Not Worthy
Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Edited by Lubomyr Luciuk
With a Foreword by Roger Daniels
The provenance of photographic evidence of the Great Famine is difficult to determine. Illustrations included in this publication are drawn from Dr. Ewald Amende, *Human Life in Russia* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936) and others reportedly taken by Otto Weinerberger in Kharkiv, 1933

Published for the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association by The Kashtan Press, 22 Greta Green, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7M 3J2

Graphic Design by G. Locklin & Associates
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Not Worthy
Foreword

ROGER DANIELS

This book bears witness to a small crusade, which, like most crusades, failed in its proximate goal: Walter Duranty is still the holder of record for the Pulitzer Prize for “foreign reporting” in 1932 even though it is now all but universally acknowledged that his reports from the USSR in the early 1930s were essentially a whitewash of Joseph Stalin and his regime. Some of the details of this misreporting are related within. But the crusade had a larger goal: to make the world in general and North Americans in particular, more aware of the special horrors that were inflicted on the people of Ukraine by the Stalin and his henchmen. This larger goal, it seems to me, has been achieved. Hundreds of column inches of newsprint in some of the continent’s leading newspapers and abroad have been devoted to describing the anti-Duranty campaign. In the process more was published about the sufferings of the Ukrainian people in the early 1930s than in seventy odd years since they should have been, but were not, front page news in those outlets.

What massive public relations effort produced this latter result and at what cost? The crusade was born in the fertile brain of a Canadian academic, Professor Lubomyr Luciuk, of Canada’s Royal Military College. The son of Ukrainian political refugees granted asylum in Canada, he is the leading historian of the injustices done to Ukrainian immigrants interned under intolerable conditions by Canada during the First World War and he is concerned with the past and present of ethnic Ukrainians everywhere. His total effort on the anti-Duranty matter did not cost more than a few thousand dollars. To be sure he had allies, most of them in Ukrainian Canadian and Ukrainian American communities, but the initial push and most of the drive flowed out of Luciuk’s Kingston, Ontario base.
How did he do it and why was he successful? An attempt to get space in North American newspapers of general circulation about the Ukrainian horrors in the 1930s would have been a bootless quest. Making Duranty the primary focus was a shrewd stroke. He was not a household word. As the crusade was starting I ran Duranty’s name by a number of my fellow American historians and only a small percentage could identify him. But Duranty plus the Pulitzer Prize plus *The New York Times* was irresistible. Journalists, like most of us, are narcissistic and like to write about their kind, and, of course, it was a scandal, and scandal is meat and drink to those folks.

In addition, and I am not sure if Luciuk was aware of this, *The Times* was trying to deal with a current scandal. A *Times* reporter, who quickly became a former *Times* reporter, named Jayson Blair had recently been caught faking stories that *The Times* had published. Thus, Luciuk’s attack on past fraudulence by a *Times* reporter resonated to recent embarrassment: without the Blair scandal *The Times* might well have been able to ignore Luciuk’s charges and demands. Because of Blair, they were irresistible. Timing is often everything. And once *The Times* had made Luciuk’s charges “fit to print,” newspapers all across the continent, egged on by press releases from Luciuk and his allies, took up the story.

For a while both *The Times* and the Pulitzer Prize committee tried to stonewall, but there was too much heat from the rest of the media. *The Times*, publisher, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr., whose major credentials for getting his job were genetic, commissioned Columbia University Professor Mark von Hagen, a respected scholar of early Soviet history, to investigate and report on Duranty’s stories for 1931 on which the Prize was based. Perhaps the publisher hoped that von Hagen’s Columbia ties would influence him to be soft on the Board, the Pulitzer Prizes are an appanage of Columbia University, and, as American historians have noted over the years, a statistically disproportionate number of Prizes in history have gone to Columbia historians.

If such were his hopes, von Hagen’s damning report, printed in this volume, could have given him no satisfaction and provided a rationale for revoking the Prize. And before the report was published the Pulitzer Prize Board announced that it would review the awarding of the 1932 prize to Duranty, who had been,
as von Hagen’s report notes, thoroughly discredited well before Luciuk began his campaign. Neither Sulzberger nor the Board claimed that Duranty was an unbiased and accurate reporter as shown by the Board’s eventual response on 21 November, included here. Yet the Board refused to revoke the Prize and Sulzberger supported that decision. That support was important: had Sulzberger asked the Board to revoke the award it is difficult to believe that the Board would have failed to comply.

The decision ran against the run of play in Western culture. While, as I have argued elsewhere, it is too much to speak, as Elazar Barkan has in his The Guilt of Nations (New York, 2000) that there was a kind of “age of apology” as the new millennium opened, nevertheless there have been a number of apologies for all sorts of past injustices in the Western world, including in North America, formal apologies to Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians for their mass exile and incarceration during the Second World War.

The Board refused to revoke its Prize to Duranty by inventing a standard which it knew that the advocates for withdrawal could not meet. It judged that “there was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception, the relevant standard in this case.” Sulzberger’s support of the Board was based on even less judicious reasoning: he acknowledged in the columns of The Times that Duranty’s work had been “slovenly” and went on to argue, incredibly, that revoking Duranty’s prize would be akin to the “Stalinist practice to airbrush purged figures out of official records and histories.” This nonsense, supported by Times executive editor Bill Keller, simply will not wash. None of those supporting the revocation had suggested any such thing: some, perhaps most, assumed that rather than a blank space, which the Pulitzer uses when it awards no Prize in a given category, the listing of the Prize for foreign reporting might have read something like this:


That, as we know, was not to be. But both Duranty’s mendacity, and the greater issue of the outrages perpetrated on the Ukrainian people by what was supposed to be its own government, are now much better known than they

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were. And, in many eyes at least, the lustre of both *The Times* and the Pulitzer Prizes have been diminished.
Not Worthy?

Presented here is an admittedly incomplete record of an international campaign symbolically launched on May Day 2003, whose aim was to have the 1932 Pulitzer Prize of Walter Duranty revoked by the Pulitzer Prize Committee or returned by *The New York Times*. ¹

That did not happen. The Committee did not rescind the award and *The Times* continues to associate its name with the much-discredited Duranty, ² even though the evidence shows he shilled for the Soviets, before, during, and after the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine.

As troubling as what happened in the early decades of the last century is what went on early in this one, behind the closed doors of the Pulitzer Prize Committee and *The New York Times*. How was the decision not to revoke Duranty’s Pulitzer made? Was this conclusion reached unanimously, or were there, as is rumoured, dissenters who urged the Board to restore the reputation of the Pulitzer Prize by disassociating it from a man who prostituted the fundamental principles of journalism? Who were the women and men who finally decided this issue? Answers to these questions remain secreted and so the seeds of future controversy are already germinating. This should leave those who hold, or have yet to achieve, the distinction of a Pulitzer to consider whether being in the company of Mr. Duranty is salutary or soiling.

This project was launched with very modest resources by a small group of activists who were able to remind the world of what arguably was the single greatest act of mass murder to take place in Europe during the 20th century. Even the administrator of the Pulitzer Prize Board, Sig Gissler, would write, “While you are disappointed in the Board’s decision, I think you are correct in saying that you have significantly increased awareness of the famine of 1932-
1933.” That alone helped hallow the memory of the murdered millions, the very same men, women and children whom Walter Duranty considered not worthy of his sympathy, not worthy even to be described as who they truly were – Ukrainians and not Russians.

Whether one considers the Great Famine (Holodomor) to have been an act of genocide or an instrument of terror deployed to impose collectivization on a resisting population - and there is legitimate debate on such issues, appropriately reflected in the scholarly contributions reprinted here - no serious student of European history would now dispute that many millions of Ukrainians were deliberately starved to death in 1932-1933. Exactly how many no one is certain, but the losses were certainly on a scale comparable to, perhaps even surpassing, those of the Holocaust.

Yet Ukraine’s Holodomor remains relatively unknown, whereas few have not heard of the Holocaust. That is a testament to the considerable success of the Soviet disinformation campaign ratcheted into place in 1932-1933, whose dean was none other than Walter Duranty. Awarded a prestigious Pulitzer Prize he would use the status it brought him to traduce and try to mute those journalists who dared expose the Stalinist regime for what it was.

Duranty was neither the only, nor the last, of his ilk. His legacy is detectable among those who still strive to deny or dismiss all accounts of the Great Famine as “anti-Soviet propaganda,” or who marginalize the victims of this politically engineered human catastrophe by suggesting that how they were killed was somehow less horrific than how death subsequently came to the unfortunates shot or gassed by the Nazis during the Second World War. Whatever the intent of their tormentors may have been, it is indisputable that many millions of Ukrainians and others perished during the Holodomor. Their needless deaths represent no less a crime against humanity than what the Nazis did to millions of Jews and others. Yet while questioning the Holocaust is denounced as a hate crime, Holodomor denial is regarded as an acceptable form of historical revisionism.

The contributors to this volume certainly do suggest differing interpretations of what happened in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-1933, and their contrasting
opinions assuredly will precipitate serious debate. Even so they all agree that millions of Ukrainians died as a consequence of a deliberate policy put into place by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. Given what we now know about the nature of the Soviet experiment one might well ask whether all those lives taken, or sacrificed, were given up in vain. Whatever one’s answer might be, it is certain that they died, horribly.

What makes the Holodomor unique, however, is not so much the number of those who died, or the continuing debate among historians and demographers over how large that number might be, or the exchanges about who was responsible or the intent of the Soviet leadership. Not even the continuing nay-saying of famine-deniers is as puzzling as the fact that while the civilized world brought those who engineered the Holocaust to justice, those who harvested Ukrainians during the Great Famine have never been pursued, even though some live amongst us. That Walter Duranty was not worthy of his Pulitzer Prize is certain. Why the Holodomor’s murdered millions are not worthy of justice remains unexplained.

LYL
1 May 2004
Kingston, Ontario
Canada

Endnotes:

1. The “May Day” campaign directed toward the Pulitzer Prize Committee was launched by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA) with the support of other Ukrainian organizations around the world. It was continued with a “Red October” appeal to Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., publisher of The New York Times. Both postcards are reproduced in this volume (see pages 107 and 155). Certainly this initiative had its antecedents, as do most things. A few authors whose articles are included here called for the revocation of
Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize years ago. And the latter’s mendacious role in covering up
the Great Famine has been well understood, for decades. No doubt efforts to have the
Duranty Pulitzer revoked or returned will continue. By placing on record what was
attempted, and accomplished, this publication may help chart out what still must be done.

2. Several authors in this collection refer to a disclaimer installed beside the plaque that
recognizes the 1932 Pulitzer Prize Walter Duranty received, found on a commemorative
wall on the 11th floor of The New York Times building. Repeated requests addressed to
Catherine J. Mathis requesting permission to photograph and publish an image of that
notice were declined. Intriguingly, Jayson Blair, a former New York Times reporter exposed
as a fraud in 2003, writes in his recently released book, Burning Down My Master’s House,
that while touring The Times building as an intern he spotted the notice stating that
Duranty’s reporting had been discredited and remarked, “All I know is that I don’t want to
be that guy.” Perhaps a new word, “Durantyism,” should be introduced into the English
language and used to describe journalists exposed as liars. See Gerry Braun, “A ‘Master’ of

3. E-mail correspondence with Sig Gissler, 22 November 2003.

4. Certainly the majority of those who perished during the Great Famine were Ukrainians by
nationality, although many other ethnic and religious groups living in Ukraine likewise
suffered, including Poles, Germans, Greeks, Russians, Jews and Mennonites, a situation
akin to the Holocaust, during which millions of non-Jews were enslaved or killed alongside
Jews. For a personal reminiscence on the Holocaust by a concentration camp survivor and
Ukrainian nationalist, see Stefan Petelycky, Into Auschwitz, For Ukraine (Kingston: Kashtan
Press, 1999).

5. The distinguished British historian, Norman Davies, has recently commented on Ukrainian
losses in the 20th century as follows: “The estimated 6-7 million Ukrainians who perished
at German hands in 1941-1944 matched the 6-7 million Ukrainians who had perished ten
years earlier on Stalin’s orders during the artificial Terror-Famine. The Ukrainians must be
regarded as the nationality which suffered the largest total of civilian war dead during the
war.” Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003), page
138.

6. See, for example, R. J. Rummell, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder Since
1917 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990) and “Was 1932 Ukraine
7. The best-known example of famine-denial is a polemic by Douglas Tottle, *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1987). Reiterating many of the same themes raised by Tottle is an article in the 8 December 2003 issue of *Modern Communism*, (Volume 4, No. 38), published by the Manitoba Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), edited by Ken Kalturnyk. Entitled “The Famine That Never Was,” this article begins: “A lot of noise has been made in the past few weeks about the 70th anniversary of the so-called “Ukrainian famine” of 1933-34. The media has been full of stories about the millions of Ukrainians who supposedly died in this famine and the Asper family has agreed to include a section on the ‘Ukrainian famine’ in the planned Museum of Human Rights to be built in Winnipeg. However, the “Ukrainian famine” is an event which never happened. It was entirely the creation of the Hearst newspaper chain and was exposed as a hoax at the time.” While not mentioning Duranty, the article suggests that efforts to recall the famine were intended to tarnish Stalin’s memory. Allegedly “dozens of American and British newspaper reporters spent weeks crisscrossing Ukraine during the height of the alleged famine and found no evidence of widespread hunger or deaths.” What did happen, the author alleges, was a “civil war” precipitated by the collectivization of agriculture, pitting *kulaks*, “armed and financed by Nazi Germany and various Nazi sympathizers in the West, including William Randolph Hearst and Henry Ford,” against Moscow. Supposedly it was the *kulaks* who called “for an agricultural strike in the spring of 1933, urging supporters not to plant crops and to destroy existing stocks of food,” their hope being “to create food shortages in the cities and undermine support for the Soviet government.” In some areas “where large numbers of peasants took up this call, localized food shortages did result” but “the vast majority of the Soviet peasantry, including the Ukrainian peasants, supported collectivization and produced bumper crops in those years, so widespread hunger was avoided.”

It was only “with the unleashing of the Cold War in the late 1940s [that] all of the Nazi propaganda of the 1930s was dredged up once again with the objective of discrediting communism.” In North America, “fertile ground” for this “was found among the million or so Ukrainian refugees and war criminals who had collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War and who were given safe haven in the United States and Canada.” As for those who claim more Ukrainians died in Joseph Stalin’s “engineered famine” than Jews murdered by the Nazis this was explained away as an attempt to “tarnish Communism, and minimize the Holocaust.” Not only is there a “total absence of credible eye-witness testimony about the Ukrainian famine,” but, supposedly, no corroborating evidence was uncovered in Soviet archives, which the author claims were “fully opened” after the USSR’s collapse. Concluding, he writes that the “myth of the ‘Ukrainian famine’ was created by the “most reactionary sections of American society,” was later resurrected by “a cabal of former Nazis, Nazi collaborators and Holocaust deniers” supported “by

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some sections of the “Left” to justify their own anti-communism,” along with “the main apologists for the Israeli genocide against the Palestinian people.”


8. For example, in commenting on Mel Gibson’s film, The Passion of The Christ, Calev Ben-David wrote: “To describe the genocide of European Jews as simply another atrocity that occurred during the war, or even to place it on the same level as Stalin’s deliberate famine policies in the Ukraine, is itself a form of Holocaust revisionism.” See Calev Ben-David, “Snap Judgement: Who’s the Real Braveheart?” Jerusalem Post, 2 March 2004. On this film and its critics see Lubomyr Luciuk, “Mel Gibson and The Passion: Critics Have It Wrong,” The Kingston Whig-Standard, 26 February 2004.

9. On the inclusive commemoration of all victims of genocide and mass murder see Lubomyr Luciuk, “Unique museum comes with a price,” Winnipeg Sun, 6 February 2004. Whether or not such persons would be found guilty of war crimes, it is undeniable that veterans of various Soviet secret police formations such as the NKVD and SMERSH are living in Canada, an issue raised previously in: “A war crime is a war crime,” The Montreal Gazette, 2 July 2002; “Go after the real culprits,” The Kingston Whig-Standard, 19 January 2004; “Selective outrage,” The Ottawa Citizen, 19 February 2004.
Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to a number of individuals, organizations and foundations whose contributions made this publication possible, including the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Heritage Foundation (First Security Federal Savings Bank, Chicago), League of Ukrainian Canadians, League of Ukrainian Canadian Women, Metropolitan Ilarion Centre for Ukrainian Orthodox Studies of St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral (Winnipeg), Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation, Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America & Southeast Michigan Chapter (UCCA), Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Ukrainian Canadian Club of Kingston, Ukrainian Canadian Congress (Justice Committee) and the Ukrainian American Justice Committee.


Thanks are also due to Stephen Bandera, Professor Yaroslav Bilinsky, Borys Potapenko, Father Jaroslaw Buciora, Marco Carynnyk, Dr. Margaret Siriol Colley, Nigel L. Colley, Professor Robert Conquest, Professor James Crowl, Duncan M. Currie, Professor Roger Daniels, Nina Dejneha, Robert Fulford, John Gleeson, Sig Gissler, John B. Gregorovich, Professor Mark von Hagen, Roma Hadzewycz, Maria Hluschuk, Professor Ian Hunter, Terry Hutchinson, Professor Henry R. Huttenbach, Dr. Julian Kulas, Dr. Myron Kuropas,
Dr. Leonard Leshuk, Gerry Locklin, Professor James Mace, Professor P. R. Magocsi, Victor Malarek, Eric Margolis, David Matas, Dr. Lubomyr Mazur, Douglas McCollam, Andrew Nynka, Olya Odynsky, Dr. R. A. Pierce, Stefan Romaniw, Dr. Oleh Romanyszyn, Carol Sanders, Michael Sawkiw, Julia Stashuk, Andrew Stuttaford, Borys Sydoruk, Sally Taylor and E. Morgan Williams for their assistance with various aspects of this project.

Only minor editorial changes have been made to the articles that follow, otherwise they are reproduced as published originally.

The opinions expressed are those of their authors, not necessarily those of the editor or of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: America’s “Red Decade” and the Great Famine Cover-Up

MYRON B. KUROPAS

The Ukrainian Weekly, 20 March 1983
Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly and the author

In 1933 Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Before his death, in 1945, more than 10 million civilians, including 6 million Jews and 4 million Gypsies, Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other untermenschen (subhumans) were slaughtered to fulfill a diabolical dream.¹

When the Second World War ended and the full extent of Hitler’s horrors was finally revealed, the civilized world demanded justice. Thousands of Nazis and Nazi collaborators were hunted down, tried and executed for crimes against humanity. The criminals were punished, but the Nazi nightmare lingered on in hundreds of books, magazine articles, films and TV documentaries. Even today, Nazi collaborators are being brought to trial to demonstrate that no matter how long it takes, no matter what the price, genocide shall not go unpunished. It is in remembering that we assure ourselves that nothing like the Holocaust shall ever again become the policy of a state.

For Ukrainians, however, the Nazi Holocaust is only half of the genocide story. The other half is the Great Famine, a crime orchestrated by Joseph Stalin in the same year Hitler came to power. No one has ever been hunted down for that crime. No one has ever been brought to trial. No one has ever been executed. On the contrary, many of those who willingly and diligently participated in the wanton destruction of some 7 million innocent human beings are alive and well and living in the countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world.
There is little likelihood that any of these individuals will ever have to face an international tribunal for their barbarism. Nor is there any reason to believe that Communists have eschewed genocide as one of their strategies. Cambodia and Afghanistan proved that.

While the Free World has not punished Bolshevik criminals, the past can teach us to be wary of those contemporary religious and intellectual leaders who urge us to “trust” them. One of the forgotten aspects of the Great Famine story is the role played by respected American clergy, diplomats, journalists and writers who, by defending Stalin in 1933, indirectly prolonged his reign of terror. Some were innocent dupes. Others were unconscionable conspirators. Almost all went on to pursue distinguished careers in their chosen professions without so much as a backward glance at the incredible human misery they helped conceal from the world’s view. It is in remembering their actions that we can best assure ourselves that in America, at least, genocide shall never again go unnoticed.

The “Red Decade”

During the 1930s, the United States found itself in the throes of the worst depression in its history. Banks failed. Businesses collapsed. Factories closed. Homes and farms were repossessed. Unemployment reached 40 percent in some of America’s larger cities. Bread lines and soup kitchens multiplied. The “American Dream,” so real and vibrant during the 1920s, was shattered.

While America suffered, the radical Left reveled. Exploiting the economic turmoil and uncertainty which plagued the nation, Communists and their fellow travellers pointed to the “success” of the great Soviet experiment. Suddenly, thousands of despairing clerics, college professors, movie stars, poets, writers and other well-known moulders of public opinion began to look to Moscow for inspiration and guidance. As millions of jobless war veterans demonstrated in the streets and workers “seized” factories in sit-down strikes, the 1930s became what Eugene Lyons has called America’s “Red Decade,” a time when romanticized Bolshevism represented the future, bankrupt capitalism the past.
In the forefront of the campaign to popularize “the Soviet way” were American intellectuals, correspondents and even government officials who grossly exaggerated Bolshevik achievements, ignored or rationalized myriad failures, and, when necessary, conspired to cover up Bolshevik crimes. Especially impressed were those who traveled to the USSR during the 1930s, almost all of whom, it seems, found something to admire.

Some found a Judaeo-Christian spirit. Sherwood Eddy, an American churchman and YMCA leader, wrote: “The Communist philosophy seeks a new order, a classless society of unbroken brotherhood, what the Hebrew prophets would have called a reign of righteousness on earth.” A similar theme was struck by the American Quaker, Henry Hodgkin: “As we look at Russia’s great experiment in brotherhood,” he wrote, “it may seem to us that some dim perception of Jesus’ way, all unbeknown, is inspiring it...” 5

Others discovered a sense of purpose and cohesive values. Corliss and Margaret Lamont concluded that the Soviet people were happy because they were making “constructive sacrifices with a splendid purpose held continuously in mind” despite some “stresses and strains” in the system. 6

Still others found humane prisons. “So vit justice,” wrote Anna Louise Strong, “aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better...the labour camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed.” 7

The Soviet Union had something for everyone. Liberals found social equality, wise and caring leaders, reconstructed institutions and intellectual stimulation. Rebels found support for their causes: birth control, sexual equality, progressive education, futuristic dancing, Esperanto. “Even hard-boiled capitalists,” wrote Lyons, from Moscow, “found the spectacle to their taste: no strikes, no lip, hard work...” 8

Contributing to the liberal chorus of solicitous praise for Stalin’s new society were American diplomats such as Ambassador Joseph E. Davies who argued
that Stalin was a stubborn democrat who insisted on a Constitution which protected basic human rights “even though it hazarded his power and Party control.”

Like most liberals, Davies never accepted the notion that Stalin’s Show Trials were staged. “To assume that,” he wrote, “...would be to presuppose the creative genius of Shakespeare and the genius of Belasco in stage production.” Nor did he believe Stalin - whom he described as “clean-living, modest, retiring” - was personally involved in the elimination of his former colleagues. Even though he had personally met and dined with many of the purge victims, Davies later concluded that their execution was justified because it eliminated Russia’s “Fifth Column” which, in keeping with “Hitler’s designs upon the Ukraine,” had conspired to “dismember the Union...”

In the United States, meanwhile, the liberal press was equally enamoured of Stalin. Writing in Soviet Russia Today, a monthly journal, Upton Sinclair, Max Lerner and Robert M. Lovett wrote glowing accounts of Moscow’s important role in defending democratic principles. In the words of Professor Frederick L. Schuman, a charter member of the Soviet defense team:

*The great cleavage between contemporary societies is not between ‘capitalism’ (democratic or fascist) and ‘communism’ but between those (whether in Manchester, Moscow, Marseilles or Minneapolis) who believe in the mind and in the government of, by and for the people, and those (whether in Munich, Milan or Mukden) who believe in might and in government of, by and for a self-appointed oligarchy of property and privilege.”*

For the Nation, Russia was the world’s first true democracy and anyone who didn’t believe it was “either malicious or ignorant.” For the New Republic, communism was “a false bogey.” When a group of 140 American intellectuals associated with the Committee for Cultural Freedom included the USSR in their list of countries which denied civil liberties and cultural independence, some 400 liberal Americans - including university presidents, professors and such prominent intellectuals as Langston Hughes, Clifford Odets, Richard Wright, Max Weber, Granville Hicks, Louis Untermeyer and
James Thurber signed and agreed to have published an “Open Letter” branding as “Fascists” all those who dared suggest “the fantastic falsehood that the USSR and the totalitarian states are basically alike.” Joining the condemnation with pointed editorial comments were the Nation and the New Republic. 17

How the press corps concealed a famine

In January 1928, Eugene Lyons, the newly hired correspondent for United Press, arrived to take up his duties in Moscow. Although he had never actually joined the Communist Party in America, Lyons came with impeccable Leftist credentials. The son of a Jewish labourer on New York’s Lower East Side, he joined the Young People’s Socialist League in his youth. Beginning his professional career as a writer for various radical publications, Lyons eventually became the editor of Soviet Russia Pictorial, the first popular American magazine about the “wonders” of Soviet life, and a New York correspondent for TASS, the Soviet news bureau. 18

“My entire social environment in those years,” he later wrote, “was Communist and Soviet.” 19 If anyone ever went to the Soviet realm with a deep and earnest determination to understand the Revolution it was this newly appointed United Press correspondent. “I was not deserting the direct service of the cause for the fleshpots of capitalism,” he reasoned, “I was accepting, rather, a post of immense strategic importance in the further service of that cause, and doing so with the wholehearted agreement and understanding of my chiefs in TASS and therefore, presumably, of the Soviet Foreign Office.” 20

As an enthusiastic member of Stalin’s defense team, Lyons consistently penned dispatches which glorified the Soviet Union. “Every present-tense difficulty that I was obliged to report,” he wrote, “I proceeded to dwarf by posing it against a great future-tense vision.” 21

The longer Lyons remained in the USSR, however, the more disillusioned he became with Soviet reality. Eventually, his reports began to expose the sham of Bolshevik propaganda, and Moscow demanded his recall. Returning to the
United States in 1934, he wrote about his experiences in *Assignment in Utopia*, a book published by Harcourt-Brace in 1937. In a chapter titled “The Press Corps Conceals a Famine,” Lyons described how he and other American correspondents conspired with Soviet authorities to deny the existence of the world’s only human engineered famine. The most diligent collaborators in this sordid affair were Walter Duranty, head of *The New York Times* Moscow bureau, and Louis Fischer, Moscow correspondent for the *Nation*.

The first reliable report of the catastrophe to reach the outside world was written by Gareth Jones, an English journalist who visited Ukraine in 1933 and then left the Soviet Union to write about what he had witnessed. When his story broke, the American press corps in Moscow - whose members had seen pictures of the horrors, taken by German consular officers in Ukraine – was besieged by their home offices for more information. Angered as much by Jones’ scoop as by his unflattering portrayal of Soviet life, a group of American correspondents met with Comrade Konstantine Umansky, the Soviet press censor, to determine how best to handle the story. A statement was drafted, following which vodka and *zakuski* were ordered, and everyone sat down to celebrate with a smiling Umansky.

The agreed upon format was followed faithfully by Duranty. “There is no actual starvation,” he reported in *The New York Times* on 30 March 1933, “but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.” When the famine reports persisted over the next few months, Duranty finally admitted “food shortages” but insisted that any report of famine “is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda.”

Duranty, of course, was aware of the situation in Ukraine and confessed as much to *The New York Times* book critic John Chamberlain, himself a Communist sympathizer. Believing, as he later wrote, that “the Russian Revolution, while admittedly imperfect, needed time to work itself out,” Chamberlain was distressed by Duranty’s casual admission that “3 million people had died...in what amounted to a man-made famine.” What struck Chamberlain most of all “was the double inequity of Duranty’s performance. He was not only heartless about the famine,” Chamberlain concluded, “he had betrayed his calling as a journalist by failing to report it.” 24
Fortunately, not all members of the American press crops in Moscow were involved with the cover-up. A notable exception was William Henry Chamberlin, staff correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, who traveled to Ukraine in the winter of 1933 and reported that “more than 4 million peasants are found to have perished...”25 In a book titled Russia’s Iron Age, published that same year, Chamberlain estimated that some 10 percent of the population had been annihilated by Stalin during the collectivization campaign.26 In describing his journey to Ukraine, he later wrote:

No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest desire to learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the Ukrainian countryside had experienced a gigantic tragedy. What had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were allowed to pass the soviet censorship, but stark, outright famine, with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad.27

First to provide extensive coverage of the Great Famine in the American press was the Hearst newspaper chain which, unfortunately, placed the event in 1934 rather than 1932-1933.28 By that time, however, Stalin’s American defense team was already busily denying the Chamberlin and Hearst reports. An example was Louis Fischer who in the 13 March 1935 issue of the Nation reported that he had visited Ukraine in 1934 and had witnessed no famine. Even though he was aware of it, Fischer made no mention that the famine had occurred a year earlier. Problems with collectivization could not be denied, however. In his book Soviet Journey, Fischer later described the process in the following simple terms:

History can be cruel...The peasants wanted to destroy collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization. The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government used the best means at their disposal. The government won.29
With help from certain members of the American press corps, the Bolsheviks succeeded in their efforts to shield the truth about Ukraine’s Great Famine from the world’s eyes. Concealing the barbarism until it was over, they generated doubt, confusion and disbelief. “Years after the event,” wrote Lyons in 1937, “when no Russian Communist in his senses any longer concealed the magnitude of the famine - the question whether there had been a famine at all was still being disputed in the outside world!”

The “need” for a famine

The famine story, however, would not die. None of this bothered Stalin’s American apologists. In a 1933 publication titled The Great Offensive, Maurice Hindus wrote that if the growing “food shortage” brought “distress and privation” to certain parts of the Soviet Union, the fault was “not of Russia” but of the people. Recalling a conversation he had with an American businessman, Hindus proudly wrote:

And supposing there is a famine...continued my interlocutor...what will happen? ‘People will die, of course, I answered. And supposing 3 or 4 million people die? The Revolution will go on.’

If a famine was needed to preserve the Revolution, so be it. “Maybe it cost a million lives,” wrote Pulitzer Prize novelist Upton Sinclair, “maybe it cost 5 million - but you cannot think intelligently about it unless you ask yourself how many millions it might have cost if the changes had not been made...Some people will say that this looks like condoning wholesale murder. That is not true; it is merely trying to evaluate a Revolution. There has never been a great social change in history without killing...”

The legacy of the “Red Decade”

Although the Ukrainian American daily newspaper Svoboda reported on the famine, and thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in New York City, Chicago, Detroit and other cities to protest Stalin’s terrorism, the White
House remained indifferent. On 16 November 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formally recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik regime.

Commenting on America’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, *The Ukrainian Weekly* reported that some 8,000 Ukrainians had participated in a New York City march protesting FDR’s decision, adding that while the protest was “not intended to hinder the policies...of the United States government – we Ukrainians are as anxious as anyone else to cooperate with our beloved president” - nevertheless, “we look dubiously upon the value of any benefits which America may obtain from having official relations with a government whose rule is based on direct force alone,” a government which is unable “to provide for its subjects even the most ordinary necessities of life, and which has shown itself capable of the most barbaric cruelty, as evidenced by its reign of terror and the present Bolshevik-fostered famine in Ukraine.”

Fifty years later, *The Ukrainian Weekly* was still warning a largely indifferent America about the perils of trusting Soviet Communists. If docudramas such as *The Holocaust*, in which the USSR was portrayed as a haven for Jews fleeing Nazi annihilation, and *The Winds of War*, in which Stalin was depicted as a tough but benevolent leader whose loyal troops sang his praises in three-part harmony, are any indication of media perceptions of the Stalinist era, then the legacy of the “Red Decade” lives on.

The world has been inundated with a plethora of authoritative information regarding Hitler’s villainy and has become ever vigilant in its efforts to prevent a repetition of his terror. This is good. But it is not enough. Hitler was not this century’s only international barbarian, and it is time we recognized this fact lest we, in our single-minded endeavour to protect ourselves from another Hitler, find ourselves with another Stalin.
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Deliberate, diabolical, starvation: Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalin’s famine

MARCO CARYNNYK

The Ukrainian Weekly, 29 May and 5 June 1983
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“...The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind, ... without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering,” Malcolm Muggeridge said. He was talking about the genocidal famine that swept Ukraine and the adjacent North Caucasus, two of the most abundant lands in all of Europe, in the winter of 1932 and the spring and summer of 1933.

The harvest of 1932 had been a fair one, no worse than the average during the previous decade, when life had seemed a bit easier again after three years of world war and Five-Years of revolution and famine. But then, as the Ukrainian peasants were bringing in their wheat and rye, an army of men advanced like locusts into every barn and shed, and swept away all the grain. The few stores that the peasants managed to put away were soon gone, and they began eating leaves, bark, cornhusks, dogs, cats and rodents.

When that food was gone and the people had puffed up with watery edema, they shuffled off to the cities, begging for bits of bread and dying like flies in the streets. In the spring of 1933, when the previous year’s supplies were gone and before the new vegetation brought some relief, the peasants were dying at the rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an hour, or 17 a minute. (In World War II, by comparison, about 6,000 people were killed every day.) Corpses could be seen
in every country lane and city street, and mass graves were hastily dug in remote
areas. By the time the famine tapered off in the autumn of 1933, some 6 million
men, women and children had starved to death.

Malcolm Muggeridge was there that terrible winter and spring. As a
 correspondant for The Manchester Guardian in Moscow, he was one of the few
Western journalists who circumvented Soviet restrictions and visited the famine
regions - and then honestly reported what he had seen.

Shortly before Mr. Muggeridge’s articles appeared in The Guardian, the Soviet
authorities declared Ukraine out of bounds to reporters and set about concealing
the destruction they had wreaked. Prominent statesmen, writers and journalists -
among them French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, George Bernard Shaw and
Walter Duranty of The New York Times - were enlisted in the campaign of
misinformation.

The conspiracy of silence was largely successful. For years to come Stalinists and
anti-Stalinists argued whether a famine had occurred and, if so, whether it was
not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves. Today, as Ukrainians
throughout the world (except in the Soviet Union, of course, where the subject
cannot even be mentioned) commemorate the 50th anniversary of the famine,
the events of 1933 are still largely unknown.

Mr. Muggeridge and I talked at his cottage in Sussex, England. I was
particularly anxious to know why he, unlike other foreign correspondents in
Moscow in 1933, took the trouble to investigate the famine.

* * *

Q: Why did you decide to write about the famine?

A: It was the big story in all our talks in Moscow, everybody knew
about it. There was no question about that. Anyone you were
talking to knew that there was a terrible famine going on. Even in
the Soviets’ own pieces there were somewhat disguised
acknowledgements of great difficulties there: the attacks on the *kulaks*, the admission that the people were eating the seed grain and cattle.

You didn’t have to be very bright to ask why they were eating them. Because they were very hungry, otherwise they wouldn’t. So there was no possible doubt. I realized that that was the big story. I could also see that all the correspondents in Moscow were distorting it.

Without making any kind of plans or asking for permission I just went and got a ticket for Kiev and then went on to Rostov. The Soviet security is not as good as people think it is. If you once duck it, you can go quite a long way. At least you could in those days. Having all those rubles, I could afford to travel in the Pullman train. They had these old-fashioned international trains - very comfortable, with endless glasses of hot tea and so on. It was quite pleasant.

But even going through the countryside by train one could sense the state of affairs. Ukraine was starving, and you only had to venture out to smaller places to see derelict fields and abandoned villages.

On one occasion, I was changing trains, and I went wandering around, and in one of the trains in the station, the *kulaks* were being loaded onto the train, and there were military men all along the platform. They soon pushed me off. Fortunately, they didn’t do more. They could have easily hauled me in and asked, “What the hell are you doing here?” But they didn’t. I just cleared off. But I got the sense of what it was like.

I’ll tell you another thing that’s more difficult to convey, but it impressed me enormously. It was on a Sunday in Kiev, and I went into the church there for the Orthodox mass. I could understand very little of it, but there was some spirit in it that I have never
come across before or after. Human beings at the end of their tether were saying to God: “We come to You, we’re in trouble, nobody but You can help us.” Their faces were quite radiant because of this tremendous sense they had. As no man would help them, no government, there was nowhere that they could turn. And they turned to their Creator. Wherever I went it was the same thing.

Then when I got to Rostov I went on to the North Caucasus. The person who had advised me to go there was the Norwegian minister in Moscow, a very nice man, very well-informed, who said, “You’ll find that this German agricultural concession is still working there. Go and see them, because they know more about it than anybody, and it’ll be an interesting experience.” So I went there. It was called the Drusag concession.

Q: What difference did you see between Drusag and the collective farms in Ukraine and the North Caucasus?

A: The difference was simply that the agriculture in the concession was enormously flourishing, extremely efficient. You didn’t have to be an agronomist, which God knows I’m not, to see that there the crops, the cattle, everything, was completely different from the surrounding countryside.

Moreover, there were hordes of people, literally hordes of people trying to get in, because there was food there, which gave a more poignant sense to the thing than anything except that service in the church. The German agronomes themselves were telling me about it. They’d been absolutely bombarded with people trying to come there to work, do anything if they could get in, because there was food there.
Q: I have read in a British Foreign Office dispatch that Drusag employed five people simply to pick up bodies of peasants who had come in and died of hunger.

A: Yes, that’s what I’d heard too, if not more. The peasants staggered in and dropped dead.

Q: Were the Germans able to do anything for the peasants?

A: They could help them with a little food - they were quite charitable in their attitude - but of course they couldn’t do more than that fleabite.

Q: What were you thinking and, more importantly perhaps, what were you feeling when you saw those scenes of starvation and privation in Ukraine? How does one respond in such a situation?

A: First of all, one feels a deep, deep, deep sympathy with and pity for the sufferers. Human beings look very tragic when they are starving. And remember that I wasn’t unaware of what things were like because in India, for instance, I’ve been in a village during a cholera epidemic and seen people similarly placed. So it wasn’t a complete novelty.

The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was not the result of some catastrophe like a drought or an epidemic. It was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind which demanded the collectivization of agriculture, immediately, as a purely theoretical proposition, without any consideration whatever of the consequences in human suffering.

That was what I found so terrifying. Think of a man in an office who has been ordered to collectivize agriculture and get rid of the kulaks without any clear notion or definition of what a kulak is, and who has in what was then the GPU and is now the KGB the
instrument for doing this, and who then announces it in the slavish press as one of the great triumphs of the regime.

And even when the horrors of it have become fully apparent, modifying it only on the ground that they’re dizzy with success, that this has been such a wonderful success, these starving people, that they must hold themselves in a bit because otherwise they’d go mad with excitement over their stupendous success. That’s a macabre story.

Q: There were kulaks throughout the Soviet Union, and they were “liquidated” as an entire class. Collectivization also took place throughout the Soviet Union. And yet the famine occurred at the point when collectivization had been completed, and it occurred not throughout the Soviet Union, but largely in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. How do you explain that?

A: Those were the worst places. They were also the richest agricultural areas, so that the dropping of productivity would show more dramatically there. But they were also places, as you as a Ukrainian know better than I, of maximum dissent. The Ukrainians hated the Russians. And they do now. Therefore, insofar as people could have any heart in working in a collective farm, that would be least likely to occur in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

Q: Given the deliberate nature of the famine in Ukraine, the decision on Stalin’s part to proceed with collectivization and to eliminate resistance at any cost and to get rid of the kulak, vaguely defined as that category was, and given the fact that food continued to be stockpiled and exported even as people dropped dead on the streets, is it accurate to talk about this as a famine? Is it perhaps something else? How does one describe an event of such magnitude?

A: Perhaps you do need another word. I don’t know what it would be. The word “famine” means people have nothing whatsoever to eat and consume things that are not normally consumed. Of course there were stories of cannibalism there. I don’t know whether they were true, but they were very widely believed. Certainly the eating
of cattle and the consequent complete destruction of whatever economy the farms still had was true.

I remember someone telling me how all manners and finesse disappeared. When you’re in the grip of a thing like this and you know that someone’s got food, you go and steal it. You’ll even murder to get it. That’s all part of the horror.

Q: How does one rank the famine of 1933 with other great catastrophes?

A: I think it’s very difficult to make a table of comparison. What I would say with complete truth and sincerity is that as a journalist over the last half century I have seen some pretty awful things, including Berlin when it was completely flat and the people were living in little huts they’d made of the rubble and the exchange was cigarettes and Spam.

But the famine is the most terrible thing I have ever seen, precisely because of the deliberation with which it was done and the total absence of any sympathy with the people. To mention it or to sympathize with the people would mean to go to the Gulag, because then you were criticizing the great Stalin’s project and indicating that you thought it a failure, when allegedly it was a stupendous success and enormously strengthened the Soviet Union.

Q: What sort of response did you encounter when you came back from the Soviet Union and published your findings, particularly from people close to you, like the Webbs?

A: The Webbs were furious about it. Mrs. Webb in her diary puts in a sentence which gives the whole show away. She says, “Malcolm has come back with stories about a terrible famine in the USSR. I have been to see Mr. Maisky [the Soviet ambassador in Britain] about it, and I realize that he’s got it absolutely wrong.
“Who would suppose that Mr. Maisky would say, “No, no, of course he’s right”?

Q: This is precisely the attitude that the British government was taking at that time. L.B. Golden, the secretary of the *Save the Children Fund*, which had been very active during the famine of 1921-1922 in Russia and Ukraine, approached the Foreign Office in August 1933. He’d received disturbing information about famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, but the first secretary of the Soviet embassy had assured him that the harvest was a bumper one, and so Golden asked the Foreign Office whether a public appeal should be put out. The Foreign Office told him not to do anything, and he did not. The Soviet authorities were not admitting to a famine, and therefore it was agreed that nothing should be said.

A: Absolutely true. The other day I had occasion to meet Lord March, the representative of the laity on the World Council of Churches. “Why is it that you’re always putting out your World Council complaints about South Africa or Chile?” I asked. “I never hear a word about anything to do with what’s going on in the *Gulag* or with the invasion of Afghanistan. Why is that?”

He said, “Whenever we frame any resolution of that sort, it’s always made clear to us that if we bring in that resolution, then the Russian Orthodox Church and all the satellite countries will withdraw from the World Council of Churches.”

“Then do you not pursue the matter?” I asked. And he said, “Oh yes, we don’t pursue it because of that.” I was amazed that the man could say that. But there it was, and it’s exactly true of the Foreign Office.

Q: You published *Winter in Moscow* when you got back from the Soviet Union, and you were attacked in the press for your views.

A: Very strongly. And I couldn’t get a job.
Q: Why was that? Because people found your reports hard to believe?

A: No, the press was not overtly pro-Soviet, but it was, as it is now, essentially sympathetic with that side and distrustful of any serious attack on it.

Q: How do you explain this sympathy?

A: It’s something I’ve written and thought about a great deal, and I think that the liberal mind is attracted by this sort of regime. My wife’s aunt was Beatrice Webb, and she and Sidney Webb wrote the classic pro-Soviet book, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization. And so, one saw close at hand the degree to which they all knew about the regime, knew all about the Cheka [the secret police] and everything, but they liked it.

I think that those people believe in power. It was put to me very succinctly when we were taken down to Kharkiv for the opening of the Dnieper dam. There was an American colonel who was running it, building the dam in effect. “How do you like it here?” I asked him, thinking that I’d get a wonderful blast of him saying how he absolutely hated it. “I think it’s wonderful,” he said. “You never get any labour trouble.”

This will be one of the great puzzles of posterity in looking back on this age, to understand why the liberal mind, The Manchester Guardian mind, the New Republic mind, should feel such enormous sympathy with this authoritarian regime.

Q: You are implying that the liberal intelligentsia did not simply overlook the regime’s brutality, but actually admired and liked it.

A: Yes, I’m saying that, although they wouldn’t have admitted it, perhaps not even to themselves. I remember Mrs. Webb, who after all was a very cultivated upper-class liberal-minded person, an early member of the Fabian Society and so on, saying to me, “Yes,
it’s true, people disappear in Russia.” She said it with such great satisfaction that I couldn’t help thinking that there were a lot of people in England whose disappearance she would have liked to organize.

No, it’s an everlasting mystery to me how one after the other, the intelligentsia of the Western world, the Americans, the Germans, even the French, fell for this thing to such an extraordinary degree.

**Q:** One man who didn’t fall for it was George Orwell. Did you discuss your experiences in the Soviet Union with him? I ask because Orwell mentioned the famine in his essay “Notes on Nationalism.” “Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people,” he wrote, “have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English Russophiles.”

