The Cold War as Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay

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The Cold War has been customarily characterized by division and rivalry between two nuclear-based super-powers and their camps. These camps also competed for the control or allegiance of the decolonizing—and what came to be known as the ‘third’—world. Moreover, the Cold War is increasingly treated as a historical period that customarily begins in 1947, when the Truman Doctrine sought to contain communism and the expansion of Soviet influence, and ends with the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in the late 1980s. In order to furnish a more comprehensive hypothesis for understanding the Cold War as a period in world history, my essay proposes to go beyond the well-known differences of goals between the two camps and grasp the commonalities between them and their approaches.

The commonalities or what we might call the ‘Cold War order’ arose from the re-configuration of the century-long history of imperialism and nationalism. The Cold War rivalry provides the frame of reference in which a novel relationship between imperialism and nationalism sought to accommodate or encompass developments such as decolonization, multiculturalism, and new ideologies and modes of identity formation, thus producing a novel constellation or configuration. The evolving configuration transforms and is affected by other historical processes regarding race, gender, class, religion, and rights among others.

A Note on Periodization

Periods in history seem to have a somewhat taken-for-granted and ad-hoc quality to it. Whether they are large time-spans—such as the medieval or modern eras—or temporal punctuations, such as the Ante-Bellum or late Qing Reforms periods, historians largely treat them as convenient slabs of time that make our work more manageable. As such, we often forget that historical periods are among the most fundamental means of symbolizing historical time. In Time and Narrative, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur showed us that narrative, and historical narrative in particular, remains the unique human means of making sense of the disparate and dispersed nature of time. In this context, I have argued that by bracketing or bounding the significant events and processes of history, periods are part of the narrative.
syntax which confer meaning to collective and individual identities. For many people in the world, 1776, 1789, and 1949 are symbolic milestones that mark who they are and who they are not.¹

Critics of the positivist view of history such as Michel Foucault or Bruno Latour defy the homogenizing or essentialist view of history embedded in the very notion of a period. Thus Foucault calls us to replace the very idea of history as a continuous project with the Nietzschean conception of ‘genealogy’ or a history of rupture and difference.² However sympathetic I am to their insights, I am not persuaded that we are ready to give up the notion of a historical period. Rather the conception of period I prefer to pursue here is simultaneously a conception of hegemony. Periods are marked by structures emerging from centers of power that tend to dominate historical life, but such structures have wildly uneven effects and there are many zones of life that are quite untouched by them. Within this space of hegemony—which in the case of the Cold War stretched across the world—we need to attend to the emergent differences, counter-movements and resistances that crack, weaken or sometimes strengthen the hegemonic order. Further, as our historical perspective changes we may see other longer-term trends both pre-dating and outliving the Cold War that may well be more significant; if so, we may hope that our hypothesis would have enabled that view.

While the equilibrium of Cold War rivalry generated an entrenched political and ideological hegemony limiting the realization of political, economic, and imaginative possibilities in much of the world, there were several weak links in the system that contributed to its breakdown. While many look to America and Europe for the causes, I argue toward the end of the essay that the developing world represented significant weak links—or relative autonomy in the system—and played an equally important role in its collapse.

Historical Conditions of the Cold War

The end of World War II is thought to mark the end of an epoch. Not only were ultra-nationalist ideologies of Fascism, Nazism, and racism defeated, but 1945 also marked the


beginning of the end of imperialism. The last was not fully accepted by European imperialists, who made several last ditch efforts to retake their colonies, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa. But by 1960 there were few Europeans who believed in the need for colonies. The decolonization movement had triumphed and the post-war world order was enshrined in the United Nations ideal of national self-determination and global development. Yet whereas the UN world order was enshrined in theory, the real world order was determined by the two superpowers and their rivalry. I turn to the longer term history in which this real order ought to be seen.

While the nation-state (or at least those that were not ultra-nationalist or fascistic) was deemed in the UN ideal to be a model of self-governance, through most of its history the nation-state had been inseparable from imperialist domination of other peoples and societies. By the nineteenth century the nation-state was already established in the major imperialist societies of Britain and France. Together with the national capitalists, the nation-state became the principal player in the inter-imperialist rivalry for colonies and resources. British imperialism dominated the world for much of the nineteenth century, but from the last third of the century this dominance came to be increasingly threatened by the rise of new nation-states with imperialist ambitions, including Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States. Most of these states sought to modernize and compete globally by creating and mobilizing the nationalist—even hyper-nationalist—sentiments of its citizenry.

The end of World War I led to yet another change in imperialism undertaken not by the old European imperialist powers but new powers such as Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This is an imperialism that I call the ‘imperialism of nation-states,’ and its first expression may be seen in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo established in northeast China (or Manchuria) from 1932 to 1945. Responding in part to the increasing demands for economic and political parity made by the new anti-imperialist movement in the colonies, and in part because of economic competition with and between the new imperialists, imperialists sought to create regional formations or economic blocs. These colonies or subordinate territories were often re-constituted as nominally sovereign nation-states, although they remained militarily in thrall to the metropole. The imperialism of nation-states reflected a strategic reorientation of the periphery to be part of an organic formation designed to attain global supremacy for the imperial power. As Albert Lebrun declared after World War I, the goal was now to ‘unite France to all those distant Frances in order to permit them to combine

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their efforts to draw from one another reciprocal advantages.’

