One of the most controversial topics in the Turkish public opinion is the Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar and MIT (National Intelligence Agency) Director Hakan Fidan’s reactions toward the intelligence that came on the night of July 15th.

Gen. Akar and Fidan's attitude towards this intelligence is also related to the political power and it is one of the main axes of many assumptions, theories and debates on 15 July.

By looking at the report prepared by the commission set up to investigate the July 15 coup attempt in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Akar and Fidan's responses to the commission must be combined with a series of comparative analysis by combining various statements with previous statements and statements that are not included in the investigation files.

To do this, first, "Was the notice about the coup, or was it just a notification of the attack?" We can start with this discussion. As is known, both seedlings and, based on it, Gen. Akar said that the information was not about a coup, it was information about an attack to the MIT Director.\(^1\)

However, the statement of Major O.K., a helicopter pilot working in the Land Aviation Command that brings the intelligence to the MIT, dated 11 August 2016, is a narrative that differs from those of Akar and Fidan’s. Harun Kodalak, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor of the period, met Major O.K. on 11 August 2016 and asked him a series of questions and made a statement from his responses.

In his statement, which was a six pages in total, O.K. stated that, on 15 July, He goes to MIT and report that he had been assigned to detain the MIT Director by helicopter. He adds;

‘I talked with Two people in the MIT, a helicopter will take Hakan Fidan, I do not know what other helicopter will do I said. They asked me what could happen. I told them that there might be a big activity, even a coup. They asked me what I mean by to take Hakan Fidan, and I told them that this activity was not a well-meaning activity. I remember very well that I said the word ‘coup’. \(^2\)

The fact that O.K. mentioned the possibility of coup during the interview raises the question of did MIT not forwarded to Akar that information?

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It was 02:20 pm when O.K.'s knock the door of MIT Headquarters in Yenimahalle/ANKARA. It took some time to process the application of this intruder. According to the MIT's statement, after being subjected to the necessary safety procedures, they were interviewed at around 03.30 pm.

In the MIT, two interrogators first entered the interview. O.K.'s information given by the Director of MIT’s Fidan to General Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar Guler at 04:20 pm. In other words, between the beginning of the interrogation and the first warning to the General Staff Headquarters, 50 minutes have passed according to MIT. An hour later (around 05.30 pm) MIT Deputy Director went to General Guler. At 06.00pm, this time the MIT Director arrives headquarters and immediately goes to Gen. Akar’s room. From O.K.'s statement, we understand that two more officials were added to the two persons who started the interrogation in the MIT. The fourth person convinces O.K. to return to the Land Aviation Command by placing a listening device on it. According to O.K At 07:00 pm he back to barracks which means he should leave MIT headquarters around 06.30-06.40pm. So at least three hours he remained in the query.

Another possibility is that O.K. has only mentioned Fidan's kidnapping at the beginning of the interrogation and pronounced coup after the third and fourth interrogators participated in the interview. In this case, Fidan also conveyed the first information to the General Staff in its raw form, and Akar also shaped his movement according to that intel.

However, in this assumption, the statements of O.K. regarding the possibility of a coup later pronounced must have been conveyed to the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense without any delay. Because the meeting between Akar and Fidan end around 08.20pm.

There is an ambiguity here. The contradiction between the words of Major O.K. and the common narrative of Akar and Fidan must be clarified publicly.

In August 2016, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Turkey, did not take O.K.’s testimony as accused or witness because he was a member of the MIT at that time. In fact, there is only one interview report, and this text does not appear as evidence in the indictment of the ‘Kara Havacılık’ command case, where O.K. served at that time. It is only possible with the permission of the President to take his statement today. According to non-discursive reports, O.K is the official person of the institution that he knock its doors on July 15, 2016.

This question will probably continue to tamper with our minds unless the contradiction is resolved. But we can approach the issue from another point of view. Did Major O.K. have to say, on July 15th, there would be a coup?