**A:** We discussed the whole question. George had gone to the Spanish Civil War as an ardent champion of the Republican side. In Catalonia he could not but realize what a disgraceful double-faced game the Communists were playing there. He was in a thing called POUM [Partido Obrero de Unification Marxista, the United Marxist Workers’ Party], which was allegedly Trotskyist. Those people were not being knocked off by the Franco armies, they were being knocked off by the Communists. And he was deeply disillusioned. He then wrote what I think is one of his best books, *Homage to Catalonia.*

And so what brought us together was that we were in the same dilemma. People assumed that because he had attacked the Communists, he must be on the Franco side. Just as people thought that because I’d attacked the Communist side, I must be an ardent member of the Right wing of the Conservatives. And so we had that in common, and we became friends. He had a feeling that I also had strongly, that the Western world is sleepwalking into becoming a collectivist, authoritarian society. And that’s really what his novel *1984* is about.
Q: Where do you think that Orwell got the idea for *Animal Farm*? His fable of the Revolution betrayed is so accurate that it even portrays the famine. Food falls short, and the animals have only chaff and mangels to eat. Napoleon (Stalin) conceals the facts and orders the hens to surrender their eggs so that he can procure grain to keep the farm going. The hens rebel and Napoleon orders their rations to be stopped, decreeing that “any animal giving so much as a grain of corn to a hen shall he punished by death.”

A: It’s his masterpiece. It is one of the few books written in the 20th century that I would say will always be read. It’s a beautiful piece of writing. If you show it to children, they love it and don’t understand the other part of it. I think that he had a deep hatred of intellectuals as people. He felt that they were fortunate, and in *Animal Farm* he was illustrating how a Revolution can be twisted into its opposite. It is a superb allegory of the whole thing.

But it’s difficult to explain. He wasn’t a man who discussed political theories. He had an instinct that these intellectuals were somehow double-faced, and he never tired of railing against them. If you had asked him about the Soviet Union, he would have just said, “It’s a dictatorship, and they behaved disgracefully in Spain.” So he’d write the whole thing off in that way. He still called himself a socialist.

Q: To the very end.

A: To the very end of his life. He actually went canvassing for Aneurin Bevin, and I’ve always wondered what particular line of talk he would have fallen into. He wasn’t a person with whom you could exchange ideas as such. He was kind of impressionistic in his mind.

Q: Absorbed things without actually analyzing them.

A: That’s right. And in 1984, all that business about “newspeak”
and “doublethink” is beautifully done. And it is the kernel of the whole thing. And the terrorism and the fact that you drift into a situation in which people are in power with no program except to remain in power, which is very much the state of affairs that’s come to pass. The people in the Kremlin at this moment are not in power because they’ve got plans to do this or the other thing. All they want is a policy which will enable them to stay in power.

**Q:** All that you’ve said about the image of the world that liberals have and about reporting, in this case from the Soviet Union, leads to a rather large and difficult question about the reliability of the image of the world that we are given.

**A:** Yes, indeed. I believe that this is how posterity will see it. We are a generation of men who have become completely captivated and caught up in false images. Television and all these things are splendid instruments for keeping them going. Splendid. And I would say that the collapse of Western Civilization will be much more due to that than to anything else.

**Q:** False images?

**A:** False images. And it’s enormously difficult to correct them. Children who grow up now have been looking at television and hearing the voice of the consensus, and they know nothing else. So I can’t myself believe that there’s any escape from this, except that the whole show will blow up sometime or other. But I think that Orwell’s position was rather different. He looked back on the past with nostalgia, which is peculiar in a man of his attitude of mind and temperament.

**Q:** He was very conservative and very English in many ways.

**A:** Deeply conservative. The most conservative mind I’ve ever encountered. But let’s take this much more sinister thing we were talking about now, this complete imprisonment of people at all
levels into images which are fantasy, bringing about in them a kind of unanimity, a consensus, which is very dangerous and which is really the Party line. For instance, I know a great many people in the BBC. I would have the greatest difficulty in finding any people there, more than a handful, who would have other than the consensus views on things like abortion, euthanasia or overpopulation. There’s a consensus, and the consensus seems to be true, and the images over which people spend a high proportion of their lives shape, color and dominate all their thoughts.

Q: What is your way to overcome these images?

A: As a Christian, I believe that you can, if you want to, find reality, which is what people call God. You can relate yourself to that reality, and as a person belonging to what’s called Western Civilization you can find in the drama of the Incarnation everything that’s come there from, you can recover contact with reality. That is in fact the only way. The ordinary man gets up and spends four, five or six hours of his day looking into these pictures and being subjected to his fantasy view. I often think that like Caliban’s island, full of sounds and sweet airs, when we wake, we cry to sleep again. But if people ever do wake, and I don’t believe they wake much anymore, they cry to sleep again. And crying to sleep again is turning on the apparatus.
The liar who won a Pulitzer

IAN HUNTER

The 1932 Pulitzer Prize in Journalism was awarded to The New York Times Moscow correspondent, Water Duranty, whom Malcolm Muggeridge called “the greatest liar I ever knew.” Likewise correspondent Joseph Alsop said: “Lying was Duranty’s stock in trade.”

Yet for two decades Duranty was the most influential foreign correspondent in Russia. His dispatches were regarded as authoritative; indeed Duranty helped to shape US foreign policy. His biographer, Sally Taylor (see Stalin’s Apologist, Oxford University Press, 1990) has demonstrated that Duranty’s reporting was a critical factor in President Roosevelt’s 1933 decision to grant official recognition to the Soviet Union.

Duranty, an unattractive, oversexed little man, with a wooden leg, falsified facts, spread lies and half truths, invented occurrences that never happened, and turned a blind eye to the man-made famine that starved to death more than 14 million people (according to an International Commission of Jurists which examined this tragedy in 1988-1990). When snippets of the truth began to leak out, Duranty coined the phrase: “You can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs”. This phrase, or a variant thereof, has since proved useful to a rich variety of ideologues who contend that a worthy end justifies base means. Yet when the Pulitzer Committee conferred its Prize on Duranty, they cited his “scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity.”

In the spring of 1933 Muggeridge, newly arrived in Moscow as correspondent for The Manchester Guardian, did an audacious thing; without permission he set off
on a train journey through what had formerly been the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the North Caucasus. What Muggeridge witnessed, he never forgot. In a series of articles smuggled out in the diplomatic pouch, he described a man-made famine that had become a holocaust: peasants, millions of them, dying like famished cattle, sometimes within sight of full granaries, guarded by the army and police. “At a railway station early one morning, I saw a line of people with their hands tied behind them, being herded into cattle into trucks at gunpoint - all so silent and mysterious and horrible in the half light, like some macabre ballet.” At a German co-operative farm, an oasis of prosperity in the collectivized wilderness, he saw peasants kneeling down in the snow, begging for a crust of bread. In his diary, Muggeridge wrote: “Whatever else I may do or think in the future, I must never pretend that I haven’t seen this. Ideas will come and go; but this is more than an idea. It is peasants kneeling down in the snow and asking for bread. Something that I have seen and understood.”

But few believed him. His dispatches were cut. He was sacked and forced to leave Russia. Muggeridge was vilified, slandered and abused, not least in the pages of The Manchester Guardian, where sympathy to what was called “the great Soviet experiment” was de rigueur. Walter Duranty’s voice led the chorus of denunciation and denial, although privately Duranty told a British Foreign Office acquaintance that at least 10 million people had been starved to death - adding, characteristically, “but they’re only Russians” (see appendix 3).

If vindication was a long time coming, it cannot have been sweeter than when Duranty’s biographer, Sally Taylor, wrote in 1990: “But for Muggeridge’s eyewitness accounts of the famine in the spring of 1933 and his stubborn chronicle of the event, the effects of the crime upon those who suffered might well have remained as hidden from scrutiny as its perpetrators intended. Little thanks he has received for it over the years, although there is a growing number who realize what a singular act of honest and courage his reportage constituted.”

Alas, when these words came to be written, Muggeridge had died. Still, they are worth remembering.
Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?

YAROSLV BILINSKY

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A distinguished Holocaust scholar, Michael R. Marrus, in his Foreword to a 1988 book The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933 wrote: “In my view, formal classification of the famine [as a genocidal attack upon Ukrainians] matters less at this point than the appreciation of the limitless cruelty and anguish it entailed” (Marrus, 1988, page xv). Some 10 years after Ukraine has become independent, I would respectfully disagree. For both intellectual and political reasons it does matter whether the man-made Soviet famine was a central act in a campaign of genocide, or whether it was designed to simply cow Ukrainian peasants into submission, drive them into the collectives and ensure a steady supply of grain for Soviet industrialization. There is, to be sure, honest disagreement in the literature on the Ukrainian famine whether it was genocidal or not. I, however, would argue that the preponderance of the evidence shows that it was, even if a more restrictive definition of genocide be adopted as, for instance, that by Henry R. Huttenbach, to wit: “Genocide is the destruction of a specific group within a given national or even international population...Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy” (Huttenbach, 1988, pages 295, 297). To help resolve the problem, a review of the literature might be in order.
The first book, edited by Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, which is based on a 1983 conference held at the Université du Québec à Montréal, in essence does not find that the man-made famine of 1932-1933 was genocidal (Serbyn and Krawchenko, 1986), even though at least one contributor, in the lead-contribution, implicitly suggested that it be so designated, James E. Mace, a Ukrainian historian of American-Irish origin wrote:

*For the Ukrainians the famine must be understood as the most terrible part of a consistent policy carried out against them: the destruction of their cultural and spiritual elite which began with the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, the destruction of the official Ukrainian wing of the Communist Party, and the destruction of their social basis in the countryside. Against them the famine seems to have been designed as part of a campaign to destroy them as a political factor and as a social organism.* (Mace, 1986, page 12; emphasis added)

Mace’s conclusion begs the question: is this not a policy of genocide?

The main reason why the Serbyn & Krawchenko volume does not find that the famine was genocidal appears to lie in their acceptance of the conceptual scheme of Holocaust scholars Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, who have become “increasingly uncomfortable” with the term genocide, as coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 and particularly with the political use — and abuse — to which it has been put (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1986, page 179). They prefer the term “mass extermination” and emphasize that there must be an “intent to destroy a whole group of people” (*ibid*, page 181; emphasis in original). Leaving aside the unfortunate nuance contained in the term “extermination,” which perfectly captures the thinking of a Hitler or a Stalin, to whom hostile human beings were just “vermin,” and granted that in their later book Chalk and Jonassohn changed their definition of genocide to “one-sided mass killing,” which is less insulting to the victims (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, page 23), their 1986 position in denying genocidal character to the Ukrainian famine is arguably a reasonable one. In their words:
Considering the inaccessibility of the archives in the USSR, it will probably remain impossible to document the intent of the perpetrator. But whatever the actual intent, it would have been impossible to implement the mass extermination of the entire Ukrainian population. In terms of our typology, we think that the case of the Ukrainian famine is a rather late occurrence of type two, where the intent is to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing power. It seems to have achieved this aim, albeit in enormous cost in human lives and suffering. (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1986, page 189; emphasis added)

Another book, a solid documentary study edited by Canadian poet, translator and publicist Marco Carynnyk, Canadian geographer Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and American political scientist Bohdan S. Kordan, with the brief, but important Foreword by Marrus, documents with persuasive detail what the British Foreign Office knew about the Ukrainian famine and when. It avoids, however, except in the Foreword, any explicit discussion whether the famine was genocidal. Even worse, by implication, the book presents in its long introduction the economic factor as the decisive one, without weighing possible alternative interpretations. The last operative sentence of the substantive introduction, before the table on the “Rates of Decline in the Rural Female Cohort of 1929-1933” and before the technical remarks and acknowledgments, reads:

... The areas of greatest [demographic] decline coincide with the fertile chernozem belt. The famine was less severe in the podzolized soil regions of the forest steppe, the intrazonal regions and the chestnut soil regions along the Black Sea. This suggests that the famine was the result of a decision to extract from the most fertile regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus the maximum amount of grain in order to finance the industrialization. The famine, in other words, was not a natural phenomenon but a politically engineered cataclysm. (Carynnyk et al, 1988, page xlix; emphasis added)
What about the political content of that “politically engineered cataclysm”? Only in the foreword does Marrus raise and partly answer the question. He graciously allows that some horrified witnesses suggest that it was genocide of Ukrainians. He even points to a “venomous detestation of Ukrainians among Communist Party officials in Moscow at the time [of the famine]” (Marrus, 1988, page xv). He then hints that he himself would not consider the famine genocidal, pending “a conclusive evaluation of motivations ... of the Soviet officials who presided over this catastrophe.” That would call “for a release of materials in Soviet archives—if that ever is to happen” (ibid). But then he diplomatically turns the question aside by saying that the presentation of the evidence of the famine at the time of writing (1988) was more important than its “formal classification” (ibid).

A smaller preceding volume by Luciuk & Kordan, with a Foreword by Hugh A. Macdonald, deals with American and British documents on the “Ukrainian Question” from 1938 to 1951, that is, not directly with the famine. But in the introductory material, the two editors could have talked about the nature of what they call the “Great Famine of 1932-1933,” but do not. Instead, they quickly turn to the pale euphemism of “denationalization in Soviet Ukraine,” which “paralleled to a lesser [sic] degree developments in Polish East Galicia ...” (Luciuk & Kordan, 1987, page 3).

On the other hand the famine is evaluated differently—as genocide—in the small 1983 volume by the Ukrainian scholar and publicist Vasyl Hryshko (Hryshko, 1983), the magisterial work by Robert Conquest (Conquest, 1986), and the publications of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine ([US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988, 1990). Hryshko’s slim volume, edited and translated by Marco Carynnyk, above all, wants to pay tribute to the victims of 1932-1933 on the fiftieth anniversary of the famine. It is also another appeal to the conscience of the West. But in his documentation and his arguments, Hryshko in some ways anticipates the broader approach by Conquest.

Hryshko not only finds that genocide, in which more than six million Ukrainians perished, had been committed in terms of the UN General
Assembly resolution of 11 December 1946, but that during the discussions of genocide in the General Assembly the Soviet representatives even proposed to include the linguistic and cultural aspects (what I would call cultural genocide) (Hryshko, 1983, pages vii, 1-2). Not only was collectivization pushed faster and more ruthlessly in Ukraine than in Russia, in Ukraine it was linked to the persecution of Ukrainian elites. “In Russia, the collectivization was limited to the liquidation of the peasantry as a social class independent of the state. In Ukraine, however, it was the starting point for the liquidation of the Ukrainian national question as such, based on the destruction of the peasantry as the principal source of Ukrainian nationalism” (ibid, page 114; emphasis added). Hryshko and Conquest after him allude to what I would call “the gun that Stalin fired,” more of which later in this article (Hryshko, 1983, page 66; Conquest, 1986, page 219). Hryshko’s treatise is also very interesting in that he argues that Brezhnev continued Stalin’s genocide on a less murderous scale:

*The contemporary policy of “merging” the non-Russian peoples of the USSR on the basis of the “international” Russian language, which amounts to eliminating them through merciless Russification, makes clear, as never before, the aim of Moscow’s genocide in 1933 and the consequences of that genocide for Ukraine. In the present Ukrainian situation in the USSR we have nothing less than a continuation and intensification of the nationalities course that Stalin applied so savagely to Ukraine in 1933.* (Hryshko, 1983, page 117; emphasis added.)

Robert Conquest, the British-born poet, master historian and political analyst, has entitled his minor masterpiece *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine*. There is even no entry for genocide in the index of the book. Does he imply with Serbyn & Krawchenko, and Chalk & Jonassohn, that the Ukrainian famine had been either *sui generis* or an effort to “create terror”? Not really. At the very end of Chapter 13, “A land laid waste,” there is a brief — but somewhat inconclusive — discussion of genocide, as defined by Articles I and II of the *Genocide Convention*, which Conquest cites in full without, however, analyzing what particular clauses apply to the Ukraine famine. Conquest then writes: “It certainly appears that

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a charge of genocide lies against the Soviet Union for its actions in the Ukraine. Such, at least, was the view of Professor Raphael Lemkin who drafted the Convention.” The substantiating note is an account in The New York Times about a manifestation of Ukrainian-Americans in September 1953 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the famine, mentioning that Dr. Lemkin was a featured speaker at the gathering. Conquest continues in a somewhat puzzling vein, possibly anticipating the statement by Professor Marrus: “But whether these events are to be formally defined as genocide is scarcely the point [?]. It would hardly be denied that a crime had been committed against the Ukrainian nation; and whether in the execution cellars, the forced labour camps, or the starving villages, crime after crime against the millions of individuals forming that nation.” The chapter ends with a partly-ironical, part-polemical counterpoint: “The Large Soviet Encyclopaedia has an article on ‘Genocide,’ which it characterizes as an ‘offshoot of decaying imperialism’” (Conquest, 1986, pages 272-273).

It is difficult to avoid the impression that Conquest was not particularly concerned with elucidating whether the famine could formally be defined as genocide, especially given the rhetorical abuse of the term. His main concern was to establish the facts. But through poetic allusion, the testimony of witnesses who had analyzed genocide and through somewhat understated historical analysis Conquest strongly implied that the famine was genocidal. The two opening paragraphs of the book are particularly effective in linking the terror-famine to the Holocaust:

Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the Ukrainian, Cossack and other areas to its east — a great stretch of territory with some forty million inhabitants — was like one vast Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men, women and children, lay dead and dying, the rest in various stages of debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbours. At the same time (as at Belsen), well-fed squads of police or Party officials supervised the victims.
This was the climax of the “Revolution from above,” as Stalin put it, in which he and his associates crushed two elements seen as irretrievably hostile to the regime: the peasantry of the USSR as a whole, and the Ukrainian nation. (Conquest, 1986, page 3).

As did Hryshko, Conquest cites the late Jewish Ukrainian writer and Holocaust researcher Vasily Grossman (Conquest, 1986, page 9 and especially pages 129, 286), though Grossman describes both the preceding dekulakization (deportation of kulaks) and the terror-famine itself. Most clearly in Chapter 11 (“Assault on the Ukraine, 1930-1932”), Conquest links the famine of 1932-1933, to the preceding wholesale attacks on the Ukrainian intelligentsia and, in a tantalizing way, alludes to Stalin’s “ideas about the connection between nationality and the peasantry” (ibid, pages 217-224, especially page 219), of which more later in this article. Did Conquest find that the famine was genocide? Yes, but it was more by allusion and implication than by extended analysis, despite his three explicit paragraphs on pages 272-273.

Conquest’s collaborator and later Staff Director of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine, James E. Mace, has repeatedly, though not exhaustively, addressed himself to the question whether the Ukraine famine was genocidal. For instance, in his well-known article in Problems of Communism, he wrote: “... The famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a ‘final solution’ on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union. According to internationally accepted definitions [such as the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide], this constitutes an act of genocide” (Mace, 1984b, page 37). In the same article, Mace calculates the number of victims as “almost 7.5 million Ukrainians” (Mace, 1984b, page 39). This is also included in the authoritative Executive Summary of the Report of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine to Congress. The Commission accepted the conclusion that “one or more of the actions specified in the Genocide Convention was taken against the Ukrainians in order to destroy a substantial part of the Ukrainian people and thus to neutralize them politically in the Soviet Union” ([US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988, page xxiii [emphasis added], see also point 16 on page vii). The Commission, however, is more cautious in assessing the precise number of victims: there are “millions” of
them ... “Various scholars have given estimates ranging from three million to over 8,000,000 Ukrainians who perished in the Famine” ([US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988, pages vi [point 2], ix). For a more nuanced view of Mace, in the context of genocide studies, we have to turn to an earlier piece of his. At the 1982 International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, Mace wrote:

What Ukrainians call shtuchnyi holod (the man-made famine) or even the Ukrainian holocaust claimed an estimated five to seven million lives. Purely in terms of mortality, it was thus of the same order of magnitude as the Jewish Holocaust. It was, however, a very different kind of genocide in that it was neither motivated by any quest for racial purity, nor was it an attempt to physically murder every single Ukrainian. The purpose, insofar as we may discern it, was to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor and social organism, a goal which could be attained far short of complete extermination. (Mace, 1984a, page 67; underlined text in the original)

Writing in 1988 by himself, Mace repeats some of his earlier reservations against calling the famine genocidal. He writes: “The famine of 1932-1933 poses particular problems from the standpoint of internationally accepted definitions of genocide, since its focus was geographic, rather than discriminatory against specific groups within a given area, and it was clearly not an attempt to destroy all members of a given group” (Mace, 1988, page 117; emphasis added). The genocidal nature of the famine, according to him; must be inferred from the “clarity with which it was geographically focused against areas containing target populations” and the combination of particularly harsh nationality policies against the Ukrainian target group (ibid). The area was clearly limited to the ethnically mixed Kuban region in the Northern Caucasus and all of Ukraine. In commenting on a much earlier version of this article, Robert Conquest shared with the author a top secret instruction by Party Central Committee Secretary Stalin and Soviet Prime Minister Molotov of 22 January 1933, in which the Kuban and all of Ukraine were to be subjected to a strict blockade and all peasants were to be prevented

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by the secret police from traveling into neighbouring areas in search of food. The peasants’ efforts to leave the Kuban and Ukraine were allegedly organized by “enemies of the Soviet authority, by Social Revolutionaries and Polish agents with the purpose of conducting agitation ‘by means of peasants’ against the collective farms and Soviet authority in general in the northern districts of the USSR.” The instruction was ominous in blaming the local Party, Soviet and secret police organs for not noticing “that counterrevolutionary conspiracy in the previous year [1932].” It was as if war had been declared against the Kuban region and all of Ukraine, but not against the neighbouring Volga region and against Belarus.

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I believe that the famine clearly fits the somewhat loose UN Genocide Convention. Lyman H. Legters put it best in his contribution at the 1982 International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, when he wrote:

> ... From Lemkin’s campaign forward, and including the final phrasing of the Genocide Convention, the crime in question is a crime against identifiable groups—national, ethnic, religious—of sufficient scope and import as to threaten the survival of that group in recognizable form. (I take this to be the intended implication of the ambiguous “in whole or in part” of the Convention ... ) (Legters, 1984, page 62)

The famine would also fit the narrower definition of Huttenbach (“... Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy”). Let us also disentangle the question of the Ukrainian terror-famine as genocide from the psychological impediments of some Ukrainians participating in the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919, or of those helping the Nazis to carry out the Holocaust in World War II, and then claiming that the famine was equivalent to the Holocaust. The question of Ukrainian guilt towards the Jews is logically separate from that of the genocidal terror-famine and it should be best addressed by a joint Jewish-Ukrainian Commission of Scholars (Bilinsky, 1988, page 374). I also do believe that it is logically inappropriate to call the
Ukrainian terror-famine a Holocaust. In the words of Yehuda Bauer: “... There may be no difference between Holocaust and genocide for the victim of either. But there are gradations of evil, unfortunately. Holocaust was the policy of the total, sacral act of mass murder of all Jews they could lay hands on. Genocide was horrible enough, but it did not entail total murder if only because the subject peoples were needed as slaves. They were indeed ‘subhumans’ in Nazi terminology. The Jews were not human at all” (Bauer, 1978; first italics added, second in the original).

What is the case for considering the terror-famine a near successful genocide? Stalin was known as a Ukrainophobe, as seen in the matter-of-fact statements by the liberal ethnic Russian leader Academician Andrei D. Sakharov (Sakharov, 1968, page 54). At the same time, unlike Hitler, Stalin was not a braggart who would shout his true feelings from the rooftops; beside expert witness testimony, we have to draw inferences from his public and confidential statements to arrive at his true intentions toward Ukrainians. The depth of his hatred toward autonomy-minded Ukrainian leaders appears clearly from his telegram of 4 April 1918, to Ukrainian Communist Volodymyr Zatonsky, who at that time was the Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Central Executive Committee: “You have been playing long enough those [childish] games of a government and a republic. Enough is enough, stop it” (Kopelev, 1982, page 61). With this outburst, it is not difficult to imagine Stalin’s feelings toward Lenin’s former associate Mykola Skrypnyk, who together with dissident Georgian Communists torpedoed Stalin’s favourite project informally to resurrect the Russian Empire at the 12th Party Congress in 1923 (the question of so-called autonomization, which was, on Lenin’s insistence, transformed into the creation of the federal Soviet Union). In 1925, at the height of the Ukrainization policy in Ukraine, Stalin possibly unwittingly issued a declaration of war against the Ukrainians — “fired his gun.” He also very cogently established the link between the peasant problem and the nationality policy. In that year he publicly attacked the Yugoslav Communist Semich for attempting to reduce the “national [i.e. nationality] question to a constitutional issue ...”
Stalin continued:

That mistake leads him to another, namely his refusal to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. Not an agrarian but a peasant question, for these are two different things. It is quite true that the national question must not be identified with the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, the national question includes such questions as national culture, national statehood, etc. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can there be. (Stalin, 1954, pages 71-72; emphasis added)

Judging from Stalin’s subsequent policy toward Yugoslavia in 1948, he was not very knowledgeable about Yugoslav political conditions. But the public rebuke of Semich in 1925 shows Stalin as fully appreciating the political significance of the Ukrainian peasantry. As a realist, he also knew that he could not kill all the 30 million Eastern Ukrainians: Khrushchev in addressing the 1956 Congress said that Stalin wanted to deport all Ukrainians but he could not find an area for resettling them (Khrushchev, 1970, page 596). (Being a determined anti-Semite as well as a Ukrainophobe, Stalin thought that he had solved the logistic problem of how to deport all the Soviet Jews in early 1953, when death overtook him and saved many Soviet Jews.) In 1932, Stalin had no illusion that he would exterminate all the Ukrainians at once, but by killing approximately one-fifth of all the Eastern Ukrainians he made a good start of turning them into a more submissive, denationalized people of “sowers of millet (hrechkosiiv in Ukrainian, with its pejorative connotation) and hewers of wood.” Is this not genocide, even in narrower, post-Lemkin definition?

Finally a few words about contemporary political usage in Ukraine. On the fiftieth anniversary of the massacre of Jews at Babi Yar, in September 1991, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and soon to be elected first President of Ukraine, Leonid M. Kravchuk, organized a week-long commemorative ceremony. One of its highlights was Kravchuk’s public apology to the Jews for any misdeeds that Ukrainians had committed toward
them. This cleared the air, even though Kravchuk’s speech was ignored by *The New York Times*, but not by *The Washington Post*. In his first foreign interview as president, Kravchuk touched upon the problem of the terror-famine as genocide, though as translated from Russian and printed in German, he may not have used the Latin term, but the German word *Völkermord* or killing of peoples. He put the number of people killed in the famine as five million (possibly, Conquest’s figure) and he added that two more million had been killed during Stalinist purges (*Repressalien*). For our purpose, the key sentence in the interview was: “I received some other information which showed that *Völkermord* (genocide?) had been constantly and systematically committed against Ukraine and that this people had suffered more than any other under the Stalinist machine as well as after his death” (Kravchuk, 1992, page 160). For a number of reasons, which may not all be due to the economic depression, but could also touch on the political advisability of attacking Ukraine’s Communist past, the problem of genocide has not been fully explored in independent Ukraine. But Kravchuk did in September 1993 publicly commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the genocidal famine, and beginning with November 1998 (the sixty-fifth anniversary) the fourth Sunday in November is to be devoted to a public commemoration of the famine, which has been officially defined as genocide, similar to the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, with an estimated 7.5 million victims. On the other hand, for whatever reason, the *US House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 295*, commemorating the famine in 1995, studiously avoids the word genocide (*The Ukrainian Weekly*, 1998; *America*, 1998).

Political usage should not override scholarly logic, especially political usage which is just being established in independent Ukraine, arguably seven years late. My argument, however, is that both logic and political usage in Ukraine point in one direction, that of the terror-famine being genocidal. Stalin hated the Ukrainians, as accepted as a fact by Sakharov, revealed in the telegram to Zatonsky and inferred from his polemics with the Yugoslav Communist Semich. Stalin decided to collectivize Soviet agriculture and under the cover of collectivization teach the Ukrainians a bloody lesson. Had it not been for Stalinist hubris and the incorporation of the more nationally minded and less physically decimated Western Ukrainians after 1939, the Ukrainian nation
might have never recovered from the Stalinist offensive against the main army of the Ukrainian national movement, the peasants.

Endnotes


11. L. Kopelev, *Derzhava i narod: Zametki na knizhnykh polyakh* [State and Nation: Notes from the books] (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1982).


How Liberals Funked It

ROBERT CONQUEST

*Hoover Digest*, No. 3, 1999

Adapted from the *New Criterion*, February 1999, *Liberals and Totalitarianism*. Reprinted with permission of the *New Criterion*, the *Hoover Digest* and the author

A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression, and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition opposed. How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West.

First, of course, we should say that there were many liberals—and in general many on the left—who kept their principles unsullied and were often among the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a vague term. Many of us would take a “liberal” position on some issues, a “conservative” one on others—as most of the American or British people in fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer).
These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a reasonably critical intelligence, whether “conservative” or “liberal” on other issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals, but to that extent they degraded the term. The phenomenon we deal with here is what Orwell called “renegade liberalism.” He defined these renegade liberals with characteristic felicity, in the unused preface to Animal Farm, as those who hold that “democracy” can only be defended by discouraging or suppressing independent thought. His immediate concern was that “where the USSR and its policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many cases, plain honesty from liberal writers and journalists who are under no direct pressure to falsify their opinions.” Elsewhere (in The Prevention of Literature), he comments, “When one sees highly educated men looking on indifferently at oppression and persecution, one wonders which to despise more, their cynicism or their shortsightedness.” And, he felt obliged to add, “it is the liberals who fear liberty and intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect.”

**THE SLIPPERY CONCEPT OF EQUALITY**

We can trace the roots of this aberration a long way back. Even before the First World War, L. T. Hobhouse in his classic Liberalism had written, “liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid meaning.” “Equality” is a slippery word. In a general sense we may allow that genuine liberals—and others—are committed to a society of equal citizens. The liberal state may have a legitimate role in redressing poverty, making health care available, and so forth, but after a point we find that the liberté and égalité that proved incompatible in the 1790s are still awkward companions. And, as the liberal attitude became more and more concerned with the use of political power to promote equality, it tended to become less and less concerned with the liberty side; even domestically (in Thomas Sowell’s words), “the grand delusion of contemporary liberals is that they have both the right and the ability to move their fellow creatures around like blocks of wood—and that the end results will be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions.”
And when these liberals looked abroad they found a regime that claimed to have the same aims—and used the same, or much the same, vocabulary. If anything, from a skeptic’s point of view, the Communists overdid it (with the result that any country nowadays calling itself a People’s Republic or a Democratic Republic is known at once to be a ruthless dictatorship).

**ROTTEN LIBERALS—AND THE VAST KLEPTOCRACY**

Communists in fact despised liberals, even if not quite as much as they despised social-democrats. It was in his procommunist period that W. H. Auden wrote:

> Because you saw but were not indignant  
> The invasion of the great malignant  
> Cambridge ulcer  
> That army intellectual  
> Of every kind of liberal,  
> Smarmy with friendship but of all  
> There are none falser.

“Rotten liberalism” was, of course, the conventional charge made by the Soviet Communists against those insufficiently ruthless in the repression of enemies of the people.

Moreover, Lenin’s own interest in the overthrow of the existing order was so intense that he did not spread his progressivism into any other fields and had nothing but contempt for modern art, free love, unorthodox medicine, and all the other paraphernalia. Communist artistic principles—socialist realism and so forth—remained overtly hostile to all the modernisms dear to many liberal hearts. The Communists’ attitude to homosexuality, at least after its criminalization in the USSR in 1935, was contrary to an important component of the liberal worldview—but Moscow did not lose the allegiance even of homosexuals such as Guy Burgess. The Soviets suppressed and maligned all the psychological views, Freudian and other, dear to Western intellectuals. And
Stalin’s extreme anti-Semitism in the post–World War II years ran against anything describable as liberal.

But, some liberals felt, at least the Stalinists were not capitalists, not motivated by greed, which, taken as the defining quality of the economic system in the West, was thus the most detested of all vices for certain liberals. These were, in general, those who gained their income (and were highly competitive with rivals for it) in academic or media spheres, that is, money derived from, but not directly dependent on, “capitalism.”

Greed, it might be argued, is not as bad as mass murder. But in any case greed was equally prevalent in the mass murder societies. Corruption of every possible type has flourished in all the communist countries. It is not only that the USSR, for example, became a vast kleptocracy but also that even the supposedly pristine early revolutionaries were anything but immune. In fact, with few exceptions the victorious Bolsheviks lived comfortably through the deprivations of the post-revolutionary period. Milovan Djilas, then a Yugoslav communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious partisans, on entering Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on. The same was noted of the Sandinistas when they entered Managua.

**THE SWING IN LEFTISH OPINION**

The phenomenon of renegade liberalism arose in the early days of the Soviet regime. Lincoln Steffens, the fearless journalist exposé of American corruption, famously said of the USSR, “I have seen the future and it works.” He had seen nothing and that future didn’t work. But until the 1930s the Sovietophiles were a minority among liberals. It is in 1933 that we see a real swing in Leftish opinion. The terror-famine early that year, in which millions died, had been widely and accurately reported in much of the Western press. But the Soviet government simply denied that any famine had taken place. President Kalinin, speaking of “political cheats who offer to help the starving Ukraine,” commented that, “only the most decadent classes are capable of producing such cynical elements.”
The Soviet story was supported—as we now know for disreputable reasons—by reporters such as Walter Duranty. Thus two versions were available to the American liberals. But it was Duranty who received the Pulitzer Prize—for “dispassionate, interpretive reporting of the news from Russia.” The announcement of the prize added that Duranty’s dispatches were “marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity,” being “excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.” The *Nation*, citing him in its annual “honour roll,” described his as “the most enlightening, dispassionate and readable dispatches from a great nation in the making which appeared in any newspaper in the world.”

A banquet was given at the Waldorf Astoria in 1933 to celebrate the recognition of the USSR by the United States. A list of names was read, each politely applauded by the guests until Walter Duranty’s was reached; then, Alexander Woollcott wrote in the *New Yorker*, “the only really prolonged pandemonium was evoked. . . . Indeed, one got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.” This scene in the Waldorf was clearly a full-dress appearance of the liberal establishment. And all this was before Stalin and his Comintern had given up their overt hostility to social democrats and liberals and moved over to a popular front.

**THE ACADEMIC FRONDE**

From the start, it was not only the occasional corrupt journalist such as Walter Duranty but also a veritable Fronde of academics who were at least equally responsible for mediating the Soviet phenomena for the Western liberal intelligentsia. It would be supererogatory to present all the horrors of expert academe. Most notorious, of course, were the deans of Western social science, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who went to Russia, saw the system, and produced what purported to be a learned tome on the subject—*Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation*?—which in its second edition, at the height of the terror, dropped the question mark.

Their massive exercise in drivel was largely based on believing Soviet official documents. They were, in effect, taken in above all by Potemkin paperwork—
of elections, trade unions, cooperatives, statistics, all the documents of the 
phantom USSR.

Many others followed, such as Harold Laski, professor of political science at 
the London School of Economics and at one point chairman of the Labour 
Party. When Sir Bernard Pares, the West’s leading “Russianist,” arrived in 
Russia, his previous anti-Soviet feelings evaporated. As his son admiringly put 
it, he “had not left the Moscow railway station before his mind was flooded 
with the realization that the Bolsheviks were, after all, Russia.” He, Laski, the 
Webbs, and others all pronounced the Show Trials genuine exercises in truth 
and legality.

These were, indeed, individuals. The academic world, though liberal in a 
general way, was not as yet a scene of organized error on the communist 
regime. That came later and in particular in the last quarter of the 20th century.

THE POTEMKIN PHENOMENON

The Potemkin phenomenon proper—the presentation of faked appearances of 
prosperity or social triumphs—was, of course, widespread in all the communist 
countries. Anyone who ever visited the Exhibition of Economic Achievements 
in Moscow will know the score. Similarly, when Vice President Henry Wallace, 
on a flight from America to China, was for a few days in the midst of the 
frightful Kolyma labour camps, the guard towers and barbed wires were torn 
down, the miserable prisoners replaced by strong and healthy NKVD men, and 
so on.

Many such stories could be told. Yet the most extraordinary are those 
representing the Soviet penal system as humane and progressive. The facts 
about the Gulag were already available in a number of firsthand accounts. But, 
etirely for deceiving the Western liberals, the Stalinists maintained some 
“model prisons”—in particular one at Bolshevik where J. L. Gillin, a former 
president of the American Sociological Society, noted that:
In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current in capitalist penology are discarded. There are no “crimes”; there are “wrongs.” . . . There is no “punishment,” only “measures of social defence.”

One liberal visitor, Jerzy Gliksman, a progressive member of the Warsaw City Council, was thus deceived but later experienced the real Soviet penal behavior—described in his striking memoirs of the Gulag. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger writes of Havana two generations later, there were delegates living “in the hotels for foreigners who had no idea that the energy and water supply in the working quarters had broken down during the afternoon, that bread was rationed, and that the population had to stand for two hours in line for a slice of pizza; meanwhile the tourists in their hotel rooms were arguing about Lukacs.”

Even the actual optic nerves of Western viewers seem to have become distorted, with falsehood coming from both outside and inside. As Malcolm Muggeridge noted:

There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who walked reverently through anti-God museums and reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across the Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university-educated tourists astonished even Soviet officials used to handling foreign visitors.
It was not only the facts about communist regimes that received such treatment but even Stalinist personalities. The French progressive novelist Romain Rolland described secret police chief Genrikh Yagoda (later shot) as sensitive and intellectual. Harold Laski had a long discussion with Vyshinsky, faker of Show Trials, whom he found “a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain.” Vice President Henry Wallace later described Beria’s terror henchman in the Soviet Far East, Goghdze, as “a very fine man, very efficient, gentle and understanding with people.” Owen Lattimore saw I. F. Nikishov, the head of the most murderous camp system in the Gulag, as having “a trained and sensitive interest in art and music and also a deep sense of civic responsibility.”

H. G. Wells arrived in Moscow in 1934 full of hostility to communism and to Stalin. An interview changed that. Stalin, it is true, “looked past me rather than at me” but “not evasively.” He asked Wells’s permission to smoke his pipe and in this and other ways soon allayed Wells’s hostility:

> I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of him but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him.

Even Franklin Roosevelt—deceived indeed by Harold Ickes—was charmed by Stalin into speaking of his being above all “getatable”: the great British Russianist Ronald Hingley commented that “ungetatability” was one of Stalin’s central characteristics.

Among the most egregious of what I hope I may be excused as calling the Kremlin creepers was a number of those who would have been called liberal Christians. One might have expected a certain alienation from communism by
any of them that had read Lenin’s virulent condemnation of all religion but particularly of sophisticated religion. The active persecution of religion in the communist countries might, you would also think, have also had an effect. But to take only one example—the World Council of Churches Central Committee’s meeting in 1973 passed a resolution deploring oppression in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and elsewhere. An attempt by a Swedish clergyman to add the communist countries was defeated ninety-one to three, with twenty-six abstentions.

**WE MIGHT SAY THAT THERE ARE TWO SORTS OF LIBERAL, AS THERE ARE TWO SORTS OF CHOLESTEROL, ONE GOOD AND ONE BAD.**

Here again, the commitment has often been so strong that it is hard to imagine that complete conversion to communism has not taken place. A Communist once told me his method. First you explain to a Christian sympathizer that communism is compatible with Christianity. That accomplished, you explain that Christianity is not compatible with communism.

**BUT WHY?**

I started by advancing a general reason, or context, for these phenomena. I argued that they arose from an excessive regard for equality as against liberty. That is, people thought they saw a system, superior to our own, in which the abhorrent profit motive had been eliminated (in a sense so it had, but there are other ways of robbing the population). It was rather as if they would rejoice to find that a slum landlord had been replaced by a gangster extortionist. But even this is hardly enough to explain how the mind of the liberal intelligentsia became so much a subject of deception and self-deception. We must inquire further.

That is so even when we consider the attraction of anything “noncapitalist”—even when we consider domestic resentment against “conservatives” on home soil—for, as Macaulay writes of British politicians in the eighteenth century, “it is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than
their original principles.” But pas d’ennemi à gauche—the idea that the far Left, even if wrong in some respects, when it came down to essentials was against the real enemy, the right—cannot sustain the procommunist liberal case. For not all on the far Left were covered: Trotskyites, the POUM in Spain, Anarchists. If we ask why this did not affect some “liberal” minds, it seems that in the first two cases, at least, the Stalinist version (that these were not “Left” at all but secret agencies of Hitler) had some distractive effect. Then again, the Trotskyites lacked the huge propaganda funding available to Stalinists everywhere, though the pervasiveness of a notion has traditionally not been the key point for critical minds. Where issues of fact were in question, the anti-Stalinist Left was not only truer but also far more plausible.

We can list, in addition to utopianism and parochial partisanship, a number of other characteristics to be found, if not in all, than in many of the Stalinophiles (and Mao-ophiles, Castrophiles, and Ho-ophiles): in some cases vanity, in others pleasure at adulation, in others yet an adolescent romanticism about “revolution” as such. Nor should mere boredom be omitted, as Simone de Beauvoir once confessed, which may remind us of the attitudes of a certain type of French intellectual, different, but not all that different, from his American or British counterparts, as given by Herbert Luthy in the early 1960s:

> For ten years the French intellectuals have discussed the big issues of the day so to speak in front of the looking-glass, in search less of facts and knowledge than of an attitude befitting their traditional role—of the “correct pose.”

**THE HEROES OF THE ARGUMENT**

Nevertheless, it might be argued that the true heroes of the long argument were not so much the committed anti-Communist conservatives (who were, of course, right, and fully deserve the verdict in their favor as against the procommunist liberals) as those within the liberal intelligentsia who not only were not deceived but also fought for the truth over years of slander and discouragement. We might in fact say that there are two sorts of liberal, as there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. The difficulty is, or has been, that good liberalism implies a good deal of mental self-control.
AND NOWADAYS?

Kenneth Minogue, the Anglo-Australian political scientist, has observed that “as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one kind or another—from the Soviet Union to Cuba—they have become more ferociously intolerant of the society in which they live.” There are plenty of up-to-date insane absurdities, such as John Le Carré writing (in a letter to The Washington Post) that capitalism was today killing many more than communism ever had; such as Nigel Nicolson in Britain saying that Solzhenitsyn had betrayed his country just as Anthony Blunt had his. And in academe we still find noisy cliques working to lower the Soviet death roll, to prove the West as the villain of the Cold War, and to call for “dispassionate” study of Stalin and Mao.

Such notions are, of course, not confined to campuses. We now get an allegedly historical film series sponsored by Ted Turner, which, with some concessions to reality, in effect tilts the balance against the West, Stalin offset by McCarthy, Castro better than Kennedy.

A WORD TO YOUNG LIBERALS

Can one offer any advice to the current generation of liberals? Well, one can advise them not to let passions provoked by the internal politics of their homelands go too far. Rhetoric of Party faction is part of democratic life, but do not project it into your assessment of alien regimes and mentalities and do not accept accounts of these cultures provided by partisan sources without a critical assessment (a point that applies, indeed, to the acceptance of supposed facts in any field in which strong emotions prevail).

As to the academics criticized above, it seems that nothing is to be done. They are committed to their misconceptions. One can only urge their younger colleagues (even if hardly able to speak out frankly in an atmosphere of academic persecution, denial of tenure, and so on) that they should work at least at thinking independently, while biding their time.
Above all, as Granville Hicks, himself temporarily deceived, put it: “It is no defence whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped, since that is what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him.”
A Pulitzer-winning offense

Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly, 18 April 1999
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In “Bloopers of the Century,” an article about “blunders, hoaxes, goofs, flubs, boo-boos, screw-ups, fakes” published in the January-February issue of Columbia Journalism Review (CJR), John Leo, a syndicated columnist and a contributing editor of US News & World Report, writes that the worst reportorial sins “always involve getting it wrong on purpose.” That is his lead-in to one particularly egregious example: coverage of the USSR by The New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, “perhaps the only Pulitzer winner that The Paper of Record would fervently like to forget.” Mr. Leo is referring, of course, to Duranty’s role in concealing the Great Famine of 1932-1933. The article reports: “When Stalin engineered massive famine in the [sic] Ukraine to help break resistance to Soviet control, Duranty told Times readers that ‘any report of a famine in Russia today is an exaggeration or malignant propaganda.’ In 1933, at the height of the famine, he wrote of abundant grain, plump babies, fat calves, and ‘village markets flowing with eggs, fruit, poultry, vegetables, milk and butter at prices far lower than in Moscow.’ He added that ‘a child can see this is not famine but abundance.’

Furthermore, Mr. Leo emphasizes: “In fact, the death toll was enormous and Duranty knew it. He told colleagues privately it was in the range of 10 million. British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge said Duranty was ‘the biggest liar of any journalist I ever met.’ But the Pulitzer committee praised Duranty’s reports for their “scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and clarity...” “Eventually, Duranty’s Soviet coverage provoked debate among his editors and readers. To its credit, The Times editorial page challenged his accounts. But in
the genteel journalistic world of that era his reporting was never odious enough to get him recalled or fired.” And the clincher, as pointed out in CJR: “The embarrassing Pulitzer has never been withdrawn or returned.”

