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Tervuren, Belgium; Royal Museum for Cen

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Wide-eyed with curiosity, Magda watches in silence while I position the last pin between the puppet’s arm and shoulder joint: ‘Who for?’ she asks me, shaking her curls in instinctive flirtation. ‘For all you children. But you can be its mommy, okay?’ ‘Yeeess!’ she replies.

Her shrill cry pierces my ears; she smacks a kiss on my hairy cheek. I had never been kissed by a little girl before.

Eloy watches us and smiles as he approaches through the arches of the courtyard. Magda does not wait for him to greet us; she jumps up and down in front of him waving the wooden puppet. ‘Look, look! Loth made it!’ Eloy kneels down and moves the puppet’s arms.

‘Is it yours?’ ‘It’s for all the children’, Magda replies dutifully, ‘but I’m going to look after it. Loth made some spoons and bowls for Mama too.’

Eloy nods his approval, and the little girl slips away to show her new toy to her friends. (Blisset 2001: 417-418, my translation)

... we can attempt, conjecturally, to suggest an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation in which the agent found himself and thus far to make the action comprehensible (or ‘rationally comprehensible’), in other words, ‘appropriate to the agent’s situation as he perceived it.’ (Popper 1991: 278, my translation)

PROLOGUE: CULTURE, AFFECTS AND EMOTIONS

Our intention is to consider certain aspects of the complex bonds that connect the cultural representations – implicit or explicit – identifiable in a human community to the affects experienced by its members. However, we find ourselves faced with a major problem: how can we analyse objectively the conscious, subjective aspects of individual experience? For even if we accept the general affirmation that the perceiving subject has privileged access to the qualia – the qualitative characteristics – of his own experience, we must also accept the idea that these

* This contribution is the result of the collaboration between François Anselmo and Pierre Liénard. Mr Anselmo is responsible for image processing, from filming to selection. Mr Liénard is responsible for the argumentation and editing of the article. The co-authors conducted a mission in Nyangatom territory from July 2001 to January 2002. Mr Liénard also carried out ethnographical research in Turkana territory during three missions lasting approximately two years in total (1996-1999).
subjective characteristics remain fundamentally ineffable. Because when we communicate the value of one of our affective experiences to others we come up against the poor transitivity between its linguistic expression and its qualia.

A good many of our affective mental states (and even more surely, those of others) are not fully comprehensible to us. What is more, a major part of the process of their elaboration remains partly inaccessible to our understanding. Thus what we undoubtedly appreciate, even without being capable of fully verbalizing either their value or their content, are the results of these intentional processes, i.e. the superficial, emergent qualities of our own experience and that of others.

Of course, for an agent, the respective appreciation processes of these two instances of affective experience (personal and that of others) partly diverge. The divergence lies in the origin of the sensorial information and in whether the affect is experienced more or less 'realistically'. When evaluating the affective experience of others, the source of the sensorial information, the stimulation, must be looked for in the analysis – often automatic and intuitive, sometimes, highly conscious – to which the perceiving subject submits the emotal indices produced by the affected subject.

Thus it is a question of appreciation of an affective experience arising from the simulation of another person's emotion rather than the intense personal experience of an affect. This cognitive evaluation may induce an altruistic sentiment in the agent. In the situation where an altruistic affective experience is induced by the cognitive processing of the simulation of another person's affective experience, it seems logical that the reality of this affective experience may vary widely (from mild pleasure to the greatest joy, from slight sadness to the greatest affective sorrow) in correlation to the more or less intense closeness of the inter-individual relationship.

To adopt the distinction between empathy and sympathy as proposed by Frans de Waal, we might say that the evaluation of another person's emotion may be confined to an empathic cognitive appreciation (i.e. the subject limits himself to understanding what the other feels), or may extend to a more or less highly affectively coloured sympathetic experience (i.e. the subject is concerned for the well-being of the other person and shares his emotion) (de Waal 1996: 57-58).

The intensity and value of this experience 'by proxy' are thus strongly dependent upon the cognitive unity (psychological proximity) that the perceiving subject feels with the subject originally affected. They depend also upon the 'belief', or cognitive salience, of the event. Let us imagine two dramatic events happening in the world: an earthquake that devastates a far-off region – a region that we have never visited – or the tragic end of a couple who hurl themselves – hand in hand – into the void to escape the flames consuming a building. Astonishing as it may seem, and given the fundamental impossibility of quantifying and comparing the degree of horror of the two situations, the second event is more certain to induce a strong sympathetic emotional experience in viewers of a televised news bulletin showing both stories.

Although it is not automatic (unlike empathy in subjects of sound mind), it seems that our propensity to sympathy is irreplaceable in the type of situation just described, i.e. where there is a combination of strong psychological unity between the individuals interacting and high cognitive salience of the event. If we emphasize that these characteristics must be present in combination to facilitate the sympathetic affective experience, it is with the intention of dismissing less specific cases such as, for example, war or torture for which other 'imperatives' than the sympathetic consideration of another's suffering seem to impose themselves.3

Thus we can partly counter our propensity to sympathy without completely eliminating it (which explains the fact that we can feel sadness and compassion for a murderer condemned to death, for example).4 We have talked about the occurrence of a simulation at the beginning of the evaluation of another person's emotion, and about altruistic affective experiences. Here a brief explanation is required about the type of mental process meant. Studies carried out in the 1990s showed that when a primate was watching an individual performing an action (in this case, the researcher), his brain began a genuine simulation of this perceived action. G. Rizzolati observed that certain neurons – which he named 'mirror neurons' – fired, whether the subject of the experience was performing the action himself or observing a third person performing the action. The results of this experiment allowed Alain Berthoz to arrive at his hypothesis of the neural coding of behavioural schemata (i.e. structures representative of potential actions, as it were). The brain could activate these coded representations and thus simulate the actions of others in order to predict the consequences (Berthoz 1997: 26-27). Mental processes similar to this motor simulation could be involved in the appreciation of other people's emotions.

One thing seems to be decisive for our theory: seemingly we always have recourse to an 'indexical' analysis (in the Pierian philosophical sense of the word) when determining and appreciating affective states, whether these are our own or other people's. The evaluation indices of an affect felt personally are in fact sensorial information stemming from internal corporal states, physiological changes induced by the activity of the perceiving subject's cerebral system and representing the world (i.e. events, agents or objects).

In the case of interpretation of the affective experience of a third person, the indices are again physiological changes, but this time account is taken only of the changes apparent to the observer. From these indices, and after simulation, in the case of the sympathetic experience of another person's emotion, a related affect – intense or mild – may then be felt by the observer. The hypothesis of the 'simulation loop',4 in so far as this is valid, would help explain this ability to feel a related affect.

Thus through the analysis of apparent indices – physiological and, more generally, behavioural changes – we are potentially capable of reconstructing, largely 'naturally' – irreplaceably, in a quasi automatic, intuitive way – the emotions of other persons confronting us, and of inferring
their affective states therefrom and, should the occasion arise (if there is close psychological proximity between the two subjects interacting), of feeling a related affect.

We therefore propose to deal with these public aspects of emotion in order to explain the type of affective experience that the social actors are likely to have. We believe in fact that these observable elements of our emotional experiences can be presented explicitly and systematized, thus allowing a scientific approach to the conscious, subjective aspects of emotions (i.e. the affects) and to their partial shaping by the cultural context in which the affected subjects move. We shall therefore attempt to describe in minute detail the situation in which the emotion emerges, and the type of behaviour observable in situ.

Our objective is to expose the rationality of the behaviours and attitudes recorded. The scientific object we construct must therefore be taken for what it is: an a posteriori reconstruction of the rationality of certain behaviours in their specific socio-cultural context. We choose to approach the problem through the analysis of the shaping and reinforcement of two affective reactions (the one, gratification, auto-centred, the other, gratitude, allocentred) that come into play in particular situations: in ordinary social interactions and in conventional collective actions. We shall seek to demonstrate the way in which the different conceptualizations of these instances of interaction by the agents each reinforce the expression of one of these two affective reactions, to the detriment of the other. The affective experiences of gratification will be seen to be reinforced in ordinary interaction. The affective experiences connected with the emotions of gratitude will be reinforced in conventional collective action.

We have chosen to deal with these two types of emotion because they cast new light on our ethnographical material. They have a distinctive characteristic that makes them of interest to our theory. Gratification and gratitude have an asymmetric relationship with one another. It seems in fact that affective reactions of gratification are more easily and directly accessible than emotions of gratitude. Taking the cases of the Turkana and the Nyangatom, we shall see the consequences that the great accessibility of emotions of gratification and the necessity for a complex social construction of the emotions of gratitude can have for the conceptualization of situations of interaction (ordinary and conventional collective) and for the morphology of rituals. We would also urge the reader not to take our reconstructions, which will sometimes seem schematic, too literally. We take social phenomena into account, and one of the distinctive characteristics of these is their instability. In each case it will be necessary to understand the argumentation in context and correctly determine what the stakes are.

**Ethnographic context**

Our analysis will focus on data gathered from two ethnic groups in East Africa, linguistically and socio-culturally related to one another: the Turkana and the Nyangatom peoples. These two groups belong to the linguistic group of the Paranilolettes (formerly known as the Nilotic-Hamites) or to be more precise are part of the eastern branch still known as the Plains Nilotes.

The Plains Nilotes branch is sub-divided into three linguistic sub-groups: north, south and central. This last linguistic group is made up of eight ethnic groups: the Karimojong, the Jie, the Dodoth, the Topotha, the Jie, the Nyangatom, the Turkana and the Teso. Seven of these ethnic groups occupy adjoining territories and use dialectal variants of a single language; these are grouped together under the name Karimojong Cluster. The Karimojong, Jie and Dodoth live in the mountainous fringes of eastern Uganda. The Topoatha and Jiey control the regions in the south of Sudan. The Nyangatom occupy part of the Lower Omo Valley in Ethiopia, and territories straddling the Ethiopia-Sudan border (Ntem Triangle and Naita). The Turkana live nomadically within a vast region extending from the northwest of Kenya to the borders of Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia.

The ethnic groups of the Karimojong Cluster present an agro-pastoral facies, some of them concentrating more on one of the two poles of activity (farming or pastoralism) at specific times of year. However, even if the survival of these societies is partly dependent upon sporadic farming activities when rainfall permits, pastoral activities clearly dominate, both economically and symbolically. All the more so among the Turkana people, where farming is minimal because of the extreme aridity of the territory in which they live. We should point out that our appreciation of this problem is coloured by our choice of human groups within which to carry out our main research, as the Nyangatom and Turkana territorial sections visited have ecosystems that favour a pastoral economy.
Whatever the case with this complex issue, which we will not go into here, we have been able to establish from literature on the subject and through successive missions amongst two of these populations that these two ethnic groups have a great many characteristics in common. We shall quickly mention a few of these before concentrating on one particular characteristic.

- As already mentioned, the members of the ethnic groups of the Karimojong Cluster use dialectal variants of a single language. Research into these variants would be extremely fruitful for an in-depth examination of the question of cultural identity.