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3 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_birlesim_baslangic/?P4=22912&P5=H&page1=25&page2=25
On July 15, 2016, General Hulusi Akar devoted a large part of his shift to the preparations for the Supreme Military Council to meet at the beginning of August. That afternoon, he was reviewing the individual names through the lists prepared with the Land Forces Commander Gen. Salih Zeki Colak, whom he called to headquarters that afternoon.

At around 04.20-04.25pm, Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Güler entered the office and went to Akar and forwarded the phone call from MIT Director Hakan Fidan and added that his vice secretary on the way there too.

According to General Colak’s statement of prosecutor dated 14 October 20164, the interview between Akar and Güler took a 5-6 minutes and Akar told to Guler; “You keep working, let me know when it's done.”. Its possible to say that he was waiting for a briefing from MIT Director vice president who is on the way to headquarters. After Güler left the room, Akar and Colak keep continue to work on the High Military Council lists for another 20 more minutes.

Shortly after an MIT manager enters general Güler’s room and says: “Today someone who claims that he is a pilot on the “Kara havacilik” base to our secretary. He told us : They called me yesterday, it was my day off I joined my unit this morning. First I talked to our battalion commander, then we went with a battalion commander to a colonel. Colonel; “take your night-vision goggles, this night we will flight and at the end of the flight we will take Hakan Fidan.” (Güler's statement of the prosecutor dated 7 October 2016)

General Güler, to forward this information immediately went to Chief of General Staff rooms. Akar told to Çolak “You keep working or go take a break, I’ll be there shortly”. When they pass to meeting room Guler said, according to his own statement, “I think there is an important situation, If you accept we should invite Hakan Fidan (MIT Director) to here immediately”. Akar responses, “Its Affirmative” and calls Hakan Fidan to invite him headquarters. (According to MIT at 04.40pm)

Akar, calls Çolak to meeting room later. Çolak’s testimony includes some details : “When I went to the meeting room, dear commander and second president were working together. They asked me to sit next to them. I wanted to notice everything that they told me on a paper placed on the table. The Major that who goes to MIT secretary said; “Today night at 07.00pm 2 unit of Sikorsky, 1 Cougar helicopter will take of without permission, flights will continue till late nights, By the way MIT secretary Hakan Fidan will detain, other pilot who will fly with me is also a member of the same community that I’m and during the flight another lieutenant colonel pilot will help us.”

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While Akar, Çolak and Güler on a meeting, around 06.00-06.05pm MIT Director joined them. Çolak says he left the headquarters around 06.15pm.

Chief of general staff gives three main order right after MIT Director briefing. In his answers to the Parliamentary Research Commission, Chief of general staff explains his first order as; “To confirm and clear the intelligence that comes from MIT and possibility of the flight plans can be turned into real action, I ordered Land force commander with Chief of Staff Uyar Pasha to go ‘kara havacilik’ command center with judicial staff and observe the situation without showing their intense. If it's necessary make the detention process, investigate the planes and helicopters situation without creating suspicious image and if the intelligence correct take any decisions to prevent such events.”

Let's go back to Akar and Fidan meeting. According to Guler, Fidan said to Akar: “My commander, it can be a part of something bigger...”

Güler ads: “Chief of General Staff immediately took the phone to talk at the headquarters Brigadier General İlhan Kirtıl and told him ‘Ilhan, I forbid Turkish airspace to any military flight .“ (Second Order)

Akar also stated in the statement of prosecutor dated on 18 July 2016 ; “We have considered that the information in our evaluations can be part of a larger plan.”. A similar statement is included in Akar's response to the TGNA commission.

Its possible to say that Gen. Akar did not consider the issue limited to an action targeting the Director of the MIT. Akar and Fidan agree on this issue.

As a matter of fact, Akar says: “... we considered that it might be part of a larger plan and not be content with the measures we have taken, I called Ankara Garrison Commander Lieutenant-General Metin Gürak to go Etimesgut Armored Troops Division and ordered that no tank and armored vehicle be allowed to go out of unity for any reason.” (Akar's prosecutor's statement)

So, Gen. Akar doesn't just see issue as a matter of helicopter airing by giving third order and trying to prevent the possibility of tanks coming out of the barracks. Well, then, the question arises in our minds: In which case tanks will be removed from their barracks?

