 2020. Horizon 2020 will operate from 2014 to 2020, and is still under review. When finalised, it will provide the funding guidelines and regulations for the great majority of research programmes. The current programme which allocated 1.4 billion euros to security research can be accessed at http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/home_en.html.

It states the programme objectives as:

To develop technologies and knowledge needed to ensure the security of citizens from threats such as terrorism and (organised) crime, natural disasters and industrial accidents while respecting fundamental human rights;

to ensure optimal and concerted use of available and evolving technologies to the benefit of civil European security;

to stimulate the cooperation of providers and users for civil security solutions; improving the competitiveness of the European security industry and delivering mission-oriented results to reduce security gaps.

The priorities are then defined in conformity with the objectives:

Emphasis will be given to the following activities:

Increasing the security of citizens - technology solutions for civil protection, bio-security, protection against crime and terrorism;

Increasing the security of infrastructures and utilities - examining and securing infrastructures in areas such as ICT, transport, energy and services in the financial and administrative domain;

Intelligent surveillance and border security - technologies, equipment, tools and methods for protecting Europe's border controls such as land and coastal borders;

Restoring security and safety in case of crisis - technologies and communication, coordination in support of civil, humanitarian and rescue tasks;

Improving security systems integration, interconnectivity and interoperability - information gathering for civil security, protection of confidentiality and traceability of transactions;

Security and society - socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of security, ethics and values, acceptance of security solutions, social environment and perceptions of security;

Security research coordination and structuring - coordination between European and international security

Useful documentation concerning these processes are online⁴, They include a showcase of current projects titled: *Security Research Projects Under The 7th Framework Programme For Research: Investing Into Security Research For The Benefits Of European Citizens* (September 2010)

The details of the new programme, Horizon 2020, are still under final review, but current plans can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm

There is also a hidden side to the research allocations. Much of the research funding for example committed to 'space and security research' is in fact being spent on surveillance or even pseudo-military projects, even though spending of EU research funds on weapons R&D is forbidden. The thinktank Transnational Institute reports for example on TALOS (*Transportable autonomous patrol for land border surveillance*). TALOS, a Polish-led project to develop unmanned drones that can be used for border control. EU funding for TALOS is €12.9 million. Like all EU-backed research projects, the consortium behind TALOS will retain the intellectual property, potentially creating a valuable asset that will boost corporate profits when sold on to governments around the world. Worse, among the TALOS partners is defence firm Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)*, which has already developed a range of drones, some of which have been used for "assassination missions" over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. IAI is also a partner in the EU-funded OPARUS project (public funding: €1.19 million), which is working on an "open architecture for the operation of unmanned air-to-ground wide area land and sea border surveillance platforms in Europe". Many such funding allocations are made with little peer review or pure academic input: rather they are

⁴ at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/index_en.htm

made in committees far from public scrutiny, packed with representatives of defence ministries and industries. <http://blogs.euobserver.com/gardner/2012/02/17/military-spending-dressed-up-as-research/>

A detailed recent study reveals that recent and projected European security research is far from humanitarian (Hayes, 2012. *NeoConOpticon: The EU Security-Industrial Complex*, Transnational Institute). The research examined all 85 of the projects funded under the EU security research programme to the end of 2008, together with several thousand related EU funded R&D projects from other thematic programmes. What emerges from the bewildering array of contracts, acronyms and EU policies is the development of a powerful new ‘interoperable’ European surveillance system that will be used for civilian, commercial, police, security and defence purposes alike. The report highlights among other issues:

- Defence giants and military research institutes in key advisory positions
- Defence industry profiting from security research contracts
- Obsession with surveillance and border control
- Covert programme for unmanned aerial vehicles or ‘drones’
- Prevalence of Israeli security experts

(<http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/neoconopticonsummary.pdf>)

Finally a reminder that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or other Weapons of Mass Destruction, remains a very major threat perception among Western politicians and security analysts. There is obviously constant monitoring and a high level of surveillance and intelligence operations in this vital area, but one beyond the scope of this paper.

4. Conclusions

The above discussion relates mostly to research funding. The EU of course also has a budget for ‘external action’ and in 2011 conducted a *Public Consultation: What funding for EU external action after 2013?*⁵ which starts by stating that the EU ‘shows solidarity by providing more than half of all international development aid and is the world’s biggest donor of humanitarian assistance. It is actively involved in protecting human rights, promoting decent work agenda, other universal values and international environmental and social conventions. The EU is increasingly active in

⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU_external_action_2013_background_paper.pdf

conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building, through EU-led crisis management missions as well as through EU crisis response and stabilisation instruments. The EU also supports UN and African Union peacekeeping and peace-restoring missions in fragile or war-torn countries.’⁶. However the outcome of that consultation is not yet known; and given the current crises in the EU, expenditure may well be reduced. It is however likely that the support of the Palestinian Authority will remain a key funding priority, and probably stability in countries close to or bordering the EU.

My conclusions from the above are as follows:

1/ There will be less EU investment in overseas interventions, ‘development’, peacebuilding, conflict resolution. This might seem a negative trend, but on the other hand, given the highly problematic results of much ‘peacebuilding’ and activities in countries like Afghanistan, it could also perhaps signal a welcome shift to a less interventionist mentality.

2/ Security will be increasingly conceptualised in terms of control of criminality, illegal migration, Islamic terrorism, and possibly social protest.

3/ There is possibly a higher level of interest in these issues than in improvement of human security for marginalised groups within and just outside the EU.

4/ Surveillance and border security, critical infrastructure protection, cyber-security and safety in case of crises such as epidemics and earthquakes will be considered important.

5/ There will be a high level of investment in security-relevant technologies.

6/ International co-operation will be welcomed in these programmes, and especially contracts which include partner universities from Europe’s poorer countries.

7/ There will still be scope for social science approaches to security issues, but they would need to be carefully formulated, and probably integrate with technological approaches.

Coming from a peace studies or human security background, how does one feel about these trends?

On one hand, they seem far away from concerns with social justice and democracy. The EU policy-making apparatus, even more than that of its important member-states, is almost completely insulated from public opinion and scrutiny, operating among tiny networks of industry specialists

⁶ And see discussions by observer thinktanks on <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7164.pdf>

and ‘defence experts’. General populations have no say whatsoever about such decisions, and they are a clear example of a ‘democratic deficit’ for which the EU is criticised in many other areas. Likewise, it can be seen that the objectives are basically technocratic and oriented towards social control rather than addressing root causes.

On the other hand, the new technologies are given impetus and investment. Of course we all welcome improvements in responses to earthquakes and epidemics, the fight against organised crime, terrorist threats to critical infrastructure and so on. In today’s society, such protection can only be gained through massive investment in relevant technologies. It is just unfortunate that they are so comprehensively detached from the much broader human security agendas. It will be very helpful to have intellectual and research inputs from Japanese expertise in this area.

Multiple Interfaces of Human Security: Coping with Downturns for Human Sustainability

Yoichi Mine and Oscar A. Gómez¹

Abstract

The present article discusses manifold ways in which the notion of human security revitalizes our understanding of people's reaction to sudden downturns. The argument is placed against the backdrop of recent experiences unfolded by the Great East Japan Earthquake, which the authors have witnessed with a sense of urgency. We also deal with a comprehensive set of key ideas related to human security, such as human development, human rights, national security, risk and sustainability. Listening to the voices of the insecure, transmitting their messages to decision-makers in critical situations is emphasized as a *sine qua non* of the human security approach. The target of inquiry should be both psychological and physical insecurities of the most vulnerable to risks and threats, especially the ways in which they perceive insecurities as a matter of life experience. The idea of human security is premised upon a framework beyond methodological individualism, envisioning a *holistic* system that would accommodate sustainable interactions between nature and human society.

Keywords:

human in/security, human development, human rights, natural disasters, sustainability

1. Introduction

The life and death experience of people who get through serious human insecurities offers invaluable lessons for future generations. The coastal areas of Japan stricken by tsunami on March 11, 2011, have occasionally been hit by large seismic sea waves in the past history, leaving archeological evidence as well as human memories and warnings in the forms of storytelling, stone inscriptions, place names and so on. Given that a tsunami of that magnitude is supposed to take place only once in several centuries or even in a millennium, it may seem practically impossible for a community to remain fully alert for such long periods. However, immediately after the initial quake on 3.11, given the collective memories, people anticipated that big waves might come from the ocean, and many of them managed to evacuate from the low grounds, often with painful reluctance

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to leave without making sure the security of their family and friends. By April 2013, it was established that 15,883 were killed and 2,681 were missing, mainly drowned, even though a majority of people survived. Weaving tales of multiple lessons for the future will surely be essential part of human security studies on emergency situations.²

Amartya Sen once described the quintessence of human security like this: “Human security demands protection from these dangers [of sudden deprivation] and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with—and when possible overcome—these hazards.”³ It should be noted, as implied in this passage, that overcoming hazards is not always possible as long as human beings are mortal. One mourns when one accepts her or his own everlasting change occasioned by the loss one undergoes, which could not be charted or planned in advance; as the loss is irreplaceable for each, we should be conscious about dehumanizing effects of a hierarchy of grief.⁴ Human’s desire and propensity to identify with others and resonate with the emotions of others goes beyond borders, and thereby characterizes the notion of human security as contrasted with the limited horizon of national security. The human security approach draws attention to what has been lost, as well as what should be protected in face of adversities, given a set of norms and values shared by multiple layers of communities.

This paper is an essay inquiring into multiple interfaces of human security *vis-à-vis* other international norms such as human rights, human development and human sustainability. As human security is a relative newcomer to the family of those human-centered norms, its unique property is expected be delineated through careful comparison with those of the adjacent elder concepts.⁵ Although most part of our paper does not directly deal with natural disasters *per se*, the following discussion is placed against the backdrop of the experiences unfolded by the Great East Japan Earthquake, which the authors have witnessed with a sense of urgency.

2. Human security as a hybrid of generations of human rights

As a general framework, human security was originally put forward as an agenda to integrate “freedom from fear” (peace) and “freedom from want” (development). These dual ideals were

² The data is based on the body count of the Japanese National Police Agency, http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf (last accessed April 12, 2013). Social vulnerability of people is of temporal nature as historical knowledge of disasters is inescapably fleeting full of cultural and individual biases (de Vries 2007).

³ Sen 2003, 8.

⁴ Butler 2004, 20-1, 31-2.

⁵ Gasper 2010.

upheld in the post-war formative years of the United Nations, and inscribed in the preamble of the Japanese Constitution promulgated in 1946 as follows: “We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” The Final Report of the Commission on Human Security released in 2003, the so-called Ogata-Sen Report, was also structured along this dual vision of basic freedoms,⁶ which largely correspond to the first and the second generation of human rights emerged after the Second World War.

Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the notion of human rights has gradually evolved to cover all major domains of human life. In its formal expression, freedom *from* critical threats to individuals corresponds to the framework of liberty, of negative freedom, such as freedom from coercion, torture and death threats, freedom from autocracy, and freedom from arbitrary forfeiture of property: the type of freedoms prioritized by the philosopher, Isaiah Berlin.⁷ Then, the post-war era has witnessed another thread of evolution of human rights, a series of social rights *toward* material well-being, rights to health, to education, to decent work, to housing, to good environment, etc. What is noteworthy in the human security agenda is that the substantial part of social rights toward well-being, positive freedom, is accommodated in the form of negative freedom, as freedom *from* want.⁸ As such, the human security approach provides us with a framework in which negative and positive freedoms, civil liberties and social rights, can be reconciled and put forward in an integrative way. In the realm of academic investigations, the combination may open up a fresh field of synergy among political, legal and economic sciences.

In addition to the duality of freedom from fear and freedom from want, the recent discourse on human security in the United Nations has come to attach special importance upon *freedom to live in dignity* as the third defining element of human security.⁹ Equally applicable to groups as well as individuals, this freedom loosely corresponds to a certain core element of the so-called third generation human rights, solidarity rights or collective rights, paying more attention to agency freedom of individuals. Based on this understanding, the triad of values espoused by the latest human security approach, namely, survival, livelihood and dignity, accommodates and reformulates the three generations of human rights. Human security can thus be instrumental in putting multiple generations of human rights under a single umbrella, so as to lay directly on the agenda the question

⁶ CHS 2003.

⁷ Berlin 1969.

⁸ Freedom from serious poverty should be regarded as part of intrinsic human rights. Inspired by the Kantian framework of moral duties, Pogge (2002) integrates negative duties and positive duties in a potent critique of national parochialism. As for the rights-based approach to development, see also Uvin (2004).

⁹ *Human Security, Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations General Assembly, A/64/701, March 8, 2010; *Follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 64/291 on Human Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/763, United Nations General Assembly, April 5, 2012.

of prioritizing a particular set of human rights in a given situation; in case of natural disasters, the challenges are concentration on a bare priority of life-saving (survival), provision of effective shelters and job creation (livelihoods), and full inclusion of the most vulnerable in the reconstruction processes (dignity), and all these are interconnected. The scope of human security overlaps with that of human rights, but the former is less normative and more context-based than the latter. According to Sen, human rights can be seen as a “general box” that is to be filled with specific demands. The sheer urgency pertaining to serious incidents of human insecurities will provide particular contexts in which such demands are substantiated with reasoned priorities.¹⁰

Human rights have a long history of institutional grounding in global and national frameworks. The inalienable rights of humans have strong claims to be recognized as legal entitlements or as a set of enumerative normative principles. In the field of disaster relief, an influential operational manual to protect human rights has been created in order to guide practitioners in the field, improving the quality of border-crossing emergency operations.¹¹ Prizing the value of coordinated activities based on the human rights principle, it should be noted that such a tool is used principally by security providers and professionals, not by disaster-stricken people who are to be empowered with dignity in the whole participatory sequence of prevention, protection and promotion. This is supposed to be an underlying motivation and reason why the Ogata-Sen Report put forward the combination of protection and empowerment, highlighting the question of agency freedom and dignity in operationalizing human security.

3. Human security and human development as shadow and light

In the context of generations of human rights, the agenda of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be considered as a practical offshoot of the first generation, ensuring elimination of extreme forms of “fear” pertaining to dictatorship and violent disintegration of a nation-state.¹² In fact, the notion of civil liberties developed originally as the resistance to tyranny and the reaction to repeated wars in modern Europe, and has been extended to the developing world after the Second World War. On the other hand, the agenda of human development derived from the second generation, serving to reduce serious “want” in economic, social and cultural spheres. The discourse of socioeconomic human rights presupposes more, and wiser, intervention of governments to uplift the state of people’s

¹⁰ Sen 1985; 2003; 2009.

¹¹ IASC 2008.

¹² ICISS 2001.

well-being. Then, the human security approach has emerged to integrate all generations of human rights, sensitizing power relations between auxiliaries and beneficiaries, equipped with the keyword of human “dignity”. In the framework of human security, the government is neither intrinsically good nor bad, but its role shall be constantly judged from the perspective of ordinary people who face insecurities in their life realities.

Despite this uniquely comprehensive, people-centered positioning, human security tended to be associated exclusively with freedom from fear under the influence of the R2P agenda, to the extent that the resolution on the definition of human security adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 10, 2012, had to state that the “notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation.”¹³ As a matter of fact, it must be remembered that the notion of human security was born originally as a younger sibling of human development; in other words, human security came into existence not as a natural extension of freedom from fear but as a powerful supplement to freedom from want, a practical manifestation of the second-generation human rights, with an ambition to integrate both “fear and want” agendas in daily operations of the UN organizations. In this section, let us discuss the nexus between human development and human security as the close siblings born from UNDP.

Both human development and human security were conceived under the influence of a group of development economists, a scholarly circle of UNDP, immediately after the demise of the Cold War. Initially, the concept of human development, which was defined as the continuous process of enlarging the range of people’s choices so that they can lead lives they value, was introduced in the inaugural issue of *Human Development Report* in 1990. It is widely known that the concept drew heavily on the capability theory elaborated by Amartya Sen. The notion of human development is much broader than the Human Development Index (HDI), a combination of life expectancy (which crudely corresponds to human survival), GNI per capita (to human livelihood), and years of schooling (to human dignity), which was originally designed to counter and replace per capita income as the leading tool of quantitative measurement of human well-being. HDI seems to have achieved the major objective of countering the economistic income poverty approach, augmenting its influence among development experts, though Sen himself once revealed his criticism against such a crude attempt of indexing of human development based on national averages of only three variables.¹⁴ This criticism is worth heeding when one tries to develop post-MDG indices covering

¹³ Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/66/290, September 10, 2012.

¹⁴ UNDP 1990; Sen 1999.

natural disasters and other elements of human insecurities. Risks are diverse and latent, and there is no straightforward measure to gauge the extent of resilience of people against calamities.

After an interval of several years, the notion of human security was introduced in *Human Development Report 1994* on the initiative of the Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul Haq. The concept of human security was then fully developed in the Ogata-Sen report published in 2003, in which Sen discussed the effects of boundary-crossing *downside risks*, which may drastically swamp the past achievements of human development in individual societies.¹⁵ Compared with the original formulation of human security that directed attention to both “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,”¹⁶ the Ogata-Sen report narrowed down the focus to the latter by shedding light upon the concept of “sudden downturns.”¹⁷ Downside risks should include the outbreak of violent wars and conflicts, spread of emerging infectious diseases, rapid degradation of environment, havoc caused by natural disasters and megascience accidents, and intensification of social discrimination, exclusion and deprivation. All of those risks do have deep structural causes as well as proximate causes, but are widely perceived as unexpected shocks or unreasonable scourges, as exemplified in sudden natural disasters. In all cases, the fact remains that the range of choices of the affected population can be extremely circumscribed.

Human security has enlarged the limited horizon of post-war development discourse. From the developmentalist perspective, human security is expected to deal with contingency and externalities, addressing vulnerability in its full sense: preventing people’s exposure to serious harm, protecting the worst-affected, and promoting the resilience and problem-solving abilities of multiple layers of human communities. Human security is the collective effort of countering adversities, of safeguarding the choices of the most insecure, and of placing the society back on the “right track” of the forward-looking, Aristotelian process of development of human potentials.¹⁸ If human development looks at the light and promotion, human security takes care of the shadow and protection, and the light and the shadow unite.

In this perspective, human security is practically understood as an agenda to promote human actions in face of systemic catastrophe. Although traditional Marxist theory produced insights into the cumulative nature of crises in a capitalist society, neo-classical economics tends to exclude such cases from the subject of analysis due to its obsession with the purity of self-regulating market

¹⁵ Sen 2003.

¹⁶ UNDP 1994, 23.

¹⁷ CHS 2003, 10-11; Sen 2003.

¹⁸ Mine 2007, 71-2.

equilibrium. In this light, human security can theoretically be understood as an extension of Sen's entitlement theory, which was developed through his analysis of famine crises in South Asia and Africa, and human security now goes beyond the question of food entitlement failure into the realm of more general crisis situations.¹⁹ One of the relevant works in this regard, even though the term human security is not used explicitly, is the in-depth study of African famines by Alex de Waal, who includes the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the famine crises defined in a broad term, as new variant famines. Another illuminating work is the comprehensive survey of African poverty by the historian, John Iliffe, who draws a perspicuous distinction between structural, long-term poverty (typically in EuroAsian class society) and conjunctural, temporary poverty (typically in case of African famines), and argues that both types of poverty tend to converge in contemporary Africa.²⁰ The interface between human development and security can be reexamined further in light of these lines of anthropological and historical studies on crisis situations.