- The pastoral economies and the ‘imaginary’ worlds associated with them are very similar to each other. The strong identification seen in all Karimojong Cluster societies between a man and his favourite zebu(s) – an identification discernible in the songs and dances, and in the use of the favourite animal’s name to refer to its owner – is a good example of the homogeneity found in the conceptualization of the relationship to the world.

- The various different political organizations of the ethnic groups of the Karimojong Cluster can be analysed as variants of a single prototypical structure. We can roughly outline the fundamental characteristics of this structure as follows:

The members of the community are divided up into successive generations. At birth a male child integrates into the generation ranking immediately below that of his real or putative father.9 The man remains in this generation throughout his life. A woman’s generational
belonging is of no significance. Among the Turkana, however, women integrate into their husbands' generation on marriage. The belonging to a generation engenders a specific kind of solidarity.

The masculine sex is further sub-divided into age-sets, also successive. Usually each generation has its own series of age-sets. In the south of the Turkana, however, due to a recent development of the system, there seems to be a single series which no longer makes reference to generational belonging (Müller 1989: 149-150). The process of recognition of the age-set is gradual and generally ends in an initiation (aspan). This constitutes a second type of solidarity similar to the previous one but this time bringing together individuals close in real age.

The picture is further complicated by a third type of solidarity: clan solidarity. Clans are exogamous groups of (patrilineal) unification. At birth a child is integrated into the clan of his real or putative father. Women join their husbands' clan on marriage (though this does not mean that their own clan origin is completely obliterated).

The belonging to a territorial section constitutes the fourth type of solidarity group to which an individual is attached. A woman changes section on marriage if necessary.

Other types of group solidarity exist but these are subject to numerous variations and reconfigurations. The grazing community is an example of this.

- The nomad warrior populations of the Karimojong Cluster share a particular ethos.

The remainder of our contribution will be devoted entirely to the analysis of this last characteristic. We shall endeavour to highlight some of the emotional components of the Turkana and Nyangatom masculine ethos. We shall explain our assertion that there is an affective continuity between the emotions felt in situations of ordinary interaction and the emotions felt in situations of bellicose interaction.

It is probably useful to define what we understand by ethos. We use the word in a general sense. When we apply the concept to a community it means the complex (the pattern) of fundamental values that underlie the thought structure and behaviour structure of the individuals who are part of that particular cultural group. When we use it to describe characteristics specific to an individual it refers to all of that individual's predispositions, propensities, preferences, attitudes and values.

We have presented a brief picture of the general characteristics of the ethnic groups of the Karimojong Cluster to give the reader an overall idea of the type of society studied. We have deliberately avoided overburdening this description with details that are not relevant to our purpose. We shall introduce new ethnographical elements into our argument at the appropriate time.

**Universal types: the specific emotions classified by A. Ortony et al.**

We present the structure for differentiating types of emotion produced by Andrew Ortony, G. L. Clore and A. Collins in their work *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* published in 1988. This explanatory model will be of use in our analysis of the Turkana and Nyangatom ethnographical data.

**Perspectives on the world, value systems of these perspectives and the corresponding categories of affective reaction:**

- When *goals and desires* underlie the attribution of a positive or negative valency to a phenomenon, Ortony et al. ascribe to it the quality of event. This quality of event is in fact determined by the type of perspective on the world adopted by the perceiving agent. Through his adoption of this perspective the individual places himself in the position of evaluator of the consequences of the event. Hence he will feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the results of the phenomenon. The outcome of the event is therefore perceived as desirable or undesirable. All those emotions connected to the 'desirability' of the consequences of the event form the first general category of affective reactions.

- When *standards and rules of conduct* underlie the attribution of valency, the phenomenon is qualified as an action. This quality is again determined by the perspective adopted by the agent. The interpreter of the action will judge its conformity with the individual or collective standards, norms and rules of conduct. The action will thus be praiseworthy or blameworthy. The class of emotions arising from the judgement of (one's own or other people's) action constitutes the second category of affective reactions.

- When the attribution of valency has its origins in the agent's *tastes, predispositions, preferences and attitudes*, the phenomenon is ascribed the quality of object. This quality is again determined by the agent's perspective. He will find the object appealing or unappealing. The emotions that have their origin in the *attribution of the object* belong to the third category of affective reactions oriented towards an aspect of the world. (Ortony et al. 1988: 18-25 and Clore and Ortony 2000: 29-32)
As we can see from this brief survey of the hypotheses that form the basis of the structure for differentiating types of emotions, Ortony et al. define emotions as affective states (i.e. states with positive or negative valency) relating to an event, an action or an object (Clore and Ortony 2000: 26). These are intentional states that are concerned with states of affairs in the world. The affective component differentiates these mental states from other intentional states, and this affect must be seen as a characteristic of the subjective (therefore private) experience of the thinking subject. The emotions thus integrate cognitive elements (i.e. the conceptualization of the situation inducing the emotion) and an affective component (i.e. a positive or negative valency). They have public aspects that can be observed directly.

Let us now look at the overall structure of the types of emotions (see diagram opposite).

The set of potential specific emotions differs from the three basic categories of affective reaction. By locating an emotion in the synoptic table we can reconstruct the formal specification of the type of emotion. If we take pride as an example, this is an emotion arising from the evaluation by an agent of his own action, according to (personal or collective) standards of behaviour. But in all, this characterization of pride is too rigid. Other variables have to be taken into consideration, such as the cognitive unity between the actual agent and the individual judging the action. It is possible for a father to feel pride for his child's behaviour, or for a football supporter to feel pride for his team’s fighting spirit (Ortony et al. 1988: 133). But we shall not go into the whole table in detail. If the reader wishes to refer to the relevant analysis by the authors of the classification. (Ortony et al. 1988: 83-171)

We are focusing our attention on one group of compound emotions (i.e. emotions with a complex structural composition, belonging to a particular structural cell). These affective reactions are likely to emerge in situations where the affected subject grasps the world 'simultaneously' from two aspects, namely the consequences of the events and the actions of the agents. The compound emotions of gratification, gratitude, remorse and anger are thus original combinations that incorporate cognitive and affective structural components of the emotions arising from the two concomitant perspectives (the formal specifications of joy, distress, pride, shame, admiration or reproach). We should be clear that this is an analytical and structural reconstruction which has implications as to some of the evident characteristics of the affected subject’s real mental processes but which does not claim to fully explain these processes of elaboration of the emotion.15

At this stage in the development of our argument, a clear definition of our working hypotheses is required. We see these as falling into two general categories: the category of 'universalist' theoretical hypotheses and that of ethnological hypotheses.

We class our working hypothesis in the first of these: the conceptualization of situations that induce affective reactions determines the potential types of specific emotion and their corresponding

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N.B.: terms in upper case are structural elements; terms in lower case refer to emotional states.

affects. By generalizing we arrive at the basic hypothesis of Ortony et al: emotions have cognitive and affective components as well as public aspects.

We include two ethnological hypotheses in the second category. Thanks to our observation of expressive behaviour in situ and our analysis of the symbolic representations made by the Turkana and Nyangatom social actors, we can advance the hypothesis that similar affective reactions (normed differently and experienced more or less intensely) underlie inter-individual relationships within the society and relationships with the enemy. We now introduce the second ethnological hypothesis. In the Nyangatom and Turkana pastoral warrior world, gratification is reinforced in ordinary interaction; gratitude, in conventional collective interaction.

It is necessary to devise descriptive terms for specific emotions to indicate the types of affective reactions in particular situations as an indication of a general tendency to react according to a certain modality. We were able to establish through our ethnographical surveys that there were strong correlations between certain types of affective reaction (and the corresponding models of expressive behaviour) and specific domains of action in society. However, we do not rule out the possibility that other overlapping combinations exist. Quite the contrary: we believe that affective reactions of gratitude exist in 'ordinary' Turkana and Nyangatom interaction, but the experience of these emotions by the social actors is lessened by reason of the impossibility of expressing them simply and directly through behaviour (linguistic and other) in these situations. Affective reactions of gratification are also present in conventional collective action. It would seem even that these are necessary to the expression of affective reactions of gratitude.

THE THREE OBLIGATIONS: TO GIVE AWAY, TO APPROPRIATE AND TO REPAY

In this section we shall highlight, through the observation and analysis of recurrent behavioural reactions, in particular interactions, some of the characteristics of the indigenous conceptualization of situations in which the emotional states of gratification and gratitude emerge. The respective cognitive universes of the other emotional states in the structural cell, anger and remorse, will gradually be brought into the argumentation as it develops.

THE OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE

We shall now consider a particular type of social interaction: the case of asking for a possession. Why this specific choice? It seems to us to be pertinent because everyday Turkana and Nyangatom social interaction is punctuated by this type of behaviour. Whether it be a request for tobacco to chew, an animal to sacrifice for a male group, an element of finery, a meal or any other object of desire, it was apparent to us that interaction between individuals is strongly dependent upon such requests to traffic in possessions. More precisely we would say that requests are one of the most frequent ways of initiating linguistic interaction between individuals (sometimes following an initial phase of silence and then greetings in more formal situations).

Thus frequently a new arrival joining a group will either be asked for something (usually tobacco) or will himself ask another member of the group for something. The state of the discussion is of little importance. Interruptions in the middle of a debate are common. The assembly then pauses to allow the person concerned to reply to the request, taking up the discussion again after.

In the event of the non-cooperation of the person to whom the request is made, several scenarios may present themselves. If the person to whom the request is made is very involved in his narrative, a third person may intervene and reply on his behalf or provide the desired object himself. If this is not the prevailing situation, the members of the assembly may point out to the person who is distracted or turning a deaf ear that a request has been made of him. The most frequent scenario, however, is that the request is repeated at regular intervals until the interlocutor eventually cooperates. The last two scenarios gradually lead to the disruption of the discussion and the reorientation of the debate. Comments, reproaches and mockery fly from all sides. It seems that the social actors consider it out of place not to reply to a request, even if the discussions taking place are patent more important than the request.

Hence in everyday interaction compliance with the request generally prevails. It seems that there is a tacit obligation to respond, whatever the situation of the person to whom the request is made. Moreover, the alternative responses are limited. In situations where an urgent request is made, the person making the request is loth to accept a flat refusal. He will keep returning to the attack for as long as it takes to obtain a satisfactory answer. If he does not succeed he is highly likely to enter into an intense emotional state (rage, anger, scorn etc.) and to subject the person refusing him 'his due' to public obloquy. He alternates between these two positions all the while the relationship between the interlocutors continues. These attempts at persuasion may go on for several days. Always in cases where an urgent request is made and the person making the request is becoming emotionally involved, the assembly will exert pressure at the same time to try to resolve the conflict. Most often the social actors will invite the person to whom the request is made to respond in some other way than flat refusal.