With the simultaneous rise of rights consciousness in the colonies and dependencies and the increased need for resource and social mobilization within them, it was more efficient for the imperialists to foster modern and indirectly controlled institutions in them. The aim was to control these areas by dominating their institutions of mobilization, such as banks, the transportation infrastructure, and political institutions, which were created to resemble those of the metropole (such as legislative councils, institutions of political tutelage, and political parties like the communist parties or the Concordia in Manchukuo). In short, unlike British free trade imperialism several interwar imperialists attended to the modernization of institutions and identities. They often espoused cultural or ideological similarities—including sometimes anti-colonial ideologies—even while racism and nationalism accompanied the reality of military-political domination.

Subordinate states were militarily dependent upon and economically mobilized for the sake of the metropole. Nevertheless, it was not necessarily in the latter’s interest to have them economically or institutionally backward. This imperialism thus occasionally entailed a separation of economic and military-political dimensions. In some situations, as in the Japan–Manchukuo relationship (and later as we shall see in the Soviet case), massive investments and resources flowed into the client states, thereby breaching the classical dualism between an industrialized metropole and a colony focused on the primary sector common to colonial imperialism.

**Imperialism and the Cold War**

In its ideal expression, the Cold War represented a logical culmination of the new imperialism. Two superpowers sought to gain the loyalty of theoretically sovereign nation-states that would be militarily dependent upon the hegemonic power and subject to its political, economic and ideological strategies. Of course, reality was much messier; first there were rivalries within each camp, and the British did not give up hope of superpower status until the Suez crisis of 1956.

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1956 and the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. In this respect, the Soviet-PRC split was much more consequential in realigning the balance of power. Second, there was the historical force of nationalism operating not only within each bloc but also outside it through the non-aligned movement (the rhetoric of which was more powerful than its politics), which resisted the hegemons and their strategies. Finally, the very polarization of the hegemons themselves permitted a few key players like Hong Kong or Ghana to leverage their status as intermediaries between the two powers.

During the post-World War II era, the Soviet Union’s creation of a regional system of militarily dependent states in Eastern Europe reflected many features of the new imperialism. A shared anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology sanctioned a centralized economic and political system. The Soviet Union combined economic leverage and military threat to integrate states that were often more economically developed than itself into a regional economy. In some ways the imperialism of the Soviet Union revealed the counter-economic consequences of this logic of empire. Not only were the client-states of the Soviet Union in Europe often more developed, but also the USSR may have subsidized their economies by supplying them with cheap oil and raw materials while importing finished products from their economies. This was the price paid by the imperial power to create and maintain dependence and assure its security.

In part because of the consciousness of its own colonial past, and with the exception of a few places (most notably, the Philippines), the United States had long practiced imperialism without colonialism. After the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States created a system of client states around the Caribbean basin in Central America. These nominally independent states became increasingly dependent on the United States, which accounted for more than three-fourths of the region’s foreign trade as well as the bulk of foreign investment. During the decade of the 1920s, when Japan was experimenting with indirect imperialism in Manchuria, the United States too was seeking to develop and refine informal control over Central American countries, especially as it faced revolutionary nationalism in the region. Officials, diplomats, and business groups stressed means such as U.S. control of banking, communication facilities, investments in natural resources, and the development of education—particularly the training of elites in American-style constitutions, ‘free elections,’ and orthodox business ideas. But the threat and reality of military intervention remained close

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American imperialism was characterized not only by the Monroe Doctrine but also by the Open Door policy. Although there were contradictions and tensions between the two approaches, there were also continuities, most importantly in the practice of using sovereign or nominally sovereign polities to advance American interests. In 1917 President Woodrow Wilson pointed to the continuities when he declared that the nations of the world should ‘with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world…. no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people.’ But this clearly did not exclude using military force upon recalcitrant nations. Just two weeks before Wilson had sent troops to the Dominican Republic and committed U.S. military forces in Haiti and Mexico as well. The United States sought to foster an ideological and economic hegemony among its client states by creating them as reliable emulators subject to external economic and military constraints. Note, however, that this imperialism did not become developmentally oriented until the early 1960s, when it was forced to respond to the Cuban revolution.

The tensions between American interests and global enlightenment were to be contained not only by military power, but perhaps more importantly by the notion of a limited self-determination—the idea of tutelage. As Secretary of Interior Franklin Lane wrote in 1922: ‘What a people hold they hold as trustees for the world…. It is good American practice. The Monroe Doctrine is an expression of it…. That is why we are talking of backward peoples and recognizing for them another law than that of self-determination, a limited law of self-determination, a leading-string law.’ Little wonder then that the Japanese representative at the League of Nations hearings on Manchukuo repeatedly insisted on the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine as Japan’s prerogative in Asia.

In the post-World War II period, this combination of interest, enlightenment, and military violence developed into what Carl Parrini has called ‘ultraimperialism.’ The latter refers to U.S. efforts to maintain cooperation and reduce conflict among imperialist nations who were busily scrambling to create monopolistic or exclusive market conditions in various parts of the world during the first half of the twentieth century. ‘Ultraimperialism’ is secured by a chain of military bases around the globe—and structures such as the International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and World Bank—to enable the conditions of

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10 Quoted in Smith, ‘Republican Policy and the Pax Americana,’ 271.
cooperation among advanced capitalist powers and to facilitate the new (developmental or modernizing) imperialism in the decolonized world. With the Cold War, the US developed a global empire employing, in the words of Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Selden, a vast system of ‘political and military vassalage’ and fostering a ‘functional specialization between the imperial and vassal (nation) states….’ In this respect, the post-war United States represents the apogee of the imperialism of nation-states.12

My point is not that the Cold War represents the essence of imperialism. Rather, we cannot understand the Cold War fully without analyzing how the historical relationship between imperialism and nationalism came to be configured anew in the post-war circumstances. Imperialism no longer emphasized conquest on the basis of innate differences among peoples and their inevitable destinies of superiority and exploitation. As noted, moreover, it was development oriented, and there were considerable opportunities for states and societies to move up the economic ladder. The imperialist factor lay in the imposition of designs for enlightenment upon emergent nations by an enormously superior national power backed by military force. These enlightenment designs were shot through with paternalism, national interests, and covert racist prejudices that constantly produced contradictions and tensions. Indeed, one could argue that it was this configuration of national imperialism that led to resistance to both the Soviet Union (contributing to its decline) as well as the United States in many parts of the world.