In their mightiness, indiscriminateness and suddenness, natural disasters are the epitome of the issues of human insecurity. However, the connection between the studies of natural disasters and of development has been tenuous and episodic, both theoretically and practically. Disaster research as a trans-disciplinary field of academic inquiry is a relatively new enterprise, mainly sponsored by developed countries only covering their own territories, during the second half of the twentieth century. Some major issues of natural disasters, mainly floods, do appear here and there on the development agendas, linked to environmental protection and engineering projects, but have not been a priority for the international aid industry. No *World Development Report* or *Human Development Report* has been dedicated to them, neither were natural disasters included in the MDGs or in the Agenda 21 agreed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. If the low frequency of natural disasters is the reason for this lack of prominence, as it seems reasonable to think, then human security is expected to powerfully supplement the perspective of development by mainstreaming the challenge to cope with sudden downturns.

Regarding the interface between human development and security, the experience after 3.11 presents a mixed picture pertaining to the dichotomy between the developed and the developing world. On the positive side, it is not uncommon to find commentaries about how *even* developed countries are exposed to a serious natural disaster, a definite proof of our common humanness. This view permeates the discourse of actors brokering global agreements and motivating preventive

¹⁹ Sen 1981. Sen's study of African and Asian famines was elaborated further in the UNU-WIDER. See Drèze and Sen (1989). See also Gómez 2013.

²⁰ de Waal 2006, 89-93; Iliffe 1987.

action, like the United Nations agencies and the World Bank, in various processes including the preparation for the renewal of the Hyogo Framework for Action due in 2015.²¹ This could be interpreted as a need to modify the framework of human development as we know it, using human security's focus on threat identification in order to renovate the global agendas. However, an opposite understanding of the nature of disasters is also manifest after 3.11. On the earlier stages of the emergency, it was usual to hear critics arguing that some of the problems endured by the disaster zone were not supposed to be happening in Japan, precisely *because* Japan is a developed country. Therefore, for instance, UN emergency agencies were not allowed to enter the ground zero of the tsunami disaster to help coordination of relief efforts, a decision that may have contributed to the widely acknowledged problem of matching actors and needs in such a situation. The acknowledgement of universality and interdependence that is the cornerstone of the human security approach may appear as a flaw for the conventional idea of development, as help is expected to flow in only one direction from the developed to the developing. Receiving aid is not always welcomed by everyone.

4. Risks, identity and security dilemma

In reality, downside risks, such as wars, armed conflicts, sudden spread of infectious diseases, and natural and human-made disasters, are inflicted upon a wide swath of people at a time. Those risks affect the most vulnerable strata of society, intensifying their insecurities. This does not mean that the rest of the society will stay completely safe either. As stated by Ulrich Beck, the smog crosses borders without hindrance and democratically affects both haves and have-nots. "Poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic."²² The boomerang effect is ubiquitous; those who chose to exit from a decaying city center to a rich suburb cannot be free from the consequences of the neglect of the poor, such as violent urban crime. Even though parents send their children to private schools, their life will continue to be affected by the quality of public education.²³ The Tohoku tsunami disaster claimed the lives of all human beings who happened to be there, and the nuclear radiation from the

²¹ Examples can be found in the Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/763, United Nations General Assembly, April 5, 2012; The World Ministerial Conference organized by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tohoku Region, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/wmcd_r_2012/index.html (last accessed April 12, 2013); and the Sendai Dialogue organized by the World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/10/10/sendai-dialogue-advances-global-consensus-on-disaster-risk-management> (last accessed April 12, 2013).

²² Beck 1992, 36.

²³ Hirschman 1970, 98-105.

ruined Fukushima Power Plant affected all exposed human bodies indiscriminately.²⁴ The border-crossing nature of risks invites us to reexamine the orientation of social solidarity and redefine the contours of the public sphere.

With the advent of global risk society, the zero-sum confrontation between haves and have-nots is being intensified, but the ground for solidarity between groups can also be consolidated, through shared concern and shared insecurities, in quest of common security. Even the most stringent critic of the private property regime, Joseph Proudhon, once argued that the freedom and security of the rich and the freedom and security of the poor may reinforce each other, even though the property of the rich and the property of the poor are opposed to each other.²⁵ The perception that everybody is faced with common threats may strengthen the “unity” of a given community. This perspective prompts us to examine subjective perceptions of humans toward risks and hazards, as the term “security” originally means a state free from care (apprehension, troubles, grief, worry, etc.) in the Greek and Latin traditions.²⁶ Sometimes irrational, collective emotions like fear, sorrow, anger and anxiety of both advantageous and disadvantageous communities, rather than the abstract summation of utilities of individuals, will become an essential part of human security studies.²⁷ Through their long history of co-existing with disasters, Japanese people have given outstanding examples of ambiguity. On the positive side, the Hanshin earthquake in Kobe has highlighted the important role of community on relief right after an emergency. While expert analyses on the best behavior after a tsunami have repeatedly shown that “take care of yourself” is the best strategy, people cannot avoid helping their loved ones *and* the vulnerable, even if they are strangers. Heroism, voluntary or involuntary, stands out as a virtue humans highly regard. However, on the negative side, emotions can result in a disconnection from the context when communities badly need coordinated action. Some of the younger generation that are used to following the world through screens rather than local networks was prone to overreaction and herd behavior. Examples from 3.11 include food hoarding and massive movements out of areas not badly affected by the emergency.

Solidarity against risks presupposes a situation where *we* are exposed to common risks. It is no wonder that narrative expression of insecurities given by individuals reveals collective perceptions of common insecurities as symbolic function. Except for “pure” natural disasters, however, the

²⁴ However, the biological fact is that children are more vulnerable than adults especially in terms of thyroid disorder caused by an immediate exposure to iodine 131. This has imposed enormous psychological strains on families with small children.

²⁵ Proudhon 1840, 42.

²⁶ Dillon 1996, 123-8.

²⁷ In spite of material presence of threats and hazards, we must keep in mind that risks are culturally constructed (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

problem is that risks are often associated with certain people, *others*, such as hostile ethnic groups, foreigners, migrants from a contaminated area, poor people, heathen, angry minority, arrogant majority, and so on. “If prosperity tends to isolate, tragedy must connect”, though, as Mahmood Mamdani wrote, the validity of this statement became tragically questionable after 9.11.²⁸ What we witness is that many societies are trapped in security dilemma, in which a group of people, the original player, starts to react to their perceived threat, provoking a similar kind of reaction of another player, which is perceived as a much greater threat by the original player. As a result, all players feel more insecure, and are exposed to new risks of an outbreak of conflict. In this case, rational choices of individual players to achieve their own parochial security make the entire system extremely insecure.²⁹

Following the demise of the Cold War, conventional wars between nation-states and ideological proxy wars have been replaced by intra-state civil strife as the extension of local or global identity politics. This trend, aptly captured by Mary Kaldor,³⁰ indicates that the theorem of the security dilemma could be applicable to groups other than established nations in practical terms. As long as a motion to achieve the security for a certain group may be perceived as incompatible with the security of another group, we must be sensitive about *whose* security we are talking about. In this regard, it is important to eliminate the room for elite manipulation of differences in perceived insecurities between groups, which may lead to divisive, sometimes extremely dangerous consequences. The practitioners of human security should clearly go beyond the dichotomy between us and estranged others, and try to avoid the cumulative vicious circle of security dilemma.

Privileging national security above the concerns of citizens can lead to tragic outcomes. At the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, thousands of Koreans were massacred in Tokyo metropolitan area, based on completely false rumors like their poisoning local wells, in chaotic situations triggered by the quake. In more recent times, however, in both the Great Kobe Earthquake in 1995 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, such a tragedy never took place, and far from being exposed to xenophobic violence, foreigners who were not fluent in Japanese were mostly given special attention by locals. Altruistic utopias depicted by Rebecca Solnit³¹ emerged out of major disasters in contemporary Japan as well, but the “paradise” started to be somewhat fouled only when the central government muscled in; after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the slogan coined in

²⁸ Mamdani 2004, 10.

²⁹ Herz 1951; Jervis 1978. The political quagmire over territorial jurisdiction of the tiny island located between Japan and China, as well as the issue of North Korean missiles, is a textbook case of security dilemma, which loomed large as the “disaster utopia” of 3.11 started to recede.

³⁰ Kaldor 1999.

³¹ Solnit 2009.

Tokyo for national unity, “Ganbaro Nippon”, was received with certain discomfort by those who were placed outside the reach of the call, especially by foreign citizens who decided to stay.

The endeavors at securing human security not only outlive individuals through collective memories but also through institutions and modalities of practices grown out of them. There are “constellations” of security providers involved in the realization of multiple freedoms from fear and want and to live in dignity.³² Human security is not equivalent to national security, rather the latter constitutes a part of the former, in that a nation-state is nothing but a security community juxtaposed with other security providers in case of serious human insecurities. In coping with natural disasters, state institutions including the military apparatus figure prominently as the challenges require swift professional rescue activities and massive investment of resources. At the same time, there are also a broader range of security communities including municipalities, local communities, voluntary organizations, business, mass media and universities, as well as international organizations.³³ In coping with disasters, the significance of dissemination of appropriate, accurate and reliable information is being emphasized.³⁴ In this regard, it must be noted that local newspapers such as *Kahoku Shimpō* as well as local branches of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) have played invaluable roles in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

5. Listening to the voices of the insecure

Although unexpected collective sufferings give rise to new forms of human associations and group cohesion, human communities are nonetheless marked by multiple cleavages. As vulnerability to risks is different for different people, at a certain point, existing groups should be disaggregated according to various needs depending on occupation, gender, age, cultural identity as well as place of residence. Even though downside risks affect everybody, insecurities spread unevenly, as emphasized by Beck, the known protagonist of “Risk Society.” “The history of risk distribution shows that, like wealth, risks adhere to the class pattern, only inversely: wealth accumulates at the top, risks at the bottom. To that extent, risks seem to *strengthen*, not to abolish, the class society.”³⁵ Then, people endowed with appropriate means try to respond to the needs of strangers, with the question of dignity, the third constituent element of human security, coming to the fore against the

³² UNDP 2003.

³³ Local knowledge and livelihoods matter in natural disasters and other crisis situations (Heltberg *et al.* 2012). A series of multi-disciplinary studies on disasters have confirmed that voluntary responses to catastrophes deserve more attention (Helsloot and Ruitenbergh 2004).

³⁴ World Bank 2010.

³⁵ Beck 1992, 35.

backdrop of asymmetric power relations. At this point, human security requires us to listen carefully to the *voices* of the most insecure people who are exposed to serious risks and suffer acute deprivation.

Those who are exposed to downturns are far from monolithic entities. If ethnic unrest erupts, those civilians who do not possess resources to protect themselves, to evacuate or to emigrate become easy targets of warring parties. Socially excluded persons living with HIV/AIDS but being denied citizenship cannot gain access to ARV treatment, even in cases when the government where they live does provide such a service. In debt-laden households, young voiceless children often fall prey to human trafficking, in connivance with corrupt public authorities. When the food price soars, landless people begin to starve earlier than land-owning farmers. The people who cannot afford to live outside the industrial zones suffer respiratory problems caused by the hazardous emission from smoky factories. The people who have no choice but to live in a wetland delta have their houses swept away by the deluge caused by the global climate change. Those who have decided to sacrifice their lives for others are tortured and “disappear”, as a warning threat to those who are to follow them, leaving their families in despair and destitution.

After a big earthquake, some people hurry to get information on the situation and become victims of collective panic. Others find security in not reacting at all, risking their lives as some of the tsunami casualties did in 3.11. There are also people who delegate decisions to others and thus become vulnerable to groupthink. People’s behaviors are conditioned not only by people’s subjectivity but also by their social attributes and material positions in economy. Even family units may be forced to break up in post-disaster displacement; after the Fukushima nuclear accident, young mothers with small children had to evacuate to safer areas, leaving their income-earning partners behind. Evacuation has been especially painful in Fukushima for those who had put down roots in villages but had no choice but to abandon their farmland and livestock. When relatively mobile segments of the population, such as foreign sojourners, leave the dangerous zone quickly, they can easily be regarded as conforming to norms and standards alien to locals.

In 3.11, the age factor intensified human suffering. Many of the elderly and the handicapped were unable to dash up to high ground, and many survivors whose children had already migrated to cities were to live solitary lives in shelters. In three seriously affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima), people of 60 years old or more amounted to 65 per cent of the total victims of the quake and tsunami, though the proportion of that age group to the total regional population had been no more than 31 per cent. As of the end of March 2012, 90 per cent of the 1,632 disaster-related deaths

(typically induced by psychological stress in shelters) are reported to have been those of over 65.³⁶ There is an old maxim, “Tsunami Tendenko”, which literally means, “When tsunami comes, go in each own direction.” That is to say, one must forget about family members or close friends, as every minute counts. In Kamaishi City, 2,921 elementary and junior high students survived only with 5 casualties, not least because the principle of “Tendenko” had been taught in school and widely shared among pupils. They managed to dash with teachers, and this maxim was also meant to alleviate the psychological burden of survivors. However, it is also argued that the “Tendenko” principle, the high priority of individual exit in the state of emergency, does not contradict the necessity of taking measures in normal situations to make sure that the lives of the socially vulnerable, like those who are bedridden, are effectively protected in emergency situations.³⁷

Recent disasters have shown the emergence of new vulnerabilities associated with urbanization, as disasters affecting mega-cities involve huge populations.³⁸ No less than 5.15 million people in Tokyo metropolitan area were unable to go home on the day of 3.11. The government recommends people not to try too hard to go home when an epicentral megaquake hits Tokyo, and encourages public facilities and companies to accommodate them.³⁹ Immediately after natural disasters, people can be hit by a serious shortage of foods as felt in towns in Tohoku and Tokyo as well as in temporary shelters. Here again, responses to the multiple demands of people are beyond what a single actor could manage, and the whole constellation of actors has their own roles to play: families and neighbors assuring the prioritized distribution of goods, companies rebuilding their supply chains, and the local and central governments coordinating actions.⁴⁰

Acts of solidarity to protect the life of the vulnerable may pose serious operational problems, however well intended they may be. In case of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, a massive amount of unrequired goods were dispatched from abroad only to hinder relief operations, and the Japanese government initially declined to accept in-kind aid from the outside in 2011. As Quarantelli noted, the sheer magnitude of a disaster invokes a parallel effort of aiding people in need of support, and it is sometimes necessary to bypass the formal government structure designed to treat all citizens “equally” irrespective of their different needs.⁴¹ Still, possible harm stemming from overreaction at

³⁶ Cabinet Office 2011, 12. “Shinsai kanrenshi 9 wari 66 sai ijou (90 per cent of disaster-related deaths are 66 years old or more)”, *Kahoku Shimpō*, May 12, 2012.

³⁷ “Bosai kyoiku ‘kiseki’ yobu (Disaster prevention education creates a ‘miracle’)”, *Kahoku Shimpō*, 26 November, 2011; “‘Tendenko’ no atsukai de ronsen (Debate over ‘tendenko’)”, *Kahoku Shimpō*, October 25, 2011. *Kahoku Shimpō* (2012) is an award-winning reportage on the tsunami disaster written in Japanese.

³⁸ Quarantelli 1996.

³⁹ <http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/syuto/kitaku/pdf/saishu02.pdf> (last accessed April 12, 2013).

⁴⁰ Gómez 2012.

⁴¹ Quarantelli 1993; Sousa and Gómez 2012.

the initial stage of disaster should not be underestimated.

Even though risks easily cross the border, the priority that emerges out of particular human insecurity situations can be different from place to place and from time to time. Human security as a policy framework is expected to contribute toward reaching at an agreement on shifting priority, based on a shared understanding about what are the *basic* capabilities for everyone,⁴² and what are the particular sets of human rights to which urgent attention is to be drawn, in a given society at a given time. By examining human insecurities in extreme crisis situations, human security thinking will help us to narrow down the focus of human development, and to reaffirm, or to create, a value system within society about what should be secured for every member of the society. The gravity of consideration should be placed over the most insecure segment of the population unduly exposed to downside risks, paying full attention to social and economic attributes of individuals and respecting their dignity and agency freedom.

Considering the duality of freedom from fear and from want in human security, the target of inquiry should be both psychological and physical insecurities of the most vulnerable to risks and threats, especially the ways in which they perceive insecurities as a matter of life experience.⁴³ The World Bank once conducted a worldwide survey on voices of the poor, and presented some of the qualitative results in *World Development Report 2000/2001*, though the citation was made in a piecemeal way as collateral evidence to strengthen the Bank's own policy agenda, rather than to formulate policies based on the grassroots findings.⁴⁴ The bottom-up characteristics of the human security thinking lead us to reconsider the distinctive attribute of human security *vis-à-vis* human rights and development. While human rights as universal norms are thought to be possessed intrinsically by every human being, the attention to human insecurities always starts with the specification of pressing human needs and human aspirations on the ground. Happiness is abstract, but human miseries are always with concrete realities. The trajectory of sustainable human development is path-dependent and should be given a firm direction by the examination of urgent needs, both physical and psychological, arising from human insecurities.

6. Conclusion

⁴² The "basic" was rephrased as the "vital core of human life" in CHS (2003) in a powerful and yet somewhat essentialist expression. As for the notion of basic capabilities, see Sen (1992, 44-5, 108-16).

⁴³ A comprehensive review of National Human Development Reports (Jolly and Ray 2006) pointed to the necessity of including the study of people's perceptions in the tools of analysis.

⁴⁴ Narayan *et al.* 2000.

Thus far, the bounds of possibility of the concept of human security have been discussed in contrast with human rights and human development as well as national security. After reviewing their multiple interfaces, we have placed an emphasis on directing our attention to the life experience of people vulnerable to downside risks, combining subjective perceptions and objective states of insecurity. Human security is more context-based than its other “human” counterparts.⁴⁵ In the context of natural disasters, priorities may change in different stages of emergency from immediate response, gradual rebuilding to future prevention. However, there is one underlying requirement of human security practitioners that is present in all processes: listening to the voices of the insecure, thereby respecting their dignity and agency freedom. This challenge will become central especially once the dramatic “CNN effect” is over, leaving the most vulnerable unattended below the surface of a restored normalcy. This is the reason why Human Security Forum, a Japanese non-profit organization currently engaged in community regeneration in temporary shelters for tsunami survivors, attaches prime importance to securing dignity as an operational keyword.⁴⁶ Encouraging social change by means of doomsaying cannot play a positive role in the rehabilitation processes, as we still have a situation in which the Fukushima children and the inhabitants of temporary shelters suffer stigmatization and marginalization.