We need to discuss the issue of whether the July 15 coup attempt was already pre-intelligence in a two main titles

First one is the question that can evaluate the major O.K.’s information as an “Coup notice” which he shared with MIT Director headquarters on 15 July.

Second one is a more general question about before July 15 is any government institution got any intelligence that include the possibility of Gulen movement can try a coup attempt in the Turkish Army?

Let’s begin with the first one. Both MIT Director Hakan Fidan and Chief of General Staff Gen.Hulusi refuses Major O.K. information includes the possibility of Coup attempt and says it was only an information against MIT Director. Also Akar adds, they evaluate the information as a part of a larger plan. We know that from some of the witness statements, Fidan have made the same evaluation.

By airing helicopter to detain MIT Director can be which other larger plan except coup attempt? Since this is not a drill, it is logical to think that the plan must be a coup.

It's obvious that Chief of General Staff Gen.Akar made this evaluation by ordering to forbid all military flights in Turkish airspace and calling Commander of the Fourth Corps, Lieutenant General Metin Gürak to go Ankara Etimesgut School of Armored Units to stop tanks movement.

Then we have to look for a very basic question about Gen. Akar's movement and the intelligence. Why did Akar consider the measure he took in Etimesgut adequate? It’s obvious that he is afraid of Tanks activities, shouldn't this possibility be considered for other cities, first of all in Istanbul?

Couldn't General Akar give a small warning to the force commanders to be careful? Chief of Staff, while turning off the Turkish airspace to military flights only puts the Armed Forces Command Operation Center's communication system into action and he adds “This order was given to the Air Force Commander Abidin Ünal in Istanbul at 07.06pm ”.

As far as is known, General Ünal, who was at Moda Deniz Kulübü for a wedding at that time, was immediately notified of the order by the Air Force Command Operations Center. Wondering why such a decision was needed, Gen. Ünal immediately called the Chief of Staff, but received a reply that he was in a meeting. Probably, Akar's pro-coup vice officer did not connect himself to the air force commander.

There is another point that should be discussed in the General Akar’s actions. Akar, who is afraid of tank mobility, immediately asks the Garrison Commander Lieutenant General Metin Gürak and tells him to go to Etimesgut Armored Units Command and gives the order, “No tank will move”.


But the union that will create tank mobility in Ankara is not only Etimesgut... The 28th Mechanized Brigade Command in Mamak, where Lieutenant General Gürak's headquarters are located, must be taken into consideration too. However, in the statements, there is no clarity as to whether a special measure has been taken for the armored brigade in Mamak in correspondence.

That evening in Etimesgut barracks, there was a serious struggle between the putschists and those who were against the coup, but ultimately no tank left the barracks. Well, on the night of July 15, from where those tanks and armored vehicles came on the streets of Ankara come up to the front of the General Staff Headquarters and passed thru people, crushed cars?

Let's answer: From the 28th Mechanized Brigade in Mamak. The indictment of this brigade in which 38 defendants were involved in the coup attempt was issued in April 2017.

Now let's talk about the general intelligence issue about the coup. The following is the expression of General Akar's response to the Parliament: “It was not expecting situation by many government institutions about this restructuring choose a systematic way through to hide itself inside the ,civil, army and police forces for a long time for a purpose to overthrow the elected Turkish Government by a coup .”

Now, let's read the same issue from Fidan's response to Parliament:

“Notes previously shared by the National Intelligence Agency with external authorities, FETÖ / PDY may have been reported to attempt a coup also as intelligence could not be collected within the TSK, a clear intelligence on the time of the coup attempt could not be reached before.”

As can be seen, while Akar says “The coup was not expected by many, including other institutions of the state”, MIT Director says “We have reported that there may be a coup attempt.”. Then we come to the initial question. If the MIT sent this general intelligence, couldn’t Major O.K. information “Three helicopters will be fly, MIT Director will be kidnapped”, consider as a clear coup attempt intelligence?