The Cold War and Nations

Although it was the rivalry between the two camps for power and allegiance of the rest of the world that shaped the global landscape, the relations among them were not symmetrical. The description by Arrighi et. al. of the US Empire as ‘political and military vassalage’ indicates a hierarchical coalition around a military hegemon rather than pure clientage. Thus Britain, Japan, France, and Germany developed a close partnership of interests and were important beneficiaries of US strategies and investments.

The reduced power and severe indebtedness of the British produced by WWII not only increased the dependence of the British upon the US but also renewed its need for empire to service the American debt. The chief mechanism used was to increase the dollar earnings of British colonial and dependent states and exchange these at an imperially mandated, lower than market, pound sterling rate. Although the US was not necessarily keen on the imperialist

sterling zone, the onset of the Cold War made it much more favourably disposed to maintain the status quo with regards to the old empires. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have detailed the ways in which the British Empire was rescued and transformed as part of the Allied front in the Cold War, especially in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia.

During the Suez crisis in 1956, the US refused to back British and French military efforts to prevent nationalization of the Canal by Egypt’s Nasser. Particularly after a brief exchange of nuclear sabre-rattling between the two super-powers, Britain saw the virtue of the American perspective on independence of the colonies. It settled into its role as junior partner to the US in order to maintain its economic interests in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia by seeking to control the independence movements and keep them away from Soviet influence. Britain and the European powers increasingly began to rely on American finances, investments, and most of all, strategic concerns in Africa to protect their own interests.13

US dominance within its camp was characterized first and foremost by a chain of about 1700 military bases in over a hundred nation-states that had varying degrees of clientelist ties to it. These garrisons were strategic enclaves supervised by the Pentagon and sustained by—as much as they sustained—a vast military industrial complex. The bases were often highly privileged enclaves that frequently fostered arrogant attitudes towards the surrounding population, particularly in the non-European regions.14 For instance, entire townships or camptowns in the Philippines and Korea composed of the sex-trade as the main industry sprung up around the bases.15

Solidarity within the socialist camp was much weaker within society and across nations. From the early period, there was considerable disaffection with the tight state controls of life and economy produced by the generalization of the Soviet state’s Stalinist model which was built not only in Soviet republics and Eastern Europe but also in Asian countries like China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, and North Korea. There were many outbursts of resistance in these societies, and the severe and violent repression that followed ensured that disaffection would continue to fester. But this did not apply to all areas of society. Socialist revolution had brought large classes of the poor and disenfranchised a better material life, especially in the Soviet Union and China, and the all-pervasive ideology of socialist personhood and moral

superiority over capitalism constituted an important source of identity for many people. But socialist egalitarianism and collectivism were not the only ideological instruments fostered to build solidarity. The other powerful ideology of the time developed and utilized by the Soviet state was the idea of nationality rights.

While the idea of national rights goes back to the French Revolution, Bolshevik theorists developed the idea of a federated state of nations in the Soviet Union as an alternative to the imperialist domination of “backward” peoples or races (note, however, the Chinese Republic of Five Nationalities was instituted five years before, in 1912). In the process what developed was an idea of nationhood as constituted by the cultures of different nationalities and could also be seen in opposition to assimilative ideas of nationhood, such as for instance, in the model of the “melting pot” in the US. Interestingly, the US was to develop its version of this idea --multiculturalism and respect for the variety of national cultures both within and outside the US-- only with the advent of the Cold War.

In contrast to the European socialists of the Second International, the Bolsheviks, and even Stalin, who would famously work from the 1920s to curtail their autonomy, were theoretically committed to the rights of nations to self-determination based on the right to secede. Their strategy of integrating the national idea into the administrative structure of the Soviet Union was also strongly motivated by their desire to hold on to all lands of the former Russian empire. The communities of the erstwhile Russian empire were identified --with the help of local elites and ethnographers—within a definitional grid of nationalities informed by evolutionary categories. Note that the different degrees of their nationhood were attributed not to inherent racial qualities (as in earlier forms of imperialism) but to socio-historical circumstances.

The goals of the Bolsheviks were to grant these communities ‘nationhood’ and facilitate centralized rule by defining the categories of identity and by control of the party structure. Communist parties in the non-Russian territories were, notably, not nationalized, and the Soviet goal was to subordinate national loyalties to “proletarian” (i.e., party) interests. They sought to contain, control, and even harness different sources of dissent by creating

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17 J. V. Stalin Marxism and the National Question Transcribed by Carl Kavanagh. Prosveshcheniye, (Nos. 3-5, March-May 1913).
national-territorial structures of administrative control and fostering loyal national elites. Incidentally, Japanese empire builders in the 1930s were quick to apply the Soviet model of the multinational state for Manchukuo. To these observers, Soviet nationality policy fulfilled the goals of federalism and protected minority rights while at the same time strengthening the power of the Soviet state and the military in relation to separatism. Thus, nationalism was not suppressed but utilized positively for the goals of the state.\textsuperscript{19} Although for different reasons, the strategies of utilizing nationality policy for state control failed in both Manchukuo and the Soviet Union.