The notion of human security has often been criticized for its vagueness and the lack of rigorous explanatory power. Nonetheless, we may well think the other way round; practical issues of human insecurities compel us to transform our conventional understanding of security. “Introducing the HS perspective into a given issue may provide us only with a limited degree of innovation, for the issues have already been defined. However, we still have another possibility: to connect the issue and the approach to it from the reverse angle. That is, we can re-examine ‘security’ through observing livelihoods of the people concerned.”⁴⁷ Disasters provide a golden opportunity for doing this, by documenting how the vulnerable survive, rebuild their livelihoods and preserve their dignity during the whole process. The voice of the people reveals society’s ideas of security, but focusing only on a single idea may lead to over-simplification of lessons to cope with downturns. Through this paper we tried to present some clues about how to undertake such an examination through different human concepts—i.e., rights, development and security—with relative weights. Matching the insights derived from those human concepts with practical demands of disaster study may

⁴⁵ Human security emerged as a flexible paradigm. Aung San Suu Kyi once noted that flexibility and weakness were completely different. “Freedom from fear”, *The Economist*, November 18, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/17520350> (last accessed April 12, 2013).

⁴⁶ See the website of Human Security Forum (in Japanese), <http://www.hsf.jp/> (last accessed April 12, 2013).

⁴⁷ Watabe and Wongsamun 2009, 79.

eventually lead us to reconciliation between the normative agenda of universal humanism and the complexity of locality, by critically assessing the nature of rationality of people's behaviors in extreme conditions. The theoretical scaffolding we propose may also have a certain affinity with the fundamental concept of human needs and welfare. The World Bank's version of disaster prevention is implemented not through newly integrated branches of government but through existing finance ministries. The attention of human security to social vulnerability overlaps with the underlying motivation of renewed thinking on social security and the role of public sphere.⁴⁸

As the human triad of the United Nations, human rights, development and security, are more or less based on the framework of methodological individualism, a different conception is needed to envision a *holistic* system, which would also accommodate sustainable interaction between nature and human society. The human security approach does not provide a framework to expound directly the future shape of human society, nor to explain the structural causation of poverty and insecurity, but rather to bring forward just a way of how to see critical things. In order to examine if a certain system of human society is sustainable, we have to look for a different framework of theoretical scheme, beyond the perspective of community resilience and individual coping within the scope of human-centrism. Despite the limit of human security, however, we cannot think of the future shape of a sustainable society separately from the examination of human insecurities, simply because a system which fails to provide substantial security for every part of society cannot be sustainable. In this sense, human security and sustainability are interdependent.

Human society is embedded within the whole system of geosphere, biosphere and noosphere. Human insecurities take place in multiple interfaces of humans within these spheres: natural disasters and climate change with the geosphere, infectious diseases with the biosphere, and violent conflicts and economic crises within the noosphere.⁴⁹ Among the multifaceted issues of human insecurities, it is natural disasters such as massive tsunami that typically impress upon all of us the fragility and transience intrinsic in human existence. We cannot but try to secure individual survival and reproduction of life and livelihoods within the limits of the interactions between these spheres as dwellings of individual humans. A society in which human rights, development and security are realized without adding too much load to the reproduction of nature can be considered a society in which *human sustainability* is attained. The frontiers of national disasters and human security should

⁴⁸ See, for example, the ILO's comprehensive report on economic security (ILO 2004).

⁴⁹ Smuts 1926; Teihard de Chardin 1955. The Global COE Program at Kyoto University, "In search of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa", has conducted a remarkably comprehensive research on the interactions of those three spheres through collaboration of scholars of natural and social sciences and the humanities, <http://www.humanosphere.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/> (last accessed April 12, 2013).

be explored further in the contexts of this macro perspective as well as through the construction of knowledge bases of best practices to cope with downturns.

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Human Security, Environmental Security, Securitization and Sovereignty

Stephen James¹

Abstract

This article explores the interrelationships between human, environmental, and (more briefly) economic security in order to demonstrate the validity of pioneering efforts to expand “security” to encompass responses to “non-traditional” threats to human beings. In particular, it concludes that environmental degradation is a matter of both national and global security, but also that the securitization of the environment need not mean its militarization. Treating environmental degradation as a matter of security need not involve thinking of it in military terms and responses. To continue to think in this way is to remain in the thrall of the realist national security mindset: the very mindset that the broadening of security to encompass environmental concerns is designed to challenge. In short, securitizing environmental concerns is only problematic when security is understood in traditional, realist terms. In contrast, this article endorses a wide understanding of human security as the constraint of state sovereignty in the pursuit of the security of people from myriad threats to their physical, environmental, and economic and social security. And it relates this understanding to debates over territorial integrity, international intervention, and the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect.”

Keywords:

human security, environmental security, securitization, responsibility to protect, economic and social security

1. Introduction

Following the “doomsday” environmental and “limits to growth” literature, and associated social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, together with the critiques by the World Order Models Project (WOMP) in the 1970s and 1980s,² a number of theorists began to challenge the realist security paradigm in terms of the security referent (i.e. whose security was at stake), the threats to

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² Falk 1971, 185; Falk, 1977, 192, 197; Robyn Eckersley, “Global Environmental Politics,” in Devetak et al., eds. 2007, 362–72, at 366; Lorraine Elliott, “Environmental Security,” in Tow et al., eds. 2000, 157–76; John Vogler, “Environmental Issues,” in Baylis et al., eds. 2008, 352–68. This article is drawn from a working paper funded by the Australian Research Council, Australian Academy of Social Sciences, and the Institute for Human Security (La Trobe University, Melbourne): James 2010. I gratefully acknowledge the feedback from Dennis Altman, Joseph Camilleri and Robyn Eckersley on that paper.

security, and the means to secure those at risk.³ Richard Ullman and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, for example, broadened national security to include threats from population growth, resource scarcities, and environmental degradation. While the referent was still the nation-state, for Mathews a range of non-military responses was needed to achieve security for it, including the containment of population growth, the pursuit of more sustainable development, and the encouragement of multilateralism.⁴

This wider understanding of security was reinforced at the end of the Cold War. Various theorists, international organizations, and commissions understood security as going beyond the interests of the nation-state, encompassing non-military threats, and requiring the redirection of a peace dividend to civilian ends, sustainable development, and peacebuilding.⁵

The distinctive contribution of this article is to make a case for the securitization of the environment as part of a human security approach. It argues, in contrast to the Copenhagen school,⁶ which is sceptical about human security, that the securitization of the environment is only problematic when it is anchored to a realist conception of security. If securitization is linked to a broader conception of human security, which recognizes, for instance, the civil roots of security in human development, economic and social rights and social security, then it will not be beholden to militaristic, statist, or undemocratic values and approaches. Moreover, recognizing environmental security as part of human security allows us to remember potentially positive overlaps between human security, national security, and state sovereignty.⁷ I explore these possibilities by examining

³ See Eckersley 1992; Eckersley 2004; Robyn Eckersley, "Communitarianism," in Dobson and Eckersley, eds. 2006, 91–108; Robyn Eckersley, "Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism," in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 85–97; Robyn Eckersley 2007; Peter Christoff and Robyn Eckersley, "The Kyoto Protocol and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate," in Bonyhardy and Christoff, eds. 2007, 32–45; Andrew Linklater, "Cosmopolitanism," in Dobson and Eckersley, eds. 2006, 109–27 ; Daniel H. Deudney, "Environmental Security: A Critique," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 187–219; Daniel H. Deudney, "Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 91–108; Richard A. Matthew, "Introduction: Mapping Contested Grounds," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 1–22; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 69–90; Michel Fr  d  ric, "A Realist's Conceptual Definition of Environmental Security," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 91–108; Eric K. Stern, "The Case for Comprehensive Security," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 127–54; Simon Dalby, "Threats from the South? Geopolitics, Equity, and Environmental Security," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 155–85; Richard A. Matthew, "Conclusion: Settling Contested Grounds," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 291–301; Allan Collins, "Introduction: What is Security Studies," in Collins, ed. 2010, 1–11.

⁴ Richard Matthew, "Introduction," in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 10; Eckersley 1992, Chapter 1. See also Macfarlane and Khong 2006; Ullman 1983 (this article includes a topical comparison between the risks of, harm from, and costs of preparation for and responses to nuclear war, and to catastrophic earthquakes); Mathews, 1989.

⁵ Robyn Eckersley, "Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism," in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 87.

⁶ See, for example, W  ver, 2011.

⁷ Stephen James, "In Defence of Breadth: The broad approach to human security," in Altman, et al., eds. 2012, 34–56.

environmental theorist Robyn Eckersley's ideas about the sovereignty of "green states" and ecological intervention. I then examine the implications of these ideas for a broader conception of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—hitherto confined to the prevention of gross human rights abuses—that encompasses a responsibility to protect the environment and to prevent gross crimes against it. But before taking up these matters, some background is needed.

2. Security developments after the Cold War

In the 1980s, the environmental movement and international community were activated by the evidence of "acid rain," by Union Carbide's Bhopal chemical factory disaster, by the discovery of a "hole" in the ozone layer (the subject of agreements in 1985 and 1987) and by the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. In 1987, the Brundtland Commission used the term "sustainable development" to reconcile Northern environmental demands with the reasonable desires of the South for further economic development to reduce poverty. The following year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established. With the end of the Cold War, the preoccupation with so-called "hard" security lessened, and, naturally, more interstate cooperation was possible. The Rio "Earth Summit" held in 1992 continued the highwire act of trying to balance economic growth and environmental protection, and during it agreements on climate change and biological diversity were concluded. It also came up with a detailed action plan known as Agenda 21.⁸

While the promise of a lawful, UN-governed world order hardly came to pass, the end of the Cold War did lead to a massive increase in the number, variety, and sophistication of peacekeeping, peace enforcement (the so-called "Chapter Six-and-a-half" of the UN Charter), and humanitarian intervention operations, all of which contributed to the development of the "protective" dimensions of human security. Combined with innovative, but extraordinarily difficult, measures to hold war criminals to account for atrocities such as massacres, concentration camps, "ethnic cleansing," and the use systematic rape as a weapon of war in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, these developments gave some substance to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's rhetorical conclusion that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty" had "passed."⁹ Although it is questionable whether the older form of sovereignty the Secretary-General condemns was ever as a matter of principle or even fact really absolute or exclusive.

⁸ John Vogler, "Environmental Issues," in Baylis, et al. 2008, 353–5; Robyn Eckersley, "Global Environmental Politics," in Richard Devetak, et al., eds. 2007, 362–72.

⁹ Cited in Camilleri, 1994, 134, 140.

3. Human security: the main features

In the 1994 United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report, human security was defined as the security of people, as their freedom from want in the midst of threats in economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political domains. Thus, the UNDP takes a broad approach to human security¹⁰. The phrases "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want," popularized by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1940s, have in the literature become metonyms for, respectively, the narrower violence-oriented and broader socioeconomic conceptions of human security.¹¹ The UNDP, however, insists that both the broader and narrower dimensions of human security are essential and interdependent. The 1994 Human Development Report, as well as a number of scholars, itemises various specific threats to the seven domains of human security.¹²

Similarly, influenced by the capabilities approach of Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, the independent Commission on Human Security (CHS), in its impressive 2003 report, defined human security in the following terms:

Human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people's vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives ... Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development ... It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and institutions.¹³

The CHS thus synthesises the freedom from fear and want and emphasises that human security is "people-centred" and must respond to a range of "menaces" by making use of many different actors beyond the nation-state: for instance, the UN and other international multilateral organizations, the European Union and other regional organizations; international, regional and local NGOs, including community-based organizations (CBOs) and not-for-profit bodies; local municipalities; transnational and other corporations and businesses; and global civil society, including faith-based organisations and individual "global citizens."¹⁴ This point about the diversity of actors is especially relevant to environmental security given the truism that pollution and other environmental threats are

¹⁰ Von Tigerstrom 2007; UNDP 1994; Ewan, 2007.

¹¹ Owen, 2004, 15–24; Martin and Owen, 2010, 213; Taylor Owen, "The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN," in Goucha and Crowley, eds. 2008, 115.

¹² Owen, 2004, 18.

¹³ CHS 2003, iv, 2, 4.

¹⁴ I thank one of the anonymous referees for this point. See also Joseph A. Camilleri, "Human Security: From Theory to Practice," in Altman, et al., eds. 2012; Falk 1999.

no respecters of national or other artificial boundaries. The CHS report is notable for distinguishing between the nevertheless overlapping phenomena of human security and human development on the basis that the former is more concerned with downturns with security (for example, social security safety nets) whereas the latter involves economic expansions with equity (for example, wealth-sharing principles and schemes). The CHS thus also takes a broad approach to security, examining not only conflict prevention but also personal violence and other crimes, economic and health security, the needs of refugees, the vulnerability of internally displaced persons and migrants, the importance of public welfare systems (“social protection”), and the pivotal role of education.¹⁵

Even the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which crystallized the Responsibility to Protect principle, and which has often been associated with the narrower approach to human security favoured by Canada, defined human security broadly. It defined it as “the security of people—their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.” According to the ICISS, human security requires attention to the security of “ordinary people” in their everyday lives. In a tone in places reminiscent of FDR’s wartime speeches, the commission criticises countries that invest heavily in the military sector while letting their citizens suffer the “chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard.” The ICISS thus adopted a very broad understanding of human security despite its defence of a place for state sovereignty, an adoption missed by those who continue to suggest that the commission was preoccupied with freedom from fear.¹⁶

4. Evaluating environmental security approaches

Political scientist Robyn Eckersley has noted that developments after the Cold War placed a spotlight on “neglected areas of vulnerability and marginalization,” on interdependence between the global natural environment and the global economy, and on the necessity for cooperation at the international level. The interactive relationships between peace, environment, development, and economy as matters of security were successively recognized by the Brandt Commission (1980), Brundtland Commission (1987), the Rio Declaration (Principle 25) (1992), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)(1994) (as a component of human security), The Commission on

¹⁵ CHS 2003, 6,9, 12 and *passim*.

¹⁶ ICISS 2001, 15; Evans 2008.

Global Governance (1995), and even, in April 2007, by the UN Security Council.¹⁷ Eckersley has identified four main themes of a broader approach to security with regard to the environment since the end of the Cold War: the emergence of new understandings of “ecological risks” as sources of insecurity; a recognition of new security referents such as the biosphere and “ecological communities”; creative responses to ecological threats based on cooperation and dialogue linked to various levels and kinds of governance; and identification of the prerequisites for “long-term security” and sustainable development, such as ecological and communicative justice based on critical, Habermasian, and constructivist theories.¹⁸

Before briefly assessing some of the criticisms of the treatment of environmental degradation as a matter of national or global security, it is useful to examine how such degradation presents a threat to security. We can do so using the general rubrics of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” that have proved useful to the synthesis of human security discourse. Under the heading of freedom from fear, we may ask how environmental degradation and emergencies might cause or exacerbate interstate and intrastate war and other forms of conflict and turmoil. In relation to freedom from want, we can ask how environmental degradation might affect economic decline and poverty. Thomas Homer-Dixon is one of the leading researchers to have sought to answer these related questions.¹⁹

As a preliminary matter, we must note that, as is the case with all threats to security, environmental harms have a differential impact: the threats affect different parts of the world more or less, dependent, for example, on factors such as gender, age, race, class, and geographical region. For instance, the consensus is that climate change will have the most destructive impacts in the South, a region that has historically contributed less to global warming. Moreover, due to poverty, lack of economic diversification, deficits in knowledge and information, unreliable governance, and the lack of necessary technology, the worst affected tend to be least able to adapt to any detrimental impacts.²⁰

Homer-Dixon has examined the impact of the scarcity of resources, with an emphasis on

¹⁷ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 87–8; Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 133; James 2009; The Commission on Global Governance 1995, 26–30, 68–75, 82–4, 144–6, 208–17, 251–2, 338.

¹⁸ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 89–91.

¹⁹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Thresholds of Turmoil,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 69–90. See also Homer-Dixon and Levy 1995/1996; Homer-Dixon, 2003; Schwartz, et al., 2000.

²⁰ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 91; Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Thresholds of Turmoil,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 69–90; Richard A. Matthew, “Introduction,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 7–8, 12–13; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Barnett and Adger, 2007. See also Fisher, 2011.

renewable resources such as arable land, water, and forests. He concluded that scarcities in these areas when combined with population growth and inequality of access could produce population movements—including the “ecological marginalization” of migrants and refugees—poverty, and violent intrastate, intergroup conflict. The violence produced by these scarcities will, according to Homer-Dixon, normally be “subnational, persistent and diffuse,” although interstate conflict is also possible, particularly over water resources such as river systems, and non-renewable resources like oil and minerals, which are vital to economic and military power. Conflict and poverty will be worse in poorer states that are heavily dependent on natural resources.²¹ Many of Homer-Dixon’s conclusions are consistent with the perspectives of “social justice ecologists” who emphasize the connections between environmental degradation and scarcity, war, violence, injustice, power and wealth inequalities, and human rights violations, especially as they affect indigenous peoples, women, the poor, and other marginalized and vulnerable populations.²² Similar concerns have been expressed by Critical Political Ecologists regarding “innocent communities” having to bear the brunt of the “unfair externalization” of environmental risks.²³

But realists have criticized a broad conception of security that includes environmental matters because it muddies the analytical waters and obscures the proper focus on “the study of the threat, use and control of military force.”²⁴ Other traditionalist critics are concerned that if everything is an urgent matter of security then one loses the useful prioritization function of security studies. There have also been criticisms of the securitization of the environment from perhaps less familiar quarters.²⁵

For example, Daniel Deudney, while sympathetic to the basic thrust of the environmental movement, is critical of ecological issues being treated as matters of *national* security. In his view, matters of national security and environmental decline are too different from each other. While conceding that the preparation for and waging of war cause environmental harm, the nature, sources, and agency of military threat differ from environmental degradation. In Deudney’s view, environmental decline is not characteristically a national problem, interstate war and violence are rarely caused by it, and interstate resource wars are unlikely: states can now get what they need

²¹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, in Deudney and Matthew 1999, 62–5.

²² Richard A. Matthew, “Introduction,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 7–8.

²³ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 91. Similar considerations based on fairness are central to Henry Shue’s argument: Shue, 1999. See also Henry Shue, “Global Accountability,” in Coicaud, Doyle, and Gardner 2003, 160–77.

²⁴ Stephen Walt, quoted in Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 134–5.