This week, as the major news media reported on the winners of this year’s Pulitzer Prizes, our thoughts turned, once again, to Duranty’s ill-gotten Prize. In previous years, when The Times won a new Pulitzer it had trotted out all its Pulitzer winners, from the year 1918 on, as a reminder of its distinguished record through the decades. For Ukrainians, seeing Walter Duranty’s name on that list was akin to rubbing salt into a wound. But no longer does The Times boast about Duranty.

A major turnaround came on 24 June 1990, when Karl A. Meyer of The Times, in a feature on its editorial page called “The Editorial Notebook,” wrote about the infamous Moscow correspondent and acknowledged that what Duranty wrote from his post constituted “some of the worst reporting to appear in this newspaper.” (The item also noted that Duranty’s misdeeds are detailed in a new book, Stalin’s Apologist by S. J. Taylor. A review of that biography appeared in the very same issue in The New York Times Book Review.)

Nonetheless, more than six decades after Stalin’s artificially created Famine killed between 7 million and 10 million people, The Times has not relinquished Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize. Nor has the Pulitzer committee done the right thing. Isn’t it clear that, in order to achieve just a measure of justice, there must be no Pulitzer Prize associated with Walter Duranty’s name?
Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development

DAVID C. ENGERMANN

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The specter of Communism haunted not just nineteenth-century Europe but most of the world in the twentieth century. The specter of Soviet Communism haunting this century, however, was as much a blueprint for rapid industrialization as an ideology of proletarian revolution, national liberation, or totalitarian control. At the same time, the Soviet specter often bore little resemblance to actually existing circumstances in the Soviet Union itself. In spite of the tremendous costs, including a catastrophic famine in 1932–1933, domestic and foreign commentators widely praised Soviet efforts at economic modernization, especially in the early years of the Five-Year Plans (1928–1937). What American diplomat George F. Kennan termed the "romance of economic development" captivated a wide range of foreign observers of all political persuasions. These interwar observers valued the fruits of rapid industrialization above its costs—even when these costs included not only repression and privation but also starvation. Many Western observers, ranging from fellow-travelers to anticommunists, summed up their balance sheets on the Soviet Five-Year Plans with the frequently repeated canard that the USSR was "starving itself great"—a phrase that appeared well before the devastating 1932–1933 famine. In Europe's colonies, political leaders as well as intellectuals enthusiastically endorsed the Soviet goal of rapid industrialization as a shortcut to economic modernity. Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, drew inspiration for India's planning efforts from the Soviet Union. As early as 1936, he recognized the costs of Soviet industrialization but stressed instead its benefits: despite its "defects, mistakes,
and ruthlessness," Nehru wrote, Soviet industrialization is "stumbling occasionally but ever marching forward." \(^3\)

Nehru's later encomium that the Soviet Union beckoned as a "bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world" suggests that the enthusiasm for Soviet economic planning was a result of the depression of the 1930s. The economic crisis that shook the global economy heightened the perception of differences between the Western and Soviet economies—and undoubtedly brought more kind words for the latter. But Western interest in Soviet economic policy predated the 1929 Wall Street crash and the widespread acknowledgement (two years later) of a serious economic downturn. \(^4\)

This essay argues that a wide range of interwar Russia experts in the United States, irrespective of their attitude toward the Soviet Union (or toward communism), shared a fervent belief in rapid economic development. These experts, furthermore, deployed longstanding national-character stereotypes in support of their beliefs: claims of Russians' "innate" passivity and conservatism pervaded Western reports on Soviet economic events. Later, faith in economic development combined with national-character stereotypes to contribute to Western misunderstandings of China's Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), which bear eerie similarities to earlier views of the Soviet Five-Year Plans. And in less obvious but nevertheless significant ways, the calculus of ends and means embedded in the sentiment that Russia was "starving itself great" undergirded Western theories of modernization and development in the 1950s and 1960s.

The famine of 1932–1933 looms large in any calculations of the costs of the rapid industrialization in the USSR. Leaving perhaps as many as 8 million dead, the famine devastated the principal breadbaskets of the Soviet Union: Ukraine, the Volga valley, the North Caucasus region, and Kazakhstan. \(^5\) The famine's legacy exceeded even its gruesome death toll. It marked the final victory of central Soviet authorities over the peasantry. \(^6\) Yet, for decades, only Ukrainian émigré groups devoted significant attention to the famine. In official Soviet histories, meanwhile, the famine remained a "blank spot," described blandly as "difficulties on the grain-requisition front." \(^7\)
What explains this silence? How could such a massive catastrophe provoke only ripples of concern among Western observers? Soviet efforts to cover up the famine come as no great surprise. Yet Western observers, in spite of widespread interest in the Soviet Union, wrote little of the famine. Many explanations for the lack of Western coverage focus on the ideological inclinations of two American journalists who denied the extent of the famine: Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* and Louis Fischer of the *Nation*. Two fellow journalists—William Henry Chamberlin (*Christian Science Monitor* and *Manchester Guardian*) and Eugene Lyons (United Press wire service)—were among the first to blame this pair of reporters. With all the vitriol of ex-believers, Chamberlin and Lyons attributed the lack of news about the famine to what one called "the Stalinist Penetration of America."\(^8\) Writers following Chamberlin and Lyons typically assert that Duranty and Fischer were accomplices in genocide who denied the famine for ideological reasons. Later critics have also made more explicit assertions that Soviet payoffs ensured the reporters' cooperation.\(^9\)

This ideological critique of famine coverage is typically linked to a political interpretation of the famine itself. Politics infused the émigré Ukrainians' writings on the famine, as well as the first widely read history of the famine, Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* (1986). These works blamed the famine on politics, typically claiming that Soviet leaders planned the famine to satisfy genocidal desires to punish the Ukrainians for their nationalist aspirations.\(^10\) More recent works on the famine, however, have explained the famine in economic terms, as the final battle in a drawn-out war over grain harvests. Based on masses of newly available materials from both local and central archives, these new writings in no way excuse central government officials. Yet they place less emphasis on advance planning.\(^11\) Such well-researched local studies, primarily by historians in post-Soviet states, have come to shape a new paradigm for understanding the famine.\(^12\) According to this emerging paradigm, the famine marked a major battle in a drawn-out war between the Soviet government and the peasants for control of the grain grown by the peasantry. The government's plans for rapid industrialization required grain for exports (to purchase foreign machinery) and domestic consumption (to feed industrial workers). The impressive evidence unearthed by these scholars...
demonstrates the importance of both economic and political factors, as well as the extraordinary efforts of the peasants to stand up for their own interests. No similarly compelling evidence exists, by contrast, to support political interpretations focusing on ethnic genocide. The 1932–1933 famine was not a process driven primarily by desires to carry out ethnic genocide. Rather, the catastrophe resulted from the Soviet leadership's larger struggle to transform an agrarian empire into an industrial power.

Contrary to political interpretations of the famine coverage, contemporary accounts often recognized that rapid modernization was a core element of the famine itself. The fact that the famine did not provoke a major response in the West had less to do with individual politics and individual perfidy than with well-worn Western understandings of Russia. Some reputable American newspapers, after all, printed accurate and disturbing reports of the famine. To answer the questions about the weak American response to the famine, then, involves consideration of broader issues than political beliefs alone. Duranty and Fischer used language and conceptual frameworks similar to their accusers'. "National-character" stereotypes, first, led many experts to expect little from the Russian peasants—little, that is, aside from passivity, conservatism, and apathy.¹³ Many experts, secondly, expressed their appreciation of the Soviet Union's program to modernize rapidly and develop its long-"backward" economy.¹⁴ Finally, the widespread belief that Russian industrialization would entail high human costs drew on notions of Russian and/or "Asiatic" character traits.¹⁵

Previously unexamined documents, from both Soviet and American sources, reveal how much Duranty's and Fischer's writings and activities had in common with those of their principal accusers, Lyons and Chamberlin. The accusers wrote their angriest works, sharply condemning Duranty and Fischer, shortly after their respective breaks with Soviet Communism, coming on the heels of the 1932–1933 famine. Most subsequent attacks on the famine coverage have taken their evidence, tone, and even their book titles from these early works.¹⁶ But all four journalistic protagonists-cum-antagonists (Chamberlin, Duranty, Fischer, and Lyons) invoked stereotypes of Russian character and expressed their belief in economic development. Carefully
tracing the actions and private writings of these journalists in 1932 and 1933 necessitates examining a wider range of evidence than the few frequently cited pieces for which each journalist is best known. These materials reveal that Chamberlin and Lyons shared with their nemeses Durany and Fischer common assumptions about the need for "modernization" as well as notions of Russian "national character." This statement should not in any way exonerate any of the journalists for disingenuous and even dishonest reporting. While Durany and Fischer have been rightly attacked for their misleading coverage of the famine, the assumptions underlying their articles bore many similarities to those of their critics. Uncovering these common aspects does not free any reporters from blame, but it does allow a consideration of the mental frameworks behind American understandings of the Soviet Union.

Before examining the intellectual issues shaping reports of the famine, however, more concrete limits on coverage deserve brief mention. The Press Office of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (known by its Russian acronym, NKID) worked assiduously to restrict foreign coverage of Soviet events. The four censors who staffed the Press Office had excellent credentials. They all spoke and read English (as well as French and/or German) well enough to prevent foreign reporters from carrying off many linguistic sleights-of-hand. Censors had to approve every dispatch that journalists wished to telegraph to their home offices. Such direct censorship did not apply to reports sent out by mail, however, and the time-honored tradition of sending letters out of Russia with westward-bound travelers provided yet another avenue to get dispatches to the United States.17 Yet such maneuvers did not escape the Press Office's powers of surveillance. Thanks to detailed analyses of press reports conducted by Soviet embassies in London, Paris, and Berlin, as well as the "information office" in Washington (not an embassy until 1934), the Press Office staff received summaries of news articles that had not been vetted through their office. If these reports sufficiently concerned the NKID, it intervened either directly or indirectly to discipline the offending journalist. Soviet officials also exploited their contacts with American editors, including those at The New York Times and the United Press, to lobby for a different slant on coverage or, on at least one occasion, for a change of reporters.18 The Press Office could also delay or deny outright a journalist's request for a visa.19
In spite of all of these tools to control foreign journalists, however, Westerners spread rumors about an impending famine through Moscow's journalistic community in the summer of 1932. One Harvard political scientist well acquainted with the Moscow-based journalists wrote a friend in the State Department that "there is definite famine" in Ukraine. Other information about rural conditions arrived overseas without first passing through the Moscow colony. German embassy officials reported famine conditions in grain-growing regions of the USSR in the summer of 1932. One published report, based more on Soviet statistics than on firsthand experience, referred to "famine [Hungersnot] in the fullest sense of the word" in Ukraine, the Lower Volga, western Siberia, and Kazakhstan. German agricultural attaché Otto Schiller, one of the best-informed foreigners in Moscow, spent much of 1932 touring the Soviet countryside. Traveling with Canadian Andrew Cairns, Schiller detailed the dire conditions in the Soviet countryside in an article that appeared in Germany in February 1933. Cairns's reports reached the British Foreign Office even earlier.

More details about rural conditions reached Moscow in the fall of 1932. One British diplomat reported in late October that Duranty "ha[d] at last awakened to the agricultural situation," blaming the severe problems on shortages of labor and draft-power. The diplomat summarized Duranty's analysis: "There are millions of . . . peasants whom it is fairly safe to leave in want . . . [But] is there no limit to people's endurance?" Yet Duranty did not foresee any organized resistance. His articles typically came across as somewhat sanguine, noting that the USSR was "in better shape than most of the world," in spite of serious supply problems that had sapped "peasant energy and initiative." Even an otherwise celebratory article on the fifteenth anniversary of Bolshevik rule closed with mixed optimism: "Times are hard and will not be easy in the near future." The ultimate victory of "socialist building," though, was assured.

Duranty's later reports took a markedly less optimistic tone about the situation in Russia. At the end of November, he published a six-part series on the food shortage, carried out of Moscow to evade censorship. This series established the parameters for Duranty's subsequent writings on the situation. While he dismissed the predictions of famine ("there is no famine or actual starvation,
nor is there likely to be"), Duranty did write of the "great and growing food shortage in town and country alike," which was having "ever graver" effects. Only bread was available in reasonable amounts. Dairy products were never seen. Meat and fish appeared only rarely and in quantities "below the people's wants and probably below their needs." The Russians' capacity for sacrifice, however, would carry them through: "Russians have tightened their belts before to a far greater extent than is likely to be needed this Winter." Duranty seemed impressed with Soviet leaders who were "not in the least trying to minimize [the food shortage's] gravity, its widespread character and its harmful effects" but were not "much alarmed by it." Finally, perhaps to explain his own reluctance to stray from Moscow, Duranty dismissed the need for a foreign observer to tour the villages, "where it commonly happens that disgruntled or disaffected elements talk loudest while others are busy working."24

The series served Duranty well in New York, where editors praised it as "one of the best stories current." Yet it served him less well in Moscow, as a British diplomat reported: "Shortly [after the series appeared], Duranty was visited by emissaries from governing circles here (not from the Censorship Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs but from higher spheres) who reproached him with unfaithfulness . . . Did he not realize that the consequences for himself might be serious. Let him take this warning. Duranty, who was to have left for a short visit to Paris that day, put off his departure to wait further developments . . . He affects to think it possible that . . . he may not be allowed to return."25 Duranty postponed his departure, but left in early December.

Among his other activities in Paris, Duranty spoke to the Travellers Club. An American diplomat in attendance summarized Duranty's views as follows: "The chief reason for his pessimism was the growing seriousness of the food shortage. This he ascribed to difficulties which the Government was having with its scheme of collective farming . . . He described the situation in Russia to-day as comparable to that which existed in Germany during the latter part of the war, when . . . the civil population was living on practically starvation rations." According to internal reports, the Paris speech angered Soviet authorities.26

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By the end of 1932, then, Duranty had set a pattern for describing the rural crisis. He frequently employed military terminology, implying the need to stay above the fray. He issued critical and pessimistic reports on the food situation accompanied by denials that "famine conditions" existed. This pattern would continue throughout the famine and beyond.

As Walter Duranty published his November series on the food shortage in the Soviet Union, Louis Fischer voiced few worries about Soviet conditions: "I feel as if this were the beginning of the end of a long Soviet winter which has lasted several years. Now the earth commences to smell of spring." Perhaps the new springtime provoked Fischer's allergies, since he left Moscow for an extended American tour—December until the following June. His final article from Moscow called for easing the pressure on Soviet peasants. It also noted a decline in grain collections in the North Caucasus region, blaming "bad organization, slack guidance by party members [and] insufficient loyalty to Moscow's instructions." The problems might extend even farther, as "important grain-growing areas like the Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Volga region and the central black-earth district" had no grain for open sale. Fischer thus identified food shortages but only in cryptic phrases containing gross understatements.27

Like Fischer, journalist William Henry Chamberlin also left Moscow for an extended trip to the United States, perhaps spurred by the rumors about food shortages. Chamberlin predicted food supply problems for the fall and winter of 1932–1933. In early October, he recommended to his replacement that foreigners should consider hoarding nonperishable food for what promised to be a tough winter.28 Traveling through London en route to the United States, Chamberlin gave a standing-room-only talk at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The overall tone of the speech was quite positive. Chamberlin lauded the growing strength of the Red Army and criticized those who opposed American recognition of the Soviet Union. He sounded decidedly optimistic about the economic prospects for the Soviet Union: collectivization had exacted a substantial toll but was making progress. In any case, he concluded, it could no longer be reversed. He hesitated to predict the future in the Soviet countryside but suggested that recent Soviet measures with regard to
trade and consumer goods would determine the success or failure of the effort. On the other hand, Chamberlin also warned that a "dual agrarian and food crisis" would be costly in human and financial terms. He shrank from calculating the bottom line on the Five-Year Plan's impact: "It is very difficult to make any sort of arithmetical balance sheet of how much happiness and unhappiness this period of violent and great change has brought in Russia." A Soviet report summarized the talk with apparent relief: Chamberlin "behaved entirely favorably for the USSR. In fact, in a few cases he resorted to quite original forms of defense of the USSR." Chamberlin also submitted an article to a British magazine; that article praised the "impressive addition to the national industrial capital" but noted that it "has been purchased at an extremely high price in the standard of living." 29

By New Year's Day 1933, then, both Chamberlin and Duranty had given mixed reports on Soviet conditions. They both remained optimistic about Soviet industrialization efforts while also describing the costs involved. Fischer, by contrast, expressed nothing but optimism and enthusiasm for the coming year. While talk of a "crisis" appeared in Chamberlin's and Duranty's writings, neither journalist considered the situation a famine per se.

Indications of actual famine first appeared in the mainstream Western press in early 1933, spurred by two reports from the countryside. One set of reports came from Malcolm Muggeridge, a Briton then working as Chamberlin's substitute for Manchester Guardian coverage. Muggeridge arrived in Moscow in the fall of 1932, full of enthusiasm for Soviet ideals. It quickly dissipated. In spite of his dislike of most foreign journalists in Moscow, Muggeridge repeated their national-character clichés. After hearing of starvation in Kiev, for instance, Muggeridge remarked in his diary that "starvation is in the nature of things" for a Russian. He also attempted to use his "Eastern" experiences—in India—to understand Russia. In both places, he wrote, "mere brutality . . . [is] not in and of [itself] a condemnation" of either British colonial or Soviet government policy. 30

Muggeridge sent reports on famine conditions to The Manchester Guardian in early 1933. His first leads on the famine came from an anonymous visitor who
deposited articles from provincial newspapers on the reporter's doorstep and also from Dr. Joseph Rosen, an American organizing Jewish agricultural settlements in the USSR. At the end of January, the reporter traveled to Ukraine and the North Caucasus to observe conditions firsthand. The Manchester Guardian did not print Muggeridge's dispatches until late March 1933, perhaps because they jarred so sharply with the newspaper's generally favorable editorial stance toward the USSR. The Guardian's three-part series reported on "famine conditions" in the North Caucasus, conditions that Muggeridge contended would last at least three to five more months. It also described "hunger in the Ukraine" and the author's pessimistic predictions for the future. Muggeridge blamed heavy grain requisitions for the precarious situation: they had left the population with a "characteristic peasant look—half resignation and half cunning." While Western journalists in Moscow may follow attentively the experiment of collectivization, Muggeridge concluded, "for the participants, [it was] often more disagreeable than interesting." 31

Eugene Lyons set into motion a second set of articles on the famine, this time appearing in American newspapers. His secretary first read of potential problems in the North Caucasus, in a local Soviet newspaper article about a secret-police "rampage" in a village near Rostov. This information set the tone for Lyons's dispatches of January and February 1933, which emphasized the food question and the harshness of government grain demands. Yet Lyons also characterized government repression as a response to peasant laziness. One undated dispatch adopted the Soviet government's viewpoint, applauding improved grain collections, while other dispatches noted the "intense struggle to extract seed grain . . . developing nationwide as the first act of the drama of spring sowing." Lyons reported dire conditions in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and parts of the Lower Volga, but he maintained optimistically that these conditions were "not typical of the entire country." Soviet economic policy, Lyons wrote later that year, amounted to various efforts to "overcome peasant apathy." 32 Lyons's view of peasant character traits—in which apathy played a central role—thus explained the hardships in the Soviet countryside.

While Lyons apparently did not write a dispatch on the Rostov news item, he did alert two American journalists, William Stoneman of the Chicago Daily
News and Ralph Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune. Stoneman and Barnes quickly hired a translator and bought train tickets to Rostov to "view the performance," as Stoneman later worded it. Stoneman's dispatch of 6 February described "virtual martial law" and increased activity of armed forces in the region despite the lack of collective resistance. He blamed the lack of grain in "one of Russia's richest grain regions" on the central authorities' "taking revenge on the peasants." After a few days of observing conditions in Rostov and environs, the journalists were picked up by the local secret police and shipped back to Moscow. They nevertheless succeeded in smuggling reports to their newspapers. Ralph Barnes's article focused on the terror in the Kuban', mentioning the dire food situation there. Perhaps building on Duranty's November reports, Barnes mentioned "only a limited number of cases of deaths due strictly to starvation" but admitted that there were "many deaths resulting from disease attacking constitutions seriously undermined by lack of sufficient food." After the first of these accounts appeared in February 1933, senior Soviet officials banned foreigners' travel within the USSR. Foreign journalists learned of the measure at the end of February. While the Press Office was charged with primary enforcement of the new ban, its censors unsuccessfully opposed a blanket prohibition, arguing confidently that they could keep foreigners out of the problem areas without calling attention to the situation by announcing a formal prohibition. In a letter written to Premier Viacheslav Molotov, the censors argued against the travel ban:

The decision on a new arrangement for foreign correspondents' movement in the territory of the Union [the USSR] without the permission of the militia will without any doubt be interpreted by Moscow-based correspondents, and also by the international press, as the denial of freedom of movement for foreigners/journalists for the purpose of hiding from them the "true situation" in the localities... The negative consequences of a general ban on the free movement of foreign correspondents might be averted if the NKID Press Office, together with some general measures, could in each individual case try to obtain voluntary rejections of this or that trip

........... 66 ............
which is undesirable to us. In precisely this way, two trips to Ukraine by foreign correspondents were recently prevented.\textsuperscript{35}

The Press Office staff protested the implementation of a full-fledged prohibition on travel, arguing that they could be just as effective in one-to-one conversations, convincing journalists not to visit afflicted areas without raising suspicions of a new policy.

Soviet officials, however, grossly overestimated their powers of persuasion. Stoneman (one of the two reporters alluded to in the final sentence quoted above) recounted his conversation with a censor in a manner that suggests the censors were heavy-handed, did much to arouse journalists' suspicions, and in no way succeeded in obtaining a "voluntary" change of itinerary from Stoneman. The censor first questioned Stoneman's need to visit Ukraine as opposed to some other rural region. He then pleaded with the reporter "as a friend" before finally declaring that "you had better postpone your trip."\textsuperscript{36}

News of the travel ban spread quickly through the foreign colony in Moscow. The New York Times and other major newspapers, however, printed nothing on either the Stoneman/Barnes reports or the new travel restrictions for foreigners. Duranty, perhaps chastened by his troubles with Soviet authorities in December, changed the focus of his reportage. He shifted toward coverage of political events, stopping on economic conditions only long enough to predict a "decisive struggle on the agrarian front" in the spring. Duranty accentuated the poverty and "backwardness" of Russian peasants, comparing peasants not to farmers but to "farm-cattle" because of their passivity and servile mentality. He also framed the rural conflicts in military terms. "I am inclined to think," he concluded, that the Bolsheviks will defeat the peasants "in the long run, but it won't be easy." By constantly focusing on the future, Duranty did not deny peasants' hardships—in fact, he rather relished them—but he attributed them to peasant character. According to Duranty, the Bolsheviks needed to "swing all the forces in their command into an effort to overcome peasant apathy, individualism, dislike of novel collective methods and the previous mismanagement of collective farms." Prospects for the current harvest were poor, and the food shortage, "already widespread and
serious, "would only get worse. The picture looked bleak, especially given the peasants' degree of "degeneration and apathy." Like Lyons, Duraty blamed peasant character, primarily apathy, for the problems with collectivization.

Chamberlin, whose November speech in London seemed relatively sanguine, apparently suffered a mood change while at sea. Once in the United States, he emphasized both the rising inequalities and the "food shortage and falling off in agricultural production" that were plaguing Russia. He did, however, find some reason for optimism: the most recent government policies, he believed, would alleviate the food situation. He also published an article in *The New Republic* (a magazine at that time sympathetic to the Soviet cause) describing the Five-Year Plan as a "forced, concentrated drive for high speed industrialization, regardless of the cost to the daily standard of living." The article mentioned both domestic food shortages and rising grain exports. But prospects were good, Chamberlin claimed, because the Soviet leaders had realized that "the process which someone wittily described as 'starving itself great' can be and indeed has been pushed to a point where it is distinctly subject to a law of diminishing returns." In another article, Chamberlin noted the "considerable strides" the USSR had made "toward its goal of becoming a powerful industrial country." In spite of the hardships, especially for those groups targeted by the Soviets, the Five-Year Plan represented "Russia's extraordinary contribution to economic history." Chamberlin, like Duraty, described the high costs of Russian collectivization and industrialization but nevertheless endorsed the lessons it offered and the achievements it promised.

While Chamberlin and Fischer remained outside the reach of Soviet censors, Duraty and Lyons continued to report on poor living conditions in the Soviet Union from Moscow, and were thus prevented from explicitly mentioning famine. Duraty headed for another European vacation in early March, however, and filed dispatches not subject to direct Soviet censorship. These reports noted the "gloomy picture" in Ukraine as well as the North Caucasus and Lower Volga regions. *The New York Times* reporter saw a "brighter side." Upon learning of new repressive organs (political departments of Machine-Tractor Stations located throughout the countryside), Duraty extolled them as "the greatest constructive step toward the efficient socialization of
agriculture." He blamed a familiar culprit for the food crisis. After one particularly critical assessment of Russian national character, Duranty concluded that "what is wrong with Russian agriculture is chiefly Russians."  

Muggeridge's *Manchester Guardian* series was quickly followed by a report on the famine from Gareth Jones. Jones, a Russian-speaking assistant to former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, obtained his information during brief travels through Ukraine. The articles described how starvation and disease had laid waste to whole villages in the region. These reports appeared within days of the stories by Stoneman and Barnes. Perhaps because Jones was not a permanent Moscow correspondent, the NKID singled him out for special treatment. The Press Office enlisted the help of the Moscow regulars in discrediting him. Lyons’s version of how Press Office chief Constantine Oumansky recruited the foreign journalists to "throw down Jones" has reached the status of a classic—even a cliché—in writings about famine coverage. As Lyons wrote in *Assignment in Utopia* (1937):

> There was much bargaining in a spirit of gentlemanly give-and-take, under the effulgence of Umansky’s [sic] gilded smile, before a formula of denial was worked out. We admitted enough to soothe our consciences, but in roundabout phrases that damned Jones as a liar. The filthy business having been disposed of, someone ordered vodka and zakuski [snacks], Umansky joined in the celebration and the party did not break up until the early morning hours . . . He had done a big bit for Bolshevik firmness that night. 

This text appears in almost every writing on the "famine cover-up" as proof positive of the journalists' craven willingness to serve the Soviets. Yet outside evidence contradicts Lyons's oft-told tale. First, there is some reason to doubt Lyons's chronology. The meeting with the censors, he reported, took place after Jones's *Manchester Guardian* article appeared—therefore, after 30 March 1933. Lyons follows up his description of the gathering for "Bolshevik firmness" with a description of how each journalist was summoned to the Press
Office and told not to leave Moscow without official permission. But Stoneman's account—corroborated by documents from American, British, and Russian archives—indicates that news of the ban circulated in late February.43 Furthermore, no other Western correspondents—including both Duranty's assistant and Stoneman, who were present in Moscow and were later interviewed about the famine—even mentioned this party. Lyons himself was rather sketchy on the details when asked about it years later. As his recollections were summarized by one historian:

*Lyons remembers little more about the meeting with Oumansky than the description of it in Assignment in Utopia. It was not a "general session" of the foreign correspondents, he recalls, nor did Oumansky have to do more than "hint" as to what should be done. Lyons cannot remember who attended or even more specifically where the meeting was held. He adds, however, that "presumably" Duranty was there.*44

Whether or not this evening affair took place as Lyons described it, Duranty indeed did "throw down" fellow Briton Jones. In an article that remains a textbook example of double-speak, Duranty criticized Jones's judgment as "somewhat hasty" and based only on minimal travels in Ukraine. (Jones, it might be noted, undertook more travel than Duranty himself.) Duranty's article, published under the headline "Russians Hungry, but Not Starving," cynically noted the number of times that foreigners have prematurely "composed the Soviet Union's epitaph." Duranty derided Jones's most recent epitaph, claiming that Jones had "seen no dead or dying human beings" and therefore had little direct evidence of famine. Duranty did not deny the "deplorable" conditions, but he blamed the problems on the "novelty and mismanagement of collective farming." In a justly infamous paragraph, Duranty then relied on his stock phrase and his usual military analogies: "But—to put it brutally—you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevist leaders are [like military commanders] . . . indifferent to the casualties that may be involved." And a phrase just as infamous if less evocative, Duranty continued with his odd denial: "There is a serious food shortage throughout the country . . . There is no actual starvation or deaths
from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition . . . In short, conditions are definitely bad in certain sections—the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower Volga. The rest of the country is on short rations but nothing worse. These conditions are bad, but there is no famine." 45 While the criticisms of Jones included new concepts, Duranty's basic formula (shortages, even malnutrition, but no famine) carried over from his November series.

Fischer, then touring the United States, needed little official encouragement to rail against famine reports. He spent the spring of 1933 campaigning for American diplomatic recognition of the USSR. As rumors of a famine there reached American shores, Fischer vociferously denied the reports. He agreed that Russians were "hungry—desperately hungry" but attributed this to Russia's "turning over from agriculturalism to industrialism." In each city he visited, Fischer flatly denied that mass starvation existed in Russia. Arguing that there were shortages but no famine, Fischer declared in another speech that the Russian peasant would endure such hardships "as long as the fulfillment of his objective is visible to the naked eye, in the form of industrial achievement." Upon his return to Russia later that summer, Fischer's story changed only slightly. His first article from Moscow, entitled "Russia's Last Hard Year," stated, "The first half of 1933 was very difficult indeed. Many people simply did not have sufficient nourishment." Fischer blamed poor weather and the refusal of peasants to harvest the grain, which then rotted in the fields. Government requisitions drained the countryside of food, he admitted, but military needs (a potential conflict with Japan) explained the need for such deadly thoroughness in grain collections. 46

While Fischer used the threat of war as a justification for hardships, Duranty continued to employ war in a metaphorical sense. Perhaps inspired by the Soviets' own rhetoric, he continued to compare collectivization to a battle between the modernizing Bolsheviks and backward peasants. Off on another vacation in April—this time to Greece—Duranty organized the trip so that he could travel through Ukraine. Gazing out the windows and speaking with peasants at the stations along the way, Duranty concluded that the rumors about a famine were unsubstantiated—always attributed to the next village.
Duranty still maintained his optimism for the future: "an end has been made of the muddle and mismanagement of the past two years, and . . . Moscow is taking an interest" in the peasants.\(^{47}\)

By late spring, Gareth Jones rebutted Duranty in a stinging counterattack. Jones reiterated his assessment of famine conditions, claiming it was based on conversations with numerous foreign diplomats in addition to peasants in more than twenty villages. He also cited Muggeridge's late March series in the Manchester Guardian as corroboration. Lashing out against the Moscow-based journalists, Jones called them "masters of euphemism and understatement," thanks to ever-stricter censorship. The letter closed on a bitter congratulatory note: the Soviets' combination of food distribution policy (so that Moscow remained "well-fed") and censorship had managed to "hide the real Russia."\(^{48}\)

By June, Duranty pleaded to travel abroad again. Until the midsummer harvest, he told his editor, things in Moscow would be "dull." \textit{The New York Times} editors scotched the trip, so Duranty redirected his complaints to a friend and fellow journalist. As for food supplies, he wrote his friend: "The 'famine' is mostly bunk as I told you except maybe Kazakhstan and the Altai where they wouldn't let you go . . . The [NKID] in particular is rather crotchety about reporters travelling these days." Stuck in Moscow, bored, Duranty returned to one of his favorite themes, Russian suffering. He referred to Bolsheviks as "fanatics [who] do not care about the costs in blood or money." Suffering in Russia, he stressed, was not strictly a Soviet phenomenon: "It is cruel . . . but the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is near to cruel Asia, and the proverb 'One Life, One Kopeck' was a century-old expression of human values in Czarist Russia." The article closed with the acknowledgment that "life here is hard and menaced by malnutrition and diseases that arise therefrom," but it once again underlined the ultimate goal justifying these sacrifices: the leadership's "fanatic fervor" for industrialization.\(^{49}\)

An early August dispatch dealt once more with rumors about the famine. Duranty attributed them to the anti-Bolshevik émigré "rumor factories" in neighboring states. Soviet authorities, Duranty wrote, had inadvertently
abetted these factories by adopting an "ostrich policy . . . in trying to hide it [the food shortage] and some of its consequences." Such shortages had taken "a heavy toll of Soviet fortitude and even Soviet lives," reducing the food supply "below what are generally regarded as the minimum requirements."

Shortly thereafter, Duranty cabled his editor that, in spite of these persistent rumors, the word "famine" should be avoided in news coverage— in favor of the above formulation about minimum requirements. He maintained his silence about the travel ban. When The New York Times published an article about restrictions on travel, it came from the Associated Press rather than the newspaper's own correspondent. Below the AP story, though, Duranty wrote an article, "Famine Report Scorned," praising the new harvest without denying past problems: "Until this harvest the picture was dark enough. The Kremlin had ruthlessly carried through the agrarian revolution of collective farming, and the costs had been heavy for the Russian people, but it looks now as if the revolution is complete because the harvest is really good."

Duranty seemed genuinely confused about the continuation of the travel ban, given the improved conditions. His letter to the foreign editor complained: "The poor goofs [in the NKID Press Office] have chosen this moment, when the harvest REALLY IS GOOD, to forbid foreign correspondents to travel." He once again denied that there was a famine per se, "but there was a heavy loss of life and much suffering and now of course is the moment to see and say that things are better. But the [NKID] doesn't seem to understand that."

Ignoring Duranty's repeated injunctions against the word "famine," The New York Times editors printed articles from Vienna and Berlin that used the word. They even printed one of Duranty's own articles under the headline "Famine Toll Heavy in South Russia." That article continued his usual themes: there was loss of life, not from starvation but from diseases "due to lower resistance"; the death rate was three times higher than normal in Ukraine, North Caucasus, and the Lower Volga—but no "famine" existed.

Poor conditions in the USSR seemed to affect Duranty's mood if not his reporting. He complained to his editors that he had tired of working overseas, especially in Moscow. Duranty distinguished himself from those whose bright future justified present hardships: the USSR "may someday be a paradise for a
future generation of Russians, but I am not a future generation, nor, thank God, a Russian." He proposed working only part-time in Moscow, writing primarily feature articles. *The Times* senior editors, all dissatisfied with Duranty's frequent absences from Moscow, were happy to accept this arrangement.\(^5^2\)

The *NKID* gave Duranty one last scoop before he stepped down. The Press Office informed him in late August that he could travel through the Ukrainian countryside. Permission to travel, however, did not imply the right to travel freely. The restrictions on his itinerary perplexed Duranty. According to one British diplomat, "Mr. Duranty professed to be much irritated by this action, which he felt had cut the ground from under his feet by obliging him to recognize a ban upon his movements."\(^5^3\)

Yet Duranty did not mention the restrictions to his editors. He instead boasted that he and *AP* correspondent Stanley Richardson soon would be taking a trip to Ukraine and the North Caucasus to challenge the "campaign about the alleged famine." The editors received this news enthusiastically, urging him to leave as soon as possible. This trip earned these two reporters no little resentment in the foreign colony—a problem for the *NKID* as well as for Duranty. As the foreign-policy chief wrote to the head of the secret police:

> After foreign correspondents Duranty and Richardson set out, with our permission and your agreement, on their trip to Ukraine, many other foreign correspondents asked for permission for trips to the south . . . Since I cannot be up-to-date [v kurse] on conditions in the various regions to which the foreign correspondents would like to go, I am asking you to give us your conclusions after weighing all of the circumstances. Personally, it seems to me that the moment has come when we can be more liberal on the issue of foreign correspondents' movements, that is, on the extremely irritating strict application of the rules about their trips outside Moscow.\(^5^4\)

Once under way, Duranty and Richardson traveled first to Rostov and then Kharkov. Duranty's reports contained the same set of contradictions as his
series on food shortages from the previous November. The first report began by asserting, "The use of the word 'famine' in connection with the North Caucasus is a sheer absurdity." After gloating that "even a child can see that this is not famine but abundance," Duranty revised downward his earlier estimate that mortality had tripled. Upon reaching Ukraine, Duranty's evaluation was far more bleak, resorting again to his wartime analogies: the Kremlin "has won the battle with the peasants," although "the cost has been heavy." The whole episode could be summed up briefly, Duranty wrote: "Hunger had broken [Ukrainians'] passive resistance—there in one phrase is the grim story of the Ukrainian Verdun." Here, Duranty wrote more explicitly about the costs: "hard conditions . . . had decimated the peasantry."55

In his private conversations, Duranty described the famine's results more graphically. In an oft-cited incident reported by Eugene Lyons, Duranty apparently stopped by Lyons's apartment upon returning from his travels. Lyons recalled:

_He gave us his fresh impressions in brutally frank terms and they added up to a picture of ghastly horror. His estimate of the dead from the famine was the most startling I had as yet heard from anyone._

"But, Walter, you don't mean that literally?" Mrs. McCormick exclaimed.

"Hell I don't—I'm being conservative," he replied, and as if by way of consolation he added his famous truism: "But they're only Russians."

While Lyons did not repeat Duranty's mortality figure in this 1937 recollection, other sources suggest that, upon returning from Ukraine, Duranty estimated that between 7 and 10 million had died "directly or indirectly from lack of food."56
William Henry Chamberlin also petitioned to travel into the famine areas in late August, but the NKID Press Office denied his initial request. The Christian Science Monitor printed an Associated Press story about this denial, referring to its desire to report on the impact of the food shortage "last winter."57 Shortly afterward, Chamberlin wrote a casual letter to a friend that explained the travel ban as related to "what has happened rather than . . . what is happening now" in the countryside. He went on in an optimistic tone, predicting that "this year's crop . . . is exceptionally good, and, while there are familiar difficulties in harvesting and transporting it, the signs seem to point to an easier winter. Everything in this world is, of course, highly relative." At the same time, Chamberlin also submitted a signed opinion piece to the Monitor, part of an occasional series called "Diary of an Onlooker." Chamberlin reported on contradictory rumors floating around Moscow about the situation in the Soviet countryside. Based on a report from "a foreign agricultural expert with a knowledge of the Russian language and long experience in various parts of the country" (perhaps his friend Otto Schiller?), Chamberlin announced that events in Russia gave "some measure of confirmation to both the optimistic and the pessimistic reports." This unnamed expert "confirmed the prevalent stories of widespread acute distress and hunger in the southern and southeastern parts of the country." Still, Chamberlin optimistically insisted that "there would be some increase in the agricultural production, measured by the extremely low level it touched last year." Better weather fueled Chamberlin's hope for improvement, as did the "fear of hunger" and the effectiveness of new repressive machinery. The section closed with the observation that Muscovites were choosing vacation spots far from Ukraine, in part because of the reports of poor conditions there.58

After the Duranty/Richardson trip, Chamberlin finally received permission to travel with his wife through the afflicted regions in late September. Journalist William Stoneman sent the first word back to the States about their travels: "Chamberlin says after a two week trip . . . that 30% of the people in some villages died of typhus & famine. It must have been a ghastly spring in the villages." Stoneman did report one note of optimism, though: central authorities "have plenty [of grain] to support the cities, to replenish the army stores and to give more to the villages." Shortly after returning to Moscow,
Chamberlin visited his friend William Strang in the British Embassy. According to Strang, Chamberlin "often asked himself why the population did not flee en masse from the famine areas. He could only attribute their immobility to the characteristic Russian passivity of temperament. In the Ukraine he had the impression that the population could find nothing better to do than die as a protest."

Chamberlin thus explained the course (if not the cause) of the famine in terms of peasant passivity.

While the Monitor did not print Chamberlin's reports from Ukraine, The Manchester Guardian ran them as a five-part series under the rubric "The Soviet Countryside: A Tour of Inquiry." The early articles referred to "famine" conditions, and actions that were "no less ruthless than those of war," but also noted the "excellent crop" for 1933 and closed with a familiar statement about Russia as a "land of paradoxes." In the final article, Chamberlin mused about peasant inaction, searching for a "psychological explanation of this curious fatalism." He concluded that "those who died were . . . old-fashioned peasants who simply could not conceive of life without their individual farm." Even though Chamberlin discussed famine conditions openly, his reporting placed ample blame on the peasants' conservatism and recalcitrance.

Reports filed by Duranty and Chamberlin in the autumn of 1933 sounded quite similar. The New York Times reporter, for instance, tallied the results of the Five-Year Plan in an article entitled "Russia's Ledger." The costs of industrialization had been "prodigious, not only in lowered standard of living but in human suffering, even in human lives." Yet Duranty did not blame Soviet policy; the fault lay instead with the "innate conservatism of the farmer." Political liberties had been trampled by the "attempt of the Bolsheviks to submerge the individual in the state"—but such should be expected of Russia's political tradition, which so closely resembled the "despotism of Asia." Russian character—in this instance, at both individual and societal levels—explained Russian conditions. Duranty did not dwell on his recent trip, but he did assess Russian suffering as Chamberlin had: the previous year had "tightened the belts of the Russian people to an almost, but not quite, intolerable degree." In reports based on their respective trips through the famine regions, Duranty and Chamberlin both emphasized the human costs.
Both remained optimistic that the worst had passed. And, most strikingly, both blamed peasants' hardships on their own passivity as much as on Soviet policy.

In the long run, their travels led Duranty and Chamberlin toward sharply divergent views of the Soviet Union. Chamberlin's trip into the countryside marked the most important event in his once-gradual estrangement from the Soviets. While most of his reports filed before the trip—and even immediately afterward—shared much with Duranty's and Fischer's, Chamberlin subsequently altered his view of collectivization as a result of these travels. Whereas Chamberlin had earlier considered peasant "backwardness" an impediment to collectivization, he later came to believe the opposite, as evidenced by this observation: "It was not the more backward peasants, but the more progressive and well-to-do, who usually showed the greatest resistance to collectivization, and this not because they did not understand what the new policy would portend, but because they understood too well." 62

This view, appearing in his articles and books published in 1934, amounted to a recantation of his earlier ideas.

But in other articles appearing in the months after his harrowing trip through the devastated countryside, Chamberlin still expressed ambivalence about collectivization. After detailing, in one widely circulated article, the destruction wrought by famine, Chamberlin sounded a note of optimism: the "tenacious vitality [of] the semi-Asiatic peasantry" ensured that "recovery comes more easily than might be the case in a softer country." National character remained a crucial factor in Chamberlin's explanations of Soviet events, even as his political position began to shift. Reviewing a book of Duranty's collected dispatches, furthermore, Chamberlin defended the legitimacy of The New York Times reporter's claims: "Duranty consistently takes the line, a perfectly logical and defensible one, that the sufferings which, as he recognizes, have been and are being imposed on the Russian people in the name of socialism, industrialization, and collectivization are of small account by comparison with the bigness of the objectives at which the Soviet leaders are aiming." Similarly, in one 1934 article containing his estimate of 4 million famine-related deaths, Chamberlin repeated his earlier argument that "the poor harvest of 1932 was attributable in some degree to the apathy and discouragement of the peasants." 63
Unlike Chamberlin or Duranty, Fischer did not write, either publicly or privately, about living conditions through the remainder of 1933. A November letter to a friend promised only that he would give him the "lowdown" when they next met. Fischer's first mention of "the Ukrainian famine of 1933"—in a 1934 article from and about Spain—connected the famine to "prodigious efforts, now already crowned with considerable success, to give the country a new and permanently healthy agrarian base." Fischer did not directly address the "difficulties" of 1933 until well after the fact—in a 1934 Nation article, "In Russia Life Grows Easier." Those articles focused on Russia's "bright prospects," and improved supplies of clothing and food in major Soviet cities. These economic improvements had led to a decline in political opposition, which Fischer hoped would lead, in turn, to a curtailment of secret-police activities.64

Fischer maintained his general optimism about the Soviet Union through the publication of his Soviet Journey in 1935. The book devoted three pages to a discussion of the famine of 1932–1933, in which Fischer described his October travels through Ukraine. He told of food left rotting in the fields as the result of peasants' "passive resistance." Fischer blamed the peasants directly for having "brought the calamity upon themselves," and History itself provided the explanation:

\[It was a terrible lesson at a terrific cost. History can be cruel. The Bolsheviks were carrying out a major policy on which the strength and character of their regime depended. The peasants were reacting as normal human beings would. Let no one minimize the sadness of the phenomenon. But from the larger point of view the effect was the final entrenchment of collectivization. The peasantry will never again undertake passive resistance.65\]

Like Duranty and Chamberlin, Fischer stressed the positive results ensuing from Bolshevik victory in the countryside and connected the famine to peasant action (or inaction).