In the words of Francine Hirsch, the Soviet strategy was to generate a “double assimilation”: to make the peripheral peoples into nationalities but also ultimately to make them into a Soviet narod where they would be merged together under communism. Insofar as the minority nationalities did use the Soviet system, the rules, the language categories and the common media, the Soviets were not mistaken.\textsuperscript{20} According to Rogers Brubaker, they did a great deal to institutionalize territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental categories of political and personal understanding. The Soviet state may have said to have produced both quasi-nation states and ethnic nationalities where there were often none before.\textsuperscript{21}

Of course, the Soviet Union practically prevented secession until the very end. But the strategy tended to backfire because narratives about the formation of these nationalities became much more popular than narratives of their destined disappearance and ultimate merger into the Soviet narod. Nationality membership became the basis to land and other economic and cultural rights. A passport system based on nationality spread throughout the USSR in the post-war period and as the rhetoric of nationality became embedded within Soviet life, local leaders also learnt to speak the language of ‘natsionalnost’.\textsuperscript{22} On the other hand, Soviet state leaders appear not to have been very successful or energetic in generating a Soviet narrative or symbolism of nationhood.

In the imperial-national configuration originally deployed in the Soviet republics for purposes of the Soviet state and socialist interests, the question of national culture complicated not only Soviet efforts to control society but also their efforts to ‘enlighten’ local communities and reform gender relations. For instance, in the Central Asian socialist republic of Uzbekistan, the Soviet party-state sought to extend its power and modernize society by enlisting the

\textsuperscript{19} Tominaga Tadashi, \textit{Manshūkoku no minzoku mondai} (Shinkyō, 1943), 43-45.
\textsuperscript{20} Francine Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 316-318.
\textsuperscript{22} Francine Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 318.
support of Muslim women to reform such practices as polygamy and bride-price. However, these policies generated resistance from Uzbek men and Uzbek national identity came to be interwoven with resistance to such enlightenment campaigns, particularly over the symbolism of veiled women. Uzbek women, whose stories are archived by Douglas Northrop, found themselves painfully caught between their patriarchal society and the Soviet state.23

Although official nationalities existed only in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (after 1968), as Katherine Verdery argues, ethnic nationalism intensified and became closely intertwined with socialism in all the other East European socialist republics. Despite the official ideology of trans-ethnic class politics, in the absence of other civic organizations, ethno-nationalism mirrored the monolithic nature of the party-state. Just as the party’s image of the “People-as-One” cast all who disagreed with it as enemies of the People, so, too, ethno-nationalists could depict those outside the pure nation as its potential enemy. This kind of politics became particularly nasty with the collapse of the system, when ethnic leaders scrambled to create new states dominated by their group, thus reproducing through still more vicious ways—such as ethnic cleansing— the close connection between (imperialistic) domination and nationalism.24

The imperial-national configuration in the US—though by no means identical to the Soviet Union—also had important social ramifications within the US and in its attitudes and policies abroad. While the US had distanced itself from European racial imperialism since at least the war, it continued to erect racist barriers to citizenship—for instance against Asian immigrants—until 1942. Moreover, the de-colonizing world noted a distinct ambivalence of the US towards the ability of darker-skinned people to govern themselves through the early post-war decades and sometimes also became implicated in the efforts of European powers to restore their imperial claims in the colonies. Once the doctrine of containment became fully developed and anti-communist fever hit a pitch—particularly with the McCarthy hearings in the fifties—the US began to be seen increasingly as a neo-imperial power, especially in the non-aligned nations of the decolonizing world.

In fact, US attitudes towards race and the colonial world in the era of United Nations multi-nationalism underwent a fundamental change. Although the roots of change were probably connected to wartime developments, especially the alliance with China, the post-war attitudes were influenced by the decolonizing movement in the context of the rivalry with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of these nations. In other words, the circumstances of the Cold

24 Katherine Verdery, “Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania” *Slavic Review*, vol 52 (Summer 1993), 179-203.
War itself induced many of these changes. Christina Klein has shown in her exploration of “middle-brow culture” in the US how the fear of the loss of Asia to communism, especially after the Korean war and wars in Southeast Asia, led to radical changes in the image of American nationhood as premised upon a multi-cultural society. She uses the idea of cultural hegemony to show how representations of Asia and the Pacific reinforced the “Cold War consensus” which supported US expansion of power across the world through the 1950s. Through these representations, ‘structures of feeling’ were created, which worked to channel ideological configurations into the field of emotions, experience, and consciousness of ordinary people. What Klein calls “Cold War Orientalism” did not merely seek to contain communism; it sought to sentimentally integrate Americans with the Orientals who had not yet been made communist, both within the US and internationally.\(^{25}\)

The image of the US as “the nation of nations” comes through particularly well in the enormously successful historical novel by James Michener (1959) *Hawaii*. As a land of diverse cultures, Hawaii could emerge as the model of racial utopia with its flows and mingling of Polynesian, Japanese, Chinese, and New England whites. It is perhaps not too surprising that the Civil Rights movement also began to develop in this environment. At the same time, this new-found appreciation continued to be channelled through the paternalistic designs of enlightenment for the misfortunate and child-like Asians and other backward peoples. Klein also notes that the image of Asians as metaphorical children to American parents—as well as the post-war phenomenon of adoption of many Asian children pioneered by Pearl Buck’s organization—justified American intervention in Asia.\(^{26}\)

Notably, during the Pacific War the Japanese had also appealed to their Asian “brethren” to resist the US and European imperialists. This appeal, which had justified Japanese intervention in East Asia, extended the imperial Japanese metaphor of the family-state to all Asians as part of a family of nations. The Russians too, sought to reinforce their solidarity in the second world by appealing to their younger socialist brothers in China and elsewhere during the 1950s. Towards China this kind of patronizing attitude was accompanied by a communist evolutionary narrative of history in which the Chinese were seen as backward and in need of help because they had been caught for so long in the stagnant Asiatic mode of production. Needless to say, these euphemisms of dominance backfired most surely in a newly resurgent and proud China which in 1968, labelled the Soviets as “social-imperialists”.