The issue, which will continue to occupy the Turkish public opinion, is whether or not the notification made to MIT at noon on July 15, 2016 has been properly evaluated.MIT Director Hakan Fidan and Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar decided to get confirmation of the information given by Major O.K.

There is an understandable reason for this: In the past, many coup notice made to the MIT and they are always unfounded... Hence, the possibility of jumping on an incoming call immediately without the confirmation, the uprising of the ground and then the false intelligence, poses a
fiasco risk for these actors. But there is also a risk of this movement: If the notice is correct and you cannot get confirmation or you are trying to get a confirmation while coup attempt begin…

Let's face it, July 15 2016, way of confirmation the intelligence that MIT followed has failed to prevent coup attempt.

Method for confirmation is Chief of the General Staff sent Land Forces Commander Gen. Salih Zeki Çolak together with Gen. İhsan Uyar, Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, to the Land Aviation School Command in Guvercinlik. The task given to Çolak is to reveal a suspicious activity.

As previously emphasized, here is the remarkable attitude of Akar, he wanted to mask his intentions from Çolak at Güvercinlik. Çolak called the commander of the base and stated that he would take a trip and asked him to prepare an airplane.

Çolak, enters the base at 06.36pm and at 07.12pm calls Akar to say “everything is fine here”. After that phone call by hiding his intentions he goes to the hangar and spent almost an hour to check the situations and called Akar second time at 08.15pm to say “there is no emergency situation”. Akar, this time ordered Çolak to “Talk with the pilots, drink tea, try to catch a few words”. Çolak spent his time at In the Land Aviation Command by tea chat with base staff. According to camera records after this chat with base staff at 09.08pm Çolak left the base.

Çolak's second information at 08.15pm is critical Because MIT Director Fidan is also sitting next to Akar in the General Staff headquarters, waiting for the news from Çolak. The answers the MIT sends to the Parliament include the following information:

“The Director continued to wait for news of the Land Forces Commander in the office of the Chief of General Staff. The Land Forces Commander did not receive any news regarding the confirmation of the attack. The Director left the General Staff Headquarters at 80.20pm because of his appointment with Muaz Hatip, the former head of the Syrian National Coalition, at 08.30pm on the MIT Headquarters.” Obviously, Akar and Fidan saw Çolak's second information as a sufficient confirmation, so Fidan returned to the center of MIT.

The paradox is that military officers whom Gen. Colak spoke at the time of the interrogation was military officers from the Gülenist community have committed to join coup attempt at 3:00 pm that night. Here is the irony of the situation. The people that commander tries to identify what they want to do by hiding his purpose, are people who have spent their entire life by applying the doctrine of intent and retention.
The question that needs to be answered in this context is: Couldn't the supervisory mission in Guvercinlik be differentiated?

Let's underline the following points when looking for answers to this question. According to the security camera records cited in the indictment of the Land Aviation Command case, when Çolak inspects the hangar area, four offensive helicopters, three of which are Cobra and one of them Atak, are parked (for the coup attempt) as open in the runway. On the other hand, General Çolak, in his first statement of 18 July 2016 to the prosecutor's office says; “During this inspection, we saw that helicopters were in hangars and the landing area with the facility area was calm, and there was not an extraordinary situation.”. It is clear that there is a contradiction here.

Another situation, which was not noticed during the audit, was also revealed in the same indictment. Ammunition are placed in the top of the attack helicopters during the day. Meanwhile, two Sikorsky helicopters are equipped with a staff of air-to-man suspension. The fact is: In this inspection, the preparation of the coup plotters in the Güvercinlik base in the last 48 hours has not been determined. However, this audit was the last chance to recognize the impact of the coup and to get confirmation of the denunciation.

**GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS CASE**

The indictment of the General Staff Headquarters case offers interesting information on Major General Mehmet Dişli, one of the most critical actors of the July 5th coup, and his works over time after arriving at the Çankaya Presidential Palace together with the Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar On July 16, 2016.