²⁵ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 89; Daniel H. Deudney, “Environmental Security: A Critique,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 187–219; Simon Dalby, “Threats from the South?,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 155–85.

through world trade and it is too costly and difficult to get such resources through territorial conquest, even in asymmetric battles. While he thinks there is greater plausibility to the scenario of wars being waged over water resources (for example, in the Middle East, where drinkable water is scarce), he considers that transboundary water resources can also provide opportunities for interstate cooperation, as was the case in relation to cooperation between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay over the use of the Parana River—a river vital for the energy, industrial, and agricultural needs of a number of countries through which it flows.²⁶ As for the possibility of an upstream state using a river as a weapon of war by denying a downstream state adequate water supply, strangely Deudney claims that this possibility is implausible since a dam used by an upstream state for this purpose could always be attacked militarily—whereas in my view a military attack on a dam sounds like a war over water. Deudney also argues that military attacks differ from environmental degradation in their timeframes (they are more immediate) and intention (they are usually intended).²⁷ Similarly, Eckersley describes most “military threats” as “discrete, specific and deliberate,” and motivated by a zero-sum, adversarial attitude, whereas “environmental threats are usually diffuse, transboundary, unintended, operate over longer time scales ... implicate a wide range of actors,” and their resolution promises mutual benefits.²⁸ While there is some truth to these claims, the contrast is perhaps overdrawn. Even classic interstate conflicts can be diffuse, are by definition transboundary, can have unintended consequences, persist over long periods, involve many actors, and bring “common benefits” upon their resolution. If, as I would argue, this was true of many Cold War tensions, proxy wars, civil wars, wars of national liberation and self-determination, and secessionist conflicts—including the “Troubles” in Ireland, Basque separatism, and enduring Middle East conflicts—it is truer still of many ethnic and religious conflicts, particularly intrastate ones, as well as terrorist actions, since the end of the Cold War.

Deudney argues against the securitization of the environment as a matter of national security. The values, norms, and mentalities of the global environmental movement and national security are too different. The mission of the environmental movement will be sullied by association with the bloody, adversarial, zero-sum, jingoistic, secretive, hierarchical, and centralized work of national security. The national security approach is unsuited to the long-term, multi-layered, behaviorally-oriented strategies needed to combat environmental decline. For Deudney, wars on

²⁶ Deudney, “Environmental Security: A Critique,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 187–219; Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation 2011 (on the Parana River); Wolf and Newton, 2011.

²⁷ Daniel A. Deudney, “Environmental Security: A Critique,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 187–219; Richard A. Matthew, “Introduction,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 18.

²⁸ Eckersley 2004, 225.

social problems such as poverty, drugs, and crime do not bode well for a war on environmental harm. Not only would such an approach lead to a focus on how other states threaten us with the irresponsible use of their environment—conveniently distracting us from the actions of our own states—but it risks unhelpful military responses to environmental problems.²⁹ Domestically, it could result in a kind of green fascism that rides roughshod over the claims of indigenous peoples, internationally it could amount to what Nancy Peluso calls a “coercive conservation,” and Deudney “eco-totalitarianism,” in which the discourse of environmentalism is a rationalization for dispossessing local populations of their resources to enrich elites and transnational corporations.³⁰

English IR theorist and self-described “political geographer” Simon Dalby—influenced by post-structuralist, Marxist, critical, World System, and WOMP theories—similarly criticizes the securitization of environmental problems. He argues that there is a high risk of Northern, geopolitical, neocolonialist (mis)adventures. Such exploits are in his view more about powerful states’ economic and strategic interests than they are about protecting the environment. These states manage, blame, and exploit the Third World while leaving the fundamental causes of global injustice and poverty, as he sees them—such as capitalism, U.S. hegemony, and Western overconsumption—untouched. Dalby also argues that the securitization of the environment is connected with the vested interests of the military and security establishment, whose funding and justification depend on the discovery of new threats. He also raises the possibility of military “solutions” insensitive to local environmental problems. The new targets of environmental interventionism will, in Dalby’s view, be confined to developing states. Powerful states will be immune to the discipline, sanctions, and military responses prescribed for others.³¹ Eckersley has also argued that “short-term, highly technical” military actions are only “rarely able to tackle underlying causes of environmental problems.”³² But this is true of military responses generally, which usually do not address the underlying causes of war. Also, as Eckersley recognizes in her discussion of ecological intervention, the military is better used in emergency situations where its resources, technical skill (especially regarding engineering, construction, and logistics), training, command structures, and discipline are virtues. The military (including peacekeepers or “National Guard”-style forces) has responded domestically and internationally to natural disasters like tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, fires, and landslides.³³

²⁹ Daniel A. Deudney, “Environmental Security: A Critique,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 187–219.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 197–8.

³¹ Simon Dalby, “Threats from the South?,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 155–85. See also Dalby 2002.

³² Eckersley, 2004, 225

³³ Eckersley, 2004, 227; Eckersley 2007; Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 137–8.

But treating environmental degradation as a matter of security need not involve thinking of it in military terms and responses. To continue to think in this way is to remain in the thrall of the realist national security mindset: the very mindset that the broadening of security to encompass environmental concerns is designed to challenge. In short, securitizing environmental concerns is only problematic when security is understood in traditional, realist terms. For instance, why couldn't ecologically responsible states cooperate with each other as part of their approach to security? After all, Deudney recognized this possibility in the context of the interstate management of river systems.³⁴ Moreover, security has a very long-established meaning in civil contexts, connected with economic and social security, human rights, welfare, human well-being, basic needs, and social democracy.³⁵ Thus, longer-term, non-military solutions to environmental problems of the kind Deudney and Eckersley urge—for example, sustainable development, reformed trade and credit regimes, transfer of technology, disarmament, reduction of poverty, debt relief, and ecologically-sensitive modernization—are not incompatible with security.³⁶

These considerations apply equally to radical theorists within the loose network of critical, postmodernist, and constructivist communities, such as Ole Wæver, who have criticized the securitization of environmental issues on the basis that, like the war on terror, such an approach encourages a kind of “political triage” where the “urgent” displaces the more important—for example, body screening at airports rather than investigation of the underlying causes of terrorism—and where civil liberties disappear into the black hole of security-state exceptionalism. While these cautions are important—as seen in the way governments can use wars, “states of emergency,” and security discourse generally to suspend human rights and the rule of law, to centralize power, suppress dissent, and persecute minorities and the marginalized—they depend again on a traditional realist approach to security. The traditional connotations of the word “security” are no doubt difficult to dispel, nevertheless broader, civil and humane conceptions of security do allow for the systemic, longer-run critiques of modernization and industrialism that radical critics (as well as Critical Political Ecologists) want to make.³⁷

Eric Stern's idea of comprehensive security is compatible with the UNDP's conception of

³⁴ Daniel A. Deudney, “Environmental Security: A Critique,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 207. See also Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 88.

³⁵ James 2009. See also King and Murray 2001–02; Nucleous 2006; Stephen James, “In Defence of Breadth: The broad approach to human security,” in Altman et al., eds., 2012, 34–56.

³⁶ Eckersley 2004, 225–7.

³⁷ Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 89. See also Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan's magisterial survey, “After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies,” in Collins, ed. 2010, 463–83.

human security³⁸ and has a number of virtues. It recognizes the many dimensions of security: political, economic, social, environmental, and military. It acknowledges the multilevel nature of security, what Stern calls kinds of “social aggregation,” including political parties, social movements, Intergovernmental Organizations, NGOs, and regions. And it sees the potential for nation-states to play a positive role in environmental protection as they cooperate with, guide, and are directed by, various levels of governance. Stern’s comprehensive security anticipates and endorses a transformation of sovereignty, upward to the transnational level and downward to regional and sub-national communities, groups, and individuals. As Stern says, the world is likely to see a “mixed system of governance characterized by an uneasy distribution of authority between autonomous subnational entities, national governments, and emergent supranational institutions, such as regional and global formal organizations, regimes, and a developing body of international law.”³⁹ Stern urges security policy-makers, and those who evaluate their decisions, to be explicit about the complex trade-offs between different values—for example, between economic and environmental security—and unforeseen externalities, thus hoping to make policy-making more transparent, accountable, responsible, and democratic. Finally, Stern identifies possible candidates for overarching core values—namely “survival, autonomy, and health”—and then proceeds to list various threats to health, to life-supporting ecological goods, to “valued non-human eco-systems,” and to biodiversity. All of these values come comfortably within the UNDP’s definition of human security.⁴⁰

5. Green states, sovereignty, intervention and R2P

Just as I would argue for a humane state exercising a conditional sovereignty for the benefit of people within its borders, Robyn Eckersley has urged the greening of the state so that it is “ecologically responsible.” In Eckersley’s view, since states are likely to remain important actors on the global scene for the foreseeable future, it is crucial to ask how they might be reformed to exercise their powers and capacities to enhance the protection of the environment while maintaining a sustainable and socially just economy, and while providing various public goods and infrastructure. The state can also regulate and reorient investment, production, and consumption in pursuit of

³⁸ See UNDP 1994.

³⁹ Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 131, 140.

⁴⁰ Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Deudney and Matthew, eds. 1999, 142–6, 148; Robyn Eckersley, “Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism,” in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 90; James 2009.

ecological sustainability. States, in conjunction with national and transnational civil communities and a wide range of other actors at the global, regional, and local levels, have the potential to act as ecological stewards or trustees to combat the harsher aspects of—particularly neoliberal—capitalist economic globalization, to be good international citizens in a society of states, and to steer themselves and their citizens away from virulent, parochial forms of nation-statism.⁴¹

Inventively, Eckersley seeks to transform what she terms the negative sovereignty of non-intervention so that states, especially those in the South, can invoke it to *protect* ecosystems. She does this by arguing that ecological protection could be linked to a state's protection of its territorial integrity (which includes ecosystems) and political independence, which includes the capacity and right to determine standards for, and to maintain, the quality of its natural environment in accordance with international law. Additionally, environmental hazards caused by other states and entering into the victim state—such as toxins, radiation, waste, or acid rain—may be condemned and resisted on the basis of human rights norms, including the rights to life, health, and to an adequate environment. Eckersley even maintains that some of these damaging environmental intrusions amount to attacks on the victim state and are thus prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, Eckersley's interpretation of "attack" is not yet part of international law and the analogy between armed attack and environmental intrusions will sometimes be strained given the difference in intention between one state's armed attack and another state's recklessness or negligence causing environmental harm. But this will not always be the case: conceivably a state could intend to cause harm to the environment of another state. For example, states might cause such harm as part of a "scorched earth" strategy of warfare, with or without the use of biological or chemical weapons (one thinks of Iraq's destruction of oil wells and the USA's use of Agent Orange and napalm in the Vietnam War).⁴²

By universalizing the principles reinforcing this sovereign "green shield," a state benefiting from the invocation of self-determination, sovereignty, and non-intervention would itself be required not to use its territory in ways that harm the ecosystems and human and non-human species in other states. In particular, its economic activities would be duly restrained by this norm. Although Eckersley does not herself make the argument, one might extrapolate that just as the "democratic peace thesis" supposes that the best way to achieve global peace is for as many states as possible to democratize, since such states are thought not to wage war against each other,⁴³ the more states

⁴¹ Eckersley 2004, 1–13, 243; Robyn Eckersley, "Environmental Security, Climate Change, and Globalizing Terrorism," in Grenfell and James, eds. 2009, 85–97.

⁴² Eckersley, 2004, 227–32.

⁴³ See, for example, Doyle, 1983a, 225–35; Doyle, 1983b, 343–9.

employ the principle of non-intervention to protect their own environments—the greener they become—the more likely it is that environmental degradation will be prevented or at least retarded. Eckersley imagines that states might internalize a general norm of environmental stewardship as part of their very being, much as they now exercise proprietary, exploitative dominion over their territories. Indeed, according to Eckersley, stewardship should replace proprietorship as the ruling global value. One obstacle to the needed process of socialization, however, is that many states, especially in the South, will jealously guard their economic sovereignty, preferring it to any environmental benefit a green shield might bring. Difficult questions can also be raised about the framing of these issues in terms of ecosystems *within* states, given that ecosystems will sometimes straddle a number of state borders as some river systems do.⁴⁴

Political philosopher Henry Shue has also sought to reconcile a state's economic development, which he sees as a "just cause," with protection of the environment and humans in other states potentially affected by the development. In Shue's view, states must not pursue development by "unjust means." Specifically, a state is responsible for all people (not only citizens, that are affected by the state's development activities) when its policies have substantially harmed victims—especially when injuring their "physical integrity"—in states that cannot prevent the harm, and where benign means of development are available that the perpetrator state has not used.⁴⁵

Eckersley has recently developed her views on "ecological intervention," which she defines as "the threat or use of force by a state or coalition of states within the territory of another state *and without the consent of that state* in order to prevent grave environmental damage" as well as on "ecological defense," which she describes as the "preventive use of force in response to the threat of serious and immediate environmental harm into the territory of a 'victim' state." Eckersley defines intervention as a military or paramilitary response by a state or states under the authority of the UN Security Council, or, given its inaction, as an exercise of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to an ecological emergency. She argues that the idea of legal, moral, legitimate, and proportionate responses of this kind in peacetime is not implausible given the recognition in international law of environmental war crimes, as well as the prospects for "green helmet" peacekeeping. Eckersley's prescriptions for intervention usefully build on human rights and humanitarian intervention norms (including those concerning crimes against humanity and genocide), as well as the responsibility to protect (R2P).⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Eckersley, 2004, 232–8. I recognize that the democratic peace thesis has hardly been proved.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 236–7.

⁴⁶ Eckersley 2007, 293–7.

Like the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),⁴⁷ which developed the R2P principle, Eckersley is aware of the perils of intervening militarily, let alone using military force to protect the environment. These perils include the following: the possible double standards (powerful states will intervene in smaller states in the South but will be immune to intervention themselves), the existence of ulterior motives for intervention, uncertainty in threat assessment, unintended consequences of intervention (including civilian casualties), and the risk of failed interventions. She thus cautions that military intervention must be used only as a last resort, after thorough cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives of inaction or non-military responses.⁴⁸ But we need more information than Eckersley provides about exactly *how* military action, and specifically what *kinds* of actions, will prevent the contemplated environmental harms, as well as about exactly *which* environmental harms can be prevented in this way. In some cases, it will no doubt be possible to prevent harm by arresting potential individual perpetrators, but often the causes and agents of the harm will be harder to identify, to constrain, and to hold to account (in this regard, the difficulty of war crime prosecutions and the frequent impunity of corporations, domestically and internationally, is instructive).

Nevertheless, Eckersley's approach supports my view that humane states and forms of sovereignty will continue to be vital to the fulfilment of human security, that securitization is only a problem when based on a realist foundation, and that human rights and human security can be reconciled and work together effectively under international law. For example, states can employ their sovereignty to resist the worst aspects of neo-liberal "necessities," defending their labour and environmental standards, human rights, health and social security against attack. What sovereignty is directed towards rather than sovereignty itself is the critical determinant of whether it will advance or undermine human and environmental security.

6. Conclusion

The interrelationships between national, global, economic, human and environmental security demonstrate the validity of pioneering efforts to extend the understanding of "non-traditional" threats to human beings. In particular, environmental degradation is plausibly regarded as a matter of both national and international security. The securitization of the environment, however, need not mean its militarization. We must recover a civil understanding of security—the idea of the constraint

⁴⁷ ICISS 2001.

⁴⁸ Eckersley 2007, 302, 312. See also ICISS 2001.

of state sovereignty in the pursuit of the security of its citizens, not just from military attack by other states, nor “just” from other forms of intentional violence harming life and limb, but from myriad threats to economic and social security. Human security promises to hold states and other actors accountable in exactly these vital respects.

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Exploring Primary School Teachers' Attitudes towards Urban Refugee Education in Nairobi, Kenya

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Abstract

In Nairobi, Kenya, refugee children are allowed to attend school with Kenyan pupils in public, formal, or informal schools. With the increase of urban refugee inclusive education, teachers have been exposed to a diversity of students from different backgrounds. This paper is an exploration of primary school teachers' attitudes towards urban refugee inclusive education in Nairobi by identifying key challenges in teaching and learning, and by highlighting the positive aspects of inclusive education between refugees and Kenyan pupils. Findings based on an open-ended questionnaire and short interviews with several primary school teachers and head teachers in two areas of Nairobi demonstrate that language barrier, mental stress or psychological disorders, overage students, precarious economic status, and religious differences are key challenges that make it difficult for teaching and learning. Nevertheless, results also show that teachers welcome refugee pupils, and that refugee inclusive education provides an opportunity for cultural exchange, mutual learning, increase in academic achievement, and an environment that leads to acceptance and respect for others.

Key words:

urban refugee, inclusive education, teachers' attitudes, challenges, and positive aspects.

1. Introduction

Education, a basic human right, can provide underprivileged people with the necessary opportunities and resources for social inclusion, poverty reduction, and upward social mobility. It can be used as a protection mechanism for refugee children by creating a safe environment that safeguards them from recruitment into armed forces, sexual exploitation, abuse, racism, forced and/or early marriage, and more. In addition, it can also empower and shape the well-being and livelihoods of pupils by teaching coping mechanisms and life skills for making individual choices. However, because of uprooted migration many refugee pupils in Kenya find it difficult to acculturate into the school system and sometimes arrive with psychological traumas. This affects their schooling and learning, and it creates several challenges for teachers. This article explores primary school

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teachers' attitudes towards urban refugee inclusive education in Nairobi, Kenya. It identifies key challenges that teachers have towards teaching refugee pupils and includes highlights of the positive aspects of inclusive education between refugees and Kenyan pupils. Findings are based on an open-ended questionnaire and short interviews with several primary school teachers and head teachers in two areas of Nairobi that have a strong concentration of urban refugees.

1.1 Urban Refugees

The iconic image of a refugee is that they live in camp settings. However, only one third of refugees are in camps and two thirds of the 12 million registered refugees under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) are now living in urban areas. The term 'urban refugee' has yet to be defined by international law. Nevertheless, this expression is often used for people "who have been forced to flee their home countries, crossed international borders and are relocated in towns and cities, rather than in refugee camps" (Ngumuta, 2010; 2). The composition of urban refugees has changed. At first, the majority of UNHCR registered urban refugees were young men. Today, the composition is mainly made up of women, children, and the elderly (Pavanello et al, 2010). Urban refugees face many challenges such as detention, deportation, exploitation, and discrimination (UNESCO, 2011; Karanja, 2010; Mundy & Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Winthrop & Kirk, 2008). Refugees often leave camps for urban cities to find better economic independence, better education, a sense of community or belonging, and safety. However, they are often overlooked by aid and development agencies. In this article, an urban refugee is an individual who classifies into the refugee definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention², the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU)³ Convention, and who lives in an urban setting regardless of their origin.

1.2 Refugees in Nairobi

Kenya has been receiving refugees since the 1970s, when a vast number of Ugandans fled their country because of violence. However it is not until the 1990s that Dadaab Refugee Camp was constructed in order to accommodate Kenya's high influx of Somali refugees. In 2011, Kenya was receiving 1,300 Somalis per day (Amnesty International). Today, Dadaab Refugee Camp is the largest in the world. What was supposed to hold 90,000 people now has over 500,000 refugees. As

² Article 1(a) of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention states that a refugee is someone who: [O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

³ For the region of Africa, there is also the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention that classifies refugees as people who flee their country because of war and other forms of violence.

of July 31, 2012, there are 628,931 registered refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, of which 55,137 are considered urban and residing in Nairobi. Out of the registered urban refugees, 6,378 are children registered in public primary schools. In addition to that, there is an estimate of 200,000 unregistered urban refugees dwelling within the city (UNHCR, 2012). In Nairobi, refugees come from eight different countries. Forty-three percent come from Somalia, twenty-six percent from Ethiopia, ten percent from Congo, fifteen percent from Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda, and six percent from Burundi and Eritrea (Panavello et al, 2010). Because of their precarious socio-economic status, urban refugees tend to live in the destitute areas of Nairobi such as Kawangare and Eastleigh.