The issues resurfaced in 1935, when Chamberlin and Fischer traded blows over their reporting in 1933. After a week-long series on a famine raging in the
USSR appeared in Hearst newspapers, Fischer published a rebuttal of these claims in *The Nation*. Fischer, Lyons, and Chamberlin all agreed that there was no famine in Russia in 1935; Lyons, for one, called the Hearst series "patently doctored." But Chamberlin used the occasion to blast Fischer, sarcastically arguing that Fischer's denial of a 1935 famine made no mention of the famine of 1932–1933, which affected (in Chamberlin's words) "Ukraine [sic], the North Caucasus, considerable districts of the Lower and Middle Volga, and Turkestan." Claiming that Fischer had yet to make any "single, forthright unequivocal recognition of the famine," Chamberlin accused Fischer of using "misleading euphemistic terms" to describe Soviet events. Fischer's reply to Chamberlin, published in the same issue, defended his treatment of the famine and then turned the tables, accusing Chamberlin of one-sidedness for blaming only the Soviet government. If the famine was "man-made," as Chamberlin had charged, then "the peasants were the men who made it," wrote Fischer.

By the time of this dispute over the famine hoax, the four protagonists had parted ways. While all had started the decade positively inclined (to greater or lesser degrees) toward the Soviets, Lyons and Chamberlin had grown disenchanted with and even disgusted by the "Soviet experiment" by 1935. After the mid-1930s, these latter writers began writing slashing criticisms of both the Soviet Union and its American supporters. Duranty and Fischer quickly became targets, especially for their writings on the famine of 1932–1933. Fischer eventually did reconsider his views about the Soviet Union, writing about his new perspective with more thoughtfulness and considerably less acid than Lyons and Chamberlin had. Fischer's essay in the widely read *The God That Failed* (1949) attributed the famine to "Bolshevik haste and dogmatism." Reflecting on his fifteen years of enthusiastic support for the USSR, Fischer concluded that he had been "glorifying steel and kilowatts and forgetting the human being." Duranty, unlike the others, never recanted his earlier views outright. Later writings mentioned the famine, calling it "man-made" but wavering as to its origins. By 1949, Duranty's final book offered an apology of sorts: "Whatever Stalin's apologists may say, 1932 was a year of famine." While it may have appeared unintentional to those "on the spot," he explained, he now believed that authorities should be blamed for
their actions. The section closed by quoting Stalin: "Why blame the peasant? . . . For we [the Communist Party] are at the helm." 69

Lyons's and Chamberlin's rancor covered up their own actions and writings during the famine year—some of which bore marked similarities to those of their targets, Duranty and Fischer. In 1932–1933, all four authors portrayed the battle between the party and the countryside as one between determined modernizers and recalcitrant, fatalistic peasants. While reporting—and regretting—the loss of peasant lives, all four authors framed the loss of life as a necessary cost in the struggle for economic progress. All four journalists, furthermore, deployed stereotypes about Russian peasants in order to explain peasant actions (or ostensible inaction). Fischer and Chamberlin explicitly linked the horrible fate of the Soviet peasantry to visions of a modern, industrial society. The expression, repeated by these two as well as other journalists and scholars, that the Five-Year Plan represented Russia's attempt to "starve itself great" emphasized the hoped-for ends of industrialization over the brutal means. 70

Enthusiasm for Soviet economic development led American Russia-watchers of all political persuasions to support or at least withhold judgment on Soviet Five-Year Plans. This "romance of economic development" explains the widespread American support for the USSR far better than Lyons's harangues about "the Stalinist penetration of America." 71 Many commentators approved of Soviet-style industrialization while denouncing communism. Their support for Soviet efforts to modernize a "backwards" nation came in spite of their recognition of the tremendous human costs entailed. Even though they had some information about rural conditions during the famine, American observers had an easier time finding the sacrifices worthy because they considered the people sacrificed so unworthy. Common stereotypes about Russians served to explain their struggles and suffering. Conservative and apathetic peasants could be trusted to resist (but only passively) Soviet plans. To bring about important changes, so the logic went, would entail extreme hardships and even significant loss of life—which the peasants, fatalistic and inured to suffering, were especially well suited to endure. National-character stereotypes thus combined with enthusiasm for economic development to
resolve the tensions between ends and means in American writings on the USSR. As anticommunist economist Calvin Hoover put it, Russian peasants would not rise from their "Asiatic" laziness unless prompted by the "immediate stimulus of hunger." The worthy goal of modernization, Hoover and others implied, could be reached only through difficult if not violent means.

This dilemma of ends and means persisted through Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Writers in Mikhail Gorbachev's Russia (and other parts of the collapsing Soviet Union) wrestled with the historical meaning of the tragedies of the 1930s. A plaintive assessment by two journalists in 1990 stands out in this often nasty debate. Concluding a newspaper article on new research on the famine of 1932–1933, these writers struggled to sum up the Soviet period in a single paragraph: "It is not true," they wrote, "that nothing good was created [under the Soviets]. It is true that everything good came at too high a price." 73

Most Western journalists in Stalin's Moscow, spared the high price paid by the Russians, reached less poignant conclusions. Chamberlin noted the great loss of life but placed it in the context of Soviet goals: the villages he visited in the famine's aftermath, he wrote at the time, stood as "grim symbols of progress." Duranty, for his part, insisted that the peasants who died in the battle for control of the countryside had become "victims on the march toward progress." 74 That the march was a forced one, prodded by Soviet bayonets, concerned these journalists less than the ostensible destination.

The Soviet pattern of the early 1930s—a devastating famine, the very existence of which was contested abroad—reappeared with alarming precision during China's Great Leap Forward (1958–1960). 75 The all-out Chinese attempt at collectivization (like the Soviet case, designed to funnel resources to the industrial sector) led to chaos in the Chinese countryside. Government authorities instituted collectivization and political repression to gather whatever food they could to further economic and political goals. The breadbaskets of China, stripped of all food, became home to mass starvation, with death toll estimates as high as 26 million. 76
Western observers denied the existence of the famine in terms strikingly similar to those used by Moscow-based reporters in the 1930s. Edgar Snow, whose *Red Star Over China* (1938) introduced Mao Zedong to the English-speaking world, returned to China in 1960. Rumors of famine clearly weighed on Snow's mind, but he denied them outright: "I saw no starving people in China, nothing that looked like old-time famine." His travelogue later repeated the line of argument used by Duranty, Fischer, and Ralph Barnes regarding the Soviet famine: "Considerable malnutrition undoubtedly existed. Mass starvation? No."77 Snow's earlier writings on Chinese famine, based on his travels through northwest China in 1929–1931, furthermore, shared much with the Moscow correspondents. In that analysis, he complained that residents of the famine region did not take any steps to prevent or even delay their deaths: "I was profoundly puzzled by their passivity. For a while I thought nothing would make a Chinese fight."78 Peasant inaction, as much as government action, had been a central factor in Snow's Chinese famines.

While Snow's case is the most famous because he was granted permission to travel through the famine regions, other Western specialists came to the same conclusions without firsthand experience. Like those Western experts who stressed the global significance of the "Soviet experiment" in the 1930s, some China specialists of the 1960s trumpeted the achievements rather than the costs of the Great Leap Forward.79 The Hong Kong–based *Far Eastern Economic Review*, for instance, editorialized that "what is happening in China is of momentous importance . . . [as] a new model for human society and a new method of overcoming poverty."80 Scholars such as Gunnar Myrdal and John King Fairbank, the dean of American Sinology, downplayed or dismissed rumors of famine conditions.81

Debates about foreign coverage of the Chinese famine have resurfaced in recent years, with increasing acrimoniousness. Some Western Sinologists who had once been more sympathetic to the People's Republic of China—recapitulating the trajectory of Eugene Lyons and William Henry Chamberlin vis-à-vis the USSR—renounced their earlier views and criticized those with whom they once agreed. Ross Terrill, a onetime colleague of Fairbank's at Harvard, recently accused American Sinology of soft-peddling Maoist "social engineering" as
well as Mao himself—whom Terrill calls "pathological" and a "borderline personality." 82

Yet broader insights from the Soviet famine of 1932–1933 extend well beyond the parallels in China three decades later. The Soviet famine also revealed assumptions about modernization that came to stand at the center of American intellectual life in the decades after World War II. The concepts shaping Western responses to the Soviet famine—enthusiasm for development, reliance on national-character stereotypes, and ideas about "Asia"—operated in various combinations through 1950s and 1960s scholarship in the United States. They appeared at a moment when many intellectuals resolved to grapple with two central problems in the postwar global order: the Soviet Union on the one hand and economic development in the newly independent states of Asia and Africa on the other. The intellectual traffic between scholars of the Soviet Union and of the Third World was heavy, as scholars applied their understanding of Russian/Soviet history to the "battle for the hearts and minds of the Third World." 83

Many scholars made the trip themselves, working in both development studies and Russian/Soviet history. Important figures here include two of the scholars responsible for promoting modernization theory within and outside the academy, Walt Whitman Rostow and Cyril Black, as well as one of the earliest and most incisive critics of modernization, the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron. All three writers' works focused on economic aspects of modernization and revolved, to a great degree, around the question of the costs of development. All three drew lessons about such costs from the Soviet case. And in quite different ways, all three scholars employed parts of the logic used by those journalists covering the Soviet famine of 1932–1933. 84

The three scholars derived from the Russian experience lessons for Third World development. Gerschenkron first discussed his theory of "economic backwardness" at a 1951 conference called "The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas." He originally submitted his contribution as "Historical Bases of Appraising Economic Development in a Bipolar World," a title that emphasized the connection between Third World development and Soviet-
American antagonisms. The conference organizer, wary of promoting a paper with such a wordy title, proposed an alternative, which was later to earn Gerschenkron his reputation: "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective." That article drew lessons from Russia's "extreme relative backwardness" to show how such economies required significant levels of state intervention in order to industrialize. 85

Rostow, like Gerschenkron, drew lessons from the Russian experience for former colonies just beginning the process of development. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960)—subtitled "A Non-Communist Manifesto"—aimed to discredit the Soviet approach to industrialization. Yet the Russian experience was a touchstone throughout the book. His description of the role of the agricultural sector in industrialization fit the Soviet experience especially well: the rural sector provided foreign exchange (*via* the export of primary commodities) and government funds to promote industry (*via* taxes). 86

Black’s transit between the Russian past and the Third World present was even more frequent. Starting in 1960, he promoted the application of modernization theory to the study of Russian history by editing a conference volume, *The Transformation of Russian Society*. It included contributions by Gerschenkron, Talcott Parsons, and an impressive array of present and future leaders in Russian/Soviet studies. By the mid-1960s, he had expanded his field of inquiry dramatically, publishing a world-history primer called *The Dynamics of Modernization* (1966); its opening pages asserted that modernization was the third fundamental transformation of life on earth, on par with the rise of human life and the shift to settled agricultural societies. 87

Of these three postwar scholars, Black had by far the most in common with the journalists of the 1930s. First, he employed national-character traits with a frequency similar to Duranty, Chamberlin, Fischer, and Lyons. His introductory essay to the Russian-history volume stressed Russians' passivity, patience, and submissiveness. Like the earlier journalists, Black deployed these traits in the interests of economic development. The traits explained the combination of economic hardship and political coercion that defined the Soviet era. Russians' traditional fatalism—which, Black claimed, began to
wane only after World War II—explained the ease with which Soviet authorities could maintain their rule. Finally, Black shared the journalists' argument that progress would be costly, even fatal, but was ultimately necessary. Considering modernization "simultaneously creative and destructive," Black hardly hid the costs, arguing that violence in modernization was primarily the result of the "radical character of the changes inherent in modernization." Twenty years later, only months after Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, Black described economic change as a worthy justification for despotic rule: "We think autocracy is a bad thing. It crushes individuals. Yet in real life you have to get things done. You have to get organized. And the Russians from that point of view had a good government, an effective government, with all its shortcomings—and still [do]." Black envisioned modernization as a process through which all societies must pass; the degree of violence varied by political circumstances and especially "national character." The universalism of this vision is perhaps best exemplified by his conjecture that the process of modernization might eventually lead to a world so homogeneous that a "single world state" would emerge.

Rostow shared Black's universalism; his Stages insisted that all nations went through a similar process of modernization, differing primarily in timing. He had even less room for variation than did Black. Rostow agreed with Black about the sacrifices and even violence that could accompany the social transformations they both described. By the late 1950s, Rostow had worked out foreign-policy applications of his theory, centered on the costs of modernization. Economic change, he argued, "create[d] potential unrest by dislodging convictions and habit patterns which have in the past insured stability." Such instability would make developing nations vulnerable to propagandizing by communists, whom Rostow called "scavengers of the modernization process." He devoted a significant portion of his political career, as a foreign-affairs adviser to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, to establishing and implementing aid programs that would help prevent communist "scavengers" from taking advantage of the turmoil. This was a significant and explicit goal of the international "Economic Development Decade" he spearheaded in the 1960s.
Gerschenkron’s dissent from Rostow’s and Black’s universalism would eventually reveal an important application of cultural particularism. Gerschenkron’s theory of economic backwardness combined a heuristic for understanding industrialization with a method for explaining differences based on the degree of "relative backwardness." The state role necessary for the most backward nations would eventually wither away, Gerschenkron believed, as once-backward nations began to lessen the gap between "what is" and "what could be." Not prone to the national-character stereotyping so common among the 1930s journalists, the economic historian nevertheless incorporated one of their most important themes: the notion that Russian development was "Asian." While Rostow and Black saw modernization as a universal process oftentimes indistinguishable from westernization (in Rostow’s case, Americanization), Gerschenkron instead insisted on the separability of economic from political progress. The emergence of an industrial economy—the process he called westernization—could happen through the most "unwestern" means. Russia, to Gerschenkron, provided an excellent case: the Soviets’ "westernization of the economy," he wrote, was accompanied by its political "orientalization." "Asia" thus took on different meanings: in the political sphere, it implied repression and despotism; in the economic sphere, it suggested stagnation and resistance to development. The result, what he saw as Russia’s combination of economic advancement and political retrogression, nevertheless met its desired aims. While disparaging the Soviet "dictatorship," Gerschenkron conceded that it "no doubt has contributed to the course of industrialization more than any other single factor."92

Comparing Gerschenkron to Rostow and Black thus reveals interesting points of intersection and difference. Those endorsing the universalism of modernization theory argued that all nations undergo a similar process of social transformation and end up in a similar state: as an "integrated society" (Black) or in the "age of high-mass consumption" (Rostow). Like the journalists covering the Soviet famine of 1932–1933, Black and Rostow recognized the costs entailed but called for further modernization. Black carried the parallel with the journalists of the 1930s further, stressing that such costs relate to national-character traits. Rostow was swayed more by national interest than national character; he called for American aid to prevent the virus
of communism from affecting those paying the costs. Gerschenkron, on the 
other hand, did not universalize the process of modernization, insisting instead 
on significant variations in national experiences. He also defined progress as 
divisible—unlike Rostow and Black—and proposed that the Soviet Union 
represented economic progress enacted through political retrogression. 
Gerschenkron characterized such cases by employing the language of "Asia" so 
central to both Chamberlin and Duraty. To Gerschenkron, "Asia" defined a 
particular form of social change, a form found in early Soviet Russia. 93 None 
of these three postwar scholars went as far as the 1930s journalists in offering 
justifications for Soviet economic policy in the era of the first Five-Year Plans. 
Yet all of them incorporated one or another aspect of American journalists' 
explanation of causes and consequences of the famine. That such usage entered 
mainstream intellectual life, as a central project of Western social science in the 
1960s, suggests the durability of combining "national character" and 
economic development. Even though modernization theory fell out of academic 
favor in the late 1960s and beyond, the issues have hardly faded away.

The idea of a uniquely Asian variant of economic development was 
reappropriated by political leaders behind Asia's "economic miracle" of the 
early 1990s, including Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia's Raden 
Suharto. These leaders saw rapid industrialization under political 
authoritarianism as the expression of "Asian values," thus turning "Oriental 
despotism" from a criticism to a compliment. Critics of Singapore and 
Indonesia, however, had a different name: "development dictatorships." 
Differences in terminology expressed radically different resolutions of the 
tension between the goal of economic development and the methods used to 
attain that goal—a central tension for the field of development economics. 94 

Notions of the "Asiatic" eased this tension for many Western experts on 
economic change. Observers used the appellation to imply individuals' 
passivity, fatalism, and general unsuitability for modern economic life. 
Centuries-old conceptions of "Oriental despotism"—like more recent claims 
about "Asian values"—offered a ready explanation for economic development 
under strict political regimes. Interwar Russia experts, many of whom saw 
Russia as an "Asiatic" society, applied a similar logic. Their responses to the
Soviet famine of 1932–1933 reveal the potency of combining such national-character stereotypes with a belief in economic development at all costs. Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer, so often blamed for the lack of major coverage of the famine, shared most of these ideas with their chief critics, Eugene Lyons and William Henry Chamberlin. These four reporters invoked peasant "passivity" and "apathy" as innate personal characteristics, not just responses to circumstances of collectivization, to explain and perhaps even justify the devastation of the Soviet countryside.

Thirty years later, Western academics turned their attention to economic modernization of the former colonies and once again considered the relationship between "national character" and economic development. Cyril Black used individual Russian traits such as passivity to explain the nation's economic and political trajectories. Alexander Gerschenkron applied notions of "Asiatic" Russia to suggest the separability of economic and political development. While recognizing the human costs of economic change, Walt Rostow insisted on its ultimate benefits, revealing the continuing power of what George F. Kennan called "the romance of economic development." Kennan coined that phrase in 1932 to explain why Soviet youths were willing to tolerate great sacrifices during the first Five-Year Plan. Yet the romance held people of all nations under its sway—observers trying to explain industrialization's high costs as well as activists willing to endure those costs (and inflict them on others). Echoing Kennan's words a quarter-century later, future US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that university youths and other intellectuals "appear to be hypnotized by the image of large-scale industry." 95 Although both Kennan and Brzezinski focused on young people (their seduction by economic development or their hypnosis by large factories), such affairs of the heart were not mere teen infatuations. Economic development in the twentieth century was both made and understood by political leaders and intellectuals under a similar spell.
Endnotes

Special thanks to Ethan Pollock and Paul Sabin for reading this essay in multiple incarnations over four years, making innumerable suggestions and improvements. I am grateful to Nils Gilman and D'Ann Penner for sharing with me their respective areas of expertise. A preliminary version was presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies meeting in November 1996, with Lars Lih as commentator; Stephan Merl and Viktor Kondrashin also offered useful commentary on this and other occasions. Finally, I am grateful to Stanley Engerman, Michael Grossberg, Michael Willrich, and the anonymous AHR readers for their comments.


Agriculture and the Depression, Michigan Business Studies 5, No. 5 (1933).


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fresh from an assignment from TASS, the official Soviet news bureau, and determined to "bore from within" the capitalist system by working for a "bourgeois" news agency. Chamberlin's interest in Russia dated back to a stay in Greenwich Village in the early 1920s, when many Village radicals followed Russian events enthusiastically. The transformation from radical to conservative was common among interwar intellectuals in America; see, for example, John P. Diggins, *Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History* (New York, 1975); and, with more sympatico, Judy Kutulas, *The Long War: The Intellectual People's Front and Anti-Stalinism, 1930–1940* (Durham, North Carolina, 1995).


13. Especially given the prevalence of ethnic interpretations of this famine it is worth noting in passing that few of the observers in the 1920s and 1930s distinguished between Ukrainian and Russian "character traits." On Russian stereotypes of the peasantry, see especially Cathy A. Frierson, *Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late 19th Century Russia* (Oxford, 1993). The origins of Western stereotypes of Russians are beyond the scope of this article—see Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, California, 1994), for early uses of these categories. Such stereotypes were dominant in late 19th century French scholarship on Russia, scholarship widely read in the United States in both French and English; most influential in the United States were Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, Zenaide A. Ragozin, translator, 2 volumes (New York, 1893–96); and Alfred Rambaud, *The History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1877*, Leonora B. Lang, translator (New York, 1878). For these authors in context see Martha Helms Cooley, "Nineteenth-Century French Historical Research on Russia—Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu" (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1971). British authors making similar claims were also widely read in the United States: E. B. Lanin [pseudonym of E. J. Dillon], *Russian Traits and Terrors: A Faithful Picture of the Russia of To-day* (Boston, 1891); and Donald MacKenzie Wallace, *Russia*, 2 volumes (New York, 1877). On American reception see Norman E. Saul, *Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867–1914* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1996), especially pages 183–84. Important connections between "racial" stereotypes and development are outlined in Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Domination* (Ithaca, New York, 1989).

15. While many historians have noted (primarily in passing) the prevalence of Western claims of Russia’s "non-European" or "Asian" nature, fewer have explored the political and intellectual implications of these claims; see Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*; Anders Stephanson, *Kenna and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), chapter 1. The literature around Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1979), is of course relevant here.


17. These general comments about Soviet press censorship are based primarily on the materials in the foreign-ministry archive, scattered throughout various collections. Archival staff indicated in the spring of 1995 that the earliest documents in the Press Office collection date only to 1943. Other context comes from the discussions in memoirs and other writings by the office's principal "clientele," Western journalists themselves. A thorough, though dated, list of reporters is available in US Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *American Correspondents and Journalists in Moscow, 1917–1952: A Bibliography of Their Books on the USSR*, Bibliography No. 73 (27 March 1953).

18. For example, memoranda of conversation with Edwin James of *The New York Times* and Karl A. Bickel of the United Press are in (respectively) Podol’skii diary, 3 November 1930, *Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii* (hereafter, AVPRF), fond 0129 (Referantura po SShA), opis’ 13, papka 127, delo 319, list’ia 6–7 (hereafter, f./op./pap./d./ll.); Oumansky to NKID Collegium, 1 January 1933, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 16, pap. 128a, d. 335, ll. 21–22. Bickel, the director of the United Press (UP) syndicate, was in Moscow to renegotiate the UP agreement with TASS; see Joe Alex Morris, *Deadline Every Minute: The Story of the United Press* (Garden City, New Jersey, 1947), 189.

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19. Two prominent cases familiar to the subjects of this article were Paul Scheffer of Berliner Tageblatt and freelancer Maurice Hindus. On Scheffer see Louis Fischer, "The Case of Paul Scheffer," Nation 132 (31 August 1932): 195–96; Scheffer, Seven Years in Soviet Russia (With a Retrospect), Arthur Livingston, translator (London, 1933), vii–xvi; Bogdanov to Stomoniakov, 25 September 1930, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 13, pap. 127, d. 13, l. 1; and Kagan diary excerpt, July 16, 1932, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128, d. 328, l. 41. On Hindus see Gnedin to Oumansky, 23 October 1937 and 27 November 1937; also Astakhov to Oumansky, 2 April 1937—all in AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 20, pap. 133a, del. 342, ll. 5, 20, 24–24 ob., 32.

20. Bruce C. Hopper to Robert F. Kelley, 24 July 1932, in Box 5, Division of East European Affairs Records, State Department Records, Record Group 59, US National Archives; a similar letter appears in Box 35, Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University.

21. Otto Auhagen, "Wirtschaftslage der Sowjetunion im Sommer 1932," Osteuropa 7 (August 1932): 644–55 (quoted at page 645). The American "listening post" in Riga reported this article to Washington in Skinner to Secretary of State, 15 November 1932, 861.6131/261, SDDF. Auhagen was a former agricultural adviser in Moscow who left to direct the Osteuropa Institut in Breslau, under whose auspices Osteuropa was published; see Red Economics, Gerhard Dobbert, ed, (Boston, 1932), iii; Jutta Unser, "'Osteuropa'—Biographie einer Zeitschrift," Osteuropa 25 (September 1975): 562–63.


26. Enclosure 1 with Walter Edge to Secretary of State, 10 December 1932, 861.5017 Living Conditions/572, *SDDF*. The NKID Press Office was already wary of Duranty prior to his Paris trip, presumably because of his articles on the food shortages: Podol'skii to Rozenberg, 29 November 1932, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128, d. 328, l. 82. A Latvian diplomat in Moscow later reported that Duranty was "no longer regarded as a friend of the Bolsheviks" in the fall of 1932; Felix Cole to Secretary of State, 8 April 1933, 861.5017 Living Conditions/671, *SDDF*. Duranty frequently compared even the most dire Soviet circumstances favorably to what he saw as a reporter during World War I; see, for instance, "About the Author" in Walter Duranty, *One Life, One Kopeck* (New York, 1937), which records that Duranty's wartime service was "such a baptism of fire that nothing he saw afterwards in the Soviet Union made him turn a hair."


31. Diary entries, 1 December 1932, 4 and 11 January 1933, Muggeridge Diary. On his trip to the countryside see Muggeridge to Crozier [his editor at The Manchester Guardian], 14 January 1933, cited in Richard Ingrams, Muggeridge—The Biography (New York, 1995), 64. The articles were published in The Manchester Guardian: "Famine in North Caucasus," 25 March 1933; "Hunger in the Ukraine," 27 March 1933; and "Poor Prospects for Harvest," 28 March 1933. His reports were apparently delayed and toned down (he used the word "mangled") by his editors; see Marco Carynnyk, "The Famine The Times Couldn't Find," Commentary 76 (November 1983): 33. See also Ingrams, Muggeridge, 62–69; and David Ayerst, The Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper (London, 1971), 511–13.

32. Improvement—telegram 24142, folder 4, Box 28, Henry Shapiro Papers, Library of Congress; drama—telegram 10120, folder 7, Box 28; not hopeless—telegram 15134, folder 7, Box 28; apathy—telegram 12152, folder 8, Box 28. Shapiro was Lyons’s successor with the United Press syndicate in Moscow. Unfortunately, none of the telegrams in these folders is dated.

33. This narrative is reconstructed from chapter 5 of Stoneman's autobiography (dated 1 March 1967), Box 1, William Stoneman Papers, Bentley Library, University of Michigan; Stoneman interview with Whitman Bassow, 10 November 1984, Box 2, Whitman Bassow Papers, Library of Congress. Also see Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 545–46 and Stoneman to Harrison Salisbury, 16 May 1979, cited in Taylor, Stalin's Apologist, 202, 235. Stoneman had always taken an interest in rural food supply, ending his first tour in Russia (in 1932) with reflections on localized shortages; see Edward Brodie to Secretary of State, 24 February 1932, 761.00/221, SDDF.

6 February 1933. Barnes's high regard for Durany's work might well suggest that Barnes may have adopted Durany's argument as his own; see Ralph Barnes to Joseph Barnes [no relation], 4 June 1932, Box 6, Joseph Barnes Papers, Columbia University Library.


36. "Conversation with Comrade Podolskii, chief Censor of Moscow Foreign office—Tuesday, 23 February 1933," Box 1, Stoneman Papers.

37. Walter Durany, Durany Reports Russia, selected and arranged by Gustavus Tuckerman, Jr. (New York, 1934), 295 (dispatch dated 29 January 1933) [future citations will be page number (dispatch date)]. Durany, "Russia's Peasant: The Hub of a Vast Drama," Durany Reports Russia, 265, 274 (2 February 1933), 304, 306 (27 February 1933).


42. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 576. While the Press Office chief's name would today be transliterated as Konstantin Umanskii, he wrote his name as used in the text above.


44. The party is not mentioned in Stoneman's "Autobiography" (Box 1, Stoneman Papers) or in Robin Kincaid's recollections (interview, 18 February 1985, in unnumbered box,


47. Duranty, *Duranty Reports Russia*, 313 (6 April 1933); Walter Duranty, "Soviet Peasants Are More Helpful," *NYT*, 14 May 1933 (dateline Odessa, by mail to Paris, 26 April 1933). On the trip routing, see Duranty to James, n.d. [mid-April 1933?]; and James to Duranty, 21 April 1933, both on reel 32, James Papers; Duranty, *I Write As I Please* (New York, 1935), 61.

48. "Mr. Jones Replies" [letter to the editor], *NYT*, 13 May 1933.


52. On Duranty’s dissatisfaction see Duranty to James, 15 August 1933, Adolph Ochs Papers, *New York Times Archive*; Duranty to Birchall, 15 August 1933, reel 63, James Papers; and Whitman Bassow, *The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting Russia from the
Revolution to Glasnost (New York, 1988), 88. His editors' complaints are contained in James to Sulzberger, 2 August 1933, Birchall to James, 16 August 1933, both in personnel files, Arthur Hays Sulzberger Papers, New York Times Archive; James to Sulzberger, 23 August 1933, reel 63, James Papers; James to Adolph Ochs, 5 September 1933, Ochs Papers. The NKID Press Office was well aware of these tensions; see Podol'skii diary, 31 December 1933, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128a, d. 335, l. 16.


54. Duranty to James, 28 August 1933, James to Duranty, 29 August 1933, Birchall to James, 31 August 1933, all on reel 33, James Papers. Litvinov to Iagoda, 13 September 1933, AVPRF, f. 05, op. 13, pap. 90, d. 14, l. 73.


63. William Henry Chamberlin, "Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry," *Foreign Affairs* 12 (April 1934): 503, 505; Chamberlin, "The Balance Sheet of the Five-Year Plan," *Foreign Affairs* 11 (April 1933): 458, 466; Chamberlin, "As One Foreign Correspondent to Another," *Christian Science Monitor Magazine*, 2 May 1934. While many critics of Duranty and Fischer have cited the chapter in Chamberlin's *Russia's Iron Age* entitled "The Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry," fewer have cited his article with the same title in *Foreign Affairs*. Although the materials appear to have been written within a month of each other—and many paragraphs appear in both pieces—they differ substantially in tone. The stand-alone article focuses on character traits such as apathy and tenacity far more than the book does. One intermediate argument connects peasant apathy to the economic and extra-economic measures of the Soviet state. See Chamberlin, "Russia without the Benefit of a Censor: Famine Proves Strong Weapon in Soviet Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 May 1934.


67. William Henry Chamberlin, "The Ukrainian Famine" [letter to the editor], *Nation* 140 (29 May 1935): 629; Fischer, "Louis Fischer's Interpretation" [reply], *ibid*, 629–30; Lyons, *Red Decade*, 141. See also Freda Kirchwey's letters to Fischer, 14 and 22 March 1935, and June 1935, folder 168, Box 10, Freda Kirchwey Papers, Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe College. This last letter noted the extensive controversy about the Chamberlin-
Fischer exchange and celebrated the resulting increase in newsstand sales.


1949), 68–69; Taylor, *Stalin’s Apologist*, 236–37. Duranty is loosely translating Stalin's
speech of 11 January 1933, "O rabotev derevne," *Sochineniia*, 13 volumes (Moscow,
1952), 13: 233, italics in original.

70. Fischer is quoted in *Experiences in Russia—1931: A Diary* (Pittsburgh, 1931), 85. Other
instances include H. R. Knickerbocker (a journalist and close friend of Duranty’s),
"Everyday Russia," in *The New Russia: Eight Talks Broadcast by the BBC* (London,
1931), 21; Bruce Hopper to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 18 January 1930, Box 35,
Armstrong Papers; and Boris Brutzkus, *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia* (London,
1935), 226.

71. See, for instance, Richard H. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and
Social Thought in the Depression Years* (New York, 1973); Paul Hollander, *Political
Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba* (1984;
reprinted edition, Lanham, Md., 1991), chapter 3; Frank A. Warren, *Liberals and
Communism: The "Red Decade" Reconsidered* (New York, 1966); John P. Diggins,
"Limping after Reality: American Intellectuals, the Six Myths of the USSR, and the
Precursors of Anti-Stalinism," in *Il mito dell’URSS: La cultura occidentale e l’Unione
Sovietica*, Marcello Flores, ed, (Milan, 1990); and Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor?
Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United


73. S. and P. P. Zavorotnyi, "Operatsiia Golod: Vosem’ mesiatsev 1932–33 goda unesla

1933; Duranty, *I Write As I Please*, 288.

75. While finding many commonalities in the Soviet and Chinese famines Thomas P. Bernstein
also notes differences, most notably that Soviet authorities (unlike the Chinese twenty-five
years later) saw the peasants as the enemy of the state; see Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine
and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap Forward," *Theory and
Society* 13 (May 1984): 339–78. I am also indebted to D’Ann Penner’s published
("Agrarian 'Strike'") and unpublished work for comparisons of the Soviet and Chinese

............ 102 ............


80. "Wheat and Chaff" [editorial], *Far Eastern Economic Review* 29 (29 September 1960): 691. While Becker cites this article disapprovingly (*Hungry Ghosts*, 299), he does not put it in the context of that magazine’s rather pessimistic view of the Chinese economic plan; the remainder of the editorial, in fact, is a complaint about China’s press policies.


83. Nobel laureate W. Arthur Lewis was among those calling attention to this relationship; see *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London, 1955), 431. For more detailed discussions

84. Rostow and Black represent important, economically oriented, strands of modernization theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, though far from the only ones. Other scholars associated with "modernization" concepts, such as Alex Inkeles, also undertook studies of the Soviet Union. Though Rostow's original training was in economic history—his PhD dissertation analyzed economic growth in nineteenth-century England—he also wrote a widely circulated book on the Soviet Union (The Dynamics of Soviet Society [New York, 1953]); see also W. W. Rostow, "Marx Was a City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail," Harper's Magazine 210 (February 1955): 25–30. For biographical details on Rostow see his reminiscences, "Development: The Political Economy of the Marshallian Long Period," in Pioneers in Development, Gerald M. Meiers and Dudley Sears, eds, (Oxford, 1984). Critiques of modernization theory have been a growth industry in recent years; see Adas, Machines as the Measure of Man, 402–18; Ian Roxborough, "Modernization Theory Revisited: A Review Article," Comparative Studies in Society and History 30 (1988): 753–61; and especially Michael Edward Latham, "Modernization as Ideology: Social Science Theory, National Identity, and American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1996, forthcoming, Chapel Hill, North Carolina., 2000). I have also learned much about the meanings of modernization theory from ongoing discussions and disagreements with Nils Gilman, who is currently completing his dissertation on the topic.


90. Black, *Dynamics*, 164. In that work, Black outlined a taxonomy of seven types of modernization based primarily on timing and political systems. See 106–28.


Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Walter Duranty - “the greatest liar of any journalist I have ever met,” - Malcolm Muggeridge

He reported “there is no famine,” The New York Times, 31 March 1933.
He claimed “any report of a famine is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda” The New York Times, 24 August 1933.
Then he admitted privately, to William Strang (British Embassy, Moscow 26 September 1933) that “it is quite possible that as many as ten million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.”

Revoke Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize!

Name
Address
Postal Code
Signature

e-mail: pulitzer@usa.pulitzer.org

To: The Pulitzer Prizes
Columbia University
709 Journalism Building
2950 Broadway
New York, NY, USA 10027

Published by the Ukrainian Coalition Civil Liberties Association with the support of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (Society, Committee), the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian World Congress.
Ukrainians demand Pulitzer be revoked

VICTOR MALAREK

*The Globe and Mail*, 2 May 2003
Reprinted with permission of *The Globe and Mail*

More than 45,000 postcards were mailed yesterday to the Pulitzer Prize Committee demanding that it posthumously revoke a *New York Times* journalist’s award because of his reports that a man-made famine that killed millions of peasants in Ukraine in 1932-1933 never happened.

The postcard campaign, spearheaded by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Toronto, points out that *New York Times* correspondent Walter Duranty lied about the famine in his dispatches from Russia, saying that “any report of a famine is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda.”

The campaign was launched to mark the 70th anniversary of the Ukrainian famine.

Lubomyr Luciuk, research director for the association, said Mr. Duranty was “a consummate liar whose reports covered up a brutal genocide. The Pulitzer Prize committee should maintain its integrity by revoking posthumously the Prize it awarded to a man who lied.”

Mr. Duranty, who was *The Times’s* Moscow correspondent from 1921 to 1934, on the Pulitzer for a series of reports in 1931 about Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin’s Five-Year Plan to reform the economy.
However, archives turned up years later reveal that Mr. Duranty admitted privately to a high-ranking diplomat at the British embassy in Moscow in September, 1933, that “it is quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.”

Sig Gissler, administrator for the Pulitzer Prizes, said that the Board is aware of the complaints. “They’ve come up from time to time through the years.” He noted that the Board gave the issue “substantial consideration” in 1990 and “after careful consideration of the issue, it decided not to withdraw the Prize that was given over 70 years ago in a different time under different circumstances.” He added that the Board is not considering reversing its stand. Mr. Gissler also pointed out that Mr. Duranty, who died in 1957, received the award for his reporting in 1931 on Stalin’s Five-Year Plan. “It is inaccurate to say the Prize was given for his reporting on the famine, which occurred in 1932-1933.”

Mr. Luciuk countered that throughout his stint in Moscow, Mr. Duranty was nothing more than a propagandist for Stalin. “How can he be honest one year and a liar the very next? He is a stain on the Pulitzer Prize and he should not be honoured as an outstanding journalist in any way.”

Mr. Luciuk said Mr. Duranty betrayed the most fundamental principle of journalism by “not truthfully reporting on what he witnessed. Over many years, in fact, he did just the opposite, and viciously smeared as propagandists those honest journalists who dared tell the truth.” He said the Prize should be revoked to preserve the integrity of journalism and the stature of the Pulitzer Prize. “Those who say that his Prize was earned for what he wrote before 1932 are being disingenuous,” he said. “Duranty was used as a shill for the Soviets before, during and after the Great Famine. Perhaps those who honoured him with a Pulitzer in 1932 did not fully know just how dishonest he was. Now we, and the jurors of the Pulitzer Prize committee, and the editors, writers and owners of The New York Times, know better.”
In his dispatches, Mr. Duranty, one of the first Western journalists allowed to interview Stalin, repeatedly dismissed reports of the famine in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, peasants in the countryside were starving to death by the millions while Soviet authorities confiscated crops, grain and livestock in an effort to force collectivization on the independence-minded farmers. British writer Malcolm Muggeridge, who reported on the famine for The Manchester Guardian, once called Mr. Duranty “the greatest liar of any journalist I have ever met in 50 years of journalism.”

Catherine Mathis, vice-president of corporate communications for The New York Times, said the newspaper has criticized Mr. Duranty’s reporting. In a display of its Pulitzer Prize winners, The Times points out that “other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.”
Earlier this year, the call went out to Ukrainian Americans to write letters to the Pulitzer Prize Board seeking the revocation of the Pulitzer Prize awarded in 1932 to Walter Duranty of The New York Times. That action was meant to attract the attention of the Board just before its deliberations about this year’s crop of Pulitzer Prizes. We have no way of knowing how many letters were sent, but we do know that Sig Gissler, administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes, sent out form letters responding that “complaints about the Prize for Mr. Duranty have been raised on and off through the years. However, to date, the Pulitzer Board has not seen fit to reverse a previous Board’s decision that now stretches back 70 years.” Furthermore, he noted that Duranty’s Prize in 1932 “was for a specific set of stories in the previous year - namely, 1931” - not the years of the Famine of 1932-1933.

What he neglected to mention, however, was the Duranty’s Prize was given for a series of articles - “especially the working out of the Five-Year Plan.” That Five-Year Plan, as we all know, called for the forced collectivization of farms, which led to the Great Famine in Ukraine. Duranty effusively praised Stalin’s Five-Year Plan. His subsequent stories denied the Famine at the same time that he told others that millions - perhaps as many as 10 million - had perished. Indeed Duranty’s role in Moscow was more that of a propagandist for Stalin than a correspondent.
In 1986, *Times* publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, when asked if the newspaper would return Duranty’s Pulitzer, replied: “what we report has to stand, for better or worse, as our best contemporary effort. ... That contemporary Pulitzer jurors thought him worthy of a Prize for the things he did write from Moscow is a judgment I am neither equipped nor entitled to second-guess at this date. ... it is not a Prize *The Times* can take back.”

In 1987, *Times* executive editor Max Frankel - reacting to the revelation in a recently declassified State Department document that “in agreement with *The New York Times* and the Soviet authorities,” the dispatches of Duranty always “reflect(ed) the official opinion of the Soviet regime and not his own” - said this “doesn’t seem to qualify as news. It’s really history, and belongs in history books.”

In 1990, Karl A. Meyer of *The Times*, in a feature on its editorial page called “The Editorial Notebook,” acknowledged that what Duranty wrote from his post in Moscow constituted “some of the worst reporting to appear in this newspaper.”

In 2001, in the book *Written into History*, which contains Pulitzer reporting of the 20th century from *The Times*, there is a parenthetical notation after Duranty’s name: “Other writers in *The Times* and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.” Elsewhere it is noted that Duranty’s Prize “has come under a cloud”; his reporting “ignored the reality of Stalin’s mass murder.”

Earlier this year, contacted by *The Washington Times* about the campaign to revoke Duranty’s Pulitzer, Catherine Mathis, vice-president of corporate communications for *The New York Times Company*, was quoted as saying: “The Pulitzer Board has reviewed the Duranty Prize several times over the years, and the Board has never seen fit to revoke it. In that situation, *The Times* has not seen merit in trying to undo history.”

But this campaign is not about undoing history. It’s about righting a wrong. If *The Times* does not want to do the right thing - as it has demonstrated over and over again - and voluntarily relinquish Duranty’s ill-gotten Pulitzer, then the Pulitzer Prize Board must act to undo this injustice. No other response will do.
Pulitzer Prize Board begins review of Duranty’s award

ANDREW NYNKA

The Ukrainian Weekly, 25 May 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly

In response to an international campaign, The Pulitzer Prize Board has begun an “appropriate and serious review” of the award given to Walter Duranty of The New York Times, an administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes said on May 20. The Board’s administrator said in a telephone interview that the review began as a result of the thousands of letters and e-mails the Board received in early May. A confidential review by the 18-member Pulitzer Prize Board is intended to seriously consider all relevant information regarding Mr. Duranty’s award, said Sig Gissler, administrator for the Pulitzer Prizes.

“There are no written procedures regarding Prize revocation. There are no standards or precedents for revoking the Prize. We look at what would be reasonable and analyze the factors that would have to be considered,” Mr. Gissler said, referring to the fact that since the creation of the Pulitzer Prizes in 1917 the Board has never revoked an award. Complaints regarding a particular Pulitzer winner are not uncommon, Mr. Gissler said. However, he did say that in this case, the Board received an unusually large number of letters and postcards. The letters, postcards and e-mails the Pulitzer office received since the campaign began this spring have not yet been accurately counted, but Mr. Gissler did say that the number was in the thousands. Most of the correspondence has come from the United States and Canada, Mr. Gissler said, although he did remember seeing return mailing addresses from England and Australia as well.
The campaign to posthumously strip Mr. Duranty of his award was initiated by Dr. Lubomyr Luciuk, director of research for the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, as a way to call further attention to the 70th anniversary commemoration of the Great Famine of 1932-1933. While the issue recently gained steam, Mr. Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize has always been contentious within the Ukrainian community. Many are angered that *The New York Times* correspondent is still honoured with one of journalism’s most prestigious awards even though information shows he repeatedly lied to and knowingly misled his readers about the situation in Ukraine in order to curry favour with the Soviet regime then in power. Mr. Gissler pointed out that the awards are given for a specific story or set of stories in the year prior to when the award is announced. In Mr. Duranty’s case, he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for Correspondence for a series of dispatches that occurred in 1931 - a year before the Famine began.

According to the Pulitzer website, *The New York Times* correspondent won the award in 1932 for “his series of dispatches on Russia, especially the working out of the Five-Year Plan.”

However, in a letter sent to Mr. Gissler on 26 April, Dr. Luciuk wrote: “To try and dodge this issue by suggesting that his Prize was given for what [Mr. Duranty] wrote before the Great Famine is a sophistry, for Duranty was already serving Soviet interests by 1931, and would continue doing so for many years thereafter. Duranty prostituted his calling for personal gain and, as such, his continuing grasp on a Pulitzer Prize soils all Pulitzer Prizes.”

The campaign asked that the Pulitzer Prize Board revoke Mr. Duranty’s Prize for a series of knowingly erroneous reports he made from the former Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian countryside, while a famine was happening there.