If a pressing request is made to a person, he has only four socially acceptable alternatives to refusal available to him if he wishes to avoid being labelled as greedy and seeing the social relationship broken off. More seriously, if he repeatedly refuses numerous requests from other individuals, he risks being ostracized by the rest of the community. Handling over the desired object puts an end to the matter. It is the simplest solution, allowing the giver the option of calling
The pre-eminence of appropriation in the representations of ordinary interaction

Thus there is a fundamental obligation to give up covered possessions. And yet someone who gives in to others’ demands too quickly is soon denigrated. In fact giving away too much too readily exposes the individual to scorn and mockery. This might seem to be a paradox, but we see that it is nothing of the sort if we bring in a second parameter: the right to seek to appropriate the possessions of others. More than a right, this is an obligation, as a number of the men explained to us. At the start of his research the author noticed only the social pressure exerted upon persons to whom requests were made. He overlooked the more fundamental aspect of the necessity of seeking to appropriate others’ possessions as the driving force behind social relations. One day, however, in response to the author’s astonishment at the constancy and frequency with which requests were made in inter-individual relations, a somewhat irritated informant explained to him that this making of requests was a rule of conduct in Turkana society. He also remarked that this was what distinguished the Turkana from any of the white people he had ever met.

A man’s prestige is judged by the power of his household and the size of his flocks and herds, and by his network of social relationships built partly through the matrimonial alliances he or members of his family have made. In order to achieve higher status an individual must develop a set of political competencies, not least of which is the ability to persuade and to federate. From his earliest childhood, in play and later in more tense combative relationships, he hones this competency requisite for the satisfaction of his personal desires (desires for prestige, power and possessions).

But he is also part of various different solidarity groups (age-set, generation, clan, grazing community, wider society). So he cannot restrict himself to an attitude of seeking to appropriate. He is obliged to submit to the other imperative in logical relation to the quest for satisfaction: the obligation to give up his own possessions to others. For this individual the whole social game will consist of mastering the opposing circulatory flows of possessions that belong to him or do not yet belong to him. Sometimes he will give up possessions; often he will manage to put off having to give them up; in exceptional cases he will refuse. At the same time he will strive to acquire objects that he desires or lacks, objects that will perhaps allow him to respond to a request from a third party and to open a new credit with this other party.

However, we believe that in the representations (implicit or explicit) made by the social actors the quest for acquisition has primacy over what we see as its logical consequence, the possible ceding of certain possessions. We have ethnographical data that support this assertion. The author, exasperated, complained to Lokorio, a man of some importance in the Turkana territorial section of the Ngikamatuk, about the number of requests that were being made to him. Lokorio replied laconically that the author only had to make more requests of the people around him.

Another seemingly less pertinent example further supports our analysis. On another occasion Naukot the eldest son of the first wife of Lokwarngomol, an important member of the Turkana territorial section of the Ngulukumong, came to find the author. The two had met for the first time a few days before. Naukot informed the ethnographer that he wished to be his friend. By now used to this type of introduction the author asked him what he wished for in return. After a moment’s silence, Naukot took the author into his father’s cattle pen and asked him what he wanted, pointing to a group of young zebras not yet weaned. Surprised by the author’s hesitation and embarrassment he welcomed his offer, this time clearly indicating that he meant to give the author one of the animals.

The situation was unusual: offering a present of such importance when no request has been made is not a common occurrence. The situation became clear soon after, when Naukot came to find the ethnographer and ask him to bring back various consumer goods from the west (sugar, blankets, combat wear etc.). He had deliberately placed himself in the position of creditor, thus forcing the author into a relationship of obligation to him that he could manipulate as he pleased. Thus he asserted his own prestige in the eyes of the members of the community and at the same time ensured the ethnographer’s obligation to him. In contrast to what had gone before (requests made to the author without acknowledgement of a reciprocal right to appropriation), he had integrated the visitor into the society in the conventional way for the first time. We could describe Naukot’s logic thus: I allow you to exercise your right to appropriate one of my possessions, in the same way as all the other members of the group; therefore I too have a right to appropriate possessions of yours.
If we observe linguistic and other behaviour in situations of compliance with the request for an object, we can discern a number of indices that validate our hypothesis that in indigenous conceptualizations of these situations of 'ordinary' social interaction the quest for gratification has primacy over acknowledgement (by any simple and immediate expression) of the giver's gesture. Certain linguistic data throw light on the subject. It is hard to find words that allow one to verbalize gratitude 'simply' and 'directly'. The words either designate the state of contentment of the satisfied subject: for example, ajok, good/well, dakana, happy, epuunana, happy (euphoric); or they refer to complex conventional processes (the rituals, the exortments expressed in songs or during rituals, the anointing with unction also performed during rituals etc.): for example, akiru, akiruak, or akikutu, to praise someone, akiru, akikik, to smear ritually (chyme, butter etc.), akiru, to spray by spitting water (a type of blessing dispensed by the elders, among other things to a person giving an animal for sacrifice), ariwokon akimu, to spray coffee (by oral projection) to protect someone from misfortune (a blessing dispensed to a host who has invited you to his home). These expressions are almost exclusively associated with strongly conventional behaviour and will refer specifically to certain gestural and linguistic sequences thereof. The regular absence of specific behaviour expressive of gratitude immediately sanctioning receipt of the desired object provides us with another major indication to support our hypothesis. The satisfied social actors take the object and then change the subject or turn on their heels without further ceremony. Later, in a situation where the acquisition can be made public, the beneficiary very often displays his new possession (a t-shirt, a piece of jewellery, a combat stick, a headrest etc.) in an ostentatious manner. It seems that the emergent characteristics of the acquirer's affective reactions observed in interaction are a product of the specific emotions of pride and joy, emotions that are the combined affective components of gratification in the sympathetic table drawn up by A. Ortony et al.

Obviously the giver of the possession and the person acquiring it view the situation differently. The former feels a certain obligation to give the object up (or to respond to his interlocutor in an acceptable form, if he does not wish to break off the social relationship), but with the prospect of eventually recovering the credit. The acquirer is pleased with his success (he assumes the role of primary agent in the sequence of actions) and displays his happiness to the group. The fact that the giver feels obligation is, however, an indication of the more fundamental acknowledgement, in the social actors' representations, of the right of the person making the request to appropriate the object, to the detriment of the desiderata of the person to whom the request is made. Simply by virtue of the request having been made it seems that there is room for only one reality, that of the person making it. The person to whom the request is addressed attempts to present his own reality, but this is hardly credited with the same weight as that of his opponent.

### The Call to the Zebu

We have stressed the absence of any expression of immediate gratitude on receipt of the desired object. We shall now consider the deferred ways of expressing gratitude in the sphere of masculine behaviour. These are instances of highly conventional expressive behaviour that occur from time to time and allow a degree of balance to be re-established between the personal satisfaction of the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the gift and that of the giver, through acknowledgement of his action. Through this analysis we hope to uncover the reasons for certain aspects of the rituals and behavioural conventions used among the Turkan and Nyangatom peoples.

Everyday life in the zebu camps is played out slowly to the rhythm of each person's tasks. Music is omnipresent: melodies endlessly repeated by the women and young girls as they go about their labours help to create a steady musical atmosphere. Some sing along to the steady rhythm of the milstones they are using to grind the grain. Some sing long lullabies for the children they are looking after. Others intone songs heard from the dance the previous night, or join in with snatch of the songs they can hear in the distance, or start new verses in response to a melody heard close by.

The men's participation in this musical atmosphere is less frequent but of no lesser importance. Here we shall talk more precisely about the situation in the Nyangatom encampments, as we have much relevant data. If we wished to deal with this matter among the Turkan, we would have to go into subjects that have no direct bearing on the subject of our essay. We shall just say that in this respect again the Turkan and Nyangatom have many similarities with one another.

Very often a man wakes the village or marks the end of the day's labour with a 'call' (akuvu) to his favourite zebu. As he sings he leads his zebu through the camp or along the outer fence around its perimeter. The warrior regularly breaks off his song for long moments at a time, contenting himself with clicking his fingers to keep the animal's attention. During this time the other habitants finish their daily tasks. In the mornings the call to the zebu goes on until the herds are taken out to graze; in the evening it lasts until the meal that marks the end of the day's activities. The women, young girls and children repeat the verses of the warrior's song. The song will also be briefly reprised during the day in its composer's absence. The song integrates the collective repertoire of melodies and plays a part in forming the camp's particular musical atmosphere. The first conventional expression of gratitude we shall talk about occurs in male song. As they walk in the encampment the man and animal maintain a special relationship. It is hard to say which of them is guiding their movements. There seems to be a regular alternation between movements made by the animal of its own volition and movements gently steered by its owner. Thus the animal is allowed a certain degree of freedom, setting the pace and stopping where it chooses. If it walks determinedly towards someone other than its owner and 'greets'
by the singer's successive *logati* sometimes induces strong affective reactions in the listeners. On several occasions we witnessed extraordinary scenes. To describe one of them: as night falls the singer is still interminably repeating his calls to his favourite zebu and his friends, practically falling into a trance, having sung for more than two hours already. His companions in the same age-set shout back to him, yelling their warrior or zebu names. They gather together and start miming warrior actions: in single file, assault rifles in hand, stamping their feet on the ground and blowing on their whistles in short bursts, they snake through the encampment for some twenty minutes, gradually getting nearer to their friend. Eventually they surround him, shouting and jumping up and down, and then gently attempt to lead him home and calm him. This example provides us with an illustration of the part played by behavioural conventions (i.e. a model of action, 'the call') in the determination of the types of affective emotions and experiences that the social actors may have.\(^\text{16}\)

**Restoration of the Social Bond**

There are other forms of conventional expression of gratitude. We shall deal with some of them through the analysis of certain aspects of a Nyangatom ritual undertaken at Nawere (locality) in the Tirga region (Lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia).\(^\text{2}\) This was an *adrikeret a enong*,\(^\text{2}\) a sacrifice bringing together the male adult members of the community (elders and men of fighting age).\(^\text{2}\)

An old man who was gravely ill was responsible for the holding of the ritual. We have chosen this example because it summarizes all the issues we wish to deal with here. The Turkana and Nyangatom perform this type of ritual very frequently on many different occasions.\(^\text{10}\) In the two cultural worlds, the configuration of the ritual area and the explicit representations made by the agents are similar, although certain differences are of course apparent. We shall mention these differences in the course of our argument.

Ekuru has been ill for a long time and his condition is deteriorating. He decides to consult an *enaron*, a soothsayer. The latter blames\(^\text{40}\) certain people living in Lomeyett\(^\text{40}\) for Ekuru's misfortune. However, he declares Ekuru himself to be the only one really responsible for his affliction. Like everyone else, he knows the reason. He has 'forgotten' some of his acquaintances. He must invite them and sacrifice an animal to them, in this case a zebu.