2. Urban Refugee Education in Nairobi: What has been done

International Conventions⁴ state that all children have a right to an education, yet many are excluded because of unequal access, ethnicity, disability, and more. All education should be inclusive, and this means to include all children regardless of their ethnicity, age, disability, gender, language, HIV, and TB status. Inclusive education also implies “the equal right to all children to the ‘educational basic package,’ however basic that package may be” (Save the Children, 2008:9-14), and this includes refugees.⁵ Education is important because it is a vital aspect for the development of the individual and of a country. As a result, without education, people are not capable of fully exercising their choices, and they are at a social and economic disadvantage. In 2003, Kenya introduced the policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE), which allows all children in Kenya to have free access to primary education, regardless of their background. However, proper documentation such as identification is required for enrolling a child into a school. Then in 2009, UNHCR introduced their Policy on Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, which states that all refugees, regardless of their location, have a right to an education. Therefore refugees in Nairobi are allowed to access public schools and integrate themselves into the school system. However, urban refugees face discriminative policies, which prevent them from accessing public schools. Previous

⁴ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960; Convention of the Rights of the Child, 1989; UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, 2009.

⁵ The following is Save the Children’s (ibid.) definition of inclusive education: It involves restructuring the culture, policies, and practices in schools so that they can respond to the diversity of students in their locality. Inclusive education:

- acknowledges that all children can learn acknowledges and respects differences in children: age, gender, ethnicity, language, disability, HIV and TB status, etcetera;
- enables education structures, systems and methodologies to meet the needs of all children;
- is part of a wider strategy to promote an inclusive society; and
- is a dynamic process that is constantly evolving.

research identifies five setbacks to education access: lack of proper documentation, discrimination, and extortion, lack of awareness, lack of capacity, and lack of finances (UNESCO, 2011; Karanja, 2010; Mundy & Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Winthrop & Kirk, 2008).

Lucy Karanja's research on Educational Pursuits and Obstacles for Urban Refugee Students in 2010 shows that to access the public schools in Kenya, refugees are required to produce proper documentation. For example, the UNHCR certificate regarding their refugee status and/or a birth certificate. However, the majority of urban refugees are not registered under UNHCR for many reasons such as not being aware of their rights as refugees, or they fear being denied refugee status. In addition, most refugees leave their country without any proper documentation, and although many refugee children are born in Kenya, they do not have birth certificates because of their precarious state. Several refugees also face discrimination by Kenyans and are not wanted in their schools. In public schools, many refugees are asked to pay an 'entrance fee' to the head teacher when enrolling into a school. According to the head teachers at the two schools where research for this article was conducted, this 'entrance fee' could be up to 10,000 Kenyan shillings per term (School K & School E September 5-10, 2012)⁶. Apart from that, even if education is 'free' and available, parents are asked to supply learning materials, and uniforms, which is also a financial burden to most people. Therefore, although UPE does exist in Kenya, education is still discriminatory and not actually free. There are still various costs that fall outside UPE that become a financial burden to families in low-income households.

In comparison, refugees that reside in camps face similar challenges as urban refugees. Some of these challenges have been mentioned above such as limited access to schools and fees outside the UPE policy. Another challenge is poor attendance. Poor attendance is usually due to poverty, house hold chores, illness and insufficient schools. Schools are also not gender equal. Many girls do not attend school, especially after primary, because of cultural biases, early pregnancy or marriage, and lack of sanitation (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). In Kenya, there are two refugee camps; Kakuma and Dadaab. Dadaab is the largest refugee camp in the world and it holds more than 500,000 refugees but there are only thirty-one primary school. Out of the thirty-one, only nineteen are funded by UNHCR and are implemented by implementing partners (IRIN, 2011). In the past UNHCR has not prioritized education in refugee camps, but researchers in the field are trying to increase the value of education by making education a durable solution. Proclaiming education as a durable solution could play a role in re-shaping national policy on education in countries that host refugees and this could

⁶ This information was obtained through interviews with head teachers at two schools. For further information on the schools please look at the methodology section.

also affect urban refugees.

3. Human Security and Education

Human security (HS) is people centered. It aims to protect and empower the individual and their community rather than the state. In this research, protection refers to the basic freedoms and rights, and empowerment is defined as imparting knowledge and life skills, to exercise those choices. It also requires a secure environment. The two key concepts of HS are “freedom from fear”, and “freedom from want” (CHS, 2003; Liotta & Owen, 2006; UNDP, 1994). The first is in relation to emergencies and development. The second refers to risks, vulnerability and coping. Human Security is defined in the 1994 Human Development Report as

[S]afety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And [as] protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP, 1994: 23).

Hence HS concerns itself with a vast range of threats that can disrupt daily life whether it is natural or societal, such as denied access to education and lack of quality of education. It is a child’s right to have an education. At the same time, schools are supposed to protect children by keeping them safe and by empowering them with the necessary tools that allow them to make individual choices making them active members of society.

4. Teacher’s Role

Teachers have multiple tasks at school. Not only do they plan their lessons and teach their pupils, they also sometimes have to help with administration, personnel, and financial management. Most importantly teachers are role models for their pupils, and must be there to support and motivate their students to achieve their educational goals and create aspirations for a better future. Teachers are also agents of social change. Whether development psychology and teaching are related to each other is a debating issue (Brown, 1994; Olson & Bruner, 1996; Sigel, 1990). Nevertheless “effective teaching must be based on understanding the child” (Daniels & Shumow, 2002; 497). Therefore, even though there are well-defined definitions of who is a refugee, it is important to remember that each refugee comes from a different background with different pre-, trans- and post-migration

influential factors and as such, cannot be classified under one category. This is important to take into consideration, especially when dealing with children because their emotional and mental state will vary depending on what they have experienced (Huyck & Fields, 1981), and their loss and psychological trauma could affect their learning abilities and their behavior in school. By understanding their students, teachers could make better assessments on how to teach and interact with their pupils, and what kind of disciplinary action should be taken into consideration. For example, a child who is behind in class could have difficulty in learning because of a language barrier. Another pupil could act more aggressive and become violent because violence is all he or she knows. As a result, schools and teachers should protect children by providing a safe learning environment away free from drugs, sexual, psychological and physical abuse, discrimination, and anything else that could be negative for a child and against the rights of a child. This is done when teachers address the best interest and development of the child for they are protectors of children's rights and act as agents of social change (Child Protection Handbook, 2006). Although teachers protect within the school, they could also protect outside the school. For example: teachers could help educate the community on child marriage, gender discrimination, female circumcision, amongst others, and could also help stop violence in the home by talking to the parents or guardians or by seeking legal action.

5. Research Objective

The objective of this research was to identify key challenges and positive aspects of refugee inclusive education by exploring primary school teachers' attitudes about teaching refugee pupils in Nairobi Kenya. This was achieved through the following:

1. By investigating the potential of the school towards inclusive education for refugees;
2. By exploring teaching methods, qualifications and difficulties in a classroom-teaching environment; and
3. By identifying how inclusive education promotes effective learning among primary school pupils.

6. Methodology

This research was conducted through a one-month field study during the month of September 2012, using qualitative research methods. The following section provides an outline of the data collection process and participants.

6.1 Data Collection

Triangulation analysis was used to collect the data during a one-month fieldwork. Triangulation analysis includes documentation review, questionnaire, interviews, surveys, and participatory observation. Secondary data refers to demographic information collected from United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The researcher developed the questionnaire; it is made up of 28 open-ended questions. The questions range from basic school and class demographics to teachers' attitudes on inclusive education, such as the needs and challenges of teaching refugees and their learning, and the positive aspects of having both Kenyan and refugee pupils in one class. In this research, attitude refers to views and opinions on schooling, teaching, and learning in a refugee inclusive education environment. The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain teachers' input on inclusive education for urban refugees. The informal interviews were a continuation of the questionnaire to obtain more thorough perspectives from teachers. The data was then coded and analyzed for major themes, using thematic analysis according to Braun & Clarke (2006).

6.2 Ethical Consideration

Research involved with "human subjects [must] compl[y] with applicable legal and ethical standards" (Wysocki, 2001; 77). Therefore prior to the fieldwork, the researcher first obtained approval from the Ethics Committee from her graduate program. Those who participated in the research volunteered, were informed of the research objectives, and signed a consent form. In keeping with ethical research standards, organizations, schools, and participants are kept anonymous.

6.3 Participants

Through networking with two different non-profit organizations, the researcher was introduced to 20 primary school teachers and 2 head teachers at two private refugee schools, in two different locations of Nairobi: near Kawangare (School K) and Eastleigh (School E). See tables 1 & 2 for a summary of schools' and teachers' data.

7. Results of School and Teacher Data

The first organization, introduced School K, located near Kawangare, a community of Nairobi with a highly condensed South Sudanese population. The South Sudanese community started this school in 2002 “in order to educate their youth to become skilled, capable leaders that can assist in the rebuilding of their homeland of Southern Sudan” (School K, Head Teacher September 5, 2012). This school has primary grades 4 to 8, and High School grades 9 to 12. The school is a formal school with both Kenyan and Refugee pupils. Refugees make up about 80% of the student ratio, and there are about 2 boys for each girl pupil, and around 30 students per teacher.

The second organization introduced the researcher to a community center in Eastleigh, where there is also a private primary school (School E) that has both refugee and Kenyan pupils. Eastleigh is a suburb of Nairobi that has a high concentration of Somali refugees. Primary school E is part of a Christian faith based organization, and teachers only teach Christian Religious Education (CRE) for the Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE), but about 90% of their pupils are Muslim. This school also has a high concentration of refugee pupils (85%), and unlike school K that has 2 boys for each girl, this school has about 1.3 girls for each boy.

Table 1. Summary of School Data

Information Item	School K	School E
Grades	4-12	1-8
Student Population	260	209
Male: Female Ratio	175: 85	90: 119
Refugee: Non Refugee Ratio	80%	85%
Student: Teacher Ratio	30: 1	16: 1

The majority of the teachers chose their profession because they love children and want to help empower them. All teachers except for two have some kind of qualification. The majority has a Certificate in Primary Teacher Education (PE) commonly known in Kenya as P1 Certificate. Although only 2 teachers do not have a qualification, both are currently students and are undertaking their first degree. Those who did not choose teaching as their first choice decided to become teachers because it was a cheaper option than their first career choice. Nevertheless, they are happy to be teachers.

Regardless of where they work, all teachers are willing to accept refugees and believe that all children, regardless of whom they are, have a right to an education. Although educators can

distinguish whether their pupils are Kenyans or foreigners, they do not always know if their foreign pupils are refugees. From the sampling, all teachers have experience-teaching refugees. At the time of this research public school teachers were on strike and public schools were closed. Therefore input from public school teachers was not possible. However, there are some universal results that could apply to all schools in Nairobi that have refugee pupils and others that only apply to this research.

Table 2. Summary of Teacher Data

Information Item	School K	School E	Total
Primary School Teachers	10	10	20
Head Teachers	1	1	2
Male	8	4	12
Female	3	7	10
Qualifications:			
P1 (Primary Teacher Certificate)	1	10	11
University Degree	4	1	5
Undertaking a 1 st Degree	2	0	2
No Qualifications	0	0	0

8. Results and Discussion: Teachers' View on Refugee Inclusive Education, in Nairobi.

8.1 Language Barrier

There were five challenges identified, but the most common theme that surfaced was language barrier. All teachers believed that communicating with refugee pupils was a key challenge. In Kenyan primary schools, both Kiswahili and English are taught at the primary level, and all subjects other than Kiswahili are taught in English. Teachers find it difficult to communicate with refugee pupils because they do not know Kiswahili or English. Some children might know some English or Kiswahili, but they are not capable of writing, reading, or sometimes even speaking it fluently. They said that it is rare to find a refugee pupil who enters a school with a good command of English and even rarer, a good command of Kiswahili. Having inadequate language skills is one reason why many pupils are put in a lower level class. Sometimes, the teachers need to use another student as an interpreter.

Most of the time we find it is harder to teach because we have to interpret in a similar language that they can understand. If you see [that] they are not getting you, you use an interpreter, a person who can tell them what I said in Kiswahili or in English...another pupil. (School E, Female Teacher, September 10, 2012)

The problem with using a student as an interpreter is that the teacher does not really know if the child truly understands. In addition, the student's interpretation might not be correct. As a result, many teachers are not always sure if their pupils are learning correctly until it is time for examinations. For the two private schools that were visited, school records showed that the subjects where students obtained the highest scores were science, social studies and mathematics, followed by English and CRE, and at the bottom Kiswahili. When asked about why their pupils are better in English than Kiswahili, they said it was because English is an 'international language' and speaking English could yield them better results for third country repatriation. It could also increase their chances of being sponsored in Kenya or abroad. One teacher did mention that Kiswahili is more difficult for them to learn because pronunciation is very different from their first language (in this case, she was speaking of Somali and Ethiopian refugees).

For teachers, a language barrier is not just a problem for teaching but also for communicating with parents. In many cases, parents rely on their children to translate and to explain things for them and therefore teachers do not have good communication with some parents. This makes it difficult for some teachers to know what is happening at home, or to communicate to the parents or guardians about the student's progress in class.

When we try to explain to [the parents] about [their child's] progress the language can be a hinder. At times the children try to interpret here and there...[sometimes] we can take an impartial pupil like the head girl or head boy, those who are well vast with the language. (School E, Male Teacher, September 10, 2012)

By being aware that language barrier is an issue, teachers are protecting their pupils by empowering them with language skills that will allow them to communicate within society. It could also be seen as a protection mechanism because the individual would become more aware of what is happening in his or her surroundings. Through this, pupils could also become more active members of society.

8.2 Discipline Issues

A second theme that emerged was issues on how to discipline their pupils. All teachers understood the meaning of a refugee as someone who is fleeing from war or violence. A lot of them knew what some of their pupils had gone through, and others could only imagine. Although not all refugee children have a psychological disorder, previous research does show that each refugee child will experience some sort of loss, instability, and change that affects his or her adaptation to their

new environment and school (Hamilton & Moore, 2004; Athey & Ahearn, 1991; Yule, 1998). However, some teachers said that trauma or loss were not affecting their pupils' learning capabilities or disrupting their class but others believed differently.

Three teachers mentioned that they had experienced aggressive behavior from male refugee pupils but never from the females. Two of them stated that their Ethiopian pupils expressed more aggressive behavior than Somalis did. However, none of the children became physical and this negative behavior was always expressed to the teachers and never to other students. Some did mention that they could sometimes sense anger in a couple of their pupils and this would change their behavior in class making them unmotivated or withdrawn. When the researcher asked how they would handle the situation, all teachers gave similar answers. Most would first let the student cool down. They would try not to cane them but instead speak to them in a soft, gentle, soothing voice. They would offer guidance and counseling, and most importantly, words of encouragement and support.

When looking at this data, it is important to understand that each child has had a different experience as a refugee and responds differently to punishment. Later, the researcher found out that, in fact, Somali children were more difficult to handle than Ethiopians because they would use more verbal abuse. The Ethiopians like to resolve arguments or problems by talking things out. However, when the two teachers mentioned that Ethiopians were more difficult, they were referring to a specific case of a young boy. This boy was told to shave his beard. However, because of his religion, he refused. When the teacher wanted to punish him, the boy hit the teacher. This angered the teacher. In another situation, the same boy had made some offense and refused to be caned. Instead, he grabbed the cane from the teacher and threatened to cane the teacher. Yes, this child was behaving inappropriately, but the teachers agreed that caning was not the best of punishments because it taught their pupils to behave abusively. So today, they try not to cane first, but to talk things over.

This is why it is important to learn the background of all students. By understanding them, teachers are better equipped to handle different situations, and complex children. This is more important when dealing with refugees because most teachers want to punish by caning, but corporal punishment is not a good solution for any child, especially those who have already suffered traumatic events and who probably have been physically abused or tortured. In addition, if teachers become familiar with their pupils, it is easier to overcome teaching and learning obstacles. Also by talking things over, teachers are helping to protect children from further psychological trauma.

8.3 Over-aged Students

A third challenge for teachers who have refugee pupils is over-aged students required for their relevant class. This is because many of their students enter the school system late and did not receive an education before arriving at their schools. Those who did receive prior education sometimes arrived without proper documentation and therefore it was difficult to know at which class level they should be placed. In addition, most children have been in a trans-migration phase for several years and have stopped their education and therefore need to catch up. At the same time, there is also the language barrier, which puts them behind in school (UNESCO, 2011; Karanja, 2010).

At school K, most refugees come from South Sudan. The head teacher mentioned that there are no good schools in South Sudan, but the people want to receive an education and so they travel to Kenya. "I have a 24-year-old in 8th grade," said the head teacher (School K, Head Teacher, September 5, 2012). South Sudanese do not care about age; they just want to receive an education and therefore you will find several older students at the Primary level. At School E, most refugee pupils are from Somalia or Ethiopia and tend to enter school at a later age because of religion and culture. The head teacher mentioned "[sometimes] they are not allowed to come to school until they have memorized the Koran. So they come about age 12" (School E, Head Teacher, September 7, 2012). However, while doing field-work, the researcher discovered that most non-Kenyan pupils were about 2 years older than the Kenyan pupils, which is also common for many Kenyans in other schools, especially in rural areas. Also many had started to go to school before memorizing the Koran. That is because they would attend Islamic Religion Courses at the local Mosque after school.

Teachers believe that over-aged pupils tend to shy away in class and sometimes feel underrated by the teacher. Although they do not bully their classmates nor are bullied by them, they do feel pressure to outperform themselves in class. In addition, over-age students sometimes fall behind and then the teacher must use class time to catch up with the syllabus, and this affects the learning of the whole class. Alternatively, their dedication to school makes them an inspiration to their classmates.

Although having over-aged students could present itself to be a problem, as long as the pupil worked hard to catch up and had all of his or her materials, there was no problem. By accepting over-aged students, the school and teachers are protecting them by ensuring their right to an education. They are also empowering them with necessary skills like reading and writing that are essential for becoming self-sufficient.

8.4 Precarious Economic Status

All teachers mentioned that the precarious economic state of their pupils, regardless of whether

they were refugees, interfered with their teaching and their pupils' learning. Many students had problems with obtaining basic needs such as food and shelter. Some students would go hungry and would lose concentration in class. Other students did not have enough money to buy school materials and the uniform. Although not having a uniform is not so disruptive, lacking school materials is. If students lack adequate school materials then they have to share books, or teachers would have to interrupt class to assist the pupil without a notebook or pen. Sometimes a student would be left behind and then the whole class would need to wait for the student to catch up. Occasionally, the teachers and students would help students who were more unfortunate by making fundraisers for school lunches or schoolbooks but all children come from low income households and supporting other children is difficult (School K & E Teachers, August 27-September 10, 2012). Children who are worrying about basic needs tend to neglect education. Some children go to school just so they can have some food in their stomach and not for actual learning. Although many of the children at both schools seemed happy, a large majority were worried about basic needs, paying school fees, materials, uniforms, lunches, etc. Therefore, poverty further increases a lack of safety and prevents human security.