In particular on pages 839-843 of the indictment, the Chief of Strategic Transformation Department of the Chief of General Staff geared to the coup attempt via mobile phone number 0530-6620390 assigned to his name and the contact details showing who he was talking to.

On this phone, there is no communication record from 07.55pm of July 7, 2016, to 03.25pm of July 11th and on 08.08pm of July 11 to 04.35pm of the night of July 15th. We understand that Major General Disli shuts down the cell phone with no traces in the pre-impact preparation period.

And when does the Gen. Disli open his phone and who does he call first? He calls Chief Consultant Staff Colonel Orhan Yikilkan, one of the participants of the coup at the General Staff Headquarters, on July 15 at 08.35pm. As camera records shows, Disli’s white car enters the headquarters at 08.45pm, he must be called Yikilkan when he left his home at Paris Street on that night.
According to Akar’s statement around 09.00pm Disli enters Chief of Staff Gen. Akar’s room and says; “My commander, operation begins, we’ll take everyone, battalions, brigades set out, you will see very soon...” and he tries to convince him to take control of the coup attempt. Also Gen.Disli is the same person who took Gen. Akar to the Akıncı base by the helicopter at 11.04 pm. Also, almost 10 hours at Akıncı Base till to the morning at 09.00pm he was with Akar in all the process when the coup attenders tries to convince Akar to be their leader.

The whole point is that this major general who played such a critical role in the coup attempt on the night of July 15, came out with the General Akar from the helicopter landing in the garden of the Çankaya Palace in the morning after the coup failed, and then spent a significant part of the day in the Prime Ministry. Disli in his second statement stated at 26 December 2016 he served at the crisis desk at Prime Ministry. On the other hand, there is no such a statement in his first statement to the public prosecutor on July 18.

Let's go back to the phone records in the indictment. The record shows that the Gen.Disli really spent a lot of time on the phone. Disli, On the night of July 15 from 08.35pm- Phone call to Colonel Yikılkın- to next day his last phone call with Air Force General Akin öztürk at 03.38pm he made 23 different calls at least. After he arrived on Cankaya Palace at 09.30am he made more than 50 phone calls.

In these speeches, it is noteworthy that Disli is in close communication with Gen. Akin Öztürk. He spoke directly with him eight times and also from the private maid of residence Housing İsmail Keskin 15 times. Mehmet Dişli had 12 speeches in the 1st Main Jet Base Command in Eskişehir. A significant portion of these conversations after 11.00am.

Public opinion that confuses minds, Major General Disli’s freedom in the Çankaya Presidential residence. In his first statement when he went to Çankaya Palace, he said that he had entered the room of Deputy Prime Minister Tuğrul Türkeş. Türkeş in his interview with Turkey newspaper on August 3,2016 says; “Chief of General Staff Gen.Akar directly come to my room. Behind him there was Mehmet Dişli. I was suspicious when I first saw him. he tried to get in the room a few times, never let him in.”

This bizarre status of Dişli in Çankaya has also been the subject of curiosity in the TGNA Commission investigating the July 15 coup attempt. The Commission reminded Akar the Statement of Dişli’s “I was with the Chief of the General Staff from the beginning. We went to Çankaya Residence with the last order of our Prime Minister. From there we managed to close the crisis together” and asked this question;

The coup leader General Mehmet Dişli claims to have been summoned by the Prime Minister. The pilot of the helicopter carrying you was arrested for the coup. Can you clarify these issues?
Gen. Akar has given a long response to the Parliamentary. Akar in his response says, after the coup failed, he went to the heliport to go to Cankaya Palace and he adds “Someone can shout the helicopter, we should inform them Helicopter will carry Gen.Akar”. He adds more;

“Before took off I told Disli to stay and he said he will contact with someone. The helicopter was moving around and conveyed this situation. Her was in contact with someone during the flight. I was greeted by the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry (Fuat Oktay) after the helicopter landed in the Çankaya Presidential Palace. And then we entered the Prime Ministry building. While I was with the Undersecretary, he asked me who was after me. I told him that he is Mehmet Dişli and I summarized the events I have experienced and evaluated that it would be appropriate to be taken him into custody. I learned later that the detention was done.”