The campaign - which was supported by the Association of Ukrainians of Great Britain, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Ukrainian American Justice Committee, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian World Congress
- was meant to attract the Pulitzer Board’s attention to the issue at a time when the Board comes together to discuss candidates for the award. Mr. Gissler did not say when such a review would be completed and would not speculate on whether there were any circumstances under which a Pulitzer would be revoked.
Resolution on the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide
Senate of Canada

Moved by the Honourable Senator Raynell Andreychuk
19 June 2003

That this House calls upon the Government of Canada:

*to recognize the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and to condemn any attempt to deny or distort this historical truth as being anything less than genocide;*

*to designate the fourth Saturday in November of every year throughout Canada as a day of remembrance of the more than seven million Ukrainians who fell victim to the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933; and*

*to call on all Canadians, particularly historians, educators and parliamentarians, to include the true facts of the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 in the records of Canada and in future educational material.*

*GIVEN THAT* the Genocide of Ukrainians (now commonly referred to as the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and referred to as such in this Motion) engineered and executed by the Soviet regime under Stalin to destroy all opposition to its imperialist policies, caused the deaths of over seven million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933;

*THAT* on 26 November 1998, the President of Ukraine issued a Presidential Decree establishing that the fourth Saturday in November be a National Day of Remembrance for the victims of this mass atrocity;
THAT the fourth Saturday in November has been recognized by Ukrainian communities throughout the world as a day to remember the victims of the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and to promote the fundamental freedoms of a democratic society;

THAT it is recognized that information about the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 was suppressed, distorted, or wiped out by Soviet authorities;

THAT it is only now that some proper and accurate information is emerging from the former Soviet Union about the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933;

THAT many survivors of the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 have immigrated to Canada and contributed to its positive development;

THAT Canada condemns all war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides;

AND THAT Canadians cherish and defend human rights, and value the diversity and multicultural nature of Canadian society.
A Tale of Two Journalists: Walter Duranty, Gareth Jones, and the Pulitzer Prize

JAMES MACE

The Day, 15 July 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Day (Kyiv) and the author

On 24 June the Pulitzer Prize Committee was sent an open letter by Dr. Margaret Siriol Colley and Nigel Linsan Colley, too long to be recounted here in full. The lady is the niece of one Gareth Jones (1905-1935), a journalist who had had the courage to tell the truth about the despicable things he had seen in Ukraine in the spring of 1933. For his courage he paid with his professional reputation and being long all but forgotten. The hatchet man in this tale was one Walter Duranty, winner of the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for writing stories from the Soviet Union, reportage that he had already freely confessed “always reflected the official Soviet point of view and not his own.” And here begins a tale of one journalist being crushed for his honesty and another rewarded for his mendacity. It is a tale that touches directly both on the ethics of journalism and the history of Ukraine.

Journalists often like to think of themselves as fearless fighters for the public’s right to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. To reward those who actually did so an extremely successful Hungarian-born American journalist named Joseph Pulitzer willed that his legacy be used in part to fund Prizes in his name for outstanding achievements in drama, letters, music, and journalism. The Prizes, modest in money but tremendous in terms of the honour they convey on their recipients, have been awarded annually since
1917. In reality, journalists, like everyone else, are rarely completely faithful to the ideals they profess. And Prizes, even prestigious ones like the Pulitzer, sometimes go to scoundrels. Dr. Colley demands the revocation of the Pulitzer Prize from the scoundrel that led a campaign for Stalin’s Soviet Union from the most prestigious newspaper in the United States, *The New York Times*, to discredit her uncle for honestly trying to do what journalists are supposed to do, for telling people the truth.

Walter Duranty, born in Liverpool (England) in 1884, was always something of a scoundrel and openly relished in being able to get away with it. In S. J. Taylor’s excellent biography, *Stalin’s Apologist*, he is seen lying even about his own family origins, claiming in his autobiography to have been an only child orphaned at ten, neither of which was true: his mother died in 1916 and his sister fourteen years later, a spinster; when his father died in 1933, he left an estate of only 430 British pounds sterling.

After finishing his university studies, he drifted to Paris, where he dabbled in Satanism, opium, and sex on both sides of the bed-sheets. By the time World War I broke out, he had a job as a reporter for *The New York Times* and could thus avoid actual combat. Duranty seems to have known that the key to success in journalism can often be in first determining what the readers want and then gauging how the facts might fit in with it. His reportage was always lively, eminently readable, and usually — but by no means always — had some relationship to the facts. Still, he realized that in the American free press, newspapers are made to make money for their owners, and the reporter’s job is to write something people would want to read enough that they would go out and buy his employer’s newspaper. It is the classic relationship between labour and management in a market economy: the more effective a worker is at helping his employer make more money, the better chance he stands of getting higher pay, a better job, or other attributes of worldly success.

For Duranty, this system seems to have worked quite well. After the war, he was sent to the newly independent Baltic States and in 1921 was among the first foreign reporters allowed into the Soviet Union. This latter achievement was a major one, for the Soviet Union was never shy about exercising control
over who could come or leave. A Western reporter in the Soviet Union always knew that if one wrote something offensive enough to the Soviet authorities, he would be expelled and never allowed to return.

There was thus a strong professional incentive not to be that person. Duranty understood this better than anyone else, but just in case someone among the journalists forgot this simple truth, there was a Soviet press officer to remind him. During the First Five-Year Plan, the head of the Soviet Press Office was Konstantin Umansky (or Oumansky: he liked it better the French way). Eugene Lyons, who had known Umansky at a distance since he had been a TASS correspondent in the United States and the latter chief of its Foreign Bureau, probably knew this little man with black curly hair and gold teeth as well as any of the foreign correspondents. He described the system as more one of give-and-take, with the foreign correspondents sometimes backing the censor down through a show of professional solidarity (it would have been, after all, too much of an embarrassment for the Soviets to expel all the foreign correspondents), often in a spirit of give-and-take and compromise. But the telegraph office would simply not send cables without Umansky’s permission. Moreover, convinced that the Soviet experiment was so much superior to the all too evident evils of capitalism, a huge segment of the West’s intellectuals wanted desperately to look with hope on the Soviet experiment, which, for all its failures, seemed to offer a beacon. And in a world where access to newsmakers is often the only thing between having something to print or not, access to power itself becomes a commodity. As Lyons himself put it his memoir, Assignment in Utopia (1937):

*The real medium of exchange in Moscow, buying that which neither rubles nor dollars can touch, was power. And power meant Comrade Stalin, Comrade Umansky, the virtuoso of kombinatsya, the fellow who’s uncle’s best friend has a cousin on the collegium of the GPU. To be invited to exclusive social functions, to play bridge with the big-bugs, to be patted on the back editorially by Pravda, to have the social ambitions of one’s wife flattered: such inducements are more effective in bridling a correspondent’s tongue than any threats... Whether in Moscow or Berlin, Tokyo or Rome, all the temptations*
for a practicing reporter are in the direction of conformity. It is more comfortable and in the long run more profitable to soft-pedal a dispatch for readers thousands of miles away than to face an irate censor and closed official doors.

Both Lyons and Duranty knew the rules of this game so well that both had been rewarded before the Holodomor by being granted an interview with Stalin himself, the Holy Grail of the Moscow foreign press corps. Umansky knew how to award and punish foreigners. Perhaps this is why he would later move on into the diplomatic beau monde of Washington, DC Lyons, who came to Russia as an American Communist sycophant, then becoming a disillusioned anti-Communist, paid the price. His lady translator, it seems, brought to his attention an item in Molot, a newspaper from Rostov-on-the-Don, designed to cow the local inhabitants but not for foreign consumption, announcing the mass deportation of three Ukrainian Cossack stanitsas from the Kuban. Nine months after he broke the story, he was gone from the Soviet Union, for good.

Into this world walked a young English socialist, Malcolm Muggeridge, who had married the niece of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, then icons in the Soviet Union for their work to turn the Soviet experiment into an icon for socialist intellectuals in the West. Coming from such a background, young Malcolm and his wife even sold their furniture, convinced that they would remain in the Soviet Union, as he reported for The Manchester Guardian. Yet, when he arrived, he quickly saw that the Five-Year Plan was not quite all it was cracked up to be. Perhaps the first inkling of the panoply of characters he happened onto was at a reception at the British Embassy in Moscow in the fall of 1932 when he found himself sitting between old Soviet apologist Anna Louise Strong and the great Duranty, the most famous foreign correspondent of his day and fresh from his Pulitzer Prize. Miss Strong, he wrote in his memoirs, Chronicles of Wasted Time (1972), “was an enormous woman with a very red face, a lot of white hair, and an expression of stupidity so overwhelming that it amounted to a strange kind of beauty,” adding:

Duranty, a little sharp-witted energetic man, was a much more controversial person; I should say there was more talk about him in
Moscow than anyone else, certainly among foreigners. His household, where I visited him once or twice, included a Russian woman named Katya, by whom I believe he had a son. I always enjoyed his company; there was something vigorous, vivacious, preposterous, about his unscrupulousness which made his persistent lying somehow absorbing. I suppose no one — not even Louis Fischer — followed the Party Line, every shift and change, as assiduously as he did. In Oumansky’s eyes he was perfect, and was constantly held up to the rest of us as an example of what we should be. It, of course, suited his material interests thus to write everything the Soviet authorities wanted him to — that the collectivisation of agriculture was working well, with no famine conditions anywhere; that the purges were justified, the confessions genuine, and the judicial procedure impeccable. Because of these acquiescent attitudes — so ludicrously false that they were a subject of derision among the other correspondents and even [the Soviet censor] Podolsky had been known to make jokes about them — Duranty never had any trouble getting a visa, or a house, or interviews with whomever he wanted.

Such subservience to a regime that was one of two truly evil systems of the 20th century, for which the term totalitarianism is most often applied, was marked by a veneer of objective analysis and certainly not without insight — he was the first to have “put his money on Stalin,” as he put it, and is even credited with having first coined the word Stalinism to describe the evolving System — and he was always fascinating to read, even more to talk to. He was the most famed foreign correspondent of the time; a nice apartment in Moscow complete with a live-in lover, by whom he did indeed beget a son, and an oriental servant to do the cooking and cleaning; was the social center of the life of foreigners in Moscow; and took frequent trips abroad, as he put it, to retain his sense of what was news.

Simultaneously, there was a strange sort of honesty to his privately admitting that he was indeed an apologist. In the 1980s, during the course of my own research on the Ukrainian Holodomor, I came across a most interesting
document in the US National Archives, a memorandum from one A. W. Kliefoth of the US Embassy in Berlin, dated 4 June 1931 (see appendix 2). Duranty dropped in to renew his passport. Mr. Kliefoth thought it might be of possible interest to the State Department that this journalist, in whose reporting so much credence was placed, had told him “that ‘in agreement with The New York Times and the Soviet authorities,’ his official dispatches always reflect the official opinion of the Soviet government and not his own’.” Note that the American consular official thought it particularly important for his superiors that the phrase, “in agreement with The New York Times and the Soviet authorities,” was a direct quotation. This was precisely the sort of journalistic integrity that was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1932.

Into the world of Moscow journalism, a world where everybody had to make his own decision on the moral dilemma Lyons’ framed as “to tell or not to tell,” came one Gareth Jones, a brilliant young man who had studied Russian and graduated with honours from Cambridge and became an adviser on foreign policy to former British prime minister, David Lloyd George. At the age of 25, in 1930, he went to the Soviet Union to inform his employer about what was happening there. His reports were considered so straightforward that they were then published in London in The Times as “An Observer’s Notes.” The following year he returned and published some of the materials under his own name. Having gained a reputation for integrity in honestly trying to get to the bottom of things, in 1932 he wrote with foreboding about the food situation as people asked, “Will there be soup?”

By the early spring of 1933, the fact that famine was raging in Ukraine and the Kuban, two-thirds of the population of which happened to be Ukrainian, was common knowledge in Moscow among foreign diplomats, foreign correspondents, and even the man in the street. In response to Lyon’s “revelations” from the regional official Soviet press, a ban had been imposed on foreign journalists traveling to the areas in question. Upon checking with his colleagues in Moscow as to what they knew — on the understanding, of course, that their names would never be mentioned — Jones decided it was worth defying the prohibition and bought a ticket at the train station to the places affected as a private person, which was not forbidden. Once there, he
employed his simple but logical method of getting off the train and walking for several hours until he was certain he was off the beaten track and start talking to the locals.

He spent a couple of weeks, walked about forty miles, talked to people, slept in their huts, and was appalled at what he saw. Rushing back to Moscow and out of the Soviet Union, Jones stopped off first in Berlin, where he gave a press conference, and fired off a score of articles about the tragedy he had seen firsthand. “I walked alone through villages and twelve collective farms. Everywhere was the cry, ‘There is no bread; we are dying.’…” (The Manchester Guardian, 30 March 1933).

Young Muggeridge, who would live to a ripe old age and become one of the most revered journalists of the 20th century, had done much the same. He sent his dispatches out through the British diplomatic pouch, and published much the same earlier, under the anonymous byline of “An Observer’s Notes.” These created barely a ripple because his story was the unconfirmed report of some unknown observer. Yet, now stood young Mr. Jones, the confidant of prime ministers and millionaires, a young man who was able to get interviews with Hitler and Mussolini. Here Mr. Umansky and his superiors in the Soviet hierarchy encountered a problem that could not be ignored. But Soviet officialdom already had a trump up its sleeve, one certain to bring into line any recalcitrant members of the Moscow press corps infected by an excess of integrity, at least for the duration of their stay.

A couple of weeks earlier, the GPU had arrested six British citizens and several Russians on charges of industrial espionage. Announcement was made that public trial was in preparation. This was news. Putting their own people in the dock was one thing, but accusing white men, Englishmen, of skullduggery was something else. This promised to be the trial of the century, and every journalist working for a newspaper in the English-speaking world knew that this was precisely the type of story that their editors were paying them to cover. To be locked out would have been equivalent to professional suicide. The dilemma of to tell or not to tell was never put more brutally.
Umansky read the situation perfectly, and Lyons summed up what happened in a way that needs no retelling:

*On emerging from Russia, Jones made a statement which, startling though it sounded, was little more than a summary of what the correspondents and foreign diplomats had told him. To protect us, and perhaps with some idea of heightening the authenticity of his reports, he emphasized his Ukrainian foray rather than our conversation as the chief source of his information... Throwing down Jones was as unpleasant a chore as fell to any of us in the years of juggling facts in order to please dictatorial regimes—but throw him down we did, unanimously and in almost identical formulas of equivocation. Poor Gareth Jones must have been the most surprised human being alive when the facts he so painstakingly garnered from our mouths were snowed under by our denials. The scene in which the American press corps combined to repudiate Jones is fresh in my mind. It was in the evening and Constantine Umansky, the soul of graciousness, consented to meet us in the hotel room of a correspondent. He knew that he had a strategic advantage over us because of the Metro-Vickers story. He could afford to be gracious. Forced by competitive journalism to jockey for the inside track with officials, it would have been professional suicide to make an issue of the famine at that time. There was much bargaining in the spirit of gentlemanly give-and-take, under the effluence of Umansky’s gilded smile, before a formula of denial was worked out. We admitted enough to soothe our consciences, but in round-about phrases that damned Jones as a liar. The filthy business having been disposed of, someone ordered vodka and zakuski, Umansky joined the celebration, and the Party did not break up until the early morning hours. The head censor was in a mellower mood than I had ever seen before or since. He had done a big bit for Bolshevik firmness that night.*
Duranty took the point position in the campaign against Jones. On 31 March 1933, *The New York Times* carried, on page 13, an article that might well be studied in schools of journalism as an example of how to walk the tightrope between truth and lie so masterfully that the two seem to exchange places under the acrobat’s feet. It is called “Russians Hungry, But Not Starving” and begins by placing Jones’ revelations in a context that seems to make everything quite clear:

In the middle of the diplomatic duel between Great Britain and the Soviet Union over the accused British engineers, there appears from a British source a big scare story in the American press about famine in the Soviet Union, with “thousands already dead and millions menaced by death from starvation.

Of course, this put everything in its proper place, at least enough for the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in November of that year. So much so that when a dinner was given in honour of Soviet Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov in New York’s posh Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, when it came time to pay tribute to Duranty, the cheers were so thunderous that American critic and *bon vivant* Alexander Woolcott wrote, “Indeed, one quite got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty.”

At the same time that Duranty was so actively denying the existence of the famine in public, he was quite open in admitting it in private. On 26 September 1933 in a private conversation with William Strang of the British Embassy in Moscow, he stated, “it is quite possible that as many as ten million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.”

The little Englishman indeed seemed to have gotten away with it. But his further career was a gradual sinking into obscurity and penury, his Katya in Moscow berating him for taking no interest in the education of their son and asking that he send more money, that is, of course, when he could. He married on his deathbed in late September 1957. A week later, on 3 October 1957, he
died from an internal hemorrhage complicated by pulmonary emphysema at the age of seventy-three. Nothing further of his son is known.

Jones had attempted to defend himself in a letter to The New York Times and Malcolm Muggeridge, once out of the Soviet Union declined to write a letter in support of Jones, although Jones had publicly commended Muggeridge’s unsigned articles in The Manchester Guardian. Various organizations, mostly on the Right, took up the cause of the telling the world about the Great Famine of 1932-1933, but within two or three years the issue faded into the background and was largely forgotten.

Gareth Jones was himself nonplussed. In a letter to a friend who intended to visit the Soviet Union, Gareth wrote:

Alas! You will be very amused to hear that the inoffensive little ‘Joneski’ has achieved the dignity of being a marked man on the black list of the OGPU and is barred from entering the Soviet Union. I hear that there is a long list of crimes which I have committed under my name in the secret police file in Moscow and funnily enough espionage is said to be among them. As a matter of fact Litvinoff [Soviet Foreign Minister] sent a special cable from Moscow to the Soviet Embassy in London to tell them to make the strongest of complaints to Mr. Lloyd George about me.

Jones and those who sided with him were snowed under a blanket of denials. When one by one the American journalists left the Soviet Union, they wrote books about what they had seen. Muggeridge wrote a thinly disguised novel, Winter in Moscow (1934), in which the names were changed, but it was clear who everybody was. Only Jones, it seems, was really concealed in the fact that the character of such integrity, given the name of Pye by the author, was older, a smoker, a drinker, none of which the real Jones was. In his memoirs, Muggeridge seems to have forgotten altogether the man who actually broke the story of the Ukrainian Holodomor Famine-Genocide under his own name. Perhaps he felt a little guilty that his courage in this situation was not quite as great as the Welshman who had the bad luck to have been murdered in China.
in 1935, probably to prevent him from telling the world that the new state of Manchukuo was not nearly as nice a place as its Japanese sponsors wanted the world to believe.

There is perhaps something of a parallel to the story of Gareth Jones. There was also in 1981 another young man, then twenty-nine years old and a newly minted PhD from the University of Michigan, hired by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute to study the Holodomor. After nearly a decade, when the Commission on the Ukraine Famine was wrapping up, he was informed that the fellowship he had been offered for an academic year had been cut back to a semester. Having nowhere else to turn, he settled for that. “We expected he’d refuse, but he accepted,” a colleague was told. The next year he was invited for a yearlong fellowship to the University of Illinois. A fund of well-meaning Ukrainian-Americans was ready to donate a million dollars to endow a chair for this man. Those who taught Russian and East European history led him to understand, however, that, while they would be quite happy to take the money, whoever might get the chair, it would certainly not be he.

It is unknown who exactly played the role of Umansky in this particular tale or whether vodka was served afterward, but the carrot and stick are fairly obvious: access to scholarly resources in Moscow vs the veto of any research projects. In a world where a number of scholars slanted their journal articles and monographs as adroitly as Duranty did his press coverage, I am tempted to someday venture my own counterpart to Winter in Moscow, based on the published works that make the players all too easy to discern. For I was that once young man. But in contrast to Jones, I have found a place to live, married the woman I love, teach, and have and a forum from which I can, from time to time, be heard.

Despite Duranty’s prophesies, Ukrainians did not forget what had happened to them in 1933, and seventy years later the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Ukrainian World Congress, with support from a number of other leading Ukrainian Diaspora organizations, have organized a campaign to reopen the issue of Walter Duranty’s 1932 Pulitzer Prize with a view to stripping him of it. They have sent thousands of postcards and letters to the Pulitzer Prize
Committee at Columbia University. We invite our readers who might have any thoughts on the matter to join them in so doing...

The whole story of denying the crimes of a regime that cost millions of lives is one of the saddest in the history of the American free press, just as the Holodomor is certainly the saddest page in the history of a nation whose appearance on the world state was so unexpected that there is, in fact, a quite successful book in English, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Still, it would be only appropriate if that nation, which was for so long so safe to ignore and then appeared so unexpectedly, expressed itself on the fate of a man who also was victimized so unexpectedly, simply for trying honestly to find out and then tell the truth. Ukrainians abroad want justice done by stripping that young man’s chief victimizer of a Pulitzer Prize that makes a mockery of any conceivable ideals of journalism. They have been joined by a host of respected journalists in the West. Is it not only right that the people most affected by the events in which the struggle between truth and falsehood, idealism and cynicism, were so blatant that it reads almost like a melodrama, also make its collective voice heard? By asserting justice in the past, we help attain it for ourselves.
A Report to *The New York Times*: Walter Duranty and his reporting from Moscow

MARK von HAGEN

24 July 2003

I’ve chosen to organize my comments below by sharing the kinds of questions about Duranty’s reporting that I, as a historian who has studied this period, might reasonably ask. What is the focus of his reporting? What appear to be his sources? Does he get out of Moscow (to other parts of the USSR) very often? What sources might he have tapped on his frequent trips to Berlin, Paris, and other European capitals? How strict were Soviet press censors at this point? What sort of “story” was he telling about the Soviet Union and to what end, if any? I also thought of comparing what Duranty wrote with other correspondents’ work, but decided to try to appraise his work on its own merits and in the context of the historical period in which he was writing. I also tried to keep an open mind about the writing, specially after having read the two “biographies-denunciations” of Duranty by S. J. Taylor (*Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times’s Man in Moscow*) and James Crowl (*Angels in Stalin’s Paradise*). Both of these books appear to have been conceived as virtual character assassinations and rely heavily on innuendo, insinuation and hostile speculation by Duranty’s enemies in the press corps above all, particularly Eugene Lyons (in *Assignment in Utopia*) and Malcolm Muggeridge (in his fictionalized memoir *Winter in Moscow*). The two authors’ own grasp of Soviet, American and European history leaves much to be desired. Moreover, Taylor conflates material from memoirs, interviews, and fictional accounts and suggests these are all equivalent sources. Still, they provide some useful historical background and context of the Moscow reporting scene during these years.
Duranty’s Reporting on the First Five-Year Plan: Themes, Sources, Biases, Constraints

The reporting that the Pulitzer Prize Committee cites in support of its nomination of Duranty was for the first Five-Year Plan, curiously, some of his driest stories for the year 1931. Most of the reports are long discussions of Soviet production statistics, either projected ones or achieved ones. All of this material comes from official Soviet sources, either newspapers or speeches by the leadership. Duranty learned Russian well enough to read the Soviet newspapers on his own, and appeared to be invited to all important officially designated newsworthy events. Not surprisingly, most of the stories on the “economic front” have the level of interest and excitement of Pravda, Izvestiia, or Promyshlennaia and Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, his favourite sources. He frequently writes in the enthusiastically propagandistic language of his sources, again without any ironic distance or critical commentary: “rural revolution flamed like a fiery beacon across Russia (2/16/31).” In what is perhaps an extreme case of this socialist realist vision of reality, Duranty describes Soviet children as “the freest, most upstanding and intelligent children the NYT correspondent has ever met anywhere. They are clean which Russians used not be, they play games for fun and think their country is the greatest ever...They do not care a rap about what Americans call comfort, but they know the job of united effort and have an opportunity to take part in national life in drives or campaigns or investigations or what-not to a degree enjoyed by no other children in the world (5/31/31).”

Even the shortcomings that Duranty highlights in the Soviet campaigns in the countryside and industrial worlds come most often from the same Soviet sources—that, for example, production was behind target at one or another plant, or that the harvest would be lower in wheat than anticipated (1/3/31, 1/6/31, 3/26/31, 5/12/31). Generally, however, the Plan is being fulfilled and overfulfilled with a great degree of rational planning, according to Duranty (6/1/31). He does pose the question for his readers about the reliability of Soviet statistics, to conclude that they are generally within a margin of error of 3 to 5 percent (2/7/31). (Given the thorough purges of the Soviet statistical administration already in the mid-1920s, this seems very generous indeed.) Perhaps more remarkable is that Duranty is convinced that the new Russia
finds its newspapers interesting, and “even blasé foreign correspondents find themselves unexpectedly interested (5/6/31).” As someone who has read quite a bit in the Soviet newspapers and leadership speeches of the 1920s and early 1930s, I find this taste very bizarre. And we also know from the contemporary press that they attracted regular readership only with great difficulty because of their insistence on making their “new” conform to the desired outcome of the current political or economic campaign. The only occasional additional source he cites are conversations with foreign diplomats, engineers and workers who either come through Moscow on their way into or out of the country or who work on projects in Moscow (5/27/31). There is little evidence that Duranty traveled much around the country or talked to many ordinary Russians or other Soviet citizens; all his stories have Moscow datelines (though that might not be the accurate conclusion to draw from that practice).

To Duranty’s credit, however, he recognized that this period of collectivization and industrialization marked a qualitatively new stage in Soviet history, something he would call Stalinism and which, while emerging somehow logically from Lenin’s achievements, made 1930 “perhaps the most critical” year “in all its checkered history.” (1/1/31, 6/14/31) Moreover, he recognized some of the peculiar features of the “Plan” and its role in the Soviet economy, that it was not just a set of economic targets but a mythical mobilizational tool for the population (1/2/31). Duranty does not seem to be much interested in internal political developments at the Kremlin, but focuses on the very narrowly economic side of the “war” against backwardness. He reports on the Menshevik Trial and another engineers’ trial in Moscow, but virtually reproduces the charges of wrecking and sabotage brought by the prosecution without any serious scrutiny of the evidence (3/4/31).

By this time, of course, overly positive mention of Trotsky or other opposition figures would likely provoke censor reactions. Beginning in the late 1920s, foreign reporters began feeling new pressures on what they could and couldn’t send out of Moscow. In 1929 a German reporter for the *Berliner Tagesblatt* was denied a re-entry visa after he made a home trip. Still, other reporters were getting around the country much more and appeared to have a wider range of sources they could interview and cite than Duranty. And Duranty himself
acknowledges that the censorship was relatively mild, if somewhat self-defeating for the Soviet cause (6/23/31); he described the wartime censorship in France as stricter than the regime the Press Officer enforced in Moscow. “On the whole, your correspondent is inclined to regard the censorship as a help no less than a hindrance, because it takes the responsibility off a reporter’s shoulders should there be subsequent complaints from any quarter.” (3/1/31)

**Advocate of US Recognition of the USSR**

Within the general range of this reporting, Duranty pursued a couple of “missions,” if that’s not too strong a characterization of his tone and line of argument. One was US recognition of the USSR. Accordingly, he made a determined effort to “explain” to his readers the injustice of the charges made by many, including in America, of Soviet dumping and forced labour (1/12/31). “To use the words `conscription’ or `drafting’ of labour gives an unfair picture of what is happening,” he writes (2/1/31, 2/13/31) and proceeds to compare the Soviet first Five-Year Plan mobilizations to the United States after it entered the Great War. Duranty offered this sort of explanation repeatedly in the context of the debate in the United States over recognition of the USSR, an issue that was also part of presidential campaign politics. (A separate story in the *NYT*, not written by Duranty, reports that Representative Fish of New York sought means to prevent convict-made goods from Russian from entering the United States and asked the Treasury Department to have agents go into Russia to see if their lumber and pulpwood exports were produced by forced labour (2/3/31). Most often, Duranty concludes his explanation with insisting that the charges are not serious obstacles to good relations with the USSR and that Soviet practice, given the historical circumstances and great historical tasks that the Stalinist leadership has undertaken, are little different than the behaviour of any number of Great Powers during the recent World War I. In a story about tens of thousands of forced labourers, Duranty wrote, “The great majority of exiles are not convicts, or even prisoners,” but can be compared to Cromwell’s colonization of Virginian and the West Indies (2/3/31). He reminds his readers that the Soviet market is a large and unsatisfied one and that the potential is there for a great economic success story in the not too distant future. He also insisted that despite a certain Soviet *Schadenfreude* about the
Great Depression and their general expectation of new world war breaking out over the “contradictions” of global capitalism (4/22/31, 5/18/31, 10/24/31), they were relatively self-absorbed and had abandoned their plans for global conquest, if, as he puts it, they ever had such plans. The Stalinist leadership and the society at large was overwhelmed by the tasks of building socialism, consolidating the collective and state farm sectors in agriculture and building the foundations for modern industry. Their interests were in peace with their neighbours and trading partners for their primary commodities (4/12/31, 6/18/31, 11/29/31). The Red Army existed entirely for the purpose of defense and was no menace to peace (6/25/31), he wrote, repeating War Commissar Voroshilov. After all, the capitalist powers did also continue to entertain fantasies of overthrowing the one, proletarian dictatorship to have seized power, so such defensive precautions were only necessary (11/25/31, 11/29/31). Again, many, if not most, of these stories read as translated press conferences with the Soviet Foreign Minister or Foreign Trade Minister with minimal or no commentary or analysis. In several pieces, Duranty makes a special effort to refute or explain away reports coming from “White Russian émigré circles” in Riga and elsewhere as clearly out of touch and so hostile as to have no credibility whatsoever (2/1/31, 2/3/31). Finally, in his apparent effort to win US recognition for the USSR, Duranty wrote occasional stories about how other countries, notably Germany, Austria, even England, might beat the US to the vast Soviet markets (2/23/31, 2/24/31, 3/11/31, 3/24/31, 4/4/31, 6/19/31, 9/28/31).

It is not clear to me what precise role Duranty played in the politics of recognition (the USA recognized USSR in 1933 after Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President; Duranty was received by the President after the recognition ceremony and returned to Moscow with the newly appointed US Ambassador; in Moscow he was feted by Stalin for his role in the recognition campaign) but I can’t help feeling it wasn’t insignificant. What this raises, then, is his complicity in the diplomacy of the US-Soviet relationship. And, though these are separate issues, the Ukrainian famine denial is inextricably part of this moral responsibility and part of a broader problem outlined below. Might not the US been able to insist on different recognition terms, including, possibly, the admission of famine relief workers to the afflicted regions? Or, in the rush to recognition, was the business and political
elite eager to overlook any evidence of troubling behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union at this time?

**Duranty’s “Theories” about Russia and the Soviet Union**

When he wasn’t reporting straight economic news or discussing international trade issues, Duranty indulged in his theories about Russia, which are a bit more disturbing from the viewpoint of objectivity, a balanced picture, and the tremendous influence of the *NYT*. Throughout 1931 Duranty proclaimed that Stalin was a progressive historical figure on the order of Oliver Cromwell (2/3/31, 2/15/31) or Napoleon (1/18/31), who was fighting a war against his own Slavic people’s Asiatic backwardness. (In the 1/18/31 long feature on Stalin, Duranty opens with comparisons to Chinese emperors and then proceeds to Mohammed.) That Asiatic backwardness he characterized alternately as passivity, fatalism, collectivism, proclivity to mass behaviour (as opposed to the individualism of the liberal west), fanatic religiosity and superstition, ant heap morality (5/4/31, 5/10/31, 7/5/31, 11/22/31, 12/20/31) Somehow Stalin was able to escape this Slavic fatalism because he was a Caucasian “who can hold fast to the thread of his own free will in the labyrinth where Slavs are lost.” (1/8/31) (How Caucasians are less Asian than Slavs Duranty doesn’t muse about.) Incidentally, Duranty was by no means unique in holding these views; one can cite the very influential biography of Stalin by Isaac Deutscher, an ostensible follower of Trotsky, as perhaps the most well known purveyor of a version of this Orientalist interpretation. And “softer” versions of this “explanation” are widespread among the historians and other social scientists who wrote under the influence of modernization theory as well. The conclusion we are meant to draw from this “analysis,” however, is that Russians need and deserve this kind of harsh, autocratic regime because that’s the way they are; they might even unconsciously long for autocracy (6/14/31).

Of course, this preferred narrative of Russians as backward Asiatics was one that the Stalinist dictatorship favoured itself as justification for its brutal regime (as so many Asian dictatorships have offered in recent times under the
guise of “Asian values”), although it would never have put it in so many words. I suppose it’s this near identity of Duranty’s “analysis” with the official Soviet version of events that is most disturbing for me as a historian. His near total reliance on official Soviet sources went hand in hand with this “understanding” of Soviet politics and Russian history. When this myth of Slavic backwardness is repeated often enough as “news,” especially when no challenge to it is ever offered from another point of view, it takes on the character of a natural truth, when it is clearly an ideological construction that is playing a nefarious role inside the country, but, in Duranty’s translation, also in international affairs. I shall devote most of the rest of this review of Duranty’s work to this one-sided presentation of the Stalinist project; I have also tried to suggest some of the contexts that allowed Duranty to be able to see the Soviet world in such blatantly positive light. Above all, these contexts are the Great Depression in the West and Duranty’s own experience of World War I in France and on other fronts.

Whatever the causes for Duranty’s so thoroughly identifying with the Stalinist position, the consequences are perhaps most apparent in his treatment of—or rather down pedaling of—resistance to collectivization and industrialization. During 1931 the official Stalinist view of society was one of harmony and conciliation in line with the remarkable successes on the economic front (8/31/31). Similar to the regime’s own self-understanding, Duranty downplayed the significance of the widespread and violent resistance to collectivization that had taken place across the Soviet Union during 1929-30 and again 1930-1931, in fact a virtual civil war in the countryside which would have been hard for Duranty to remain ignorant of. He does mention kulak friction or opposition as much diminished over the previous year and apparently a thing of the past (4/22/31, 11/19/31) and, importantly, a sign of peasant backwardness. For Duranty to attribute the difficulties of collectivization to peasant backwardness is particularly distorting; in fact, collectivization wrought the greatest damage in those regions where the peasants had the most modern skills, had the longest history of voluntary rural cooperation, and were most productive, namely Ukraine, the Kuban, the areas cultivated by the Volga Germans. To pronounce the destruction of that independent peasantry and its replacement by what the peasants themselves
referred to as the “second serfdom” as progressive and a triumph over Slavic fatalism and backwardness lends weight to the Stalinist dictatorship’s own justification for its violent and murderous assault on its own countryside.

Similarly, Duranty dismissed the political opposition to aspects of collectivization and industrialization policy within the ruling Bolshevik Party, an opposition that unleashed a series of purges and expulsions (5/20/31). Because these acts of resistance and opposition had been crushed by a ruthless Stalinist state, it was now “the Russian condition” to be eternally fatalistic, passive, inclined to backward anarchistic outbursts in infantile, monolithic fashion. There were constant Show Trials since 1928 at least which featured Soviet or foreign engineers or professors charged with some sort of sabotage, wrecking, or other “crimes” against the Revolution. If Duranty wasn’t aware of this powerful opposition from sources inside the Soviet Union, something that is frankly hard to imagine, he would have had plenty of opportunity to learn more about this when he made his regular trips out of Moscow to Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and Prague. In all four capitals there were very politically engaged and well-informed Russian émigré organizations and institutions that met regularly and clandestinely even at this late date with visiting Soviet bureaucrats, diplomats, and other “agents” and developed rather sophisticated understanding of the political life of the USSR. Among the best informed were the Mensheviks abroad, who published Sovietnik or foreignengineers or professors charged with some sort of sabotage, wrecking, or other “crimes” against the Revolution. If Duranty wasn’t aware of this powerful opposition from sources inside the Soviet Union, something that is frankly hard to imagine, he would have had plenty of opportunity to learn more about this when he made his regular trips out of Moscow to Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and Prague. In all four capitals there were very politically engaged and well-informed Russian émigré organizations and institutions that met regularly and clandestinely even at this late date with visiting Soviet bureaucrats, diplomats, and other “agents” and developed rather sophisticated understanding of the political life of the USSR. Among the best informed were the Mensheviks abroad, who published Socialistischeskii vestnik. In Prague during the interwar years, there were whole universities of émigré Russian and Ukrainian liberals and some conservatives who would also have offered alternate “narratives” of modern and more ancient Russian history. In Warsaw, too, there were several very good scholars and specialized institutes that made it their business to understand the history and contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union (and Duranty did make occasional trips to Poland).

When he wrote another characteristic piece about why the Communists only allowed voting for Communist Party candidates, Duranty condescendingly explained that Russians were so uneducated in self-government that they needed to be taught this fundamental truth by the all-wise Party (1/26/31), again ignoring the history of early 20th century Russia and well into the civil war years when political parties and public organizations mobilized millions of
voters in a series of doomed democratic and revolutionary governments. To say that Russians had no and especially no recent memory of a more genuine electoral politics is extremely distorting. For someone who was an adult—as was Duranty—during the Russian Revolution and a correspondent in France during the First World War, there is another story about the Russian people that he ought to have known, that the subjects of the Russian Empire were among the most oppositionist and revolutionary and even anarchistic people on the earth’s surface for several years running until they had the will to fight killed in them by so many invading armies, famines, and a few other natural and man-made disasters. This is not to argue, by contrast, that Russia had become a model European parliamentary democracy during the early 20th century or even that its “genuine” workers’ Revolution had been betrayed by the Bolshevik dictatorship. But to insist on the power of eternal Slavic fatalism, as Duranty so frequently invokes, is to ignore the tremendous transformations that had occurred in the early decades of the 20th century. It is very present-bound and short-sighted and, more importantly, it conveys precisely the anti-democratic justification for the creation of a dictatorship that was mastered by the Stalinist propaganda apparatus.

In another characteristic vein, Duranty devotes several pieces to the decline in religious services at Easter and Christmas (12/26/31), and above all the razing of the Cathedral of Christ the Redeemer, again as signs of progress and triumph over traditional Russian religious obscurantism (8/3/31, 12/26/31). There is little hint here of the concerted antireligious campaigns, including outright repression and not just the League of the Militant Godless anti-Christmas and anti-Easter demonstrations. Instead, he describes how Soviet citizens are joyously celebrating their new Soviet holidays through increasing output and other achievements (18/8/31). One waits in vain for some signal of ever so slight tongue in cheek.

Duranty warned his American readers again and again not to try to judge Soviet life by their own comfortable standards. Besides Cromwell, Napoleon, Ivan the Terrible and other more distant historical parallels, another device he frequently deployed to “explain” for his American readers how the Soviet regime could be so apparently indifferent to the comfort and freedoms of its
citizens was to appeal to his own World War I experience. Knowing what we know about the traumatic impact that the Great War had on so many intellectuals and ordinary combatants and appreciating the proximity of the shared experience he could appeal to, he tries again and again to contextualize the Soviet hardships against the backdrop of that suicidal European civil war. Certainly in its own self-image, the Soviet leadership was engaged in a war to defeat its own backwardness. But Duranty never seems to question the logic of a country putatively at peace waging war against its own population and erecting the entire panoply of internal enemies and enemy aliens that seem to come straight out of a more strictly military experience; he never questions the “normalcy” of a militarizing society and the tremendous assaults on what fragile liberties Soviet citizens still enjoyed during the NEP years. He, I think, therefore misleadingly, compares Stalin occasionally to Marshall Foch of the French (1/8/31). One additional comparison he frequently makes for American audiences is Tammany Hall and Charles Murphy, suggesting Stalin is to be understood in the context of American machine politics of the late nineteenth and early 20th century. Again, by 1931 Stalin had certainly transcended the scale of American machine politics by any stretch of the imagination. By 1931 the Stalinist dictatorship had murdered hundreds of thousands of its own peasant citizens as they refused to submit to Moscow’s dictates to collectivize. The Tammany Hall parallel is, once again, distorting because of its relativizing and familiarizing effects, suggesting that Stalin is really not much worse or more threatening than a New York City boss.

Any Conclusions?

Duranty was neither unique among reporters nor even many scholars of the time in sharing these unbalanced and, ultimately, condescending, views of Russian history and the Soviet people. Moreover, several foreign correspondents fell under Stalin’s spell to a certain extent, as Duranty clearly did, especially if they had been granted the privilege of an interview with the great man. And, after all, he certainly did turn out to be one of the most important political leaders of the 20th century. Unfortunately, however, such views do not make his reporting distinguished or particularly unusual, let alone...
Not Worthy

profound; I would not judge that his reporting has stood an even minimal test of time given the criteria I tried to outline in my critique of his “theories.”

After reading through a good portion of Duranty’s reporting for 1931, I was disappointed and disturbed by the overall picture he painted of the Soviet Union for that period. Much of the “factual” material is dull and largely uncritical recitation of Soviet sources, whereas his efforts at “analysis” are very effective renditions of the Stalinist leadership’s self-understanding of their murderous and progressive project to defeat the backwardness of Slavic, Asiatic peasant Russia. That hundreds, if not thousands, of well-intentioned and intelligent European and American Leftist intellectuals shared much of this Stalinist understanding of might making for right and a sort of Hegelian acceptance of historical outcomes, especially against the backdrop of the Great Depression in the West, does not make his writing any more profound or original. But after reading so much Duranty in 1931 it is far less surprising to me that he would deny in print the famine of 1932-1933 and later defend the prosecutors’ charges during the Show Trials of 1937.

I believe there is room in international reporting for an effort to convey the “Soviet” point of view, meaning the official one, without leaving it, however at that; instead, he would seem to have some obligation to take the analysis to a different level by suggesting alternate plausible explanations and motivations for events and actions. In other words, there is a serious lack of balance in his writing. Instead, Duranty is very insistent by this time in his own authority and understanding of the reality of Stalinist Russia. He prided himself on his “independent” judgments that went at odds with the conventional wisdom in Moscow. He even acknowledged earlier “misunderstandings” of Soviet political culture to reinforce his hard won expertise and current level of understanding (10/11/31). It is a clever rhetorical device but adds nothing to the overall analysis.

That lack of balance and uncritical acceptance of the Soviet self-justification for its cruel and wasteful regime was a disservice to the American readers of The New York Times and the liberal values they subscribe to and to the historical experience of the peoples of the Russian and Soviet empires and their struggle for a better life.

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[Reports on Professor von Hagen’s analysis received considerable international attention, including Jacques Steinberg, “Times should lose Pulitzer from ‘30s, consultant to paper says,” The New York Times, 23 October 2003. It was noted that Professor von Hagen had told The New York Sun, on 22 October: “They should take it [the Pulitzer Prize] away for the greater honour and glory of The New York Times” for “he [Duranty] really was kind of a disgrace in the history of The New York Times.”]
Resolution on 1932-1933 Man-Made Famine in Ukraine

US House of Representatives, 21 October 2003

The US House of Representatives on 20 October adopted the following H. RES. 356 “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933” by a vote of 382-0. The resolution was introduced by Henry Hyde (R-IL), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee (with Christopher Smith (R-NJ), Helsinki Commission Chairman and Tom Lantos (D-CA), Ranking Member, House International Relations Committee as original cosponsors.

Congressional Record Statement for The Honorable Christopher H. Smith on H.Res.356, Regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine 1932-1933:

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of H. Res. 356. I thank and commend Mr. Hyde for introducing this resolution commemorating and honouring the memory of victims of an abominable act perpetrated against the people of Ukraine in 1932-1933. Seventy years ago, millions of men, women and children were murdered by starvation so that one man, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, could consolidate control over Ukraine. The Ukrainian people resisted the Soviet policy of forced collectivization. The innocent died a horrific death at the hands of a tyrannical dictatorship which had crushed their freedom. In an attempt to break the spirit of an independent-minded Ukrainian peasantry, and ultimately to secure collectivization, Stalin ordered the expropriation of all foodstuffs in the hands of the rural
population. The grain was shipped to other areas of the Soviet Union or sold on the international market. Peasants who refused to turn over grain to the state were deported or executed. Without food or grain, mass starvation ensued. This manmade famine was the consequence of deliberate policies which aimed to destroy the political, cultural and human rights of the Ukrainian people.

In short, food was used as a weapon in what can only be described as an organized act of terrorism designed to suppress a people’s love of their land and the basic liberty to live as they choose. Mr. Chairman, I recall back in the 1980s seeing the unforgettable movie, Harvest of Despair, which depicted the horrors of the Famine, as well as the fine work of the Congressionally-created Ukraine Famine Commission, which issued its seminal report in 1988. Their work helped expose the truth about this horrific event. I am pleased that the resolution notes that there were those in the West, including The New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, who knowingly and deliberately falsified their reports to cover up the Famine because they wanted to curry favour with one of the most evil regimes in the history of mankind. The fact that this denial of the Famine took place then, and even much later by many scholars in the West is a shameful chapter in our own history.