**Militarization, Modernization and the Developmental State**


\(^{26}\) Ibid., 253-263.
By the time of the Cold War, the nation had become an over-determined concept, but it continued to play a critical role. Its 19th century role as the vehicle for rights of a people and as the impetus for territorial maximization continued to fan out on a global scale. In the 20th century as a whole, its power derived from its advocacy by the anti-imperialist movement, its role as the only legitimate principle of sovereignty the world over—expressed most fully in the UN, and its emergent function as part of a new imperialist strategy. During the Cold War, the new imperialist advocacy, based on modernizing designs of enlightenment reached a height, fostering new discourses of multi-culturalism, development, and modernization.

But perhaps what was most unique to this period was the type of nation-state that emerged in much of the developing world—an undemocratic, authoritarian, if not military, ruling structure committed in varying degrees to building a developmental nation-state. This structure was in no small measure an outcome of the Cold War order. The equilibrium of Cold War rivalry tended to congeal political structures of nation-states organized in the two camps. The territorial boundaries and institutional arrangements established to the superpower’s advantage in the new nation states often had its military support. The superpowers sought to preserve or acquiesce in the dominant groups that had formed the client nation-state often because any change or destabilization might strengthen the other side. Thus these new states were frequently built upon the suppression of old and new aspirations.

Writing from the perspective of a millennium of state formation in Europe, Charles Tilly has noted that the form of nation-state building that took place among the de-colonizing states of the post-WW II era was dominated by militarism and civil war. Between 1960 and 1987, per capita military expenditure in the world increased by almost 150%, while GNP per capital rose about 60%. In a dozen rich states, including the USSR, the military budget declined from 6.9% of GNP in 1960 to 5.5% in 1984. But in the developing world, this percentage rose from 3.6 to 5.6%, indicating a larger spend from much smaller incomes. Even in the 1980s 40% of third world states outside of Latin America were military states and civil war took the greatest toll on human life and refugee displacement.27

Superpower support and involvement, particularly through the transfer or sale of arms, in exchange for resources and political support in the Cold War was evidently among the most important factors behind militarization. For instance, US military aid (including sales and loans) to Latin America rose from US$450 million in 1953-63 or US$45 million a year to about US$112 million per year in 1964-67. US training of military personnel from Latin

America was escalated and in 1969, the Rockefeller report could declare that the Latin American militaries were “a progressive force able to carry out social change in a constructive way.” Even as late as 1980, two-thirds of the Latin American people lived under military or military dominated rule.\(^{28}\)

In many parts of Asia and Africa, the superpowers became involved with the different sides of the anti-colonial struggles that had developed in the first half of the twentieth century. The prime example is, of course, the Vietnam War in which over a million Vietnamese were killed and in which the US spent US$111 billion between 1965-1975 (equivalent to US$686 billion in 2008).\(^{29}\) The principal socialist power backing the Vietnamese (until around 1969) was not the USSR, but the People’s Republic of China. Between 1965 and 1969, China provided considerable support to the Vietnamese dispatching over 300,000 engineering and anti-aircraft troops to North Vietnam. China had also been the more active socialist power in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953 and we shall haveoccasion to discuss its role below.\(^{30}\) As for the US, the Vietnam War strained its financial and moral power and contributed to the relative weakening of US economic strength vis-à-vis Japan and Europe. By and large the Cold War had a deeply divisive impact on the developing world, weakening what counter-hegemonic potential it possessed.

One of the cruel ironies of the Cold War was that while the US and its allies originally championed democracy and freedom as their goals, more often than not in the developing world they ended up supporting undemocratic military regimes, dictators, and monarchies alienated from the aspirations of the ordinary people. The frequent intervention of Western powers to protect their interests in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and the covert and overt US operations in Latin America polarized and radicalized large segments of the population in these societies. Driven by the need to secure oil supplies in the Middle East, Anglo-American interests sought to develop the pre-war system of mandates and protectorates by establishing military bases and reliable clients who were both anti-Soviet and anti-democratic. In 1953, the CIA engineered the coup in Iran that overthrew the elected government of Muhammad Mossadeq who had nationalized Iranian oil and restored the Shah as an American protégé.

Even in South Asia, seemingly quite distant from the lethal Cold War rivalries, the US involvement with Pakistan considerably affected the nature of that society. Hamza Alavi has


shown that the strong military alliance with Pakistan—including a highly secretive US military base in Pakistan near the Persian Gulf—did not, contrary to Indian views, have to do with its rivalry with India. Rather it was part of a new Anglo-American strategy for the defence of oil interests in the Gulf. Around the time the CIA overthrew the Mossadegh government in August 1953, there was a flurry of negotiations between the Pakistani government and military and the US and a military alliance between the two countries was concluded in May 1954. In 1955, Pakistan became a signatory to the Baghdad Pact.  