In Akar response, There is not enough clarity about what Mehmet Dişliu did during his six-hour period in Çankaya. Disli claims he worked at the crisis desk and adds; “There is a witness, especially Mr. Prime Minister”.

According to the statement of the prosecutor's office of Disli, At the Prime Minister's office around 05.30pm two police came by, ”We need to apply to you,” and they took him to a room. The police said that Prime Minister Binali Yildirim’s Chief of the Cabinet, Murat Aydn, had complained that he had handcuffed Gen. Akar, and they had prepared a report in this regard to sign. Dişli refuses to sign.

Disli describes the following as: “I didn't sign the report. They said 'You know' and they turned me over to the plainclothes cops waiting by the kiosk.

Key role holder of the failed coup attempt, Strategic Transformation Center Director Major-General Mehmet Disli, in his July18,2016 dated statement says; “I worked with my commander 16 years in a different positions together. I saw him as my family”

When we read the both stories of General of the Chief Staff and Major General Disli, who informed Akar about the coup attempt and tried to convince him to be the leader of that, we see that they actually worked closely after 2000.

For example while Hulusi Akar served between 2000-2002 as a Plan Principle President Brigadier at Nato Headquarters in Naples, Disli, according to his statement, he was there at that time too.

After his return in 2002, Akar became military academy command at Ankara and promoted to Major General and he saved this position till to 2005. Disli also served at the military academy
command under Akar as Student Battalion Commander after he returned from Naples. After 2 years, in 2005 he was promoted to Training Branch Manager in Military Academy Command.

At 2005 Akar promoted to Turkish War Academies Command in Istanbul and served two years over there. If we don't count Disli’s studies at war academies in 2006, Akar and Disli’s path divide for a moment. Disli goes to USA at 2007 to National Defense University for one year. When he returns serves at Bingol and at 2009 at Mus for field duty.

By the way Akar at 2007 promoted to Lieutenant General and guess who were assigned as his chief of staff when he promoted as 3rd corps commander at 2009 in İstanbul? Staff Colonel Mehmet Dişli…

After this two year working schedule at İstanbul, Akar and Dişli worked together again in 2012 in Chief of Staff Headquarters. Akar at 2011 August High Military Council promoted to General to serve as secondary chief of staff. At the same council Disli promoted to Brigadier General and goes to Istanbul to serve as 66th Armored Brigade Commander.

Next year on a Necdet Ozel’s chief of staff period Disli moved from Istanbul to Ankara and promoted to Head of project management department in the headquarters. at the same time Akar serving as a Secondary Commander at the headquarters. They worked one year together. After a two years service as a Land Force Commander when Akar back to the Headquarters as a Chief of Staff, Disli was still on the same position.

Same year Disli also promoted to Major General and stays at the same department. Akar changed the name and the status of that department at 2016 as Strategic Transformation Center. This department first founded to provide scientific support for command council. and it name was Scientific Support Centre. By changing the names two times his department enlarge its power and responsible to designing of the Turkish Army transformation for the future, Mostly staff officers participated under 4 branch in this centre.

In the administrative investigation report on General Staff Headquarters Case Indictment different determinations available about the department that Mehmet Disli serving as a commander. According to one of those determinations Major General Disli worked with 20 staff officers in a 4 years. 18 of this 20 staff officers somehow participated in the coup attempt.

This means; Strategic Transformation Center which created for providing scientific support to command council practically turned into a Coup Lab. In the General Staff Administrative Investigation Report names of the officers are available whom participated to coup attempt and member of FETO. For example, Staff Colonel Ahmet Oz cetin who commanded the F-16 which took of from Akinci Airbase at 15 July night and Staff Pilot Major Mustafa Azimetli that whom
made the laser point at the Golbasi General Directorate of Security Aviation and operated low flight at the same night over Kızılay Square are both served at the strategic transformation center.