The culpability of the person suffering is often claimed to be the primary cause of his misfortune. You will ask yourself how an individual affected by the malevolent designs of others can be culpable. And why should he slay an animal? If we fit this model of justification into the structure of the argument we have sustained until now, we can understand the logic behind the reasoning of the soothsayer and the other social actors.
Thus it seems that Ekuru has not respected a fundamental imperative of life in his society, and his illness is proof of this. He has shown himself to be too greedy, neglecting to give anything back in return for goods and favours of which he has had the benefit. The ritual constitutes one of the conventional procedures that allow an individual or a group to express this gratitude for other peoples' actions. It is a recurrent characteristic of ritual actions. The gestures and linguistic expressions of gratitude survive even in the most banal rituals.\footnote{Every akikirik ends with an agata, a harangue or solemn speech made by one or more of the elders to the members of the gathering. The approximate translation 'harangue' only partly conveys the sense of the phenomenon. The agata has an intricate structure. The orator talks about the political problems facing the community, the threats weighing upon the encampments, the events of recent times. He seeks to convince by means of exemplary tales, telling a story that is vaguely familiar to his audience. He praises or utters reproaches. He curses the enemies or the wild beasts that threaten the cattle. As he does so he breaks off from time to time to issue injunctions,\footnote{to which the members of the gathering reply in unison. It is at these moments that the orator introduces the conventional expressions of gratitude. We give an example of Ekuru's ritual below. An elder (A) takes the role of orator. He is talking about Ekuru. The chorus (Ch) of men respond.}

A The thing that came down upon Ekuru at Lomuria ( locality), taken away from him for ever.
Whether it is a cow, whether it is a person, whether it is a goat, whether it is a donkey; let us take this thing from him (hu, it), let us take!
Ch We take!
A Let us take this thing from him, let us take!\footnote{(twice)}
Ch We take!

A Does it not turn away from Ekuru? Turn away! (to the thing)
Ch Turn away!
A The cattle in the pen where Ekuru speared (the animal), the cattle in this pen, let them be many in number!
Ch Let them be many in number!
A All these stomachs, all these mouths (i.e. the participants) do they give cattle to Ekuru?
They give!
Ch They give!\footnote{(twice)}
A Grow rich!
Ch You are rich!
A Ekuru's cattle have a good relationship with Ekuru, they have a good relationship!
Ch They have a good relationship!
A This bad thing that affects Ekuru, doesn't it go away? Go!
Ch Go!
A Doesn't the grass kill it? Kill! (reference to the rhyme with which the sick man is smeared)
Ch Kill!
A The others, let them be many in number! (the cattle)
Ch Let them be many in number!
A Let them stay!
Ch Let them stay!
A Let them be many in number!
Ch Let them be many in number!\footnote{(four times)}
A Don't they have a good relationship with Ekuru? They do!\footnote{Ch They do!}
A Are they friendly to each other?
Ch They are friendly to each other!
A The bad things away, Woi?
Ch Woi!
A Run from these legs, thing!
Ch Run..... Get out!
A Let us say that the bad thing is going away from Ekuru. Gone! Gone for ever!
Ch Gone for ever!
A All these houses, are they not free (of the bad thing)? Free!
Ch Free! ...Good!
A All the 'flu' from here, to go. Go!
Ch Go!
A The 'flu' that was in our cattle. Our cattle, doesn't it leave them in peace?! Leave!
Ch Leave!
A All my wives gathered here, all my children, this day, Ciuuu!
Ch Ciuuu! (exclamation of relief)
-He is getting cool!
-He is getting cool!
-Coool!
-Coool!
A The 'sleeper' (the sick man) here again, there is none!\footnote{(twice)}
Ch There is none!
-No more!
...repetitions with variations. The elder prolongs his harangue for some time.
Acok, a second elder, harangues the participants in the ritual. At the start of his speech the orator criticizes the members of the Nyangatom society for the lack of caution they show in their choice of grazing, and for the lack of solidarity between the various different territorial sections. Acok attempts to convince the assembly of the need to stand united in the face of adversity.

- You called for this 'Ilu'. (Acok speaks to a person from Lomayen, a Nyangatom outpost near the Surma enemy.)
- When your father's cows became weak and the problem had affected their stomachs, you came when the sun rose.
- It is well that you came!
- And now this question about the land you spoke of, are there Nyangatom who feel it in their hearts?
- The Nyangatom feel nothing in their hearts!

- All our fathers, the house of our fathers built in this land (i.e. Tirga), nothing [has been followed] of the things they thought in their hearts when they told themselves they would have to move (i.e. migrate) when they reached this water and this grass and they fell ill (i.e. 'their stomach fell ill').
- A person is bad when he does not listen to what another is saying!
- A negative attitude [shown by] the Nyangatom in time past when they saw the grass and when, with this friend called Kudoto and others, I said 'Woi, Woi, Woi, it's the grass (that is bad for the cattle)'
- The Ngilingakol (a territorial section) said to move (i.e. to leave the mountain for the plains) and go to Nakua (i.e. the 'heart' of the Nyangatom land, in the plain beside the border with Kenya).
- The Ngisakol (the territorial section of Acok and members of the assembly) also said that it was necessary to move, and ran to Nakua.
- We again asked ourselves in Namugir (locality): was this now, 'God', ideas from the past?... (i.e. to return to Nakua)
...Acok expands this theme for approximately 15 minutes, then sits down again. A third elder then speaks.

In this instance the individual who is suffering and the giver of the animal are one and the same person. If they were two different people, the orator would also say an agata for the person who has given the animal.44 We have considered the representations (implicit and explicit) made by the actors in the ritual. Ekuru seems to accept the soothsayer's interpretation. His illness is the outward sign of a breaking off of the reciprocal relationships that govern social interactions. He makes an act of contrition by offering a zebu to his companions, thus belatedly expressing his gratitude to them for all they have done for him.45 Ekuru's companions accept the reparation and express their gratitude to him for this demonstration of generosity and acknowledgement of their own altruistic acts. By his offering, Ekuru thus expresses his acknowledgement of the need to make 'restitution' from time to time, in a conventional form, for the personal advantages he has enjoyed.

Obviously the above is a consideration of the normative aspects of the ritual. One must also look at their affective consequences for the participants in the ritual procedure. We reiterate our earlier observation that conventional behaviour does not always produce the desired effects, but certainly facilitates their emergence.46 We could attempt to qualify Ekuru's type of affective experience. Acting in conformance with the behavioural conventions current in his society he is likely to experience in turn anger, sadness, remorse, comfort, joy and pride. It is interesting to follow the course of the ritual. Several expressive behaviours dramatize these same emotions. At the start of the process, Ekuru, helped by his companions, goes to the pen where the
animal has been killed. Standing facing towards Lomeyen (the origin of the misfortune), he points his assault rifle into the distance and fires several shots in a row. He gives vent to his anger. He utters curses and ‘sends the sickness back’ whence it came. He is then smeared with chyme by the elders of the assembly who ‘order’ the evil to go away and galvanize Ekuru into action, commanding him to regain his health. The assembly strives to comfort Ekuru by lavishing care upon him and assuring him of their support. The participants thus demonstrate their understanding (his close friends probably also their sympathy) through their conventional behaviour. The elders then gather near the sick man’s night hut. There they are served coffee. An (oral) spraying session begins. The elders spit in all directions (on the ground, in the air, towards the cardinal points) and launch into harangues at the same time. The next stage of the ritual is enacted outside the perimeter fence of the camp, where the meat is cooked and eaten by the members of the assembly. The ritual finishes with the final agata in which the elders express their support for Ekuru and their gratitude towards him (cf. above).

A system of altruistic relationships: the conventional collective action

We could analyse other aspects of the ritual in detail. But this would only serve as a refinement of the general picture we have presented. The scope of this article does not allow us to deal with all the expressive behaviour that structures the ritual process. In our analysis we have singled out two models of praxis as conceptualized by the Turkana and Nyan- gatom: interaction between individuals, and conventional collective action. In the first we have seen that the quest for personal gratification prevails. By contrast, in conventional collective action it seems that the quest for the satisfaction of others and the expression of gratitude modify the ‘natural’ propensity (considered as such by the social actors) to seek personal satisfaction.

In the ritual, for example, it is clear that all the actors involved (all male), depending on their status, their social responsibilities and the conventions governing the relationships between individuals, enter into service to the community (i.e. the other social groups that constitute the community). The young men prepare and cook the sacrificial animal for their elders. In return they will be given specific parts of the animal (very often part of the backbone). Other men in their prime make sacrifices for the elders and direct the younger ones. They also receive certain parts of the animal from the elders. The elders share out the flesh of the animal among themselves, eating the best parts (entrails, head, haunches, bone marrow, fat etc.) and giving the rest to the others involved in the ritual. They dispense blessings and direct the conventional expression of
gratitude. Thus fundamentally the ritual proceeds only because some men place themselves in service to others (and reciprocally) for the sake of higher objectives, represented explicitly or implicitly.

To explain what we mean by this last observation it is useful to return to the notions of collective action and intention. John Searle, in *Intentionality*, collective, advances the theory that "there is really such a thing as a collective social behaviour, which is not equivalent to the sum of the individual behaviours" (Searle 1992: 218). Thus Searle differentiates mass movements that can be reduced to a collection of individual acts from those that constitute a collective action\(^6\) (Searle 1991: 239). Although the observable results of these movements (the collection of individual acts and the collective action) may not present notable differences, the 'internal' constitutions of these two instances of 'mass' movement differ radically from each other. The element of differentiation is the form of the agents' intentionality. In the first case the agents have individual intentions derived from a genuinely collective 'we-intention. As a first approximation we could express this proposition thus: the individual intention 'I perform act A' is derived from the collective action 'We perform act A'.\(^5\) (Searle 1991: 229-230).

When, like Searle, we assert that genuinely collective intentions exist, we are not saying, however, that these intentions exist other than distributively in the minds of all the agents engaged in the collective actions. It is more a question of recognizing the possibility that the intentional mental states of individuals may make direct reference to (i.e. may be directly concerned with) the collective (or be 'we-intentional mental states). As Searle tells us, the 'we-intentions are primitive and do not depend on primary individual intentions (Searle 1991: 233-234). Thus the relationship that connects the singular component (here, the individual intention to perform a specific act) to the collective component of the intention is, according to Searle, "the same as the relationship that establishes itself between the representation of the means and the goals in individual intentions. The individual behaviour is the means to achieve the collective goal" (Searle 1991: 243).

In conventional collective action, behaviour is strongly conventional but leaves plenty of room for unspecified actions. The agents act in accordance with a common suggested goal or goals. In their interactions, the actors of the conventional collective action respect behavioural conventions (such as those that define relations between older and younger, men and women etc.). The conventional determination of the type of action to be undertaken (and the behaviours appropriate in these situations) thus plays a part in shaping this type of collective interaction. But in the end these elements under-determine the interaction. Further factors also play a part: conflictual relations between individuals, affective fondnesses and other random components (a situation of imminent danger for example). Thus there is always a 'déjà vu' aspect about the collective conventional action (because of the references to the type model for the action), although it is never in fact the identical reproduction of a previous activity (it can only be an occurrence of the general type).