8.5 Religion

A final challenge that surfaced only at School E was religion and culture. This school is a private school run by a Christian faith based organization only teaches CRE, but approximately 85% of the students are Muslim. Although they cannot always tell if their students are refugees, the majority of them are not Kenyan and because they come from Somalia, Ethiopia or Uganda, it is assumed that 90% of the foreign students are refugees (School E, Head Teacher, September 14, 2012). When students enter the school, the parents or guardians know that they do not offer Islamic Religion Education (IRE), but they also understand that CRE is not a course intended to convert their children but intended at teaching them the stories of the Bible to pass the KCPE. The KCPE examination offers three religions (Christian, Muslim, and Hindu). Students must choose one for examination. Therefore, at public schools, all three religions are offered. Those teachers who previously worked in a public school did not believe that religion was an issue there, but now at their private school it is. Nonetheless, parents still choose this school because it is the cheapest private school in the community and because they know that there, their children will be safe.

Difference in religion is a key issue at School E because teachers, especially the female teachers, believe that they are not always being respected because they are not Muslim. They said that their students sometimes call them liars or do not trust them because they do not wear a

headscarf (School E, Female Teachers, September 10, 2012). During CRE classes, students also mishandle the Bible but go to extreme lengths to make sure that their holy book (the Koran) is respected. All teachers at this school are Christian and therefore, at some point, feel disrespected. Another example is during prayer time after morning assembly. Before, on Mondays and Fridays after the morning assembly, prayer time was reserved for Christian prayers. Today it has changed. Now, on Mondays, students' prayer time is reserved for Christians and on Fridays for Muslims. This came about because the Muslim students were not paying attention, and were being disrespectful when their classmates were praying. Therefore, the head teacher decided that it would also be good to have prayer time reserved for Muslim students and then both religions could teach each other how to respect each other and how to pray in each religion (Personal communication, September 7, 2012). Now the students are more respectful of each other, and one can sometimes see students praying in both religions or sitting quietly waiting for their classmates to finish.

9. Although teachers did have challenges in their classrooms, they also had several positive aspects from a refugee inclusive education environment.

9.1 Tolerance, Respect and Acceptance of Others

The first positive aspect is the development of tolerance and acceptance of others. Since children from different backgrounds are mixed together, they learn to accept each other. At the private school in Eastleigh, both Muslim and Christian pupils learned to accept each other's religion. At first, they were rebellious and disrespectful but with time and through understanding they learned to accept the other's religion and to respect them. Teaching religious tolerance and respect for others is important, especially in a country like Kenya because sometimes there are religious feuds between Christians and Muslims. In addition, younger students learn to further value education because they can see their older classmates trying hard to receive an education. Older students also are caring of their younger classmates and neither bullies the other. Playing games and learning together also helps create a safe and stable environment for refugee pupils where they slowly begin to let go of some of their mental stress or trauma. By experiencing acceptance from their community, their classmates, and teachers, refugee pupils focus more on integrating themselves and less on rebelling. At the same time, children feel safe and protected and are more inclined to attend school.

9.2 Cultural Exchange and Mutual Learning

Another good thing about having a refugee inclusive education classroom is that it creates an

opportunity for cultural exchange and mutual learning. From the refugee perspective, they learn to become more fluent in Kiswahili and English faster by interacting with Kenyan pupils. They also get to learn about Kenyan traditions and way of life through their peers. Kenyan pupils also get to learn a lot from refugees. With time, the refugee pupils become more comfortable and begin to share their stories and experiences. The sharing of stories and experiences widens each child's knowledge on refugee issues and on many issues that occur in their community, country, and neighboring countries. During social sciences, class is also more interesting because they can hear about other countries through the eyes of their classmates. Teachers also learn a lot from their pupils. Sometimes it is about culture and geography but mainly they learn how to handle different children and how to react to different situations and through that, they become better teachers.

9.3 Increase in Academic Achievements

Finally, inclusive refugee education increases academic achievement through competition. Children compete against each other to be the best in class. Children also motivate each other to do their best. This is because in both schools refugee pupils obtain the highest scores (School K & E Teachers, September 5-10, 2012). Therefore, the Kenyan pupils also want to do well in school and do not want to be left behind, so they too try harder. Teachers believe that refugees do well because before arriving at their school they did not have a chance to an education; most of them lived in camps in a life of limbo. Now they can go to school and learn. They have hope for a better future. Also, a high performance in school could lead to sponsorship, which is essential for many refugee children. Kenyan pupils also come from low-income households and they too could get sponsorship, especially if they have good grades. At the same time, the KCPE, a national examination given to eight graders at the end of the school year, determines their chances of entering secondary school. The higher the score, out of 500, the higher the chances of being admitted to a good school, and potentially receive funding. So, if kids have a desire to go to school, and the majority do, they need to get good grades to increase their chances. Also, when many of their classmates do well in class, it creates competition. Finally, refugee pupils also put a lot of effort to achieve a high academic performance because it could make them better candidates for third country repatriation. Many refugees aspire for third country repatriation in Canada, USA, and Europe.

10. Conclusion

In both schools it is possible to see how teachers are protecting and empowering their pupils.

They do so by providing a safe environment, by enforcing a child's right to an education and by educating them with vital skills that will assist them to become functional members of society. All teachers believe that all children, regardless of who they are or where they come from, have a right to an education. Teachers accept refugees into their classrooms and do not differentiate between Kenyans and non-Kenyans, nor give special treatment to different students. Although at first teachers might not always know if their pupil is a refugee, through time they become familiar with their students and learn about their backgrounds and experiences. In urban refugee inclusive education, the key challenges for teachers are language barrier, addressing students who are suffering from psychological distress, teaching overage students, and a child's lack of income that interferes with being able to attend school or to learn at the same pace as their classmates. For one specific school, religion was also an obstacle because teachers believed that they were respecting their pupils' differences but their pupils were not respecting their teachers. However, with time, and through teaching, pupils became more aware of the importance of tolerance and began to respect their classmates and teachers of a different faith.

Even though teaching refugees does have its challenges, there are several positive aspects to refugee inclusive education. Having students from different backgrounds creates an opportunity for cultural exchange and mutual learning. Refugees are able to learn from their Kenyan pupils and vice versa. Kenyans become more familiar with current refugee issues and learn to accept and care for their classmates. At the same time, those who are refugees feel secure and accepted into the community and try harder to acculturate. Refugees do well in school, which creates a feeling of competition between classmates and it motivates Kenyan pupils to try harder in school too. Refugee inclusive education is important because to develop a country all people residing within it should be equipped with adequate skills and knowledge that allows them to become independent and active members of society. Most importantly, teachers should understand their students. Many times, a student is behind in class because of a language barrier and not because the student lacks intelligence. In addition, when students are unmotivated it could be because of something that happened at school or in the home, and not necessarily because of the lesson itself.

Finally, to avoid discrimination and increase awareness, tolerance and acceptance, the local population in refugee hosting countries should be better informed in refugee issues. Schools with refugee pupils should try to at least inform their own students, parents, and community members. This will avoid discrimination, bullying and could create a sense of unity and promote peaceful resolution.

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Human Trafficking in South Asia: Issues of Human Security and Gender in India, Bangladesh and Nepal

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Abstract²

This paper focuses on the situation of human trafficking in South Asia, particularly in India, Bangladesh and Nepal. It argues that the nexus of poverty and migration coupled with culturally sanctioned practices and natural disasters create a vicious cycle of insecurity, which disproportionately threatens the lives of the vulnerable people and pushes them to trafficking. It argues that the focus on trafficking as a problem of illegal migration and prostitution still dominates the discourse of trafficking in this region, which prioritizes the security of the state over human security and do not adequately address the underlying reasons for trafficking and the insecurity of trafficked persons. This point has remained unrecognized in anti-trafficking literature and policy areas in these countries. The paper argues that looking at trafficking from a gender-sensitive human security perspective helps to address trafficked persons' security rather than the security of the state and thus helps to formulate victim centered policy intervention focusing on the plight of trafficked persons. It concludes with the finding that emphasis needs to be given to the underlying root causes of trafficking that are exacerbated by gender violence and suggest the ways to deal with these root causes that lead to human trafficking in South Asia.

Key terms:

Human Trafficking, Human Security, Securitization, Gender violence, South Asia

1. Introduction

Human trafficking is a contemporary form of slave trade in which humans are forced into sexual slavery and various forms of slave-type exploitative labors. All countries in the world are affected by this problem whether as a country of source, transit or destination. It has been estimated that approximately 800,000 people are trafficked every year across the globe.³ Such a huge number of human trafficking impedes socio-economic development, threatens national, regional and international security, violates human rights of the trafficked, and most importantly poses severe threats to the security of individuals. Human trafficking causes various socio-economic problems

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³ U.S. Department of State, 2008.

through, for example, increasing social and political corruption, contributing to a fragile socio-economic structure by spreading HIV/AIDS that harms both states and their citizens, and more importantly through violating the rights of the people in a society.

Debate on human trafficking in South Asia has been more or less dominated by the prostitution/sex work approach on the one hand and the migration approach on the other. As mentioned earlier, in South Asia too, the former approach creates an opposition among the activists and practitioners which focuses on the view of anti-prostitution and/or legalization of it. The latter approach focuses on the supply and demand sides of trafficking, and emphasizes promoting safe migration by distinguishing trafficking from illegal migration. These two approaches are framed in policy measures by the governments and anti-trafficking activities by NGOs as well as donor related research programs in this region. It is a matter of concern that trafficking has seldom referred to an issue of individual security both in policy and academia. Research on trafficking as a security problem is yet to be taken into consideration. Looking at trafficking as a problem of migration and prostitution does not address the root causes or the insecurity of the trafficked. This paper tries to bring this realization into the fore by looking at how trafficking entails a security dimension in South Asian countries and how it intersects with gender and violence.

Is trafficking a security problem? How does it entail a security dimension? It is only recently that trafficking is attracting attention in the security studies, especially in the context of European states. Aradau has argued how the issue of trafficking is constructed as a security threat in Europe as a form of illegal migration, organized crime and prostitution. She notes that trafficking, although not of a military nature, could be integrated in a loose definition of national security. Citing Weiner, she argues that trafficking conceived as a problem of migration could be a security concern for the host country by posing cultural and socio-economic threats to its citizens. Human trafficking connected with organized crime could be analyzed as threat as it could contribute to the breakdown of cohesion of the society by promoting a high level of violence. Aradau goes onto argue, "It is by being represented as a form of illegal migration, organized crime and prostitution that human trafficking acquires the threat connotation of the former."⁴ Securitization of trafficking is not necessarily the discourse that discusses security itself but it is represented as such by the securitizing actors. At the European level, Europol, border police, immigration, customs and other organizations are involved in management of trafficking which, Aradau argues, fabricates the threat migration represents.⁵

It could be argued that the securitization of trafficking has received little or no attention in

⁴ Aradau, 2008, 43, 48.

⁵ Ibid.

South Asia. Is trafficking being securitized in South Asia? If it is securitized, then is it for the interest of the state or for the people? Less attention has been paid to the security of trafficked persons and to the ways it is further linked with other aspects such as gender and violence. Kempadoo argues that governments of destination countries in South Asia also treat trafficking as a security problem.⁶ As such they try to enforce their border to prevent illegal migration and trafficking. But how exactly governments securitize the problem is yet to be explored by the existing research in the region. What would be the nature of securitization of trafficking in South Asia? How would it affect the lives of the trafficked persons? Would it be different when we look at the problem from a gender perspective? Could a security approach to trafficking bring a more viable option for anti-trafficking policy in this region? Reviewing the pros and cons of the existing approaches to human trafficking, this research tries to focus on how human trafficking causes human insecurity for trafficked people in South Asia, in particular India, Bangladesh and Nepal. It shows how it makes a difference for men and women when we see the problem through a gender lens, and discusses how governments and civil society could respond to it.

2. Securitization of Human Trafficking: Looking at Human Security through a Gender Perspective

2.1 Human Security and the Theory of Securitization

The idea of human security was first introduced by UNDP Human Development Report in 1994. The report defines human security mainly in two respects: “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and harmful disruption in the patterns of daily life,” which is represented by its twin goals: freedom from want and freedom from fear.⁷ Based on these two aspects, as the report suggests, the potential threats to human security can be reduced to seven categories: economic, food, health, personal, environmental, community, and political security. All these types of security are associated with the security of individual which is the central focus of the concept. The idea of human security emerged in order to respond to the failure of traditional security which often causes the insecurity of the people. An implicit assumption of human security is that the inclusion of issues such as human rights, economic inequality or global warming, for example, to the field of security will allow greater attention to these issues, and thus will maximize the potential to be addressed meaningfully by policy makers. This assumption has

⁶ Kempadoo, 2005, xv.

⁷ UNDP, 1994.

produced a huge debate among the proponents of human security with regard to its policy and academic utility. They are basically divided into two schools: narrow and broad.

During the late 1990s, securitization theory emerged in response to narrowing down the broader concept of human security. It is important to understand the concept of securitization in order to understand the contemporary discourse of human security. I am particularly concerned about the relationship between human security and securitization which is crucial for the framework of this research. Several questions could be raised in this context. Is securitization a tool of practicing human security? Does human security lead to negative securitization? Can human security lead to positive securitization? What implications do both of these approaches have in terms of analytical and normative utility? By positive and negative securitization, I do not mean the process of securitization itself, but these adjectives refer to the consequences or results of securitization. In order to clarify the above questions, it is necessary to look at the theory of securitization and how it connects with the concept of human security. I will endeavor to explore the relationship between these two based on the aforementioned questions in the following section.

The innovation of securitization theory by the Copenhagen School's (CS)⁸ scholars, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and their associates provides important insights to define and extend the meaning of security. The CS has developed its approach to security in various publications, particularly in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* in 1998. In this book Buzan, Waever and Jap de Wilde argue that security is about survival. According to them, in order to know what constitutes security, an issue is presented that poses an existential threat to the survival of the designated referent object (traditionally the state, incorporating government, territory and society).⁹ Bearing this point in mind, the CS extends the notion of security into five different categories: military, economic, societal, environmental and political security. The notion of each type of security is determined by the securitizing actor and referent object. Securitizing actors refer to those who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened. These actors may include governments, political leaders, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and pressure groups.¹⁰ A referent object refers to something that is threatened and has a legitimate claim to survival which can be, for instance, the state, national sovereignty, national economy, collective identities, etc.¹¹ In short,

⁸ Originated in the early 1980s, the Copenhagen School is an academic thought represented by the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde and others who were associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). The school has played a crucial role in broadening the conception of security and providing a framework for analyzing how an issue becomes securitized.

⁹ Buzan et al. 1998, 21.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

securitization is the process through which issues become objects of security analysis. It focuses on the interrelationship among three main elements: (i) an existential threat; (ii) securitizing actor/agent; and (iii) the referent object. A key criterion is how a certain threat is recognized as legitimate by a particular audience, who then seeks and gains the approval for emergency measures to be taken against the threat. The focus within this framework is not what security is in reality, but what and how it is presented and successfully recognized as a threat through the speech act.¹²

The other striking feature of the CS's theory is desecuritization. Desecuritization refers to the reverse process of securitization. It refers to the shifting of the issues from emergency mode into the normal political sphere. Since it is assumed that securitization does not always result in a 'good thing,' which means more security through securitization is not necessarily better, Weaver argues that there is a need to emphasize desecuritization.¹³ The idea of desecuritization has remained relatively under-theorized. However, Buzan and Waever (2003) define desecuritization as "a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat."¹⁴ Thus, desecuritization can be understood as the fading away of a particular issue from the security agenda when certain threats are no longer valid. Huysmans has suggested three possible ways in terms of migration. First, the 'objectivist strategy' which entails the process of proving the fact that migrants are not a threat to the identity of the host society; second, the 'constructivist' strategy which might include developing a broader understanding of how migrants are framed as threats in the securitization process as a method to discourage the securitizing move; and third, 'deconstructivist strategy' which involves listening to the voice and experience of migrants themselves as the means of breaking down the exclusionary notion of 'us' versus 'them.'¹⁵

Although securitization has been one of the most successful innovations in terms of defining security, it has gained a huge amount of criticism. In particular, the CS's focus on securitization fails to recognize the agency of some actors which perpetuates and exacerbates their marginalization and silencing. Lene Hansen points out that the power to speak is crucial to achieving security under the securitization framework but once established, the power positions of actors are not easily challenged using the model, thus reinforcing the insecurity of those who lack the power to speak out against the system that oppresses them.¹⁶ Although it might be very useful in identifying existing

¹² Weaver, 1995, 35.

¹³ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, 83.

¹⁴ Buzan and Waever cited in Harders and Legrenzi, 2008, 94.

¹⁵ Huysmans cited in Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, 84-85.

¹⁶ Hansen, 2000, 285.

and potential cases of securitization using the CS's framework, due to the state-centrism of the school, particularly the speech act performed by the powerful state actors, securitization framework's focus on what can be articulated as a security issue to a particular policy audience prevents security interests of marginalized groups from being seen as security issues within its framework. Because of these characteristics, a major critique of securitization theory is that it bolsters the marginalization of certain security units, namely those that are not prominent in the traditional framework and the definitional hierarchies in which it operates. Hansen articulates this in her claim that securitization theory subsumes security, denying the inclusion of a gendered lens on the basis that gender does not constitute the relatively narrow definition of 'collective identity' that is required to be a referent object as defined by the CS.¹⁷

One may argue that if human security leads to securitization and if securitization is criticized as being negative for its consequences then what is the logic to utilize the concept of human security? Here the answer becomes somewhat contradictory which requires clarification of positive and negative securitization that rests upon the normative utility of both concepts. Although the securitization theory is very useful in terms of its analytical utility, it is limited in terms of its normative utility. Floyd points out that normative utility is conceived as the ability of the securitization analyst to influence the securitization process to a desired effect. She argues that by speaking or writing about security, the securitization analyst is involved in the production of knowledge regarding a security issue and becomes part of the process "without any means to rectify what s/he her/himself has co-constituted, simply by virtue of performing security analysis."¹⁸ Here Charrett argues that the normative dilemma is "how one might engage with security analysis without replicating dominant subjectivities, how might an analyst apply securitization without reproducing or legitimizing the potentially harmful, neglectful or exclusionary securitization of a referent object: the negative securitization of a referent."¹⁹ The securitization theory reproduces dominant subjectivities of security that represents the idea that state power is required to manage threats which eventually contributes to the validation of oppressive or exclusionary securitization processes and thus contributes to the negative securitization.

Given all that has been discussed above, unlike the securitization approach as Floyd argues, from a human security perspective proponents can highlight insecurities on behalf of other individuals, especially those individuals who are in no position to speak for themselves. Hoogensen

¹⁷ Ibid. 297-298.

¹⁸ Ibid. 43.