Also Staff Gendarmerie Captain Zekeriya Acikgoz whom death at the fight at 15 july night in Ankara is on the list too. Of course it's possible to say that all this officers whom participated in the coup attempt worked with Mehmet Disli can be a coincidence. This situation is just Chief of Staff headquarters opinion.

In the General Staff Headquarters Case Commander of Chief of General Staff Strategic Transformation Center Major General Mehmet Disli refuses all accusations. As his prosecutor statement Major General refused all acquisitions at the trials held on Sincan and claimed that during the coup attempt all night he tried to help and protect Chief of General Staff General Hulusi Akar.

He says when he called to Headquarters at 15 july night, 2-3 person from special forces detained him and force him to forward General Akar and he had to inform Akar that there is a ‘Coup’ attempt.

As an accused, Major General Disli of course has a right presumption of innocence. On the other hand, other witness statements, General Akar and other aggrieves statements, camera records and his call records allow us to see a different picture about him.

First, let's focus on two statements about the credibility factor of Major General Disli. Disli in his first statement says: “I was working in my room ad Headquarters and because of AC I had a Pontiac Fever so I went home and come back later”. In his court statement he claims that he doesn't know his AKP PM brother Saban Disli’s phone number by adding “His number is not recorded on my phone”

One of the most important statements against Disli in the indictment made by Head of Press and Public Relations Department Brigadier General Ertugrulgazi Özkurkcu who detained right after Akar’s detain at the Headquarters during 15 july night.

Özkürkçü at the 15 july night in front of the General Akar’s room was laid on the ground by special forces, then his hands and feet were tied. According to Brigadier General’s statement Mehmet disli at that time get out from Akar’s room and checked the situation when one of the special force members asked him when they will begin the transfer and he responded “not now, wait for the instruction”.

According to this witness Özkürkçü says Coup attempt leader in Headquarters is Major General Mehmet Disli.
Also Akar’s order officer Lieutenant Colonel Levent Turkan in his prosecutor statement said: “Noon time at 15 july, he joined a meeting at the Mehmet Disli’s room by a phone call from Akar’s Head Advisor Colonel Orhan Yikilkan. In this meeting Dişli informs about coup plan and tells them around 02.30am he will go to Akar’s house to tell the coup and offer him to be the leader of the coup, if he doesn't accept they will detain him. Levent Türkkan refused his prosecutor statement in the court.

In this case, let's just focus on the camera records that tells us the facts. Let's focus on Mehmet Disli’s order officer Suat Saglam’s actions that night.

In the Chief of General Staff Headquarters Case Indictment Suat Saglam’s shift at 15 july night is like an action movie.

At 09.10pm: Suat Sağlam with Colonel Doğan Öztürk navigated 24 officers in the headquarters to armament toward the ammunition centre and delivers the guns.

At 09.17pm: After waiting a while Suat Sağlam goes to the south gate of the headquarters at that time a white bus comes toward there.

At 09.19pm: Full armored 33 special force members gets out from the bus and the lights in the south gates turns off and at 09.21pm Saglam and Ozturk put this special force members to the headquarters from the barriers the right wing of the south gate.

At 09.22pm special forces goes to the command floor from the stairs and General yasar Güler with other Officers detains by this special force members.

It’s also possible to see Suat Sağlam with his gun in the backyard while he accompany Lieutenant General Metin Gurak whom detained in the headquarters by the pitchers earlier. In another one he salutes Pitcher Brigadier Admiral Sinan Süer from Navy in the Headquarters main entrance at 11.22pm with Judicial Council Colonel Muharrem Kose at 00.07am.

All this records show us Saglam had a key role in the coup attempt during the 15 july night at the Headquarters. Saglam escaped from Headquarters on the morning of 16 july. at 19 july he accompanied Mehmet Disli’s wife to Sincan prison for seeing.

Is it possible to say Suat Saglam did all these things by himself?