Thus the competencies and aptitudes to act, the knowledge and representations connected with the ritual procedure, are distributed among the individual agents. What they clearly perceive is the contribution made by their individual actions within the structure of the collective action. They guide their actions by indices – the reference points/conventions of the collective action.\(^4\) They do this with reference to those goals of the collective action that they have the capacity to grasp.\(^5\) The outlined goal (which corresponds to a genuinely collective intention) is explained verbally in this case: a sacrifice is made to rebuild the social bond, i.e. in this case 'We make an akwirik to allow Ekuru to kill for his friends whom he has forgotten'. But other intentions are communicated implicitly. They are displayed in conventional behaviour. The gestures of 'blessing' in response to the action of a third person (expression of gratitude) and the reciprocal services that the participants render each other (expressions of gratitude and bonds of solidarity that unite the social actors) help to make the ritual what it is. These behavioural models have important psycho-social consequences. They reinforce the feelings of attachment to each other and more generally to the group as a constituted social unit. The individuals internalize in action the behaviour, status and social roles of the different social categories and rebalance their affective relationships with others through the occasional reinforcement of disinterested, altruistic attitudes.\(^6\)

If we accept the proposed meaning of collective action, the akwirik is also a collective action even if often only the singer is acting. In fact the latter is conforming to a particular collective convention: the model of expression of the call to the zebu which allows the warriors to assert their individuality or their power and to demonstrate their affection for their favourite animals and friends. The singer's individual intention certainly derives from a 'we-intention:
within the solidarity group, the men (the ‘we’) measure themselves against each other, among other ways by these musical performances. To sing and measure themselves against each other in this way is to respect the fundamental principles of tradition. This respect for tradition is a collective goal in itself. Moreover, an individual’s contribution has no intrinsic meaning unless it is integrated into the sequence of respective performances by the members of the male group.

The warrior therefore sings for an audience, the community (and his favourite zebu, a quasi subject). The members of the group freely appropriate the song, and hence it joins the other melodies in the collective musical repertoire. This gesture, which might seem individualist in the first analysis, is thus fundamentally altruistic. We believe that it is the most pertinent expression of the Turkana and Nyangatom cultural spirit that we have been able to record. The natural propensity to egocentrism is used here to reinforce the social bond. By expressing his pride conventionally the singer gives himself the opportunity to experience strong, gratifying personal emotions, but at the same time he is serving a higher collective imperative upon which the group’s solidarity depends: the need to play a part in the circulating of possessions to the best of his ability (‘we give each other some of our possessions reciprocally’). Hence it is no surprise to often find a conventional expression of gratitude integrated into this altruistic behaviour.

THE UNBRIDLED QUEST FOR GRATIFICATION

If, within the limits of ethnic solidarity, the natural propensity to seek individual satisfaction is counterbalanced by the inducement and reinforcement of altruistic affects in conventional collective behaviour, this is certainly not the case outside these limits. Thus the communal participation in collective actions and the sharing of conventions strongly determines the attachment that individuals may feel towards one another. It is particularly pertinent to note that the Nyangatom conventionally keep one of the hind legs of the sacrificial animal for the Topotha, with whom they have a special alliance. In this connection, thanks to the highly controversial work by Colin Turnbull, *Les ikis, survivre par la cruauté*, we were made aware of a particular situation that supports our interpretation of the importance of rituals and conventional behaviour of gratitude in the forming of social bonds within solidarity groups. The Ikis live in a narrow territory squeezed between the ethnic groups of the Turkana and the Dodooth. They were originally hunter-gatherers. At the time of Turnbull’s ethnographical survey (1964-1967), ‘Ikan’ society was undergoing a grave crisis. Its territory had been turned into a national park (Kidepo National Park). Overnight, hunting was banned and people thereafter forbidden to carry weapons (spears etc.) on pain of imprisonment. Their weapons were confiscated. The population was invited to convert to an agricultural way of life. These were ideal conditions for a catastrophe, which was not long in coming.

Turnbull’s description of the situation is distressing. A terrible famine plunged the population into disaster. The collapse of family values, the near-total absence of mutual aid and the complete disappearance of the conventional collective behaviours are some of the general characteristics of the social situation Turnbull describes. Seeing the systematic destruction of the values, behaviours and institutions to which we generally attribute a primordial role in social cohesion and, perhaps even more fundamentally, in sociability itself, Turnbull wonders what can still bind the Ikis to one another if not their language and sometimes their homes. In his search for an answer he uncovers an element of great relevance to our subject: the nyot. The nyot is a bond of individual friendship that resisted the almost total collapse of society (Turnbull 1987: 148). This bond unites two individuals who acknowledge certain rights and duties towards each other. In a normal situation, an individual may legitimately appropriate certain possessions from his nyot partner.

In the crisis situation that the society was experiencing, Turnbull states that this right to appropriation was exercised only with respect to tobacco, and no longer to food. But it was still “a reality that the ikis ... could not shirk”, even if “they made vague attempts to do so in the sense that they never responded very willingly to requests from a nyot ...” (Turnbull 1987: 148). Again we encounter the two fundamental rules that govern the interaction of agents in the Nyangatom and Turkana cultural worlds: the obligation to cooperate (and therefore eventually to give) and the right to appropriation. It is surprising to note that almost all of the bonds that we would consider fundamental had disappeared and that only the nyot, an inter-individual bond, was preserved. Here we might perhaps discern the influence of previous cultural context. This is probably true in part. But we believe there is a more profound reason for the preservation of this cultural element. We are guided by Turnbull in our choice of argument. The preservation of the nyot, despite all opposition, clearly shows that interpersonal relationships retain a certain value and permanence, but at the lowest level. This resulted in a reduction of human relations to an individual level (Turnbull 1987: 148-149). The inter-individual recognition of the right to acquisition was in fact an expression of the acknowledgement of a right to individual satisfaction and thus more fundamentally the reciprocal acknowledgement of each other’s right to exist...around each other. Thus the reciprocal altruism of the partners of the nyot was the minimum element necessary for any form of solidarity to survive. Thus ikisan society did survive, but expression of the social bond was reduced to a minimum.

This example shows an intermediate case between a society where solidarity is reinforced and widespread and an interaction where no social bond is recognized. We can already see signs of the type of conceptualization of warrior interactions defended by the Turkana and Nyangatom social actors. In warrior action the individual is exercising his right to appropriation. The same right is refused to his opponent because there is no bond of solidarity between the two.
Consequently to allow the warrior to achieve his aims (the acquisition of others’ possessions) murder is permitted and even encouraged. The enemy is commonly reified and animalized in the harangues uttered at the start of warrior actions. It seems, however, that their humanity is not completely denied. Renowned enemy warriors are known by name. When individuals clash, they challenge each other. They name each other and ‘invite’ each other to dare to attack their respective camps. The author also heard a song known in the northeastern region of Turkana country that celebrated the bravery of a tough enemy warrior who managed to kill some of his tormentors even as he was dying.

We stress the logical relationship that exists between the affective reactions of the agents in interaction in the solidarity group and those that occur in bellicose interaction. We believe, in fact, that there is an ‘affective continuity’ between these two instances. The attaching of value to the quest for individual satisfaction, apparent in ordinary interactions, is further reinforced in confictual interactions in the absence of regulatory social mechanisms. The differences between these two types of action are (1) the degree of interaction between agents; frequent interactions in everyday life or occasional, extraordinary interactions in war; (2) the presence or absence of affective bonds with a moderating influence; those that inhibit aggression and extreme negative emotions or those that reinforce positive, empathic and sympathetic emotional reactions and of cooperative relationships between agents, and more fundamentally, (3) the norms and other representations of the contexts of interaction that permit or do not permit certain types of behaviour. These behaviours potentially induce a wide variety of specific affects depending on the situation in which they emerge. In a skirmish the personal – autocentric – affective experiences of the warriors are certainly of greater intensity than in ordinary interaction (i.e. not including situations of conventional collective action). Fear, hatred, pleasure, pride and gratification are therefore magnified, providing the combatants with experiences that will have a lasting effect upon them.

Confrontation, Aggression and Ascendancy: a Young Boy Claims a New Status

Below we present a series of images taken from a filmed sequence of everyday Nyangatom life (in the Lokiyen locality, Tira, in the territorial section of the Ngisakol, August 2005). Acok’s encampment has just moved. The ‘useful’ members of the population are all occupied, the women and adolescents in repairing the old camp into which they have moved, the men and the young shepherds in supervising the works, rebuilding the defence round the settlement and guarding the herds. A group of children is playing within the camp enclosure. Some little girls (aged five to nine) are amusing themselves building little night huts by piling up cow dung which they sprinkle with ash. Lokwarerol, a young boy in a period of latency (aged about five or six), stands slightly apart, watching the cameraman filming the little girls at play. The camera seems to serve to trigger the interaction between the group of little girls and a group of boys led by Lokwarerol, the oldest boy. Some distance away, Lokonyo, Lokwarerol’s father, notices the scene. He comes to sit nearby with his back to the area where the children are playing. At the end of the sequence we are about to describe, Lokonyo will intervene to offer mild supervision and will calm the tempers of the parties who are heavily involved in their interaction.

We have chosen to follow Lokwaberol because he is at a stage in his existence of particular interest to our subject. He is emerging from infancy and his dependence on the female world. In his earliest childhood his mother, other women relations and his older ‘sisters’ looked after him all the time. But for some time now he has been left more and more to his own devices. He has taken up the habit of wandering about in a group with other little boys. The older boys are now big enough to go out with the cattle. Lokwaberol finds himself alone among his age group, too young to accompany the animals and too old to go on playing with the younger boys. He is also too old to mix in with the children being looked after by the young girls. Lokwaberol has thus entered a stage where he is forced to abandon certain behaviours that have become too babyish for him, such as, for example, the stonking and gestures of tenderness that the little boys make to each other so often. This type of attitude between partners of the same sex will be taken up again later during adolescence in a different form (less intense and less direct), gradually becoming less frequent as the individuals reach adult status.

Throughout the whole sequence Lokwaberol is striving to exert his ascendancy over the little girls (his own age or slightly older) and the other boys (all younger). To do so he copies the behavioural models he has observed in interactions between adults. He has not yet internalized all the behavioural nuances that will help him to carry his interactions with others through to a successful conclusion. He is brusque, and excessively intractable. However, his attitude undeniably shows the beginnings of certain traits of male Nyangatom behaviour. The quest for leadership, the insistence on imposing his will in situations where another social actor is refusing to cooperate and the dramatization of his anger are some of the characteristic traits of the male ethos that the young boys exhibit very crudely in this film sequence.

Lokwaberol’s behaviour is excessive because he has not yet acquired a set of behavioural norms relating to life in society. For example, he has not fully internalized the fact that it is sometimes more useful to alternate between negotiation and force to persuade one’s interlocutors. His aggressive and demanding behaviour is partly explained by his fragile status and ‘isolation’ in society prior to his assumption of responsibility in the pastoral economy. Note the subsequent phase of his integration into society (guarding the flocks) is a relatively hard time. Pre-adolescents are severely punished and publicly humiliated if they lose animals in their care.
At these night-time sessions of public humiliation, much emphasis is placed upon the asocial nature of the thoughtless little shepherds. Those present impose a series of trials upon them, ranging from the most benign to the most brutal. The shepherds must suffer beatings at the hands of their companions. On the receiving end of the mockery and jibes of the spectators for long spells at a time, they learn to salute their elders in suitable fashion, to recount the ups and downs of their day looking after the animals, to acknowledge their mistakes and to justify themselves eloquently. This period of the young shepherds’ lives is also very hard because they spend the majority of their time alone in the bush, loosely supervised by the older boys. It is at this time that the young boys forge their own individual characters and impose their autonomy on the rest of the group. Once they have been recognized (when they have demonstrated their ability to look after the animals), they can gradually begin to play a part in ritual activities. At the same time the adolescents will act more and more often within social groups (the age-sets and war groups) and will be acknowledged collectively by the community.