Through these treaties Pakistan (and Turkey, the other trusted ally in the region) undertook to provide military service whenever an allied regime (such as the Shah’s) was threatened internally or externally.

The extent of American involvement with the Pakistani military was so great that it completely marginalized the civilian government even before the first military coup in that country in 1959. The US Pakistan relationship and the deteriorating relations between India and China as well as the Soviet Union and China led India, despite its official non-aligned stand, to tilt towards the Soviet Union. It received considerable military and industrial support from the latter. Although the US has been careful not to overtly support Pakistan in the wars against India, it is nonetheless ironic that it found itself allied with the wrong side when it came to democracy and the national aspirations of Bangladeshis.

The most dramatic intervention in Africa took place after Congo (Katanga) won its independence from Belgium in 1960. Patrice Lubumba who tried to build an independent nation-state on the socialist model and align his nation with the Soviet Union was removed from power and finally murdered by his opponents backed militarily by the Europeans and the Kennedy administration. Congo became a vast client state of the United States with huge investments in its mineral resources. Similarly the coup directed against Sukarno and the communists in Indonesia, where hundreds of thousands—perhaps even a million—people were killed in 1965, had the tacit backing of the CIA.

As Odd Arne Westad has shown, Soviet intervention in the developing world was not as extensive or committed until the 1970s and 1980s when it became mired in the arguably fatal occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was more occupied with instabilities in its own camp requiring extended periods of military occupation in parts of East Europe such as Poland


and Romania (till 1956 and 1958, respectively) and, more famously, with the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring in 1968. While the Soviets supported radical movements in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, these were largely home-grown Marxist or leftist movements which sought the support of the Soviet bloc.

Early Soviet leadership were not quite convinced that revolution could be truly successful in these societies even though it was important for Soviet superpower status to be influential in the emerging nation-states and utilize them for the goals of Soviet socialism. Communist victory in Vietnam among other developments in the 70s, however, emboldened the Soviet leadership to intervene more actively in places such as Ethiopia, Angola, and finally, in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Afghanistan also represented the spread of Islamist radicalism as an alternative to the ideologies of socialism and capitalism and to the legitimacy of the national unit as the boundary of Cold War politics.34

If superpower backing propped up and strengthened unpopular and militarized ‘nation-states’, the Cold War order was theorized in the academic world through modernization theory. As Nils Gilman demonstrates, both the US and Soviet sides shared the principal assumptions and agenda of transformation for their less developed allies and the developing world. One of the chief formulators of modernization theory in the West, W.W. Rostow, even named his principal work The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, thus mirroring not only the Communist Manifesto but also the Marxist idea of stages of growth to measure progress. Both sides took for granted the nation-state and nationality as the vehicle to achieve progress through correct policy prescriptions and state actions. Indeed a strain in modernization theory even claimed the convergence of socialist and capitalist systems.35

Modernization and allied theories of political development came to be inextricably implicated with Cold War political realities. Unlike classical liberalism or post-Cold War neo-liberal doctrines such as the Washington Consensus, the state played a central role in these theories. These theories advocated the role of developed or modernized states to aid and instruct developing states through their stages of growth thereby also justifying the designs of enlightenment that were fundamental to the Cold War order. However, most developing states had not evolved historically—as they had in the West—but been hastily put together by urban

34 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapters 7 and 8.
or military elites (including Eastern and Central Europe) in highly contested terrains. Faced with the challenge of creating a nation from its diverse, sometimes warring communities, state builders in the new nations utilized the prevailing territorial model of the nation-state, which granted equal citizenship to all its inhabitants regardless of ethnicity, gender or religion, as a means of creating a homogenized citizenry. On the ground, however, the dominant ethnic group or military leaders or a combination of the two were able to use tacit or overt superpower support to suppress other ethnic or subaltern classes within the new nation-state.

At the same time, these states implemented centralized administrative means to impose large-scale projects upon local communities to bring them into the modern world. The technology, capital and impetus for these projects often came from the industrialized powers, although the local leadership was very desirous of them. Thus, for instance, even while the relatively non-aligned leadership of India sought to develop an alternative or third model of development, it did not turn to Mahatma Gandhi’s conceptions based upon autarkic rural communities. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, shelved these ideas even before they saw the light of day and sought to develop large projects in a Soviet-style planned economy with elements of free enterprise. Thus India ended the Cold War not with a novel or third system, but with a combination of the Soviet and free-market system (arguably gaining the advantages of neither).

James Scott’s insights into the high-modernist authoritarian state in the developing world and socialist societies of the USSR and East Europe are relevant here. The state which sought to administratively reorder society as ‘legible’ by abstract, measurable, and large-scale scientific and engineering means, was responding as much to the perceived backwardness as to the recalcitrance of the population who often did not co-operate with its centralizing and modernizing projects. The designs of enlightenment were imposed upon an often unwilling population whose life-worlds were being destroyed even as tangible benefits from the projects were not readily evident.36

Many of the new states sought to control the means of identity creation in their societies through the development and control of education, media, and cultural policies. Take for instance, religious policies during the Cold War period. New Asian states often sought to monitor the religious practices of their population by enhancing the visibility of these practices in the eyes of the state. It did so by destroying uncontrollable religious groups, co-opting religious leadership, and segregating religious communities to better control their activities. This seemed to work in large part not only in East Asia but also in regions which had seen

religious volatility earlier such as Indonesia and South Asia. It is remarkable that since the end of the Cold War this ability to channel or subordinate religious identities to national goals has come rapidly undone in many parts of the world.\textsuperscript{37}