¹⁹ Charrett, 2009, 15.

and Rottem point out the challenge that marginalized people face in attempting to challenge mainstream views with the observation that “positive connotations of security have not really penetrated the dominant discourses.”²⁰ Citing Hoogensen and Rotterm, Floyd argues that human security has the enabling capacity to bring the marginalized back as the referent object into security analysis which can have a positive connotation, including positive securitizations.²¹ Therefore, Floyd attempts to overcome the normative dilemma of the securitization theory by suggesting that the securitization analyst should actively engage with the marginalized perspectives by bringing the notion of positive or human security into their security analysis. Floyd mentions about positive securitization of human security by exemplifying the ban on anti-personnel landmines and International Criminal Court (ICC). Both anti-personnel landmines and actors subjected to ICC pose an existential threat to human security. These initiatives have helped to uphold human security through saving people’s lives in conflict prone areas and by bringing the people to justice who are involved in crime against humanity.²² Nevertheless, Floyd’s explanation of positive securitization refers to the notion of freedom from fear and does not focus on freedom from want that carries the positive notion of human security as well.

The point of my argument here that is based on the above discussion is threefold. First, as we have seen, although securitization is undoubtedly an effective analytical tool to conceptualize security issues, it ultimately does so by emphasizing the state as the main referent object. This put the idea of securitization back to the statist notion of security, which may cause a violation of human rights of the people in the name of protecting the state and lead to negative securitization. This brings us to the question of more humane based security thinking if we think about the security of people in a broader sense which may refer to positive securitization. Securitization of human security needs to be considered from this positive notion of the concept. It is important to note here that, as pointed out earlier, positive and negative securitizations do not necessarily refer to the process of securitization itself but they hold the meaning of the consequences of the process. I do not intend to disagree with the process of securitization as it is important to some extent, particularly when it truly leads to a positive outcome resulting in the welfare of people, but rather I contend that if the outcome is negative, which would mean violation of people’s rights, then we need to consider how securitization would avoid a negative result. At this point, I argue that the danger that is associated with securitization leading to negative consequences could be mitigated through the

²⁰ Hoogensen, and Rottem., 2004, 158.

²¹ Floyd, 44.

²² Ibid.

warning system of human security. Securitization is a necessary evil and thus its importance cannot be overlooked but in order to have a positive securitization, human security may offer a positive and humanistic solution from a normative perspective through focusing on the marginalized as the referent object. Second, as argued by Hansen, gender is problematically omitted from the discussion of securitization as such, which could be an important analytical tool to look at human security. Third, whether the idea of desecuritization helps us to look at the positive/holistic notion of human security through identity deconstruction. These will be further discussed in the following sections.

2.2 Gender as a Missing Link in the Discourse of Securitization and Human Security

Looking at human security from a gender perspective helps us to think about everyday insecurities that are experienced by people who have conventionally been marginalized by the statist focus of traditional security. Yet, the discourse of human security is not concerned with such criticism. As Muthein argues about the report of Commission on Human Security (CHS), *Human Security Now*, 2003, one of the most important documents on human security by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, “[it] does not deal with the issue of gender critique of militarized security’s fundamental incompatibility with human security. Neither does it deal with the notion of Galtung’s theory of violence.”²³ Before exploring the absence and the potential of a gender analysis in the discourse of human security, it would be useful to look at what gender means and how violence correlates with gender.

According to Peterson and Runyan, “Gender refers to socially learned behavior and expectations that distinguish between masculinity and femininity...Whereas biological sex identities are determined by reference to genetics, socially learned gender is an acquired identity gained through performing prescribed gender roles.”²⁴ Steans also argues, “Gender refers not to what men and women are biologically but to the ideological and material relationship which exists between them...Historically, women possessed certain gender traits, for example they are more passive, emotional and sensitive than men, and that men by contrast, were aggressive, objective and logical, had been used to justify female subordination.”²⁵ Gender is thus a social construct based on a binary (masculine/feminine)²⁶ and hierarchical (men in relation to women) power relation.

²³ Muthein, 2010, 69.

²⁴ Peterson Spyke and Runyan, 1999, 5.

²⁵ Steans, 1999, 10-11, 14.

²⁶ Feminists have argued that there is a binary construction of gender such as subject/object, public/private, active/passive and masculine/ feminine in which the former of each construction is always associated with men while the latter is associated with women. These binary constructions allow men to have greater access to power and resources than women and thus show the socially oppressed and powerless position of women.

Violence is produced and reproduced through this power relation in the social strata.

The notion of violence was initiated by Johan Galtung. He defines two specific types of violence that are known as structural and cultural violence. Structural violence is the form of violence where violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.²⁷ It is the unequal distribution of resources and the uneven distribution of power to decide over the distribution that give rise to structural violence. Inequalities in social structure and unequal distribution of the resources cause uneven development which leads to poverty and injustice. Poverty, starvation, discrimination, human rights violations and so forth are all manifestations of violence embedded in the structure of the society.²⁸ Thus structural violence is produced in the social structure and damages the human potential in the forms of poverty and discrimination. Cultural violence, as Galtung argues, in the form of religion, ideology, and patriarchy serve as a legitimizing factor for structural violence.²⁹ The definition of structural and cultural violence by Galtung represents the notion of freedom from want of human security. Confortini provides some insights in the relation between gender and violence. She suggests that Galtung's theory of violence could be better understood in terms of gender relations. She argues that Galtung considers gender in order to understand the notion of violence but he vaguely leaves the discussion focusing on gender as a biological (sex) rather than social construction.³⁰ My point here is to find the interrelationship between gender and violence in the premise of social construction of power which is useful to understand human security through a gender approach.

Gender as a unit of analysis has been used by the feminist international relations scholars from the beginning of the concept. It is important to note here that gender sometimes is synonymously mistaken to refer to women but it does not necessarily refer only to women, rather it focuses on the notion of masculinity and femininity. There are also oppressed men who represent the feminine character and are victim of oppressive power structures. However, feminist international relations scholars provide important critiques of the masculinized nature of national security where women are significantly invisible compared to men in the security discourse. This view helps us to look at the different implications of security practice on men and women.³¹ The renowned feminist scholar

²⁷ Galtung, 1969, 171.

²⁸ Matsuo, 2005, 26.

²⁹ Galtung, *op. cit.*, 196

³⁰ Confortini, 2006, 333.

³¹ Here, my intention is not to posit myself against masculinity in terms of its impact on security discourse, rather it is to focus how feminist scholars bring the issues of silence of women in security practice, which I believe is helpful to rethink the security of both men and women as individual human that is supposed to be the basic foundation of human security.

J. Ann. Tickner points out, “While security has always been considered a masculine issue...women have seldom been recognized by the security literature.”³² Feminist international relations scholars were the first to demonstrate how the national security policies have often led to the intensification of structural violence and harm to human beings and that underpinning national security was mainly masculine ontology. O’Manique argues that the purpose of national security has rarely been to make all citizens secure but instead to maintain the power of ruling elites, and militarization itself has become one of the greatest threats to human security, particularly to the security of women.³³

In the above discussion, I have argued that a gender perspective can help us to look at different types of violence. Examining violence through a gender lens helps to reconsider human insecurity of men and women. As O’Manique argues, “The essence of human security is the absence of violence, whether sexual, military, environmental or economic, whether it originates from individual relationships within the household, or from the global political economy.”³⁴ She goes on to argue that the idea of human security that has emerged from the feminist critique of realist security puts individuals at the center of the concept of human security, proposing an emancipatory notion of security which would free people and communities from social, economic and political constraints that prevent them from freedom of choice.³⁵ Likewise, Gupta argues that gender discrimination encompasses aspects of economic deprivation, violation of human rights and political exclusion. She suggests that the protection of women’s rights and the formulation of a gender-equal society are integral to human security.³⁶ A gender sensitive human security approach in this context has much to offer to promote gender equality.

While securitization has remained focused on freedom from fear, desecuritization may help to deconstruct the notion of fear and thus help to bring the issues back into normal politics, which would help to focus more on the issues of structural/cultural violence, and thus on the positive notion of human security. In addition to the three step process of desecuritization offered by Hyusmans, another dimension could be added in desecuritizing migrants, which would call for a further deconstruction of migrants within the migrant community. This would refer to deconstruction of vulnerable people in that community. For example, deconstructing the identity of vulnerable women as being more susceptible to exploitation and suffering among others in migrant groups would place emphasis on the insecurity of the most disadvantaged. However, it is argued that desecuritization

³² Tickner, 1992, 46.

³³ O’Manique, , 2006, 174.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Gupta, 2003, 53.

might be impossible as it would be extremely difficult to bring an already highly securitized issue (e.g. migration) back into normal politics. Some have argued that non-state actors could be involved in this process by bringing the voice of the marginalized to the forefront and by helping desecuritize the state-centric notion of securitization.³⁷

Referring back to the discussion in the previous sections, it could be argued that securitization is mostly practiced at the interest of the states, and negatively affects the positive notion of human security through negative securitization. Securitization theory would be helpful if it could contribute to the positive notion of human security, in other words: positive securitization. Securitization does not necessarily mean militarization or use of force rather it could be mobilizing resources in order to secure human lives from socio-economic and environmental threats.³⁸ If desecuritization is not the answer, the current trend of securitization should focus more on how to initiate positive securitization by emphasizing the core value of human security, i.e., humanity. The existing nature of securitization of human security does not offer a viable option to look at this core value. The next section will further explore this limitation with regard to human trafficking.

2.3 Securitization of Human Trafficking and Gender Sensitive Human Security

The concept of trafficking has remained contested itself. It was stated in the beginning of this chapter that there are various approaches to deal with trafficking. The dominant trafficking paradigms have rested upon an absence of the distinction between trafficking and migration on the one hand, and trafficking and prostitution on the other. It also rested upon a crime control and human rights approach. Few works have focused on the problem from a gender perspective. However, before I proceed to the discussion of how trafficking has been securitized and its particular implications on gender, it is important here to look at how the trafficking discourse has developed over the past and the pitfalls associated with the existing approaches. Much of the debate on these approaches derived from the definition of trafficking adopted by the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention in 2000. According to Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol of the Convention:

Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person

³⁷ Aradau, op. cit., 65.

³⁸ Newman, 2010, 81.

having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other form of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.³⁹

Although this definition is internationally recognized today, it has led to considerable debate centered on the vague terms such as sexual exploitation, prostitution of others, coercion, consent, etc. over the years. My purpose here is not to focus on all these debates in detail; rather it is to acknowledge some important and contemporary concerns in terms of securitization of trafficking. The following discussion will show how securitization affects the dominant approaches to trafficking, and how it leaves out the questions of the root causes of trafficking and the security of the trafficked individuals.

Trafficking for prostitution has been the dominant paradigm in trafficking discourse. As Sanhera claims, “There has been a continued persistence among anti-trafficking players within the prevailing discourse to conflate trafficking with prostitution.”⁴⁰ The feminist alliance of Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) tried to securitize the issue of prostitution during the drafting of both the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and of the UN Trafficking Protocol in 2000. The Alliance argued that prostitution/sex work destabilizes the foundation of the moral structure of the society and threatens state sovereignty. The purpose of the alliance was to influence the government to condemn all sex work. As the alliance began to lobby the US Senate to strengthen the sovereignty of states and veto any UN Treaty that might erode this, it succeeded in 2000 by influencing the wording of the TVPA by ensuring that all sex work be condemned along with forced labor.⁴¹ In 2003, the US Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides for the reinforcement of border police and appliance of the US sanctions against countries that are not complying with the State Department’s anti- trafficking mandate.⁴²

The US is committed to the eradication of human trafficking because it fosters political and social corruption and threatens the rule of law.⁴³ This commitment of the US could be translated into a national security issue, a challenge to its immigration laws and sovereign borders. Thus the US, based on the heightened concern over national security issues, has taken the issue of trafficking and prostitution out of normal politics. As Beare argues, there is pressure from powerful lobby

³⁹ UNDOC, 2004.

⁴⁰ Sanhera, 2005, 11.

⁴¹ Crago, 2003.

⁴² US Department of State, 2003

⁴³ The White House, February 25, 2003.

groups, security agencies and governments to address such issues not as human security issues through social, economic and political policies, but with traditional responses such as military or policing measures.⁴⁴ Similarly, Siers argues that trafficking of people has been portrayed as a threat to US national security by conflating it sometimes with the so called 'war on terror.'⁴⁵ The State Department began to produce an annual report known as Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) in which each country is assessed under a three-tiered system based on their efforts in eradicating human trafficking.⁴⁶ Source countries specifically, are required to review its national laws, punish traffickers, conduct public awareness campaigns and implement support systems for trafficked people. As an incentive to obey this direction, the US government threatens compliance by withdrawing non-humanitarian aid or placing economic sanctions.⁴⁷ Thus, the securitization of trafficking with regard to prostitution by the US shows that there are limitations to the CS theory to address the problem of trafficking as only the most powerful voices are heard throughout the process of securitization.

Human trafficking has been conceptually associated with migration. Historically, people have migrated and crossed the border for a better livelihood. While migrating, many people gain economic opportunities and better life styles whereas others are being deceived or coerced into exploitation and thus fall prey to trafficking. There has been a problem in identifying the definitional difference between trafficking and migration. Trafficking has been seen as a byproduct of illegal migration that occurs in the stream of the migration process. Both trafficking and migration involve movement of persons, therefore the physical site of migration and trafficking can be the same but the difference lies in the elements of choice, coercion and exploitation. Hence, all acts of trafficking involve migration but not all acts of migration involve trafficking. However, as mentioned earlier, stricter immigration policy and border control have been used as measures to securitize the issue of trafficking for prostitution. Securitization of trafficking as a form of illegal migration and the control of borders represents the traditional concept of security. According to Lobasz, "Traditional security solutions to human trafficking have focused primarily upon enhanced border security and swift deportation of trafficked persons, who are considered illegal immigrants."⁴⁸ Securitization of migration on the part of destination countries leads to human rights abuse through harassment, detention and deportation of the trafficked. Thus, both strategies fall short to address the actual

⁴⁴ Beare, 1999, 14.

⁴⁵ Siers, 2007, 215.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ O'Beirne, 2002

⁴⁸ Lobasz, , 2010, 214.

problems of trafficking.

All the issues discussed in this section have been reflected in many international and regional legal initiatives such as the UN Trafficking Protocol 2000 and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Trafficking Convention 2002. These conventions consist of such Articles that could encourage the State Parties to securitize their borders. For instance, Article 11 of the UN Trafficking Protocol calls for special measures through which member states should enforce their borders to prevent trafficking. This could be seen as a direct practice of securitizing trafficking in the name of preventing irregular migration. Under the auspices of the SAARC Convention, most of the South Asian countries are still concentrating on the issue of prostitution in trafficking. Trafficking for purposes other than prostitution has been given little or no attention and the underlying causes of trafficking are inadequately addressed. The approaches to trafficking have remained contested. This contestation has given rise to a range of diverse policies and research without providing a coherent framework to deal with the problem. It has also led to widespread disagreement among actors involved and academics. Indeed, there is a need for a more holistic approach that focuses on the underlying factors as well as the issues of human rights violations. A gender approach to human security holds a potential path to address human trafficking without necessarily being paralyzed by the debate on prostitution, migration or organized crime. Friman and Rich have argued that regardless of whether one sees prostitution as a choice or as immoral exploitation, a human security approach reveals that progress is still possible through taking steps to ease freedom from want and freedom from fear.⁴⁹ Yet, they do not argue that the dominant and partial focus on freedom from fear hinders us from looking at the causes and consequences of trafficking. While both causes and consequences are gendered in nature, they have been ignored at the expense of the security of the state through securitization. Despite the fact that the human security project may seem to have more normative utility if it brings the issues of gender into analysis, the potential of such analysis remains unrealized.

3. Securitization of Trafficking in South Asia and the Prospect of Gender Sensitive Human security

3.1 Trends and Causes of Trafficking in India, Bangladesh and Nepal

It has been argued that India has the world's largest labor trafficking problem with hundreds of

⁴⁹ Friman and Reich, 2007, 142.

thousands of sex trafficking victims and millions of bonded laborers including forced child laborers.⁵⁰ Based on the 2007 estimates by the Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD), the number of individuals trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation in India is 2.8 million.⁵¹ The Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) of 2010 states that 90 percent of trafficking in India is internal which indicates that 10 percent is international/cross-border trafficking.⁵² Among the 10 percent of cross-border trafficking, approximately 2.17 percent occurs from Bangladesh and 2.6 percent from Nepal according to the study conducted by Sen and Nair.⁵³ The study by Asian Development Bank (ADB) reveals that around 10,000-15,000 and 5,000-11,000 people are trafficked per year respectively from Bangladesh and Nepal.⁵⁴

The most common root cause or vulnerability factor of trafficking in these three countries is economic insecurity or poverty. Poverty stricken states are the most vulnerable to trafficking. In India, although economic growth is rapidly increasing, the gap between rich and poor remains high. Women especially have lack of access to education and employment. Women and girl children face both gender inequality and caste discrimination in India and Nepal. Lower caste people have less access to education and jobs, and if they are women they have fewer options. The unique feature of the Devadasi and Deuki (culturally sanctioned prostitution) system that produces the supply of young women into commercial sexual exploitation is a distinct vulnerability factor of trafficking in India and Nepal. The number of bonded laborers is also high in India. It is also a part of the cultural practices in the rural areas where in order to repay parents' debt people are forced to debt bondage. Child labor also remains a severe problem in India and also in Bangladesh and Nepal. Millions of children work in hazardous situations in the glass bangle factories, brick kilns and circus industry where Indian, Bangladeshi and Nepali children are trafficked and exploited. In the case of Bangladesh, children are trafficked for camel jockeying. Natural disasters and organ trade are other important root causes of trafficking, especially in Bangladesh.

3.2 India's Border Management, Securitization of Migration and Cross Border Trafficking

India has 15,106.7 km. of land border which it shares with China, Pakistan, Bhutan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. Among the Neighboring countries, India has its longest border with Bangladesh which is around 4,096.7 km. Since independence, securing the country's borders

⁵⁰ Ghosh, 2009, 720

⁵¹ Mukherji and Mukherjee cited in Hameed et al., 2010, 29

⁵² The US Department of State, 2010.

⁵³ Sen and Nair, 2005, 12.