The play sequence we are analysing lasts approximately half an hour. We present five series of images, each of which deals with a type of interaction. These are shown in sequence. However the sequences should not be linked to one another too closely. Other interactions and developments occur in the intervening moments between those that we have chosen to present. Our reconstruction of the actional structure of the play sequence is therefore of course partly arbitrary. It throws light on some of the themes we have tackled in this article. We follow the development and progression of Lokwarakol’s behaviour as our leitmotiv.

**Opening Sequence:**

Young girls are building little houses by heaping up lumps of cow dung. One of them sprinkles her house with ash. Meanwhile, Lokwarakol is running in all directions around the camp that is being rebuilt. He trails a band of little boys after him. The group is torn between the cameraman’s activities and the little girls’ game. Lokwarakol undertakes to interfere in the girls’ group in a roundabout way, gradually getting nearer and nearer.

**The Confrontation**

Lokwarakol pushes abruptly into the middle of the girls’ game. He tries several times to appropriate the bracelets that one of the girls has taken off for a moment because they were bothering her. The girl grabs them back from him and shows Lokwarakol her irritation. The latter, frustrated in his attempt at acquisition, modifies his aggressive attitude and feigns cooperative behaviour. He seeks to take the initiative in the game and starts moving lumps of dung about and placing them elsewhere in the building.

The girl rebuffs him and pushes him away again. He is obliged to stop what he is doing. Faced with the failure of the interaction, thrown off balance, he pauses in silence for a moment, surveying the scene, then gets up and leaves the play area. This momentary stillness occurs very frequently in awkward situations when there is an abrupt breaking off of interaction between adults.

In the Nyangatom and Turkana worlds, the failure of an agent to realize his desire is commonly greeted with a suspension of activity by the two partners in the interaction. Nothing is said or
done. The thwarted individual may then grumble about his interlocutor's non-cooperation or may let the awkward moment pass in silence. In this case the little girl pays no attention whatsoever to Lokwarakol.

Withdrawal and failure of the attempted coup
Lokwarakol has tired of his interaction with the little girls, who refuse to cooperate with him. Or rather he has tired of having no hold over the girls.

He has gone to look for some dung and has sat down some distance away under a tree to make his own little house. The girls, who have been ordering the little boys about right from the start of the game, sending them off to fetch dung, notice that Lokwarakol has gone off by himself with a heap of dung.

The two eldest girls approach without ceremony to seize some of his building material. They are clearly trying to impose upon Lokwarakol an identical relationship to the one they have with the younger boys. They are trying to defend their status as 'big sisters'.

Lokwarakol reacts immediately, violently expressing his rage. With the remainder of his building material in one hand he chases after the little girl who has just carried the dung back to the

female group. Pushed away a first time by the oldest girl, Lokwarakol approaches the girls again, groaning. They lead him off and push him away. Lokwarakol finally gives up and goes back to his solitary play area.

Anger and action
The eldest of the girls comes back to Lokwarakol. She tries to help him nicely (as a big 'sister'). She indicates that she wants to correct some detail of the construction. Lokwarakol explodes with anger and hits the little girl twice, violently. Lokolonyo, Lokwarakol's father, intervenes verbally as the girl gets ready to return the blows. She remains silent and motionless for a moment (cf. above), then picks off the dung sticking to her hands, gets up and goes away. Two of the boys, those nearest to Lokwarakol in age, have joined him. He is now concerned only with his building. He finishes it quickly, surveys it for a few moments and then demolishes it. He throws the dung at the little girls.

Ascendancy
In the interim sequences not shown, Lokwarakol tries to monopolize the attention of the other little boys. In an attempt to free them from the little girls' hold once and for all, Lokwarakol,
wildly overexcited, goes running off after a dog shouting "Thief, thief!". The troop of little boys tear off after him, some armed with sticks, some with stones. Lokwarakol has won. He now holds the position of leader among the boys. Some time later they are all back at the male play area. There Lokwarakol does his utmost to tease and provoke the younger ones for no reason. He pushes in between two children who are tenderly embracing. After a brief moment of idleness, Lokwarakol throws himself on top of another little boy and tugs sharply at his clothing. Meeting with a negative reaction from the little one, Lokwarakol threatens him. Then in an overexcited attitude, his face frozen into a rictus, he throws his head back, turns and falls back onto the two little children embracing.

The sequence continues for some time yet. Lokwarakol interacts more calmly with the other children. Lokwarakol's father calls his son and presents him with a t-shirt, singing all the while. This item of clothing is generally given to children old enough to look after the flocks. Proud as a peacock, Lokwarakol rushes to show it to the other children. The boy then loses interest in the play scene.

In this sequence of interaction between children, it is clear that we are seeing important elements of the transformation of Lokwarakol's ethos. Taken in isolation this episode in the boy's life is of no great importance. After all, it is only a game. But if we take into account the many situations in which the child will reproduce and refine this behaviour, we can appreciate this sequence of events for their true worth. Lokwarakol is leaving early childhood behind him and adopting new behaviour. He is still strongly autocratic; he exercises his desire for appropriation brutally, and attempts to dominate others. He will only gradually become more strongly aware of real otherness (beyond the maternal bond). Participation in conventional collective activities and adoption of the behaviour that structures these activities will help him to do so.

Reconsideration of the hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Emotions have cognitive and affective components as well as public aspects. By way of a summary we suggest a general interpretative model of the relationships between cultural representations and affects. In our argument we have explained some of the factors that determine the agents' action through the analysis of expressive behaviour. Expressive behaviour has a characteristic of interest to our argument. It is a Janus: one face turned towards ego (the subject of the behaviour), the other towards other people. Thus it allows the agent to express...
and communicate his mental states (real or ‘conventional’). But often too it induces, shapes and reinforces these same mental states. They are clearly cultural elements of the first order for allowing us to analyse and understand a society. They give us access to the representations that govern interaction, the agents’ motivations and the potential types of personal experience for the social actors. The special links between this behaviour and complex social emotions allow us to reconstruct conjecturally certain aspects of the agents’ sociability and ethos. Below we present a synoptic table of the relationships between representations, affects, behaviour and emotions.

HYPOTHESIS 2: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SITUATIONS THAT INDUCE AFFECTIVE REACTIONS DETERMINES THE TYPES OF SPECIFIC EMOTION

If we refer to the synoptic table shown above we see the role played by conceptualization in the determination of specific emotions. To the representations of contexts and situations correspond some representations of conventional expressive behaviours. The conventional behaviours stemming from these representations will give rise to affective experiences (or not). It can therefore be normative – then it will be executed formally – or can trigger emotions in the agents in interaction, inducing a specification of the particular type of affective experience. In the case of emergence of non-conventional expressive behaviour, the processing of the information by the agent differs somewhat. At the start of an idiosyncratic evaluation of the situation, the agent experiences an emotion, certain aspects of which will manifest themselves in his behaviour. He may reassess his reaction and modify it according to the reactive attitudes and behaviours of the persons interacting with him and the results that he seeks to achieve. Thus with repetition of the situations of interaction, some reactions will eventually be inhibited, some reinforced, others modified and reoriented towards socially acceptable expressions. Again we perceive the influence of individual and collective representations in the determination of the agents’ types of emotions and affects.

HYPOTHESIS 3: IN THE NYANGATOM AND TURKANA PASTORAL WARRIOR WORLDS, GRATIFICATION IS REINFORCED IN ORDINARY INTERACTION AND GRATITUDE IN CONVENTIONAL COLLECTIVE INTERACTION.

We have amply illustrated the reinforcement of the two affective reactions of gratification and gratitude, firstly in situations of ordinary interaction and secondly in situations of conventional collective interaction. Our descriptive analysis allows us to propose a new hypothesis. The affective reactions of gratitude seem to benefit from a less ‘natural’ expressivity than those of the emotions of gratification. We believe that this at least partly explains the complexity and strong conventionality of behaviours expressing gratitude as well as the multitude of reinforcements necessary for these emotions to appear. Our argument is summarized in the synoptic table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS</th>
<th>PROPERTY</th>
<th>SHAPING</th>
<th>ETHOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal types of emotions</td>
<td>Natural expressivity</td>
<td>Cultural models of expressivity</td>
<td>Ethological characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratification</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Behaviours of ordinary interaction</td>
<td>Quest for satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratitude</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conventional collective behaviours</td>
<td>Altruism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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HYPOTHESIS 4: THERE IS AN AFFECTIVE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE EMOTIONS OF THE AGENTS IN INTERACTION IN THE SOLIDARITY GROUP AND THOSE THAT OCCUR IN BELLICOSE INTERACTION

The attaching of value to the quest for individual satisfaction is reinforced in conflictual interactions with the enemy. The absence of social regulatory mechanisms – the second order expectations of the agents involved in cooperative relationships within solidarity groups, inter-individual affective bonds and conventional collective activities – facilitates the emergence of aggressive behaviour in warrior interactions. Consequently the quest for satisfaction can lead to exaction and murder. We believe that conventional collective action allows altruistic affective bonds to be induced and reinforced between social partners. The suppression of these processes could therefore have grave consequences for the cohesion of solidarity groups and for social harmony.

We have analysed particular ethnographical situations in which altruistic sentiments are reinforced through ritual or quasi-ritual procedures. We defend the theory that the conventional behaviour of these collective activities facilitates the inhibition of the natural propensity to seek individual satisfaction, which is strongly reinforced in ordinary interaction, as we have seen. We believe that this recourse to conventional collective behaviour in order to make individuals aware of others by inhibiting a natural propensity is not peculiar to the Nyangatom or the Turkana. Our proposition has, it seems to us, a universal scope that goes beyond our ethnographical examples.

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Notes

1. De Waal talks of the human capacity for sympathy, the premises for which, like Darwin (2001), he sees in a number of social animals. These affective reactions derive from parental care and from the attachment of parents to their offspring (a selected relational characteristic which puts social species at a clear evolutionary advantage). This kind of reaction, valuable for the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals within the family, is extended to include adults not belonging to this sphere of solidarity (de Waal 2001: 352).

2. In these two situations, if the undertaking is to succeed it is important that the agent recognises the mental states of his adversary (sometimes incorrectly). If one wishes the agent to do as he has been trained to do, it will be necessary to combat his propensity to sympathetic reactions. Hence in a war situation for example the ‘belittling’ of the enemy that inevitably begins as soon as hostilities open. Sympathetic affective reactions can sometimes surface unexpectedly.

3. It seems that our propensity to sympathy is very difficult to suppress in a situation where another person’s distress is perceived. De Waal tells us that “distress at the sight of another’s pain is an impulse over which we exert no control; it grasps us insidiously, like a reflex, leaving us without the time to weigh up the pros and cons” (de Waal 2001: 135). We accept this assertion for the most part but emphasize the fact that variables come into play to facilitate or prevent the exhibiting of this type of reaction.