To be sure, the Cold War order had by no means the same effects across the developing or decolonizing world. Cold War authoritarian regimes in most of these societies were not able or committed to establishing the developmental state. However, East Asian states were able, partially because of their historical legacies, to form the developmental state under military or authoritarian rule and modernize their societies. What were the circumstances of this transformation?\textsuperscript{38}

In the 1960s, the military leadership of South Korea and Taiwan followed the Japanese model of state-led industrialization that included strategic planning, intervention and regulation—though not ownership—of the economy and society. They pursued export-oriented strategies—in contrast to the import substitution strategy that characterized much of the rest—which produced very high growth rates enabling their transition to industrialized economies. To be sure, they were assisted by certain favorable conditions. US economic and military aid to South Korea and Taiwan were among the highest to any country, particularly when viewed in per capita terms. Between 1946 and 1979 (although mostly until the mid-1960s), South Korea received about $7 billion in military and $6 billion in economic aid. Taiwan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was also the recipient of similar magnitudes of aid. Privileged access to US markets and US tolerance of protected domestic markets made South Korea, which in the late 1940s had become one of the poorest countries in the world into the twelfth largest economy by the late 1970s under military dictator Park Chung-hee.\textsuperscript{39} It might be noted that Park Chung-hee sent over 300,000 troops to South Vietnam to support the US military efforts and South Korea had the second largest military presence on the US side.\textsuperscript{40}

While some states in Pacific Asia were distinguished by high economic growth, all of the client states and allies in the region—South Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia—were characterized by military or authoritarian regimes backed by the US. In Thailand, for instance, the anti-communist military which dominated government until 1982,

\textsuperscript{38} For the historical legacy, see Prasenjit Duara, “The Imperialism of “Free Nations”: Japan, Manchukuo and the History of the Present” in Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan and Peter Perdue eds. \textit{Imperial Formations and their Discontents} (School of American Research Press, Santa Fe. 2007).
\textsuperscript{39} Mark Berger, \textit{Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization} (London: Routledge, 2004), 225-229.
received extensive aid from the US. Between 1972 and 1982, the Thai armed forces were able to expand their troops from 30,000 to 233,000 even without counting the expansion of paramilitary forces. Even where the Pacific Asian economies developed rapidly, subservience to US military power and interests was unpopular in the society. In Japan, arguably the most democratic of US allies in Asia, a popular nationalism identified with an anti-imperialist stance came to be directed against the US. Here the extent of popular disaffection with US policies and ideology became visible during certain periods, for instance during the renewal of the unpopular 1951 Security Treaty in 1960 and the Vietnam War.

Meanwhile, among American scholars and intellectuals, Japan had become the paragon of modernization theory. Ironically, Japanese intellectuals held a different view of what modernization should be about. In 1960, the Hakone conference on modernization was organized among US and Japanese scholars. Coming on the heels of the struggles against the Security Treaty earlier in the year, the conference became embroiled in debates precisely over the extent and nature of Japanese democracy. American academics promoted an objectivist, value free conception of modernization without much role for democratic or participatory institutions. This was contested by leftist and liberal Japanese academics and Victor Koschman observes that Hakone “has been remembered in Japan as a struggle between Americans and Japanese over the role of democratic values in modernization…” Indeed, for modernization theorist Samuel Huntington, the experience of the 1960s suggested that modernization was not about democracy, but about state power. According to him, the important factor in modernization was not “the form of government, but the degree of government.”

In the rest of Pacific Asia, the band of military or military dominated regimes began to be challenged from the late 1970s. Beginning with the student and worker (minjung) protest movement against the authoritarian rule of military dictator Park Chung-hee (who was assassinated in October 1979), democratization movements followed in the Philippines (1986), Taiwan (1987), Indonesia (1998) and is currently being fought out in Thailand. To be sure, popular movements were not always behind these transformation; for instance, martial law was lifted in Taiwan without significant popular pressure. Rather, changing geo-political conditions more closely connected to the US pullout of Vietnam and

41 Cited in Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 213.
44 Quoted in Gilman, “Modernization Theory, The Highest Stage of American Intellectual History”, 64.
rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China were more important in the collapse of the Cold War order in Pacific Asia-- even before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

We cannot undertake to study the post Cold-war world dominated by a single hegemon and ideology here. Suffice it to say that the redistributive state and even the civic territorial state model are considerably weaker than before. With the entrenchment of a global market society, the state is no longer the exclusive or pre-dominant creator of identity. Globalization may not have weakened the state per se—and in some areas it may even have strengthened it--but state nationalism is now only one among several identities created by globalization and localization. We see the transition quite clearly in the flourishing of transnational religion. The globalization of Islam, to which I will return below, is the most evident phenomenon. The rise of Hindu nationalism is in fact a transnational phenomenon. It had been largely contained during the Cold War but has flourished since, in part as a response to the resurgence of Islam. In China the tremendous growth of religious affiliation and identity is testimony to the vastly changed political and social circumstances since the Cold War. While the reasons for its emergence can doubtless be found in the rampant spread of capitalism in China, the transnational and local orientations of religious life are equally significant. Christianity, mostly built around house churches, is the most rapidly growing religion, and native Chinese religions, most famously-- but by no means exclusively—the Falungong, also have universalist aspirations.

I have indicated the hegemonic power of the Cold War order upon much of the developing world by looking at national modes of control (both internally and externally) and statist models of development which also channeled much of the ideological identifications of the period. In these concluding pages I will recount two cases of counter-hegemonic forces emerging from the weak links and the reactions to this domination from the developing world that contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War. The first case is the People’s Republic of China. After it successfully conducted its nuclear weapons test in 1964, China, which was equally estranged from the United States and the Soviet Union, was able not only to play off each power against the other, but it arguably also contributed to the ultimate collapse of the system.