Mr. Chairman, this is an important resolution which will help give recognition to one of the most horrific events in the last century in the hopes that mass-murders of this kind truly become unthinkable.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

WHEREAS 2003 marks the 70th anniversary of the height of the famine in Ukraine that was deliberately initiated and enforced by the Soviet regime through the seizure of grain and the blockade of food shipments into the affected areas, as well as by forcibly preventing the starving population from leaving the region, for the purposes of eliminating resistance to the forced collectivization of agriculture and destroying Ukraine’s national identity;

WHEREAS this man-made famine resulted in the deaths of at least 5,000,000 men, women, and children in Ukraine and an estimated 1-2 million people in other regions;
WHEREAS the famine took place in the most productive agricultural area of the former Soviet Union while food stocks throughout the country remained sufficient to prevent the famine and while the Soviet regime continued to export large quantities of grain;

WHEREAS as many Western observers with first-hand knowledge of the famine, including *The New York Times* correspondent Walter Duranty, who was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for his reporting from the Soviet Union, knowingly and deliberately falsified their reports to cover up and refute evidence of the famine in order to suppress criticism of the Soviet regime;

WHEREAS Western observers and scholars who reported accurately on the existence of the famine were subjected to disparagement and criticism in the West for their reporting of the famine;

WHEREAS the Soviet regime and many scholars in the West continued to deny the existence of the famine until the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991 resulted in many of its archives being made accessible, thereby making possible the documentation of the premeditated nature of the famine and its harsh enforcement;

WHEREAS the final report of the United States Government’s Commission on the Ukraine Famine, established on December 13, 1985, concluded that the victims were ‘starved to death in a man-made famine’ and that ‘Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-1933’; and

WHEREAS, although the Ukraine famine was one of the greatest losses of human life in the 20th century, it remains insufficiently known in the United States and in the world:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) the millions of victims of the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933 should be solemnly remembered and honoured in the 70th year marking the height of the famine;

(2) this man-made famine was designed and implemented by the Soviet regime as a deliberate act of terror and mass murder against the Ukrainian people;

(3) the decision of the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) to give official recognition to the famine and its victims, as well as their efforts to secure greater international awareness and understanding of the famine, should be supported; and

(4) the official recognition of the famine by the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada represents a significant step in the reestablishment of Ukraine’s national identity, the elimination of the legacy of the Soviet dictatorship, and the advancement of efforts to establish a democratic and free Ukraine that is fully integrated into the Western community of nations.
Revoke Duranty’s Pulitzer

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Few journalists have disgraced the fourth estate more than Walter Duranty, the Pulitzer-winning *New York Times* correspondent who covered up the Stalin-induced famine that killed as many as seven million Ukrainians in 1932-1933. Now, a Columbia University history professor commissioned by *The Times* to investigate Duranty has confirmed his work was flawed, and is recommending that his Pulitzer be revoked.

The Pulitzer Board has been reviewing the Duranty case, and *The Times* has forwarded the professor’s report to them with an undisclosed recommendation. For the sake of *The Times*’ reputation, we hope it urged revocation.
Why honour a shill for Stalin?

LUBOMYR LUCIUK

The National Post, 24 October 2003

To the Editor: Re: “Revoke Duranty’s Prize,” The National Post, 23 November 2003:

Canadians should take pride in learning that the international campaign to have Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize revoked or returned originated in this country, with the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Our goal was never to erase Duranty’s record or the man himself from history. Quite to the contrary, we want Duranty known for all time for what he truly was: a shill for Stalin, before, during and after the genocidal Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine.

Of course, we have no way of predicting whether the Pulitzer committee will do the right thing and revoke or return his Prize. We hope so, otherwise future Pulitzer recipients will have to accept this distinction knowing their company is polluted by the spectre of a man who buried the truth about the mass murder of millions of people.
Duranty’s award: Pulitzer Board should not revoke the award

Reprinted with permission of The Globe and Mail

Walter Duranty, who reported from the Soviet Union for The New York Times between 1922 and 1941, is probably the most tainted scribe in that newspaper’s long history. In fact, such is the enormity of the correspondent’s misreporting of events in Stalin’s Russia in the 1930s, and so great was his influence, that he probably would qualify for worst reporter of all time were there such an award. No picayune plagiarist he, Mr. Duranty helped cover up a genocide: Stalin’s deliberate killing by starvation of as many as seven million Ukrainians in 1932-1933. There is plenty of evidence to suggest Mr. Duranty did this deliberately. According to one credible first-hand account, The Times correspondent once, in the depths of the famine, breezily remarked that “a few million dead Russians” were unimportant, given the “sweeping historical changes” then underway in the country. In August of 1933, he dismissed reports of mass starvation as “malignant propaganda.” Earlier that year, on 14 May, he had coined the monstrously cynical phrase for which he is probably best remembered: “You can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs.” Small wonder, then, that Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University history professor hired by The Times last summer to reassess Mr. Duranty’s work, has declared it egregiously biased and distorted, and called its author a disgrace to the history of The Times. It’s also understandable that in 2003, the 70th anniversary of the famine, Ukrainian groups worldwide have lobbied to have Mr. Duranty posthumously stripped of his 1932 Pulitzer Prize, awarded for articles published in 1931. With hindsight, it is hard to conceive of anyone less worthy of US print journalism’s most prestigious award. But that’s the heart of
the matter, isn’t it? Hindsight. The Pulitzer Prize Board should think long and carefully. For there is no new information here. And there is a whiff of historical revisionism. It has been common knowledge for nearly two decades that Mr. Duranty was a propagandist for Stalin. *The Times* began apologizing for his dispatches as early as 1986, with the publication of Robert Conquest’s noted history of the Ukrainian famine, *The Harvest of Sorrow*. Moreover, Mr. Duranty was not given the Prize for stories in which he denied the famine. Those came later. In 1931, he was writing effusively about Stalin’s economic Plan. As *New York Times* executive editor Bill Keller put it this week, “The stuff he wrote in ’31 was awful. The stuff he wrote in ’33 was shameful.” That means Mr. Duranty would be stripped of his award for later misdeeds. How many other prestigious Prizewinners would then be in similar straits? History should not be airbrushed to suit current political tastes. That smacks of, well, Stalin. It makes far more sense to try to understand the context in which historical events occurred. In 1932 America, socialist ideas were fashionable. Mr. Duranty was not the era’s only apologist for the Soviet dictator. He’s just the best known. In 1990, S. J. Taylor published *Stalin’s Apologist*, a biography of Mr. Duranty that excoriated his reportage. The Pulitzer Board considered revoking the award at the time, but opted not to because of the precedent such a move would set. That was the right decision then. As now.
Doubts over a Pulitzer

LUBOMYR LUCIUK

The New York Times, 28 October 2003

To the Editor: Re: “Times Should Lose Pulitzer From 30’s, Consultant Says”

The international campaign to have Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize either revoked or returned was initiated by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Our initiative has never been aimed at “airbrushing” Mr. Duranty out of history. On the contrary, we insist on remembering him for what he truly was, Stalin’s apologist and a shill who helped cover up the genocidal Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine. We just don’t want Mr. Duranty to be distinguished with a Pulitzer Prize for having so served the Soviets. Nor should anyone else.

***

[A second letter was published under the same heading on the same date, from Justin Kaplan, of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mr. Kaplan noted how Duranty “was far from alone in misreporting Stalin’s crimes and failures during the early 1930’s” so rescinding his Pulitzer Prize would be “precisely the same sort of appalling abuse of the historical record that Mr. Duranty himself and the Soviet regime were guilty of.” Mr. Kaplan concluded: “we’re lucky enough to be able to acknowledge and live with our blunders.”]
Clever in crafting words, a *bon vivant*, ever engaging as a dinner companion, Walter Duranty was much in demand in certain circles. He was *The New York Times*’s man in Moscow in the early 1930s, and for supposedly “distinguished” reporting from there, he was awarded the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for Correspondence. What Mr. Duranty really was however, was Joseph Stalin’s apologist, a libertine prepared to prostitute accuracy for access.

Much of this was known at the time, hence the deprecating references to him as “Walter Obscuranty.” More tellingly, writer Malcolm Muggeridge, a contemporary, said that Mr. Duranty was “the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in fifty years of journalism.”

Despite being one of the few eyewitnesses to the politically engineered Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine, in which millions were deliberately starved to death on the orders of Stalin, Mr. Duranty nevertheless spun stories for *The New York Times* dismissing all accounts of that horror as nothing more than bunk, or malicious anti-Soviet propaganda.

He knew otherwise. On 26 September 1933, at the British Embassy in Moscow, Mr. Duranty privately confided to William Strang, the embassy’s *chargé d’affaires*, that as many as 10 million people had died directly or indirectly of famine conditions in the USSR during the past year. Meanwhile, publicly, Mr. Duranty orchestrated a vicious ostracizing of those journalists...
who risked much by reporting on the brutalities of forced collectivization and the ensuing catastrophe, Mr. Muggeridge among them.

Even as the fertile Ukraine, once the breadbasket of Europe, became a modern-day Golgotha, a place of skulls, Mr. Duranty plowed the truth under. Occasionally pressed on the human costs of the Soviet experiment with communism he did, however, evolve a dismissive dodge, canting the infamous words, “you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs.”

To honour the memory of the many millions of victims of this crime against humanity, an international campaign was initiated on May Day this year, calling upon the Pulitzer Prize Board to posthumously revoke Mr. Duranty’s award. This month, a second phase of the effort began with a letter-writing campaign to Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of The New York Times, asking him return Mr. Duranty’s Prize regardless of what the Pulitzer Prize Board decides.

From around the world, tens of thousands of postcards, letters and e-mails have now been sent, recalling the 70th anniversary of the famine, underscoring Mr. Duranty’s perfidiousness and how his duplicitous reports helped cover up one of the greatest acts of genocide in 20th century Europe. This crusade’s momentum was enhanced by an independent report penned by Columbia University historian, Mark von Hagen. He concluded that Mr. Duranty had knowingly distorted the news, before, during and after his particularly odious bout of famine denial.

There are sophists who retort that Mr. Duranty was recognized for what he wrote before he bore false witness about the Holodomor, as Ukrainians refer to this genocide. Those willing to be so indulgent with Mr. Duranty seem oddly comfortable with ignoring how he betrayed that most fundamental principle of journalism: the obligation of reporting truthfully on what is observed.

Others argue that we are engaged in an exercise in revisionism. They miss the point entirely. No one wants Mr. Duranty to be deleted from history. He must be remembered for exactly what he was — a shill for the Soviets.
No matter how good a scribbler Mr. Duranty may have been, he was, foremost, a teller of lies, who helped Moscow cover up reality as millions starved to death. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 was Ukraine’s holocaust. That this fact is only now being understood has much to do with the determined efforts of scoundrels like Mr. Duranty. Certainly, others also served Stalinism, out of conviction, for profit, for perks. But none of those others came to be distinguished with a Pulitzer Prize, regarded as print journalism’s most prestigious award.

The men and women whose principled labours have earned them the honour and distinction of a Pulitzer Prize, or those who might aspire to that select company, should be revolted at knowing that within their ranks there remains a blackguard who, Janus-like, turned a blind eye to one of history’s greatest atrocities while casting the other about in wrath against journalists who reported that truth. Quite simply, Mr. Duranty’s continuing grasp on a Pulitzer Prize soils all Pulitzer Prizes. It must be returned or revoked.

I have not always seen eye-to-eye with David Matas, a B’Nai Brith Canada advocate. And so, when he informed me of his disagreement with the exculpatory editorial stand of The Globe and Mail (Mr. Duranty’s Award – 25 October 2003), I found his message not only welcome, but remarkable, evidencing just how inclusive is revulsion at the thought of Mr. Duranty continuing to hold this Prize. Mr. Matas wrote “If hindsight is indeed 20/20, why should we continue to insist on being blind?”

In truth, I have no idea.
Sauce for the gander

DAVID MATAS

*The Globe and Mail*, 4 November 2003
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*The Globe and Mail* wrote in an editorial that Canada should strip David Ahenakew of his Order of Canada because of his remarks attempting to justify the Holocaust [“To Repair The Damage Ahenakew Has Done,” 17 December 2002]. The reason the paper gave was that allowing him to keep the award would bring the order into disrepute. We commend that reasoning. Yet the same *Globe and Mail* editorial Board writes that Walter Duranty should keep his Pulitzer Prize in journalism for articles apologizing for, and covering up, the crimes of Stalin (“Duranty’s Award,” 25 October 2003). There are many reasons why Mr. Duranty should not keep his award, but surely one is the reason that *The Globe* itself has given in its Ahenakew editorial. To allow Mr. Duranty to keep his award brings the Pulitzer Prize itself into disrepute. Allowing Mr. Duranty to keep his Prize is an insult to every other Pulitzer Prize winner.
Dear Mr Sulzberger,


He lied for the Soviets, before, during, and after 1932-1933. Stalin’s apologist did not merit a Pulitzer Prize.

Keeping Duranty’s prize benefits The New York Times. Do the right thing. Return it to the Pulitzer Prize Committee.

Name

Address

Postal/Zip Code

Signature

To: Mr Arthur Sulzberger, Jr
Chairman & Publisher
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
USA
Should This Pulitzer Be Pulled?

DOUGLAS MCCOLLAM

Columbia Journalism Review (Issue 6, November-December 2003)
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Seventy years after a government-engineered famine killed millions in Ukraine, a New York Times correspondent who failed to sound the alarm is under attack

If you get off the elevator on the eleventh floor of the New York Times building, and head down a long hall leading toward the executive dining rooms, you pass under the fixed gaze of some of the finest journalists in American history. Along the walls hang portraits commemorating all eighty-nine Pulitzer Prizes awarded to The Times to date, including those given to such notable lights as Thomas Friedman, Anthony Lewis, J. Anthony Lukas, and David Halberstam.

As you enter the hall, just past the portrait of Russell Owen, whose dispatches from Admiral Byrd’s 1928 Antarctic expedition riveted the nation, you come to the picture of Walter Duranty, a balding Englishman who served as The Times Moscow correspondent from 1922 to 1934. In 1932, at the age of forty-seven, Duranty was awarded the Pulitzer for a series of stories that the Board thought showed a “profound and intimate comprehension of conditions in Russia,” consistent with “the best type of foreign correspondence.” Next to Duranty’s portrait appears the following note: “Other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.”
Revoking a vintage Pulitzer seems a tricky matter

Indeed they have, and this year, more than seventy years after Duranty won the Prize, both Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of The New York Times, and members of the Pulitzer Board have found themselves inundated with letters, postcards, faxes, e-mails, and phone calls demanding that Duranty’s Prize be returned or revoked. The campaign has left some of its targets mystified. “The whole thing is just odd,” says Andrew Barnes, chairman and chief executive officer of the St. Petersburg Times, who has served on the Pulitzer Board for seven years. David Klatell, who was on the Board for a year as interim dean of Columbia’s Graduate School of Journalism, also was a bit stumped when he began receiving the letters last fall. “It’s been a fairly massive writing campaign,” says Klatell, who estimates that he and Sig Gissler, administrator of the Prizes, have received tens of thousands of cards and letters. “Whoever funded it has spent a good deal of money,” Klatell says.

The ongoing effort is actually a joint project of several Ukrainian groups worldwide, spearheaded by Lubomyr Luciuk of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. A principal architect of the campaign in America is thirty-five-year-old Michael Sawkiw Jr., president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Washington, DC, Sawkiw, an American whose parents emigrated from Ukraine after World War II, says he recommended the campaign to his Board of directors as a way to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the 1932-1933 Ukrainian famine, an event some historians consider the greatest man-made disaster in history. When we met for drinks in Washington (vodka, of course), Sawkiw was adamant that Duranty and The Times were coconspirators in what he calls the Ukrainian “famine-genocide.” Well-groomed and affable, Sawkiw nonetheless exuded intensity when he spoke of his determination to see Duranty stripped of his honour. “It’s a cop-out just to say ‘others dispute’ Duranty’s reporting,” Sawkiw said with just a hint of a Ukrainian accent. “That doesn’t get The Times off the hook!” Other Ukrainian activists I spoke with were even more blunt: “Duranty and The Times have blood on their hands and the only way they can wash it off is to return that Prize and apologize for what they did,” says Peter Borisow, whose parents survived the famine.
Both Arthur Sulzberger Jr., and his father, Arthur Sulzberger Sr., the previous publisher, declined to be interviewed for this article, but a Times spokesman, Toby Usnik, did e-mail a statement, saying, in part, that The Times has “reported often and thoroughly on the defects in Duranty’s journalism, as viewed through the lens of later events.” Among The Times’s reports on Duranty’s failings was a 1990 editorial that chided him for his “indifference to the catastrophic famine . . . when millions perished in the Ukraine.” Max Frankel, who was the executive editor when that editorial ran, recalls consulting with the senior Sulzberger, then the publisher, on returning Duranty’s Prize, but says the feeling was “it was history and what was done can’t be undone, but if the evidence was he didn’t deserve the Prize or was wrong with his coverage we’d give it back.” In the end, Frankel says, the decision was made to put the disclaimer on Duranty’s portrait in the Pulitzer gallery and leave it at that. In its statement The Times seems to put the onus for revoking the Prize on the Pulitzer Board, noting that it has reviewed the Duranty award in the past and taken no action.

In April the Board voted to consider the question again, forming a special committee to investigate, a step it hasn’t taken in the past. Gissler, who became administrator of the Prizes in 2002, says the committee was not formed in response to the letter-writing campaign, which he says didn’t start in earnest until around May of this year, but because the Board views the allegations against Duranty as serious enough to merit an in-depth inquiry. The special committee is scheduled to make a report to the full Board at its November meeting. The committee’s preliminary findings were being circulated as I worked on this article, but Gissler declined to make it available, nor would he comment on the substance of the controversy.

Most of the twenty-two other present and past Board members I contacted were similarly mum, including William Safire, The Times columnist who currently co-chairs the Pulitzer Board, and Richard Oppel, the editor of the Austin American-Statesman, who heads the special investigative committee. Rena Pederson, editor at large of The Dallas Morning News, who co-chairs the Pulitzer Board with Safire, would say only that the Duranty controversy is “a serious issue that we are looking at in the most thoughtful way possible.”
Nicholas Lemann, who joined the Board in September as a nonvoting member by virtue of his new position as dean of Columbia’s journalism school, said he has definite views about the Duranty matter, but couldn’t comment because the Board, in its private deliberations, might ask for his opinion.

Not everyone was reticent. Barnes of The St. Petersburg Times said he feels strongly that reopening the Duranty case is a bad idea. “There have been many Prizes during my tenure where you could look back and ask ‘Is that the best we could do?’” says Barnes. “I can’t imagine what good this will do.” In the eighty-seven-year history of the Pulitzer Prizes, no award has ever been revoked. In 1981 The Washington Post declined to accept a Pulitzer that had been awarded to reporter Janet Cooke after it became clear that her story about an eight-year-old heroin addict had been made up. The Pulitzer Board then withdrew the Prize. But revoking a vintage Pulitzer seems a trickier matter. “It’s an extraordinarily difficult thing to recreate the historical and intellectual context in which many of the Pulitzer jurors were working,” says David Klatell.

To get a clearer idea of the issues facing the Board, I spent some time at the Library of Congress researching Duranty and his work. In addition to the thirteen stories he wrote in 1931 that were the basis for his 1932 Pulitzer, I also read dozens of other dispatches he filed before, during, and after the Ukrainian famine, as well as accounts of Duranty by colleagues and historians, and a good deal of his autobiographical writing. The picture that emerged was sufficiently complex to make me not envy the Pulitzer Board’s task. While it’s clear that much of Duranty’s reporting was suspect, it’s also clear that he and other correspondents in Moscow operated under censorship rules akin to those governing reporters at the front lines of a war — which was exactly how the Soviets viewed their revolutionary struggle. Later Times Moscow correspondents, such as Harrison Salisbury (who resides in Pulitzer Hall with Duranty), would defy Communist minders and be barred from the country for their trouble. Duranty worked within the system, trading softer coverage for continuing access. Deciding whether that exchange ended up with The Times substantially whitewashing Soviet atrocities requires a closer examination of Duranty’s work.
When Walter Duranty left The Times and Russia in 1934, the paper said his twelve-year stint in Moscow had “perhaps been the most important assignment ever entrusted by a newspaper to a single correspondent over a considerable period of time.” By that time, Duranty was a journalistic celebrity — an absentia member of the Algonquin Roundtable, a confidant of Isadora Duncan, George Bernard Shaw, and Sinclair Lewis. He was held in such esteem that the presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt brought him in for consultations on whether the Soviet Union should be officially recognized. When recognition was granted in 1934, Duranty traveled with the Soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, to the signing ceremony and spoke privately with FDR. At a banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York held to celebrate the event, Duranty was introduced as “one of the great foreign correspondents of modern times,” and 1,500 dignitaries gave him a standing ovation.

In Moscow, Duranty was known as “the dean of foreign correspondents,” and was renowned for his lavish hospitality. In an austere city, he enjoyed generous living quarters and food rations, as well as the use of assistants, a chauffeur, and a cook/secretary/mistress named Katya, who bore him a son named Michael. Duranty, who had a wooden left leg caused by a train accident, was driven through the streets in a giant Buick outfitted with the Klaxon horn used by the Soviet secret police. His competitors gossiped that these perks were allowed because of his cozy relationship with the Soviet government. Eugene Lyons, a United Press correspondent, even suspected that Duranty might be on the Soviet payroll, but no evidence of that seems to exist. Still, many then and later wondered if the status Duranty enjoyed in Moscow led him to curtail his coverage of the Soviets. Malcolm Muggeridge, a correspondent for The Manchester Guardian, would later call Duranty “the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in fifty years of journalism.” Joseph Alsop would tab him a “fashionable prostitute,” in the service of Communists. And S. J. Taylor’s 1990 biography of him would be titled Stalin’s Apologist.

This was all a long way from where Duranty started. Before going to Russia — as he later wrote — he was “viciously anti-Bolshevik.” In fact, when he arrived in Moscow in 1921 (to cover a famine, ironically enough), the Soviets almost denied Duranty a visa because of his record of antagonizing them in print. But
soon after his arrival, Duranty’s attitude changed. He came to see the Soviets as “sincere enthusiasts trying to regenerate a people who had been shockingly misgoverned.” He was hardly alone in this view. In the early 1930s, capitalism was at a low ebb, with depression-era unemployment in most industrialized countries approaching 25 percent. For many, especially among the educated elite, communism became a fashionable alternative to capitalism, as well as a bulwark against the rising tide of fascism. The nascent Soviet Union was seen as a grand, romantic experiment, one that carried the best hopes for the mass of humanity. Unlike many writers and journalists who went to Moscow at the time, Duranty was not a Communist or even blind to the Soviet excesses; he simply excused the forced labour camps, property seizures, and political purges as measures necessary to drive a backward country into the 20th century. “You can’t make an omelet without breaking some eggs,” was a phrase many remembered Duranty using to excuse Soviet tactics, but in his 1935 book _I Write As I Please_, he gave a fuller account of his thinking: “Even to a reporter who prides himself on having no bowels of compassion to weep over ruined homes and broken hearts, it is not always easy or pleasant to describe such wreckage, however excellent may be the purpose... But what matters to me is the facts, that is to say whether the Soviet drive to Socialism is or is not successful irrespective of the cost. When, as often happens, it makes me sick to see the cost, I say to myself, ‘Well, I saw the War and that cost was worse and greater and the result in terms of human hope or happiness was completely nil.’”

This perspective is evident in the 1931 series of articles that won him the Pulitzer. The stories sought to explain the impact of the first five years of “Stalinism” (a term Duranty is credited with inventing). In the series, Duranty explained that Stalin was focused on domestic progress, as opposed to Lenin’s earlier emphasis on achieving a world worker revolution. Stalinism, Duranty wrote, was marked by unprecedented invasion into every aspect of life in the country. “The Stalinist machine is better organized for the formation and control of public opinion than anything history has hitherto known,” Duranty wrote in one piece. In another, about the forced collectivization movement in agriculture, he noted that while it was based in theory on producing more food to feed a hungry nation, the reality “is that 5,000,000 human beings, and
1,000,000 families of the best and most energetic farmers are to be dispossessed, dispersed and demolished, to be literally melted or ‘liquidated’ into the rising flood of classless proletarians.” In general, Duranty wrote, Stalinism was not unlike the iron rule of the tsars, and was “an ugly, harsh, and cruel creed...flattening and beating down with, so far, no more than a hope or promise of a subsequent raising up. Perhaps this hope is vain and the promise a lie. That is a secret of the future.”

Taken together the thirteen articles (eleven were part of a series, datelined from Paris, that ran in June of 1931; the two others were separate stories) are a sometimes prescient exploration of a kind of totalitarian government the world had never seen before. Duranty’s writing style is often stilted, and the stories are flawed in many respects, but overall seem sound, and even include notes of moral condemnation rarely found elsewhere in his work.

The same cannot be said about Duranty’s coverage — or lack of coverage — of the 1932-1933 famine in Ukraine. After five years of brutal agricultural collectivization, Stalin increased the grain quotas due from Ukraine despite a poor harvest year. When it became evident that the quotas would not be met, Soviet troops and Party activists swept through Ukraine tearing apart peasant farms looking for secret grain hordes. They stripped the people clean and the result was catastrophic. Though no reliable census data are available, most historians now estimate at least 5 million people starved to death. Ukrainian groups put the figure at 7 million to 10 million and passionately believe it reflects a deliberate campaign by Stalin to break resistance to the Soviets in Ukraine and obliterate the Ukrainian identity, though not all historians agree with that interpretation.

Duranty’s stories begin to describe the food problem in August 1932. By October, he reported that Ukraine’s harvest was coming in at only 55 percent of 1931 levels, and in November he wrote a series on the food shortage “crisis.” But the articles largely parroted the government line about lazy peasants and kulak class enemies in the provinces being the cause of the problem. All the stories are datelined in Moscow, and Duranty goes to some lengths to play down the crisis. “There is no famine or actual starvation, nor
is there likely to be,” Duranty wrote in words that are now used against him. But just a couple of lines later in the same story he notes, “but it is a gloomy picture, and as far as the writer can see, there is small sign or hope of improvement in the near future.”

Even these toned-down reports, however, were apparently enough to draw the ire of the Soviet government. In a meeting with the British ambassador to Moscow, William Strang, Duranty said government officials had threatened that his food shortage stories could result in “serious consequences” for him because they endangered recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. Duranty told Strang he was afraid his visa would not be renewed. About a week after the series ran in November, Duranty filed a story from Paris about the censorship issue, saying his position had grown “delicate and difficult.” But, he hastened to add, the censors were generally reasonable. It’s clear he was trying to serve two masters.

By early 1933 word of the famine in Ukraine was leaking into the Western press. In March Malcolm Muggeridge bought a train ticket from Moscow to Kiev (without informing the Soviet press office) to check out famine rumors. There he found the population starving to death. “I mean starving in its absolute sense; not undernourished,” he wrote in reports that were smuggled past the censors. Worse, Muggeridge found grain supplies that did exist were being given to army units brought in to keep starving peasants from revolting. Upon his return to Moscow, Muggeridge informed the British embassy that the situation was so bad he wouldn’t have believed it if he had not seen it in person. Embittered, the idealistic Muggeridge left the Soviet Union, convinced he had witnessed “one of the most monstrous crimes in history, so terrible that people in the future will scarcely be able to believe it ever happened.”

Confined to Moscow and perhaps alarmed at being scooped, Duranty began to openly criticize the famine reports. Muggeridge’s stories were followed by a similar one from Gareth Jones, a secretary to the former British prime minister David Lloyd George, who had made a three-week walking tour of Ukraine. Duranty attacked Jones in The New York Times as naive and dismissed his article as another in a long line of failed predictions of doom for the Soviets.
Duranty wrote that he had made his own “exhaustive” inquiries around Moscow. Based on those he could report there was a serious food shortage but “no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.” While conditions were bad, Duranty went on to write, there was no famine. As S. J. Taylor notes in Stalin’s Apologist, the Timesman was “cutting semantic distinction pretty slim” and his downplaying of the famine was “the most outrageous equivocation of the period” — one that Gareth Jones did not let Duranty get away with. In a long letter to The Times published in May 1933 Jones wrote that during his weeks in the countryside he visited twenty villages and talked with hundreds of peasants. In Moscow, he discussed the tragedy with consuls from twenty or thirty countries, all of whom supported his view that a massive famine was under way. Further, Jones said, censorship in the Soviet Union had turned correspondents into “masters of euphemism and understatement” so that “famine” became “food shortage” and death from starvation became “widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.”

When travel restrictions were eased, Duranty finally made his own tour of Ukraine. In late August of 1933, at the start of a bumper harvest, he was able to report that “any report of a famine in Russia is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda.” In the same story, however, he noted that the food shortage had previously caused “heavy loss of life” in the region, at least trebling the normal death rate. In an editorial the next day, The Times noted that Duranty’s figures suggested that the “famine must have taken at least 5,000,000 lives and perhaps twice as many,” an estimate very much in line with what historians would later conclude. The editorial goes on to note that the United States in 1933, despite the Depression, had a surplus of 350 million bushels of wheat that could be used to offset the famine. But it was already too late.

Do these failings mean that Duranty should be stripped of the Pulitzer? That was certainly the conclusion of Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University history professor The Times hired to analyze Duranty’s work. In an eight-page report that leaked to The New York Sun in late October he blasts Duranty’s reporting as uncritical and unbalanced. In a July 29 letter to the Pulitzer Board,
forwarding the report, Arthur Sulzberger Jr. wrote that *The Times* had often acknowledged Duranty’s slovenly work, but argued that the Board might set a bad precedent by revoking the award. Sulzberger wrote that *The Times* would respect whatever decision the Board made, but cautioned that revoking the award was somewhat akin to the Stalinist urge “to airbrush purged figures out of official records and histories.”

Von Hagen’s report examined the totality of Duranty’s reporting in 1931, and found that he frequently hewed to the Party line and excused or explained away Soviet excess. In this, von Hagen notes, Duranty was not unique. But his report does not focus on the thirteen stories cited by the Pulitzer committee as the basis for the Prize (he cites only six of the thirteen and one of them favourably).

If the case for revoking the Prize is based solely on the series that Duranty won for, then it is less compelling. If it is based instead on the totality of his reporting, then the Prize should probably be revoked.

Duranty did not simply write watered-down stories about the famine. Others, including later critics like William Henry Chamberlin of *The Christian Science Monitor* and Eugene Lyons of *UP*, filed similarly bland reports, correcting the record only after they were out of the country. No one, it appears, both reported the depths of the famine and managed to stay inside the Soviet Union.

But Duranty did more than equivocate; he repeatedly cast doubt on whether the famine was taking place, relying on scarcely more than official Soviet press reports. In so doing he allowed himself to become a vehicle of Soviet propaganda. When he was finally allowed to tour the region in September of 1933, Duranty played up the big harvest that was by then under way, and wrote that “the populace, from the babies to the old folks, looks healthy and well nourished.” But writing of the same trip years later, in 1949, Duranty recalled that he had driven “nearly two hundred miles across the country between Rostov and Krasnodar through land that was lost to the weeds and through villages that were empty.” That was also the image Duranty gave to the British ambassador, Strang, and others shortly after his return to Moscow.
“The Ukraine has been bled white,” Duranty is reported as saying to Strang in a diplomatic dispatch to London dated 30 September 1933. Duranty ventured to Strang that it was “quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.” These sentiments, needless to say, never appeared under Duranty’s byline.

Researchers who have investigated Duranty’s career have found that certain editors at The New York Times did have doubts about his coverage of the Soviet Union, but never acted to recall him. Times editors were aware of famine reports in other newspapers, and even ran editorials and stories contrary to Duranty’s coverage in The Times. Those who wish to see Duranty’s Pulitzer revoked point to a 1931 State Department memo from the American ambassador to Germany on a meeting he had with Duranty in which Duranty supposedly said that by agreement between The Times and the Soviet government, all his dispatches reflected the Soviets’ official position. Though the report appears genuine, it’s hard to know how much weight to give it given the lack of other supporting evidence and the tone of The Times coverage. Certainly Duranty’s dispatches were contorted to get past the censors, but The Times headlines on his stories were often harsher in tone than the articles under them. The paper had a long record of anti-Soviet coverage and took a much harder editorial line against the Soviets than Duranty did, leading to a somewhat inconsistent picture during Duranty’s tenure.

That tenure ended in early 1934, when Duranty stepped down as The Times Moscow correspondent, just months after his triumphal trip with Litvinov to the White House. He continued as special correspondent for The Times through 1940 and wrote several books on the Soviet Union, never altering his view of Stalin as a cruel but necessary figure in Russian history. He died in Florida in 1957 with both his bank account and his reputation severely diminished. Given his cynical world view, Duranty might be mystified by the outrage still surrounding his career.

Then again, perhaps he anticipated the questions to come about his reporting from the Soviet Union. In his best selling 1935 memoir, I Write As I Please, he
discusses whether the “noble” objectives of the Soviets justified the harsh means they employed. In deciding, he recounts an incident that occurred while he was a cub reporter for The Times’s Paris desk in 1917 during World War I. George Creel, the head of the US military’s public information office, had relayed a tale about how American sailors on their maiden voyage to Europe sank a pack of German submarines. Duranty believed the story to be war propaganda meant to bolster flagging morale, but he filed the story anyway. Did the end justify the means, a troubled Duranty wondered? His answer took the form of a poem written in the style of e.e. cummings. In long stanzas he tells of the sailors’ heroic tale and his decision to write about it despite doubting its truth. The final stanza concludes:

well i ask you does a reporter not mean someone who reports
reports exactly what he sees verbatim what he hears
and did I not report it to my full two thousand words
and did it LEAD THE PAPER or not
and if Saint Peter asks unpleasant questions about it i shall
appeal to Saint Athanasius
and if Saint Athanasius lets me down i’ll shout for citizen Creel
and if they can’t
find him in heaven then I fear we’ll meet in HELL
If Ukraine forgets about who brought it so much misery, it will never be free

JAMES MACE interviews LUBOMYR LUCIUK

The Day, 4 November 2003
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Recently The Day wrote about the important achievement in the campaign to rescind Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize The New York Times has published an article saying that Professor Mark van Hagen, who conducted an independent research on the newspaper’s request, came to a conclusion that the Prize should be returned. Today we publish an exclusive interview with Professor Lubomyr Luciuk, research director of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, initiator of this campaign in which our newspaper took an active part. Professor Luciuk doesn’t intend to stop on this and shares with The Day his view of what Ukrainians throughout the world could and should do to commemorate the Holodomor victims

Q: Professor Luciuk, the campaign you began to rescind the 1932 Pulitzer Prize awarded to Walter Duranty of The New York Times, essentially for reporting what many people in the West wanted to hear about Stalin’s Soviet Union instead of the horrors, which that period entailed, has inspired Ukrainians the world over. Why did you begin the campaign to remove from Stalin’s most famous and successful apologist the laurels he was then awarded for denying, among other things, the Ukrainian Holodomor in Ukraine?

A: To hallow the memory of the many millions of Ukrainians who were victims of the genocidal Great Famine of 1932-1933.
**Q:** You are research director of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. What can you tell us about its relation to civil liberties — and with specific reference to the national indignities from which your own ancestors fled — and issues in Ukraine such as the freedom of the press and of the issues of national language and the coexistence of Ukrainians in a nation state with its own national minorities that have their own national rights that the Ukrainian state has responsibility for?

**A:** The UCCLA has been in existence since the mid-1980s as a voluntary, nonpartisan organization dedicated to articulating and defending the interests of the Ukrainian Canadian community and, more recently, of the Ukrainian Diaspora and even Ukraine. We have launched major campaigns on several fronts. For example, we have attempted to correct distorted reporting about what happened in Ukraine during the Second World War. Ukraine lost more of its people than any other nation in Nazi occupied Europe, a fact still not appreciated in the world. We have advocated that all war criminals should be brought to justice in criminal courts, regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial backgrounds or political beliefs, or when or where their alleged wrong doings were committed. We have stood up for the rights of Canadian citizens who have been, in our view, falsely accused of having participated in war crimes and subjected to denaturalization and deportation hearings. We have also championed the notion of recognition and reconciliation between the government of Canada and our community for the wrongs done during Canada’s first national internment operations, when thousands of Ukrainians were branded as “enemy aliens,” lost their freedoms and what little wealth they had, lost their right to vote, and were forced to do heavy labour in frontier areas of this country, for the profit of government and big business. We are also beginning a campaign to alert the world to the horrors befalling Ukrainian and other east European women, a modern-day holocaust orchestrated by criminal elements who suck these innocents into international prostitution and slavery. We are astounded that the government of Ukraine has done so little to protect its women from these
transnational rapists and whoremongers. We do whatever we can to support democratic forces in Ukraine, hoping that, sooner rather than later, an expectoration of all those who once served the Soviet regime will take place. They have no role to play in civil society. While former Communists and their collaborators hang onto the reins of power and influence in Ukraine our ancestral homeland can not be truly free.

**Q:** Everybody in Ukraine or concerned about it says that it is important to understand and recognize that Ukraine was the victim was genocide, but they sometimes differ in explaining why. Why do you think so?

**A:** To date the government of Ukraine has not done enough to ensure that the archival evidence about the genocidal Great Famine in Ukraine is made readily available for scholars around the world. Releasing some documents, but apparently not all, is insufficient. As well, Ukraine should be launching investigations into who perpetrated the *Holodomor* and bringing those responsible, from the top down, to justice before the criminal courts of the country. Today there still are many former servants of the Soviets living on pensions in Ukraine. These collaborators have, to date, gotten away with mass murder. No one would argue that aged Nazi war criminals and collaborators should escape justice. Neither should Soviet war criminals or those who collaborated in Communist crimes against humanity. Of course, one cannot blame Ukraine alone in this regard. We have alleged Soviet war criminals and collaborators in Canada, and others are alive and enjoying their pensions in Israel, the USA and throughout Western Europe. The world has simply not done enough to bring these villains to justice. Ukraine could lead the way. And, most certainly, Ukraine needs a major Great Famine Memorial complex in Kyiv and perhaps also in Kharkiv, educational, research and commemorative centers that would ensure that all Ukrainians and all visitors to Ukraine are forever reminded of the horrors that befell the country under Soviet and Nazi rule.
Q: Which organizations were most helpful in supporting your efforts in the Duranty campaign?

A: We have been very fortunate in securing the support of individuals and groups from around the world. The Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian American Justice Committee, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America have been particularly helpful. But it was the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association that initiated and orchestrated this effort, which has now received so much international attention. I would like, in this context, to also personally thank Dr. Myron Kuropas, of Chicago, who came up with the idea of a second postcard campaign, directed at The New York Times, asking them to return the Duranty Pulitzer Prize, regardless of whether or not the Pulitzer Prize Committee does the right thing and revokes it, as we have called for. It is a pity that the Government of Ukraine has yet to come forward and lend its moral support and weight to this international campaign. It certainly is odd that the government of a country that fell victim to genocide is relatively unengaged in this process. No one can imagine Israel being indifferent to Nazi war criminals or calls for bringing them to justice, or uninterested in commemorating the victims, or uninvolved when it comes to seeing justice done by exposing a major famine denier. Yet, to date, Kyiv is silent. That is very troubling, inexplicable, embarrassing.

Q: Your work on the issue of rescinding the Pulitzer Prize of Walter Duranty has won a victory with Mark von Hagen’s report to The New York Times that the award should be rescinded, while the recent editorial in Canada’s Globe and Mail that defending the 1990 decision not to pull his Pulitzer was the correct one in not wanting to airbrush history? Who has airbrushed history here? Duranty or those who want to preserve an award that was won for something everyone, including The Globe and Mail, recognize as a disgrace to journalism?
A: We have no desire to “airbrush” Mr. Duranty from history. We want him remembered for exactly what he was, a shill for the Soviets, Stalin’s apologist, a man who knowingly covered up a genocide. Professor von Hagen has confirmed that Duranty was a liar before, during and after the Great Famine. We know that he used his status as a Pulitzer Prize winner to attack those journalists, like Gareth Jones and Malcolm Muggeridge, who risked a great deal to tell the truth, only to then become victims of Duranty’s poisoned pen. We want all of that recalled, remembered, inscribed into the historical record for all time. Perhaps some Ukrainians, being Christians, can forgive Duranty, knowing that God will have judged him. But we have a duty to remember. No ones wants to forget Duranty or erase him. Quite the contrary. I think these kinds of rebuttals from The New York Times and Pulitzer Prize Committee representatives are very feeble. They should do the right thing and revoke Duranty’s Prize, and do so this November, to mark the 70th anniversary of this famine genocide. That would help bring closure to this matter and hallow the memory of the many millions of victims.

Q: What do you in general think about the von Hagen report to The Times?

A: Most welcome for confirming what we have always said. Professor von Hagen is to be commended for his forthright statement and for then going on to say that he recommends that The New York Times return Duranty’s Pulitzer. His statement helped a great deal by securing even more coverage internationally for our efforts, from Kenya to Canada to Russia to the USA and Ukraine. This story is all over the media, worldwide.

Q: You have asked the question of why we should stop here. Where should we go from here and how?

A: Ukraine needs to fund and create a Great Famine Memorial in Kyiv and probably in Kharkiv (capital of Soviet Ukraine during the Famine), with a commemorative and educational function, and
funding sufficient to make it unequaled as a center for the study of Soviet war crimes and crimes against humanity, not only during 1932-1933 but before, during and after that particularly horrific tragedy. And the government of Ukraine must also move forward with identifying, locating and bringing to criminal prosecution those who orchestrated the genocide or served the Soviets as collaborators in other crimes against humanity and war crimes. There should be no statute of limitations that would allow mass murderers to escape justice. And, regardless of where they might now live, be it in Russia, Israel, Canada, England or elsewhere, the government of Ukraine should locate such persons and call for their extradition to face justice. If Ukraine forgets about who brought so much misery, physically and spiritually, to our homeland then Ukraine will never be free. This will be a painful process but it is an essential one.
Statement by His Excellency Mr. Valeriy P. Kuchinsky
Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations

10 November 2003

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset I wish to thank the Secretary-General for the documents under this agenda item and the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr. Bertrand Ramcharan for his brilliant presentation. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the memory of the late High Commissioner for Human Rights, outstanding Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello, an excellent peacemaker and a strong advocate for human rights. We will miss Sergio and will never forget other people who perished in Baghdad. In connection with this tragedy as well as a number of others in many parts of the world we ask ourselves again and again: how can we save and promote the most fundamental and inalienable right of every person – the right to life? There is no doubt that we should combat new threats like terrorism in all their forms. And we need to respond to them not only by legislative and security measures but with the armoury of common values, common standards and common commitments on universal rights. A comprehensive strategy to establish global security must be grounded on promoting respect for human rights through upholding the rule of law, fostering social justice and enhancing democracy. Raising public awareness of human rights and fundamental freedoms is among the most important tasks we are facing today. Just a year ago, in his first and last report as the High Commissioner before the General Assembly Mr. de Mello rightly pointed out that nations had the right to know the truth about past events. Full and effective exercise of this right to truth is essential to avoid any recurrence of violations in the future. Guided by this
principle my delegation together with the delegations of Argentina, the
Republic of Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Canada, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nauru,
Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Timor-Leste, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and
Uzbekistan have issued the joint statement on one of the most tragic events in
the history of Ukraine, and I believe, in the history of humankind – the Great
Famine of 1932-1933 (Holodomor). This statement will be circulated as an
official document (A/C.3/58/9) of the 58th session under agenda item 117(b),
and Ukraine would like to thank once again all delegations who have signed
this statement for their valuable support. We also thank those countries who
expressed support for the declaration. We, in Ukraine, are also very grateful to
the Senates of Argentina, Australia, Canada and the US House of
Representatives for adopting this year respective documents on the Great
Famine. Some of them clearly pointed out that the Holodomor was one of the
most terrible expressions of genocide in the history of humankind. The Great
Famine engineered by the totalitarian Soviet regime claimed the lives of 7 to 10
million of our compatriots, the figure that can be compared with the
population of an average European country. The dreadful Famine that engulfed
Ukraine in 1932-1933 was the result of Joseph Stalin’s policy of forced
collectivization. This Famine was accompanied by a devastating purges of the
Ukrainian intelligentsia, religious leaders and politicians. It broke the peasant’s
will to resist collectivization and left Ukraine politically, socially and
psychologically traumatized. Unfortunately, back in 1933 the world did not
respond to our tragedy. The international community believed the cynical
propaganda of the Soviet Union, which was selling bread abroad while in
Ukraine the hunger was killing 17 people each minute. In other words, a
number of people equal to the number of people present in this Conference
room was perishing every 20 minutes. During this week the delegation of
Ukraine together with a number of NGO’s organize scores of events in
observance of the 70th anniversary of the Great Famine, and invites all the
delегations, their families and friends to attend them and to learn more about
the Ukrainian Holodomor. As the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma stated
in his address at the general debate of the 58th session of the General Assembly,
and as was clearly expressed in the joint document of our delegations, we do not want to settle scores with the past. We just want that as many people as possible know about our tragedy and that this knowledge help all of us to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. I thank you.
United Nations

General Assembly

Fifty-eighth session
Third Committee
Agenda item 117 (b)
Human rights questions: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Letter dated 7 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the delegations listed in the annex to the present letter, I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement on the seventieth anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 117 (b).

(Signed) Valeriy Kuchinsky
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations
Annex to the letter dated 7 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Joint statement by the delegations of Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nauru, Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America on the seventieth anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor)

In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.

Honouring the seventieth anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy, we also commemorate the memory of millions of Russians, Kazakhs and representatives of other nationalities who died of starvation in the Volga River region, Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan and in other parts of the former Soviet Union, as a result of civil war and forced collectivization, leaving deep scars in the consciousness of future generations.