4. Damasio puts forward the hypothesis of a simulation loop for certain affective states. He makes the distinction between the cases of emotion where the neural mechanisms that procure perceptions have a ‘direct hold’ on the body and the cases of emotions where the neural mechanisms procure perceptions ‘as if’ they arose from emotional states induced by physiological changes. Thus he asserts that the brain learns to make weak as images of the body’s emotional states without these having to be reproduced in the body itself. These weaker emotional states short-circuit what he calls the ‘corporal loop’, thus avoiding setting in motion processes that are slow and consume energy. We shall not go into this association between mental images and substrates for corporeal states that allows the rapid, economical simulation of intra-individual states. We shall restrict ourselves to voicing the hypothesis that this type of mechanism occurs in the situation where an altruistic affective experience is triggered. This seems to us to be a line of research worth following. (Damasio 1995: 201-202)

5. In our suggested descriptions and formulations of the ‘average’ ethos we are choosing to overlook intra-individual and inter-individual contextual variations. We will focus mainly on the male side of Nyangatom and Turkana society. To talk about the female universe would take us too far for the extent of the present paper. The characteristics of the female ethos present a lesser picture of their male equivalents. To be complete, we would have to talk about the special relationship between women and progency, about the type of cooperation between women and about the interaction between the male and female sides of society. Thus we are talking about a very specific aspect of the rationality of the behaviour under consideration, an aspect often isolated in analysis. The constraints bound up with linguistic expression explain the fixedness of some descriptions. Our limited objective is to show some of the cognitive and affective elements that play a part in the elaboration of the agents’ attitudes and predispositions. We are thus endeavouring to explain certain characteristics of the Turkana and Nyangatom ethos.

6. The available census records are very approximate. The Turkana population is estimated at 24,000 (Mueller 1988: 19). As for the Nyangatom, they are far fewer in number. Estimates vary between 5,000 (Tornay 1989) and 50,000 (private communication with members of the Ifjka regional administration).

7. The Turkana and Nyangatom are zebras, goats, sheep, camels and donkeys. They grow mainly sorghum.

8. The author carried out research within the Turkana territorial sections (north-west Kenya) of Ngikamunak, Ngilkumong, Ngalupua and Ngapyakano during three missions, lasting a total of approximately two years. Mr. François Anselmo and the author jointly carried out a six-month ethnographical survey in Nyangatom country (Tirga region, Lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia), in the territorial section of the Ngikamunak.

9. In the event of non-payment of matrimonial compensation, the child will belong to the generation below that of his maternal grandfather. If subsequently payment is made, the child will reign the generation ranking immediately below that of his father.

10. This integration of the woman into the husband’s generation can be observed among Turkana women by their use of a specific colour for their marriage necklace (alaguma): grey for the Mountains generation, yellow for the Leopards. But the division into generations is of particular importance for the male community. The father’s generational belonging allows the (male) children to be classed in the generation below at birth. Generally we can say that a woman’s status is defined by that of her husband.

11. Generational systems sometimes differ. The succession of the Turkana generations differs from other succession models current in the Karimojong Cluster: at birth individuals integrate into one of the two existing alternate generations. A boy is born into the Leopards generation if his father is a Mountain, and conversely, into the Mountains generation if his father is a Leopard. So there are only two names for the successive generations. This might be seen as a transformation of the generational system into a system of alternations (in which the grandchildren belong to the grandparents’ group). This does not seem to be the case. The division of male society into age-sets plays a very significant part in rituals and other collective activities. The Turkana seem well on the way to replacing the generational system with a system of classification by age. This is, perhaps, the manifestation of a practical necessity. The Turkana are more numerous than the other peoples of the Karimojong Cluster. The transformation of the original system into a system of classification by age seems to be partly explained by the need to establish coherent solidarities between individuals belonging to the same generation but further and further apart in age.

12. This appears not to be the case with the Nyangatom. Tornay concluded that the system had undergone a transformation, the asapun now marking the transfer of power from one generation to the next and no longer the initiation of the age-sets (Un Système Générationnel, les Nyangatom de l’Ethiopie du sud-ouest et les peuples apparentés, Doctoral thesis, Laboratory of ethnology and comparative sociology, 1989, n.p. & Les Faits juanes: générations et politiques en pays Nyangatom – Ethiopia, 2001).

13. The ban on marrying applies as much to members of the father’s clan as to those of the mother’s clan.


15. It seems that affective reactions require cortical mediation. Thus they cannot be put in the same category as sub-cortical reflexes. Let us mention the hypothesis put forward by J. LeDoux (Dossier Pour la Science, special edition, April/July 2001: 104-109) that we have two circuits for processing information about the stimulus of fear. Information about the fear signal can be transmitted via a direct circuit going from the thalamus to the baso-lateral node of the amygdala. This rapid route would place the perceiving subject on alert in a risk situation. The other route is via a slower circuit passing through the cortex. This path would allow the subject to process the nature of the stimulus more safely and to establish a connection between the risk incurred and the type of behaviour most appropriate to it. Thus, in a way, this hypothesis of dual processing circuits reconciles supporters of the hypothesis of emotions as sub-cortical reflexes with supporters of the appraisal theory (an emotion is partly the result of a cognitive evaluation process). We shall not go into the complex triggers of emotional states here but shall restrict ourselves to considering the characteristics evident from the ‘integrated’ results of these processes (the socially constructed emotions).

16. This heading is an adaptation for our purposes of the title of a chapter of L’essai sur le don, forme et raison d’échange dans les sociétés archaiques by Marcel Mauss: “Les Trois Obligations: Donner, Recevoir, Rendre” (M. Mauss, 1935 (1905): 205).
For the sake of completeness we must mention that many of these situations of interaction are not devoid of humour. We witnessed many amicable sparring matches where some were striving to persuade others and vice versa. The exchange of subtle opposing arguments and feigned 'invectives' was drawn out interminably, to general hilarity.

The intensity of the expressed desire may have relatively little connection with the intrinsic usefulness of the object.

Attempts are made to reconcile the different points of view. However, the greatest pressure seems to be exerted upon the person to whom the request is addressed. This tendency is particularly evident when all the protagonists are present as the discussions are taking place. There are other ways of resolving the matter. In one case where a Turkana elder asked for an animal to sacrifice was not cooperating, the young members of a warrior group returning from a scouting mission attempted a 'coup de force'. After several days of intimidation and provocation (expressed conventionally by the naming of warrior-like actions), the young men made as if to head for the elder's cattle pen to seize an animal. After some altercation (not entirely without humour) and much general hilarity, the elder ended the conflict by acceding to the demand.

The credit to which we refer should be understood as the moral obligation that falls upon the debtor to 'repay' the giver.

The expression 'to request' does not correspond exactly to the type of phrase used by the social actors to obtain what they desire in 'ordinary' (non-rival) interactions. The phrase most frequently used is 'give... (nakha... ). In saying this we do not seek in any way to stigmatize what some might see as a lack of manners. Certainly respect is shown in a good many other ways. We wish only to highlight the specific type of conceptualization of the appropriation of another's possessions. This conceptualization has obvious effects on the behaviour of those in interaction.

The informant used the word 'est' to express what we have translated as 'rule of conduct'. This means all the clan's rules, duties and taboos but also more generally what we would refer to as 'habit', 'custom' and 'tradition'.

An attitude that older boys will have more systematically towards their juniors. Appropriation is often 'brutal': the object is seized without ceremony. In time the younger ones learn to offer resistance to the older boys' desires. We note however that there is a basic asymmetry between older and younger. It will always be harder for the latter to express refusal.

In a situation where a collective request is made for an important possession – for example, when a group of young warriors comes to claim a zebu from a man of importance for a collective feast – its owner will unfailingly either respond with a firm refusal or adopt an attitude of non-cooperation (i.e. indifference). The young men will then engage in a series of war-like demonstrations aimed at the stubborn owner. Given the regular occurrence of this model of interaction in such delicate situations, we can conclude that the refusal and the warrior minding are conventional in nature.

The spraying (spitting) of coffee is widely practised among the Nyangatom with a drink made from the pods of coffee beans.

The appellation of the specific action will often be taken up to mean the behavioural sequence that integrates this action. Thus the appellations are in metonymical relation to one another.

We would stress the general nature of this assertion, as in the last few years the Turkana and Nyangatom social actors have adopted new behaviours in the repertoires of expressive gestures of their respective national societies. This new behavioural consists of a pronounced marking of respect when the individual receives something or greets someone of importance. This gesture is made only in interactions with representatives of modern times (those in charge of the administration etc.) that are not participating in the 'traditional' social network.

Another behavioural indication can often be observed. On receipt of the coveted object, the individual hides his pleasure and sometimes expresses mild disappointment, or says that he would have liked some other object. Our observation of relations between parents and children in situations of giving and receiving is edifying to our argument. In the traditional Nyangatom and Turkana context, we have not seen an adult reinforce an expression of gratitude of any sort in the child who has been given something. In fact the reinforcements of attitude most frequently observed apply to the person to whom the request is made when he gives in to the arguments of the opposing camp.

The giving of important possessions will be followed by deferred ritualized expressions of gratitude (cf. below). We note that a great many requests concern items of adornment (broadly speaking: clothing, necklaces, beads etc.). The ostentatious attitude exhibited by the agents is thus in a way imposed by the choice of object requested.

This obligation felt by the giver is perceptible in the discussions and behaviour that ensue when a request is made. The presentation of arguments to justify possible refusal is a good indication of the sense of obligation felt by the person to whom the request is made.

During the day the majority of the men and the young boys old enough to guard the herds are absent from the camp. Some meet under the 'men's tree', others accompany the animals to the grazing.

Here we should say that the homes are very spread out (primary home, secondary home etc.) and mention the locations of the homes of different categories of the population (young men, warriors, elders), their occupations and the ways the different areas are used (heart of the territory, border with the enemy etc.). The Nyangatom model is easier to describe. The size of the territory is small compared to that of the Turkana. The habitat is therefore more concentrated. Activities and social groups that are scattered over wide areas in the Turkana world are brought together in one place in Nyangatom territory.

Young men do this more often than the mature adults. Akawuma comes from the verb akawamakèn, 'to exclaim', 'to call' (A. Barret 1990: 92). The song takes the form of a call to the favourite zebu. We include here the akawuma of Lopele, the eldest son of Acok, by way of illustration.

- Ove... (lit. 'Grey-Fleabald', animal's name), Lokumari (lit. 'Asymmetrical-Horns', another of the animal's names referring to the set of its horns, one bent forwards, one backwards)
- Ox of Longabwo (lit. 'Dog's', one of the owner's names), Liwanye (lit. 'Pale Yellow', another name for the same individual)
- The girl is calling him, the girl Nakorio (her name) of Lokiliwa (her father)
- The girl of Killer-of-young-bride (father's warrior name)
- Sipol Lomongoro (lit. 'grey-mouse-Ox', another of the zebu's names), Nyisowa (lit. 'Snow', another of the zebu's names)
- Girl's Nyisowa, Ekwauma (lit. White) bends his horns

The song continues following the same structure. Variations are introduced from time to time.

A particular phrase is used to designate this gift of compensation: alucudum enong, literally 'to release the zebu'.