During the ideologically and politically polarized Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), the Soviet Union came to be seen as a greater threat than the United States. China’s overtures to the Nixon administration was, some argued, a direct response to the fear of Soviet attack—even nuclear attack—in 1969.45 One could thus argue that the nuclear threat not only

45 This was the view in the CIA and State Department in 1969. See Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishers, 2008), 118, 130
acted as a deterrent from first attack but also influenced important shifts in the balance of power that ultimately undermined the principal superpower rivalry itself. The Reagan administration with its heightened ideological fervor—and emboldened by the neutralization of China—ultimately raised military spending to such high levels that the Soviet Union could no longer match it and continue to supply the consumer needs of its population.

But was it only the acquisition of nuclear power that permitted China to play the relatively independent role it did? Nuclear power was certainly a necessary factor, but it was not a sufficient one. In many ways the Chinese rural revolution, which was independent of the Soviet pattern, produced a mighty party-state that was able to break away early from Soviet dependence. This was the sufficient factor as well as the pre-condition driving China to acquire the bomb. There is now debate as to how much the fledgling PRC had to concede to the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950, which enabled cooperation of the two during the Korean War and Soviet aid to China through the 1950s. Although the Chinese gained a great deal, the treaty was also alleged to have perpetrated Soviet imperialist-style special interests in the border regions of Xinjiang, Mongolia and to some extent, Manchuria. Whatever the merits of the debate, it is clear that Chinese independence was not compromised for long. The independence and power of the Chinese revolutionary state was the historical condition for the emergence of one of the crucial disequilibrating factors in the Cold War. Agency in such hegemonic systems as the Cold War emerges not only from both the attractive power of consumer capitalism and alternative and momentous historical developments.

The second case is the globalization of Islam. Indeed, the globalization of Islam is not simply a post-Cold War phenomenon. In many ways it was a result of, even a backlash against, the Cold War order. From the early 1980s the mujahedeen, militarily supported by the US and its Muslim allies, played the major role in driving out the Soviets from Afghanistan and bringing the Taliban to power. In turn the mujahedeen were encouraged by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Even though these events preceded the end of the Cold War, they represented the disenchantment with the two Western options of capitalist and socialist modernity.

It is instructive in this context to explore the writings of a relatively obscure Iranian Marxist turned Islamist Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1923-1969), who died a decade before the Islamic revolution but whose work was immensely popular among the youth in Iran at the time.

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of the revolution. Al-i Ahmad’s early Marxism furnishes him a radical critique of the contemporary imperialism of industrialized nations—including Europe, North America, and also Soviet Russia—which not only exploited the people and resources of the rest of the world but also patronized the people as objects of knowledge and “raw material for every sort of Western laboratory”. In Al-i Ahmad’s view, the socialist camp is no less materialist and greedy and represents “would-be corporate colonists” who can sit quite comfortably on the same table with their capitalist counterparts. What gall him particularly are the hypocritical designs of enlightenment that strip a people of their culture and identity. “Thus only we in our Islamic totality, formal and real, obstructed the spread (through colonialism, effectively equivalent to Christianity) of European civilization, that is, the opening of new markets to the West’s industries.” (61-62) Note how the Marxist materialist critique is no longer sufficient to counter the outrages against morality and identity. 48

Conclusion

My argument for figuring the Cold War as a period began with the emergence of superpower rivalry as a framework for containment. The effort to contain communism and capitalism (and covertly subvert the other), however, entailed a larger containment or channeling of the flow of possible change in various areas of political, social, and cultural life within its political imagination. The Cold War rivalry sustained an equilibrium which tended to freeze not only the power relations between hegemonic and client states but also the political contours of nation-states in the two camps backed by economic inducements, military power, and nuclear threat. The models of development, structures of clientage and dominance, including designs of enlightenment, and even many gender and racial-cultural relationships followed tracks that were similar within and often between the two camps. This configuration was the hegemonic form that characterized the period.

To what extent was the Cold War order responsible for the imposition of the nation-state model, in particular, the model of the centralizing and often authoritarian, developmental state in the developing world? To be sure, many of the features of this state model appeared in the pre-war era. Yet equally, the advantages found by hegemonic powers in the nation form to control, incentivize (key sectors usually of the elite), and mobilize support for the goals of the hegemon played a key role in the spread of the model. Indeed, the end of the Cold War appears to have significantly transformed the model of the centralizing, developmental state in favor of the ‘Washington Consensus’ which emphasized state withdrawal and re-deployment.

privatization of public goods, and the model of the consumer citizen. The displacement of national regulatory frameworks by a relatively unregulated global financial system has produced its own crisis. While the nation-state and nationalism have certainly not gone away, our present crisis reveals the replacement of one configuration by another.

And what about the counter-hegemonic forces that played an important role in bringing changes to the Cold War? China’s role was disruptive of the rivalry and political order, but it turned out to have been counter-hegemonic only in this limited sense. Indeed, the centrality of capitalism and nationalism in China affiliates it with the victorious capitalist side in which it has become a key player today, albeit with its own developmental path. Whether we like it or not, the role of global Islam may be more powerfully counter-hegemonic. Both of these forces emerged in regions of the non-Western world that were able to recover confidence from their relatively independent historical paths—whether revolutionary or tradition-directed. Does this portend the beginning of the end of a long period of Western hegemony?