Expressing sympathy to the victims of the Great Famine, we call upon all Member States, the United Nations and its special agencies, international and regional organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, foundations and associations to pay tribute to the memory of those who perished during that tragic period of history.

Recognizing the importance of raising public awareness on the tragic events in the history of mankind for their prevention in future, we deplore the acts and policies that brought about mass starvation and death of millions of people. We do not want to settle scores with the past, it could not be changed, but we are convinced that exposing violations of human rights, preserving historical records and restoring the dignity of victims through acknowledgement of their suffering, will guide future societies and help to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. We need that as many people as possible learn about this tragedy and consider that this knowledge will strengthen effectiveness of the rule of law and enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
For almost seventy years, my uncle, Gareth Jones, the first journalist to expose the 1932-1933 famine genocide has been conveniently ‘airbrushed’ out of history, the first and main casualty in the politics of acknowledgement of the Holodomor.

His only crime was his journalistic pursuit of the truth. Sticking his head above the parapet, he refused to be silenced, on righting the moral injustices of the Soviet famine, which from first hand knowledge he clearly knew to be true. Tragically, he paid the same ultimate price as many others who displeased the Stalinist regime.

Gareth Jones was kidnapped and murdered under mysterious circumstances by bandits in North China, just over six months after his last series of articles for Randolph Hearst in 1935, where he again, repeated his famine observations of March 1933.

You may ask who was Gareth Jones? Well, he was born in 1905 in Barry, South Wales, and educated first in his father’s school. Afterwards he attained two first class degrees, at the Universities of Wales, Aberystwyth, and Trinity College, Cambridge in French, German, and Russian.

In 1930, he became a foreign affairs advisor to former wartime Prime Minister David Lloyd George and first visited Russia and Ukraine in August 1930. On leaving Moscow, 26 August 1930 he wrote to his parents from Berlin (see appendix 1):
Hurray! It is wonderful to be in Germany again, absolutely wonderful. Russia is in a very bad state; rotten, no food, only bread; oppression, injustice, misery among the workers and 90% discontented. The winter is going to be one of great suffering there and there is starvation. The government is the most brutal in the world. This year thousands and thousands of the best men in Russia have been sent to Siberia and the prison island of Solovki. In the Donetz Basin conditions are unbearable. Many Russians are too weak to work¹.

One should note that the convention of the time meant that the word “Russia” was used in the West to describe all parts of the Soviet Union.

On his return to Britain, he was summoned to David Lloyd George’s country home in Churt where he met Lord Lothian. Lothian impressed with Gareth’s diary notes, introduced him to the editor of The Times, who subsequently published three unsigned articles entitled the ‘Real Russia’.

Gareth wrote in the Cardiff Western Mail:

*The success of the Five-Year Plan would strengthen the hands of the Communists throughout the world. It might make the 20th century a century of struggle between Capitalism and Communism.*²

Soon after Gareth’s return from the Soviet Union, Ivy Lee of Wall Street, New York, the then renowned Public Relations Advisor to big business, engaged Gareth Jones’ services, especially for his in-depth knowledge of the Soviet Union.

Gareth arrived in New York in May 1931, and shortly after his arrival, was invited to accompany a young Jack Heinz II, of Heinz Ketchup fame, for an extensive six weeks tour of Russia and Ukraine in the late summer. Gareth had kept a very extensive diary of their visit, which Jack Heinz later transcribed into a small book, entitled *Experiences in Russia – 1931: A Diary* — for which Gareth wrote the foreword:

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With knowledge of Russia and the Russian language, it was possible to get off the beaten path, to talk with grimy workers and rough peasants, as well as such leaders as Lenin’s widow and Karl Radek. We visited vast engineering projects and factories, slept on the bug-infested floors of peasants’ huts, shared black bread and cabbage soup with the villagers - in short, got into direct touch with the Russian people in their struggle for existence and were thus able to test their reactions to the Soviet Government’s dramatic moves.3

Time does not permit me to quote from the book, but there are several references to starvation and deaths where “peasants had been sent away in thousands to starve.”

After a year in the employ of Ivy Lee and due the fact that the United States was suffering from severe financial depression, Gareth returned to David Lloyd George for another year and unbeknown to many, assisted the former prime minister in writing his War Memoirs.

In London, in September 1932, Gareth learnt through several informed sources, including Malcolm Muggeridge, of reports emanating from Moscow of a severe famine crisis in the Soviet Union. Professor Jules Menken (of the London School of Economics), an eminent economist of the time, told Gareth that he “dreaded this winter, when he thought millions would die of hunger and finally stated that “There was already famine in Ukraine.”4

In light of this information, on 15 and 17 October, Gareth wrote two prophetic articles for the Cardiff Western Mail entitled: “Will There be Soup?” where he painted a very bleak picture of the coming Soviet winter.5

Before returning to the Soviet Union, on 23 February, Gareth through his connections with Lloyd George, became the first foreign journalist to be invited to fly with Adolf Hitler to a Frankfurt rally, just four days before the burning of the Reichstag. Describing that trip he wrote:
If this aeroplane should crash the whole history of Europe would be changed. For a few feet away sits Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of Germany and leader of the most volcanic nationalist awakening which the world has seen.\(^6\)

Before leaving Germany he wrote in the Western Mail: “The Europe of 1933 has seen the birth of the Hitler dictatorship in Germany. What will it see in the Soviet Union?”\(^7\) Then, on 1 March 1933, with his usual frenetic lifestyle, Gareth was in Moscow, from where he embarked on a tour of Ukraine.

On his way to Kharkiv, he narrowly escaped being arrested at a small railway station when he entered into conversation with some peasants. They were bewailing their hunger to him, and were gathering as a crowd, all murmuring, “There is no bread,” when a militiaman appeared. “Stop that growling,” he had shouted to the peasants; while to Gareth he said, “Come along; where are your documents?” An OGPU (secret police) man appeared from nowhere, and he was submitted to a thorough grueling of questions. After his fate had been decided the fortunate Gareth was allowed to proceed on his way.\(^8\)

He had piled his rucksack with many loaves of white bread, with butter, cheese, meat and chocolate, which he had bought at the foreign currency stores. Gareth believed that, “To see Russia one must travel “hard class,” and go by a slow train. Those tourists who travel “soft class.” and by express trains, get only impression, and do not see the real Russia.”\(^9\)

About that trip Gareth was to write in The Daily Express in April 1933:

\begin{quote}
In every little station the train stopped, and during one of these halts a man came up to me and whispered in German: “Tell them in England that we are starving, and that we are getting swollen.”\(^10\)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
In one of the peasant’s cottages in which I stayed we slept nine in the room. It was pitiful to see that two out of the three children had swollen stomachs. All there was to eat in the hut was a very dirty watery soup, with a slice or two of potato, which all the family including myself, ate from a common bowl with wooden spoons.
\end{quote}
Fear of death loomed over the cottage, for they had not enough potatoes to last until the next crop. When I shared my white bread and butter and cheese one of the peasant women said, “Now I have eaten such wonderful things, I can die happy.” I set forth again further towards the south and heard the villagers say, “We are waiting for death.” Many also said, “It is terrible here and many are dying, but further south it is much worse.”

On 29 March 1933, in Berlin, immediately on Gareth’s return from the Soviet Union, he issued a press release, which the 1931 Pulitzer Prize winner, H. R. Knickerbocker reported through the New York Evening Post Foreign Service.

Similar statements then appeared in the British press including the then Soviet–sympathetic Manchester Guardian, which quoted Gareth: “I walked alone through villages and twelve collective farms. Everywhere was the cry, “There is no bread; we are dying.”

Knickerbocker commented that: “the Jones report, because of his position, because of his reputation for reliability and impartiality and because he was the only first-hand observer who had visited the Russian countryside since it was officially closed to foreigners, was bound to receive widespread attention in official England as well as among the public of the country."

On 31 March, Walter Duranty made his outrageous and prompt rebuttal to Gareth’s press release:

Since I talked with Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive inquiries about this alleged famine situation. . . . There is serious food shortage throughout the country with occasional cases of well-managed state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or death from starvation, but there is widespread is mortality from diseases due to malnutrition . . . But - to put it brutally - you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs.
Gareth immediately on his return to Britain wrote at least 20 articles. In fact over the previous four years he had published between forty to fifty articles in Britain, the USA and other countries.

On 13 May 1933 The New York Times printed a letter of reply from ‘Mr. Jones’ to Walter Duranty’s article of 31 March, in which Gareth said: “he stood by his statement that the Soviet Union was suffering from a severe famine." The censors had turned the journalists into masters of euphemism and understatement and hence they gave “famine” the polite name of “food shortage” and “starving to death” was softened to read as “widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.”

Countering Walter Duranty’s rebuttal in The New York Times, Gareth Jones concluded by congratulating the Soviet Foreign Office on its skill in concealing the true situation in the USSR: “Moscow is not Russia, and the sight of well-fed people there, tends to hide the real Russia.”

On 8 May 1933, Gareth wrote a long letter to the editor of The Manchester Guardian in support Muggeridge’ series, of three articles in which he concluded:

I hope fellow liberals, who boil at any injustices in Germany, or Italy, or Poland, will express just one word of sympathy, with the millions of peasants, who are the victims of persecution and famine, in the Soviet Union."

After Gareth’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1933, he was banned from returning. In a letter to a friend he wrote:

Alas! You will be very amused to hear that the inoffensive little ‘Joneski’ has achieved the dignity of being a marked man on the black list of the OGPU and is barred from entering the Soviet Union. I hear that there is a long list of crimes which I have committed under my name in the secret police file in Moscow and funny enough espionage is said to be among them. As a matter of
fact Litvinoff [the Soviet Foreign Minister] sent a special cable from Moscow, to the Soviet Embassy in London, to tell them to make the strongest of complaints to Mr. Lloyd George about me.\textsuperscript{16}

Whilst working at The Western Mail and unable to return to the Soviet Union, Gareth gave many public lectures entitled: “The Enigma of Bolshevik Russia” throughout Britain and Ireland in 1933, and then across the United States in late 1934.

In October 1934, after one year in the ‘wilderness,’ Gareth embarked on a ‘World Wide Fact-Finding Tour’, with his eventual destination to be Manchukuo – otherwise known as Japanese controlled Manchuria. He wanted to find out what the Japanese were intending to do, in the light of their desire to expand territorially.

Following an earlier interview with Randolph Hearst in Wales, during the previous July, Gareth was invited to be a guest at St Simeon’s, Hearst’s American Estate, on 1 January 1935. Here he was commissioned to write a series articles for Hearst’s New York American. These were printed on 12 and 13 January 1935, in which he was given a further platform to reassert his previous 1933 observations of famine in Ukraine.

Leaving America on 18 January, he spent six weeks in Japan where he interviewed a number of very influential politicians, one being General Araki Sadao, who had designs on expanding northwards into Soviet Siberia. After traveling extensively around the Pacific basin, Gareth had some transport laid at his disposal for an extensive trip into the wilds of Inner Mongolia by the German Wostwag Company - now known to be a trading front for the OGPU.

On his journey, he discovered a Chinese town that had been newly infiltrated by the Japanese and where troops were massing. Apprehended for a number of hours he and his German companion were advised to take one of three routes back to the town of Kalgan. One was safe and the others infested by bad bandits. Despite taking the recommended route, they were both captured two days later. His companion was released, but Gareth was held for £8,000
ransom. Tragically, he was killed on 12 August 1935, after 14 days in captivity, and on the eve of his thirtieth birthday.\textsuperscript{17}

Paul Scheffer, the well-respected editor-in-chief of the non-Nazi \textit{Berliner Tageblatt} – and who was previously, the first journalist banned by the Soviets in 1929 for his negative reporting of the Five-Year Plan – was a close friend of Gareth’s. He wrote a front-page editorial on 16 August 1935:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The number of journalists with Gareth Jones initiative, and style, is nowadays, throughout the world, quickly falling, and, for this reason, the tragic death of this splendid man is a particularly big loss. The International Press is abandoning its colours - in some countries more quickly than in others - but it is a fact. Instead of independent minds, inspired by genuine feeling, there appear more and more men of routine, crippled journalists of widely different stamp who shoot from behind safe cover, and thereby sacrifice their consciences. The causes of this tendency are many. Today is not the time to speak of them.}\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

For almost seventy years Gareth’s articles have almost, but not quite, been forgotten. Now is the time to speak again of the truthful reporting of my uncle, rediscovered and vindicated for its original accuracy, despite his 1933 spat with Walter Duranty within the columns of \textit{The New York Times}.

It is also fitting that it is here at Columbia University, the home of excellence for American journalism, that Gareth’s ghost has come back to haunt those who stopped at nothing to silence his conscience. So, to end, I would like to thank Professor von Hagen for the honour of speaking from this prestigious platform, which has allowed me to finally put my uncle’s soul to rest – by recognizing at this conference his courageous role in exposing one of the greatest and most barbaric episodes in human history. I would like but one final word. Allow me to point out that the Welsh are not English. Like Ukrainians we were somewhat of an oppressed minority and so I would like to think that Gareth Jones, who very much appreciated his Welsh ancestry, took an added pleasure in helping the Ukrainians.
Endnotes


10 ibid.


17 Margaret Siriol Colley, Gareth Jones: A Manchukuo Incident (Nigel Colley: Newark, Nottinghamshire, 2001).

Seven million died in the ‘forgotten’ holocaust

ERIC MARGOLIS

The Toronto Sun, 16 November 2003
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Five years ago, I wrote about the unknown Holocaust in Ukraine. I was shocked to receive a flood of mail from young Americans and Canadians of Ukrainian descent telling me that until they read my column, they knew nothing of the 1932-1933 genocide in which Josef Stalin’s Soviet regime murdered seven million Ukrainians and sent two million more to concentration camps.

How, I wondered, could such historical amnesia afflict so many? For Jews and Armenians, the genocides their people suffered are vivid, living memories that influence their daily lives. Yet today, on the 70th anniversary of the destruction of a quarter of Ukraine’s population, this titanic crime has almost vanished into history’s black hole.

So has the extermination of the Don Cossacks by the Communists in the 1920s, the Volga Germans in 1941 and mass executions and deportations to concentration camps of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Poles. At the end of World War II, Stalin’s Gulag held 5.5 million prisoners, 23% of them Ukrainians and 6% Baltic peoples.

Almost unknown is the genocide of two million of the USSR’s Muslim peoples: Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Tajiks, Bashkirs and Kazaks. The Chechen independence fighters who today are branded as “terrorists” by the USA and Russia are the grandchildren of survivors of Soviet concentration camps.
Add to this list of forgotten atrocities the murder in Eastern Europe from 1945-
1947 of at least two million ethnic Germans, mostly women and children, and
the violent expulsion of 15 million more Germans, during which two million
German girls and women were raped.

Among these monstrous crimes, Ukraine stands out as the worst in terms of
numbers. Stalin declared war on his own people in 1932, sending Commissars
V. Molotov and Lazar Kaganovitch and NKVD secret police chief Genrikh
Yagoda to crush the resistance of Ukrainian farmers to forced collectivization.
Ukraine was sealed off. All food supplies and livestock were confiscated. NKVD
death squads executed “anti-Party elements.” Furious that insufficient
Ukrainians were being shot, Kaganovitch - virtually the Soviet Union’s Adolf
Eichmann - set a quota of 10,000 executions a week. Eighty percent of
Ukrainian intellectuals were shot.

During the bitter winter of 1932-1933, 25,000 Ukrainians per day were being
shot or died of starvation and cold. Cannibalism became common. Ukraine,
writes historian Robert Conquest, looked like a giant version of the future
Bergen-Belsen death camp.

The mass murder of seven million Ukrainians, three million of them children,
and deportation to the Gulag of two million more (where most died) was
hidden by Soviet propaganda. Pro-Communist Westerners, like The New York
Times’ Walter Duranty, British writers Sidney and Beatrice Webb and French
Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, toured Ukraine, denied reports of genocide,
and applauded what they called Soviet “agrarian reform.” Those who spoke
out against the genocide were branded “fascist agents.”

The US, British, and Canadian governments, however, were well aware of the
genocide, but closed their eyes, even blocking aid groups from going to
Ukraine.

The only European leaders to raise a cry over Soviet industrialized murder
were, ironically and for their own cynical and self-serving reasons, Hitler and
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Because Kaganovitch, Yagoda and some
other senior Communist Party and NKVD officials were Jewish, Hitler’s absurd claim that communism was a Jewish plot to destroy Christian civilization became widely believed across a fearful Europe.

When war came, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill allied themselves closely to Stalin, though they were well aware his regime had murdered at least 30 million people long before Hitler’s extermination of Jews and Gypsies began. Yet in the strange moral calculus of mass murder, only Germans were guilty. Though Stalin murdered three times more people than Hitler, to Roosevelt he remained “Uncle Joe.”

The British-US alliance with Stalin made them his partners in crime. Roosevelt and Churchill helped preserve history’s most murderous regime, to which they handed over half of Europe in 1945. After the war, the Left tried to cover up Soviet genocide. Jean-Paul Sartre denied the Gulag even existed.

For the Western Allies, Nazism was the only evil; they could not admit being allied to mass murderers. For the Soviets, promoting the Jewish Holocaust perpetuated anti-fascism and masked their own crimes. The Jewish people, understandably, saw their Holocaust as a unique event. It was Israel’s raison d’être. Raising other genocides at that time would, they feared, diminish their own. This was only human nature. While today, academia, the media and Hollywood rightly keep attention focused on the Jewish Holocaust, they mostly ignore Ukraine. We still hunt Nazi killers, but not Communist killers. There are few photos of the Ukraine genocide or Stalin’s Gulag, and fewer living survivors. Dead men tell no tales.

Russia never prosecuted any of its mass murderers, as Germany did. We know all about the crimes of Nazis Adolf Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler, about Babi Yar and Auschwitz. But who remembers Soviet mass murderers Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovitch, Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria? Were it not for writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, we might never know of Soviet death camps like Magadan, Kolyma and Vorkuta. Movie after movie appears about Nazi evil, while the evil of the Soviet era vanishes from view or dissolves into nostalgia. The souls of Stalin’s millions of victims still cry out for justice.
Statement on Walter Duranty’s 1932 Prize

Pulitzer Prize Board, 21 November 2003

After more than six months of study and deliberation, the Pulitzer Prize Board has decided it will not revoke the foreign reporting Prize awarded in 1932 to Walter Duranty of *The New York Times*.

In recent months, much attention has been paid to Mr. Duranty’s dispatches regarding the famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933, which have been criticized as gravely defective. However, a Pulitzer Prize for reporting is awarded not for the author’s body of work or for the author’s character but for the specific pieces entered in the competition. Therefore, the Board focused its attention on the 13 articles that actually won the Prize, articles written and published during 1931. [A complete list of the articles, with dates and headlines, is attached below.]

In its review of the 13 articles, the Board determined that Mr. Duranty’s 1931 work, measured by today’s standards for foreign reporting, falls seriously short. In that regard, the Board’s view is similar to that of *The New York Times* itself and of some scholars who have examined his 1931 reports. However, the Board concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception, the relevant standard in this case. Revoking a Prize 71 years after it was awarded under different circumstances, when all principals are dead and unable to respond, would be a momentous step and therefore would have to rise to that threshold.

The famine of 1932-1933 was horrific and has not received the international attention it deserves. By its decision, the Board in no way wishes to diminish

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the gravity of that loss. The Board extends its sympathy to Ukrainians and others in the United States and throughout the world who still mourn the suffering and deaths brought on by Josef Stalin.


6/14/1931 “Red Russia of Today Ruled by Stalinism, Not Communism”
6/16/1931 “Socialism First Aim in Soviet’s Program; Trade Gains Second”
6/18/1931 “Stalinism Shelves World Revolt Idea; To Win Russia First”
6/19/1931 “Industrial Success Emboldens Soviet in New World Policy”
6/20/1931 “Trade Equilibrium is New Soviet Goal”
6/22/1931 “Soviet Fixes Opinion by Widest Control”
6/23/1931 “Soviet Censorship Hurts Russia Most”
6/24/1931 “Stalinism Smashes Foes in Marx’s Name”
6/25/1931 “Red Army is Held No Menace to Peace”
6/26/1931 “Stalinism Solving Minorities Problem”
6/27/1931 “Stalinism’s Mark is Party Discipline”

Two articles in The New York Times magazine

3/29/1931 “The Russian Looks at the World”
12/20/1931 “Stalin’s Russia Is An Echo of Iron Ivan’s”
[See also David D. Kirkpatrick, “Pulitzer Board won’t void ‘32 award to Times writer,” The New York Times, 22 November 2003 which cites Mr. Sulzberger acknowledging that Duranty’s work had been “slovenly” but adding that a revocation of the Prize might evoke the “Stalinist practice to airbrush purged figures out of official records and histories.” Mr. Sulzberger also wrote that “the Board would be setting a precedent for revisiting its judgments over many decades.”]
Ukraine marks Soviet-era famine that killed millions amid increased awareness of the deaths

ANNA MELNICHUK

Associated Press, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 November 2003
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Increased international recognition of a forced famine that killed up to 10 million Ukrainians brought bittersweet relief Saturday to elderly survivors marking the 70th anniversary of a dark chapter in the history of Soviet communism.

Gathering at a cathedral in the now independent Ukraine, survivors recalled their desperation during a famine historians say was provoked by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin as part of his campaign to force peasants to give up their land and join collective farms.

“This year is of particular significance for Ukraine, because the world has recognized the crime against the Ukrainian people,” said E. Morgan Williams, senior adviser of the US-Ukraine Foundation. Two weeks ago, some 30 countries signed a joint statement to commemorate the memory of the millions of men, women and children who suffered because of the “cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime in the former Soviet Union.” The UN statement became the first, significant international recognition of the famine, which was denied by the Soviets for decades.

Marking the day set by the government as an annual memorial for the famine, some 2,000 people gathered at the golden-domed St. Michael Cathedral in the
capital, Kiev to light candles at a memorial dedicated to the victims, estimated at between 7 and 10 million.

Dozens of elderly survivors, many leaning on crutches, were helped by younger relatives as they shuffled under flags with black ribbons and the cathedral’s bells chimed in mourning.

“My grandfather cut and dried loaves of bread and hid them in sacks to his dying day many years after the famine,” said Lidia Kolysnichenko, 67, from the village of Irpin near Kiev.

Historians say that Stalin deliberately provoked the famine by having harvests taken out of Ukraine and having secret police confiscate whatever scarce grain reserves farmers tried to hide.

Even according to the most conservative figures, some 25,000 people died every day in Ukraine, or 17 people every minute, in 1933. Cases of cannibalism were widespread.

“Our neighbour killed his wife, dismembered her body and was seen to make soup of her,” said 82-year old Volodymyr Pianov, his hand trembling. “It was not the only case when people ate each other in our village.” His village of Kriuchki in the eastern Kharkiv region, one of area’s most devastated by the famine, died out almost entirely.

Earlier this year, Ukraine declassified more than 1,000 files documenting the famine, and Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed a law establishing a day of remembrance for famine victims.

In a related development, the Pulitzer Prize Board said Friday it would not revoke a Prize awarded in 1932 to a reporter for The New York Times who was accused of deliberately ignoring the famine in Ukraine to preserve his access to Stalin. The Pulitzer Board said there was not clear evidence of deliberate deception.

Walter Duranty covered the Soviet Union for The Times from 1922 to 1941, earning acclaim for an exclusive 1929 interview with Stalin. Duranty was later criticized for reporting the Communist line rather than the facts.
The Board’s decision was immediately criticized by Ukrainian groups, who sent more than 15,000 letters and postcards to the Pulitzer committee demanding the Prize be withdrawn.

“We certainly will continue to press for revocation,” said Victoria Hubska of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. “Duranty misled the international community. The lie should be punished.”
Times lied, millions died: The paper of record’s Cold War record

ANDREW STUTTAFORD

*National Review Online*, 24 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of the *National Review Online* and the author

So that’s it then. Despite all the protests, the Pulitzer Prize Board has decided that it will not revoke the award won by Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* for his reporting in Stalin’s Soviet Union. This was not a decision that it took lightly, mind you. The Board’s members want everyone to understand that they only took their decision after “more than six months of study and deliberation.” Six months — that’s around one month, perhaps less, for each million who died in the *Holodomor*, the man-made famine that Duranty tried so hard to deny.

Here’s how Petro Solovyschuk from the Ukraine’s Vinnytsia region remembers that time:

*I no longer lived in my house. I slept in patches of clover, in haystacks; I was swollen from hunger, my clothes were in shreds. Our house was torn down and they took everything to the collective farm. Only a pile of clay remained. And there is no trace of my family — not a grave, nor a cross. There are only these names: my father — Makar Solovyschuk, died May 1933; my mother — Oliana Solovyschuk, died March 1933; my brother — Ivan Solovyschuk, died April 1933; my sister — Motrya Solovyschuk, died April 1933.*
Here’s what Walter Duranty said in June of that year: “The ‘famine’ is mostly bunk.”

To be fair, the Board’s argument is not without some logic:

In recent months, much attention has been paid to Mr. Duranty’s dispatches regarding the famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933, which have been criticized as gravely defective. However, a Pulitzer Prize for reporting is awarded not for the author’s body of work or for the author’s character but for the specific pieces entered in the competition. Therefore, the Board focused its attention on the 13 articles that actually won the Prize, articles written and published during 1931...In its review of the 13 articles, the Board determined that Mr. Duranty’s 1931 work, measured by today’s standards for foreign reporting, fall seriously short....

But what can the Board mean by “today’s” standards? The distortions, cursory research, and rehashed propaganda that characterized so much of Duranty’s work even prior to the famine were a disgrace to journalism — then just as much as now.

The Board adds that there was “not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception, the relevant standard in this case. Revoking a Prize 71 years after it was awarded under different circumstances, when all principals are dead and unable to respond, would be a momentous step and therefore would have to rise to that standard.”

Quite how those circumstances are “different” isn’t explained. Are we meant to believe that it was perhaps reasonable in those days to expect that the Five-Year Plan would be buttressed by a Pulitzer Prize-winning lie or two? The Board does not say. As for trying to justify its inaction on the grounds that “all the principals are dead and unable to respond,” let’s just say that’s an unfortunate choice of words in the context of a horror that left five, six or seven million (Khrushchev: “No one was counting”) dead and, thus, one might agree, “unable to respond.” But the argument (with which I have some
sympathy) that, however repellent they were, the events of 1932-1933 should be irrelevant in considering a Prize won for writings that predate them, can only be taken so far. Duranty’s behavior in those later years is certainly relevant in coming to an assessment as to whether the flaws in his Prize winning work were the product of a deliberate piece of deception. And the evidence from 1933 is clear. Duranty was a liar. And if he was a liar in 1933, it’s probable that he was a liar in 1931.

To make things worse, not only may Duranty have been lying, but also The New York Times may have known that he was lying. One historian has pointed to State Department papers recording a 1931 (note the date) conversation between Duranty and a US diplomat in Berlin suggesting that there was an “understanding” between The New York Times and the Soviet authorities that Duranty’s dispatches always reflected the official opinion of the Soviet regime rather than his own point of view.

Now, Duranty could have been lying about that too, or the diplomat could have misunderstood what he was being told, but, like so much of this story, it raises issues that need airing in something more than one brief press release. As the body responsible for administering journalism’s most prestigious Prize, the Pulitzer Board ought to be advocates of openness and disclosure. We are told that it considered this matter for over six months of “study and deliberation.” Assuming this is true, the Board should publish its findings in full.

But if the Pulitzer Prize Board can, in theory at least, make a respectable case for leaving the Prize in Hell with Duranty’s ghost, The New York Times, usually so exquisitely sensitive to the injustices of the past, is on less certain ground. To be sure, over time it has distanced itself from its former Moscow correspondent, but not (apart for some rather feeble cosmetic gestures) from his Pulitzer.

In response to the latest campaign to revoke the Prize, earlier this year The New York Times commissioned Columbia University history professor Mark von Hagen to review Duranty’s work. He turned out to be no fan of a man who, The New York Times once said, had been on perhaps “the most............200............
important assignment ever entrusted by a newspaper to a single correspondent over a considerable period of time.” In the report, von Hagen describes Duranty’s work from 1931, for example, as a “dull and largely uncritical” recitation of Soviet sources, but the report itself contains no final recommendation. Subsequently, however, von Hagen has argued that the Prize should be withdrawn for the sake of the gray lady’s “honour.”

Honor? Well, when it comes to accepting responsibility for Duranty, The New York Times (usually so eager to be seen as being on the side of the angels) has always tended to be a little reticent, so perhaps it is no surprise that its publisher, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., seemed a touch unwilling to go quite as far as his historian. Oh yes, he did what he had to. He dutifully forwarded von Hagen’s report to the Pulitzer Board. He even sent a cover letter with it in which he condescended to “respect” whatever the Board might choose to decide, but he just couldn’t resist adding the thought that rescinding Duranty’s Prize evoked the old Stalinist practice of “airbrush[ing] purged figures out of official records and histories,” a view, interestingly, that von Hagen does not share. Sadly for Pinch and his paper, any airbrushing would likely to be ineffective anyway. Whatever was finally decided, the controversies of recent years have ensured that the historical record will always be clear. The 1932 Pulitzer, the Prize about which The New York Times was so proud for so long, was won by a liar and a fraud, won by a journalist to whom genocide was not news that was fit to print, won by a journalist who by his silence made his newspaper an accomplice to mass murder.

If I were Arthur Sulzberger Jr., I would have begged them to take that Prize away.
Duranty was Stalin’s spin doctor

ROBERT FULFORD

The National Post, 25 November 2003
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Walter Duranty, famous seventy years ago as a distinguished reporter for The New York Times, has slowly turned into a symbol of the willfully deceptive reporting on the Soviet Union that misled the West about the nature of Stalinism for many years. This week Duranty appeared in the news again when the Pulitzer Prize Board announced its decision not to strip him posthumously of the award he won in 1932 for persistently dishonest reporting from Moscow.

Duranty served as Moscow correspondent from 1921 to 1934, wrote several books on Soviet politics, and won an admiring public in America. Meanwhile, he and the Soviets developed a mutually beneficial arrangement. They let him live like a commissar in a big apartment stocked with caviar and vodka. He had assistants, a chauffeur, and a cook-mistress who became the mother of his son. In return he followed the Soviet line. Sometimes he criticized the Bolsheviks, but on crucial issues he echoed their opinions and praised their plans.

Duranty depicted Stalinist dictatorship as a version of what Russians considered proper government: “Absolute authority, unmellowed by the democracy or liberalism of the West.” He accepted outright the new Soviet spin of the early 1930s: No longer interested in exporting revolution, they desired nothing but co-operation and trade with the West. By selling this approach to Times readers, Duranty helped win public approval for the American decision to recognize Stalin’s government. When recognition was granted in 1934 a
banquet was held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York to celebrate. Duranty, introduced as “one of the great foreign correspondents of modern times,” was given a standing ovation.

Elsewhere, his mendacity was noticed. Malcolm Muggeridge, reporting from Moscow for The Manchester Guardian, considered him the worst liar he ever encountered in journalism. But Duranty’s most passionate critics have been Ukrainians, for excellent reasons. When Ukrainian farmers resisted collectivization, Soviet soldiers seized their crops at gunpoint, leaving the people to starve while the government sold the grain abroad for hard-currency credits. As a result, at least 5-million and possibly even 10-million Ukrainians died.

This man-made famine, at that time the greatest act of genocide in history, was reported by newspapers in several Western countries, including the US. But even at its peak in 1933, Duranty denied that it existed: “There is no famine or actual starvation, nor is there likely to be.” “Russians Hungry, But Not Starving” said the heading on his 31 March 1933 report. Later, when Stalin sent old colleagues to prison or death on false charges of treason, Duranty reported that justice was being served. “Stalin is not an arrogant man,” he wrote. In fact, he was “remarkably long-suffering in his treatment of various oppositions.”

The evidence against Duranty piled up over the years, often in memoirs like Muggeridge’s and in Robert Conquest’s books on Soviet terror. In 1990 Sally J. Taylor wrote in Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, The New York Times’s Man in Moscow (Oxford University Press) that he knew the truth all along and admitted to British diplomats that possibly 10-million had died. The New York Times editors, never eager to admit such a stain on their paper’s honour, finally assigned Karl Meyer to review Duranty’s work. He called it “some of the worst reporting to appear in this newspaper.”

Ukrainians now mark the history of the famine as Jews mark the Holocaust; this year their day of remembrance fell on Saturday, the same day as the Pulitzer announcement. Led by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Toronto, they have been petitioning the Pulitzer Board to cancel
Duranty’s award. Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University historian hired by *The Times* to judge the Prize-winning articles, reported that they were a “largely uncritical recitation of Soviet sources.” He argued for withdrawing the Prize but the publisher, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., disagreed. Sulzberger said it would resemble the Stalinist practice of airbrushing purged figures from official photographs. All to the contrary: It would acknowledge a dreadful mistake. But the Pulitzer Board saw it Sulzberger’s way. Ukrainian groups, unsatisfied, have vowed to continue their campaign.

Underlying the Pulitzer committee’s decision we can detect lingering traces of respect for Communist dictatorship as a noble endeavour that turned barbarous because its leadership fell into the wrong hands. There’s still a belief abroad that communism contained an ethical core, the search for social justice, and therefore its supporters need never apologize. It’s doubtful that we would extend this generosity to anyone who once embraced fascism. Had Duranty knowingly published something similar about the Nazis, such as a false denial that death camps existed, his Pulitzer would have been retracted decades ago, perhaps even before his death in 1957.

In our standard agreed-upon history of the 20th century, communism still stands morally above fascism, even though communism lasted much longer and killed many more. Meanwhile, in the place on the 11th floor of *The Times* that displays the framed citations of its 89 Pulitzer Prizes, there’s a notice appended to Duranty’s citation: “Other writers in *The Times* and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.”
The world’s greatest liar?

LUBOMYR LUCIUK

Ottawa Citizen, 26 November 2003

It was just by chance, at the end of a very rough week. I was hurrying home, hungry, tired, stressed. It was getting dark but somehow I spotted her, sitting at a Brock Street bus stop, alone, resigned to a wait. I haven’t seen very much of her in recent years. Her husband has been ill and the Ukrainian community of Kingston, at least the part of it that I grew up in, never large to start with, has shrunk, an inevitability with the passage of time. Yet I almost drove by. What changed my mind? I’m not sure. But I pulled over and offered a lift. She was grateful. The half hour or so she would have spent in transit would now pass in a few minutes. I dropped her off and went on my way, a little delayed but no matter, good deed done.

I was barely through my front door when the telephone rang. A man in Alabama, whom I do not know, wanted my reaction to the news that the Pulitzer Prize Committee had just announced that it would not revoke the 1932 award given to Walter Duranty. He was The New York Times correspondent who served Soviet interests before, during, and after the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine, arguably one of the greatest acts of genocide in 20th century Europe. Publicly, Duranty dismissed all accounts of this man-made famine, going out of his way to denigrate those who risked much by reporting the unfolding horrors. Privately he admitted, at the British Embassy in Moscow, 26 September 1933, that as many as 10 million people had died of hunger in the past year.
Officially, the fourth Saturday of every November, 22 November this year, is set aside in Ukraine to hallow the memory of the many millions of innocent victims of the Terror-Famine. So the timing of the Pulitzer Prize Committee’s announcement could not have been more base, whether intentional or an example of profound obtuseness. Granted a unique chance to champion truth, the Committee’s grandees instead rallied around a liar, casting themselves as the vindicators of Stalin’s apologist. That they larded their manifesto with expressions of “sympathy” for those who “suffered” made their missive even more execrable. Shedding crocodile tears for the murdered places Duranty’s contemporary apologists in his company, forever. They may warrant some pity for it’s a foul congregation they have joined.

Duranty knew but didn’t care that millions were deliberately starved. This Pulitzer Committee didn’t care either. Instead they worried over setting a precedent that might require reviewing whether other awards were as ill-deserved as Duranty’s. Are there more like him in the ranks of Pulitzer winners? And what would be wrong with establishing such a model? If Dr. Joseph Goebbels had secured a Pulitzer in 1932 for eloquent prose about the New Order in Europe does anyone believe his Prize would still stand? Is this reluctance to do what’s right grounded in the fact that the victims were peasants, and Ukrainians?

When, on May Day, the campaign began to have Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize either revoked by the Pulitzer Committee or returned by The New York Times, our intent was to draw attention to the Holodomor, as the Great Famine is called in Ukraine. What we sowed now allows us to reap dozens of stories about the Famine-Genocide and Duranty’s mendaciousness, found in mainstream newspapers published from Moscow to Montreal, Prague to London, Wichita to Kingston. This bountiful harvest seems to discomfort some folks. Columbia University professor David Klattel alleged in the current issue of the Columbia Journalism Review: “Whoever funded [this campaign] spent a good deal of money.” Wrong. A few thousand dollars in printing costs, certainly, but those who signed and sent in our cards paid their own postage. The remarkable volume of mail signals an unambiguous expression of international revulsion at the thought that Duranty might be left grasping his
unmerited Pulitzer. It is not evidence of a well-endowed global conspiracy of the sort some paranoiacs mutter about.

Sig Gissler, administrator of the Pulitzer Committee, has acknowledged how our efforts “significantly increased awareness of the famine of 1932-1933.” True, and we have done just as much to further expose the greatest of the famine deniers, although there was nothing new in underscoring just how perverse a scoundrel Duranty was. Everyone admits the latter, although, oddly, Duranty’s willful prostitution of the most fundamental principle of journalism, the duty to accurately report on what one observes rather than just regurgitating Party propaganda, seems not to have troubled those charged with shepherding journalism’s most prestigious award.

What our initiative never tried to do was “airbrush” Duranty out of history, as Bill Keller of The New York Times pleaded recently. Quite to the contrary, we want Duranty remembered for exactly what he was, a shill for the Soviets, a man whom his contemporary, Malcolm Muggeridge, described as “the greatest liar of any journalist I have ever met.” Why the Pulitzer Committee would want to keep such a scamp on their honour role defies explanation. Duranty’s continuing hold on a Pulitzer soils all Pulitzers, past, present, and future.

Those who made the unconscionable decision not to revoke Duranty’s award will have to live with their choice. Perhaps Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of The New York Times, will still return this Prize, or at least instruct his editors to stop listing Duranty in their annual paean to that newspaper’s Pulitzer recipients, for surely no decent journalist can feel comfortable sharing this distinction with the reprobate in their midst. Or was it just naïve of us to assume that those on the receiving ends of our epistles would be capable of rendering anything other than the Pharisaical findings they did?

The crippling legacy of this unparalleled horror for Ukraine, described as a post-genocidal society by Professor James Mace, needs to be analyzed thoroughly. And bringing to justice those responsible for this Communist crime against humanity, and others, must become a priority. Canada could help for some perpetrators are not only alive but here amongst us, enjoying their pensions.
As I reflect on the events of this past weekend I am comforted by knowing that in the early evening of the day on which the Pulitzer Committee soiled itself with sophistries I slowed down to give an elderly lady a ride. In doing so I showed a small kindness, perhaps the best thing I could have done on that day for a survivor of Stalinism, my godmother.
Waste is unthinkable for survivors: Lessons learned from horror haven’t been forgotten

CAROL SANDERS

Winnipeg Free Press, 28 November 2003
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I remember going to a friend’s house after school when I was a kid and her quiet, smiling Baba pinched my cheeks and offered me freshly baked cookies and bread. The only time I ever heard her Ukrainian grandma raise her voice was when I took a big piece of bread, had one bite and threw the rest in the garbage.

At the time, it seemed like an overreaction.

With so much food, what’s the big deal?

Thirty years later, I found out. This week I met some of the survivors of the Ukrainian famine-genocide of 1932-1933.

When we were children, my friends and I played with Barbies and wasted food; 70 years ago in southern Ukraine, kids were scrounging for scraps of anything edible and were surrounded by people starving to death.

I’d heard about the famine orchestrated by Communist dictator Joseph Stalin, but didn’t feel it until I listened to the people who lived through it. I saw how their experiences shaped them. And how years of official denials, the apathy of other governments and a cover up at the time by a New York Times reporter in Stalin’s back pocket kept them from talking about it.
Not long after Stalin succeeded in the collectivization of their farms, closure of their churches and the killing of nearly one-quarter of the population, the young Ukrainians who made it through the “famine” had to deal with Hitler. They were rounded up and sent to work camps in Germany. If they survived till the end of the Second World War, they were placed in displaced persons camps before coming to Canada. In a new country they had to find their way, start their own families and learn to speak English. There was no time to dwell on the past.

And for decades, no one believed them, so what was the point in discussing it?

Now in their 70s, 80s, and 90s, they can finally take a breath and tell their stories. Some, like 92-year-old Peter Trimpolis of Winnipeg, have written about the famine of 1932-1933. Trimpolis’s book, *My Rocky Road of Life*, documents his first-hand account of collectivization of the farms in Ukraine and the adventures and hardships that followed.

Edith Friesen, another Winnipegger, wrote *Journey Into Freedom* about her mother’s experience as one of the many Mennonites living in southern Ukraine who survived the artificial famine.

The man-made disaster isn’t an event that’s buried in the past. The thriftiness, devotion to family and strong ties to the church as the cultural centre of the community have been passed down through the generations. And the importance of sharing when there’s not much to share is another.

Friesen goes back to that part of Ukraine every year and is struck by the kindness of the people, most of whom are living in poverty.

“It’s amazing they can still be so generous having experienced that.”

This weekend, the Ukrainian community is hosting a symposium on the famine-genocide of 1932-1933 at the St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral in Winnipeg. It’s their chance to tell their story and for us to listen.
For anyone who’s wondered about their friend’s quiet Baba who loves to cook and hates to waste, it’s a big deal.
No shortage of monsters in the world

JOHN GLEESON

The Winnipeg Sun, 28 November 2003,
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The overall tone of the 70th anniversary of the Ukrainian Holodomor has been one of reconciliation, respect and shared sadness for the seven million victims of Stalin’s inhuman regime. But when you’re talking about genocide — and especially comparing one genocide with another — some bad blood’s bound to resurface, and sure enough it did. Responding to last Friday’s column (Genocide survivors end silence), T. Ranisgu of Toronto didn’t just rewrite history to make his point — he turned it upside-down. “Maybe the Ukrainian people kept quiet because of their complicity with the Nazis in WW2,” Ranisgu wrote. “I have Jewish relatives who have told me of atrocities committed by Ukrainian citizens. They helped the Nazis round up and kill Jews during the war and in return they got their property and belongings. The Ukrainians helped the Nazis also because they figured it would make them independent from the Soviets. What Stalin did was pay them back for siding with the Nazis.” There you go. The Holodomor of the early 1930s was payback for the Holocaust of the 1940s. Now it all makes sense, right? n fact, ethnic conflict between Jews and Ukrainians in the old country is well-documented — and since it was a factor in both genocides, it should be exposed to the light of day and then hopefully laid to rest. After the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Ukraine was occupied in turn by Red Russians, White Russians and Poles. In just three years, Kiev was liberated 15 times. When the Reds re-invaded Ukraine in late 1918 they outraged the peasants by taking their grain and starting the process of consolidating
individual holdings into state farms. Ukrainians, their culture and livelihoods now under attack, rose up against the Bolsheviks, some of whom were Jews. “To these angry mobs anti-Bolshevism automatically meant anti-Semitism,” Lionel Kochan and John Keep wrote in *The Making of Modern Russia*: “Fifty pogroms occurred at that time in three provinces and by 1921 the total had reached 2,000. Overall ethnic violence cost some 30,000 Jews their lives.” A dozen years later, when Stalin’s minions went about the monstrous business of exterminating at least seven million Ukrainians, some of the Soviets involved (including the chief of the secret police and other senior Communist officials) were Jewish. A decade later, when the Nazis invaded Ukraine and started rounding up Jews as part of Hitler’s “Final Solution,” some Ukrainians collaborated (and many, many more became victims of the Nazis). So yes, Jewish blood was on Ukrainian hands and Ukrainian blood was on Jewish hands. Still, a few racist murderers being among the millions killed in both holocausts does not render the overwhelming majority of victims any less innocent, nor the genocide carried out by the Bolsheviks and Nazis any less depraved. Even T. Ranisgu acknowledges as much, ending his letter: “There’s no shortage of monsters in the world and Stalin may have been just as evil as Hitler. Ukrainians should have their peace of mind and maybe the governments can acknowledge their pain.” Acknowledging the pain is what this weekend’s *Holodomor* symposium is all about. Along with a noon-hour ceremony on Saturday by the Famine monument at City Hall, one of the highlights will be a memorial luncheon for the approximately 30 survivors now living in the Winnipeg area.