This type of call to one's companions also occurs in dances, often at night, attended by all the young men in the group. Interrupting the dances, the young men repeat their lists of names several times in a row. At this the persons named rush to seize their weapons, laid out near the dance circle, and respond with warrior actions (omakuk-warrior demonstration), shouting their zebu or warrior names, streaking round the dancers in single file, stamping their feet hard on the ground and sometimes firing shots.
In fact, this situation, we are talking about an original experience combining sentiments of pride, gratification, gratitude and close attachment. The affective experience is not always of such intensity. Conventional expressive behaviour does not always produce the desired mental states. Thus warrior demonstrations may be performed formally. But they must be performed because above and beyond their potential effectiveness at unleashing emotion, they have social consequences. Let us explain by means of an example. An adult separates two children who are squabbling. The elder tells the pair to 'shake hands' and make up. The two opponents will perhaps do so but, generally speaking, their differences are not resolved the moment they shake hands. Quite the contrary; the behaviour itself helps to trigger the adversaries' change of attitude. The embarrassment of the children shaking hands - embarrassment frequently followed by a spell of hilarity - is an indication of this transformation. But these attitudes also tell us about the opponents' type of experience of the fundamental mismatch between their mental states and the conventional significance of the gesture (appraisal and reconciliation). However, even if the desired transformation did not occur - and some time later the children stared squabbling again - the token gesture by the two children could be held against them: "Why are you still squabbling? Haven't you already shaken hands?" Conventional expressive behaviour may potentially induce particular emotions, but on the other hand always has social consequences.

The term sikibeschäft refers to the ritual as a whole (the collective feast) and more specifically to the semicircle of branches around which the participants sit to eat the meat of the sacrificed animal. A among means 'of zebu' and indicates the type of animal sacrificed for the occasion.

In the example of the Nyangatom ritual in question the individuals sitting round the semicircle of branches belong to the five constituted generations of which members still survive. These are, from the 'oldest' to the 'youngest': Ngimora, Ngitem, Ngimerikop, Ngipietyang and Ngikosowa. Among the Nyangatom the criterion for acknowledgement of the right to partake in the ritual remains relatively vague. It seems that one must have reached an 'age of reason'. In the Turkana cultural world much more weight is given to whether one has initiated or uninhibited status. Only the initiated will be admitted to the semicircle round the branches; individuals close to being initiated will serve their elders.

For example on a visit to neighbours, at the request of a warrior group, for a feast between friends, on returning from a raid etc.

The soothsayer resorted to 'divination by the sands' to determine the origin of the misfortune. He takes the sands, holds them sole to sole and claps them together three times while asking a question. Then he throws them abruptly to the ground. He infers the answer to his question from their respective positions and their relational configuration. The soothsayer repeats the process to confirm his 'diagnosis'.

Lomeyen is a mountainous area in the north of the region occupied by the camp of Ekuwu (Tigra). It is a Nyangatom outpost near territories occupied by enemy Surma groups.

These will then have a formal aspect, sometimes cursory or reduced to a minimal expression but present nonetheless.

The word agata refers specifically to this sequence. But it is also used to mean the whole of the speech pronounced at the end of the ritual.

In general the orator will review all the different groups in the society and will 'command' them to receive their due (well-being, husband or wife, children, cattle etc.). But it is clear that he places greater emphasis on the well-being of the donor, and possibly, the sick man for whom the ritual procedure is being performed. Among the Turkana, the orator will almost inevitably mention previous generations, particularly those said to have 'started the country' (i.e. the first Mountains and Leopards). This acknowledgement of their fundamental indebtedness to their predecessors is regularly expressed in a rhetorical phrase (or variations of this): 'We have always sacrificed for our predecessors..." (implication: so nothing can happen to us), from the fact that they belong to Ekuwu's sphere of solidarity, by virtue of the behavioural model favoured in 'ordinary' interactions (i.e. the quest to appropriate), they must have done something beforehand.

Our analysis allows us to put forward a hypothesis. It is clearly easier for us to feel affects that fall within the category of emotions of gratification. The complexity and strong conventionality of behaviour expressing gratitude, and the multitude of reinforcements necessary to induce these attitudes, seem to support the hypothesis that these affective reactions of gratitude are of a less 'natural' expressivity.

This warrior action to start a ritual is frequently performed during large-scale conventional actions. However it will be performed by different actors in correlation to the recognized objectives of the procedure.

They express their desire to see matters resolved. They drive out sickness, curse, ask the earth to cool down etc. They teach them how to sacrifice.

The elders occupy the generic position of 'eaters of the flesh', but having shared out the portions among themselves they will give pieces of meat to the other participants. The sharing out may be performed much less formally at a ritual of lesser importance. If only a few of the elders are present, the sharing out will underlie the demarcation between initiated and uninhibited among the Turkana, and the distinction between elder and younger generations among the Nyangatom.

One of the criteria for determining the collective nature of an action will be its orientation towards an outlined goal or goals common to all the agents. Hence the individual actions by the agents that form part of this collective activity will be (under-)determined by this previously defined goal.

If we emphasize the words 'as a first approximation', this is because most of the time individual intentions, although derived from collective intentions, will differ from these. Soackle gives an example to illustrate this frequent differentiation. A football team tries to score a goal from a free kick. 'The intentionality of the team is thus expressed by... We are scoring a goal from a free kick...'. No individual member of the team has this as his individual intentionality because nobody can score a goal from a free kick on his own. Each member of the team will share the collective intentionality; each has an individual task derived from the collective intentionality but different in content. When the collective intentionality is 'We do A', the individual intentionalities will be 'I do B', 'I do C', etc. (Soackle 1991: 230).

Piere Livet, in La communauté virtuelle: actio et communication (Livet 1994: 124-135), talks of the reference points ('repers') of collective action that allow the agents to articulate their actions in interactions with other agents. Livet calls these reference points of collective action 'conventions'.

This capacity of the agents to grasp the objectives of the collective action is correlated to their degree of socialization (their age, their familiarity with social procedures etc.), their status (soothsayer, elder etc.) or their involvement in the process (in our example, Ekuwu who decides to perform the ritual).

5. E. J. Lawler, in his article Micro Social Order (Lawler 30-02: 12-14) offers an interpretive model of the effects of recurrent interaction upon the constitution of social units. Recurrent interaction generates reciprocal typifications: the protagonists give themselves consensual definitions of the type of relationship that unites them. The relationship therefore becomes a world 3 object as defined by Karl Popper.

The agents will guide their behaviour by this reference point (the world 3 object). Lawler also asserts that repetitive interaction creates a mutual knowledge that allows each actor to foster reliable expectations of others' behaviour and to adapt his behaviour in advance (p.12). Through their regular participation in specific interactions the agents also develop a number of normative expectations (which behavior is appropriate in which situation, with which status etc.). Finally social interaction reinforces the solidarity of the group, particularly when the actors have a known common objective (p. 13). The social units can be generated and maintained on purely structural, normative and cognitive bases. But they may also be based
on emotions (p.14). This is, we believe, one of the strengths of conventional collective action. It generates stable associations between certain relational configurations and particular affective experiences. The expressive behaviour to which the individuals conform in interaction facilitates the inducement of these specific emotions (without always succeeding!).

56. Several singers may decide to sing their ‘call’ at the same time. They then endeavour to sing as loudly as possible, attempting to impose their respective songs on the group, as it were. But even if no competitive aspect is immediately observable in the occasional juxtaposition of calls, this aspect resurfaces when one looks at the sequence of interactions over long periods.

57. In this case, songs sung for the greatest pleasure of the members of the group.

58. Whether there are Teposa present or not, a leg will be allocated to them (albeit a Ngitopora). Who eats the meat from it is another story.


60. A conversion made difficult by the type of soil in the region (sloping and lateritic) and by the series of droughts that struck the area occupied by the Lks.

61. Mothers take care of their children for some years and then abandon them, the trading of sexual relations in return for food becomes more widespread...

62. People are left to die alone, others’ misfortunes are mocked, people start stealing (even within their own families) etc.

63. Rituals are no longer performed – no more dances, no more marriages...

64. Although we have not found an expression to exactly convey this type of inter-individual understanding among the Nyangatom and Turkana, the attitudes and behaviours of the social actors clearly show this obligation to cede things to others. For example, a man can come to his friend’s house, enter his cattle pen and choose himself an animal to eat. This is a right explicitly recognized by the social actors. Nevertheless, it is of course seldom exercised with such brutality.

65. The attachment between mother and child was preserved for a short period of time – three years according to Turnbull – but seemed to be reduced to a minimal expression.

66. Analysis of Turkana and Nyangatom social behaviours shows that this is a possibility. The gradual disappearance of the conventional expressive behaviours that allows one to rebalance one’s affective relationship to others might plausibly have such consequences in a time of acute crisis.

67. Obviously requests for another person’s possessions cannot endanger this person. Therefore non-essential goods are requested, such as tobacco, of which there is an abundance, but not food.

68. Somehow this institution seems to prevent the community from falling apart. The reasons for this are still unclear to us. It is difficult to accept that a series of inter-individual bonds can preserve the solidarity of the whole group. De Waal offers one line of response in his work The Ape and the Sushi Master: cultural reflections by a primatologist (de Waal 2001:350). From his observations of colonies of primates he highlights what he believes to be one of the foundations of the social relationship: reciprocal altruism, which he defines as assistance given to those who assist you in return.

69. They go off on a raid to steal cattle from the enemy.

70. Some conventional behaviours feature encouragement to kill the enemy. Regularly in rituals the elders command the warriors to kill enemies and to avoid their bullets. After his victory a killer may assert his status by having his shoulders scarified. He will also receive a new name which describes his fight with his victim.

71. We have seen in the Turkana and Nyangatom socio-cultural context that conventional collective action is a favoured way of countering the agents’ tendency to autocentricity. These activities in fact have social and affective consequences for the subjects in interaction, such as the reinforcing of their attachment to one another or to the group, the recognition and appreciation of the behavioural models for each status etc. The belonging to a community and hence the frequent ‘ordinary’ interactions are obviously also powerful social regulators. But because of the great value attached to the quest for personal satisfaction in the two cultural universes under consideration, other regulators seem to be required. Thus solidarity is strongly reinforced through conventional collective procedures. This is the sense in which we mean that rituals maintain (or re-establish) harmony.

72. When individuals interact frequently within a group they foster a certain number of second order expectations. These expectations in fact correspond to what the agents believe that others hope of them. First order expectations are what the agents hope of themselves. (Troyer, L., Younts, C. W. & Kalhoff, W., 2001). In a ‘solidarity’ group, an agent must appreciate the constraints that arise from others’ expectations in order to optimize the results of his action. If he is to achieve his objectives he must therefore enter into complex political games, taking account of the power relationships and socially acceptable tactical behaviour. Thus second order expectations constitute powerful social regulators.

73. The reintegration rituals to which warriors are subjected on return from a raid show us that the social actors have a very clear perception of the consequences of these activities. Thus, in these reintegration rituals, the group seeks to ‘cool down’ the warriors by spraying them or smearing them with chyme, or other procedures.
References