⁵⁴ Asian Development Bank (ADB) cited in Ali, 2005, 143, 146

against interests hostile to the country has been one of the principal objectives of border management. As a part of the strategy to secure the borders several initiatives have been undertaken by the Department of Border Management which include construction of fencing, floodlighting and strategic roads along Indo-Bangladesh borders, development of check posts at various locations on the international borders of the country. According to the Annual Report of 2011, these initiatives are important constituents of maintaining vigilance along the border. As the report notes, “In order to curb infiltration, smuggling and other anti-national activities from across Indo- Bangladesh borders, the Government has undertaken the work of construction of fencing, floodlighting and roads along these borders.”⁵⁵

Migration from Bangladesh has been treated as a security threat to India by political parties, media and even by the Judiciary of the country. In 2001, during the hearing of a public interest petition filed by the lawyer O.P. Saxena, the Chief Justice A.S. Anand and two other Justices of the Supreme Court said: “Bangladeshi migrants are eating into the economy of the country and, to a large extent, are becoming a security threat.”⁵⁶ The issue has been portrayed more as a security concern by the political parties. The present opposition party BJP has always used the issue as a tool to gain political support of the Hindu dominated population in India. It has successfully securitized the issue of illegal migration, particularly in Assam from Bangladesh, which resulted in the rapid rise of the BJP in the 1990s followed by an electoral victory in 1998. In 1992, the BJP National Executive passed a resolution claiming that over 15 million Bangladeshis had illegally entered India. The resolution mentioned that “the influx constitutes a serious strain on the national economy, a severe stress on the national society and withal a serious threat to the stability and security of the country. And yet the Congress takes no action to stem this flood or push back illegal immigrants, because it views them as its vote bank.”⁵⁷ The BJP aimed to use this migrant issue as one of the main political agendas to gain support and widen its political base in West Bengal and Northeast Assam in 1992 and 1993, where it had low standing and support. The BJP was successful in its objectives and received increased media attention at that time. In 1999, the BJP formed a coalition government under the name National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with support from other political parties including the Shiv Sena.⁵⁸ During the year 2003, 18,801 Bangladeshis were deported by the Indian government.⁵⁹ In July 2011, BJP leader again urged West Bengal Chief Minister to check the

⁵⁵ Government of India, 2011, 39.

⁵⁶ Times of India, 2001.

⁵⁷ Gillan, 2008, 77.

⁵⁸ Vicziany, 2002, 41-60.

⁵⁹ Government of India, 2004-05.

influx of Bangladeshi migrants in West Bengal.⁶⁰

In response to the BJP-Shiv Sena's campaign on the security threats arising from migrants by Bangladeshis, a study conducted by a group of NGOs in Mumbai revealed that the BJP-Shiv Sena's estimate about the number of illegal migrants was not merely an exaggeration but almost complete fabrication. The report points out that the BJP-Shiv Sena government attempted to fabricate illusionary danger and generate fear. According to the report, this issue was raised by the BJP to divert people's attention from the reality. The report criticized push back of Bangladeshi migrants initiated by the Narashima Rao government in 1992 as "inhuman, condemnable and unthinkable in this century."⁶¹ It concluded that the so called infiltrators did not pose any threat and the perception of danger was a product of BJP-led propaganda. The study argued that the migrants were more preoccupied with their day to day subsistence needs and hardly had any time to think about other issues. The report recommended that if immigration from Bangladesh is indeed a serious issue for the Indian government, then the problem must be resolved through negotiation with the Bangladesh government, deportation of poor Muslims is not the answer.⁶²

The above mentioned securitization has had an adverse effect on trafficked persons from Bangladesh to the north-east, West Bengal and elsewhere in India. It could be argued that trafficking has been securitized in the name of illegal migration. Many trafficked women and children are arrested and booked as illegal migrants under India's Foreigners Act 1946 and treated as perpetrators, when they should be identified and treated as victims under the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 1956 (ITPA) and other legal instruments.⁶³ The distinction between illegal migration and trafficking is not an important concern for police involved in rescue. The well-being of the trafficked Bangladeshis as well as the potential prosecution of the trafficker depends on the willingness and knowledge of the police officer who apprehends the trafficked person. Generally, if the BSF apprehends the trafficked, he/she is handed over to the local police, who file a First Information Report (FIR) under the Foreigners Act, 1946 as illegal migration. This makes the trafficked a 'perpetrator' rather than a 'victim'.⁶⁴ The Director of Public Prosecution, Taj Mohammad forcefully argued that it is not a problem when trafficking happens from Nepal to India, but when someone

⁶⁰ Indian Express, 2011.

⁶¹ Nivedita Rao et al., 1998.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interview with Manabendra Mandal, the Chairman of the Action against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children (ATSEC) South Asia on 29 July, 2011 in Jharkhand, India. The issue was also raised during the training workshop entitled, "Three Day State Level Training of Trainers Program to Combat Human Trafficking," in Ranchi, 27-29 July, 2011 where some of the presenters mentioned that cross-border trafficked victims are treated as illegal migrants at the first place and are arrested under the Foreigners Act. I participated in the workshop as an observer.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

crosses the border from Bangladesh they are immediately arrested under the Foreigners Act and their rights are violated many times, which is the real scenario.⁶⁵ This way it is assumed that the suspect/perpetrator that crosses the border is a potential security threat for the country and needs to be interrogated. Thus being securitized as illegal migrants, the trafficked persons lose their voice. As an outcome of securitization of migration, they become victim of severe human rights violations. While the securitization approach to migration dominates the real scenario, the human security approach underlying the root causes of trafficking is currently absent. The following case illustrates an extreme example of the result of such securitization:⁶⁶

Nadia Sultana, an 18 year old girl was trafficked to Habra, Kolkata from Faridpur, Bangladesh. Though the girl was in mental distress at the time of rescue, and despite social workers requesting police to file case against the traffickers, the girl was instead arrested under section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and was processed in court as an adult. During the time of her detention in Dum Dum jail of Kolkata, she was not given enough time for a hearing and became a victim of exploitation, humiliation and violence and was not given a minimum standard of care. Nadia committed suicide and her dead body was not treated with any respect or dignity and was in a state of being decomposed at the time of repatriation. The Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association (BNWLA) repatriated her body on 2 December, 2010 and filed a case against the trafficker under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, 2000 on 6 February, 2011. The case is now under investigation at the Women and Children Special Tribunal at Faridpur.

This incident was given as an example of the failure of the state to protect trafficked persons particularly by the NGOs I visited in India. NGOs view this case as a result of lack of responsibility of police and their cooperation with NGO workers. They urge for the acceptance of their presence by police during rescue operations.⁶⁷ But the fact that the discourse of securitization of migration from Bangladesh, which has a long history and still remains strong in the mainstream socio-political context of the country, obstructs the state authority from viewing trafficked persons as victims rather than criminals. The case of Nadia Sultana clearly illustrates that she was not an illegal migrant, rather was a victim of trafficking. Trafficking takes place in the stream of migration, but when deception and exploitation are involved; the migratory process turns into trafficking. The above case indicates such deception and exploitation, which supports the argument that trafficked victims are not perpetrators. During my visit in Kolkata and Delhi, I met some trafficked survivors who were

⁶⁵ Interview with Taj Mohammad, the Director of Public Prosecution on 20 July, 2011 in Kolkata.

⁶⁶ Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010. Also, I received the information about this case while interviewing various NGO staffs and anti-trafficking activists in Kolkata.

⁶⁷ Commented by the NGOs participated in Ranchi training workshop, 27-29 July, 2011.

rescued and are waiting to be repatriated.⁶⁸ All of them were victim of deception and exploitation. However, perhaps they were fortunate enough as their fate did not end up like Nadia Sultana.

In the case of Nepal, some people in India argue that the Maoist, also known as the Naxalites, rebels in India backed by the Nepali Maoists has been causing a security threat for India because they recruit trafficked children from different states of India in their paramilitary group. The rebel group was originated in Naxalbari, a place in West Bengal and has spread out in Jharkhand, Bihar and many other states. In his comment, Ramana of IDSA states that there is a strong linkage between Nepalese and Indian Maoist, and the former trains the latter. Ramana points out that the linkage is either admitted or downplayed by both sides of Nepalese and Indian governments.⁶⁹ The Indian national daily, the Times of India, reported that Nepalese Maoists have been cooperating with the Naxalites in India through arms supply and other supports.⁷⁰ The Naxalite, a far-left communist party, was founded in 2004 and was banned by the Indian government as it has been trying to overthrow the government, and establish an independent communist state. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned that the Maoists pose the most serious threat to the national security of India.⁷¹ The recruitment of trafficked children by the Naxalites was raised in the Ranchi workshop in Jharkhand in July, 2011. Some police officers alleged that in Junglemahal region bordering Jharkhand state, the Maoist/Naxalites have their strong militia groups who conduct anti-state guerilla operations from the forest areas, and kidnap young children who are forcefully engaged in their battalion. They also pointed out that many of the Naxalites are involved in trafficking these children. According to them, this is an issue which the government needs to take into serious consideration.⁷²

From the above discussion it could be assumed that India may look at the issue of trafficking as a security problem happening inside the country, which is facilitated by cross-border terrorism. It becomes evident from the Indian Prime Minister's statement that Maoist/Naxalites rebellion is a grave security concern for the country. This rebel groups' involvement in trafficking people and extending their force could be seen as another security problem for the country. Maoist rebels/traffickers as organized criminal group connected with the Nepalese Maoist thus could be seen as a security threat for India. In response, Indian government has deployed its security force

⁶⁸ I interviewed 10 trafficked survivors with the help of Tapati Bhowmic, Senior Coordinator of Sanlaap Shelter Home and Kakoli Roy, the Project Coordinator of Stop Trafficking and Oppression of Women and Children (STOP) on 22 and 13 July, 2011 in Kolkata and New Delhi respectively. It was very difficult for me to talk with some of them as they were suffering from trauma. Some Bangladeshi girls in the Shelter Home are waiting to be repatriated. However, due to the complicated judicial process they are still staying there with a hope that someday they will go back home.

⁶⁹ Ramana, 2010.

⁷⁰ The Times of India, 2009.

⁷¹ BBC News, 2007.

⁷² Commented by the police officers in Ranchi workshop, 2011.

near the Indo-Nepal border to strictly check Naxalite/Maoist terrorism.⁷³ In this way it could be argued that trafficking is (or will be) securitized as an organized crime (Maoist/Naxalites terrorism). On the other hand, for Nepal, returning of HIV infected trafficked sex workers is a security threat for the socio-economically and politically unstable nation. It is not a hardcore security issue, rather an issue of human security in the country.

3.3 Anti-trafficking Intervention in India, Bangladesh and Nepal

The governments of Bangladesh, India and Nepal have undertaken various measures to tackle the problem of trafficking. Some improvements have been observed particularly in prevention as the governments have provided skills training for different officials through workshops, seminars, anti-trafficking materials (e.g., posters, publications) and awareness programs to some extent. However, problems mainly remain in protection and prosecution. Rescue and rehabilitation are some of the main challenges that the governments are facing. Simultaneously repatriation of trafficked persons particularly from India to Bangladesh is also a major challenge for Bangladesh. Prosecution of trafficking offence, especially registration of trafficking cases and conviction of traffickers, is considerably low. Governments, particularly of sending countries (Bangladesh and Nepal) have low capacity and resources to deal with the problem as they are already heavily burdened by the issues of poverty, natural disaster and socio-political instability. Hence, the receiving country, India, should take the leading role particularly in rescue and rehabilitation as well as repatriation especially for cross-border trafficking victims respecting the fact of their human rights under the obligation of the UN trafficking Protocol and other relevant instruments.

Ratification of regional/international conventions and reform in national legislations are yet to be implemented in practice due to the pitfalls associated with legal frameworks and conventions themselves. For instance, at the regional level, although the SAARC Trafficking Convention is seen as a milestone on the way to coordinated interventions against trafficking, the definition of trafficking provided in the Convention does not address trafficking from a general perspective, but only focuses on prostitution. Article 1 of the SAARC Trafficking Convention exclusively focuses on prostitution as the only purpose of trafficking.⁷⁴ Therefore, in order to stop trafficking, the argument would follow that there is a need for reducing the demand of prostitution particularly in destination countries. In order to reduce such demand, states take security measures through police-raids in brothels. Treated as morally illegal on the one hand, and as illegal migrants on the

⁷³ Government of India, 2004-05.

⁷⁴ SAARC Convention on Trafficking, Article 1, 2002.

other, prostitutes as well as trafficked victims who are in prostitution are doubly victimized and securitized by the receiving states. It is important to note that these types of provisions both in the UN Trafficking Protocol and SAARC Trafficking Conventions do not look at the fact that people cross the border for their daily livelihood and border enforcement or criminalization do not address the underlying reasons of this movement. Looking at prostitution as a threat also does not help to sustain the human rights of the trafficked. In short, these provisions do not emphasize the vulnerability factors associated with gender violence that increases the incidents of trafficking. Since trafficking does not occur only for prostitution, the text of the SAARC Convention needs to be reviewed in order to broaden its scope. On the other hand, due attention is also needed to ensure that the Convention does not become an instrument to restrict or control the voluntary movement of women from one country to another. Additionally, the Convention does not hold the state parties responsible for the rehabilitation and reintegration of trafficked survivors, which is also a severe limitation of the convention. At the international level, Bangladesh and Nepal eventually need to ratify the UN Protocol in order to set international standards and measures on trafficking in persons in their domestic legislation and to develop a bilateral mechanism on easy and fast repatriation.

According to the TIP report⁷⁵, India, Bangladesh and Nepal have not made adequate efforts to combat trafficking. Based on the TIP report, India had been ranked as tier-2 watch list from 2006 to 2010, and finally was removed from it by achieving the rank as a tier-2 country in 2011 which means India has taken some initiative to effectively deal with the problem. Bangladesh was in tier-2 from 2006 to 2007 but from 2009 its ranking went down as the tier-2 watch-list, which reveals the fact that the effort of the government to combat trafficking has been reduced over last three years. The rank of Nepal has remained the same for the last five years as a tier-2 country, which indicates that Nepal has been making more effort than India and Bangladesh (see Table 1). However, although the TIP ranking is often criticized by NGOs, it still remains as the international yardstick for assessing the global anti-trafficking initiative. Considering the evaluation, India, Bangladesh and Nepal have not yet made significant efforts to reduce trafficking.

⁷⁵ The TIP report is published by the US Government every year, which ranks countries all over the world based on their performance on combating trafficking focusing on prevention, protection and prosecution. The ranking is based on a four tiered system, which is evaluated by the Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 2000. Countries belonging to tier-1 fully comply with minimum standards of TVPA for the elimination of trafficking. Tier-2 countries do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Tier-2 watch-list countries do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards. Tier-3 countries' governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making any significant efforts to do so.

Table 1: TIP Tier Ranking of India, Bangladesh and Nepal, 2006-2011

Year	TIP Tier Ranking		
	India	Bangladesh	Nepal
2006	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2	Tier 2
2007	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2	Tier 2
2008	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2	Tier 2
2009	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2
2010	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2
2011	Tier 2	Tier 2 Watch-list	Tier 2

Source: US Department of State. 2006-2011, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, Washington, DC

The governments of India, Bangladesh and Nepal have initiated various programs to achieve gender equality, but the reality shows they have yet to achieve their goal. Looking at the situation in India, Bangladesh and Nepal, for example the Gender Inequality Index (GII) initiated by the UNDP, we can see that women have lower political representation, lower literacy rate and lower participation in the labor force which makes it apparent that these countries are still far from achieving this equality. Women in India, Bangladesh and Nepal represent only 10.7, 18.6 and 33.3 percent of the seats in national parliament respectively. The percentages of secondary female education, which are 26.6, 30.8 and 17.9 respectively in these three countries, indicate a lower literacy rate women than men.⁷⁶ In addition, women's lower status in the society, culturally sanctioned practices and less opportunities in both home and outside leave them with fewer options than men. Abovementioned situation make women more vulnerable to trafficking. Why people are trafficked, who are more vulnerable, in other words, the dimension of gender violence that exacerbates underlying root causes of trafficking has yet to be addressed in these countries.

4. Concluding Remarks

Human trafficking poses a serious threat to the dignity and security of trafficked individual. Apparently, human rights of these individuals are violated in every stages of trafficking. Constitutions of India, Bangladesh and Nepal guarantee the equal rights of men and women, but they are only rhetoric when it comes to the question of practical implementation. One of the most important aspects to reconsider would be the strong political will of the governments in these countries to implement what they introduce in their anti-trafficking mandates as well as in gender related policies. More importantly, a particular focus on women's vulnerability in the source and

⁷⁶ UNDP Human Development Report, 2011.

destination countries needs to be urgently addressed if we are concerned about their security. Trafficking in India, Bangladesh and Nepal is exploited and perpetuated by patriarchal attitudes and behavior (e.g., female foeticide due to son preference, girl's limited access to education, caste discrimination, etc.) that in turn undermine efforts to promote gender equality.

Gender violence is inherent in the societies of India, Bangladesh and Nepal. This could be seen as the major driving force that underlies the vulnerability factors of trafficking in these countries. While gender does not necessarily refer only to women, it is the women in relation to men who are more prone to being victims of violence due to the patriarchal social setting in these countries. Men are also trafficked and those men who are trafficked symbolize the weaker version of masculinity that is dominated by hegemonic masculinity or hegemonic patriarchy. However, as we know that the concept of gender focuses on the power relationship between men and women in society, women in most cases are found to be the powerless and oppressed in this power relation compared to men who are the powerful and oppressor. Due to this binary construction of power relationships, women have a lack of voice to speak about their security. Hansen's argument reminds us that women are ignored in the securitization discourse. Women are not seen as the securitizing agent who can speak in favor of their security. In other words, women are not seen as the referent object of security. The victimization of the lower caste, for example, Dalit (or untouchables) women in the form of interpersonal and structural violence, is a legitimate reflection of the caste dynamics in India. Ironically, the ideological construction of purity/pollution is forgotten when upper caste men are engaged in sexual encounters with lower caste women. In the Indian context, intersection of caste and gender lead the women having less prestige and respect compared with the men even within the same caste.

Khan and Arefeen have addressed women's subordinate position in Bangladeshi society. The authors note that patriarchy with its ideological manifestation plays a pivotal role in generating vulnerable situation for women in a diverse socio-economic context.⁷⁷ Patriarchy as cultural violence produces an uneven role and relationship for men and women in the society. In Bangladeshi society, men are treated as breadwinners and women their dependents whose role is limited to biological reproduction and care of children. The assumption of control and protection by men leads women to the vulnerable and exploitative situation in which the slightest sexual deviation makes them contaminated and the object of social disgrace. Girls are raised and socialized in the family with a general understanding of becoming a future mother and wife. They grow up with a mental

⁷⁷ Khan and Arefeen, 1989-90, 244.

attitude of being dependent on a male-controlled family setting where their contributions toward the family are acknowledged only as unpaid family workers. Learning about and participating in household work is seen as the processes of preparing themselves as prospective housewives. This shows the cultural manifestation of violence inside the family.

A gender sensitive human security approach would help us to address this patriarchal mindset and bring the voiceless into the discourse. It helps us to look at how structural/cultural violence reinforces the root causes of trafficking in these countries. It also helps us to consider how trafficked persons are victimized in the destination and are worthy of protection. At present such an approach is absent in the region. Governments of South Asia, particularly India, have always been concerned about the national security. This becomes evident from the increasing amount of the defense budget in India. India raised its military budget from US\$32.7 billion in 2010-11 to US\$ 36.5 billion in 2011-12.⁷⁸ India ranked as the 9th largest military spender in the world in 2010.⁷⁹ Such a huge military budgeting indicates that human security is not a priority concern for India. State security and any forms of threat associated with it are the major concerns for the country. There is a pressing need to reconsider the issues of human security such as trafficking in order eventually to strengthen the security of the states and their people in these countries.

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⁷⁸ The Dawn, 2011.

⁷⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2010.

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