Speaking at the Sunday luncheon will be Asper Foundation executive director Moe Levy, who is spearheading the late Israel Asper’s Canadian Museum of Human Rights, slated to open by the summer of 2008 at The Forks. Although the museum will have a strong Canadian focus, Levy says the *Holodomor* will not be forgotten this time. “The Ukrainian genocide was always one of the stories we wanted to tell in this museum,” Levy says. “We intend to tell the whole story and tell it accurately.” To ensure this, he says, Ukrainian Canadians will appoint their own historians and representatives to the committee overseeing the museum exhibits. Levy is aware of the historical bad blood between Ukrainians and Jews but says both communities have “come a long way” since the genocides of the last century,
adding he hopes any lingering acrimony will be replaced by the “spirit of reconciliation” that’s driving the museum project.

Eugene Hyworon, parish president of St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral, where the symposium is being held, says the historic conflict between Ukrainians and Jews was the result of misunderstanding, but he feels it shouldn’t be swept under the rug. “The cycle of violence is not going to stop until people recognize the mistakes they made in the past and correct past injustices,” Hyworon says. Most of the survivors were small children when the Holodomor occurred; they know little of the ethnic politics or “genocidal justifications” behind it. They remember hunger and death. Symposium organizer Father Jaroslaw Buciora notes many survivors did not want to be given special recognition or feted at this weekend’s event. So instead, a symbolic famine meal is planned and 30 icons will be blessed and presented to the survivors individually after the Sunday morning liturgy. “The survivors are quite humble people,” he says. “For some of these people God was their only source of life — it’s because of God they survived.” Thank God they did.
Revoking Duranty’s Prize

DUNCAN M. CURRIE

The Harvard Crimson, 3 December 2003
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In the annals of 20th century journalism, few names are more ignominious than Walter Duranty. The New York Times’s Moscow correspondent during the 1920s and 1930s, Duranty was by all accounts a liar, a recycler of propaganda and a willful apologist for one of history’s bloodiest tyrants, Joseph Stalin.

Back in 1932, however, he was the toast of Western elites, having won a Pulitzer Prize for 13 articles filed from Russia the previous year. According to the selection committee, his dispatches were “excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.”

Duranty’s Prize has long been the subject of intense controversy. Last spring the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA) initiated a campaign to urge its revocation by the Pulitzer Prize Board. After six months of consideration, the Board decided on 21 November not to rescind the Prize. It concluded that the pieces in question, while they fell well below “today’s standards for foreign reporting,” showed “no clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception.”

The Board tacitly acknowledged that Duranty covered up the widespread Soviet famine of 1932-1933, which claimed the lives of several million in Ukraine alone.
But it isolated Duranty’s famine-denying articles from his Pulitzer articles on Stalin’s Five-Year Plan. “A Pulitzer Prize for reporting is awarded not for the author’s body of work or for the author’s character,” the Board explained, “but for the specific pieces entered in the competition.”

This argument is understandable. No matter how odious Duranty’s morals and reprehensible his treatment of the famine—while denying it in print, he privately told British diplomats in September 1933 that as many as 10 million people had starved to death—the fate of his 1932 Prize should ultimately rest upon the strength of the writing for which it was won.

Yet by any conceivable measure, Duranty’s reporting in 1931 was an utter failure. “It reads like Pravda and Izvestiya in English,” historian Mark von Hagen tells me, citing two of the leading Kremlin press organs of the time. Von Hagen, Professor of Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian History at Columbia, was commissioned by The Times this summer to conduct an independent study of Duranty’s 1931 coverage of the Soviet Union.

“Much of the ‘factual’ material is dull and largely uncritical recitation of Soviet sources,” he wrote in his subsequent eight-page report, “whereas his efforts at ‘analysis’ are very effective renditions of the Stalinist leadership’s self-understanding of their murderous and progressive project to defeat the backwardness of Slavic, Asiatic peasant Russia.”

Was this propagandizing unintentional, as the Pulitzer Board seemed to imply? No one can say for sure. But it’s hard to imagine that a man who would spend the next two years deliberately concealing a genocidal famine was a paragon of integrity in 1931. Moreover, Duranty’s sources were almost exclusively Soviet authorities. Would he really have been naive enough to trust their veracity so blindly?

In the early 1930s there were few Western correspondents in Russia, and members of the Pulitzer committee, like most other Americans, would have deferred to The Times as somewhat authoritative on all matters Soviet. Many have speculated whether Duranty’s editors were aware of the gross deficiencies in his journalism. Again, it’s tough to tell, although Sally J. Taylor’s 1990 book,
Stalin’s Apologist, alleged that several editors considered Duranty a Soviet stooge.

Since the publication of Taylor’s book, The Times has distanced itself from Duranty’s work. In a review of the book, then-editorial Board member Karl Meyer wrote that Duranty’s Soviet pieces represented “some of the worst reporting to appear in this newspaper.” That same year (1990), The Times placed a disclaimer next to Duranty’s framed picture in its Pulitzer hallway, noting: “Other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.” Executive editor Bill Keller recently told The Washington Post that the 1931 articles were “awful,” “a parroting of propaganda” and “clearly not Prizeworthy.”

Even still, in an interview with his own newspaper Keller expressed unease at the idea of Duranty’s Pulitzer being revoked. “As someone who spent time in the Soviet Union while it still existed,” he said, “the notion of airbrushing history kind of gives me the creeps.” Publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr. also warned the Pulitzer Board against evoking such a “Stalinist practice.” (Neither he nor Keller specified how the Board’s rescinding a journalism Prize on account of documented fraud was at all comparable to a Stalinist purge.)

Sulzberger added that the Board should avoid “setting a precedent for revisiting its judgments over many decades.” Yet the slippery-slope argument is not very compelling here. Consider that in December 2002, Columbia University rescinded Michael Bellesiles’s Bancroft Prize after it was discovered that his award-winning book, Arming America, relied on fabricated sources. Were the Pulitzer Board to revoke Duranty’s Prize, it would not threaten past Pulitzer winners any more than the rescinding of Bellesiles’s award threatened previous Bancroft winners.

Bottom line: Duranty’s is an extraordinary case of second-hand propaganda masquerading as real journalism. Rarely, if ever, has a Western reporter so consistently trumpeted the Party line of a brutal dictatorship. It is perhaps too much to hope that The Times would voluntarily “return” Duranty’s Prize, as The Washington Post returned Janet Cooke’s Prize in 1981. And yes, no
Pulitzer has ever been outright revoked. But it’s hard to fathom another instance where the Pulitzer Board has made, or will make, such an egregious, indisputable error in judgment.

By passing up a chance to right a seven-decade-old wrong, the Board tarnishes its image. As Canadian academic Lubomyr Luciuk, the UCCLA’s research director, tells me, its members have effectively “become apologists for Stalin’s apologist.”

But hey, at least that’s better than “airbrushing,” right?

MARGARET SIRIOL COLLEY

9 December 2003

Dear Mr. Keller:

Surely, you must now agree that on 31 March 1933, your Moscow correspondent, Walter Duranty, denigrated my uncle, Gareth Jones, when he wrote:

*Since I talked with Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive inquiries about this alleged famine situation...There is no actual starvation or death from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.*

My uncle was a fluent Russian linguist from Cambridge University and an experienced Foreign Affairs Advisor to former British Prime Minister, Lloyd George. After three independent journeys along the off-beaten track of the Soviet Union in 1930, 1931 and 1933, his published articles for the London *Times*, the *Daily Express* and Cardiff *Western Mail*, still represent the most truthful contemporary reporting of the Five-Year-Plan.

Even your readers benefited from his poignant insights when on 13 May 1933, your paper published Jones’ incisive understanding of Soviet influences exerted upon your correspondent:

*The censors have turned the [Moscow] journalists into masters of euphemism and understatement and hence they gave “famine” the*
polite name of “food shortage” and “starving to death” was softened to read as “widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.”

Disgracefully, bolstered by the huge prestige of his recently awarded Pulitzer, Duranty clearly violated the role expected of trustworthy reporting, something which your esteemed paper willingly supported. By effectively silencing Jones’ lone voice of truth, Duranty was irrefutably guilty of facilitating Stalin’s inhumanity. By professional association, you must readily appreciate that your paper is tarnished by this same historical ‘airbrush’.

As many as ten million Ukrainians became innocent victims of Stalin’s enforced terror-famine: one third of these were children. The events in question began to unfold as early as 1930, when Gareth Jones first forewarned of an inevitable course of starvation, death and destruction. On 24 June 2003, I wrote to the Pulitzer Administrator outlining Jones’ contribution to this revocation debate, and after having had no response, in October, I personally airmailed each individual member of the current Pulitzer Board. Herein, I requested that they consider in their deliberations the unbiased reporting of my uncle, but, to date, I have received not a single reply. This makes me seriously doubt their sincerity in every aspect of their role in this brutal atrocity.

The original 1932 Pulitzer Board declared that Duranty’s Prize-winning articles were an “intimate comprehension of conditions.” Incredibly, he did not visit one single collective farm or one factory, and never once ventured outside of Moscow for his Soviet reporting throughout the whole year in question. This will always remain a very sad indictment upon the prestige of these awards and upon the journalistic standards of your paper.

I recently read the Pulitzer Board statement ‘apologising’ for its non-revocation of Duranty’s Prize, claiming there “was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception, the relevant standard in this case”. According to James Crowl’s definitive 1982 book on the subject, Angels in Stalin’s Paradise, Herbert Knickerbocker’s articles for The New York Evening Post “were singled out as some of the best articles of the year, but the Jury recommended that he
not be selected, as the 1931 award had gone to him”. This to me indicates a distinct possibility of ‘deliberate deception’, and deliberate self-deception in the justification of Duranty’s award.

Your publisher recently wrote to the Pulitzer Board expressing his concerns regarding the possible airbrushing of Duranty out of history – an opinion, which you are known to concur. Perhaps, the question which should now rightfully be asked, is whether Duranty ever warranted being worthy of either competition entry or even subsequent ‘Jury’ deliberation for such a ‘prestigious’ award?

Jones, on the other hand, was literally ‘airbrushed’ out of existence in the true Stalinist meaning of the word. By daring to expose the horrific truth of this famine, he paid the ultimate price. In August 1935, just seven months after repeating his observations of famine in Hearst’s New York American, Jones was kidnapped and murdered by politically-controlled bandits in Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, his conscience still stands above all others. I suggest that until your paper bows to reason and returns Duranty’s (allegedly lost) Prize, you can rest assured that the spectre of Jones – and those of countless Ukrainian victims – will continue to loom over your publisher’s ill-considered support of your former correspondent’s undeniably shoddy reporting and unforgivable deceit.

In any event, it is within your remit to rightfully, though belatedly, publish a public and posthumous apology to Gareth Jones, the true liberal hero in this tragic saga. This, to every fair-minded person, is the only way to undo some of the wrongs meted out to a truthful and honest man. Had he lived he would have been applauded as one of the 20th century’s most astute and courageous journalists.

Yours sincerely.

Dr. Margaret Siriol Colley
Nottinghamshire, England
The New York Times Office of the Public Editor  
re: Gareth Jones  

18 December 2003  

Dear Mr. Colley,  

Here is a copy of the recent article published by The Times on the Pulitzer Board’s decision not to retract the award (“Pulitzer Board Won’t Void ‘32 Award to Times Writer,” by David D. Kirkpatrick, 22 November 2003). The Times has no plans to return the Pulitzer for Duranty’s reporting.  

Cheers,  

Arthur Bovino
Duranty’s Pulitzer: A reflection

JAMES CROWL

As one who has studied and taught the history of the Soviet Union for nearly four decades, I must note my disappointment with the Pulitzer Prize Committee’s decision to allow Walter Duranty to remain as its 1932 recipient for excellence in journalism. Duranty, of course, was The New York Times reporter whose denials of a famine in the Soviet countryside in 1932 and 1933 were critical in enabling Stalin to conceal the deaths of millions of its citizens while continuing to export grain to the outside world. To its credit, the current Pulitzer Committee has acknowledged Duranty’s role in this massive famine cover-up, though such a concession is hardly noteworthy. Any who still believe that Duranty was somehow ignorant of Soviet conditions or an innocent dupe need only check British Foreign Office records for those years. While Duranty was telling readers that reports of a famine were greatly exaggerated, the British embassy in Moscow was told by him in confidence that as many as ten million had died. It was the most accurate figure the outside world had yet received.

The Pulitzer Committee, however, has chosen not to revoke Duranty’s award, explaining that it was based on his 1931 reports, which it still views as free from the lies and deceit which characterize his more infamous dispatches of the next several years. Such a finding is, in my opinion, a cover-up worthy of Duranty himself. I have carefully re-read those 1931 articles and remain convinced that the conclusions I reached more than twenty years ago in my book, Angels in Stalin’s Paradise, are sound. Duranty was aware of the suffering of the Soviet people well before 1932, and chose to conceal that suffering in part because he viewed Soviet citizens as backward and lazy. His trademark quips to friends were, “They’re only Russians,” and “You can’t
make an omelet without breaking eggs.” But if Duranty felt that the Soviet people needed something to stir them from their lethargy, self-interest played an even more significant role in his attitude. What many Western journalists later remembered as a “special deal” existed between the Kremlin and Duranty that permitted him to become the “Harun al-Rashid” of Moscow, after the 9th century luxury-loving caliph of Baghdad. Correspondents such as William Henry Chamberlin, Eugene Lyons, and Malcolm Muggeridge, to name but a few, later recalled Duranty as favoured with the best of apartments, a mistress, and possibly money, all provided by the authorities. As early as 1922, Duranty was allowed a car with a horn like that used by the GPU, and the freedom to race through Moscow’s streets with his driver’s hand against the horn, while Muscovites fled in terror.

Yet, in fairness to the Pulitzer Committee and to Duranty, we need to examine his reports from 1931 in hopes of finding them free of duplicity, and, presumably, so chock-full of insight and understanding that they still warrant his award. We need to be aware that Stalin by this point had unleashed a savage program of industrialization and agricultural collectivization. This program was so ill-conceived that the human cost was great, even well before 1932. Yet Duranty consistently kept his readers ignorant of the conditions. In his 1935 autobiography, I Write As I Please, Duranty came close to an admission that poor journalism had marked his reports for years. As he put it:

In 1928 there began for me a period which lasted nearly four years upon which I look back with mingled regret and pride. During much of that time I was in the position of seeing the woods so well that I did not distinguish the trees well enough. What I mean is that I gauged the “Party Line” with too much accuracy and when my opinions and expectations were justified by events as they frequently were, I was so pleased with my own judgment that I allowed my critical faculty to lapse and failed to pay proper attention to the cost and immediate consequences of the policies that I had foreseen. I had no intention of being an apologist for the Stalin administration; all that I was thinking was that I had “doped out” the line that the administration must follow, and when it did follow that line I naturally felt that it was right.
One might feel a twinge of sympathy for Duranty if this admission had been followed by a full account of the suffering that he had helped the Soviets conceal, or an acknowledgement that the Pulitzer rightfully belonged to a more forthright correspondent.

In May of 1932 when Duranty was named as the Pulitzer Committee’s recipient of its award for foreign correspondents, it had this to say of his work:

> Mr. Duranty’s dispatches show profundity and intimate comprehension of conditions in Russia and of the causes of those conditions. They are marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment and exceptional clarity, and are excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.

That the Committee should suggest that Duranty deserved recognition for his “scholarship” seems, in retrospect, almost laughable. During 1931 Duranty never even claimed to visit a collective farm, a factory, or a worker’s apartment. He never traveled to another Soviet city or another section of the country during the whole year for which he received the award. In truth, his articles relied so completely on official sources of information that they could have been written by anyone who cared to subscribe to a Soviet newspaper or read a Kremlin press release.

If Duranty’s lack of research could scarcely have stirred the hearts of the Pulitzer Committee, a more likely reason for their choice would seem to have been his Soviet sympathies. At a time when America was in the throes of depression and many had lost hope in Western values, the Soviet Union seemed like a noble experiment. Yet in looking back on his 1931 articles Duranty clearly went beyond sympathy for the Soviets and was blatantly an apologist for Kremlin policies. In January of 1931, a New York Times reporter, Marcus A. Tollett, interviewed an OGPU official who had fled to the West and told of Soviet labour camps where millions of kulaks worked and died under frightful conditions. Duranty responded with perhaps his most duplicitous articles of the year. In an early February piece his seemingly sensational title, “Million Are Held in Russian Camps, 200,000 in Forests,” was followed by the comforting assurance that conditions in the camps were far from difficult since “the
Kremlin has a spark of softness in its heart for politicals.” The camps offered life in “communes” that were “comparatively free.” He added that kulaks were paid trade union wages to do work that was “for the good of the community,” and allowed to win back their civil rights. Two weeks later, Duranty insisted that the Soviets were exiling “malignants” to labour camps in much the way that Oliver Cromwell had shipped them to Virginia. He concluded that Stalin and Cromwell were much alike in their desire to teach their people a work ethic and a sense of personal responsibility. Duranty returned to the topic of the kulaks later in the year, and at last referred to their “persecution” and “physical extermination.” Yet he denied that such terms meant that they were being killed. He insisted that labour camps gave the kulaks an opportunity to earn admission back into civil society. As he put it:

_They take a kulak [and] tell him. “You outcast! You man that was and is not! You can get back your civic rights; can be reborn a proletarian; can become a free member of our ant heap by working for and with us for our communal purpose. If you don’t, we won’t actually kill you, but you won’t eat much, won’t be happy, will remain forever an outsider, as an enemy, as we consider it, even if you ultimately return from exile and rejoin your family._

Other correspondents noted that Duranty liked to scatter words and phrases such as “persecution” and “physical extermination” in his reports so that he could later claim that they had been accurate.

If Duranty concealed and distorted conditions in the labour camps, he was silent about the major story in the Soviet Union early in 1931, the tumultuous drive to collectivize the peasants and the suffering that resulted. Duranty instead continued his reassurances about a progressive Soviet leadership and its commendable efforts to get peasants to abandon centuries of backwardness and lethargy. In a February piece called “Russian Peasants Gain in Collectives,” written at a particularly brutal time in the countryside, he asked readers to remember that the “Russian masses today are in the position of children at school who personally might sooner be out at play and do not realize that they are being taught for their own good.” From Paris in mid-year he added that the economic Five-Year Plan was a necessary measure for a
people locked in the past. He explained, “The whole purpose of the Plan is to get the Russians going—this is, to make a nation of eager, conscious workers out of a nation that was a lump of sodden, driven slaves.” In another dispatch from Paris he added that:

Everyone who has employed Russians or worked with Russians or knows Russians finds that if he wants them to jump on a chair, he must tell them to jump on a table, and aiming at the table they will reach the chair. The important thing is that they have something to jump at and make an effort—whether they actually get there all at once or not does not really matter.…

Behind this modernization effort Duranty offered a picture of Stalin as a bold “Tamerlane” with his “impressive Asian face, and his willingness to rip away Russia’s “European veneer.” Stalin, he assures us, has:

Re-established the semi-divine supreme autocracy of the imperial idea and has placed itself on the Kremlin throne as a ruler whose lightest word is all and all and whose frown spells death. Try that on free-born Americans or the British with their tough loyalty to old things or on France’s consciousness of self. But it suits the Russians and is as familiar to the Russian mind as it is abominable to Western nations.

It was a theme to which he returned consistently during the year, and seems clearly designed to keep his Western audience from fretting about Stalin’s brutal measures. In December he argued that “Bolshevism has given back to Russia something the Russian people have always understood—absolute authority, unmellowed by the democracy or liberalism of the West. He added “… the masses of the Russian people—only two generations removed from virtual slavery—are being taught a regime of joint interest, effort and sacrifice whose roots strike deep into their history.”

Though Duranty’s time in Russia was spent exclusively in Moscow, his reports were no more perceptive or revealing of conditions there than in the
countryside. In late summer he offered his first real comments on life in the city, where he insisted “the divide has been crossed, better days are coming, and the promised land is already dimly visible far away.” If “far away” perplexed some readers, Duranty insisted that Moscow’s shabbiness was fast disappearing. “Hundreds of new buildings and highways” had re-made the city in the image of other European capitals. Reports that the city was overwhelmed with refugees from the countryside only made Duranty scoff. It was Russia’s “ant heap” mentality that was responsible, not wrenching conditions in the rural areas. Muscovites delighted in inviting friends and relatives until twelve or more were stuffed happily into a two-room flat.

Today’s readers can see, then, that the lies and deception that were so much a part of Duranty’s record in 1932 and 1933 were just as ingrained in his 1931 pieces. And for an America weary of the Depression, such duplicity won Duranty many admirers and likely played a role in earning his award. Indeed the Pulitzer Committee had been loath to select a reporter with Soviet sympathies in the past. Malcolm Cowley, editor of The New Republic and himself a Soviet enthusiast, regularly blasted the Pulitzer committees for their conservative choices. In one editorial Cowley urged the Pulitzer to “go out of business” since it was “afraid of ideas, afraid of blood, revolution, and, of course, language.” The 1932 committee simply may have bowed to such pressure.

It is worth noting, too, that for over a year in the 1920’s Duranty had shared an apartment in Moscow with Herbert Pulitzer, the youngest of Joseph Pulitzer’s three sons. Herbert Pulitzer and the amiable Duranty seem to have become good friends, and both of Pulitzer’s brothers were part of the thirteen-member Advisory Board which made the final choice. Yet, Leland Stowe, then a New York Herald-Tribune foreign correspondent and himself the 1931 Pulitzer choice, cites another possible reason for Duranty’s selection. In a 1977 letter to this author he “suspects” that “one big reason” for the choice was The New York Times had its “representatives on Pulitzer committees—or others influential.” If there was any single reason for the regrettable choice of Duranty, according to Stowe, it was pro-Times rather than a concession to the political Left.

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Whatever the reason for the Pulitzer Committee’s choice, it is clear that the selection was an egregious error. Duranty represented the worst rather than the best in journalism. For a variety of reasons he had slanted, distorted, misled and lied to readers as consistently as he would in 1932 and 1933. How much Soviet citizens suffered as a result is difficult to judge. But in all likelihood their lot was the worse because of the cover-up in which he was a key element. To continue to honour his memory through the Pulitzer Award is unconscionable.
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http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/Great_Famine/index.shtml

and at the website of Artukraine.com

http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/index.htm

For information about Gareth Jones, his reports on the Great Famine, those of Malcolm Muggeridge, and correspondence with Walter Duranty and others, go to

http://colley.co.uk/garethjones/soviet_articles/soviet_articles.htm

Information about the campaign to have Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize revoked is available on the website of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association:

http://www.uccla.ca

A documentary film, *Harvest of Despair*, by Slavko Nowytski and Yuri Luhovy (1984) is available from the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre, 620 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 2H4, *tel*: (416) 966-1819 or email: ucrdc@interlog.com
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Appendix 1: Letter from Gareth Jones to his parents, 26 August 1930

Berlin,
Near the Station for Saxony,

My dearest All,

Hurray! It is wonderful to be in Germany again, absolutely wonderful.

Russia is in a very bad state; rotten, no food, only bread; oppression, injustice, money among the workers, and 90% discontented. I saw some very bad things, which made me wild. I made me mad to think that people like高低 these and come back after having been led around by the nose and had enough to eat, and say that Russia is a paradise. In the South there is talk of a new revolution, but it will never come.
off, because the Army in the G.P.U. (Political Police) are too strong. The winter is going to be one of great suffering, there and starvation. The Government is the most brutal in the world. The peasant hate the Communist. This year thousands and thousands of the best men in Russia have been sent to Siberia and the frozen island of Solovki. People are now speaking openly about the revolt in the Donetz Basin, conditions are unbearable. Thousands are leaving. I shall never forget the night I spent in railway stations on the way to Yuzhnoevo. One reason why I left Yuzhnoevo so quietly was that all I could...
get there was a roll of bread— that’s all I had up to 7 o’clock. Many Russian workers are too weak to work. I am feeling sorry for them. My comrades strike at the rate of short or sent to Siberia. We are happy of enemies of the Communist within the country.

Nevertheless great strides have been made in many industries and there is a good chance that when the situation in our Russia may become prosperous. But before that there will be great suffering, many riots and many deaths.

The Communists are doing excellent work in education, hygiene and against alcohol.

Butter is 16/- a pound in Moscow, prices terrific. Books cannot be had. There is nothing in the shops.
Appendix 1: Letter from Gareth Jones to his parents, 26 August 1930

The Community was remarkably kind to me and gave me an excellent time. Last Sunday I flew from Rostov to Moscow on their guest. You will get this letter probably before my Sunday letter.

Germany is a fine place. I am looking forward so much to seeing the Hufshorns and to getting your letters there, because I have had very little news.

Thank goodness I am not a Cornish in Russia, moreover in Tashkent!

Just had a fine lunch. When I come back I shall appreciate Auntie’s dinners more than ever.

Yours sincerely,

Gareth.
Hurray! It is wonderful to be in Germany again, absolutely wonderful. Russia is in a very bad state; rotten, no food, only bread; oppression, injustice, misery among the workers and 90% discontented. I saw some very bad things, which made me mad to think that people like [the Webbs?] go there and come back, after having been led round by the nose and had enough to eat, and say that Russia is a paradise. In the South there is talk of a new revolution, but it will never come off, because the Army and the O.G.P.U. (Soviet Police) are too strong. The winter is going to be one of great suffering there and there is starvation. The government is the most brutal in the world. The peasants hate the Communists. This year thousands and thousands of the best men in Russia have been sent to Siberia and the prison island of Solovki. People are now speaking openly against the Government.

In the Donetz Basin conditions are unbearable. Thousands are leaving. I shall never forget the night I spent in a railway station on the way to Hughesovka. One reason why I left Hughesovska so quickly was that all I could get to eat was a roll of bread –and that is all I had up to 7 o’clock. Many Russians are too weak to work. I am terribly sorry for them. They cannot strike or they are shot or sent to Siberia. There are heaps of enemies of the Communist within the country.

Nevertheless great strides have been made in many industries and there is a good chance that when the Five-Year Plan is over Russia may become prosperous. But before that there will be great suffering, many riots and many deaths.

The Communists are doing excellent work in education, hygiene and against alcohol. Butter is 16/- a pound in Moscow; prices are terrific, boots etc. cannot be had. There is nothing in the shops. The Communists were remarkably kind to me and gave me an excellent time.

Last Sunday I flew from Rostov to Moscow as their guest. You will get this letter probably before my Sunday letter. Germany is a fine place. I am looking forward so much to seeing the Haferkorns and getting your letters there, because I have had very little news. Thank goodness I am not a Consul in Russia – not even in Taganrog!

Just had a fine lunch. When I come back I shall appreciate Auntie Winnie’s [Gareth’s 'live-in' aunt at his parent’s home] dinner more than ever.

Cariad cynhesaf
Gareth

source: http://www.uanews.tv/mirror/jones.htm
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sirs:

As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum containing the substance of a conversation between Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, and a member of the Embassy, concerning Soviet Russia.

Respectfully yours,

George A. Gordon,
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:

Memorandum.

Copy to Riez.

JUL 6 1931
MEMORANDUM

June 4, 1931.

Mr. Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, who stopped in Berlin only for one day, left Russia on June 2 for his annual summer vacation. He told me that the situation in Russia was quiet, although the "Right (Communist) opposition" was still patent. Nevertheless, Stalin considered the time propitious to take his annual vacation and planned to leave Moscow within a short time. This year's area under cultivation amounted to about 70 million hectares in comparison with 65 million in the previous year. Unless the country experienced a severe drought the prospects for the new harvest were for a crop somewhat larger and better than last year. In respect to the Five Year Plan, Duranty, for the first time, was exceedingly reticent. He said it was a mistake to have called it a "Five Year Plan," but as the name and idea was Stalin's pet, everybody was obliged to promote it. The shortage of iron and steel and the disorganization of the railway system was a serious matter and if combined with a real drought, as in 1922, it might cause a collapse not of the Soviet regime but of Stalin and the Five Year Plan. Duranty denied that
that the authorities were interested in dumping Russian goods on the world's markets "at any price" merely to undermine capitalism; their sole purpose was to sell their goods. Russia, he added, was actually dependent upon the continuation of capitalism and the maintenance of high prices until such a time when it could stand upon its feet. In the field of foreign affairs, Duranty stated that Russia was much pleased with Litvinoff's speech at Geneva but disappointed because the League meeting had not widened the breach between the "Versailles Peace Treaty states of Europe" and Germany and its friends. The French willingness to negotiate a commercial treaty was greeted with much enthusiasm and regarded as an offset against Germany's "degovernmentalizing" of its relations with Russia (see the Embassy's despatch No. 942 of May 26, 1921). He was unable, however, to offer any explanation for Germany's new attitude towards Russia and until the moment he reached Germany was under the impression that the change was initiated by Russia. In conclusion, Duranty pointed out that, "in agreement with the NEW YORK TIMES and the Soviet authorities," his official despatches always reflect the official opinion of the Soviet regime and not his own.

A.W. Kliefoth
Appendix 2- A.W. Kliefoth, Embassy of the United States re: Walter Duranty
Appendix 3: William Strang, British Embassy, Moscow, re Tour by Mr. Duranty

Tour by Mr. W. Duranty in North Caucasus and the Ukraine.

Refers to Moscow despatch No. 503 of 12th September (N 6078/114/30).
Submits accounts of impressions gained by Mr. Duranty on harvests and conditions generally, during his recent tour, with Mr. Richardson of the Associated Press, in North Caucasus and the Ukraine. (Sent Department of Overseas Trade, Export Credits Guarantee Department.)

The King, Cabinet, Dominions.

An interesting account of conditions by an actual observer who might be expected to write of what he has seen.

Cabinet has against the Joint Corp. (in fact, with keen interest).

Mr. Duranty considers it probable that 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food. During this last year, 201,000,000 tons of grain and 26,000,000 tons of meat were used, which is an estimated return of 10 per cent. of what was grown.

He estimates that 30% of the harvest will be lost this year. Famine is approaching.

Note that the drain on the grain reserves is quite being allowed to affect the grain areas, and presumably, to report on their

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Tour by Mr. W. Duranty in North Caucasus and the Ukraine

William Strang (Moscow) to Sir John Simon,
26 September 1933

Sir,

Moscow, September 26, 1933

With reference to Mr. Coote’s despatch No. 503 of the 12th September, I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, returned to Moscow a few days ago after a ten days’ trip in the North Caucasus and the Ukraine in company with Mr. Richardson of the Associated Press. Mr. Duranty has given to a member of my staff the following account of the impressions gathered during his trip:

2. In Rostov Mr. Duranty and Mr. Richardson spent a few days going round the town and the markets and interviewing the heads of the central administration of the political departments in North Caucasus farms and other officials. During their stay in Rostov they journeyed by car to collective farms, at first within a radius of about 20-30 miles and later on farther afield. The condition of the collective farms in these sections of the country varied very considerably, some of them having fulfilled 100 per cent., others only 31 per cent., of their grain delivery plans. The deliveries naturally depended upon the efficiency of the management of the collective farms and also upon the number of people who still remained in the district. In the North Caucasus, in consequence of a heavy decrease in the population, it was found necessary to send into the fields all persons residing upon the collective farm with the exception of the president and the economic manager of the farm. Mr. Duranty often came across patches where weeds (especially spirea and barbarea vulgaris) were so thick that it was impossible to harvest the grain. Certain small settlements of about eight and nine houses (known as “khu-tor”) were deserted. More than half the grain was still in the fields and had not been stacked. During the first five days of September it was impossible to do any stacking owing to rains. Since then, the weather had improved and a certain amount had been brought in. The condition
of the animals was fairly good, but Mr. Duranty was struck by the very small number of calves to be seen and the lack of small cattle and poultry. As an instance of the great variation between conditions in one farm and another, Mr. Duranty was told that, on a certain farm worked by Letts, who had immigrated thither some hundred years ago, as much as 12 kilog. of wheat and 5 of maize would be obtained by each collective farm worker per working day, when distribution of the produce took place.

3. On the Lettish collective farm, Mr. Duranty was told that last year they had fulfilled 200 per cent. of their grain delivery plan, but that the surrounding farms had done badly, and the better farms had therefore to "carry" the inefficient ones. As 200 per cent. represented almost the whole harvest yield, the collective was left denuded, and the Letts stated that if this took place this year they would pack up and go back to Latvia on foot as their ancestors had come a hundred years before.

4. The collective farm workers had some complaints to make, of which the chief was against the so-called counter-plans. These, however, would not be allowed this year. Mr. Duranty was told of a case in which an official who had proposed that a voluntary "loan" of grain should be granted to the State had been arrested by the Political Department, and no more had been heard of the loan. Another complaint was that, prior to the establishment of machine-tractor stations, collective farms had owned their own tractor stations. One particular farm had seven tractors, which were kept in first-class condition. Under the decree published in the early spring, these tractors were sold to the machine-tractor stations, added to the pool, and allowed to deteriorate. In many cases tractors supplied by machine-tractor stations failed to work at all. A further complaint was that many collective farms which had formerly existed as independent units were grouped into large collectives. This interfered with efficiency, but it had been possible, by the introduction of the so-called "brigade system," to split up these large collective farms into their component parts. The Letts complained that much confusion and disorganization might have been avoided if the consolidation of smaller collectives had not been carried out. A still further complaint was that collective farm workers were obliged by contract to work a certain number of days on State farms. They much preferred to work on their own farms, because there payment was in grain, whereas the State farm paid wages in money. 5 roubles a day, which the Letts said was almost useless, as it would purchase very little.

5. According to Mr. Duranty, the population of the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga has decreased in the past year by 3 million, and the population of the Ukraine by 4-5 million. Estimates that he had heard
from other foreigners living in the Ukraine were that approximately half the population had moved either into the towns or into more prosperous districts.

6. The president of the Lettish collective farm was very frank in his conversations, and, amongst other things, mentioned that a considerable number of Cossacks had left the district. Some had been deported, but most had simply emigrated elsewhere, either to the towns or to parts of Russia where the conditions were slightly better. There had not been any actual armed revolts amongst the Cossacks, but in 1930 and 1931, and even later, many murders had taken place, mostly of Communists. In some places Cossacks had gone into the hills, formed themselves into bands, and raided the inhabited points. Mr. Duranty was struck by the fact that there were now practically no troops in the North Caucasus, but that nearly all the officials whom he met had only been in the North Caucasus since last year.

7. From Rostov Mr. Duranty went to Kharkov, and on the way he noticed that large quantities of grain were in evidence at the railway stations, of which a large proportion was lying in the open air. Conditions in Kharkov were worse than in Rostov. There was less to eat, and the people had evidently been on very short commons. There was a dearth of cattle and poultry. Supervision over visitors was also stricter in Kharkov. During the year the death rate in Kharkov was, he thought, not more than 10 per cent. above the normal. Numerous peasants, however, who had come into the towns had died off like flies. On the 19th and 20th July, over 200,000 people were mobilised in Kharkov and despatched to work in the fields. Most of them had only worked four or five days, but about 75,000 had been working in the country during five or six weeks. I have had this statement that town workers are compulsorily drafted into fields confirmed from other sources.

8. Mr. Duranty estimated that about 30 per cent. of the harvest would be lost as a result of pilferage and weather conditions. In the Ukraine about 66 per cent. of the grain collection quota had been gathered in up to date. On the whole the harvest yield in the Ukraine was from 10 to 12 centners per hectare. Allowing for deliveries to the State, for payments to machine-tractor stations, for the return of grain loss, and for insurance and seed funds, &c., which would amount to about 50 per cent. of the harvest, the average wage per labour day would be about 4-5 kilog. per man. Even those collective farms which had fulfilled their grain deliveries would not be allowed to sell grain in the open market until the whole area had fulfilled its obligations. As soon as such sale of grain was permitted the price of bread would fall, and a kilogramme of black bread, which at present costs 2.50 roubles, would, it is esti-
mated, be sold for 80 kopeks. It was difficult, however, to provide the peasants with the necessary manufactured goods, of which there was a great shortage.

9. Mr. Duranty had a conversation with the head of a political department of a machine-tractor station, who explained to him the working of these departments. This official admitted that the work of the political department could be divided under the three headings of coercion, instruction and assistance. He appeared to be rather grieved that people in Moscow considered their activities to be similar to those of the town G.P.U. They certainly had to struggle against kulak propaganda and strikes, but they had found that, as time went on, they had to employ less coercion, and they hoped that, in the next few years, their work would be confined to education and propaganda.

10. Mr. Duranty considers that the political departments may well prove a success. Their work, however, could not be properly assessed until January 1931 [1934?], and it might be that their victory would prove a Pyrrhic one. The Ukraine had been bled white. The population was exhausted, and if the peasants were "double-crossed" by the Government again no one could say what would happen. It was all very well, Mr. Duranty said, to call the U.S.S.R. a pacific country. It had to be, for, if a war occurred within the next five years, before the peasants had had time to forget the winter of 1932 and the spring of 1933, it would be impossible to mobilise the peasants. There were two kinds of opposition to collectivisation. The first lay in the tendency of collective farm workers to adopt the line that, "as we are now socialised, it is up to the State to help us when things go wrong." The second was more positive, namely, a policy of passive resistance, designed to cause such a deterioration in the situation that the authorities would be forced to return to something like nep.

11. According to Mr. Duranty, Postyshev is the real force in the Ukraine. He and his "boys" in the political departments now run the country. Chubar and Kosior appear to have very little to do, and are produced for the reception of eminent visitors. During a conversation with a head of a political department Mr. Duranty asked why the political departments in the machine-tractor stations had not been established before. He was told that the reason was partly that they had not been thought of, and partly that there were previously not sufficient tractors to go round. Now, however, the position was improving, and tractors which would stand up to the work were being manufactured in fairly large quantities in Russia.

12. At Kharkov Mr. Duranty saw the Polish consul, who told him the following story: A Communist friend employed in the Control Com-
mission was surprised at not getting reports from a certain locality. He went out to see for himself, and on arrival he found the village completely deserted. Most of the houses were standing empty, while others contained only corpses. The consul also mentioned that, during the early part of the spring, stones were thrown at any car passing through a village, it being supposed that any such car must be an official one. There was a good deal of passive resistance in the Ukraine, but no mass deportations had taken place as the result of this.

13. Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and the Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

William Strang

Minutes

The King; Cabinet; Dominions

An interesting account of conditions by an actual observer who might be expected to write of what he had seen without bias against the Soviet Govt. (– in fact, with bias in their favour).

Mr. Duranty considers it possible that 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food, during the last year, & I think this estimate exceeds any we have yet had.

His estimate that 30% of the harvest will be lost this year tallies with that of Dr. Schiller.

Now that Mr. Duranty & other press correspondents are again being allowed to visit the grain areas and, presumably, to report on their experiences, it would not be surprising if the Soviet Govt. were contemplating admitting the famine conditions in some part of the country & perhaps appealing for outside help. The Secretary of the “Save the Children Fund” told me not long ago that the Board of his organisation thought this might well happen during the winter. Mr. Duranty may be working up an appeal to the U.S.A.[....]

T. A. Shone

Oct 2

Paragraphs 5 and 10 are particularly interesting.

L. Collier

October 3rd.

Paragraph 13 is horrifying – particularly coming from Mr. Duranty.

R Oct 3
The collective farmers this year have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless.

This was how President Kalinin, in a speech delivered early last summer, referred to the food situation in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. When the prohibition on travel by foreign correspondents in the rural districts was relaxed in the autumn, I had an opportunity to find out what this "ruthless school" had meant in concrete practice.

I shall never forget a scene which I witnessed in a Ukrainian village named Zhuke, which lies some 15 miles to the north of Poltava. The president of the local collective farm and a state agronomist, or agricultural expert, were accompanying me on visits to a number of peasant houses. So long as my companions chose the houses to be visited I found myself invariably meeting local Communist or "udarniki" (shock brigade workers), with pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Kalinin on the walls and a fairly contented tale of their experiences.

I suddenly picked out a house at random and went into it with my companions. It was a typical Ukrainian peasant hut, with thatched roof, earth floors, benches running around the walls, an oven and rickety-looking bed as the chief article of furniture. The sole occupant was a girl of 15, huddled up on the bench. She answered a few simple questions briefly, in a flat dull voice.
"Where is your mother?"

"She died of hunger last winter."

"Have you any brothers or sisters?"

"I had four. They all died, too."

"When?"

"Last winter and spring."

"And your father?"

"He is working in the fields."

"Does he belong to the collective farm?"

"No, he is an individual peasant."

So here was one man - his name was Savchenko - whose passive stubbornness defied even Kalinin's "ruthless school," who refused to go into a collective farm, even after almost all the members of his family had perished.

My companions, the president of the collective farm and the state agronomist, had nothing to say. Smooth-tongued officials in Moscow might assure inquiring visitors that there had been no famine, only little food difficulties here and there, due to the wicked machinations of the kulaks. Here on the spot in Zhuke, as in a dozen other Ukrainian and North Caucasian villages which I visited, the evidence of large-scale famine was so overwhelming, was so unanimously confirmed by the peasants that the most "hard-boiled" local officials could say nothing in denial.

Everywhere a tale of famine
Some idea of the scope of the famine, the very existence of which was stubbornly and not unsuccessfully concealed from the outside world by the Soviet authorities, may be gauged from the fact that in three widely separated regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus which I visited - Poltava and Byelaya Tserkov and Kropotkin in the North Caucasus - mortality, according to the estimates of such responsible local authorities as Soviet and collective farm presidents ranged around 10 percent. Among individual peasants and in villages far away from the railroad it was often much higher.

I crossed Ukraine from the southeast to the northwest by train, and at every station where I made inquiries the peasants told the same story of major famine during the winter and spring of 1932-33.

If one considers that the population of Ukraine is about 35 million and that of the North Caucasus about 10 million and that credible reports of similar famine came from part of the country which I did not visit, some regions of the Middle and Lower Volga and Kazakhstan, in Central Asia, it would seem highly probable that between 4 million and 5 million people over and above the normal mortality rate, lost their lives from hunger and related causes. This is in reality behind the innocuous phrases, tolerated by the Soviet censorship, about food stringency, strained food situation, etc.

What lay behind this major human catastrophe? It was very definitely not a result of any natural disaster, such as exceptional drought or flood, because it was the general testimony of the peasants that the harvest of 1932, although not satisfactory, would have left them enough for nourishment, if the state had not swooped down on them with heavy requisitions.

Hidden stocks of grain which the despairing peasants had buried in the ground were dug up and confiscated; where resistance to the state measures was specially strong, as in some stanitsas, or Cossack towns, in the Western Kuban, whole communities were driven from their homes and exiled en masse, to the frozen wastes of Siberia.

State had its "squeeze"
Unquestionably, the poor harvest of 1932 was attributable in some degree to the apathy and discouragement of the peasants, subjected, as they were at the time, to constant requisitions, at inequitable fixed prices - the state was practically compelled, by the necessity for raising capital for its grandiose, new industrial enterprises, to squeeze out of the peasants a good deal more than it could give them in return - of their grain and other produce by the authorities, and driven against their will into an unfamiliar and distasteful system.

The Communists saw in this apathy and discouragement, sabotage and counter-revolution and with the ruthlessness peculiar to self-righteous idealists, they decided to let the famine run its course with the idea that it would teach the peasants a lesson.

Relief was doled out to the collective farms, but on an inadequate scale and so late that many lives had already been lost. The individual peasants were left to shift for themselves; and the much higher mortality rate among the individual peasants proved a most potent argument in favor of joining collective farms.

War is war, but -

The Soviet government, along with the other powers which adhered to the Kellogg pact, has renounced war as an instrument of national policy. But there are no humanitarian restrictions in the ruthless class war which, in the name of socialism, it has been waging on a considerable part of its own peasant population; and it has employed famine as an instrument of national policy on an unprecedented scale and in an unprecedented way.

At the moment it looks as if the famine method may have succeeded in finally breaking down the peasant resistance to collectivization. In 1921 the peasants were strong enough, acting no less effectively because they had no conscious union or organization, to force the government to give up its requisitioning and to introduce the "NEP," or New Economic Policy, with its security of individual farming and freedom of private trade, by withholding their grain and bringing the towns close to starvation.
Now the tide of revolution has rolled beyond the NEP stage, and in 1933 the Soviet government, quite conscious of what it was doing, was strong enough to wring out of the peasants enough foodstuffs to provide at least minimum rations for the towns and to turn the starvation weapon against the peasants themselves.

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Foreign correspondents in Kharkiv en route to Dniepropetrovsk, Ukraine. Fortune magazine photographer Margaret Bourke-White (in railroad car entrance); author Louis Fischer; Anna Louise Strong (centre, light coat); at her left, William Henry Chamberlin (Christian Science Monitor) and his wife, Sonia. At her left, in trench coat and fedora is Eugene Lyons (United Press). Behind him is William Stoneman (Chicago Daily News). Malcolm Muggeridge stands center right, bare headed, just behind Sonia Chamberlin.
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*Holodomor* commemorative stamp issued by Ukraine, 21 November 2003