The Italian Job. 
Voting Preference and Information Aggregation 
in the 2013 Italian General Elections

Alberto Prati

May 2014

Abstract

Starting from some reasonable assumptions, we build a simple model which can represent the results of the general elections in Italy in 2013. Our aim is to supply a formal setting able to explain the cumbersome dynamic of these elections – characterized by some big critiques about the outcomes of left wing primary elections and a clamorous upheaval in the right-wing leadership. We point out two possible adverse effects of the left-wing party primary elections in that specific context. First, the selection of the weaker candidate for the subsequent general election, due to the risk of Condorcet cycle in the constituency’s preferences. Second, when the timing in the announcement of the leader of the parties is not regulated, sophisticated behaviors may weaken the efficiency of primary elections.

Keywords: primary elections, Condorcet cycle, strategic agenda, sophisticated voting, Italian politics.